Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment

Author: Lewis Ross
Category: Epistemology, Historical Philosophy
Word Count: 995

Skeptics accept skepticism, the view that we lack knowledge or justified beliefs.^[1]

There are different types of skepticism: extreme skeptics deny we have knowledge or justified beliefs about anything, whereas other skeptics deny only that we have knowledge or justified beliefs about certain topics, e.g., about religion, or ethics, or other specific areas.

Pyrrhonian skepticism is named after an ancient school of thought based on the teachings of Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE).^[2] Pyrrhonian skeptics employ ingenious arguments that are supposed to show that we lack justified beliefs, and therefore knowledge, so we should suspend judgment about whatever matters we consider: that means that we should neither believe nor disbelieve claims about whatever matter is in question.^[3] 

This essay explains Pyrrhonian skepticism, what motivates it, and some responses to it.

1. Pyrrhonian Skepticism

Everyone agrees that suspending judgment is sometimes justified. For example, if someone asks you whether a flipped coin will land heads or tails, you wouldn’t be justified in believing that it will land heads. And you wouldn’t be justified in believing that it will land tails. The reasonable response is to remain neutral and suspend judgment because you lack evidence that justifies believing either conclusion.

Pyrrhonian skeptics argue that suspending judgment is the rational response to every question we might consider. Allegedly, Pyrrho was so skeptical in his attitude toward the world that he had to be pulled from the road by his friends whenever a wagon approached, apparently neither believing nor disbelieving that he’d get hit.^[4] Pyrrhonian skeptics even urge suspending judgment about skeptical arguments themselves: they deny even that their skepticism is justified.

2. Arguments for Pyrrhonian Skepticism

Pyrrhonians argue for such a radical view by emphasizing that appearances sometimes deceive— our senses mislead us—and that our minds are fallible: we cannot trust how things seem, our memories, or what people tell us. Given these defects, it’s possible to make any claim controversial to the point that we must suspend judgment.^[5] 

One way to appreciate this is to consider the potential for irresolvable disagreement.

Suppose you’re a Pyrrhonian skeptic who currently suspends judgment on whether it will rain tomorrow. I want to convince you to believe that it will. People generally deal with disagreements by providing reasons that justify their beliefs.

I might defend my belief that it will rain tomorrow by saying I read the weather report. But you might ask: why trust the weather report? I might respond by saying that meteorologists are often right. But you might persist: why accept that meteorologists got it right previously? A natural answer I might give is because I remember their predictions being accurate. But you could reply: why trust your memory? People often misremember things … and so on.

Pyrrhonians note that attempts to justify beliefs against a persistent skeptic can only end in one of three ways:

1. you might try to keep answering until inevitably running out of responses; 
2. you might eventually start repeating yourself, going in a circle; 
3. you might insist that one of your assumptions should be accepted without providing reasons. 

Pyrrhonian skeptics are unimpressed by all three outcomes, as each of them appears to leave skeptical challenges unanswered.^[6] Neither failing to respond to a challenge, arguing in a circle, nor insisting that some assumptions require no justification are uncontroversial ways to defeat skeptical doubts. Given the unresolved controversy, Pyrrhonians conclude that suspending judgment is the justified response.

Pyrrhonian skeptics claim this pattern of tenacious disagreement can be repeated with any question—try it for yourself! They conclude that no beliefs can be justified and that we should suspend judgment on every matter.

3. Responses

How might one respond to the Pyrrhonian skeptic?

One way is to reject the reasoning above and defend the idea that some assumptions are justified without our providing further reasons for them. This view is known as “Foundationalism.” As the name suggests, the idea is that you can build up your knowledge on top of the firm support given by foundational beliefs, which are assumptions that are justified without our having to defend them against challenges. 

Another strategy is to embrace certain kinds of circular reasoning. “Coherentism” is the idea that beliefs can be justified because they are supported by other beliefs, creating a type of mutually reinforcing web. Coherentists claim that, taken together, our beliefs create a system of justification by explaining and supporting each other, even if we eventually stop providing new reasons in response to controversies.^[7]

An obvious objection concerns the radical implications of suspension of judgment regarding everything. Going about our daily lives seems impossible without believing anything. How could we navigate the world while adopting the Pyrrhonian view, for example, suspending judgement on ordinary things like where our home is located (or even that we have homes)?

One reply is that the correct attitude to have about the world does not involve belief, but rather some other cognitive state. Perhaps we can accept that things seem a certain way without believing that they actually are that way.^[8] Timon, an ancient Pyrrhonian, supposedly said: “That honey is sweet I do not assert, but I agree that it seems to be.”^[9] One concern is that this response really does involve belief—a belief that things seem a certain way—but perhaps things can seem to seem a certain way, without belief.

4. Conclusion

Responding to Pyrrhonian arguments is essential if we are to explain how we know about anything, especially given controversies that exist in science, religion, philosophy, and most other domains of human thought. 

Pyrrhonians also thought that skepticism was not only the correct intellectual response to controversy but also a way of finding tranquillity in an unsettled world. Suspending judgment was said to free us from dogmatism—or overconfident, unreasonable belief—and brings us ataraxia, mental and emotional calmness and freedom from disturbance. Skepticism can, so the Pyrrhonians claimed, be a way of living a good life as well as being a theoretical position.^[10]

Notes

[1] Pyrrhonian Skepticism is generally taken to be one of two main families of skepticism, with the other being Cartesian Skepticism, inspired by René Descartes’ skepticism: see Descartes’ Meditations 1-3 and Descartes’ Meditations 4-6 by Marc Bobro and Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” by Charles Miceli. An overview of both types of skepticism is found in Comesana and Klein (2024). Fogelin (1994) is an example of contemporary epistemology that takes the Pyrrhonian challenge seriously. For introductions to other types of skepticism, see External World Skepticism by Andrew Chapman and Al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism by John Ramsey.

For what is meant by “justified,” see Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd R. Long. A very concise explanation of justification is that justified beliefs are likely to be true. Justification is widely thought to be important since it knowing a claim arguably requires justifiably believing it (and it be true): see The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge by Andrew Chapman.

[2] Information about Pyrrho and the development of ancient Pyrronhism is found in subsequent commentators on Pyrrho’s views. A particularly influential source is Sextus Empiricus, especially his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Interestingly, some claim that Pyrrho himself was not a Pyrrhonian skeptic as he endorsed some positive views about reality. Thorsrud (2009: Chapter 2) provides detailed historical discussion.

[3] For contemporary epistemology on suspension of judgment, see McGrath (2021) and Friedman (2013). A well-known example of suspending judgment is agnosticism, which involves suspending judgment about whether there’s a God—considering whether there’s a God or not and then neither believing God exists nor that God does not exist: see Agnosticism about God’s Existence by Sylwia Wilczewska.

[4] While Pyrrho’s writings have not survived, we have second-hand testimony about his philosophical outlook. The story about the wagon is found in Book IX, Section 62 of The Lives of the Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius. For more on Pyrrho, see Bett (2022).

[5] The ancient skeptics developed standardized ways of calling propositions into dispute, called “modes.” These modes categorized typical ways to generate disagreement—e.g. the fact that things seem different to different people, or seem different in different circumstances, or seem different in different times and places, and so forth. For an introduction to the epistemic significance of disagreement, see The Epistemology of Disagreement by Jonathan Matheson. Also see Christensen (2009).

[6] This is sometimes called the “Agrippan Trilemma”—it is a trilemma because attempting to respond to the skeptic involves three (supposedly) unsatisfactory outcomes. For recent scholarship on this trilemma and how it is generated through skeptical modes, see Sienkiewicz (2019).

[7] For an introduction to foundationalism and coherentism, see Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf. Also see Sosa (1980).

[8] For more on seemings, see Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem by Kaj André Zeller.

[9] Timon’s works, like those of Pyrrho, are also lost. This attribution is recounted in both Laertius (2018) and Thorsrud (2009). 

[10] Vogt (2022) provides a good introduction to ancient skepticism. Accepting this form of skepticism can also be part of applying philosophy as a way of life: see Philosophy as a Way of Life by Christine Darr. It can also be seen as an application of the later-developed “ethics of belief”: see Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” by Spencer Case.

References

Bett, Richard, “Pyrrho”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).

Christensen, David (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.

Comesaña, Juan and Peter Klein, “Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).

Fogelin, Robert J. (1994). Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition. Oxford University Press.

Friedman, Jane (2011). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.

Laertius, Diogenes (2018). (James Miller, Editor; Pamela Mensch, Translator). Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. Oxford University Press.

McGrath, Matthew (2021). Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment. Noûs 55 (2):463-484.

Stefan Sienkiewicz, (2019). Five Modes of Scepticism: Sextus Empiricus and the Agrippan Modes, Oxford University Press.

Sosa, Ernest (1980). The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):3-26.

Thorsrud, Harald (2009). Ancient Scepticism. Routledge.

Vogt, Katja, “Ancient Skepticism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).

Related Essays

Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf

External World Skepticism by Andrew Chapman

Al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism by John Ramsey

Descartes’ Meditations 1-3 and Descartes’ Meditations 4-6 by Marc Bobro

Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” by Charles Miceli

The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge by Andrew Chapman

Agnosticism about God’s Existence by Sylwia Wilczewska

The Epistemology of Disagreement by Jonathan Matheson

Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem by Kaj André Zeller

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Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” by Spencer Case

Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism by Chris Ranalli

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About the Author

Lewis Ross is a faculty member in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. He is also the Director of LSE’s Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS). He writes on various topics in epistemology, political philosophy, and philosophy of law. LewisDylanRoss.com

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