Author: Matthew Sanderson
Category: Philosophy of Religion, Epistemology
Word Count: 1000
Mysticism refers to religious traditions devoted to cultivating altered states of consciousness called “mystical experiences.”
During these experiences, mystics feel “one” with a supernatural being, or they have other types of experiences in which they allegedly perceive unity through direct contact with some fundamental aspect of reality.[1]
Mystics tend to believe that their mystical experiences justify their religious beliefs.
This essay reviews philosophical attempts to define mystical experience as well as arguments about whether mystical experiences justify religious beliefs.
1. What are Mystical Experiences?
Mystical experiences are taken by mystics to be experiences of union with a higher power or another “ultimate” reality.[2]
Mystical experiences are often understood as “unitive” experiences, which distinguishes them from ordinary experiences in which we are aware of multiple, separate things.[3]
Perhaps because language typically focuses on distinctions, it might be impossible to express in language an experience of mystical union where all differences seem to disappear. Thus, mystical experiences are often considered “ineffable,” or beyond description in any language.[4]
Also, time appears to stand still during mystical experiences which seem to mystics to take place in a timeless present moment or “eternal now.”[5]
Finally, mystical experiences are usually felt by mystics to be profoundly blissful and joyful.[6]
1.1. Extrovertive and Introvertive Mysticism
There are two major types of mystical experience: introvertive, which lack all sensory content, and extrovertive, which include sensory elements.[7] Introvertive experiences only involve what can be described as events occurring inside one’s own mind; extrovertive experiences seem to involve awareness of the world normally regarded as outside one’s mind.[8]
Even though extrovertive mystical experiences include sensory content, the focus of all mystical awareness is often thought to be non-sensory.[9] For example, in an extrovertive experience of purportedly perceiving God in a sunset, the sun is sensory, while God is non-sensory.
An entirely non-sensory introvertive mystical experience might be, for instance, a “pure consciousness” without sensations and thoughts, which some mystics report experiencing during meditation.[10]
1.2. Perception of “Ultimate” Reality
Mystics believe they make contact with “ultimate” realities during mystical experiences through a type of spiritual perception.[11] This means that the “ultimate” reality is directly present to consciousness (i.e., it is perceived) instead of indirectly through another object.[12] For example, theistic mystics believe they experience God first-hand instead of reasoning towards believing in God’s existence from a miracle or the beauty of nature.[13]
Mystical experiences are thus considered to be a particular type of “unitive,” direct religious experience. They are thus distinguished from other forms of religious experiences—for example, visions, voices, and prayer—that usually don’t involve “union” or direct experiential contact with an “ultimate” reality.[14]
2. Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?
Mystics often argue that their experiences justify their religious beliefs. They commonly argue that mystical experiences are a type of perceptual experience—like sense perception—in relevant aspects; therefore, since sense perception justifies beliefs in external reality, mystical experiences also supply rational grounds for believing in realities outside the perceiver.[15]
The basis of this “argument from perception” is that both sense perception and mystical perception share a relevantly similar structure: a perceiver for whom it seems that they experience an external object. And the object perceived is directly experienced rather than indirectly through something else: just as when one experiences the plane rather than solely the vapor trail, one experiences God directly.[16]
In response, skeptics about mystical experience argue that the analogy is flawed because there are significant differences between the two types of perception.
2.1. The Problem of Cross-Checkability
Some skeptics observe that sense perceptions can be cross-checked by other people in ways mystical experiences cannot: someone can’t just “take a look” to see if what you’re perceiving in a mystical experience is really there. As a result, mystical experience doesn’t support beliefs with the same strength as sense perception.[17]
However, proponents respond that mystical experiences can be checked for authenticity by spiritual guides and in accordance with sacred texts.[18]
2.2. The Problem of Partial Distribution
Skeptics also argue that everyone constantly experiences sense perceptions and they require no special preparation, whereas few people have mystical experiences (i.e. they are “partially distributed”) which can take years of meditative practices to achieve.[19]
However, proponents respond that some sense perceptions also necessitate training, such as tasting different kinds of wine or properly perceiving art.[20] Also, many extrovertive mystical experiences happen spontaneously.[21] Lastly, people from many places and times have had mystical experiences.[22]
Nonetheless, you seemingly cannot force a mystical experience to occur. Mystical experiences appear to happen to mystics rather than being primarily caused by them.[23]
This can possibly be explained by the idea that “ultimate” realities operate independent of human control: for instance, God’s appearance is believed to be a choice entirely up to God.[24]
2.3. The Challenge from Constructivism
Another skeptical challenge is the argument from “constructivism” that mystical experiences are created by the beliefs of the mystic’s religion.[25] For instance, Christians near-universally report experiencing Jesus rather than Krishna or the Buddha. Maybe mystics then don’t actually experience “ultimate” realities outside their perception.
One response is that mystical experiences often surprise mystics, revealing truths counter to their beliefs.[26] Another reply is that there might be mystical experiences of “pure consciousness” which are empty of beliefs.[27]
2.4. The Challenge from Naturalism
One last skeptical perspective is the argument from “naturalism” that mystical experiences are solely caused by the brain.[28] Mystical experiences are then just a physical event in the mystic’s skull with no supernatural reality involved.
However, one can argue that such explanations can’t rule out that a divine agent uses the brain to cause mystical experiences.[29]
3. Conclusion
Perhaps because mystical experiences can seem incomprehensible and even irrational, philosophers often view mysticism with suspicion.
However, mysticism raises philosophically interesting questions about religious experience, justification, and perception.[30]
Also, insofar as philosophy seeks to discover what makes life meaningful, it should investigate mysticism because mystical experiences are more common than assumed and experiencers often consider them the most meaningful experiences of their lives.[31]
Notes
[1] For thorough discussions of different types of mystical experience, see Wainwright (1981: Ch. 1) and Jones (2016: Ch. 1).
[2] For examples of the idea that mystics believe they experience “ultimate” realities, see Elwood (1999: p. 39), Marshall (2005: pp. 2 and 74-76), Gellman (2001: p. 4), Wainwright (1981: p. 1), and Jones (2016: p. 6).
[3] For examples of the claim that mystical experiences are allegedly “unitive” in nature, see Stace (1960: Ch. 2), Wainwright (1981: p. 1), Marshall (2005: pp. 3 and 60-64), Elwood (1999: p. 39), and Foreman (1999: Ch. 7).
[4] James (1958: p. 329) considers ineffability an essential feature of mystical experience. For detailed reflections on the allegedly ineffable nature of mystical experience, see Stace (1960: Ch. 6) and Jones (2016: Ch. 6).
[5] For discussions of how time appears to mystics to stand still during mystical experiences, see Wainwright (1981: pp. 10, 14, and 34), Stace (1960: p. 110), Marshall (2005: pp. 27 and 72-73), and Jones (2016: p. 6).
[6] See Stace (1960: pp. 79 and 110), Marshall (2005: pp. 27 and 80-81), and Jones (2016: p. 6) for discussions of the positive emotions allegedly felt by mystics during their experiences.
[7] Stace (1960: Ch. 2) was the first to define extrovertive mystical experiences as involving sensory content and introvertive experiences as purely non-sensory. Most philosophers after Stace adhere to his distinction. For example, see Jones (2016: p. 5), Marshall (2005: p. 26), and Wainwright (1981: p. 33).
[8] Even though introvertive mystical experiences occur in one’s mind, they still can consist of the alleged perception of some “ultimate” reality. For instance, traditional Christian mystics arguably believed they had introvertive experiences of God. For discussions of such theistic introvertive mystical experiences, see Zaehner (1957) and Wainwright (1981).
[9] Gellman (2001: p. 5) and Alston (1991: p. 5) insist on the non-sensory focus of all mystical experience.
[10] However, Katz (1978) argues that all consciousness is always consciousness of something, and therefore “pure consciousness” without any content is impossible. Foreman (1999) responds that even if ordinary consciousness always consists of content, that doesn’t mean altered states of consciousness (such as a “pure consciousness” mystical experience) must also.
[11] Philosophers of mysticism typically argue that mystics believe they know “ultimate” realities through their experiences and that this is an essential feature of mystical experience. Philosophers call the purported knowledge-granting aspect of mystical experience its “cognitive,” “veridical,” or “noetic” dimension. For example, see Jones (2016: Ch. 1 and Ch. 3), James (1958: p. 329), Foreman (1999: Ch. 7), and Marshall (2005: pp. 2 and 65-67). Alston (1991: p. 5 and Ch. 1), Gellman (2001: Ch. 1), and Wainwright (1981: Ch. 1 and 3) argue that mystical experience is allegedly a type of spiritual or non-sensory perception.
[12] Alston (1991: Ch. 1) argues for the allegedly direct nature of mystical perception.
[13] Alston (1991: Ch. 1) draws this distinction: on reasoning towards believing in God’s existence from a miracle or the beauty of nature, see Can We Believe in Miracles? by Tomas Bogardus, Design Arguments for the Existence of God by Thomas Metcalf, and many other essays reviewing arguments for theism in the Philosophy of Religion essay section. For discussions of theistic mysticism, see Pike (1992), Steinbock (2007), Stoeber (1994), and Zaehner (1957).
[14] Gellman (2001: pp. 6-7), Wainwright (1981: pp. 1-7), and Jones (2016: p. 4) argue in favor of this distinction.
[15] For examples of this “argument from perception,” see Gellman (2001), Wainwright (1981), and Alston (1991). See also “Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument by Jamie B. Turner for another perspective on believing in God through a religious experience rather than based on an argument. The issue is whether mystical experiences can provide epistemic justification for beliefs such that, if they are true, they are likely knowledge: see Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd R. Long and Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf.
[16] Gellman (2001), Wainwright (1981), and Alston (1991) argue for these similarities.
[17] Wainwright (1981: Ch. 3) and Alston (1991: Ch. 5) cover the points of this debate in detail.
[18] See Gellman (2001: pp. 30-31), Alston (1991: pp. 209-222), and Wainwright (1981: pp. 85-87) for discussions of how mystical experience can be checked by spiritual mentors and through consulting scriptures. Another example of how mystical experiences can possibly be verified is what’s sometimes called “the fruits test,” which involves considering the positive benefits or “fruits” for the mystic that might follow from the person’s experience. For instance, one can consider whether the mystic’s spirituality and/or morality is deepened as a result of a mystical experience. If it is, then that can be considered one form of evidence in support of the authenticity of the mystical experience. For discussion of “the fruits test,” see James (1958: p. 368), Wainwright (1981: p. 86), Jones (2016: pp. 104-106), and Alston (1991: p. 203).
[19] Alston (1991: pp. 197-199) characterizes this issue as the problem of “partial distribution.”
[20] See Alston (1991: p. 198) for the argument that many types of sense perceptions require special training much like some types of mystical experiences.
[21] Many philosophers highlight the often-spontaneous nature of extrovertive mystical experiences. See, for example, Marshall (2005: p. 190).
[22] See Wainwright (1981: p. 88) for the argument that, while mystical experiences are relatively rare compared to experiences of sense perception, they are widely distributed in the sense that many different people throughout history and across cultures have had mystical experiences.
[23] James (1958: p. 329) argues that such alleged “passivity” is one of the essential features of mystical experience. See also Jones (2016: p. 7).
[24] Wainwright (1981: pp. 93-95) and Alston (1991: pp. 218-219) both make the point that the realities allegedly experienced by mystics do not seem to appear solely as a result of mystics’ efforts, and yet it still seems necessary for mystics to spiritually position themselves correctly (for example, by letting go of the ego, etc.) in order to “receive” the appearance of the “ultimate” reality. Alston (1991: pp. 198-199 and 213) calls such positioning “spiritual receptivity.”
[25] This position is also known as “contextualism.” Katz (1978) presents the definitive case for this view. Proudfoot (1985) presents a similar argument.
[26] See Jones (2016: p. 64) for the argument that what mystics allegedly experience often surprises them because it does not match their prior beliefs, and therefore constructivism is incorrect to insist that all mystical experiences are constructed by pre-experiential beliefs.
[27] Foreman (1999) devotes an entire book to refuting constructivism based on this argument.
[28] Jones (2016: Ch. 4) provides a thorough summary of naturalism’s attempts to explain mystical experience, as well as possible arguments in response. Also, see Wainwright (1981: Ch. 2) and Gellman (2001: pp. 88-102).
[29] See Jones (2016: p. 156) for the argument that naturalism can never fully rule out that a supernatural reality uses the brains of mystics to enact mystical experiences.
[30] Indeed, it is arguably mystics’ knowledge claims that primarily interest philosophers insofar as such claims bring mysticism into contact with the concerns of epistemology. See Jones (2016: p. xvii). The issue is whether mystical experiences can provide epistemic justification for beliefs such that, if they are true, they are likely knowledge: see Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief? by Todd R. Long and Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge by Thomas Metcalf.
[31] Many philosophers point out that mystical experiences are more common than thought and typically considered the most meaningful experiences for those who undergo them. For example, see Jones (2016: pp. ix and 336), James (1958: p. 330), and Marshall (2005: Ch. 1).
References
Alston, William P. (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cornell University Press.
Elwood, Robert S. (1999). Mysticism and Religion. Seven Bridges Press.
Forman, Robert K.C. (1999). Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness. SUNY Press.
Gellman, Jerome I. (2001). Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry. Ashgate.
James, William (1958). The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature. New American Library.
Jones, Richard H. (2016). Philosophy of Mysticism: Raids on the Ineffable. SUNY Press.
Katz, Steven T. (1978). Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Marshall, Paul (2005). Mystical Encounters with the Natural World: Experiences and Explanations. Oxford University Press.
Pike, Nelson (1992). Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism. Cornell University Press.
Proudfoot, Wayne (1985). Religious Experience. University of California Press.
Stace, Walter (1960). Mysticism and Philosophy. Macmillan.
Steinbock, Anthony J. (2007). Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience. Indiana University Press.
Stoeber, Michael (1994). Theo-Monistic Mysticism: A Hindu-Christian Comparison. St. Martin’s Press.
Wainwright, William J. (1981). Mysticism: A Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value, and Moral Implications. University of Wisconsin Press.
Zaehner, Robert C. (1957). Mysticism Sacred and Profane: An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praenatural Experience. Oxford University Press.
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About the Author
Matthew Sanderson is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew
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