Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem

Author: Kaj André Zeller
Category: Epistemology, Ethics
Word count: 1000

It appears to me that there’s a cup of coffee in front of me and that I’ve had two coffees already. It’s obvious that 5 + 7 = 12, common sense that one shouldn’t torture puppies, and the string of words “The ran this” feels ungrammatical. We sometimes have the intuition that something’s wrong with an argument or are under the impression that the time is right to take up an opportunity.

These examples illustrate that we often have something like a sense or feeling that something is true. Many philosophers believe that there’s a type of mental attitude that is connected to such feelings, called a seeming.^[1]

This essay reviews some important philosophical issues about seemings.^[2]

1. Seemings and Justification

Beliefs can be justified or reasonable. Often, this is so because they are based on other beliefs.

But plausibly, some of our beliefs can be justified or reasonable without being based on other beliefs.^[3] Seemings are of philosophical interest because they might explain how this can be the case: perhaps beliefs can be justified by how things seem to us.

And seemings might explain how we could be entitled to many of our everyday beliefs. For instance, while I cannot exclude the possibility that the cup of coffee in front of me is an illusion, I don’t have a good reason to take this possibility seriously.^[4] Some philosophers argue that my seeming that there’s a cup of coffee in front of me is enough to justify my belief that there’s, indeed, a cup of coffee in front of me.

Many philosophers think that there are various kinds of seemings: the seeming that there’s a cup of coffee in front of me is visual, the seeming that I already had two coffees is memorial, the seeming that 5 + 7 = 12 is intellectual, the seeming that one shouldn’t torture puppies is ethical, and the seeming that “The ran this” is ungrammatical is linguistic.

It’s up to debate, however, whether and to which degree all of those types of seemings can justify beliefs. Memorial seemings might be, for instance, generally more often mistaken than linguistic seemings.

Most philosophers think that visual appearances can provide evidence for beliefs or justify beliefs.^[5] Some philosophers argue that other sorts of seemings, such as common sense and intuition, can also justify beliefs. Suppose it clearly seems to me that torturing puppies is wrong. Since I have no reason to doubt that torturing puppies is wrong, these philosophers would say that I’m justified in believing that it’s, in fact, wrong to torture puppies.^[6]

Of course, just because something seems to be true doesn’t always mean one should believe it. Suppose there’s a pencil in a glass of water in front of me. The pencil seems bent to me, but I know this to be an illusion: I know water can make straight objects appear bent. Certainly, I shouldn’t believe that the pencil is bent. Some philosophers would say that I’m still slightly justified in believing the pencil is bent but that I’m more justified in believing that it’s not. Others would say that in such a case, my seeming doesn’t provide any justification.^[7]

2. What are Seemings?

As we have seen, seemings are clearly related to beliefs. One might then wonder whether they simply are beliefs, perhaps just beliefs that we did not infer from other beliefs.^[8] Indeed, I believe there’s a cup of coffee in front of me right now, and I didn’t infer this belief from some other belief I had. Note that if seemings just were a kind of belief, they could not explain how some of our beliefs can be justified without being based on other beliefs.

But consider the pencil in the water glass again. When I look at the pencil, it merely seems to me that it’s bent, but I don’t believe it is. Many philosophers hold that therefore we shouldn’t say that seemings are just a kind of belief.^[9]

Another suggestion is that seemings are inclinations to believe.^[10] Inclinations to believe can result in beliefs. But we can also reject an inclination. When I see the pencil in the water, I feel drawn towards the belief that it’s bent. But I don’t have to accept this inclination.

However, one can be inclined to believe something without having a seeming that it’s true. For instance, you might lean towards believing that your favorite candidate won the elections because you wish this to be true.^[11] At the same time, it can seem to you that she lost. So seemings aren’t clearly inclinations to believe either.^[12]

For such reasons, many philosophers claim that seemings are neither beliefs nor inclinations to believe but a different, special type of mental attitude or mental state.^[13]

3. Doubts about Seemings

Other philosophers doubt that seemings are a unique type of attitude. Why?

Well, perhaps the alleged examples of seemings only share the name “seeming.”^[14] As already noted, the examples given above are quite diverse.

Yet, every mental state we call “seeming” has a common feature: it typically produces—but is not identical to—an inclination to believe.

That’s, however, not enough to convince someone of the existence of a unique mental state called “seeming.” After all, wishful thinking and other mental states also typically lead to inclinations to believe.

Another reason to doubt that there are seemings is this: you’re probably aware of many mental states, including beliefs and inclinations to believe. But can you find seemings in your mind? If not, you aren’t alone: famous philosophers haven’t found them either.^[15]

On the other hand, throughout history, many philosophers have written about attitudes that are at least very similar to seemings, using names such as phantasia or clear and distinct perception.^[16] This longstanding interest in such mental states gives some confidence that seemings exist even though they’re hard to grasp.

4. Conclusion

If there are seemings, they might explain why we appear to have a whole host of reasonable beliefs that aren’t justified by other beliefs. But are there seemings? To many, it seems so.

Notes

^[1] The topic of “seemings” is a subtopic in the area of epistemology or theory of knowledge and is closely related to the concept of epistemic justification. For introductions to these, see Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Tom Metcalf and Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd Long.

^[2] Seemings are sometimes also described in terms of appearances and intuitions. Some philosophers, however, use “intuition” only for intellectual seemings, and “appearance” only for perceptual seemings. Moreover, it is important to note that we do not always aim to report a mental state when we say, “It seems to me…”. For example, when I politely want to tell you that I disagree with your opinion, I might say, “It seems to me you’re wrong.”

^[3] Such beliefs are sometimes called basic beliefs, which are justified beliefs, but beliefs that are not justified by other beliefs. See “Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument by Jamie Turner.

^[4] Therefore, seemings are of philosophical interest regarding skepticism, roughly the view that we do not, or cannot have, have knowledge of a particular type, or of any kind. For an introduction to a type of skepticism, see External World Skepticism by Andrew Chapman.

^[5] So, what is thought is that seemings provide epistemic justification for beliefs. To better understand the concept of epistemic justification, see  Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd Long.

^[6] Philosophers who think that it’s only (or mostly) sensual appearances that can provide evidence or justify beliefs are often called empiricists. Philosophers who argue that a priori seemings such as common sense or intuition can justify beliefs are often called rationalists. See Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf. The view that I am at least to some degree justified to believe something when it seems true to me and I don’t have good reasons to doubt that it’s true is known as phenomenal conservatism. This view is most prominently advocated by Michael Huemer (e.g., 2007). Some philosophers argue that appeals to seemings are important, and perhaps even indispensable, to giving reasons for one’s ethical views: see Ethical Realism by Thomas Metcalf.

^[7] Matthias Steup (2023) and other philosophers call the view that seemings always provide at least some justification dogmatism. If my seeming doesn’t provide any justification because I know that I’m facing an illusion, philosophers would say that my seeming is defeated (i.e., undercut or overridden) by my knowledge that I face an illusion: basically, contrary (and stronger) evidence undermines the initial (and weaker) evidence.

^[8] William Lycan (1988) argues that seemings are beliefs we do not derive from other beliefs.

^[9] One response here would be to claim that I both believe that the stick is bent and believe that it’s not. This reply, however, would have the implausible consequence that I’m irrational when experiencing such a simple visual illusion. 

^[10] Ernest Sosa (2007) argues that seemings are inclinations to believe.

^[11] Believing on the basis of a wish or desire that some claim is true—perhaps because believing that will satisfy some desire or goal of the person that does not relate to the belief being true or justified—is often described in terms of “prudential” or “pragmatic” justification, in contrast with epistemic justification. For an example of this distinction applied to belief that there is a God, see Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God by Liz Jackson. A potentially related attitude is hope—hoping that some claim is true or that something will happen. See Hope by Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale for an analysis of hope.

^[12] A similar response to the one given in footnote 5 is given by Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux (2009): you might be inclined to believe that your candidate will win, and have a competing inclination to believe that she will lose.

^[13] Chris Tucker (2013) mentions another option: instead of a belief or an inclination to believe, a seeming might be a belief or an inclination to believe that a mental state is evidence for something.

^[14] Michael DePaul (2009) expresses the suspicion that there’s no unique type of mental state that the name “seeming” refers to.

^[15] Earl Conee (1988) and Timothy Williamson (2007) report that they are not aware of having seemings.

^[16] Aristotle uses the word phantasia (e.g., in De Anima, [350 BC] 1986), and Descartes uses the phrase clear and distinct perception (e.g., in Meditations on First Philosophy, [1641] 1993). See “I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge by Charles Miceli and Descartes’ Meditations 1-3 and Descartes’ Meditations 4-6 by Marc Bobro. Blake McAllister (2023) provides more historical examples.

References

Aristotle. ([350 BC] 1986). De Anima (On the Soul). Translated by H. Lawson-Tancred. Penguin Books.

Conee, Earl. (1998). “Seeing the Truth.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 4: pp. 847–857.

Descartes, R. ([1641] 1993). Meditations on First Philosophy: In which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body are Demonstrated. Translated by D. A. Cress. Hackett Pub. Co.

DePaul, Michael. (2009). “Phenomenal Conservatism and Self‐Defeat.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 205–212.

Earlenbaugh, Joshua & Molyneux, Bernard. (2009). “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe.” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 145, No. 1, pp. 89–109.

Huemer, Michael. (2007). “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 30–55.

Lycan, William G. (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge University Press.

McAllister, B. (2023). Seemings and the Foundations of Justification: A Defense of Phenomenal Conservatism. Routledge.

Sosa, Ernest. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Steup, Matthias. (2023). “The Chemistry of Epistemic Justification.” In K. McCain, S. Stapleford, & M. Steup (eds.), Seemings, pp. 7–22. Routledge.  

Tucker, Chris. (2013). “Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.” In C. Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, pp. 1–29. Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Timothy. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.

Related Essays

Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf

Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd Long

“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument by Jamie Turner

Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective by Matthew Sanderson

Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience by Matthew Sanderson

External World Skepticism by Andrew Chapman

Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment by Lewis Ross

Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God by Liz Jackson

Hope by Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale

Ethical Realism by Thomas Metcalf

“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge by Charles Meceli

Descartes’ Meditations 1-3 by Marc Bobro

Descartes’ Meditations 4-6 by Marc Bobro

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About the Author

Kaj André Zeller is a Graduate Student of Philosophy at Koç University in Istanbul, Turkey. His research interests are in the fields of contemporary ethics, the philosophy of emotions and phenomenology. He is currently working on the topic of moral vagueness. KajAndreZeller.wordpress.com

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