Author: Matthew Sanderson
Category: Phenomenology and Existentialism, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind and Language
Wordcount: 999
It’s common today to attempt to understand human experiences from the outside looking in, based on objective, measurable causes. For instance, the pleasure in cuddling is often understood as the release of the brain’s “cuddle chemical” oxytocin; vision is explained as light hitting the retina; goosebumps from music are seen as a nervous system response; stress is a surge in cortisol; a “runner’s high” is an endorphins rush.[1]
The philosophical method called phenomenology takes a different approach. It focuses on trying to understand experiences from the inside, i.e., what it’s like to live through different types of experiences from the individual experiencer’s own point of view.
This essay introduces phenomenology’s attempt to achieve this understanding of our experiences.[2]
1. Describing Experiences
Phenomenology is the study of phenomena, i.e., things—objects, memories, people, emotions, ideas, sensations, spiritual realities, etc.—as we subjectively experience them from our first-person perspectives.[3] It studies how phenomena seem to be “given” or appear to our minds—not just visually, but also in hearing, feeling, remembering, desiring, touching, perceiving, thinking, choosing, imagining, etc.[4]
To examine how phenomena show up to consciousness, phenomenologists attempt to describe what “lived experiences” are like—i.e., experiences of phenomena as we live or undergo them.[5] They do this instead of explaining the possible causes of experiences (e.g., brain chemicals). For instance, instead of asking, “What causes people to be motivated?” phenomenologists would ask, “What’s it like to feel motivated?”
The goal of phenomenology, then, is not to explain why things happen or what they are (e.g., their chemical composition), but to describe, in detail, how phenomena become present to consciousness from the perspective of people living through the experience.[6]
2. Purpose
Phenomenological descriptions of lived experiences are attempts to understand the general features of experiences, i.e., the defining characteristics of experiences that make them what they are. Thus, phenomenological descriptions are not just of what the phenomenologist experiences, but of what that type of experience is like in general, for everyone.
Another goal of phenomenology is to provide a foundation for objective studies of experience: e.g., science.[7] For instance, phenomenologists would observe that we can’t effectively search for a physiological cause of a runner’s high if we don’t first know what it is we are trying to explain, i.e., what the experience of such a high is like.[8]
Phenomenologists also argue that their descriptions allow them to appreciate the personal meaning of experiences as we live them and so resist attempts to reduce experiences to nothing more than objective measurements.[9] For instance, phenomenologists would insist that the emotional significance of lived happiness isn’t fully captured by identifying dopamine or serotonin as its physical cause.
3. Method
To try to discover the defining traits of experiences, phenomenologists use a careful methodical process.[10] Let’s say we want to know what it’s like to experience nostalgia—wishing you could return to a past experience, e.g., a happy experience you had when you were a child. Phenomenologists would start by mentally “bracketing” or setting aside causal explanations (e.g., “experiences are caused by brain events”) in order to focus intensely only on how the phenomenon appears to our minds—what it’s like to feel nostalgic.[11]
Phenomenologists also set aside biases and any particular aspects of the experience that are specific only to an individual’s unique personal perspective and are not universally experienced by all who have the experience. So, phenomenologists won’t say nostalgia always involves longing for a past vacation because that specific element isn’t essential or necessary for making the experience what it is.
Finally, phenomenologists would mentally experiment with imagining the experience of nostalgia with and without certain elements (e.g., grief, desire, hope, yearning, etc.) to see which are essential and which are not essential.[12] So, phenomenologists might insist that nostalgia includes sadness about the inability to return to a past situation, because without that, the experience is just a simple pleasant memory.
4. Examples
To see some results of this methodology in practice, let’s consider a few well-known phenomenologists’ descriptions of various experiences:
- Michel Henry (1922-2002) provides a phenomenology of subjectivity—what it’s like to be a self—which says that my experience of my inner self—e.g., my experience of my emotions—appears different from my experience of objects outside myself. Whereas objects (e.g., tables) appear separate and different from me, I feel “one” with my emotions: e.g., I perceive the table over there, but I am[13]
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) offers a phenomenology of “the lived body” which observes that I subjectively inhabit my body—i.e., I live my body from the inside out—whereas I perceive other peoples’ bodies as objects in the world.[14]
- Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) gives a phenomenology of other people which argues that the faces of others appear differently than my experience of things in the world. In particular, faces seem to demand an ethical response from me in a way objects do not. For instance, tables ask nothing of me, whereas the face of a homeless child at my door compels me to feel concern and want to help her.[15]
- Jean-Paul Sartre provides a phenomenology of freedom which argues that I experience the past as fixed and unchangeable, whereas the future appears like an open array of possibilities I get to shape and create using my ability to choose (including deciding how I think and act in response to my past).[16]
5. Conclusion
Critics of phenomenology insist that it’s not possible to identify general defining characteristics of experiences independent of individual bias or social conditioning, i.e., there’s no way to bracket out all non-essential features.[17] For instance, perhaps experiencing human faces as demanding a response could be due simply to personal upbringing or cultural norms, rather than some essential feature of the experience.
Nonetheless, phenomenology is valuable because the first-person perspective it studies is where we live and experience meaning.[18] Phenomenology can deepen our appreciation for life: we often overlook our experiences, and phenomenology helps us slow down and pay attention to their richness.[19]
Notes
[1] For a scientific explanation of the pleasure experienced in cuddling, including an explanation of the term “cuddle chemical,” see Joe Schwarcz, “Want to cuddle? Personality is likely to get you further than oxytocin,” McGill Office for Science and Society, 12/10/2021. For a scientific explanation of vision, see “How the Eyes Work,” by National Eye Institute, 4/20/22. For a scientific explanation of experiencing goosebumps from music, also known as “frisson,” see “Frisson” on Wikipedia. For a scientific explanation of stress, see “Chronic stress puts your health at risk,” Mayo Clinic, August 1, 2023. For a scientific explanation of runner’s high, see David J. Linden, “The Truth Behind ‘Runner’s High’ and Other Mental Benefits of Running,” Johns Hopkins Medicine.
[2] Note that while this essay presents some of the major ideas of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who is considered the founder of phenomenology, it aims to summarize phenomenology in a general and broad manner that can apply to a wide variety of phenomenologists. For other helpful introductions to phenomenology, see Zahavi (2025), Moran (2000), and Sokolowski (1999).
[3] While not an explicit concept in phenomenology, some philosophers call what seems to be the case in experiences “seemings.” For an introduction to the concept of seemings, see Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem by Kaj André Zeller.
[4] For this reason, Husserl (2001/1900: p. 168) said that the “motto” of phenomenology is “back to the things themselves!” In other words, phenomenology is an attempt to return to examining how things (i.e., “the things themselves”) give themselves or appear to our minds. Thus, Marion (2002) stresses that phenomenology is the study of “givenness.” Heidegger (2008/1927: p. 58) defines phenomenology in a similar manner as follows: “Phenomenology means to let that which shows itself [i.e., gives itself] be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” For an introduction to Marion’s philosophy, see Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences? by Matthew Sanderson. For an introduction to Heidegger’s philosophy, see Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? and Martin Heidegger on Technology, both by Matthew Sanderson.
[5] The relationship between consciousness and phenomena—i.e., that consciousness is always consciousness of something, that is, always directed towards or about something–is what phenomenologists call “intentionality.” For an introduction to the concept of intentionality, see Intentionality by Addison Ellis. However, some phenomenologists (see, e.g., Henry 2002 and Marion 2001) argue that intentionality is only one way in which phenomena appear to consciousness, i.e., only one type of “phenomenality.” This is because they view intentionality as always consciousness of separate, distinct objects or individual beings, but they insist that humans experience some phenomena that can’t be understood as objects.
[6] For instance, Husserl (2014) insisted that, to study how phenomena appear to us, it’s necessary to “bracket” (i.e., to remove from mental consideration) what causes the phenomenon or what it is. For instance, phenomenologists study how trees present to our minds rather than trying to figure out what chemical compounds they are made out of. Husserl called this method of studying phenomena “the phenomenological reduction,” referring to how one “reduces” one’s attention to just focus on what the experience is like from a first-person perspective.
[7] Arguably every phenomenologist sees phenomenology as laying the foundation for a different type of study: Husserl (1970) for science; Heidegger (2008/1927) for ontology (i.e., the study of the Being of beings); Merleau-Ponty (2010/1945) for psychology; Levinas (1969/1961) for ethics; and so on.
[8] For example, we’d need to know what the experience of a runner’s high is like to be able to identify who is experiencing it so that we know whose brains to study (and when) to discover the physiological causes of a runner’s high. A brain researcher who has never heard of runner’s high before would have no idea what she is trying to explain or when events in the brain might correlate with the experience. She could, of course, scan a person’s brain while he is running and observe changes in the brain, but she couldn’t know which of those changes corresponds to the experience of a runner’s high as opposed to other types of experiences a person might undergo while running.
[9] Arguably every phenomenologist fights against a different form of what they understand as reductive approaches to human experience: Husserl (1970) against science reducing experience to natural causes; Heidegger (2008/1927) against metaphysics reducing Being to beings; Merleau-Ponty (2019/1945) against psychology reducing the lived body (i.e., the body as we subjectively experience it) to another object in the world; Henry (2002) against modern culture (what he calls “barbarism”) reducing subjectivity (i.e., the experience of the self) to behavior in the world; and so on.
[10] Note that the process described here is largely the method used most fully by Husserl. Each phenomenologist arguably revises Husserl’s method based on their own individual conception of phenomenology and what they think works best for the phenomena they are attempting to describe. But arguably every phenomenologist could endorse this summary as encapsulating the gist of the phenomenological method.
[11] This method of “bracketing” is what Husserl called “the phenomenological reduction.” Arguably every phenomenologist after Husserl uses their own version of the reduction, even if they don’t explicitly call it that. They also critique Husserl’s version for different reasons. For examples of this type of criticism and revision, see Heidegger (2008/1927) and Marion (2002). It’s important to note that phenomenologists bracket, e.g., scientific explanations not because they are seen as incorrect, but only for the purpose of paying full attention to how phenomena appear to our minds.
[12] Husserl (2014) called the method or process of thinking through what elements are necessary or essential in an experience “imaginative variation” or “free variation in imagination.” This is because it involves imagining variations of an experience—for instance, mentally adding or removing characteristics of an experience—in order to discover what features or traits are essential for making the experience what it is. This process is part of the phenomenological reduction.
[13] See Henry (2002) for this description of one’s inner self.
[14] See Merleau-Ponty (2010/1945) for this description of the lived body.
[15] See Levinas (1969/1961) for his description of experiencing the face of another person. Levinas believes the face compels an ethical response, and thus the face-to-face relation is the origin of moral responsibility.
[16] See Sartre (2021/1943) for his description of the experience of freedom or what philosophers typically call “free will.” Technically speaking, Sartre didn’t view our ability to choose as a type of will, but rather as the very nature of consciousness. For an introduction to the philosophy of free will, see Free Will and Free Choice by Jonah Nagashima and Free Will and Moral Responsibility by Chelsea Haramia. For an introduction to Sartre’s philosophy, see “Hell is Other People”: Jean-Paul Sartre on Personal Relationships by Kiki Beck and Existentialism by Addison Ellis.
[17] Sellars (1997), Rorty (2017), Derrida (1989), and Foucault (1994), among many others, can be understood as criticizing phenomenology in this manner.
[18] Arguably every phenomenologist makes this point in their own way. For a good example, see Husserl (1970).
[19] For an introduction to philosophical reflections on the meaning of life, see Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful? and The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?, both by Matthew Pianalto.
References
Foucault, Michel. (1994). The Origin of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. Vintage.
Heidegger, Martin. (2008/1927). Being and Time. Harper.
Husserl, Edmund. (2001/1900). Logical Investigations. Routledge.
Linden, David J. (2025). “The Truth Behind ‘Runner’s High’ and Other Mental Benefits of Running.” Johns Hopkins Medicine. Last accessed July 9, 2025.
Marion, Jean-Luc. (2001). In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena. Fordham University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. (2010/1945). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.
Moran, Dermont. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. Routledge.
National Eye Institute. (April 20, 2022). “How the Eyes Work.” Last accessed July 9, 2025.
Rorty, Richard. (2017/1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. (2021/1943). Being and Nothingness. Simon and Schuster.
Schwarcz, Joe. (12/10/2021). “Want to cuddle? Personality is likely to get you further than oxytocin.” McGill Office for Science and Society. Last accessed July 9, 2025.
Sellars, Wilfrid. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press.
Sokolowski, Robert. (1999). Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge University Press.
Zahavi, Dan. (2025). Phenomenology: The Basics. Routledge.
Wikipedia. (2025). “Frisson.” Last accessed July 9, 2025.
Related Essays
Existentialism by Addison Ellis
Intentionality by Addison Ellis
Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem by Kaj André Zeller
“Hell is Other People”: Jean-Paul Sartre on Personal Relationships by Kiki Beck
Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? by Matthew Sanderson
Martin Heidegger on Technology by Matthew Sanderson
Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences? by Matthew Sanderson
Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful? By Matthew Pianalto
The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point? by Matthew Pianalto
Free Will and Free Choice by Jonah Nagashima
Free Will and Moral Responsibility by Chelsea Haramia
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About the Author
Matthew Sanderson is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson
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