Kant’s Theory of the Sublime

Author: Matthew Sanderson
Category: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art, Historical Philosophy
Word Count: 1000

Imagine watching a sunset break through dark clouds. Or listening to thunder pound the atmosphere as lightning flashes and explodes through the sky. Or viewing raging torrents of water or the vastness of the cosmos on a clear night. Or walking through a forest with trees that seem to stretch upwards forever.

Some of the most memorable experiences in life—like these—fill us with a profound sense of wonder and awe. Philosophers consider these experiences examples of the sublime.

While experiences of the sublime are often overwhelming and overpowering, overall they are deeply empowering. According to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the sublime empowers us by revealing the greatness (i.e., the sublimity) of our rational minds.

This essay summarizes Kant’s theory of the sublime.

Vincent van Gogh's "The Starry Night" (1889).
Vincent van Gogh’s “The Starry Night” (1889).

1. What is the Sublime? 

The sublime is an aesthetic experience, i.e., a perceptual experience enjoyed for its own sake.[1] The experience of enjoying the beauty of flowers, for instance, is also an aesthetic experience. So what makes the sublime unique?

While the experience of beauty is purely pleasurable, the sublime includes a partial feeling of displeasure, such as fear, albeit an even stronger sense of pleasure.[2] Kant thus considers the sublime a “negative pleasure” in that, while it’s mostly pleasurable overall, it’s also partly displeasurable (i.e., negative).[3]

Given the sublime’s displeasurable dimension, we can wonder why we like or derive aesthetic enjoyment from it. This means it’s important to figure out why it “hurts,” but even more so why it feels good overall. [4] 

Kant explains there are two major types of the sublime: the mathematical, or what appears to sense perception infinite in size; and the dynamical, which is what seems infinite in power.[5] An example of the mathematical sublime is the starry night sky.[6] An example of the dynamical sublime is an erupting volcano.[7]  

According to Kant, the sublime is the infinite, but the natural object (e.g., the volcano) is not actually infinite, and thus it is incorrect to consider it the true sublime object.[8] Instead, the true sublime (i.e., infinite) object is the rational part of the human mind (i.e., reason). For Kant, we only call the natural object sublime because it reveals the sublimity (i.e., infinity) of reason.[9] 

2. The Mathematical Sublime

In the case of the mathematical sublime, the experiencer encounters something so large that visual perception cannot take it all in at once, i.e, it appears infinite in size.[10] Kant argues this experience provokes the rational faculty of the mind (i.e., reason) to think of infinity, and reason then wants a sense perception to match its idea.[11] 

However, perception cannot deliver what reason desires. For instance, you cannot see the entirety of the Grand Canyon in one visual glance the way you can a chair. (And the Grand Canyon only appears infinite anyway.[12]) As a result, perception buckles under the demands of reason, and this is why immensely large objects cause displeasure.[13] 

But, Kant argues, this experience is nonetheless pleasurable overall because it reveals the awesome power of reason to conceive of the idea of infinity. Only an infinite mental faculty (i.e., reason) can think of infinity in size.[14]

Thus, it is really reason, rather than the large natural object, which is truly sublime (i.e., infinite); the seemingly infinite natural phenomenon just triggers this realization.[15]

3. The Dynamical Sublime

In an experience of the dynamical sublime, we are presented with a perceptual object that seems infinitely powerful, such as a hurricane. To enjoy the experience of the mighty storm (i.e., to regard it as sublime rather than horrific), we must view it from a safe physical position.[16]

However, even if we are watching the storm on television (for instance), it nonetheless reminds us of our mortality as natural creatures: simply put, the hurricane could crush us. This explains how the dynamical sublime causes displeasure: while it might not kill us today, it reminds us that we can die, which makes us fearful.[17] 

At the same time, however, Kant says the storm fills us with a triumphant sense of our own incredible strength. In particular, what merely appears to be an infinitely powerful object (e.g., the hurricane) makes the rational part of the mind think of the idea of our own infinite power, i.e., free will.[18] 

Wind and rain may push us around as natural beings, but Kant says they cannot move us as spiritual beings endowed with free will (i.e., infinite power).[19] Free will can be understood as infinite power because it is an unlimited (i.e., infinite) ability to resist natural determination.

The joyful realization of the idea of free will explains why we find this experience pleasurable.[20] The dynamical sublime makes us feel physically weak, but spiritually powerful overall as rational beings who can conceive of the infinity of free self-determination. Only an infinite mental faculty (i.e., reason) can conceive of infinite power (i.e., free will).

Thus, once again, it is the rational mind, for Kant, which is the true sublime (i.e., infinite) object for being able to think of infinity in power (i.e., free will).[21] The powerful object of nature is just the occasion for this discovery.[22]

In this way, both the mathematical and dynamical sublime reveal our immeasurable capacities as humans, highlighting the superiority of our rational minds over nature.[23] No matter how grand or dominant nature appears to be, it is miniscule and weak compared to reason’s ideas of infinite size and power.

4. Conclusion

For many people, the sublime is an experience of feeling a deep connection to nature or even a divine reality.[24] Thus, Kant’s decision to locate sublimity in the rational human mind might seem like an inaccurate description of what the experience is really like.[25] 

Nonetheless, Kant’s theory of sublimity is an ideal starting point for anyone who wants to philosophize about why we derive aesthetic enjoyment from the experience of overwhelmingly large and powerful phenomena.[26] 

Notes

[1] Kant (1987: p. 97) says we like the sublime for its own sake just as we do other aesthetic experiences.

[2] See Kant (1987: pp. 98 and 115) for his discussions of the distinction between beauty and the sublime.

[3] Due to its combination of negative feelings (e.g., fear) and positive feelings (e.g., pleasure), Kant (1987: p. 98) characterizes the experience of the sublime as a “negative pleasure,” and (1987: p. 117) “a pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure.”

[4] This question is similar to the issue of understanding why, for instance, we derive aesthetic enjoyment from viewing horror movies and dramatic tragedies.

[5] See (1987: pp. 103-117) for Kant’s discussion of the mathematical sublime, and (1987: pp. 119-123) for Kant’s discussion of the dynamical sublime.

[6] Kant (2005: 133) famously writes, “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration [wonder] and reverence [awe], the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.” The starry heavens can be understood as mathematically sublime, and the moral law, especially in its connection with free will, can be viewed as dynamically sublime.

[7] See Kant (1987: pp. 122 and 129) for his list of examples of the sublime. Kant mostly focuses on examples of the sublime from nature. Kant (1987: p. 109) writes that it is “crude” or “monstrous” nature, or (1987: p. 99) nature “in its chaos” and “wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation” that best arouses the experience of the sublime. This is because chaotic nature appears most formless or unbounded (i.e., infinite), unlike form-bound art or objects of nature such as plants and animals. Kant (1987: p. 108) does cite two examples of human-designed sublime objects: the Egyptian pyramids and St. Peter’s Basilica. He also cites the example of war (1987: p. 122), which can be regarded as a human phenomenon.

[8] Regarding the definition of the sublime as the infinite, Kant (1987: p. 98) says the sublime is “formless” and “unboundedness.” Kant (1987: p. 103) also writes that the sublime can be defined as what is “absolutely large,” or “large beyond all comparison.” Kant (1987: p. 112) explicitly says that “nature is sublime in those of its appearances whose intuition carries with it the idea of their infinity.” Kant (1987: p. 105) points out that objects of nature are never genuinely infinite or absolutely large, because there could arguably always be an even larger natural object, and thus infinity “must be sought solely in our [rational] ideas.”

[9] Kant (1987: pp. 99 and 113) points out that we usually call the natural object (a storm, for example) sublime, and yet that is incorrect, because “sublime” is a positive term, while “the sight of [the storm] is horrible.” Instead, Kant says the true sublime object is only “ideas of reason” which are “aroused and called to mind” by the natural object. Kant (1987: p. 100) thus writes that the sublime is found “merely within ourselves.” Kant (1987: pp. 113 and 135) says explicitly that the sublime is found in “reason’s ideas.” Kant (1987: p. 114) writes that we have an experience of the sublime when nature is revealed to be “vanishingly small in contrast to the ideas of reason.” For Kant, reason is the mental faculty that produces absolute ideas such as infinity, free will, God, and immortality.

[10] Kant (1987: p. 107) writes that the natural object of the mathematical sublime is what we are unable to “take…in directly in one intuition.”

[11] Kant (1987: p. 106) writes that, in an experience of the mathematical sublime, “reason demands absolute totality as a real idea.” “Absolute totality” is here another way to say the infinite; “real idea” means an idea that corresponds to a sense perception. In Kant’s estimation, there are no sense perceptions of objects which match reason’s ideas of infinity, God, free will, and the immortal soul.

[12] The Grand Canyon might seem infinite, because you can’t perceive it all at once, but it’s not actually infinite because it is limited in space; it doesn’t truly stretch on in all directions forever. According to Kant, no natural object is genuinely infinite, because they all have limits and there could arguably always be an even larger object.

[13] In an experience of the mathematical sublime, reason essentially pushes sense perception to its breaking point. Kant (1987: p. 106) says that reason’s demand reveals the “inadequacy” of “our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense.” Kant (1987: p. 113) writes that we experience sublimity when sense perception is “inadequate to reason’s ideas.” The role of what Kant calls the imagination, or the mental faculty that produces images in the mind, is important in the inadequacy of perception: neither can you “take in” a seemingly infinite natural object all in one visual perception, nor produce a complete image of it in your mind. Reason can conceive of the idea of the infinite, but imagination cannot mentally visualize it.

[14] Kant (1987: p. 116) writes that the sublime “uncovers in [us] the consciousness of an unlimited [i.e. infinite] ability,” which is reason’s ability to think of infinity.

[15] Thus, Kant (1987: p. 101) writes that the true object of mathematical sublimity is our “cognitive power.” As Kant (1987: p. 106) says, “Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense.” See also Kant (1987: p. 111).

[16] Kant (1987: p. 119) insists on the necessity of viewing the powerful object from a safe distance when he writes that nature appears dynamically sublime only when we consider it “as a might [i.e., power] that has no dominance over us.” It has no dominance over us because we are physically safe from it. Kant (1987: p. 200) writes that while dynamically sublime objects could easily destroy us, “the sight of them becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, provided we are in a safe place.” Kant (1987: p. 121) further specifies that “the danger is not genuine” in an experience of the dynamical sublime, and “we must find ourselves safe in order to feel this exciting liking [pleasure].”

[17] Kant (1987: p. 129) writes that while a person might feel something like fear in an experience of the dynamical sublime, “since he knows he is safe, this is not actual fear.” Kant (1987: pp. 119-200) writes that we are fearful without being genuinely afraid in an experience of the dynamical sublime. If we were immediately afraid for our lives (such as when caught in a hurricane, for instance), we would not find the storm sublime, that is, pleasurable. As Kant (1987: p. 200) writes, “we flee from the sight of an object that scares us, and it is impossible to like terror that we take seriously.” Kant clarifies that fearfulness is caused by merely thinking of how the powerful object could harm us, as opposed to being genuinely afraid of it. In other words, the sublime consists of imagined rather than genuine fear. We are also not genuinely afraid of the powerful natural object because, like with all aesthetic experiences for Kant, we contemplate the sublime in a “disinterested” manner, which means without regard for how it could impact us in a physical or material sense. However, we must find the storm fearful (that is, it must cause us mental discomfort in some way) in order for the experience to consist of the emotional ambivalence (i.e., “negative pleasure”) essential to the sublime.

[18] Kant (1987: p. 120) specifically says that, just like in the mathematical sublime, it is “our power of reason” which is the true dynamically sublime object. Once again, for Kant, only an infinite mental faculty (i.e., reason) can conceive of the idea of infinity, which in this case is infinite power, that is, free will.

[19] Kant (1987: p. 120) writes that the dynamical sublime “allow[s] us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist…nature’s seeming omnipotence.” Kant (1987: p. 121) says that the dynamical sublime reveals the idea of our power “to choose” and engage in “full deliberation.” Furthermore, Kant (1987: p. 125) writes that everyone can experience the sublime because all humans are endowed with “moral feeling” or (1987: p. 127) “practical reason,” which includes the notion of free will. Kant (1987: p. 135) says explicitly that the dynamical sublime reveals “the idea of freedom.” For reflections on the philosophical notion of free will, see Free Will and Free Choice by Jonah Nagashima and Free Will and Moral Responsibility by Chelsea Haramia. We can be regarded as spiritual beings in regards to our free will for Kant because free will is “supersensible” or supernatural, non-physical, and immaterial.

[20] Clewis (2009) devotes an entire book to exploring how the sublime is an experience of the revelation of free will.

[21] Kant (1987: p. 121) writes that the dynamical sublime allows the rational “mind to feel its own sublimity.” In greater detail (1987: p. 123), “sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature outside us (as far as it influences us.)” Also (1987: p. 120), the sublime is a positive or honorific term, and thus cannot be ascribed to negative and terribly destructive phenomena like hurricanes.

[22] Kant (1987: p. 120) writes that the dynamic sublime reveals that the true infinite (or sublime) object is reason and its idea of free will, which by comparison shows that nature’s might is only a “seeming omnipotence” which merely appears infinite.

[23] Kant (1987: p. 121) writes that the sublime “reveals in us a superiority over nature,” that it “elevates [reason] above even nature.” The sublime (1987: p. 123) makes us “conscious of our superiority to nature” as it allows us to think of our rational vocation “as being sublimely above nature.” The sublime (1987: p. 124) consists in reason’s “dominance…over sensibility.”

[24] Kant (1987: p. 122) himself notes that people often interpret the sublime as an appearance of God. As a result, the sublime may harbor a mystical dimension, even if Kant didn’t acknowledge that. For more on mysticism, see Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Belief? by Matthew Sanderson.

[25] For examples of this criticism, see Crowther (1991) and Brady (2013). Note that Kant’s decision to base sublimity in reason is consistent with what is arguably the main project of his critical philosophy: demonstrating the sovereignty of reason, according to which, for instance, reason can critique the foundations of knowledge and provide moral duties.

[26] For essays on the sublime that include reflections on Kant’s theory, see Clewis (2018), Doran (2017), Shaw (2017), and Costelloe (2015). For studies dedicated to Kant’s theory, see Clewis (2009), Crowther (1991) and Merritt (2018).

References

Brady, Emily. (2013). The Sublime in Modern Philosophy: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Nature. Cambridge University Press.

Clewis, Robert R. (2009). The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.

Clewis, Robert R. (2018). The Sublime Reader. Bloomsbury.

Costelloe, Timothy M. The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present. Cambridge University Press.

Crowther, Paul. (1991). The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art. Oxford University Press.

Doran, Robert. (2017). The Theory of the Sublime: from Longinus to Kant. Cambridge University Press.

Kant, Immanuel. (1987). Critique of Judgment. Hackett Publishing.

Kant, Immanuel. (2005). Critique of Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.

Merritt, Melissa McBay. (2018). The Sublime. Cambridge University Press.

Shaw, Philip. (2017). The Sublime. Routledge.

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About the Author

Matthew Sanderson is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew

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