Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings

Author: Emma Otterski
Categories: Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy of Science
Word Count: 999

Did that person shove me, or did they slip on the icy ground? Are they smiling, or is that really a sneer? Why is my colleague walking towards the fridge?

When we answer these types of questions, we rely on our remarkable ability to think about what other people might be thinking and feeling.^[1] The ability to understand others’ beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and moods is called mindreading.^[2]

Mindreading plays an important role in human social life, helping us to interpret and predict others’ behavior. And there is ongoing research into whether other animals can mindread. Questions about mindreading have brought philosophers and psychologists into close collaboration.

This essay introduces issues in the study of mindreading, the main theories of mindreading, and its place in our understanding of others.

1. Background to mindreading research

In a series of experiments in 1978, a chimpanzee named Sarah successfully selected photographs depicting a human actor’s goals after observing their actions. Primatologists concluded that Sarah could understand at least some of others’ mental states.^[3]

However, Sarah’s success was compatible with her using other strategies, such as recognizing behavioral patterns.^[4] On seeing someone move their hand towards a cup, one might predict that they will pick it up by attributing to them this intention or the desire to take a drink. However, it is also possible to make this prediction without considering the person’s mental states by noting that people whose hands move toward cups tend to end up holding cups.

Philosophers have argued that the best evidence for showing that an agent can mindread comes from tasks that are difficult to complete unless the agent understands another’s point of view.^[5] Situations where someone has a false belief about the world are a good example. Psychologists subsequently designed false-belief tests suitable for children. In one, the Sally-Anne test, children see two dolls, Sally and Anne. Sally puts a marble in a basket and leaves. While she is away, Anne moves the marble to a box. When Sally returns, the child is asked where she will look for it.^[6] Children are typically able to correctly indicate that Sally will look in the basket between the ages of four and five.^[7]

Passing classic false-belief tests requires strong language, memory, and attentional skills. New types of false-belief tests remove these cognitive demands by measuring non-verbal responses, such as where infants look or whether they help someone.^[8] Based on results from these tests, some philosophers and psychologists now think that great apes and human infants in their second year understand others’ false beliefs.

The strong focus on false-belief tests in the research means we have limited ways to assess differences in adults’ mindreading abilities.^[9] This might be a problem, because people seem to differ in how well they understand others.

2. How do we mindread?

Two theories have dominated the literature on how we mindread: theory-theory and simulation theory.

Theory-theorists think that mindreading requires a psychological theory of the relationship between people’s behavior and their mental states.^[10] Just as we predict that an apple falling from a tree will hit the ground because we have an intuitive theory of physics, theory-theory claims that we also use a theory of how people behave based on their mental states. In Sally’s case, given her belief about where the marble is and her desire to retrieve it, we infer where she will look.

One criticism of theory theory is that it treats us as if we observe other people like scientists, using a theory to figure out what they’re doing. But real social interactions don’t usually feel like that.

According to simulation theorists, when interpreting someone’s behavior, we use the same mental processes we use to perform those actions ourselves. In other words, we step into the actor’s perspective and simulate their mental states. The discovery of mirror neurons, which fire both when an action is performed and when it is observed, was initially put forward as evidence for simulation theory.^[11]

A criticism of simulation theory is that it still seems to require some kind of theory in order to work. Most versions involve the use of mental-state concepts (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions)^[12] and using these concepts requires at least some understanding of how they relate to each other. As a result, many simulation theorists now offer hybrid accounts that combine aspects of simulation theory and theory-theory.

Some researchers argue that we can directly perceive certain mental states, such as emotions and intentions.^[13] If so, then at least some types of mindreading might be possible without theories or mental simulation.

3. The place of mindreading in understanding others

Theory-theory and simulation theory assume that understanding others mainly involves mindreading. However, some philosophers disagree. They argue that we often make sense of what people do without directly thinking about their mental states. Instead, we rely on character traits, social roles, and patterns we’ve learned from experience. In everyday life, this may mean we understand others mainly by recognizing how people usually behave in certain situations, rather than by figuring out what they are thinking or feeling. However, it remains debated whether this really avoids mindreading altogether.

These approaches also emphasize the various functions of mental-state attributions. For example, attributing to Sandrine the belief that her appointment was at 3:00 pm doesn’t just explain her turning up an hour late; it might also justify it. Saying to Sandrine that you know she wants to be on time might also shape her future behavior, as it creates expectations about how someone who wants to be on time ought to behave.^[14]

Given these insights, recent work has shifted to thinking about how mindreading relates to the wide range of social practices that regulate both our behavior and our mental lives.^[15]

4. Conclusion

Mindreading helps us to navigate the social world. Clarifying its development, its presence in animals, and its relation to other forms of social understanding will deepen our understanding of the mind and might offer a clearer view of the sources of social misunderstandings.

Notes

^[1] The question of whether we are justified in believing that other people have thoughts and feelings is known as “the problem of other minds.” While mindreading research and the problem of other minds are both concerned with other people’s minds, they ask different questions. Mindreading research looks at, for example, the psychological basis for our understanding of others’ mental states, whereas the problem of other minds asks whether we can ever know that others have minds and what basis we have for that knowledge: see Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf. Understanding the existence and contents of our own minds is often thought to be easier, but there are some complications even with that: see Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind by Benjamin Winokur. For further discussion of the questions being explored in these two philosophical areas see Avramides (2023) and Goldman (2006).

^[2] “Mindreading” is a theoretically-neutral term for the capacity to understand others’ mental states to oneself and others, which used to be referred to as “theory of mind”. The newer terminology enables questions such as when and why we mindread, which do not arise naturally from “theory of mind.” The latter, introduced by Premack & Woodruff (1978) and still common in empirical research, is sometimes used synonymously but is less favored in philosophy.

^[3] See Premack and Woodruff (1978).

^[4] There are different views about whether a mindreading explanation or a behavior-reading explanation is simpler, as well as the role that simplicity should play in deciding between explanations. For further discussion of some of the philosophical issues in comparative psychology, see Animal Minds by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist.

^[5] Daniel Dennett (1978), Gilbert Harman (1978), and Jonathan Bennett (1978) made these comments independently in an open peer commentary responding to Premack and Woodruff’s paper.

^[6] The child is also asked two additional questions: “where is the marble really?” and “where was the marble at the beginning?” These check the child’s understanding of reality and their memory of the events. See Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) for full details. The Sally-Anne test was developed to test autistic children’s understanding of others’ false beliefs. Subsequent theorizing about autistic people’s mindreading abilities has contributed massively to conceptions and misconceptions of autism. See Yergeau and Huebner (2017) for an examination of the ethical and political issues involved in thinking about the relationship between mindreading and autism.

^[7] Though the age varies across cultures. See Slaughter and Perez-Zapata (2014) and Naito and Kayamo (2006) for evidence of cultural variation in the development of false-belief understanding.

^[8] E.g., see Onishi and Baillargeon (2005).

^[9] Apperly (2012) makes this point.

^[10] Theory-theory is influenced by a strand of 20th-century analytic philosophy that treated folk psychology, our everyday understanding of others, as a theory and asked whether it was true or false. Key interlocutors in this debate include Paul Churchland (1981), Patricia Churchland (1986), Fodor (1987), and Dennett (1987).

^[11] See Gallese and Goldman (1998); Goldman (2006).

^[12] See Gordon (1986) for an exception. 

^[13] E.g., Gallagher (2008) and Zahavi (2011).

^[14] McGeer (2007).

^[15] See particularly Zawidzki (2013).

References

Apperly, I.A. 2012. What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65(5), pp. 825–839.

Avramides, A. 2023. “Other Minds.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)

Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A.M. and Frith, U. 1985. Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ? Cognition, 21(1), pp. 37–46.

Bennett, J. 1978. Some remarks about concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), pp. 557–560.

Churchland, P.M. 1981. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 78(2), pp. 67–90.

Churchland, P.S. 1986. Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind-brain. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. 1987. The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. pp.xi, 388.

Dennett, D.C. 1978. Beliefs about beliefs [P&W, SR&B]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), pp. 568–570.

Gallagher, S. 2008. Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), pp. 535–543.

Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. 2014. Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. Topoi, 33(1), pp.185–199.

Gallese, V. and Goldman, A. 1998. Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(12).

Goldman, A.I. 2006. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Philosophy of Mind Series. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gordon, R.M. 1986. Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language, 1(2), pp. 158–71.

Harman, G. 1978. Studying the chimpanzee’s theory of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), pp. 576–577.

McGeer, V. 2007. The regulative dimension of folk psychology. In: D.D. Hutto and M. Ratcliffe, eds. Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 137-156.

Naito, M. and Koyama, K. 2006. The development of false-belief understanding in Japanese children: Delay and difference? International Journal of Behavioral Development, 30(4), pp. 290–304.

Onishi, K.H. and Baillargeon, R. 2005. Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs? Science (New York, N.Y.), 308(5719), pp. 255–258.

Premack, D. and Woodruff, G., 1978. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), pp. 515–526.

Slaughter, V. and Perez-Zapata, D. 2014. Cultural variations in the development of mind reading. Child Development Perspectives, 8(4), pp. 237–241.

Yergeau, M. and Huebner, B. 2017. Minding Theory of Mind. Journal of Social Philosophy, 48(3), pp. 273–296.

Zahavi, D. 2011. Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3), p. 541.

Zawidzki, T.W. 2013. Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA, USA: A Bradford Book.

Related Essays 

Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf

The Mind-Body Problem: What are Minds? By Jacob Berger

Animal Minds by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist

Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind by Benjamin Winokur

Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds by Thomas Metcalf

About the Author

Emma Otterski is interested in social cognition, philosophy of science, and feminist philosophy. She also has teaching interests in moral philosophy and environmental philosophy. She received her PhD from the University of Edinburgh and has taught there and at Trinity College Dublin.

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