# 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology > Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time > Generated by All in One SEO Pro v5.0.3, this is an llms-full.txt file, used by LLMs to index the site. ## Posts ### [Essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/essays/) **Published:** February 13, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** --- ### [The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/10/06/ship-of-theseus/) **Published:** October 6, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: [Chad Vance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Vance) Category: [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 998 That table you’re sitting at; or that coffee mug in front of you; or that phone: have you seen these objects before? Presumably you have. But, consider some of the assumptions behind this: first, that there *are* such things as tables and mugs, and, second, that these things *continue to exist through time* (e.g., from yesterday to today). What is required in order for such material objects like these to survive through time?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay explores that question, by way of a famous story about the Ship of Theseus. [![Meme styled as a CAPTCHA reading “Select all squares with the ship of Theseus,” showing an ancient Greek sailing ship divided into a grid, with a “Skip” button below.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/ship-of-theseus-meme.jpg?resize=656%2C950&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/ship-of-theseus-meme.jpg?ssl=1)Meme styled as a CAPTCHA reading “Select all squares with the ship of Theseus,” showing an ancient Greek sailing ship divided into a grid, with a “Skip” button below.### 1. The Ship of Theseus Imagine this: A man named Theseus sails a wooden ship. (Call it ‘Original’.) Every week, he arrives at port and has one plank of his ship replaced. After many years, so many replacements have been made that finally Theseus’s ship (now call it ‘Repaired’) no longer has any of its original parts.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Is the ship at the end of the story the same ship as the one at the beginning? That is, are *Original* and *Repaired* the same ship? ### 2. The Repaired Ship Let’s start with a simpler question: consider the ship after *just* a *single* part—one board—is replaced. Is *that* still the same ship? It seems so. After all, the following principle is overwhelmingly plausible: *Gradual Replacement:* if an object, A, is composed of many parts, and has a single part replaced, resulting in object B, then A and B are the same object. This is just a fancy way of saying that composite objects survive the replacement of a single part. Imagine what would follow if we were to reject this principle: a mechanic replaces the spark plugs on your car. As they hand you your keys, you complain, “That isn’t the car that I arrived in today. Dude, where’s my car!?” Indeed, even the table, the mug, the phone: these would *not* in fact be objects that you have ever seen before—material objects are *constantly* exchanging atoms and electrons with their environment, and thus having their parts repeatedly replaced at the atomic scale. How absurd! Yet, if we accept this principle (as it seems that we should), then it immediately follows that *Repaired is* the same ship as *Original*. Consider: if *Original*, the ship with zero parts replaced (call it S0) survives the replacement of a single part, then *that* ship (the one with a single part replaced; call it S1) *also* survives the replacement of a single part. (That is, S1 survives as S2, the ship with *two* parts replaced.) And then S2 survives as S3; and S3 as S4; and so on, since each of these changes is merely an instance of replacing a single part of a ship that has many parts. In short, the Gradual Replacement Principle entails that it remains the same ship throughout *each and every one* of these replacements.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In other words, it *never* ceases to be *Original*. That seems plausible.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 3. The Reconstructed Ship Now consider the following addition to our story: [\[5\]](#_ftn5) Unbeknownst to Theseus, every time he has a part of his ship replaced, the ship repairperson sets the old part aside with the intent of eventually constructing a ship of their own. At the end of Theseus’s story, just after Theseus receives *Repaired* (the ship with all new parts), the repairperson sets sail on a ship which has *all* of *Original*’s parts, in the exact same arrangement: call this ship ‘Classic’. If the repairperson voyaged around declaring that it was *he* who sailed the *Original* ship of Theseus, would he be correct? *Classic* really does seem to have a legitimate claim to being *Original*. After all, the following principle is overwhelmingly plausible: *Same Parts:* if object A (at time-1) and object B (at time-2) are composed of all and only exactly the same parts, arranged in exactly the same way, then A and B are one and the same object. This is just a fancy way of saying that *objects always survive whenever their exact composition survives*. Put even more simply: same parts, *arranged* *in the same way,* same object.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Imagine what would follow if we were to reject this principle: imagine my friend is convinced that his bicycle is not the same one that he parked there earlier. You carefully verify that it has the exact same parts in the exact same places as the bike he parked earlier and share this information with him. Your friend, if he rejected the Same Parts Principle, would claim that this isn’t enough to convince him that it’s the same bicycle and would demand some further information.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) But that seems absurd! ### 4. A Paradox If we accept the *Same Parts Principle* (as it seems that we should), then *Classic* *is* *Original*, since they have exactly the same material composition. But, wait: earlier, we had already discovered that *Repaired* is *also Original*. Yet, it can’t be the case that *Classic* is *Original* and *Repaired* is *Original*; for then it would follow that *Classic* and *Repaired* are the same ship as *each other*! This is entailed by the following principle: *Transitivity of Identity:* if A is identical to B, and A is identical to C, then B is identical to C.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) It would be absurd to reject this principle: it’s part of what it means for things to be identical. Yet, now we appear to have a predicament. It is overwhelmingly plausible that objects survive the replacement of a single part. So, *Repaired* is *Original*. And it is overwhelmingly plausible that objects survive so long as their composition survives. So, *Classic* is *Original*. But it is *also* overwhelmingly plausible that identity is transitive, in which case *Repaired* and *Classic* are one and the same ship—i.e., they are just one ship and not two. But that is absurd! There are clearly *two* ships here, not one! ### 5. Conclusion We have just discovered that, together, three overwhelmingly plausible principles entail something impossible. So, we *must* reject one of them! Which should it be, and why? ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For the related question of when material parts compose an object in the first place, see [Objects and their Parts: The Problem of Material Composition](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/04/18/material-composition/) by Jeremy Skrzypek. For the related question of what is required for *persons* to persist through time, see [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance, and [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) and [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) both by Kristin Seemuth Whaley. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This story is originally found in “The Life of Theseus” (c. 75 A.D.) by the ancient Greek historian, Plutarch. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For discussion of how objects can persist despite changes in their material parts, see [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy Skrzypek. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Compare this reasoning to the following: “If someone with a full head of hair loses one hair, they are not bald. If they lose one more hair, they are not bald . . . and if they lose one more hair, they are not bald . . . so someone who has lost all their hair is not bald,” which is clearly false (in contrast to someone losing a hair but then it being “replaced”!). Here, we see that lots of tiny changes that do not seem to make any difference can add up to big changes that *do* make a difference. So, perhaps the *Repaired* ship at the end of the story is *not* the *Original* ship after all? (Though, note that this verdict would require that we reject the Transitivity of Identity. See below.) For discussion of this type of reasoning, and its potential implications for various ship cases, see [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/ "Original URL: https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/. Click or tap if you trust this link.") by Darren Hibbs. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This addition to Theseus’s story is initially found in the works of philosopher Thomas Hobbes. See *Thomas White’s* De Mundo *Examined* (1642; ch. 12, parts 3-4) and *De Corpore* (1655; part 2, ch. 11). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) After all, if the repair person had used all of the old planks from Theseus’s ship to construct a giant wooden horse statue, we would agree that the horse statue is not the same object as *Original*. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For example, perhaps it would not be the same bicycle if a friend of yours had dismantled it and put it back together while you were away. Perhaps dismantling an object and putting it back together causes a thing to cease to exist. (After all, this appears to be all that has happened in the intervening time between *Original* and *Classic*.) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This type of principle is often appealed to by *psychological theories of personal identity*: see [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley. ### References [Hobbes, Thomas (1642). ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf)[*Thomas White’s* ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf)[De Mundo ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf)[*Examined* ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf)[(ch. 12, parts 3-4).](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf) [Hobbes, Thomas (1655). ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf)[*De Corpore*](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf)[ (part 2, ch. 11).](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Hobbes.pdf) [Plutarch (75 AD). “The Life of Theseus.”](https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Theseus%2A.html) ### For Further Reading [Gallois, Andre (2026). “Identity Over Time”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/)[, ed. Edward N. Zalta.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/) [Wasserman, Ryan (2013). “Material Constitution](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/material-constitution/)[”,](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/material-constitution/) [*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/material-constitution/)[, ed. Edward N. Zalta.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/material-constitution/) ### Related Essays [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibbs [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy Skrzypek [Objects and their Parts: The Problem of Material Composition](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/04/18/material-composition/) by Jeremy Skrzypek ### About the Author [Chad Vance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Vance) is a Teaching Professor of Philosophy at William and Mary. His specialties include the metaphysics of modality and environmental ethics. He earned his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder. [rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/index.html](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/index.html) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics **Tags:** Ship of Theseus, vance --- ### [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) **Published:** December 4, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay provides an overview of the main claims and basic motivations for hylomorphism, the view that all material objects consist of both matter and form. **Content:** Author: [Jeremy Skrzypek](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Skrzypek) Categories: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 words When I order a new dining room table and the shipment arrives at my door, I don’t yet have a dining room table. Something more must be done or added to the contents of that box to produce a table. According to the theory of *hylomorphism*, what must be added to produce the table is the *form* of the table. And the table is not a special case. According to hylomorphism, all material objects consist of both matter *and* form. This essay provides an overview of the main claims and basic motivations for hylomorphism. [![A dining room table, available for delivery. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/table.jpg?resize=656%2C655&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/table.jpg?ssl=1)A dining room table, available for delivery.### 1. Hylomorphism: The Basics Hylomorphism (from the Greek words ‘hyle’ meaning ‘matter’ and ‘morphe’ meaning ‘form’) is the theory according to which material objects, things like tables, chairs, rocks, trees, rabbits, planets, and human beings, consist of two fundamental parts, components, or aspects: matter and form.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The *matter* of any object refers to the materials or stuff of which it is made. In the case of the table, the matter is the wood, metal, and plastic that comes in the box. The *form* of the object is the organizing principle that makes the object what it is: the organization, structure, or configuration present in its matter, which allows it to perform the functions or operations characteristic of its kind.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) For the table, the form is the particular way that the parts need to be arranged and fastened to produce something that can serve our dining purposes. For things like tables and chairs, the form is just the particular way in which the parts are arranged and fastened. But for things like living organisms, the form cannot simply be the spatial arrangement of the parts. Living organisms are constantly reordering and rearranging their parts as they grow and age. So, in the case of living organisms, the form might be better understood as a kind of activity or process in which its matter is engaged, which allows it to perform the functions or operations characteristic of that type of organism.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Here we might look to the “life” of the organism or the particular metabolic, homeostatic, and developmental processes or activities of which that life is composed.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. The Motivations for Hylomorphism Hylomorphism was first introduced by Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) as an analysis of the different types of change we see in the world.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Sometimes objects undergo various changes in their parts and yet remain the very same object. Indeed, the metabolic processes of living organisms require that they be constantly exchanging materials with the outside world. That a living organism remains the very same living organism despite changes in its parts is explained by the sameness of form.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) On the other hand, sometimes the parts of an object remain and yet the object that they once composed is gone. So, for example, if I take a sledgehammer to my table, the matter of that table is still there, but the table is destroyed. This is explained by a difference in form. Hylomorphism also helps to provide a theory of *kinds*. Objects are the kinds of object that they are, and possess the characteristic capacities that they do, because of the kinds of forms that they possess. If, in assembling the parts of the dining room table, I give them the wrong form, then I might end up not just with a different object than I would have, but a different *kind* of object – like a desk, or a chair, or a piece of art. In short, objects of the same kind possess forms of the same kind, and objects of different kinds possess forms of different kinds. ### 3. Alternatives to Hylomorphism What are the alternatives to hylomorphism? Well, perhaps there are no tables. Perhaps nothing new comes into existence when I assemble the contents of the box. Perhaps it is still just those contents, only rearranged. This is the response given by *mereological nihilists*, who hold that there are no composite wholes, only atomic simples and the various relations they bear to one another.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Or perhaps the table was there all along. Perhaps a table really is nothing more than the contents of the box. Prior to assembling those contents, we might say that a table is there, just unassembled. This is the response given by *mereological universalists*, who hold that for every possible combination of smaller objects, there is some composite whole, a larger object, composed of just those things, regardless of the proximity or remoteness of those things in space or time.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Or perhaps both the table and the parts exist, and the table exists only after its parts have been assembled, but the mistake is to think of there being some *further* part or component or aspect that is present in the parts of the table when it is assembled. This could be because the forms of objects are, as Plato understood them, not in the objects at all, but outside of space and time. Or it could be because there are no forms or properties at all, only material objects and their parts.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) But notice that the first two proposals clash with how we ordinarily think about the world. It seems intuitive to say that I have produced something *new* by assembling the contents of the box. And if that’s the case, then it seems that that new thing can’t just be the things that I started with. For, once again, those things were there before the table was. There must be something more to the table. ### 4. Conclusion If I do produce something new when I assemble the contents of the box, then the table is something more than just those contents. The table is not only its material parts, but also the formal organization of those parts. And that is the fundamental claim of hylomorphism: that there is some kind of formal part, component, or aspect to any table, chair, rock, tree, rabbit, planet, or human being, something beyond its matter which accounts for its existence and nature.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Some hylomorphists like to think of the form of an object as an additional part or component of the object, whereas others dislike the language of parthood and prefer to call it an aspect or attribute of the object. I have tried to remain mostly neutral on that issue here. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For some recent defenses of hylomorphism according to which forms are best understood as certain types of structures, see Kathrin Koslicki, *The Structure of Objects* (Oxford University Press, 2008) and William Jaworski, *Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind* (Oxford University Press, 2016). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For a recent defense of hylomorphism according to which forms are best understood as certain types of activities or processes, see Jeremy W. Skrzypek, “From Potency to Act: Hyloenergeism,” *Synthese*, Vol. 198, No. 11 (Jun., 2021): pp. 2691-2716. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Aristotle thinks that the forms of living things are so complex and interesting that he designates a special term for them: *souls*. But in saying that living things possess souls all Aristotle means is that they possess the sort of form that makes them alive. That human beings possess souls, then, is, for Aristotle, uncontroversial: it simply falls out of his hylomorphic analysis of living things. The real question is whether the type of soul that human beings possess gives us unique and distinctive capacities or persistence conditions unlike those possessed by other creatures. For more on the nature of the human person and what makes us the same over time, see Chad Vance’s [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The best place to look for this is Aristotle’s *Physics*, Book I, Chapter 7. Aristotle’s teacher and mentor, Plato, was actually the first to introduce the notion of form and to use that notion to explain the existence and nature of material objects. But, for Plato, forms are separate from the material world, altogether outside of space and time. It is Aristotle’s insistence that forms be understood as somehow “in” the objects that possess them that sets his view apart from that of his predecessor. For more on Plato’s theory of the forms, see Spencer Case’s [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) This is controversial. All hylomorphists think that sameness of form makes an object the same in kind, but not all think that sameness of form makes an object the same in number. And this is so because hylomorphists are split over whether forms are universal, the very same form belonging to all members of a kind, or particular, a qualitatively identical but numerically distinct form belonging to each member of a kind. Here I am describing the approach taken by the latter camp, according to which sameness of form makes an object the same in kind and the same in number. If we go with the former, then sameness of form is only part (but an important part nonetheless!) of the story for how an individual remains the very same individual over time. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Peter van Inwagen defends this view with respect to material artifacts in his *Material Beings*, pp. 124-141, but also defends the view that there are living composite material objects later in the book. For further reading on mereological nihilism, see Daniel Z. Korman, “Ordinary Objects,” especially section 1.2. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Michael C. Rea defends this view in his “In Defense of Mereological Universalism”. For further reading on mereological universalism, see Korman, “Ordinary Objects,” especially section 1.3. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For other non-hylomorphic approaches to preserving the existence of both tables and their parts, see David Cornell, “Material Composition,” section 3. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The inspiration for my dining room table example used throughout this essay is Aristotle’s famous syllable argument for hylomorphism in Book VII, Chapter 17 of his *Metaphysics*. There he argues that even something as simple as the syllable BA is more than the sum of its parts, more than simply the letters B and A, otherwise BA would exist whenever and wherever B and A are found, which is clearly not the case. ### References [Aristotle. (1984a). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one)[*Physics*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one)[.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one)[ Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. In J. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one)[Barnes (Ed.), ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one)[*The Complete Works of Aristotle*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one)[, Vol.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one)[ 1 (pp. 315–446). Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016504/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-one) [Aristotle (1984b). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-two)[*Metaphysics*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-two)[. Translated by W. D. Ross. In J. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-two)[Barnes (Ed.), ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-two)[*The Complete Works of Aristotle*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-two)[, Vol.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-two)[ 2 (pp. 1552–1778). Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/the-complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-two) [Cornell, David. (2018). ](https://iep.utm.edu/mat-comp/)[“Material Composition.” ](https://iep.utm.edu/mat-comp/)[In ](https://iep.utm.edu/mat-comp/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/mat-comp/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/mat-comp/) [Korman, Daniel Z. (2020). “Ordinary Objects.” In E. N. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/)[Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/) [Koslicki, Kathrin. (2008). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-structure-of-objects-9780199539895?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Structure of Objects*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-structure-of-objects-9780199539895?cc=us&lang=en&)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-structure-of-objects-9780199539895?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-structure-of-objects-9780199539895?cc=us&lang=en&) [Jaworski, William. (2016). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/structure-and-the-metaphysics-of-mind-9780198749561?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/structure-and-the-metaphysics-of-mind-9780198749561?cc=us&lang=en&)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/structure-and-the-metaphysics-of-mind-9780198749561?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/structure-and-the-metaphysics-of-mind-9780198749561?cc=us&lang=en&) [Rea, Michael C. (1998). ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513)[“In Defense of Mereological Universalism.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513)[, Vol.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513)[ 58, No. 2: pp. 347-360.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513) [Skrzypek, Jeremy W. (2021). ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02089-w)[“From Potency to Act: Hyloenergeism.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02089-w)[*Synthese*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02089-w)[, Vol.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02089-w)[ 198, No. 11: pp. 2691-2716.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02089-w) [van Inwagen, Peter. (1990). ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801483066/material-beings/#bookTabs=1)[*Material Beings*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801483066/material-beings/#bookTabs=1)[.](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801483066/material-beings/#bookTabs=1)[ Cornell University Press.](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801483066/material-beings/#bookTabs=1) ### Related Essays [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Objects and their Parts: The Problem of Material Composition](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/04/18/material-composition/) by Jeremy Skrzypek [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case ### Translation [Turkish](https://veritasdergisi.com/2024/08/03/form-ve-madde-hilomorfizm-jeremy-skrzypek/) ### PDF Download Download in [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/hylomorphism-1.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Jeremy Skrzypek](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Skrzypek) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ohio Dominican University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Saint Louis University in 2016. His main areas of research are metaphysics, medieval philosophy, and philosophy of religion, with a special focus on issues surrounding the Aristotelian theory of hylomorphism and the thought of Thomas Aquinas. [sites.google.com/site/jeremywskrzypek](https://sites.google.com/site/jeremywskrzypek) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics **Tags:** Aristotle, Hylomorphism, mereological nihilism, mereological universalism, metaphysics of material objects, Skrzypek --- ### [Objects and their Parts: The Problem of Material Composition](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/04/18/material-composition/) **Published:** April 18, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the problem of material composition, which is the attempt to answer the following question: under what circumstances do some smaller objects make up or compose some further object?” **Content:** Author: [Jeremy Skrzypek](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Skrzypek) Category: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word Count: 997 words There are several items on a desk: a pen, a notebook, a laptop, a coffee cup. Each of these items is also made up of other things. The laptop has a screen, a keyboard, and a hard drive. The notebook includes several sheets of paper, a cover, and a spiral ring. Ultimately, each of these items is made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons. But is there an additional item on the desk, something made up of all of these other items, something we might call “deskassortment”? If not, why not? And if not, why do those other objects exist but not deskassortment? This is *the problem of material composition*, which is the attempt to answer the following question: under what circumstances do some smaller objects make up or compose some further object?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay provides an overview of the four main answers to this question: *always*, *never*, *just once*, and *sometimes*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [![A picture of a cluttered desk: how many objects are there?](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/material-composition.jpg?resize=656%2C436&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/material-composition.jpg?ssl=1)A picture of a cluttered desk: how many objects are there?### 1. Mereological Universalism Some say that smaller objects *always* compose some further object. For every possible combination of objects, there is some additional object composed of just those objects. According to *mereological universalism*, tables, trees, and human beings exist, but so do things like “shoetowermoon,” an object composed of my left shoe, the Eiffel tower, and the moon.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The main advantage of mereological universalism is that it offers clear, precise, and principled answers to questions concerning what objects there are, what parts those objects have, and where one object ends and another begins. The main concern with mereological universalism is that it is counterintuitive. Most of us wouldn’t think to include strange objects like shoetowermoon in our inventory of the universe. Another concern with mereological universalism is that it means that an object can never change any of its parts. This is because, on mereological universalism, each object is identified with its parts: having the particular parts that it does is what makes any object the particular object that it is. As a result, on mereological universalism, replacing the brakes on my car would mean that it is no longer the same car. ### 2. Mereological Nihilism Others say that it is *never* the case that smaller objects compose some further object. According to *mereological nihilism,* there are no composite material objects. The only objects that exist are simple particles, which never make up anything larger than themselves.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Like mereological universalism, mereological nihilism is clear, precise, and principled. And, unlike mereological universalism, it doesn’t force us to recognize the existence of strange objects like shoetowermoon. The main concern with mereological nihilism is that it denies the existence of most of what we would ordinarily take to exist, including ourselves.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) On this view, there are no tables, trees, or even human beings, only simple particles in table, tree, and human-like arrangements. Another concern with mereological nihilism is that it is not clear whether there are simple particles.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) We used to think that atoms could not be further divided, but we later discovered that they could. For all we know, no matter how small we go, objects can always be broken down into smaller parts, and so on forever. If that’s true, then there are no simple particles. Which means that, on mereological nihilism, there are no material objects at all. ### 3. Mereological Monism Others say that smaller objects compose some further object in only one case: when they are considered altogether. According to *mereological monism*, the only thing that exists is the universe, the complete set of everything.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Mereological monism is the simplest and most straightforward of the views we have considered. There is just one composite material object, and it includes everything. The main concern with mereological monism is that it too denies the existence of most of what we would ordinarily take to exist. On this view, there are no tables, trees, or human beings, only table-ish, tree-ish, and human-ish patterns sewn into the seamless fabric of reality.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Another concern with mereological monism is that it is not clear whether there is some complete set of everything.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) We used to think that our solar system was everything there is, but we later discovered that the universe is much larger. For all we know, no matter how big we go, we can always go bigger. For any set of objects in our universe, there might always be some larger set which includes items not included in the first, and so on forever. If that’s true, then there is no complete set of everything. Which means that, on mereological monism, there are no material objects at all. ### 4. Mereological Conservatism Finally, others say that smaller objects sometimes, but not always, compose some further object. According to *mereological conservatism*, the composite material objects that exist are all and only those that we ordinarily recognize.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The main concern with mereological conservatism is that it seems arbitrary. Consider *islands* and *incars*. An island is a mass of land surrounded by water. An incar is a car surrounded by a garage. We all think that islands exist. But none of us think that incars exist. And yet they would seem to be composed in very similar ways. Our decision to recognize the existence of islands but not incars seems unjustified.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Consider also clouds. Take all of the water molecules that make up a particular cloud. It seems that all of those molecules minus-one should still be enough to compose a cloud. How could a single water molecule be the difference between a cloud and a non-cloud? If that’s right, then why don’t all of the molecules minus-one also compose a cloud right now? Once again, our decision to recognize the existence of the first cloud but not the second seems unjustified.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 5. Conclusion These are the leading proposals for how to solve the problem of material composition. Each has its pros and its cons. None of them is clearly the best. Doing a full inventory of the contents of the desk turns out to be more difficult than we first thought. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Peter van Inwagen calls this the “Special Composition Question,” in contrast to the General Composition Question, which asks “What is Composition?” (see his *Material Beings*, p. 20 and p. 39). It has since become the key guiding question for this debate. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) I owe this way of breaking down the debate to Robert C. Koons and Timothy H. Pickavance (see their *Metaphysics: The Fundamentals*, Chapter 6, for a similar taxonomy of views). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Michael C. Rea defends this view in his “In Defense of Mereological Universalism.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) van Inwagen defends this view with respect to material artifacts in his *Material Beings*, pp. 124-141, but also defends the view that there are living composite material objects later in the book. By “simple particles,” I mean particles that are completely lacking in any kind of parts and so cannot be further divided or broken down into anything more simple than themselves. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) I am assuming here that we are material objects composed entirely of material parts. That assumption might be false. Perhaps we ourselves are simple particles, material objects completely lacking in any kind of parts, or perhaps we are entirely immaterial. See Chad Vance’s [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/), Kristin Seemuth Whaley’s [Animalism and Personal Identity: Are We Animals?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/), Jacob Berger’s [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/), and Marc Bobro’s [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) for helpful introductions on whether we are entirely material, partly material, or entirely immaterial. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Philosophers call this the problem of “gunk,” where gunk refers to matter that is infinitely divisible. For a discussion of gunk as a potential problem for mereological nihilism, see Jonathan Schaffer, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) There are two types of monism discussed and defended in contemporary metaphysics: *existence monism* and *priority monism*. According to existence monism, the whole universe is the only material object that there is. All of the smaller “objects” that compose our universe are really just ways of arbitrarily carving up the whole for practical or explanatory purposes, like a big cake that can be sliced in an infinite number of ways. According to priority monism, the whole universe is the only *fundamental* material object that there is. All of the smaller objects that compose our universe exist and are real, but are merely derivative and not fundamental, meaning that they depend for their existence and identity on the whole rather than having their own independent existence and identity. Terence Horgan and Matjaž Potrč defend existence monism in their “Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism”. Jonathan Schaffer defends priority monism in his “Monism: The Priority of the Whole”. For the sake of simplicity, my arguments here concern existence monism. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Here priority monism might have the advantage over existence monism. For, on priority monism, these objects exist and are real, they are just not fundamental. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Philosophers call this the problem of “junk,” where junk refers to matter that is infinitely composable. For a discussion of junk as a potential problem for mereological monism, see Schaffer, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) There are many ways of fleshing out mereological conservatism, and each is an attempt to provide an informative analysis of composition that preserves the existence of as many of the objects of our experience as possible without letting in too many objects that we wouldn’t ordinarily recognize. According to embodied mind sparsism, for example, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, the activities of those objects jointly support consciousness. (See Stuart Clint Dowland, “Embodied Mind Sparsism”.) According to organicism, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, the activities of those objects jointly constitute a life. As a result, living organisms exist, but things like tables and chairs do not. (See, for example, the later chapters of van Inwagen, *Material Beings*.) According to emergentism, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, their union gives rise to “emergent features,” features that arise only when the parts interact with one another in certain ways. Living organisms are candidate emergent entities, but there may be other examples as well. (Trenton Merricks defends something like this view with respect to persons, in his *Objects and Persons*, though with respect to everything else he leans mereological nihilist. For a helpful overview of the prospects and perils of emergentism, see Koons and Pickavance, *Metaphysics*, Chapter 6.4.) According to hylomorphism, smaller objects compose something larger than themselves when, and only when, those objects possess or exhibit a certain form, configuration, or structure. This may include both emergent and non-emergent entities. (Kathrin Koslicki defends this view in her *The Structure of Objects*. See also Jeremy W. Skrzypek’s [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/).) And according to brutalism, smaller objects sometimes but not always compose something larger than themselves, but there is no further analysis possible for when this occurs. It is just a brute fact. (Ned Markosian defends this view in his “Brutal Composition.”) [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See John Hawthorne, *Metaphysical Essays*, p. vii for a brief discussion of this argument. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Peter Unger, “The Problem of the Many,” and David Lewis, “Many, but Almost One” for important discussions of this argument. For an excellent general overview of islands, incars, clouds, other problems for mereological conservatism, and how we might try to solve them, see Korman, “Ordinary Objects.” ### References [Dowland, Stuart Clint (2015).](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0581-3)[ “Embodied Mind Sparsism.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0581-3)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0581-3)[, Vol.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0581-3)[ 173, No. 7: pp. 1853-1872.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0581-3) [Hawthorne, John. (2006). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/metaphysical-essays-9780199291243)[*Metaphysical Essays*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/metaphysical-essays-9780199291243)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/metaphysical-essays-9780199291243)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/metaphysical-essays-9780199291243) [Horgan, Terence and Matjaž Potrč. (2012). ](https://link.springer.com/book/9780230279483)[“Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.” ](https://link.springer.com/book/9780230279483)[In Philip Goff (Ed.), ](https://link.springer.com/book/9780230279483)[*Spinoza on Monism*](https://link.springer.com/book/9780230279483)[.](https://link.springer.com/book/9780230279483)[ Palgrave Macmillan: pp. 51-76.](https://link.springer.com/book/9780230279483) [Koons, Robert C. and Timothy H. Pickavace. (2015). ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Metaphysics%3A+The+Fundamentals-p-9781405195737)[*Metaphysics: The Fundamentals*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Metaphysics%3A+The+Fundamentals-p-9781405195737)[.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Metaphysics%3A+The+Fundamentals-p-9781405195737)[ Wiley-Blackwell.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Metaphysics%3A+The+Fundamentals-p-9781405195737) [Korman, Daniel Z. (2020). “Ordinary Objects.” In E. N. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/)[Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/) [Koslicki, Kathrin. (2008). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-structure-of-objects-9780199539895?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Structure of Objects*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-structure-of-objects-9780199539895?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-structure-of-objects-9780199539895?cc=us&lang=en&) [Lewis, David. (1999). “Many, but Almost One.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/papers-in-metaphysics-and-epistemology/951D5B7E172A80A173E0850D6CF8070E)[In ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/papers-in-metaphysics-and-epistemology/951D5B7E172A80A173E0850D6CF8070E)[*Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/papers-in-metaphysics-and-epistemology/951D5B7E172A80A173E0850D6CF8070E)[.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/papers-in-metaphysics-and-epistemology/951D5B7E172A80A173E0850D6CF8070E)[ Cambridge University Press: pp. 164-182.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/papers-in-metaphysics-and-epistemology/951D5B7E172A80A173E0850D6CF8070E) [Markosian, Ned. (1998). “Brutal Composition.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320891)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320891)[, Vol.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320891)[ 92, No. 3: pp. 211-249.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320891) [Merricks, Trenton. (2001). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/objects-and-persons-9780199266319)[*Objects and Persons*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/objects-and-persons-9780199266319)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/objects-and-persons-9780199266319)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/objects-and-persons-9780199266319) [Rea, Michael C. (1998). “In Defense of Mereological Universalism.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513)[, Vol.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513)[ 58, No. 2: pp. 347-360.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653513) [Schaffer, Jonathan. (2010). “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” ](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/119/1/31/2871/Monism-The-Priority-of-the-Whole?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*The Philosophical Review*](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/119/1/31/2871/Monism-The-Priority-of-the-Whole?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[, Vol.](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/119/1/31/2871/Monism-The-Priority-of-the-Whole?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[ 119, No. 1: pp. 31-76.](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/119/1/31/2871/Monism-The-Priority-of-the-Whole?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Unger, Peter (1980) “The Problem of the Many.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00416.x)[*Midwest Studies in Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00416.x)[, Vol.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00416.x)[ 5, No. 1: pp. 411–67.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00416.x) [van Inwagen, Peter. (1990). ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801483066/material-beings/#bookTabs=1)[*Material Beings*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801483066/material-beings/#bookTabs=1)[. Cornell University Press.](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801483066/material-beings/#bookTabs=1) ### Related Essays [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Are We Animals? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/)[Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Descartes’ Meditations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) 4-6 by Marc Bobro ### Translation [Turkish](https://veritasdergisi.com/2024/07/03/nesneler-ve-parcalari-materyal-kompozisyon-problemi-jeremy-skrzypek/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/material-composition.pdf). ### About the Author [Jeremy Skrzypek](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Skrzypek) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ohio Dominican University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Saint Louis University in 2016. His main areas of research are metaphysics, medieval philosophy, and philosophy of religion, with a special focus on issues surrounding the Aristotelian theory of hylomorphism and the thought of Thomas Aquinas. [sites.google.com/site/jeremywskrzypek](https://sites.google.com/site/jeremywskrzypek) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics **Tags:** material composition, Skrzypek --- ### [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/) **Published:** April 10, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Ethical non-cognitivists argue that ethical judgments are, strictly speaking, not beliefs: they are expressions of emotions, or commands, or expressions of approval or some other non-cognitive mental state. This essay introduces this view in metaethics. **Content:** Author: Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) Word Count: 999 Consider a common ethical judgment, e.g., that unprovoked assault is wrong. People who say this seem to *believe* that these actions are wrong: such assaults have the characteristic of being wrong*.* Advocates of *ethical non-cognitivism*, however, argue that ethical judgments are, strictly speaking, not *beliefs*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) There are different types of non-cognitivists. Some argue that to judge that assault is wrong is to *express disapproval* of such actions; others argue it’s like *urging* people to not act like that, or *wanting* people to not hurt others. They all agree though that ethical judgments are not literal beliefs.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay introduces ethical non-cognitivism, an important view in *metaethics*, which focuses on fundamental philosophical issues concerning what ethical judgments are. [!["Dos Caras (Two Faces)" by Rufino Tamayo. Lithograph. 1973.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/non-cognitivism.jpg?resize=656%2C480&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/non-cognitivism.jpg?ssl=1) “Dos Caras (Two Faces)” by Rufino Tamayo. Lithograph. 1973.### 1. Beliefs and Desires Our minds are made up of different *mental states*. *Beliefs* are mental representations of the world. We have beliefs about where we live, what’s dangerous, and much more. Beliefs are often called *cognitive* mental states, meaning that *they can be true or false*. Mental states that don’t represent the world are often called *non-cognitive*: these include desires, emotions, and preferences, which are all *neither true nor false*. While it’s true *that* someone has, say, a particular desire, that desire *itself* is neither true nor false. Non-cognitive mental states play roles other than representing the world. Desires motivate us to act: unless a person has a desire to, say, eat a piece of cake, they won’t be motivated to get some, no matter what they believe about cake. [\[3\]](#_ftn3) Emotions influence how situations feel to us and make us more likely to respond in certain ways. Preferences rank our wants and guide choices. ### 2. Varieties of Non-Cognitivism Early versions of non-cognitivism focused on what people *do* when they make ethical judgments. *Emotivists* held that to say, for example, “Lying is wrong” is to try to influence people not to lie, akin to *emoting* “Boo for lying!”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) *Prescriptivists* held that such judgments are *commands* to not lie, something like “Don’t lie!”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) More recent versions of non-cognitivism focus on the mental states we express with ethical judgments: judging that lying is often wrong is more like *disapproving* of lying or *planning* not to lie in most situations.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Like desires, these mental states are primarily meant to guide action.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Why Non-Cognitivism? There are two common motivations for non-cognitivism. Some non-cognitivists hold their views because of how they see moral judgment as related to action and motivation. They argue that moral judgments always motivate the people who make them, at least to some extent.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Suppose someone sincerely judges that they should donate to charity, but never shows the slightest inclination to do this. Non-cognitivists find this puzzling: they think that if the person is sincere, they would usually act, or at least want to act, accordingly. Non-cognitivists use this consideration to argue that, although action normally requires both beliefs and desires, moral judgments seem to bring their own motivational push in a way beliefs do not. So they conclude that moral judgments must be inherently desire-like, or non-cognitive. Another argument for non-cognitivism is that if moral judgments were primarily about representing the world, like beliefs, they would represent *moral* *truths* or *facts*. But it is unclear what those facts would be, beyond facts we are most familiar with: facts we can observe, measure, and test. Moral facts do not seem to be the kind of thing we encounter in those ways, and so they conclude it’s more likely that moral judgments are non-cognitive. ### 4. Responses In response, some find it not surprising that people are sometimes not motivated by their moral judgments: they think this happens all the time. So they reject the non-cognitivists’s claim that sincere moral judgments always motivate. About ethical truths or facts, some respond that, yes, these would not be like ordinary facts or truths about common physical objects. But they *might* be like mathematical facts—known by thought alone—*or* very complex scientific facts, *or* a type of general “normative” fact, comparable to facts about how people *should* reason and form their beliefs.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) So perhaps there are more types of facts than those that non-cognitivists initially recognize. ### 5. Objections #### 5.1. Moral Criticism Non-cognitivism is subject to a number of objections. First, imagine someone says, “dictatorships are good.” If non-cognitivism is true, this claim expresses a desire-like attitude, such as *wanting* dictatorships or *approving* of dictatorships. What sort of criticism can such attitudes be subject to? With beliefs, the answer is straightforward: some beliefs are *false*. But non-cognitive attitudes, however, are *not* true or false.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) So, if moral judgments are non-cognitive attitudes, this seems to undermine our ordinary ability to criticise anyone’s moral views, about *any* topic.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) #### 5.2. The Frege-Geach Problem Another challenge for non-cognitivism is to explain how moral judgments interact with other mental states, including other moral judgments. The problem becomes clear when we think about conditional (i.e., “if-then”) moral claims like “if lying is wrong, then getting your brother to lie is wrong,” or when they clash, as when someone judges both that “lying is wrong” and that “getting your brother to lie is *not* wrong.” If we, again, think of these states as *beliefs*, the explanation is straightforward: two beliefs clash when they cannot both be true: this is an *inconsistency*. But if moral judgments are non-cognitive states, it is unclear what it means for them to clash in this way. If moral judgements are neither true nor false, then it is unclear what kind of mistake one makes when holding both of the attitudes above. For the non-cognitivist, the challenge is to explain why the pair is inconsistent, rather than just an odd combination. This is a version of what is known as the *Frege-Geach problem*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 5. Conclusion Non-cognitivism understands moral judgments less like attempts to state ethical facts and more like attitudes that guide how we live. It faces challenges in explaining things like moral criticism and logical consistency. Whether these challenges can be met remains an open question in contemporary metaethics.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Likewise, they are not any of the *contents* of a belief, such as a statement, or assertion, or declarative sentence. Non-cognitivism contrasts with views like *moral realism* and *error theory* according to which moral judgments are classified as beliefs or the contents of those beliefs. About the former see [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf, about the latter see [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Ethical non-cognitivism can be understood as a theory of what mental states or states of mind people are in when they make moral judgments, or as as a theory about the “contents” of those mental states, and so a view about the meaning(s) of ethical concepts and language, or both. Here we will mostly focus on non-cognitivism as a view about moral mental states—sometimes called *psychological non-cognitivism* (Bedke, 2017: 294). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This way of thinking about the connection between non-cognitive states and action is often associated with the views of David Hume and is called the *Humean theory of motivation*. See [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: David Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman. For a classic articulation and application of the view, see Smith (1987). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Ayer (1936) and Stevenson (1944) for representative examples of emotivism. Emotivism is often associated with *emotions*. Historically, however, it is more accurate to group emotivists in the way suggested here by their views about how moral language functions in a way similar to emoting (see Schroeder, 2024: 21). Still, emotions and their expression play an important role in many emotivist views. See Satris (1987) for a historical overview and further examples. Even later non-cognitivist views that moved away from the label “emotivism” still connect moral judgment to emotions in more indirect ways—for example, by linking moral judgment to when emotions like guilt or resentment are *appropriate* or *rational* (e.g. Gibbard 1990). Views that connect morality to emotions in similar ways are often grouped under the label *sentimentalism*, whether or not they are non-cognitivist. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Hare (1952) for a classic example of prescriptivism. Prescriptivism reflects a broader motivation shared by many views grouped under “non-cognitivism”: that moral thought and talk are distinctive and their close connection with action. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) It is important to observe that, for non-cognitivists, “subjective approval” is *not* that the person making an ethical judgment is saying, “I approve of this action” or “I disapprove of this action,” since those claims are either true or false and so *cognitive*. For some discussion of a simple version of what can be called “ethical subjectivism,” see [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis: but see footnote 2 for caveats about that discussion. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For contemporary variations of non-cognitivism based on different non-cognitive states see Blackburn (1998) for *approvals*, Gibbard (2003) for *plans*, and Silk (2015) *preferences*. Nowadays there are also more complex hybrid views that hold that moral judgments combine beliefs with non-cognitive states (e.g. Ridge, 2014), but which still count as non-cognitivist, since they take the non-cognitive element to be fundamental. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Philosophers often call the thesis that moral judgment and motivation are *necessarily* connected is called *motivational internalism*: motivation is “internal” to moral judgment itself. For an introduction to motivational internalism, see Tiberius (2023). Those deny this connection are *motivational externalists*: motivation is “external” to moral judgment itself. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For more on these proposals, see [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Non-cognitive states can, in one sense, be truly or falsely attributed to us. For example, “it is true that Ana wants more crisps.” However, compare this with how beliefs can also be truly attributed to us independently of whether they are true or false themselves. “It is true that Ana believes there are more crisps in the kitchen” can be true independently of whether there really are crisps in the kitchen. It is in this latter sense that non-cognitive attitudes do not seem to be true or false. See Schroeder (2018) for further discussion. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Contemporary non-cognitivists have developed various strategies to address this challenge. For example, when we consider more complex cases, it becomes less obvious that we cannot make sense of being mistaken about our non-cognitive attitudes. We are often pressured to revise or abandon our desires once we reflect on their consequences and costs; the same can be said about other non-cognitive attitudes. See Blackburn (1998: 296; 1999) for ways to develop this line of response. For alternative approaches, see Gibbard (1990: Ch. 3) and Schroeder (2014). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The problem is called the Frege-Geach problem because Peter Geach (1916-2013) (1960) developed it as an objection to views like non-cognitivism, drawing on a more general point associated with Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). The problem is also more commonly presented as a problem about moral *language,* specifically about the meaning of moral claims. However, if one argues that the meaning of moral claims should be explained in terms of the non-cognitive mental states they express then the problem presented here and the problem about language are interconnected. An account of the inconsistency of our moral claims in this framework depends on an account of the inconsistency of our moral judgments. For a more advanced overview see Schroeder (2008). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Contemporary non-cognitivists respond, for example, by arguing that some combinations of states can be *practically inconsistent*: you cannot hold them together while reasoning about what to do. For example, you cannot consistently intend to arrive at the airport at 3 p.m. and also intend to catch a flight that leaves at 2 p.m. Similarly, you cannot consistently hold both “lying is wrong” and “getting your little brother to lie is not wrong” even if these are desire-like states. One worry, however, is whether this practical inconsistency is really the same kind of inconsistency that the Frege–Geach problem seems to demand; see van Roojen (1996). For an overview of the main options in the debate see Woods (2017). ### References [Ayer, Alfred Jules (1936). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/AYELTA-2)[*Language, Truth and Logic*](https://philpapers.org/rec/AYELTA-2)[.](https://philpapers.org/rec/AYELTA-2)[ London: V. Gollancz.](https://philpapers.org/rec/AYELTA-2) [Bedke, Matthew (2017). ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-19/cognitivism-non-cognitivism-bedke-matthew)[“Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism.” ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-19/cognitivism-non-cognitivism-bedke-matthew)[In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett, ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-19/cognitivism-non-cognitivism-bedke-matthew)[*The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics.*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-19/cognitivism-non-cognitivism-bedke-matthew)[ New York: Routledge. 292-307.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-19/cognitivism-non-cognitivism-bedke-matthew) [Blackburn, Simon (1998). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BLARPA-4)[*Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BLARPA-4)[ New York: Oxford University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BLARPA-4) [Blackburn, Simon (1999). “Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?” *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 42 (2): 213-227.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BLAIOM) [Enoch, David (2011). *Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.* Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.](https://academic.oup.com/book/26213) [Geach, P. T. (1960). “Ascriptivism.” *Philosophical Review* 69 (2): 221-225.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183506?origin=crossref) [Gibbard, Allan (1990). ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674953789)[*Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674953789)[.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674953789)[ Cambridge: Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674953789) [Gibbard, Allan (2003). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBTHT-8)[*Thinking How to Live*](https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBTHT-8)[.](https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBTHT-8)[ Cambridge: Harvard University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBTHT-8) [Hare, Richard Mervyn (1952). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/12879)[*The Language of Morals*](https://academic.oup.com/book/12879)[.](https://academic.oup.com/book/12879)[ Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/12879) [Moore, G. E. (1903). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOOPE)[*Principia Ethica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOOPE)[.](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOOPE)[ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOOPE) [Ridge, Michael (2014). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RIDIB)[*Impassioned Belief.*](https://philpapers.org/rec/RIDIB)[ New York, NY: Oxford University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/RIDIB) [Roojen, Mark van (1996). “Expressivism and Irrationality.” *Philosophical Review* 105 (3): 311-335.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185703) [Satris, Stephen (1987). *Ethical Emotivism.* Norwell, MA: Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.](https://philpapers.org/rec/SATEE) [Schroeder, Mark (2008). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWIT-3)[“What is the Frege-Geach Problem?” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWIT-3)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWIT-3)[ 3 (4): 703-720.](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWIT-3) [Schroeder, Mark (2018). ](https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTMT-3)[“The moral truth.” ](https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTMT-3)[In Michael Glanzberg, ](https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTMT-3)[*The Oxford Handbook of Truth.*](https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTMT-3)[ Oxford, United Kingdom.](https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHTMT-3) [Schroeder, Mark Andrew (2023). ](https://www.routledge.com/Noncognitivism-in-Ethics/Schroeder/p/book/9780367529222)[*Noncognitivism in Ethics*](https://www.routledge.com/Noncognitivism-in-Ethics/Schroeder/p/book/9780367529222)[.](https://www.routledge.com/Noncognitivism-in-Ethics/Schroeder/p/book/9780367529222)[ New York, NY: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Noncognitivism-in-Ethics/Schroeder/p/book/9780367529222) [Silk, Alex (2014). ](http://philpapers.org/rec/SILHTB-2)[“How to Be an Ethical Expressivist.” ](http://philpapers.org/rec/SILHTB-2)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](http://philpapers.org/rec/SILHTB-2)[ 91 (1):47-81.](http://philpapers.org/rec/SILHTB-2) [Smith, Michael (1987). ](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/XCVI/381/36/946058?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false)[“The Humean Theory of Motivation.” ](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/XCVI/381/36/946058?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false)[*Mind*](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/XCVI/381/36/946058?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false)[ 96 (381): 36-61.](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/XCVI/381/36/946058?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false) [Stevenson, Charles Leslie (1944). *Ethics and Language.* New York: Yale University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/STEEAL-13) [Suikkanen, Jussi (2009). “The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism.” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 90 (3): 364-387.](about:blank) [Tiberius, Valerie (2023). ](https://www.routledge.com/Moral-Psychology-A-Contemporary-Introduction/Tiberius/p/book/9781032388465)[*Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction*](https://www.routledge.com/Moral-Psychology-A-Contemporary-Introduction/Tiberius/p/book/9781032388465)[.](https://www.routledge.com/Moral-Psychology-A-Contemporary-Introduction/Tiberius/p/book/9781032388465)[ 2d. Edition. London: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Moral-Psychology-A-Contemporary-Introduction/Tiberius/p/book/9781032388465) [Woods, Jack (2017). ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-15/frege-geach-problem-jack-woods)[“The Frege-Geach Problem.” ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-15/frege-geach-problem-jack-woods)[In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett, ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-15/frege-geach-problem-jack-woods)[*The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics.*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-15/frege-geach-problem-jack-woods)[ New York: Routledge. 226-242.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315213217-15/frege-geach-problem-jack-woods) ### Related Essays [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: David Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/) by Nathan Nobis ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/NonCognitivism.pdf). ### About the Author Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco is a postdoctoral fellow at National Autonomous University of Mexico’s Institute for Philosophical Research. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Leeds. His primary research area is metaethics and has a growing interest in the philosophy of social and political language. [philpeople.org/profiles/rodrigo-valencia-pacheco](https://philpeople.org/profiles/rodrigo-valencia-pacheco) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** emotivism, expressivism, meta-ethics, metaethics, non-cognitivism --- ### [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) **Published:** February 12, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to business ethics, with an overview of the many relevant stakeholders whose interests are ethically important in business. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word count: 996 Everyone does business, of some kind or another, on a near-daily basis. We buy food and shelter and pay for many other wants and needs. And most people sell their labor by working for an employer, or for themselves. When all goes well, people enjoy rewarding jobs and paychecks, and lots of valuable goods and services. But when things go badly, people can lose their jobs, lose their money, ruin their reputations, and even end up in prison, in poverty, or dead.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) What happens in the course of business is therefore of great ethical significance: people can be harmed and benefited in many ways; people can be treated, and treat others, in respectful and uplifting ways, as well as disrespectful and degrading ones; and businesses can promote fairness and justice, as well as enable unfairness and injustice, in many ways. *Stakeholders* are anyone who can be affected by a business. But not all stakeholders are individuals. Others include communities, countries, and even the natural world, including animals.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The scope of business ethics is thus very wide indeed. *Business ethics*, therefore, is one of the most important areas of applied or practical ethics. Here we’ll review some of the ethical obligations that business owners, employees, and customers have to each other and to the rest of the world. [!["Let's get ethical!" A scene from "The Office."](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ethical.gif?resize=600%2C375&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ethical.gif?ssl=1) [“Let’s get ethical!” A scene from “The Office.”](https://vimeo.com/111360699)### 1. Obligations to Employees and Customers Maybe most people don’t expect to ever own their own businesses. But they’ll still be employers from time to time. Suppose you hire someone to fix your roof. Do you need to ensure that your yard is free of unexpected dangers? Suppose your roofer quotes you an estimate and you agree to it, and then the roofer forgets their quote and asks you to repeat it. Do you have an obligation to tell the truth? One main area of business ethics concerns an employer’s obligations to employees. Thus, business ethicists study the moral duties employers have to ensure safe working conditions and decent pay. While the law often requires such treatment, business ethics isn’t simply about following the law itself.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Some argue that these moral duties arise from truly respecting your employees.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Fairness or justice might require that salaries or wages be relatively equal.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) And employers have an obligation to ensure that women and people from other oppressed groups are treated fairly, which might extend to giving some preference to hiring women or people of color.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Beyond this, businesses might have obligations of loyalty or reciprocity not to replace striking workers, and not to offshore jobs.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Employees also have obligations to treat their fellow employees fairly: help ensure a safe workplace and communicate honestly with the other employees. You might also have an obligation of fairness to not work during a strike. As a customer, you have an obligation to treat employees with kindness: while they are means to the end of acquiring some product, they also deserve respect.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This respect might also include not buying from a business when its workers are on strike. Agents of businesses should not deceive their customers, and perhaps should not sell defective or dangerous products to their customers, at least without warning.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) There might be important moral obligations concerning advertising as well, such as not to advertise to children or other vulnerable groups.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) And businesses might have obligations about protecting customers’ (and employees’) privacy.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) We likely also have the obligation not to steal intellectual property.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) This is just a start; there are many other obligations.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 2. Obligations to Owners, Society, and the Environment If you work for a retailer, do you have an obligation not to steal clothes from that retailer? What if your employer is a huge corporation and probably won’t miss the items? Is it okay to slack off when no one’s watching? Suppose your boss wants to pay you under the table: is it wrong to accept a tax-free wage? And if your boss orders you to dump a bunch of trash in a neighboring park, what should you do? Most ethicists believe that businesses have some obligations to the business’s owners. Agents of a corporation have a *fiduciary duty* to the corporation’s owners. If I trust you with something as important as my investment money, then by accepting that trust, you take on substantial moral responsibility.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) One might also argue that businesses have obligations to the owners to not waste money by paying employees too much.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Similarly, even setting aside the law, there might be a moral obligation of fairness not to allow insider trading.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Most business-ethics courses focus primarily on moral obligations of businesses to stakeholders and vice-versa. However, businesses have enormous political and societal influence, so business-ethics topics are inextricably linked to broader topics in economics, sociology, politics, and justice:[\[17\]](#_ftn17) e.g., businesses commonly lobby Congress to pass special, rent-seeking laws that don’t benefit society nor the nation’s economy overall.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Ethicists believe that businesses have many obligations to the broader society, such as to obey minimum-wage and intellectual-property laws,[\[19\]](#_ftn19) to minimize pollution, and not support corruption.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) And they might have obligations not to run sweatshops.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) As a customer, you might have an obligation of respect or beneficence to buy only from morally responsible businesses.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) And as a potential employee, you might have an obligation not to work for an apparently immoral industry.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) ### 3. Conclusion As we can see, business ethicists deal with a wide variety of ethical questions. To answer them, we use the methods and resources of philosophical ethics, such as appealing to normative-ethical theories and arguments from analogy.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) Of course, some say that the only obligation in business is to make money.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) But that’s implausible: there is a difference between what’s beneficial and what’s morally right, and it is selfish to always prioritize the former.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Ethicists therefore advocate for *corporate responsibility*: to take seriously the set of obligations a business has to the broader society and environment.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) Beyond this, fortunately, when a business is ethically responsible, that can also help it be profitable.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Sometimes, morality and self-interest converge. [The Office Ethics Dance](https://vimeo.com/111360699). ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See e.g. Bryce 2002 for a prominent example of a disaster that can occur when businesses act insufficiently ethical; Rosenfield 2010 also provides a helpful account, and see also Brown and Dugan 2002. See also von Drehle 2006 for another famous example of failures of business ethics and the corresponding harms. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The project of prioritizing all the people who can be affected by a firm is the project of adopting a stakeholder orientation. “Stakeholders” are anyone who can affect or be affected by the business, and the business attempts to satisfy its moral obligations to all these stakeholders. See e.g. Freeman (2010 \[1984\]) for one of the first entries in the advocacy for the stakeholder approach. See also Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 3.1). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 4.1, and especially ch. 4 itself) for more about corporations and the law. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See also Werhane (1985, p. 132); Arnold (2003) and (2010); Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 6.1) on working conditions and Wertheimer (1996, p. 230) on wages. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Boatright 2010; Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 6.2). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Himma (2001); Boxill (2010); Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 8.1). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See e.g. Gould (2010, p. 309), Biondi (2010), and Byers and Stanberry (2018, §§ 6.3). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See also [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See e.g. Carson (2010, p. 343). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Carson (2010, p. 351). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See e.g. Byers and Stanberry (2018, §§ 6.4 and 11.1). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Himma (2008); DeGeorge (2010); Byers and Stanberry (2018, §§ 7.1). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a recent, comprehensive survey, see Byers and Stanberry (2018). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Goodpaster (2010, p. 131); Byers and Stanberry (2018, §§ 4.1). See also Marcoux (2003). More generally, in business ethics, we encounter principal-agent problems: cases where one person (the principal) hires someone else to do some work, and the principal wants to ensure that the agent gives the principal’s interests some priority. If I hire you to mow my lawn, you have a strong interest in making me believe that you did a good job, and I have a strong interest that you actually do a good job. Those aren’t the same thing. Jensen and Meckling (1976). One potential solution is to pay the employee a lot, but there might also be an obligation to the owner of the business not to waste money by paying the employee too much (Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Boatright 2010; Byers and Stanberry 2018, § 6.2). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) This can be especially important when a new CEO might be friends with people on the Board of Directors, who might prioritize their friendship over saving shareholders’ money. See e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2004); Boatright (2010); Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 6.2). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Engelen and Van Liederkerke (2007); Strudler (2010); Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 7.4). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Thus, a comprehensive study of business ethics includes social-and-political philosophy, philosophy of law, and potentially also political economy and macroeconomics. See e.g. Heath (2014) for such an approach. Similarly, some ethicists have argued that firms can be like small governments, issuing orders to their employees (Anderson 2017). Economists have studied how the standard structure of the firm might mirror other structures in society in morally important ways (Coase 1937; see also Gaus 2010, p. 90). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See Munger (2006) for a discussion of rent-seeking and some examples. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) De George (2010, p. 421). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Sagoff (2004); Newton (2005); Newton (2010); Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 4.2). On corruption, see Rose-Ackerman (1999); Velasquez (2010); and Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 7.4). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See n. 5. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Arnold (2003); Arnold (2010); Powell and Zwolinski (2012); Newton (2010, p. 668); Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 8.5); cf. Huemer (2019) on the meat industry. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) See e.g. Williams (1973, 97 ff.). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) See e.g. [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz and [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Some people think that businesses should not be too concerned with their moral obligations to anyone other than the businesses’ owners. For example, the economist Milton Friedman (1912-2006) famously argued that the only obligation a business has is to do what the business’s owners (typically, shareholders) want it to do. Usually, that means maximizing profits. See Friedman (1970). But business ethicists generally believe that firms have some moral obligations beyond simply increasing profits. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See also [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) We’ll assume that business owners actually do have moral obligations beyond simply obeying the wishes of the owners. On corporate responsibility, see Farmer and Hogue (1973) and Den Uyl (1984). See also Goodpaster (2010) and Byers and Stanberry (2018, § 3.4). This is sometimes also called “corporate social responsibility,” but the broader term (without “social”) implies that firms might have obligations that aren’t to society or aren’t to members of society. Such obligations might include environmental protection for its own sake. We should also assume that even in a capitalistic system, businesses can behave better or worse from the perspective of morality. We make this assumption because someone might argue that *no* business can be morally good in a capitalistic system, or at least, that no privately-owned business can be good. Indeed, some have argued that there can be no morally permissible consumption in a capitalist system (Tang 2021). For more, see my [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/). See also Gaus (2010). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) See e.g. Rosalsky 2019 and Morrison 2021 for useful discussions. ### References [Anderson, E. 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(2021). “Can You Make a Profit and Be Socially Responsible?” Business.com (22 September 2021).](https://www.business.com/articles/can-you-make-a-profit-and-be-socially-responsible/) [Munger, M. (2006). ](https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html)[“Rent-Seek and You Will Find.” ](https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html)[*EconLib*](https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html)[ (3 July 2006).](https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Mungerrentseeking.html) [Newton, L. H. (2005). ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470776452)[*Business Ethics and the Natural Environment*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470776452)[.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470776452)[ Blackwell.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470776452) [Newton, L. H. (2010). “Environmental Ethics and Business.” In G. G. Brenkert and T. L. Beauchamp (eds.), ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195307955.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195307955)[*The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195307955.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195307955)[ (pp. 657–676). Oxford University Press.](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195307955.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195307955) [Powell, B. and Zwolinski, M. (2012). ](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947569)[“The Ethical and Economic Case Against Sweatshop Labor: A Critical Assessment.” ](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947569)[*Journal of Business Ethics, 107*](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947569)[(4): 449–472.](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947569) [Rosalsky, G. (2019). “Does it Pay for Companies to Do Good?” Planet Money (17 September 2019). ](https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/09/17/761312221/does-it-pay-for-companies-to-do-good) [Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/corruption-and-government/94925B501D79FA0357060F5489DE2F1F)[*Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/corruption-and-government/94925B501D79FA0357060F5489DE2F1F)[.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/corruption-and-government/94925B501D79FA0357060F5489DE2F1F)[ Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/corruption-and-government/94925B501D79FA0357060F5489DE2F1F) [Rosenfield, H. (2010). ](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fking-grandmothers-widows_b_563398)[“Grandma Millie, Widows, and Orphans.” ](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fking-grandmothers-widows_b_563398)*[Huffpost](Huffpost)*[.](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fking-grandmothers-widows_b_563398) [Sagoff, M. (2004). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/price-principle-and-the-environment/2F1860B9DF74E3D1A90A858AFB81F09E#:~:text=Sagoff%20argues%20that%20economics%20can,people%20can%20settle%20environmental%20disputes.&text=Economic%20valuation%20lacks%20data%20because,producer%20cost%20not%20consumer%20benefit.)[*Price, Principle, and the Environment*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/price-principle-and-the-environment/2F1860B9DF74E3D1A90A858AFB81F09E#:~:text=Sagoff%20argues%20that%20economics%20can,people%20can%20settle%20environmental%20disputes.&text=Economic%20valuation%20lacks%20data%20because,producer%20cost%20not%20consumer%20benefit.)[.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/price-principle-and-the-environment/2F1860B9DF74E3D1A90A858AFB81F09E#:~:text=Sagoff%20argues%20that%20economics%20can,people%20can%20settle%20environmental%20disputes.&text=Economic%20valuation%20lacks%20data%20because,producer%20cost%20not%20consumer%20benefit.)[ Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/price-principle-and-the-environment/2F1860B9DF74E3D1A90A858AFB81F09E#:~:text=Sagoff%20argues%20that%20economics%20can,people%20can%20settle%20environmental%20disputes.&text=Economic%20valuation%20lacks%20data%20because,producer%20cost%20not%20consumer%20benefit.) [Tang, I. (2021). Why There Is No Ethical Production Under Capitalism. ](https://issiahk.org/blog/why-there-is-no-ethical-production-under-capitalism-.html)[*ISSIA Magazine*](https://issiahk.org/blog/why-there-is-no-ethical-production-under-capitalism-.html) [(30 January 2021).](https://issiahk.org/blog/why-there-is-no-ethical-production-under-capitalism-.html) [Velasquez, M. G. (2010) “Corruption and Bribery.” In G. G. Brenkert and T. L. Beauchamp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics (pp. 471–500). Oxford University Press.](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195307955.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195307955) [Von Drehle, D. (2006). ](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/uncovering-the-history-of-the-triangle-shirtwaist-fire-124701842/)[“Uncovering the History of the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire.” ](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/uncovering-the-history-of-the-triangle-shirtwaist-fire-124701842/)[*Smithsonian Magazine* (August 2006).](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/uncovering-the-history-of-the-triangle-shirtwaist-fire-124701842/) [Werhane, P. H. (1985). ](https://www.amazon.com/Persons-Rights-Corporations-Patricia-Werhane/dp/0136603416)[*Persons, Rights, and Corporations*](https://www.amazon.com/Persons-Rights-Corporations-Patricia-Werhane/dp/0136603416)[.](https://www.amazon.com/Persons-Rights-Corporations-Patricia-Werhane/dp/0136603416)[ Prentice-Hall.](https://www.amazon.com/Persons-Rights-Corporations-Patricia-Werhane/dp/0136603416) [Williams, B. (1973). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/utilitarianism/D1E9651ADF3FC5E614E4D5FE22DF9AF2)[“A Critique of Utilitarianism.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/utilitarianism/D1E9651ADF3FC5E614E4D5FE22DF9AF2)[In Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, B., ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/utilitarianism/D1E9651ADF3FC5E614E4D5FE22DF9AF2)[*Utilitarianism For and Against*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/utilitarianism/D1E9651ADF3FC5E614E4D5FE22DF9AF2)[ (77–150).](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/utilitarianism/D1E9651ADF3FC5E614E4D5FE22DF9AF2)[ Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/utilitarianism/D1E9651ADF3FC5E614E4D5FE22DF9AF2) ### Related Essays [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher [V](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/)[egetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/) by Zach Ferguson [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) by Ryan Jenkins [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Distributive Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/business-ethics.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. <http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf> ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** business ethics, ethics in business, metcalf --- ### [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) **Published:** April 5, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** While many medical advances such as vaccines, analgesics, and dialysis have involved animal research, the practice is controversial for a simple reason: we experiment on animals because they are like us, yet this likeness may imply that we’re wrong to use them. This essay discusses the ethics of animal research, by considering three common defenses of it and some responses. **Content:** Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Bioethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/bioethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/) Author: Paul Bali Word Count: 995 Millions of animals are used in scientific research annually.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) They’re burned, blinded, drowned, starved, and electrocuted; they’re forced to ingest poisons, given strokes and heart attacks, and made prone to cancer, diabetes, and other diseases.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) And they’re almost always killed at the experiment’s end. While many medical advances such as vaccines, analgesics, and dialysis have involved animal research, the practice is controversial for a simple reason: we experiment on animals because they are like us, yet this likeness may imply that we’re wrong to use them. This essay discusses the ethics of animal research, by considering three common defenses of it and some responses. [![A guinea pig being held by a technician. The technician measures the size of a reaction of the animal due to a recent injection.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/960px-Guinea_pig_tumor_sizing.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/960px-Guinea_pig_tumor_sizing.jpg?ssl=1)A guinea pig being held by a technician. The technician measures the size of a reaction of the animal due to a recent injection.### 1. Claim: ‘Animal Research is Necessary for Progress’ Defenders of animal research claim it’s “necessary” for medical progress. Critics reply that in many cases it might *facilitate* or *speed* progress, but it’s not strictly necessary: progress is made in other ways.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Critics also argue it has sometimes *hindered* medical progress: results from animal experimentation can be misleading when applied to humans, due to biological differences.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But even if animal research *has been* necessary for some advances, it might not always be. Sophisticated alternatives, such as *in vitro* or organ-on-a-chip technologies, may render much animal research unnecessary.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Defenders counter that though alternatives may replace *some* animal use, live organisms are too complex to accurately model for all scientific purposes: lab-grown skin cells may serve well for testing chemical irritants, but basic research may require a live animal with all its subsystems interacting.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) But even if progress requires animal research, that doesn’t make it *absolutely* necessary: it is necessary only *to seek that progress.* If achieving a goal requires doing something morally wrong, then it’s wrong to seek it. So, *if* animal research is morally wrong, then claiming that it’s necessary for progress doesn’t *show* that it’s not wrong: indeed, that might just *assume* it. ### 2. Claim: ‘The Benefits of Animal Research Outweigh the Harms’ To assess this defense, we might apply an influential moral theory called *Utilitarianism* which requires us to act in ways that most increase happiness and reduce unhappiness overall.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Utilitarianism is *egalitarian*: *all* beings who have an experiential welfare matter. Like humans, animals matter morally because they are *sentient*: they have an inner life: they experience pleasures and pains, desires and fears, emotions, and, perhaps, thoughts.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) To exclude or underweight animal experiences from our moral calculation would be *speciesism*, an inter-species parallel of racism and sexism.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Utilitarianism makes the easiest case *against* animal research wherever the benefits of the experiment are small, while the harm to animals is great:[\[10\]](#_ftn10) e.g., testing the toxic effects of yet another detergent brand. Demonstrating which animal research *meets* the Utilitarian standard often isn’t easy: harms to animals in research are clear and definite—such as induced injuries and illnesses, confinement and social isolation in cages, and their deaths—while the benefits of animal research can be vague and uncertain—especially in basic research without a particular therapeutic goal.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) A Utilitarian case may be made *for* an instance of animal research where the animal harms are clearly outweighed by the medical benefit: e.g., many dogs were harmed in the development of insulin, but insulin has since saved the lives of millions of diabetes patients. Yet this same Utilitarian logic might justify experimentation on *humans*, especially since the experimental results would be more relevant to human medicine. Perhaps this result of Utilitarian reasoning shows that Utilitarianism is an incorrect moral theory. Philosopher Peter Singer thinks, rather, that it creates a high bar for the justification of animal research: the experiment must be so vital that it would also justify experimenting on a human.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 3. Claim: ‘Animals Lack Rights’ Perhaps experimenting on humans would violate our rights, which animals arguably lack.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Philosophers have tended to ground rights in the *rationality* of the rights bearer, and denied animals rights on the claim that they’re not rational.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) To recognize animal rights, we might demonstrate a rationality common to humans and non-humans. Ironically, animal research itself may provide some evidence for animal rationality.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Yet we already ascribe rights to infants and mentally-impaired humans. So even if animals lack sophisticated rationality, to exclude them from moral consideration may be inconsistent insofar as we do not condone experimentation on babies or the cognitively disabled. Another way to ground animal rights is in *sentience*. Perhaps animals, like infants, have rights simply because each is a “subject of a life”, to use philosopher Tom Regan’s (1938-2017) influential formulation: things can go well or badly for them; what happens to them *matters* *to them*, and this gives them a value that places hard limits on what we’re allowed to do to them.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) This rights-based approach is critical of the Utilitarian approach, arguing that Utilitarianism can’t explain how a mouse grafted with tumors has been *wronged* if the harm leads to an effective chemotherapy.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Utilitarianism might justify “the 3Rs” of lab animal usage—Reduce, Replace and Refine[\[18\]](#_ftn18)—yet can’t justify the *abolition* of animal research. In contrast, argues Regan: If animals have rights, and if rights are the trump in the moral game, their rights override any benefits, real or imagined, we have gained, or stand to gain, from using them in biomedical research.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) A *negative* right, a right *to* *not* be treated in some way, often has priority over a *positive* right, a right of access *to* some good, such as healthcare or education. So even if the search for cures is part of our general positive right to healthcare, that right may be overridden by animals’ negative right to not be violated by that search. ### 3. Conclusion We’ve considered three common defenses of animal research. The topic is of course part of a larger discussion on the moral status of animals, and our treatment of them. The history of civilization is in part the history of increasing human control over non-human life. How we use that power is surely one of the central problems of ethics. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 190 million vertebrates annually, by one recent global estimate. (See Taylor & Alvarez, 2019.) Our focus here is on vertebrates since they are most likely to have *minds,* and that a being has a mind is usually taken to be ethically significant: see Tiina Carita Rosenqvist, [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/). Of course, we’re talking about *non-human* animals, here. We’ll say *animals* for short, with the cautionary note that this linguistic practice may reinforce anthropocentric attitudes that facilitate our exploitation of animals—justified or not. Common *invertebrate* “model organisms” of the modern lab, such as fruit flies and planaria worms, are in the scope of this essay’s main arguments only to the extent that they are sentient. For a compilation of research on invertebrate sentience, see The Invertebrate Sentience Table (2020), by the Rethink Priorities group. Also, our focus is on invasive research on captive animals in the lab. Research on wild populations of animals using, e.g., fairly non-invasive tagging and tracking, may lie beyond the scope of the arguments here. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This list of procedures done to animals is informed by Regan’s (2005) essay “Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection.” [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Some argue that what would be most effective for promoting human health and well-being at the broadest scale would not be animal research, but a better distribution of current medical knowledge and health-promoting resources: see Brandon Boesch, [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) for the basis of such an argument. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For example, 30-40 HIV vaccines were effective in tests on non-human primates, yet none were found effective in human trials. On the other hand, penicillin failed post-approval toxicity tests on guinea pigs, but was safe in humans. Had the tests been required *prior* to administration on humans, would penicillin have been adopted? For an overview of these and other prominent failed translations between animal research and human medicine, see Keen (2019, pp. 248-258). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The European Union aims to replace all animal research with alternate methods, according to Directive 2010/63/EU. By the FDA Modernization Act 2.0 animal research is no longer *required* for approval of new pharmaceuticals in the U.S. For an overview, see U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2024). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See, e.g., Stanford Medicine (2024) for an assertion of the continuing necessity of animal research. Note that in *psychological* research there’s often no replacement for a functioning mind: in testing a novel analgesic, e.g., we seem to *require* pain-sentient test subjects. Another problem for animal-free psychological research: a computer model of the brain sophisticated enough to model the mind *may by that fact itself be sentient.* This is a controversial view in the philosophy of mind, but if correct, the “virtual” alternative to animal research would be just as ethically fraught as the thing it’s meant to replace. See Thomas Metcalf, [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Shane Gronholz, [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/). For a full discussion of utilitarianism’s applications to animal research, see Bass (2012). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Tiina Carita Rosenqvist, [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) for discussion of what types of minds many animals might have and the basis for thinking that they do. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Dan Lowe, [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Alastair Norcross (2007), p. 654. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The floorspace in a standard mouse cage is 280,000-times smaller than the mouse’s natural range. See Lahvis (2017), p. 2. For rabbits, the National Research Council allows 1.5 square feet of floor space that is 16 inches high: not enough to run and jump. See National Research Council (2011), p. 59. Concerning whether death harms animals, killing animals (at least, conscious and sentient animals) prevents them from experiencing their future experiences. Since this is the typical reason why death is thought to be harmful for humans—it prevents us from experiencing our future experiences—it seems that many animals can be harmed by death. For discussion of the basic case to think that death is often bad for human beings—to consider whether that case applies to any animals—see Frederik Kaufman, [Is Death Bad? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/)[Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/). It’s also often thought that an animal’s poor quality of life can make it that they are better off dead too and so compassion dictates that we should end their lives: for discussion that can be applied to animals, see Nathan Nobis, [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/), especially [note 2](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/#_ftn2). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Singer (2023), 2nd Chapter. By a *human* he specifies *a severely cognitively-damaged orphan*, to (purportedly) equalize that human’s capacities for experience with the capacities of a typical mouse in a laboratory. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Here the focus is on *moral* or *natural* rights—not legal rights— roughly, rights that anyone would have, regardless of what the law says or whichever legal rights they have or lack. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) As in the work of Immanual Kant (1724–1804), whose ethical theory is one of the foundations of traditional rights-based ethics. See Andrew Chapman, [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For an overview of research on animal rationality, see Krupenye and Call (2019). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Regan actually believes that many species of animals *are* rational and autonomous, but that it’s better to argue that rights depend on a capacity more widespread and accommodating since, among other reasons, not all human beings who most people believe have rights are rational and autonomous. See Regan (1997). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Singer, though Utilitarian, accepts the idea of animal “rights”, but only “as a shorthand reference to the way in which the needs and desires of animals give rise to moral obligations on our part.” The Utilitarian goal remains maximizing total overall goodness—such as overall happiness—and rights are recognized only insofar as they serve that goal. Rights are not inviolable, so they can’t override aggregated group interests. See Singer (1987), p. 3. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) That is, wherever scientifically possible, *replace* animal research with alternate methods; *reduce* the number of animals used, by maximizing the data gathered per animal; and *refine* animal usage to minimize pain and distress. These three Rs were proposed by Russel and Burch, two English biologists, in their 1959 book *The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique*. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Regan (1997), p. 105. ### References [Bass, Robert (2012). “Lives in the balance: Utilitarianism and animal research”. in *The Ethics of Animal Research: Exploring the Controversy*, Garret, Jeremy, (ed.), MIT Press, Boston: pp. 81-106.](https://philarchive.org/rec/BASLIT) [Keen, Jim (2019). ](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en)[“](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en)[Wasted Money in United States Biomedical and Agricultural Animal Research](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en)[”](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en)[. in ](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en)[*Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm Change*](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en)[.](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en)[ Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne, Eds. Brill.](https://brill.com/edcollbook-oa/title/35072?language=en) [Krupenye, Christopher and Call, Josep (2019). “Theory of mind in animals: Current and future directions”. Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science 10(1).](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31099977/) [Lahvis, Garet P (2017). “Unbridle biomedical research from the laboratory cage”. ](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5503508/)[*eLife*](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5503508/)[ 6:e27438.](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5503508/) [National Research Council (2011). ](https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratory-animals.pdf)[*Guide for the Care and Use* ](https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratory-animals.pdf)[of](https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratory-animals.pdf)[ *Laboratory Animals*](https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratory-animals.pdf)[, Eighth Edition.](https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratory-animals.pdf)[ The National Academies Press.](https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratory-animals.pdf) [Norcross, Alastair (2007). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/NORAE-4)[“Animal Experimentation”, in Bonnie Steinbock (ed.),](https://philpapers.org/rec/NORAE-4)[ *The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics*](https://philpapers.org/rec/NORAE-4)[.](https://philpapers.org/rec/NORAE-4)[ Oxford University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/NORAE-4) [Regan, Tom (1976). “The Case for Animal Rights”, in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.). ](https://search.worldcat.org/title/Animal-rights-and-human-obligations/oclc/18909689)[*Animal Rights and Human Obligations*](https://search.worldcat.org/title/Animal-rights-and-human-obligations/oclc/18909689)[.](https://search.worldcat.org/title/Animal-rights-and-human-obligations/oclc/18909689)[ Prentice Hall.](https://search.worldcat.org/title/Animal-rights-and-human-obligations/oclc/18909689) [Regan, Tom (1983). ](https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Case_for_Animal_Rights.html?id=2OFPVE4cpYkC&redir_esc=y)[*The Case for Animal Rights*](https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Case_for_Animal_Rights.html?id=2OFPVE4cpYkC&redir_esc=y)[.](https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Case_for_Animal_Rights.html?id=2OFPVE4cpYkC&redir_esc=y)[ University of California Press](https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Case_for_Animal_Rights.html?id=2OFPVE4cpYkC&redir_esc=y) [Regan, Tom (1997) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/REGTRO)[“](https://philpapers.org/rec/REGTRO)[The Rights of Humans and Other Animals](https://philpapers.org/rec/REGTRO)[”](https://philpapers.org/rec/REGTRO)[.](https://philpapers.org/rec/REGTRO) [*Ethics and Behavior*](https://philpapers.org/rec/REGTRO)[, 7(2), 103-111.](https://philpapers.org/rec/REGTRO) [Regan, Tom. (2005). “Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection” in Andrew I. ](https://tomreganemptycages.blogspot.com/2012/07/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html)[Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, (eds.), ](https://tomreganemptycages.blogspot.com/2012/07/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html)[*Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics*](https://tomreganemptycages.blogspot.com/2012/07/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html)[.](https://tomreganemptycages.blogspot.com/2012/07/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html)[ Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers: 77-90.](https://tomreganemptycages.blogspot.com/2012/07/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html) [Rethink Priorities (2020). “Invertebrate Sentience Table”.](https://rethinkpriorities.org/invertebrate-sentience-table) [Russell, William and Burch, Rex (1959). ](https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Principles_of_Humane_Experimental_Te.html?id=j75qAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y)[*The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique*](https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Principles_of_Humane_Experimental_Te.html?id=j75qAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y)[. Methuen & Co. Ltd.](https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_Principles_of_Humane_Experimental_Te.html?id=j75qAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y) [Singer, Peter (1987). ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903010)[“](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903010)[Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903010)[”](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903010) [*The Monist*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903010)[, 70 (1), 3-14](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903010) [Singer, ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818)[Peter ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903010)[(2023).](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818) [*Animal Liberation Now*](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818)[: ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818)[*The Definitive Classic Renewed*](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818)[.](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818)[ Harper Collins.](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818) [Stanford Medicine. “Why Animal Research?” Accessed July 13 2024. ](https://med.stanford.edu/animalresearch/why-animal-research.html) [Taylor, Kate and Alvarez, Laura Rego (2019). “An Estimate of the Number of Animals Used for Scientific Purposes Worldwide in 2015”. ](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32090616/)[*Alternatives to Laboratory Animals*](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32090616/)[.](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32090616/)[ 47(5-6), 196-213.](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32090616/) [U.S. Food & Drug Administration. “Facts about FDA and Animal Welfare, Testing & Research”. Accessed September 13 2024.](https://web.archive.org/web/20240913172931/https:/www.fda.gov/news-events/rumor-control/facts-about-fda-and-animal-welfare-testing-research) ### Related Essays [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Is Death Bad? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/)[Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/hayvan-deneyleri-ve-etik-paul-bali/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Ethics-and-Animal-Research.pdf). ### About the Author Paul Bali teaches Philosophy at Toronto Metropolitan University. He has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from The University of Toronto, and a B.A. in Philosophy from The University of Guelph. His interests range from Ethics to Aesthetics, with lots of Philosophy of Religion along the way. [philpeople.org/profiles/paul-bali](https://philpeople.org/profiles/paul-bali) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)[*.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** bioethics, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Social & Political **Tags:** animal, animal experimentation, animal experiments, animal research, animal rights, animal welfare, animals --- ### [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/) **Published:** July 16, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Many philosophers have argued that it’s usually morally wrong to raise and kill animals for food, and buy and consume animal-based food products. This essay introduces some of the most influential arguments about ethical vegetarianism and veganism. **Content:** Author: Zach Ferguson Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Bioethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/bioethics/) Wordcount: 996 More than 100 billion animals are raised and killed each year for their meat, milk and eggs.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Though most people consume these products, many philosophers have argued that it’s usually morally wrong to raise and kill animals for food, and buy and consume animal-based food products.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay introduces some of the most influential arguments about *ethical vegetarianism* and *veganism*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) [![Ester the Wonder Pig (2012-2023) carrying a stick in her mouth.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Esther_clearing_brush.webp?resize=656%2C528&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Esther_clearing_brush.webp?ssl=1)[Ester the Wonder Pig](https://www.estherthewonderpig.com/) (2012-2023) carrying a stick in her mouth.### 1. Raising and Killing Animals Most farmed animals today are raised using intensive methods that are often called *factory farming.*[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Animals are densely confined, unable to move freely or satisfy basic instinctual urges. Their bodies are deformed and intentionally mutilated, and many spend their entire lives sick and in pain.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) They are then killed long before the end of their natural lifespans: for example, chickens raised for meat can live up to ten years but are usually slaughtered within weeks of hatching. Some argue that animal agriculture is wrong because it causes extreme, unjustified suffering to billions of creatures.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) It *is* sometimes permissible to cause suffering if there is a justifying reason—it is OK to vaccinate my dog, though she suffers from the needle poke, because the immunity benefits her. But the number of farmed animals and total suffering are so great, and any benefits so minor, that many conclude that these practices are unjustified.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Others argue the main problem is *rights violations.* Animals have some of the same features that grant human beings *moral rights*. Unlike tables or rocks, we have experiences; we have first-person perspectives on the world, and thoughts, emotions, and interests; life can go better or worse for us; each of us are what’s called “*subjects of a life*.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Some philosophers argue that these considerations grant humans rights and inherent value that rule out certain kinds of ill treatment, such as killing or manipulating us against our will. If we have these rights, they argue, then many animals do too. If farmed animals have rights, then most farming practices violate those rights. This view offers a response to the claim that some farms treat animals humanely; even if they aren’t suffering, killing them for food, even painlessly, would violate their rights. Some philosophers highlight the parallels between racist and sexist discrimination—which involve not giving consideration to someone’s *interests* for morally irrelevant reasons—to argue that animal agriculture is usually wrong.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) This is a rejection of *speciesism:* unjustified discrimination based on biological species alone.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Furthermore, many people think it would be wrong to mutilate, confine, and slaughter dogs.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) But pigs are just as smart and sociable as dogs. If it would be wrong to subject dogs to this treatment, then we shouldn’t do it to pigs either: the fact that they are different species is irrelevant.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Lastly, animal farming is a major contributor to climate change and environmental degradation.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) It is also a primary source of antibiotic resistance and new zoonotic diseases, putting us at risk for future pandemics.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) It may be wrong to contribute to these problems.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 2. Common Objections One common response to these arguments is that humans need meat to survive. But this isn’t true. It is well established that most people can live healthy lives on plant-based diets.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Farming animals isn’t necessary for survival or health in affluent societies. Another response is that eating animal-based food products is pleasurable. However, that an action causes pleasure does not by itself make it permissible. Eating bacon is a relatively minor pleasure that is unlikely to outweigh the lifetime of suffering the pig endures.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Furthermore, eating plant-based foods can also be pleasurable. Some claim that meat is an important cultural good or part of a traditional way of life. But some traditional practices can be immoral, like slavery or genital mutilation.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) These objectors would need to show that these human cultural goods are more morally important than the suffering and environmental damage caused by animal farming. Others claim that eating meat is natural, or that it is OK because animals kill and eat each other in nature. But just because some action is “natural” does not mean it’s not wrong, and just because animals do something doesn’t mean it’s permissible for us to do it. For example, some animals kill and eat their own young.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Some point out that all methods of food production, even crop cultivation, involve harming *some* animals (for example, field rodents killed by tractors). While that is true, estimates suggest that plant-based food systems would result in far fewer animals harmed overall.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Others argue that it isn’t wrong to eat animals because they are less rational than humans or because they aren’t moral agents. But many humans, including infants and those with severe cognitive disabilities, cannot reason like typical adults or make moral decisions, and it would be wrong to farm them for food.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 3. Farming vs Eating Some philosophers argue that most animal farming is wrong but deny that individuals therefore have an obligation to be vegetarians. They distinguish the morality of *producing* animal products from the morality of *purchasing* or *consuming* them—while producing meat may be wrong, buying or eating meat might not be.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) One response to this position is to argue that it is wrong to create economic demand for a wrongfully produced product. If people buy meat, their purchases signal to meat producers that they should increase meat supply, making it more likely that more animals are raised and killed in the future.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) In reply, critics sometimes argue that one individual becoming vegetarian doesn’t influence producers to raise and kill fewer animals.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) However, some economic research suggests that meat producers *are* sensitive even to small changes in consumer demand.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) Another response claims it is often wrong to be *complicit in* or *supportive of* wrongful practices.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) By buying meat, we don’t do the wrongful acts ourselves, but we help or encourage others to act wrongly, which might itself be wrong. ### 4. Conclusion If arguments for vegetarianism are sound, most people are doing something unethical at nearly every meal. Fortunately, there are many plant-based foods that are delicious, healthy, and affordable.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Roser (2023) for estimates of the number of animals killed for food. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) “Usually” here refers to ordinary circumstances where adequate plant-based foods are available. These philosophers don’t typically claim, for instance, that it would be wrong for someone who is starving to death to eat meat if it were the only food available. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Vegetarian* is a broad term for anyone who doesn’t eat meat. This essay is about people who don’t eat meat for *moral* reasons rather than for reasons like personal health or cultural heritage. One form of ethical vegetarianism is *veganism*. In addition to not eating meat, vegans also don’t eat or use other kinds of animal products, like milk, eggs, and leather. Many of the arguments for the immorality of eating meat apply just as strongly or more so to these other products, whose production also involves harming animals. (For example, *chick culling* is the process of killing the billions of unwanted male chicks produced by the egg industry. Since male chicks don’t lay eggs, they have little economic value and are typically killed the day they are born, usually with a grinder or gas chamber*.* The FarmForward article “Chick Culling” provides a short summary.) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Estimates suggest that over 99% of animals farmed in the US are raised this way, as are 74% of animals farmed globally. See Ritchie (2023) for a summary. Though not all animals are factory farmed, many traditional farms also engage in practices that some consider inhumane, like unanesthetized branding, castration, and horn removal. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Accounts of inhumane, industry-standard practices are widely available, but see “Animals on Factory Farms” by the Animal Welfare Institute for a short summary. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For further discussion of this type of argument, see [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman. This type of argument often appeals to a type of ethical theory known as *consequential* or *utilitarianism*. See [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz for an introduction to these theories. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This argument concerns animals who can suffer, like pigs, cows, and chickens. It might be that some animals without brains or central nervous systems, like bivalves, cannot suffer or feel pain. If an animal cannot suffer or feel pain, this argument suggests that it might not be wrong to farm them. For a discussion of what pain is, see [The Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Tom Regan is the most prominent advocate of the position that some animals have moral rights, which he developed in *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983/2004). Regan argues that any being, of any species, who is a “subject of a life” has a moral right to respectful treatment. Regan’s position is often interpreted as a development of Kant’s ethics, with a broader view of who is an “end in themself”: see [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. For a further introduction to reasoning like Regan’s, see [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff. For a more recent Kant-inspired defense of animals, see Korsgaard (2018). To be a “subject of life” is to be a being with a particular type of mind. For more on animal minds, see [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Peter Singer popularized this argument in the seminal article “All Animals are Equal” (1974) and the opening chapter of *Animal Liberation* (1975), which has been released in many different updated editions. Since then, scholars of gender and race have written extensively on the similarity and/or differences between these kinds of oppression. See for instance *The Sexual Politics of Meat* by Carol J. Adams (1990) and *Aphro-ism: Essays on Pop Culture, Feminism, and Black Veganism from Two Sisters* by Aph Ko and Syl Ko (2017). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For further discussion, see [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe. Also see [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/) by Dan Peterson, [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey, and [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/) by Dan Peterson. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Some readers might respond here with the observation that eating dogs is *believed* to be not wrong in some cultures thinking that means that eating dogs *is* not wrong in those cultures. This response suggests the person *may* be appealing to an ethical theory called *cultural relativism*. For discussion, see [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Norcross (2004) makes this kind of argument comparing dogs to pigs. Importantly, those persuaded by this line of argument generally think that it would apply to humans as well: if it is wrong to mutilate and slaughter human babies for pleasure, then it is wrong to mutilate and slaughter pigs for pleasure. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Ritchie (2019, 2021). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Anomaly (2015) for discussion. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) A further type of argument against raising and killing animals for food builds on the concerns mentioned here and argues that kind, caring, and compassionate people—people with morally good character traits or *virtues*—would not usually support practices like these. For a general introduction to this perspective, see [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry. For applications to ethical issues concerning animals, see Hursthouse (2006) and Donovan and Adams (2007). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) This is now widely accepted by major dietetic associations like the *Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics*: See Vesanto et al. (2016). As they note in their review of the scientific and medical literature, “Vegetarians and vegans are at reduced risk of certain health conditions, including ischemic heart disease, type 2 diabetes, hypertension, certain types of cancer, and obesity.” For vegans, a well-planned diet will include a vitamin B-12 supplement. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See Engel (2016) for a version of this argument. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) On arguments against slavery, and why these arguments are demonstrably bad arguments, see [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See [Ethics and Evolution](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk for further discussion of why it is difficult to settle moral questions by appealing to what is “natural.” Interestingly, moral arguments that appeal to what animals do and don’t do, and what’s “natural” and “unnatural,” arise with other ethical issues: for example, see [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For discussion of this issue, see Fischer and Lamey (2018). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) For discussion of further common objections to arguments for vegetarianism, see Lowe (2016) and Nobis (2011). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) See Shahar (2021) for this type of argument*.* [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Examples of this kind of argument can be found in Singer (1975), Norcross (2004), Rachels (2011), and Kagan (2011). If correct, this implies people should not *buy* animal products, but it might not be wrong to eat meat that is free or will be thrown away. For debates about the possible exceptions to generally pro-vegetarian principles, see Abbate and Bobier’s (2023) volume *New Omnivorism and Strict Veganism: Critical Perspectives*. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) This objection is often called the *causal inefficacy problem* and has received a lot of philosophical attention: e..g, it is discussed in many of the essays in Chignell, Cuneo, and Halteman (2015) and in Shahar (2021). See Budolfson (2019) for a version of this argument applied to the meat industry. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) See McMullen & Halteman (2019) and Isaacs et al. (2024) for responses to the claim that individual consumers’ purchases make no difference to what producers do. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) McPherson (2015) makes this argument with respect to animal products. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Vegan and vegetarian diets are generally cheaper than those that include meat, especially in higher and upper-middle income countries. See Sprigmann et al. (2021) for price data. For evidence that plant-based cooking can be delicious and accessible, see online food bloggers like [Nora Cooks](https://www.noracooks.com/), [Rainbow Plant Life](https://rainbowplantlife.com/), and [Pick Up Limes](https://www.pickuplimes.com/). ### References [Abbate, Cheryl, and Christopher Bobier, eds. ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003204152/new-omnivorism-strict-veganism-cheryl-abbate-christopher-bobier)[*New Omnivorism and Strict Veganism: Critical Perspectives*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003204152/new-omnivorism-strict-veganism-cheryl-abbate-christopher-bobier)[. Taylor & Francis (2023). ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003204152/new-omnivorism-strict-veganism-cheryl-abbate-christopher-bobier) [Animal Welfare Institute, “Animals on Factory Farms.”](https://awionline.org/content/inhumane-practices-factory-farms) [Adams, Carol, J. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/sexual-politics-of-meat--35th-anniversary-edition-9798765123669/)[*The Sexual Politics of Meat.* ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/sexual-politics-of-meat--35th-anniversary-edition-9798765123669/)[Continuum (1990).](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/sexual-politics-of-meat--35th-anniversary-edition-9798765123669/) [Anomaly, Jonathan. ](https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phu001)[“What’s Wrong with Factory Farming?” ](https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phu001)[*Public Health Ethics*](https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phu001)[ 8, no. 3 (2015): 246-254.](https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phu001) [Budolfson, Mark Bryant. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-018-1087-6)[“The Inefficacy Objection to Consequentialism and the Problem with the Expected Consequences Response.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-018-1087-6)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-018-1087-6)[ 176, no. 7 (2019): 1711-1724.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-018-1087-6) [Chignell, Andrew, Cuneo, Terence, Halteman, Matthew C. ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9780203154410/philosophy-comes-dinner-andrew-chignell-terence-cuneo-matthew-halteman)[(eds), ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9780203154410/philosophy-comes-dinner-andrew-chignell-terence-cuneo-matthew-halteman)[*Philosophy Comes to Dinner*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9780203154410/philosophy-comes-dinner-andrew-chignell-terence-cuneo-matthew-halteman)[, Routledge (2015).](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9780203154410/philosophy-comes-dinner-andrew-chignell-terence-cuneo-matthew-halteman) [Donovan, Josephine, and Adams, Carol. (eds). ](https://archive.org/details/feministcaretrad0000unse)[*The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics: A Reader*](https://archive.org/details/feministcaretrad0000unse)[.](https://archive.org/details/feministcaretrad0000unse)[ Columbia University Press (2007).](https://archive.org/details/feministcaretrad0000unse) [Engel Jr, Mylan. ](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/1/)[“The Commonsense Case for Ethical Vegetarianism.” ](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/1/)[*Between the Species*](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/1/)[ 19, no. 1 (2016): 1.](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/1/) [FarmForward, “Chick Culling: What Is It, What Are the Methods & Is It Cruel?”](https://www.farmforward.com/issues/animal-welfare/chick-culling/) [Fischer, Bob, and Andy Lamey. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10806-018-9733-8)[“Field Deaths in Plant Agriculture.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10806-018-9733-8)[*Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10806-018-9733-8)[ 31, no. 4 (2018): 409-428.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10806-018-9733-8) [Hursthouse, Rosalind. ](https://hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf)[“Applying Virtue Ethics to our Treatment of the Other Animals.” ](https://hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf)[In Welchman, Jennifer (ed), ](https://hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf)[*The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics*](https://hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf)[, Hackett](https://hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf)[ (2006): 136-155.](https://hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf) [Isaacs, Yoaav, Adam Lerner, and Jeffrey Sanford Russell. ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2024.2309579?casa_token=rV0XZLmm5DkAAAAA%3AzJFV-d98C56ZbFG8jm_Vt5qG8C41kY3JkDEfxrAq_4wWnnzbBqTY8rpxP8SGu8Zj_1Jb9Jm71AmiFQ)[“Counting Your Chickens.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2024.2309579?casa_token=rV0XZLmm5DkAAAAA%3AzJFV-d98C56ZbFG8jm_Vt5qG8C41kY3JkDEfxrAq_4wWnnzbBqTY8rpxP8SGu8Zj_1Jb9Jm71AmiFQ)[*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2024.2309579?casa_token=rV0XZLmm5DkAAAAA%3AzJFV-d98C56ZbFG8jm_Vt5qG8C41kY3JkDEfxrAq_4wWnnzbBqTY8rpxP8SGu8Zj_1Jb9Jm71AmiFQ)[ 102, no. 3 (2024): 675-692.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2024.2309579?casa_token=rV0XZLmm5DkAAAAA%3AzJFV-d98C56ZbFG8jm_Vt5qG8C41kY3JkDEfxrAq_4wWnnzbBqTY8rpxP8SGu8Zj_1Jb9Jm71AmiFQ) [Ko, Aph, and Syl Ko. ](https://lanternpm.org/shop/aphro-ism-essays-on-pop-culture-feminism-and-black-veganism-from-two-sisters-by-aph-ko-and-syl-ko/)[*Aphro-ism: Essays on Pop Culture, Feminism, and Black Veganism from Two Sisters*](https://lanternpm.org/shop/aphro-ism-essays-on-pop-culture-feminism-and-black-veganism-from-two-sisters-by-aph-ko-and-syl-ko/)[.](https://lanternpm.org/shop/aphro-ism-essays-on-pop-culture-feminism-and-black-veganism-from-two-sisters-by-aph-ko-and-syl-ko/)[ Lantern Publishing & Media (2017).](https://lanternpm.org/shop/aphro-ism-essays-on-pop-culture-feminism-and-black-veganism-from-two-sisters-by-aph-ko-and-syl-ko/) [Korsgaard, Christine. ](https://academic.oup.com/book/4616)[*Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals*](https://academic.oup.com/book/4616)[.](https://academic.oup.com/book/4616)[ Oxford University Press (2018).](https://academic.oup.com/book/4616) [Lowe, Dan. ](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/7)[“Common Arguments for the Moral Acceptability of Eating Meat: A Discussion for Students.” ](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/7)[*Between the Species*](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/7)[ Vol.](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/7)[ 19: Iss. 1 (2016), Article 7.](https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/7) [Nobis, Nathan. ](https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.2008v13n8.4)[“Reasonable Humans and Animals: An Argument for Vegetarianism,” ](https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.2008v13n8.4)[*Between the Species*](https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.2008v13n8.4) [Vol.](https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.2008v13n8.4)[ 13: Iss. 8 (2011), Article 4.](https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.2008v13n8.4) [McMullen, Steven, and Halteman, Matthew C. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41055-018-00030-4)[“Against Inefficacy Objections: The Real Economic Impact of Individual Consumer Choices on Animal Agriculture.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41055-018-00030-4)[*Food Ethics*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41055-018-00030-4)[ 2, no. 2 (2019): 93-110.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41055-018-00030-4) [McPherson, Tristram. “Why I Am a Vegan (and You Should Be One Too).” In Chignell, Andrew, Cuneo, Terence, Halteman, Matthew C. ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203154410-6/vegan-one-tristram-mcpherson)[(eds), ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203154410-6/vegan-one-tristram-mcpherson)[*Philosophy Comes to Dinner*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203154410-6/vegan-one-tristram-mcpherson)[, Routledge (2015): 73-91.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203154410-6/vegan-one-tristram-mcpherson) [Norcross, Alastair. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840934)[“Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840934)[*Philosophical Perspectives*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840934)[ 18 (2004): 229-245.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840934) [Rachels, Stuart. “Vegetarianism.” In Beauchamp, Tom and Frey, R. G. ](https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/38546/chapter-abstract/333827636?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[(eds), ](https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/38546/chapter-abstract/333827636?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics*](https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/38546/chapter-abstract/333827636?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[, ](https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/38546/chapter-abstract/333827636?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[Oxford University Press (2011): 877-904.](https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/38546/chapter-abstract/333827636?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Regan, Tom. ](https://www.ucpress.edu/books/the-case-for-animal-rights/paper)[*The Case for Animal Rights*](https://www.ucpress.edu/books/the-case-for-animal-rights/paper)[.](https://www.ucpress.edu/books/the-case-for-animal-rights/paper)[ University of California Press, (1983/2004).](https://www.ucpress.edu/books/the-case-for-animal-rights/paper) [Ritchie, Hannah. ](https://ourworldindata.org/food-ghg-emissions)[“Food Production is Responsible for One-quarter of the World’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions” At OurWorldinData (2019)](https://ourworldindata.org/food-ghg-emissions). [Ritchie, Hannah. “If the World Adopted a Plant-based Diet, We Would Reduce Global Agricultural Land Use from 4 to 1 billion Hectares.” At OurWorldinData (2021).](https://ourworldindata.org/land-use-diets) [Ritchie, Hannah. “How Many Animals Are Factory-Farmed?” At OurWorldinData (2023).](https://ourworldindata.org/how-many-animals-are-factory-farmed) [Roser, Max. “How Many Animals Get Slaughtered Every Day?” At OurWorldinData (2023).](https://ourworldindata.org/how-many-animals-get-slaughtered-every-day) [Shahar, Dan C. ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003221944/ok-eat-meat-dan-shahar)[*Why It’s OK to Eat Meat*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003221944/ok-eat-meat-dan-shahar)[.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003221944/ok-eat-meat-dan-shahar)[ Routledge (2021).](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003221944/ok-eat-meat-dan-shahar) [Singer, Peter. ](https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf)[“All Animals Are Equal.” ](https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf)[*Philosophic Exchange*](https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf)[ 5, no. 1 (1974)](https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf). [Singer, Peter. ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818)[*Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals.* ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818)[Harper Collins (1975).](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-now-peter-singer?variant=40952213110818) [Springmann, Marco, Michael A. Clark, Mike Rayner, Peter Scarborough, and Patrick Webb. ](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(21)00251-5/fulltext?_ga=2.5791281.361268736.1712223507-1911686929.1672746603)[“The Global and Regional Costs of Healthy and Sustainable Dietary Patterns: a Modelling Study.” ](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(21)00251-5/fulltext?_ga=2.5791281.361268736.1712223507-1911686929.1672746603)[*The Lancet Planetary Health*](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(21)00251-5/fulltext?_ga=2.5791281.361268736.1712223507-1911686929.1672746603)[ 5, no. 11 (2021): e797-e807.](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(21)00251-5/fulltext?_ga=2.5791281.361268736.1712223507-1911686929.1672746603) [Vesanto, Melina; Craig, Winston and Levin, Susan. ](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jand.2016.09.025)[“Position of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics: Vegetarian Diets.” ](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jand.2016.09.025)[*Journal of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics*](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jand.2016.09.025)[ 116, no. 12 (2016): 1970-1980.](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jand.2016.09.025) ### Related Essays [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [The Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/) by Dan Peterson [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/) by Dan Peterson. [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Ethics and Evolution](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/veg.pdf). ### About the Author Zach Ferguson is a philosophy PhD candidate at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a 2026 recipient of the Charlotte W. Newcombe Fellowship. His primary research program is focused on ethical questions involving nonhuman animals, but has broad research and teaching interests in ethics and normative philosophy generally. His work has been published in journals such as *Ergo*, *Analysis*, and *Synthese*, among others. [fergusonphilosophy.com](https://www.fergusonphilosophy.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** bioethics, Ethics **Tags:** animal ethics, animal rights, vegan, vegetarian --- ### [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) **Published:** September 26, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the philosophy of videogames: ethical, aesthetic and metaphysical issues about video games. **Content:** Author: Alex Fisher Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word Count: 999 Videogames allow people to live out their sporting dreams, explore other worlds, complete puzzles for hours on end, and more. But videogames aren’t just fun: they raise serious philosophical and ethical issues, some of which are reviewed here. ### 1. The Ethics of Videogames The typical concern for ethics is how we treat other people. While harming other people is wrong, videogames generally don’t involve harming any real people.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Yet they raise ethical issues nonetheless. For example, many videogames contain extreme violence, such as brutal killings, that would clearly be wrong if performed in reality. While some people find killing in videogames morally problematic, most people don’t. Many people *would*, however, find child abuse and other sadistic crimes to be wrong, even when only in a videogame. But if virtual murder is OK since nobody is actually harmed, why isn’t virtual child abuse also OK, since nobody is actually harmed? Conversely, if virtual child abuse is unacceptable *despite* harming nobody, why isn’t virtual murder also unacceptable? Most people don’t want to say that virtual child abuse is benign, or that virtual murder is as bad as virtual child abuse.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But how might these judgments be justified? First, we may note a difference in the typical motivations behind the two actions.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Players usually want to kill in videogames *not* because they want to actually murder anyone. The desire to virtually commit child abuse, however, often derives from wanting to actually commit child abuse, making this action bad in ways that virtual killing is not.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Distinguishing the moral status of these actions by their motivations, however, does suggest that it would be OK if someone committed virtual child abuse without any desire to commit *actual* child abuse—a consequence many would find unappealing.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) We can avoid this consequence by identifying the moral difference not in motivation, but instead within the actions *themselves*. For instance, virtual child abuse, like virtual racism or sexism, targets individuals using the same criteria for which actual individuals are targeted and harmed: victimizing a child *because* they are a child (or a woman *because* she’s a woman). Enjoying such actions comprises a lack of sensitivity towards these actual victims. Virtual murder, however, is often represented very differently from actual murder: the “victims” are usually just random and non-descript; they aren’t killed because of anything in particular about them.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) So our actual moral standards may only condemn virtual child abuse, but not virtual murder. But perhaps, contrary to common intuitions, both are indeed wrong or maybe neither are? ### 2. The Aesthetics of Videogames The aesthetics of videogames concerns philosophical issues relating to videogames as art. One core question is whether videogames can be artworks at all.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Some argue that videogames are interactive films and so, like films, are art.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Whether videogames are art or not, we do engage with them differently from traditional artworks. We are involved in the experience of the game: we often play *as* a player-character, controlling their actions and what happens in the game.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Some claim we imagine that we *are* the player-character.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Alternatively, perhaps the player-character acts as our “proxy” in the game-world—a person (or object)—who acts *on behalf of* the player.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Either way, we clearly are involved in playing videogames in ways we usually aren’t for experiencing other artworks. Another difference from other art forms is videogames’ lack of directives. Philosophers of music ask what it means to perform a piece of music—whether, if I make a few mistakes, I am *really* playing the piece I claim to play.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Videogames, however, often have no explicit directive for how to play. One question, then, is whether we can ever *fail* to play a videogame. Some argue that we can fail to play a videogame by “speedrunning” it, that is, trying to complete it as quickly as possible.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) All artworks have a “prescriptive frame”—a way they are meant to be encountered—and videogames are (usually) not intended to be speedrun.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) So, when players speedrun a videogame, they arguably aren’t playing *the* game they claim to be playing. But if they aren’t playing the game, then what are they playing? ### 3. The Metaphysics of Videogames A final issue is the *metaphysics* of videogames. What makes something the *same* videogame despite significant changes? Do virtual objects exist? These metaphysical issues matter legally for copyright purposes, and for whether virtual objects can be stolen.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) One position, called *formalism*, holds that games are identified by their rules—if you changed the rules of chess, it wouldn’t *be* chess.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) We can similarly identify videogames by their rules—their algorithms and code.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) The trouble is that code frequently changes, with “patches” fixing bugs and altering the power of weapons and characters. Intuitively, it doesn’t seem that each patch produces a new game, just as football wasn’t a distinct sport prior to the offside law. One suggestion is that we instead see games like chess and *Call of Duty* as family resemblance concepts—they have many different instantiations in different mediums, but with no set of rules common to all instances.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Another metaphysical issue is the existence of virtual objects. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that a robbery took place when two boys coerced a third into relinquishing a virtual sword in *RuneScape*.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) The court reasoned that the sword was of value to the assailants, and hence stealable. But this is puzzling: how can we steal virtual objects which don’t *really* exist? One answer is that virtual objects depend upon certain “props”—physical objects like bits and bytes on silicon chips.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) So virtual objects *can* be stolen, as domain and control of these props can be removed unlawfully, which is theft.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Alternatively, others argue that virtual objects do exist as *digital* objects, which can themselves be stolen, rather than their props.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ### 4. Conclusion The ethics of virtual actions are becoming more pressing with the development of virtual and augmented reality technologies. The philosophy of videogames can help answer these ethical questions and the aesthetic and metaphysical issues on which they depend. Videogames aren’t just fun; they’re philosophical. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Though in multiplayer games, you might harm other players emotionally by harming their avatars, speaking to them over voice chat, or even stealing their in-game items (see §3 below on virtual theft). In other cases, we might think the player harms *themselves*—perhaps playing some videogames might desensitize us to violence or make us more aggressive. See the [American Psychological Association’s updated resolution (2020)](https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2020/03/violent-video-games-behavior) for an overview of empirical research on violence and videogames. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) These two options, which result from a moral equivalence between virtual murder and virtual child abuse, constitute the “Gamer’s Dilemma” (Luck 2009). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For various responses to the Gamer’s Dilemma, see Bartel (2012: 13-15 and 2020 ch. 5-6), Patridge (2011 and 2013), Young (2013 and 2016), Ali (2015), Bourne and Caddick Bourne (2019), Ramirez (2020), and Kjeldgaard-Christiansen (2020). See Luck and Ellerby (2013) and Luck (2018 and 2019) for responses to Bartel, Ali and Young. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Bartel (2020 ch. 5-6). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Young (2013), however, simply accepts this conclusion, arguing that there is no moral difference between virtual murder and virtual child abuse, so when the motivations are the same, the actions are in fact morally on a par. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Patridge 2011 and 2013. This has the consequence that realistic virtual murder, where we target groups that are actually targeted, is subject to our actual moral standards and is unacceptable, just as virtual child abuse is. Thus, this view allows that some instances of virtual murder are OK, while others are not. See Bartel (2012: 13-15) for another view of this kind, which draws a distinction between the *acts* of virtual murder and virtual child abuse. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) One approach to defining art is a Cluster Account, according to which various properties common to many art forms give evidence that something is a work of art (Davies 2004). Hence, we need to consider the similarities and differences between videogames and other art forms, some of which are addressed in this section. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Smuts (2005: §5) and Gaut (2010: 13-14). Alternatively, Dominic McIver Lopes suggests that videogames are part of a wider category of “computer art” (2009: 113-120). See Preston (2014: 270-272) for criticism of Lopes on computer art, and Tavinor (2009: ch. 9) and Nguyen (2020: ch. 6-7) for further arguments that videogames constitute a form of art. Rough (2018a, 2018b) objects that videogames cannot be artworks, as being a game is incompatible with being an artwork – different attitudes are required for engaging with each. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) We also play as characters in other forms of “interactive” fiction. Wildman and Woodward (2018) offer an account of the interactivity in interactive fiction: the player is forced to resolve fictional incompleteness, whereby it is initially neither fictionally true that *p* nor that *not-p*, with the player forced to decide which option becomes true. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Robson and Meskin 2016. This captures our first-personal discourse about our characters’ actions: ‘*I* beat the raid’, or ‘*I* fought the dragon’. Arguably, our identification with our character and involvement in shaping the narrative gives us a greater emotional investment in what happens (Van de Mosselaer 2019 and 2020). Some videogames also contain no player-character—many racing games, for instance, do not depict drivers in their cars. In such games, we can posit an “implied” driver, whom we imagine ourselves to be (Robson and Meskin 2016: 168). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Carlson and Taylor 2019. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Goodman (1968: 186) famously argues not. A related question is whether the player “performs” a videogame in any sense. See Kania (2018) for an argument against gamers as performers. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Nguyen 2020: 128. Another plausible way to fail to play might be by cheating in a videogame, for instance using console commands or external programs to play in the “wrong” way. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Irvin 2005. Some videogames are designed with speedruns in mind, for instance designers will avoid unskippable cutscenes and random elements which make speedrunning less enjoyable. In such cases, speedruns are intended in some sense. An interesting series which touches on these issues is IGN’s “[Devs React to Speedruns](https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLraFbwCoisJA6eO7VSWtUqLaIFBQq4PCv)”. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For instance, copyright depends on our being able to identify a particular game that others are not allowed to reproduce without permission. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Suits 1978. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Declos 2020: §2.4. Holt (2016) argues that due to such rules, some competitive multiplayer videogames constitute sports, rather than being a separate category of “Esports”. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Ridge 2020: §5. For instance, we could play queenless chess, and whilst this would not be allowed in an official tournament, it would still *be* a version of chess. Similarly, this allows for a game of football to be played in a videogame, where the rules might be different to a real game of football. This position is notably distinct from Wittgenstein’s (1953: §66) famous suggestion that the term “game” is a family resemblance concept, where there is no single feature that all games have, disputed by Suits (1978), who offers a definition of a game. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) [“Teen Steals Virtual Items, Gets Real Punishment”](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/teen-steals-virtual-items-gets-real-punishment/), *CBS News*, 31 January 2012. A similar case is the [EVE Online heist](https://www.pcgamer.com/uk/inside-the-biggest-heist-in-eve-online-history/) where $10,000 worth of virtual items were “stolen” from one of the largest alliances in the game. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Wildman and McDonnell 2020. This terminology derives from Walton’s (1990) theory of fiction as prop-oriented make-believe – certain representational objects function as “props”, where we are prescribed to imagine various things of them, just as we do of teddies and dolls in children’s games of make-believe. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Similar issues arise for NFTs. Unlike buying traditional artworks, however, buying an NFT does not endow domain and control. The images in Beeple’s collection “Everydays”, which recently sold for $69 million, are all freely available on the artist’s [website](https://www.beeple-crap.com/everydays). This generates interesting legal questions regarding whether NFTs can be stolen. For further philosophical issues thrown up by NFTs, see [“Beeple and Nothingness: Philosophy and NFTs”](https://aestheticsforbirds.com/2021/03/18/beeple-and-nothingness-philosophy-and-nfts/). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Chalmers 2017 and 2022, Ludlow 2019. ### References [Ali, Rami. 2015. ‘A New Solution to the Gamer’s Dilemma’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-015-9381-x)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-015-9381-x)[ 17 (4): 267–74.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-015-9381-x) [Bartel, Christopher. 2012. ‘Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-011-9280-8)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-011-9280-8)[ 14 (1): 11–16.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-011-9280-8) [Bartel, Christopher. 2020. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/video-games-violence-and-the-ethics-of-fantasy-9781350121874/)[*Video Games, Violence, and the Ethics of Fantasy: Killing Time*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/video-games-violence-and-the-ethics-of-fantasy-9781350121874/)[.](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/video-games-violence-and-the-ethics-of-fantasy-9781350121874/)[ Bloomsbury Publishing.](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/video-games-violence-and-the-ethics-of-fantasy-9781350121874/) [Bourne, Craig, and Emily Caddick Bourne. 2019. ‘Players, Characters, and the Gamer’s Dilemma’. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12634)[*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12634)[ 77 (2): 133–43.](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12634) [Carlson, Matt, and Logan Taylor. 2019. ‘Me and My Avatar: Player-Character as Fictional Proxy’. ](https://doi.org/10.5617/jpg.6230)[*Journal of the Philosophy of Games*](https://doi.org/10.5617/jpg.6230)[ 1.](https://doi.org/10.5617/jpg.6230) [Chalmers, David J. 2017. ‘The Virtual and the Real’. ](https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0009)[*Disputatio*](https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0009)[ 9 (46): 309–52](https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0009). 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Presses Universitaires de Rennes.](https://philarchive.org/rec/DECFFA) [Gaut, Berys. 2010. ](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511674716)[*A Philosophy of Cinematic Art*](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511674716)[.](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511674716)[ Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511674716) [Goodman, Nelson. 1968. ](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/9780915144341?gC=5a105e8b&gclid=Cj0KCQiA9P__BRC0ARIsAEZ6iriez342zzyxaeFSt_U-lCPgGfR1XLhhe6z0ZK0kWR2ZDRFw_npuyDIaArsQEALw_wcB)[*Languages of Art*](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/9780915144341?gC=5a105e8b&gclid=Cj0KCQiA9P__BRC0ARIsAEZ6iriez342zzyxaeFSt_U-lCPgGfR1XLhhe6z0ZK0kWR2ZDRFw_npuyDIaArsQEALw_wcB)[.](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/9780915144341?gC=5a105e8b&gclid=Cj0KCQiA9P__BRC0ARIsAEZ6iriez342zzyxaeFSt_U-lCPgGfR1XLhhe6z0ZK0kWR2ZDRFw_npuyDIaArsQEALw_wcB)[ Bobbs-Merrill.](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/9780915144341?gC=5a105e8b&gclid=Cj0KCQiA9P__BRC0ARIsAEZ6iriez342zzyxaeFSt_U-lCPgGfR1XLhhe6z0ZK0kWR2ZDRFw_npuyDIaArsQEALw_wcB) [Holt, Jason. 2016. ‘Virtual Domains for Sports and Games’. ](https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2016.1163729)[*Sport, Ethics and Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2016.1163729)[ 10 (1): 5–13.](https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2016.1163729) [Irvin, Sherri. 2005. ‘The Artist’s Sanction in Contemporary Art’. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-8529.2005.00214.x)[*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-8529.2005.00214.x)[ 63 (4): 315–26.](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-8529.2005.00214.x) [Kania, Andrew. 2018. ‘Why Gamers Are Not Performers’. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12451)[*Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12451)[ 76 (2): 187–99.](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12451) [Kjeldgaard-Christiansen, Jens. 2020. ‘Splintering the Gamer’s Dilemma: Moral Intuitions, Motivational Assumptions, and Action Prototypes’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-019-09518-x)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-019-09518-x)[ 22 (1): 93–102.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-019-09518-x) [Lopes, Dominic. 2009. ](https://www.routledge.com/A-Philosophy-of-Computer-Art/Lopes/p/book/9780415547628)[*A Philosophy of Computer Art*](https://www.routledge.com/A-Philosophy-of-Computer-Art/Lopes/p/book/9780415547628)[.](https://www.routledge.com/A-Philosophy-of-Computer-Art/Lopes/p/book/9780415547628)[ London: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/A-Philosophy-of-Computer-Art/Lopes/p/book/9780415547628) [Luck, Morgan. 2009. ‘The Gamer’s Dilemma: An Analysis of the Arguments for the Moral Distinction between Virtual Murder and Virtual Paedophilia’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9168-4)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9168-4)[ 11 (1): 31–36.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9168-4) [———. 2018. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9455-7)[‘Has Ali Dissolved the Gamer’s Dilemma?’ ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9455-7)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9455-7)[ 20 (3): 157–62.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9455-7) [———. 2019. ](https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-02-2018-0017)[‘Can Young’s Constructive Ecumenical Expressivism Resolve the Gamer’s Dilemma?’ ](https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-02-2018-0017)[*Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society*](https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-02-2018-0017)[.](https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-02-2018-0017) [Luck, Morgan, and Nathan Ellerby. 2013. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-013-9322-5)[‘Has Bartel Resolved the Gamer’s Dilemma?’ ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-013-9322-5)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-013-9322-5)[ 15 (3): 229–33.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-013-9322-5) [Ludlow, Peter. 2019. ‘The Social Furniture of Virtual Worlds’. ](https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0009)[*Disputatio*](https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0009)[ 11 (55): 345–69.](https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2019-0009) [Nguyen, C. Thi. 2020. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/games-9780190052089?cc=gb&lang=en&)[*Games: Agency As Art*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/games-9780190052089?cc=gb&lang=en&)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/games-9780190052089?cc=gb&lang=en&)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/games-9780190052089?cc=gb&lang=en&) [Patridge, Stephanie. 2011. ‘The Incorrigible Social Meaning of Video Game Imagery’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-010-9250-6)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-010-9250-6)[ 13 (4): 303–12.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-010-9250-6) [———. 2013. ‘Pornography, Ethics, and Video Games’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9310-1)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9310-1)[ 15 (1): 25–34.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9310-1) [Preston, Dominic. 2014. ‘Some Ontology of Interactive Art’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-013-0134-7)[*Philosophy & Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-013-0134-7)[ 27 (2): 267–78.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-013-0134-7) [Ramirez, Erick Jose. 2020. ‘How to (Dis)Solve the Gamer’s Dilemma’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10049-z)[*Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10049-z)[ 23 (1): 141–61.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10049-z) [Ridge, Michael. 2020. ‘Individuating Games’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02603-5)[*Synthese.*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02603-5) [Robson, Jon, and Aaron Meskin. 2016. ‘Video Games as Self-Involving Interactive Fictions’. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12269)[*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12269)[ 74 (2): 165–77.](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12269) [Rough, Brock. 2018a. ‘The Incompatibility of Games and Artworks’. ](https://doi.org/10.5617/jpg.2736)[*Journal of the Philosophy of Games*](https://doi.org/10.5617/jpg.2736)[ 1 (1).](https://doi.org/10.5617/jpg.2736) [———. 2018b. ‘Videogames as Neither Video nor Games: A Negative Ontology’. ](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210377)[In ](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210377)[*The Aesthetics of Videogames*](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210377)[, 24–41.](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210377)[ Routledge.](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210377) [Smuts, Aaron. 2005. ](http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7523862.0003.006)[‘Are Video Games Art?’ ](http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7523862.0003.006)[*Contemporary Aesthetics*](http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7523862.0003.006)[ 3.](http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7523862.0003.006) [Suits, Bernard. 1978. ](https://broadviewpress.com/product/the-grasshopper-third-edition/#tab-description)[*The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia*](https://broadviewpress.com/product/the-grasshopper-third-edition/#tab-description)[.](https://broadviewpress.com/product/the-grasshopper-third-edition/#tab-description)[ Broadview Press.](https://broadviewpress.com/product/the-grasshopper-third-edition/#tab-description) [Tavinor, Grant. 2009. ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Art+of+Videogames-p-9781405187886)[*The Art of Videogames*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Art+of+Videogames-p-9781405187886)[.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Art+of+Videogames-p-9781405187886)[ Wiley-Blackwell.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Art+of+Videogames-p-9781405187886) [Van de Mosselaer, Nele. 2019. ‘Only a Game? Player Misery across Game Boundaries’. ](https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2019.1613411)[*Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*](https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2019.1613411)[ 46 (2): 191–207.](https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2019.1613411) [———. 2020. ‘Imaginative Desires and Interactive Fiction: On Wanting to Shoot Fictional Zombies’. ](https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz049)[*The British Journal of Aesthetics*](https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz049)[ 60 (3): 241–51.](https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayz049) [Walton, Kendall L. 1990. ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674576032)[*Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674576032)[.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674576032)[ Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674576032) [Wildman, Nathan, and Neil McDonnell. 2020. ‘The Puzzle of Virtual Theft’. ](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa005)[*Analysis* ](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa005)[80 (3): 493-99.](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa005) [Wildman, Nathan, and Richard Woodward. 2018. ‘Interactivity, Fictionality, and Incompleteness’. In *The Aesthetics of Videogames*, edited by Grant Tavinor and Jon Robson, 112–27. Routledge.](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210377) [Willis, Marissa D. 2019. ‘Choose Your Own Adventure: Examining the Fictional Content of Video Games as Interactive Fictions’. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12605)[*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12605)[ 77 (1): 43–53](https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12605). [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. ](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophical-Investigations-by-Ludwig-Wittgenstein-P-M-S-Hacker-Joachim-Schulte/9781405159296)[*Philosophical Investigations*](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophical-Investigations-by-Ludwig-Wittgenstein-P-M-S-Hacker-Joachim-Schulte/9781405159296)[.](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophical-Investigations-by-Ludwig-Wittgenstein-P-M-S-Hacker-Joachim-Schulte/9781405159296)[ Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees, and G. H. von Wright. ](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophical-Investigations-by-Ludwig-Wittgenstein-P-M-S-Hacker-Joachim-Schulte/9781405159296)[*Philosophical Investigations*](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophical-Investigations-by-Ludwig-Wittgenstein-P-M-S-Hacker-Joachim-Schulte/9781405159296)[.](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophical-Investigations-by-Ludwig-Wittgenstein-P-M-S-Hacker-Joachim-Schulte/9781405159296)[ Oxford: Basil Blackwell.](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophical-Investigations-by-Ludwig-Wittgenstein-P-M-S-Hacker-Joachim-Schulte/9781405159296) [Young, Garry. 2013. ‘Enacting Taboos as a Means to an End; but What End? On the Morality of Motivations for Child Murder and Paedophilia within Gamespace’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9306-x)[*Ethics and Information Technology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9306-x)[ 15 (1): 13–23.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-012-9306-x) [———. 2016. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1)[*Resolving the Gamer’s Dilemma*](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1)[.](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1)[ Cham: Springer International Publishing.](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46595-1) ### Further Reading [Bartel, Christopher. 2020. *Video Games, Violence, and the Ethics of Fantasy: Killing Time*. Bloomsbury Publishing.](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/video-games-violence-and-the-ethics-of-fantasy-9781350121874/) [Bartel, Christopher. “Why Video Game Violence Isn’t Innocent”. *Aesthetics for Birds.*](https://aestheticsforbirds.com/2020/10/27/why-video-game-violence-isnt-innocent/) [Cohen, Eliya. “The House Never Loses: How Microtransactions Exploit Video Game Players”. *Aesthetics for Birds.*](https://aestheticsforbirds.com/2021/02/12/the-house-never-loses-how-microtransactions-exploit-video-game-players/) [Nguyen, C. Thi. 2020. *Games: Agency As Art*. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/games-9780190052089?cc=gb&lang=en&) [Pezlar, Ivo. “What Video Games to Play in a Philosophy Classroom”. *Daily Nous.*](https://dailynous.com/2021/05/18/what-video-games-to-play-in-a-philosophy-classroom-guest-post/?fbclid=IwAR2-ADl0OSovUHM80HaX0oy3gAAhghE4O1YzTi7K7GJBQU810glC2mxm_bo) [Robson, Jon, and Grant Tavinor, eds. 2018. *The Aesthetics of Videogames*. Routledge.](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315210377) [Rough, Brock. “Why Video Games in Art Museums Still Aren’t Art”. *Aesthetics for Birds.*](https://aestheticsforbirds.com/2014/02/13/why-video-games-in-art-museums-still-arent-art-by-brock-rough/) [Willis, Marissa D. “Is Commander Shepard Female? Determining Canon in Video Games”. *Aesthetics for Birds.*](https://aestheticsforbirds.com/2019/03/06/is-commander-shepard-female-determining-canon-in-video-games/) ### Related Essays [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) by Brock Rough [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia ### About the Author Alex Fisher is Society for Applied Philosophy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Leeds, UK. His thesis centers on philosophical and ethical issues regarding our imaginative engagement with fiction, videogames and virtual reality. [AlexFisher.org ](https://www.AlexFisher.org) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics, Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** philosophy of video games, philosophy of videogames, video games, videogames --- ### [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/) **Published:** September 12, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** But what is science, and how does it work? Is it unique in its approach to making sense of the world? Does it progress in a straightforward way? Does it aim to give us a truthful description of reality in its theories? These are some core questions in the philosophy of science, which this essay introduces. **Content:** Author: [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word Count: 997 Science has given us life-saving medicines, sophisticated technologies, and a much better ability to understand the world and predict the future. Because of science we now think that the Earth orbits the Sun, that water consists of molecules that are made up of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, that common colds are caused by viruses, and that our behavior is shaped by social factors. But what *is* science, and how does it work? Is it unique in its approach to making sense of the world? Does it progress in a straightforward way? Does it aim to give us a truthful description of reality in its theories?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) These are some core questions in the philosophy of science, which this essay introduces.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [!["A group of flags," a photo of a a colorful scientific mosaic of formulas and chemistry materials. Nikita Palenov. 2022.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/nikita-palenov-THLPC4Le0-I-unsplash.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/nikita-palenov-THLPC4Le0-I-unsplash.jpg?ssl=1) A photo of a colorful scientific mosaic of formulas and chemistry materials by Nikita Palenov, 2022.### 1. Science vs. Non-science Many people think that science is our best bet at understanding the natural world. But is there something that makes science unique and distinguishes it from other attempts to understand the world, such as religion, astrology, or philosophy? One famous candidate is *falsifiability*, the ability of a theory to make specific and “risky” predictions that can be tested empirically and found to be false. For example, Newton’s gravitational theory made predictions about where planets would be at specific times. These predictions were *risky* because if the planets weren’t there, that would have given scientists reason to think that the theory was wrong.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Scientific hypotheses are generally falsifiable in a way that the claims of, say, astrology are not. Horoscopes often make predictions so vague that they can cover almost any event (what does it mean that your love life “will take on a more complicated flavor”?).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But there are reasons to think that falsifiability doesn’t reliably distinguish science from non-science. First, there might be scientific theories (say, in fundamental physics) that are not falsifiable in a straightforward sense.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Second, non-scientific belief systems also yield falsifiable predictions. A palm reader might predict that you will have two children by the age of 30, and this prediction is easily falsified if on your 30th birthday you are childless. And while non-scientific theories might not be abandoned after such failed predictions, scientific theories aren’t always either. Newton’s theory made false predictions about the movement of Uranus. Instead of abandoning the theory, astronomers theorized that there is an unknown planet affecting its orbit, and this led to the discovery of Neptune.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Other candidates for distinguishing features also face exceptions, which suggests that there might not be a feature that *all* scientific theories, and *only* scientific theories, share.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. Scientific Practice and Progress People often think that science progresses steadily and linearly toward a better understanding of the world through rigorous testing of *hypotheses* (tentative explanatory claims) against empirical evidence obtained through observation and experiment. But many philosophers have argued that this view is oversimplified. Some observe that individual hypotheses cannot be tested in isolation because scientists always rely on background assumptions.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) A failed prediction does not tell us *where* the error lies—in the hypothesis being tested or in the background assumptions. This idea is called *holistic underdetermination*.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Scientists also evaluate *theories* (broader explanatory frameworks) based on what they can explain. A challenge is that for any set of evidence there might be *many* explanations. If your evidence is wet grass, possible explanations include rain, sprinklers, and an exploded fire hydrant. The evidence alone doesn’t tell us which of these explanations is correct, or even if any of them is—an idea known as *contrastive underdetermination*. If the same holds in science, then a theory’s ability to explain some set of evidence might not be a good enough reason to accept it.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) A response to this concern is that we often have good reasons to prefer one theory over others. Our preferred theory might be simpler, make more successful predictions, explain more observations or explain them at a deeper level, or align better with our accepted theories. These are *explanatory virtues*, and by comparing such virtues we might be able to rationally choose between competing theories.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) That said, some have questioned whether there are genuinely objective standards that would allow us to decide between theories. Scientists operate within particular frameworks or *scientific paradigms*. Theories are part of these paradigms. If different paradigms have different ideas about what sorts of questions science should ask and what good answers to those questions might look like, their ideas about what counts as a “simpler” or “deeper” explanation might also vary.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Still, some standards, such as predictive accuracy, could be sufficiently objective. ### 3. Do Scientific Theories Aim at Truth? Many philosophers argue that scientific theories aim at truth and seek to provide us with an accurate description of reality, even when they talk about things that cannot be directly observed, such as quarks and electrons. They also think that the theories often succeed in this aim. This is known as *scientific realism*.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Others think that the aim is more modest: rather than aim at truth about the unobservable part of reality, scientific theories just seek to account for the phenomena we *can* observe. Good theories are “empirically adequate” in this way, but empirical adequacy is not a good reason to think that the theories are true. This is *scientific anti-realism*.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Realists think they can give a better explanation for the success of science; if scientific theories weren’t approximately true, the success of science would seem like a miracle.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Anti-realists respond that the history of science shows that empirically successful theories often turn out to be false, and this gives us good reason to withhold judgement on whether our current theories are true.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 4. Conclusion Asking questions such as these is to engage philosophically with science, to try to understand it better. This is different from *doing* science, but philosophy and science have historically been deeply intertwined, and many philosophers of science have been scientists themselves. This is no accident. If science is to do its job well, it needs critical investigation of its starting points, theories, and methods—in other words, philosophy.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) There are different kinds of sciences, including natural sciences (such as physics), social sciences (such as sociology), health sciences (such as epidemiology), and applied sciences (such as environmental science). Traditionally, philosophers of science have focused heavily on the natural sciences, and a lot of the ideas covered in this essay were initially introduced with the natural sciences in mind. That said, contemporary philosophy of science increasingly engages with disciplines such as psychology, medicine, and economics. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Philosophers of science ask many other questions as well, including questions about scientific explanation, scientific reasoning, and the role of values in science. Some of these questions arise in relation to specific sciences, such as biology, physics, or psychology. For examples, see [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/) by Michael Zerella, [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson, and [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/) by Emma Otterski. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The idea that falsifiability distinguishes scientific theories from non-scientific ones was introduced by Karl Popper. Popper (1962) was interested in this question because he suspected that certain theories, such as Freudian psychoanalysis, which claimed to be scientific, were better described as “pseudo-scientific.” For additional discussion, see [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/) by Michael Zerella. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Vague claims are non-risky: they are consistent with almost any event and therefore very difficult to falsify. But vague claims can still be meaningful or valuable in some sense. For example, horoscopes could be used as a tool for self-discovery and reflection. Falsifiability is also meant to distinguish science from disciplines that are clearly valuable but do not generally make claims that can be empirically tested. For example, mathematical claims are specific but evaluated through proofs rather than observation or experimentation. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Sean Carroll (2014) suggests that using falsifiability as a demarcation criterion for science-–a criterion that separates science from non-science—risks excluding string theory and multiverse theories in physics. He advocates for a more subtle approach and writes that “Science is (…) about explaining the world we see, developing models that fit the data. But fitting models to data is a complex and multifaceted process, involving a give-and-take between theory and experiment, as well as the gradual development of theoretical understanding in its own right.” [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For additional discussion, see, e.g., Okasha 2016, 11-14. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Hansson (2025) for some of the other candidates. Hansson points out that there is a striking degree of agreement among philosophers of science about which practices are not scientific, even if there is “almost complete disagreement on the general criteria that these judgments should presumably be based upon.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Pierre Duhem famously wrote that “a physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to an experimental test but only a whole group of hypotheses” (1906). W.V.O Quine later generalized this point and argued that our beliefs form an interconnected web and that “statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (1951, 38). The idea that an observation cannot show the error in a single hypothesis is also known as the “Duhem-Quine underdetermination thesis.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) This also explains why scientists often don’t just abandon their theories when predictions fail, but look for errors elsewhere in their system of beliefs and assumptions, as in the Uranus/Neptune case described in the previous section. In fact, the Uranus/Neptune example nicely illustrates holistic underdetermination: a failed prediction derived from Newton’s theory did not show that the theory itself was wrong. This gives us additional reason to be suspicious of falsifiability as the distinguishing feature of science. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For additional discussion of different forms of underdetermination, see Stanford (2023). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) This form of reasoning is known as *Inference to the Best Explanation* or “IBE” (for discussion, see, e.g., Lipton 2017). Not everybody accepts IBE as a justified form of inference; critics deny that better explanations are more likely to be true. Philosophers have also questioned whether some purported explanatory virtues should be considered as such. For example, if the world is complex, then there may be no good reason to expect that simpler theories are more likely to be true (see Okasha 2016, Ch. 1). Others have pointed out that explanatory virtues might conflict (one theory might explain more phenomena and another might explain some phenomena at a deeper level), and there might not be a principled way to deal with such conflicts. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Thomas Kuhn (1962), a historian and philosopher of science who wrote about scientific revolutions and popularized the term “paradigm shift,” has suggested that there are no neutral standards that could be used to *decisively* choose between paradigms. (For additional discussion of Kuhn’s ideas, see [Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm Shifts, and Academic Rifts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/16/thomas-kuhn-paradigm-shifts-and-academic-rifts/) by Michael Zerella.) Donna Haraway (1988) has drawn attention to how the social and embodied positions of scientists (their gender and other aspects of their social position) might influence what kinds of questions they ask and how they understand the world. Helen Longino (1990) has added to this by suggesting that the background assumptions that affect scientific inquiry are influenced by the larger societal context in which science operates. Haraway and Longino are both feminist philosophers of science who call for greater attention to how values, interests, and perspectives interact with scientific practice. Both suggest that genuine objectivity can be found in engaging with multiple perspectives rather than trying to eliminate perspective altogether. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) There are different versions of scientific realism, but most realists are committed to the mind-independent existence of the “essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories” and to scientific theories “mostly being right about the properties of those entities” (Dewitt 2013). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) There are different versions of scientific anti-realism as well. One version states that theoretical statements that appeal to unobservables do aim at truth but should not be taken literally: talk of electrons and quarks is just shorthand for some statements about how observable phenomena behave. Another version of anti-realism states that theories like these should be taken literally but that we should suspend judgment on whether they are true. (See van Fraassen 1980.) Some philosophers have combined aspects of scientific realism with aspects of scientific anti-realism. For example, Nancy Cartwright (1983) advocates for realism about theoretical entities coupled with antirealism about theoretical laws. For additional discussion of theoretical laws in scientific knowledge, see [Laws of Nature](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) This is known as the “No-Miracles Argument,” often attributed to Hilary Putnam (1975). Bas van Fraassen has proposed an alternative, selectionist explanation: empirically inadequate theories are weeded out and only empirically adequate theories survive, which explains the overall success of science (1980, 40). Realists have responded that the approximate truth of the successful theories explains *why* they survive (see Psillos 1999, 94). Philosophers have also appealed to underdetermination in defending antirealism. Consider the theory that there are unobservable elementary particles called quarks that are fundamental building blocks of matter. The quark theory can account for important observational data, such as patterns in particle collisions. A realist might think that this provides good reason to believe that the quark theory accurately describes reality and that quarks really exist. An antirealist can counter that, in principle, the patterns in particle collisions can be explained by alternative theories that do not posit quarks, and that we should therefore be agnostic about whether quarks really exist. A realist comeback might then involve appealing to the explanatory virtues discussed in the second section of this essay. (For additional discussion of the argument from underdetermination, see Okasha 2016, 66-70.) [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) For a detailed argument, see Laudan 1980. You might worry that if antirealists are right about science, then we should trust science less. Katie Morrow (2023) argues that this isn’t so. She writes that scientific practice doesn’t depend on whether realism is correct and, because of this, our trust in science shouldn’t depend on whether realism is correct either. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Philosophers’ contributions to science aren’t limited to investigations of problems in philosophy of science; philosophers have also played crucial roles in the development of scientific theories and methods of investigation (see Smith 2017). ### References [Carroll, Sean (2014). “Falsifiability.” ](https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25322)[*Edge.org.*](https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25322) [Cartwright, Nancy (1983). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/27605)[*How the Laws of Physics Lie.*](https://academic.oup.com/book/27605) [Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/27605) [Dewitt, Michael (2013). “Realism/Anti-Realism.” ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203744857-26/realism-anti-realism-michael-devitt)[In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds), ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203744857-26/realism-anti-realism-michael-devitt)[*The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203744857-26/realism-anti-realism-michael-devitt)[.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203744857-26/realism-anti-realism-michael-devitt) [Routledge](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203744857-26/realism-anti-realism-michael-devitt). [Duhem, Pierre (1906/1954). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691025247/the-aim-and-structure-of-physical-theory?srsltid=AfmBOoqcg3HpZ2g7VDKwebK_Hk3WM-SDExV8K6rmiYFDOuV5Wuijq94Q)[*The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691025247/the-aim-and-structure-of-physical-theory?srsltid=AfmBOoqcg3HpZ2g7VDKwebK_Hk3WM-SDExV8K6rmiYFDOuV5Wuijq94Q)[ (transl. by Philip Wiener.)](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691025247/the-aim-and-structure-of-physical-theory?srsltid=AfmBOoqcg3HpZ2g7VDKwebK_Hk3WM-SDExV8K6rmiYFDOuV5Wuijq94Q) [Princeton University Press](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691025247/the-aim-and-structure-of-physical-theory?srsltid=AfmBOoqcg3HpZ2g7VDKwebK_Hk3WM-SDExV8K6rmiYFDOuV5Wuijq94Q). [Hansson, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/)[Sven Ove (2025).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/)[ “Science and Pseudo-Science.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/)[In ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/) [Haraway, Donna (1988). “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3178066)[*Feminist Studies*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3178066)[ 14: 575-599](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3178066). [Kuhn, Thomas (1962). ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo13179781.html)[*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo13179781.html)[The University of Chicago Press.](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo13179781.html) [Laudan, Larry (1981). “A Confutation of Convergent Realism.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/187066)[*Philosophy of Science*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/187066)[ 49: 19-49.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/187066) [Lipton, Peter (2017). “Inference to the best explanation.” In W.H. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405164481.ch29)[Newton-Smith (ed), ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405164481.ch29)[*A Companion to the Philosophy of Science.*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405164481.ch29) [Blackwell](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405164481.ch29). [Longino, Helen (1990). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691020518/science-as-social-knowledge?srsltid=AfmBOoor6R4D9PzpfMB8-Lnswy_Bb2QxcUUOpOwOI5rtTYC6v-Lcs0YH)[*Science as Social Knowledge.* ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691020518/science-as-social-knowledge?srsltid=AfmBOoor6R4D9PzpfMB8-Lnswy_Bb2QxcUUOpOwOI5rtTYC6v-Lcs0YH)[Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691020518/science-as-social-knowledge?srsltid=AfmBOoor6R4D9PzpfMB8-Lnswy_Bb2QxcUUOpOwOI5rtTYC6v-Lcs0YH) [Morrow, Katie (2023). “Why we can’t resolve the scientific realism debate—and why we should believe in science anyway.” ](https://blog.apaonline.org/2023/07/25/why-we-cant-resolve-the-scientific-realism-debate-and-why-we-should-believe-in-science-anyway/)[*Blog of the APA*](https://blog.apaonline.org/2023/07/25/why-we-cant-resolve-the-scientific-realism-debate-and-why-we-should-believe-in-science-anyway/)[.](https://blog.apaonline.org/2023/07/25/why-we-cant-resolve-the-scientific-realism-debate-and-why-we-should-believe-in-science-anyway/) [Okasha, Samir (2016). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-of-science-9780198745587?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-of-science-9780198745587?cc=us&lang=en&)[, ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-of-science-9780198745587?cc=us&lang=en&)[*2nd Edition*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-of-science-9780198745587?cc=us&lang=en&)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-of-science-9780198745587?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-of-science-9780198745587?cc=us&lang=en&) [Popper, Karl (1962). ](https://archive.org/details/conjecturesrefut0000popp)[*Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.* ](https://archive.org/details/conjecturesrefut0000popp)[Basic Books.](https://archive.org/details/conjecturesrefut0000popp) [Psillos, Stathis (1999). ](https://www.routledge.com/Scientific-Realism-How-Science-Tracks-Truth/Psillos/p/book/9780415208192)[*Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth.* ](https://www.routledge.com/Scientific-Realism-How-Science-Tracks-Truth/Psillos/p/book/9780415208192)[Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Scientific-Realism-How-Science-Tracks-Truth/Psillos/p/book/9780415208192) [Putnam, Hilary (1975). ](https://archive.org/details/mathematicsmatte0001putn)[*Mathematics, Matter, and Method.* ](https://archive.org/details/mathematicsmatte0001putn)[Cambridge University Press.](https://archive.org/details/mathematicsmatte0001putn) [Quine, W.V.O. (1951). “Two dogmas of empiricism.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/w-v-quine-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-the-philosophical-review-vol-60-1951-pp-2043/C05D5C2FB2DD7D46708108A5BB03C5C0)[*The Philosophical Review*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/w-v-quine-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-the-philosophical-review-vol-60-1951-pp-2043/C05D5C2FB2DD7D46708108A5BB03C5C0)[ 60: 20-43.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/w-v-quine-two-dogmas-of-empiricism-the-philosophical-review-vol-60-1951-pp-2043/C05D5C2FB2DD7D46708108A5BB03C5C0) [Smith, Subrena E (2017). “Why philosophy is so important in science education.” ](https://aeon.co/ideas/why-philosophy-is-so-important-in-science-education)[*Aeon*](https://aeon.co/ideas/why-philosophy-is-so-important-in-science-education)[.](https://aeon.co/ideas/why-philosophy-is-so-important-in-science-education) [Stanford, Kyle (2023). “Underdetermination of scientific theory.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/)[In ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/) [van Fraassen, Bas (1980). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/7116)[*The Scientific Image.*](https://academic.oup.com/book/7116)[ Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/7116) ### Related Essays [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/) by Michael Zerella [Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm Shifts, and Academic Rifts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/16/thomas-kuhn-paradigm-shifts-and-academic-rifts/) by Michael Zerella [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/) by Michael Zerella [Laws of Nature](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/) by Emma Otterski [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/) by Thomas Metcalf [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Acknowledgement Many thanks to Jacqueline Wallis, John Kulvicki, Peter Lewis, and the editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* for their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the students in my Philosophy of Science class at Dartmouth College, who enthusiastically and thoughtfully engaged with these topics during Summer 2026. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Philosophy-of-Science.pdf). ### About the Author [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) is an assistant professor of philosophy at Rowan University, New Jersey. She specializes in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of medicine, with particular interests in color vision, pain, and chronic illness. [TiinaRosenqvist.com](https://www.tiinarosenqvist.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** Philosophy of Science, Rosenqvist --- ### [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) **Published:** February 10, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to the topic of personal identity: how do we continue to exist over time as the same being, despite the many changes that occur to us? **Content:** Author: [Chad Vance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Vance) Category: [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/ "Metaphysics") Word Count: 1000 You are a person. Presumably, you used to be a *younger* person. But, in virtue of what is it the case that you and that younger person are *one and the same* individual? In other words, how is it that you continue to exist over time? There had better be *something* that grounds our continued existence, for we make judgments that presume that people continue to exist every day—for instance, when we assign rewards and punishments to them, or moral obligations, or property rights, and so on: - the woman presently being punished for some past crime had better be the same person who committed it, or else her punishment is unjust; - if I am obligated to keep a promise, I had better be the one who made it in the first place, or else I have no such obligation; - if you presently possess a car, you had better be the one who purchased it, or else you have no legitimate claim to its ownership. Clearly, the question of what grounds the persistence of one’s identity is an incredibly important one. Let’s look at some proposed answers. !["Freaky Friday," one of many films about personal identity.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/freakyfriday.jpg?resize=656%2C465&ssl=1) “Freaky Friday,” one of many films about personal identity.### 1. The Body Maybe our bodies have something to do with our continued existence; as long as my *body* continues to exist, *I* continue to exist. But, *mere* sameness of body over time does not seem to be enough to ground the continued existence of a person.1 For, if that were the case, then a brain-dead body in a persistent vegetative state (entirely lacking consciousness) would still be the same person as the one who once talked and thought and laughed with others. That seems wrong. To illustrate further, imagine this story: The human body of your next-door neighbor leads two completely different lives—one during the day, and one at night. From 6am to 6pm every day, his body claims to be named “Day Man.” Day Man thinks that his body sleeps every night, but what really happens is that, from 6pm to 6am, his body is awake and claiming to be named “Night Man.” Night Man and Day Man have different jobs, friends, goals, tastes, etc., and, furthermore, have *no knowledge of each other*. Doesn’t it seem like what we have here is a case of *two persons* inhabiting *one body*? If that is correct, then sameness of body is *not* what grounds sameness of person; for, in that case, it would turn out that Day Man and Night Man were really just one person and not two (since they share the same body). ### 2. The Soul Many people believe that what we are is not something material, but rather something *immaterial*. They say that each of us has a *soul*—or rather, *is* a soul—and that souls are immaterial things that *reside in* bodies. Maybe our souls ground our continued existence; so long as my *soul* continues to exist, *I* continue to exist. But, if that were so, we would have no way of *knowing* whether or not people continue to exist over time. Since souls, *if they exist*, are immaterial, we cannot see or touch or smell them: souls would be completely undetectable by the senses. And yet, it seems that we *can* know whether or not someone in the present moment is the same person as some earlier one. You do not greet your friends and say, “But, how can I know whether or not you are really my friend? My friend is merely an immaterial thing, and since I cannot see immaterial things, I have no way of knowing whether or not my friend stands before me.” Furthermore, people who believe in souls typically believe that souls can *leave* their bodies and go elsewhere (for instance, to heaven). But, then, for all we know, when a soul leaves one body it simply inhabits another. Abraham Lincoln’s soul might have left his body after his death and migrated into mine. If that happened, then I *am* Abraham Lincoln—one and the same person, such that *I* was once the 16th president of the United States, who wrote the Gettysburg Address and so on—a result that many find counter-intuitive. ### 3. Psychology If Day Man and Night Man are two different people, then it is because they have two different psychologies. If a body in a persistent vegetative state is no longer a person, then it is because that body is no longer conscious. If I am not Abraham Lincoln, despite sharing one and the same immaterial soul, then it is because I cannot *remember* doing anything that Lincoln did. For these reasons, we might think that *psychology* or *consciousness* is what grounds our continued existence. But, consciousness *alone* will not do. Imagine that your body woke up today claiming to be Pope Francis; your body now possesses all of the pope’s beliefs and opinions, and claims to be the pope. In short, imagine your body waking up with the pope’s psychology.2 Imagine also that the *actual* body of Pope Francis woke up in the Vatican this morning and continued with business as usual, doing pope things. Now you *both* have the pope’s psychology, so, apparently, you are *both* Pope Francis. But, that can’t be. You cannot *both* be the pope (how could one person be in two places at once?). So, psychology alone does not seem to be what grounds identity. ### 4. Conclusion Intuitively, the *real* pope is the man who wakes up in the Vatican. Meanwhile, your body is merely an imposter pope. Might this be because the man in the Vatican has the same body *and* psychology as the man elected to the papacy, while your body has only his psychology? This line of reasoning has led to many hybrid proposals. For instance, perhaps you continue to exist over time only so long as your body *and* your psychology do. On this proposal, survival of *only* your body (e.g., as a human vegetable) or *only* your psychology (e.g., if downloaded into a new body) would not suffice for the survival of *you*. ### Notes 1 For one thing, strictly speaking, we do not even *have* the same bodies over time. After all, our bodies are constantly taking in new material as we breathe and eat and drink, and constantly shedding material as we perspire and excrete and exhale or lose our hair and skin our knees. So, most body-theorists do not actually believe that *exact* sameness of material is what grounds identity. Rather, it is only bodily *continuity* that matters. For instance, even though my body is made of slightly different material today than it was yesterday, there is nevertheless some causal continuity between my present body and my former one which binds them together as one and the same. 2 Or do you merely *seem* to have his psychology? E.g., if you seem to remember something the Pope did, do you actually have *his* memories, or does it just *seem* like it? What’s the difference between *remembering* something, and it *seeming* to you that you remember something? How do answers here make a difference to psychological theories of personal identity? ### References [Locke, John (1689). “Of Identity and Diversity”, in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, section II.27.](http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/johnlocke/BOOKIIChapterXXVII.html) [Olson, Eric T. (2019). “Personal Identity”, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/) [Parfit, Derek (1971). “Personal Identity”, in *Philosophical Review*, vol. 80, 3-27.](http://www.uvm.edu/~lderosse/courses/metaph/Parfit(1971).pdf) [Parfit, Derek (1987). “Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons”, in *Mindwaves*, Blakemore and Greenfield, eds. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 19-26.](http://www.stafforini.com/txt/parfit_-_divided_minds_and_the_nature_of_persons.pdf) [Perry, John (1978). *A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality*.](http://www.humanscience.org/docs/Perry%20(1978)%20A%20Dialogue%20on%20Personal%20Identity%20and%20Immortality.pdf) ### For Further Reading [Korfmacher, ](https://iep.utm.edu/person-i/)[Carsten](https://iep.utm.edu/person-i/)[. “Personal Identity”. *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://iep.utm.edu/person-i/) ### Related Essays [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek [Origin Essentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/ "Origin Essentialism") by Chad Vance [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/ "The Non-Identity Problem") by Duncan Purves [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis ### Translation [Turkish](https://veritasdergisi.com/2024/05/11/kisisel-kimlik-zaman-gectikce-nasil-var-oluyoruz-chad-vance/) ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/personal-identity.pdf). ### About the Author [Chad Vance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Vance) is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the College of William and Mary. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He also holds degrees in astrophysics and theology. He specializes in metaphysics and is also very interested in normative ethics, applied ethics, philosophy of religion, and early modern philosophy. [wmpeople.wm.edu/site/page/cvance/home](http://wmpeople.wm.edu/site/page/cvance/home) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Metaphysics **Tags:** identity, persons, vance --- ### [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different about You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) **Published:** April 28, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Chad Vance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Vance) Category: [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/ "Metaphysics") Word Count: 1000 Could you have been an alligator? Or a roller skate? Is there a possible scenario where you were never born as a human being, but where someone builds a roller skate, and *you are that roller skate*? Probably not. Most people think that you could not have been anything other than a human being. But, this is just to say that you have the property of being a human being *essentially*. Now ask: Could you have had different parents? Could you have been the child of, say, Bill and Hillary Clinton? Many philosophers believe that this is impossible too. It seems plausible that you could not have even originated from a different sperm-egg pair. Consider: If your own parents had waited a month to conceive a child, then you would never have been born—for, a month later it would have been a different egg, and therefore a different child. But, this is just to say that certain features of your origin are *essential* to your identity.1 ### 1. Origin Essentialism and Branching Possibilities Origin essentialism seems quite appealing given a *branching conception of possibilities*. Consider: It seems true that things could have gone differently for you today. For instance, you could have gone for a walk instead of reading this. One way of picturing this possibility (where you went for a walk) is as a “fork in the road”—a diverging path along the course of your life, a path you did not take. There have been many forks in the road during the course of your life. You could have studied harder for that exam. You could have been nicer to that stranger. You could have done that thing which you later regretted not doing. Each of these “could have beens” were forks in the road which you did not take. The possibilities surrounding your life are shaped like a giant tree, uncountable untaken paths continuously branching from the central timeline of your life. But, all of these branches are ones that diverge from some point in *your actual life*; and, as we trace these branches backward in time, they *all* inevitably trace back to your beginning. Intuitively, though, *here* is a piece of your timeline that *could not* have gone differently. That is, while many things about your life could have been different, your origin is not one of these things—this *starting point* is something that *all* of your possible lives share in common. ### 2. Origin Essentialism and the Uniqueness of Identity Alternatively, we are driven to origin essentialism if we believe that there is some unique, identifying property of you that makes you *you*. That is, if there is some property, X, such that anything which has this property is *you*, then X is most likely your *origin*. For, none of your other properties seem up to the task. For instance, X cannot be your *life experiences*. While it is probably the case that no one else *in fact* has had all of the same experiences as you have had, surely it is nevertheless *possible* (if, say, you were switched at birth with some other infant, and that infant then grew up to, by some great coincidence, have exactly the same experiences that you have ever had). Your experiences, then, are not necessarily unique to *you*; i.e., they are not something that you and *only you* could ever have. Furthermore, X cannot be your *genetic code*. For, identical twins have the same genes, and yet they are distinct individuals. Again, your genetic code is not something that you and *only you* could ever have. Plausibly, the one thing about you that you and *only you* have is your origin. Saul Kripke (1972, 1980) famously offered “something like proof” of this conclusion.2 What follows is a brief sketch: Let us call the zygote (sperm-egg fusion) from which *you* actually originated *Alpha*, and call the zygote from which *I* actually originated *Beta*. If it is possible for you to have had a different origin than the one you actually had, then it is possible for you to have originated from Beta instead of Alpha. But, then, if both Alpha *and* Beta could be your origin, then there is a possible scenario where one individual originates from Alpha, and another individual originates from Beta, and *both of these individuals are you*. But, this is implausible. You could not be two distinct individuals, in two places at once. We may conclude that you could not have originated from any zygote other than the one from which you *did* in fact originate. ### 3. The Recycling Problem Many philosophers find origin essentialism to be incredibly attractive. Whole bodies of philosophical literature even seem to presuppose it (see, e.g., [The Non-Identity Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/ "The Non-Identity Problem")). Unfortunately, your zygote is not necessarily as unique as you might think. Imagine that, as your zygote grew into a fetus, it gained some new atoms, and shed some others. Now imagine that, by some incredible coincidence, some of these atoms formed *another zygote*. Remarkably, this other, second zygote contains all and only the same atoms that *your* zygote originally contained—and arranged in exactly the same way. Here, we seem to have a scenario where your zygote exists twice over; there is the first zygote, and then the second, “recycled” one. If both of these zygotes are carried to term, then *two* children will be born. If you and *only you* have the particular origin that you do, then apparently *both* of these children are you. This will not do.3 ### 4. Conclusion The idea that you have your origin essentially is intuitively appealing. It seems true, for instance, that if your parents had never met, then you would never have existed. It is common for philosophers to propose that originating from a particular zygote, or sperm-egg fusion, is one of your essential properties—this is a feature of you that is yours and yours alone; nor could it be a feature of anyone else. However, in light of the possibility of zygote duplication (as illustrated in recycling cases), even our origins may not be as metaphysically unique as we would have hoped. ### Notes 1 Here, my focus will be upon origin essentialism for *biological organisms*. But, it is quite plausible (perhaps even more so) that inanimate objects have their origins essentially too. For instance, it seems true that the table in front of me, which was made from a certain hunk of pine wood, could not have originated from, say, a block of ice. Rather, it *must* have originated from that particular hunk of pine and no other. Note that everything that I say here about organisms applies to inanimate objects as well. 2 Since Kripke’s original proposal, there have been several attempts to defend various versions of this proof in much greater detail (see, e.g., Salmon, 1979, 1981; Forbes, 1980, 1985). 3 This problem has come to be known as The Recycling Problem (found in McKay, 1986, and Robertson, 1998). Another problem for origin essentialism lurks in the vicinity: For simplification, imagine that your actual zygote (call it Z1) contained 100 atoms, {A1 – A100}. Surely, though, your zygote could have differed by *one atom*, originating instead from atoms {A2 – A101}; call this zygote Z2. So, anyone originating from Z1 could have originated from Z2 instead. But, surely, anyone originating from Z2 could have originated from a zygote that differed by only *one atom*, originating instead from atoms {A3 – A102}; call this zygote Z3. So, anyone originating from Z2 could have originated from Z3 instead. You might see where this is going. Repeat this inference enough times and we get the result that Z1 = Z2 = Z3 = … = Z100, where Z100 is composed of atoms {A101 – A200}. But, then, by the transitivity of identity, Z1 = Z100 (that is, the zygote composed of atoms A1 – A100 is *one and the same* zygote as the zygote composed of atoms A101 – A200). Here, we have a case where two material objects can be one and the same object, *even though they are composed of completely different material*. This will not do. This problem has come to be known as The Tolerance Problem. For more, see Penelope Mackie’s excellent discussion of the major problems for origin essentialism in her (2006). ### References [Forbes, Graeme (1980). Origin and Identity, *Philosophical Studies* 37(4), 353-362.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00354904) [Forbes, Graeme (1985). *The Metaphysics of Modality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Metaphysics-Modality-Claredon-Library-Philosophy/dp/0198244339/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&qid=1398686085&sr=8-7&keywords=The+Metaphysics+of+Modality) [Kripke, Saul (1972, 1980). *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Naming-Necessity-text-only-Kripke/dp/B004FFJM6E/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1398686205&sr=8-2&keywords=Naming+and+Necessity) [Mackie, J.L. (1974). De What Re Is De Re Modality? *The Journal of Philosophy*, 71(16), 551-561.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2025231?uid=3739664&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103934336547) [Mackie, Penelope (2006). *How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/how-things-might-have-been-9780199562404?q=How%20Things%20Might%20Have%20Been:%20Individuals,%20Kinds,%20and%20Essential%20Properties&lang=en&cc=us) [McKay, Thomas J. (1986). Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 11, 295-304.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1986.tb00499.x/abstract) [Robertson, Teresa (1998). Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism, *Mind*, New Series, 107(428), 729-749.](http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/107/428/729.short) [Salmon, Nathan (1979). How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 76(12), 703-725.](http://www.math.ucla.edu/~dam/282.03w/salmonk.pdf) [Salmon, Nathan (1981). *Reference and Essence*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Reference-Essence-Studies-Analytic-Philosophy/dp/1591022150/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1398686584&sr=8-1&keywords=Reference+and+Essence) ### Related Essays [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/ "Personal Identity") by Chad Vance [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman [The Non-Identity Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/ "The Non-Identity Problem") by Duncan Purves [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/origin-essentialism.pdf "Origin Essentialism"). ### About the Author [Chad Vance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Vance) is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the College of William and Mary. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He also holds degrees in astrophysics and theology. He specializes in metaphysics and is also interested in normative ethics, applied ethics, philosophy of religion, and early modern philosophy. <http://wmpeople.wm.edu/site/page/cvance/home>[ ](http://wmpeople.wm.edu/site/page/cvance/home) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Metaphysics **Tags:** essence, vance --- ### [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) **Published:** January 8, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the philosophy of pain: is pain physical or mental? What is the role of the pain system? And, is pain always unpleasant? These questions are the focus of this essay. **Content:** Author: [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 992 Most of us have experienced some, probably many, forms of bodily pain.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Unless you were born with congenital insensitivity to pain,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) you’ve likely experienced at least toothaches, headaches, or backaches. Pain experiences differ in intensity, quality, and duration. A toothache might be sharp and intense but fleeting, while a backache might be dull and aching yet more enduring. Despite these differences, there seems to be a common thread that unites toothaches, backaches, and so on—something that makes them all pains. This raises interesting philosophical questions: is pain physical or mental? What is the role of the pain system? And, is pain always unpleasant? These questions are the focus of this essay. [![An image of a hand suggesting the person is in pain.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/philosophy-of-pain.png?resize=656%2C443&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/philosophy-of-pain.png?ssl=1)An image of a hand suggesting the person is in pain.### 1. Two Views of Pain To begin, what sort of thing is pain? To answer this, imagine walking barefoot through a garden when you suddenly feel a sharp, shooting sensation in your foot. You recognize that you’re feeling pain, but what is pain itself? Many philosophers believe that the ways we normally think and talk about pain provide valuable clues for answering this question. Our initial instinct might be to think of pain as something in the body. Continuing with the example above, let’s say you discover that you’ve stepped on a nail hidden in the grass. We might then conclude that your pain experience amounts to you perceiving the injury to your foot, and that the pain itself is simply the damaged condition of the foot.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) We can call this the *bodily* view of pain. The bodily view of pain has some intuitive appeal: pain is felt in body parts and often aligns with physical damage. Our everyday language reinforces this view as well—for example, you might say that you have pain *in your foot*. But what if your pain has no clear cause—no puncture wound or other visible injury—yet your foot continues to hurt? Imagine a doctor conducts a thorough examination and finds no physical issues.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Even if you trust the doctor’s expert opinion and accept that nothing is physically wrong with your foot, you will likely still insist that you have pain.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This suggests that, when pushed, we identify pain with pain *experience*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) For some, this is a reason to conclude that pain is not a physical state of the body but rather a specific kind of conscious mental state.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) This is the *mental* view of pain. Others might argue that this example highlights how our everyday ways of thinking and talking about pain are confused, leaving the debate unresolved.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 2. The Role of the Pain System Another question concerns the role of the pain system in the lives of creatures like us.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Some philosophers view the pain system as a kind of bodily damage detector, designed to inform us about injuries or other disturbances within our bodies.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) They often assume that, under normal circumstances, greater damage results in greater pain, much like higher temperatures lead to higher thermometer readings. There is some empirical backing for this idea. For example, pain scientists will tell us that there are specialized neurons, “nociceptors,” that respond to actual or potential bodily damage—like the injury from a nail piercing your foot—and transmit signals to the spinal cord and further into the brain. But even though nociceptors are sometimes referred to as “pain receptors,” this term is misleading. The activation of nociceptors does not correlate strongly with the subjective experience of pain, as nociceptive signals are heavily modulated along their pathway.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Therefore, while nociception may signal bodily damage, it is important not to confuse the nociceptive system with the pain system. In fact, many scientists now characterize the pain system as a complex network integrating a wide range of elements, including nociceptive and other sensory inputs, genetic and hormonal influences, immune system activity, emotional and cognitive processes, and past experiences.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) For example, a stimulus once perceived as painful might no longer elicit pain if we learn that it’s harmless. Conversely, even harmless stimuli might provoke a pain experience in situations that feel threatening. Given the complexity of pain, if the pain system is supposed to inform us about bodily damage, it doesn’t seem to do a very good job. An alternative perspective is that the pain system’s role is not to inform about damage, but rather to prompt actions that help us stay safe in changing circumstances.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 3. The Unpleasantness of Pain If asked to describe pain, we might naturally characterize it as “unpleasant.”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) However, from a philosophical point of view, it’s interesting to consider whether pain is *always,* or *necessarily,* unpleasant.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) It’s certainly true that pain is *typically* unpleasant. If one were to step on a nail, it’s unlikely the sensation would feel pleasant—or even neutral. We go to great lengths to avoid pain: we take painkillers, steer clear of activities that might cause it, and generally regard it as something undesirable. That said, there may be counterexamples to the much stronger claim that pain is *always* unpleasant. One potential example is “pain asymbolia,” a neuropsychiatric condition in which individuals report feeling pain but lack the emotional responses and avoidance behaviors typically associated with it.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Pain asymbolics are sometimes described as feeling pain but not caring about it. To account for pain asymbolia, some philosophers have suggested that pain is not necessarily unpleasant. Instead, its affective quality—or “feeling tone”—may be shaped by our desires, interpretations, or attitudes. For example, perhaps pain only feels unpleasant if we dislike it.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Other philosophers argue that pain asymbolics do not experience *genuine* pain, or that they do experience pain and their pain is unpleasant, just to a significantly lesser degree than the pain typically experienced by people.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) If either of these views is correct, pain asymbolia does not constitute an exception to the general rule that pain is unpleasant. ### 4. Conclusion Pain is a complex phenomenon that defies easy analysis. Its nature, role, and relationship to unpleasantness have been long-standing subjects of philosophical debate, and these debates are increasingly shaped by advances in pain science. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay focuses on bodily pain, or pain felt in the body. While it is an intriguing question whether and to what extent mental states like grief share commonalities with bodily pain, this question falls outside the scope of the present discussion. Readers interested in exploring these connections are encouraged to consult, e.g., Corns (2015) and Radden (2022). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Congenital insensitivity to pain (CIP) is a rare genetic condition caused by mutations that affect the development and function of nociceptors, the specialized neurons that respond to actual or potential tissue damage. As a result, individuals with CIP do not feel pain in response to injuries, burns, or other harmful stimuli. Some authors suggest using the alternative term “congenital nociceptor deficiency” to more precisely describe the condition (Weisman et al. 2019). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The perceptual view of pain draws a parallel between experiencing pain and paradigmatic perceptual processes like seeing; proponents often argue that pains are objects of pain perception in much the same way that apples and oranges are objects of vision (see, e.g., Hill 2009, Ch. 6). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This type of pain is often labeled “medically unexplained,” though this term reflects an outdated perspective that views pain solely as a symptom of an underlying disease (see, e.g., Reme 2024). Many cases of chronic pain cannot be directly linked to a specific organic cause. Recognizing this, the latest edition of the International Classification of Diseases (2019/2021) classifies chronic primary pain (MG30.0) as a disease in its own right. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Many people intuitively believe that we cannot be mistaken about our own pain; if you *feel* pain, then you *have* pain. This idea is often captured by the claim that our beliefs about our own pains are “incorrigible” (for further discussion, see Jacobson 2017; for a general discussion of self-knowledge, see [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur). In contrast, we can be—and often are—wrong about the pain of others (Elaine Scarry famously writes, “To have great pain is to have certainty; to hear that another person has pain is to have doubt” (1985, 7)). This discrepancy arises because we cannot directly observe another person’s pain as we can our own; instead, we typically infer it from their behavior, such as verbal expressions, or some other evidence. For example, you might infer your friend’s pain from her exclaiming “Ow!” For a discussion of the communicative content of pain utterances, see Wiggleton-Little 2024. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Another reason might be the intuition that one cannot have pain without pain experience (Pautz 2010). A person can sustain all kinds of bodily damage without feeling any pain (a phenomenon well-documented in the medical literature; see, e.g., Beecher 1956). It would seem strange to claim that someone who feels no pain nonetheless has pain. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For example, Murat Aydede (2019) suggests that taking pain to be an experience is “the more dominant thread” in our commonsense conception of pain. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Some philosophers think that our ordinary, commonsense understanding of pain is fundamentally confused: we tend to regard pain *both* as a bodily state and as a mental state when it can’t be both. The tension between these seemingly conflicting aspects of the commonsense conception of pain is sometimes referred to as “the paradox of pain” (Hill 2009, Ch. 6). Various attempts have been made to disentangle these elements. For example, Michelle Liu (2022) argues that pain terms are polysemous and have two related senses (the “mental sense” and the “bodily sense”), which reflect two distinct concepts of pain. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Determining if and when other species experience pain is a challenging task. René Descartes (1596-1650) appears to have thought that non-human animals are mere automata, devoid of mental lives, including pain experiences (see Descartes’ *Discourse on the Method* in \[CSM\]). Historically, scientists have been hesitant to attribute pain experience to most animals. However, in recent decades, this perspective has shifted, and there is now a growing consensus that many animals do, in fact, feel pain (see, e.g., Sneddon et al. 2014). That some animals experience pain is ethically significant since, on many ethical perspectives, the ability to feel pain makes something, or *someone—*of any species, what’s often called “morally considerable” and such that there can be moral obligations toward that being: see the theory called “sentientism” in [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman; for an introduction to an ethical theory that emphasizes the badness of pain, [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz; for an application of that type of theory to animals, [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For example, Fred Dretske (1995) and Michael Tye (1995) both paint the pain system as a sort of bodily damage detector. For criticism, see Coninx 2020; Casser 2021; Rosenqvist 2024. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Nociceptive signals can be thought of as messages sent from the tissues of the body to the spinal cord and brain. Modulation of these signals involves either amplifying (strengthening) or attenuating (weakening) them. For a better understanding of nociception and how nociceptive signals are modulated, see Dubin & Patapoutian (2010); Mason (2008). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Párraga & Castellanos 2023; Athnaiel et al. 2023. For a historical overview of competing neurophysiological theories of pain, see Moayedi & Davis 2013. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) These views on the role of pain have prompted various analyses of pain itself. For example, Tabor et al. (2013) take pain to be an “experience that signals the need to take action to protect the tissues of our body,” Moseley (2018) considers pain “a warning signal from your brain that depends on credible evidence to say your body needs protecting,” and Klein (2015) suggests that pains are sensations with a specific content: a command to protect a part of the body. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For example, the International Association for the Study of Pain, an international organization dedicated to the science and treatment of pain, defines pain as an “unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or potential tissue damage” (Raja et al. 2020). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) A related question concerns whether pain is always bad. In philosophical discussions, the “badness” of pain is frequently associated with its unpleasantness (e.g., Bain 2013). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Grahek 2007; Bain 2013. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For example, Richard Hall (1989) argues that pains aren’t necessarily unpleasant and that their (typical) unpleasantness consists in their being disliked. Other counterexamples to the claim that pain is always unpleasant might include the pain of physical exertion during an intense workout or the sharp, cold sting of plunging into icy water. While these sensations seem to qualify as pain experiences, many who seek them out do not find them unpleasant; some even describe them as deeply enjoyable. Gwen Bradford (2020) refers to these as “hurts-so-good experiences,” and proposes that people who enjoy these experiences enjoy the *unpleasantness* of the pain. If she is right, these experiences would not serve as counterexamples to the claim that pain is inherently unpleasant. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Trevor Griffith & Adrian Kind (2023) argue that pain asymbolics do not experience genuine pain. 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](https://www.jpain.org/article/S1526-5900(18)30687-4/fulltext)[*The Journal of Pain*](https://www.jpain.org/article/S1526-5900(18)30687-4/fulltext)[ 20(9): P1011–1014](https://www.jpain.org/article/S1526-5900(18)30687-4/fulltext) [Wiggleton-Little J (2024). ](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2313097)[“Sharing Pain: A Hybrid Expressivist Account.” ](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2313097)[*Australasian Journal of Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2313097)[102(3): 608–622](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2024.2313097) ### For Further Reading [Bain D, Brady M, Corns J (eds) (2019). ](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Pain-Unpleasantness-Emotion-and-Deviance/Bain-Brady-Corns/p/book/9780367734091?srsltid=AfmBOoqfsSCc3AEDgoda9kUvKyz32goQK2-jbXLKddpJN6fjWHiYBW_o)[*Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance*](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Pain-Unpleasantness-Emotion-and-Deviance/Bain-Brady-Corns/p/book/9780367734091?srsltid=AfmBOoqfsSCc3AEDgoda9kUvKyz32goQK2-jbXLKddpJN6fjWHiYBW_o)[.](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Pain-Unpleasantness-Emotion-and-Deviance/Bain-Brady-Corns/p/book/9780367734091?srsltid=AfmBOoqfsSCc3AEDgoda9kUvKyz32goQK2-jbXLKddpJN6fjWHiYBW_o)[ Routledge, London](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Pain-Unpleasantness-Emotion-and-Deviance/Bain-Brady-Corns/p/book/9780367734091?srsltid=AfmBOoqfsSCc3AEDgoda9kUvKyz32goQK2-jbXLKddpJN6fjWHiYBW_o) [Corns J (ed) (2017). ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Pain/Corns/p/book/9780367573423?srsltid=AfmBOooJ9las5tb6m6FlK_DLA0k-oJmfb8GQ380nISj98JUaBdCda4lW)[*The Routledge handbook of philosophy of pain*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Pain/Corns/p/book/9780367573423?srsltid=AfmBOooJ9las5tb6m6FlK_DLA0k-oJmfb8GQ380nISj98JUaBdCda4lW)[. Routledge, London](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Pain/Corns/p/book/9780367573423?srsltid=AfmBOooJ9las5tb6m6FlK_DLA0k-oJmfb8GQ380nISj98JUaBdCda4lW) ### Related Essays [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/philosophy-of-pain.pdf). ### About the Author [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) is an assistant professor of philosophy at Rowan University, New Jersey. She specializes in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of medicine, with particular interests in color vision, pain, and chronic illness. [TiinaRosenqvist.com](https://www.tiinarosenqvist.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics, Mind & Language, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** pain, philosophy of pain, Rosenqvist --- ### [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) **Published:** March 24, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** It’s natural to believe that many nonhuman animals think and feel—and therefore have minds—but it’s important to consider whether these beliefs are justified. This essay explores animal minds, the challenges involved in studying them, and why such study matters. **Content:** Author: [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics) Word Count: 1000 When dogs limp and whine, we think they feel pain. When a chimpanzee uses a stick to access food, we take this as evidence of reasoning. It’s natural to believe that many nonhuman animals think and feel—and therefore have minds—but it’s important to consider whether these beliefs are justified. This essay explores animal minds,[\[1\]](#_ftn1) the challenges involved in studying them, and why such study matters. [![A collage of diverse animals.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/animal-collage.png?resize=656%2C295&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/animal-collage.png?ssl=1) A collage of diverse animals.### 1. What Makes Understanding Animal Minds Difficult It seems obvious we know what goes on in our own minds, or at least that we *have* minds.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But philosophers have long questioned whether we are justified in thinking that *other* individuals have minds, given that other minds are not directly observable.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Considering what we know about other *humans*—that they have brains like ours and behave in similar ways—it seems reasonable to conclude that they also have minds. With *nonhuman* animals, however, this conclusion is less clear, especially when their brains and behaviors differ significantly from our own.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Historically, many philosophers and scientists have been suspicious of the idea of animal minds, preferring to view animals as mindless machines.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Yet, the remarkable complexity and flexibility of animal behavior speak in favor of mindedness, and very few people today deny that at least some animals are minded. Even if we accept that many animals have some form of mental life, identifying specific mental states—such as particular beliefs, desires, or emotions—is challenging. Adding to this difficulty is our tendency to *over*-attribute humanlike characteristics to animals. For example, it’s unlikely that cats would deliberately plot revenge, yet we might still interpret their behavior that way.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) At the same time, the belief in human uniqueness—the idea that certain abilities are exclusive to our species—can make some of us reluctant to attribute complex mental capacities to other animals.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) To accurately interpret animal behavior, we need to consider different interpretations and decide which best explains the evidence.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) When these interpretations involve mindedness, they ascribe conscious experiences, thinking, or both to animals. ### 2. Conscious Experience Human beings are conscious. We experience pain and pleasure, sadness and joy, and sensory qualities like redness. We are also aware of ourselves as distinct individuals moving through the world.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) When scientists ask whether nonhuman animals are conscious, they often focus on the experience of pain. It may seem obvious that many animals feel pain, as they recoil from harmful stimuli and tend to their injuries. But skeptics argue that these behaviors could be explained by reflexive, *fully* unconscious responses to damage to their body. While many animals possess nociceptors—specialized neurons that respond to such damage—they often lack the brain structures that, in humans, are associated with the conscious feeling of pain.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) But we shouldn’t just assume that similar mental capacities require similar brains, as the same capacities could have evolved separately in different species.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Additionally, some behaviors—such as crabs enduring electric shocks rather than abandoning a shelter when exposed to predator smells—are difficult to explain solely in terms of unconscious nociception and reflexive responses. Conscious pain experience seems more likely.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Behavioral evidence has also been used to support arguments for conscious emotions and self-awareness in animals. For example, elephants and chimpanzees show behaviors that suggest grief,[\[13\]](#_ftn13) octopuses engage in seemingly enjoyable play,[\[14\]](#_ftn14) and some fish appear to recognize themselves in mirrors.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) While the possibility of unconscious responses must also be considered, many scientists and philosophers now think conscious experience is the best explanation in many of these cases.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 3. Thinking In addition to having conscious experiences, human beings also think. If I want to order takeout, I consider where to order from, how much I’m willing to spend, and what my partner might like to eat. Thinking enables me to flexibly navigate a complex world. When it comes to animals, we are also interested in the kind of thinking that facilitates flexible behavior. While we know that most animals are capable of “associative learning”—responding to environmental cues based on past rewards, punishments, and associations between stimuli—we want to know whether they have beliefs and desires, understand their surroundings, and possess the ability to reason. Research in recent decades has provided plausible evidence of complex thinking in many species of animals.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) For example, crows have been observed constructing and using tools in ways that suggest an understanding of cause and effect and the ability to plan ahead.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Similarly, rats seem to maximize foraging success by strategically balancing looking for new food locations with returning to familiar ones.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Some animals might also be capable of understanding the mental states of others, a skill psychologists refer to as “mindreading.” For example, chimpanzees behave in ways that suggest they understand what others can see.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Similarly, dolphins engage in complex cooperative behaviors and joint action which may require some degree of mindreading.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 4. Conclusion: What’s at Stake? Studying animal minds is fascinating in its own right, but it also carries significant implications. Some are theoretical: if our goal is to understand mental capacities, limiting our focus to human minds may lead to oversimplifications. For example, much of human thought appears to be shaped by language, but it would be shortsighted to conclude that thinking *always* requires language.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Other implications are practical: many of us believe that minded beings deserve moral consideration. If we base this consideration on specific capacities—such as the capacity to feel pain and suffer—then understanding the extent of these capacities across the animal kingdom becomes crucial.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) We might readily accept that our companion animals—cats, dogs, and so on—can feel pain and suffer, yet be more skeptical about chickens, lobsters, or bees. But it is important to consider whether such skepticism is grounded in reason or simply a reluctance to acknowledge that many of the animals we use and kill without hesitation might, in fact, be thinking and feeling beings.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) Studying animal minds pushes us to confront our biases and blind spots, both in theoretical and practical matters. While we may never *fully* grasp what goes on in the minds of rats, crabs, or chimpanzees, it is important we try. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) While humans are also animals, in this essay, I use the term ‘animal’ to refer specifically to *nonhuman* animals. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For additional discussion, see [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur. I use the terms “to have a mind,” “to have a mental life,” and “to be minded” interchangeably. I will not consider the question of what minds themselves are, but those interested in this topic can refer to [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This is called the “problem of other minds” in philosophy. Some philosophers dispute the idea that other minds are not directly observable, rejecting the notion that this is a genuine philosophical issue. At its core, the issue is whether the belief that other individuals have minds is epistemically justified and, if so, what the source of that justification is: see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. For a detailed discussion, see Avramides 2023. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff (1997) refer to this as the “other species of mind problem.” [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) A famous example is René Descartes (1596-1650), who considered nonhuman animals to be purely material, mechanistically-driven beings, devoid of minds (see Descartes’ *Discourse on the Method* in \[CSM\]). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The tendency to attribute human-like traits to nonhuman animals, plants, and even inanimate objects is known as “anthropomorphism.” Concerns about unwarranted anthropomorphism in the study of animal minds are justified. A notable historical example is the case of “Clever Hans”. Hans was a horse believed to perform mental arithmetic, tapping its hoof the right number of times in response to questions like “What is 2 + 3?” More careful investigation revealed that Hans wasn’t solving math problems but was instead responding to subtle cues from his owner. (For additional discussion, see Andrews 2020, Ch. 3.) The story of Clever Hans is sometimes cited in support of “Morgan’s canon,” a principle introduced by C. Lloyd Morgan, an early comparative psychologist. Morgan proposed that “in no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes that stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development” (1903, 292). The influence of Morgan’s canon has declined in recent decades, as many animal minds researchers now consider it vague and biased. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Frans de Waal (1997) warns against exaggerating the uniqueness of the human species, writing: “The ancients apparently never gave much thought to this practice, the opposite of anthropomorphism, and so we lack a word for it. I will call it anthropodenial: a blindness to the humanlike characteristics of other animals, or the animal-like characteristics of ourselves. Those who are in anthropodenial try to build a brick wall to separate humans from the rest of the animal kingdom.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This means that animal minds research, like research in many other scientific fields, relies on Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). In IBE reasoning, we first identify competing explanations for the same set of data and then assess their relative “goodness.” As Gilbert Harman explains, we infer “from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true” (1965, 89), or at least *likely* to be true. A key criterion of goodness is explanatory power and depth, though other factors—such as simplicity or consistency with prior knowledge—may also play a role. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Birch et al. (2020) propose a multidimensional approach to studying animal consciousness, distinguishing between five key dimensions: (i) perceptual richness, which refers to the variation in the level of detail with which animals consciously perceive their environment, (ii) evaluative richness, encompassing the range of positive and negative feelings, such as pain, fear, and joy, (iii) the integration of an animal’s conscious experience at a given time, (iv) the integration of its conscious experience across time, and (v) self-awareness. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between nociception and pain, see [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Philosophers of mind often say that mental states and capacities are “multiply realizable.” What this means is that the same mental state or capacity can arise from different physical structures and mechanisms. While this concept is frequently invoked to support the possibility of artificial minds, it also suggests that animals with vastly different brain structures may share similar mental capacities. A relevant idea from biology is that of convergent evolution, which refers to the independent evolution of similar traits in different animal lineages (at different times), often as a response to similar challenges. A classic example is the independent evolution of wings in bats and birds. While the evolution of a basic pain system may have occurred early in evolutionary history, with subsequent selection refining its specifics in different species (with the possibility of “novel structures taking on ancient functions,” as Brown (2016) puts it), other mental capacities—such as high intelligence—may have evolved independently in multiple lineages (see, e.g., Roth 2016). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Magee and Elwood (2016) administered small electric shocks to crabs while they were hiding in their shelters (found shells). In response, the crabs generally abandoned their shelters—except when predator cues were present, in which case they often endured the shocks. This is an example of a trade-off behavior, where an animal appears to balance two competing needs—in this case, pain relief and the protection provided by the shell. Such behaviors are often cited as evidence of conscious pain experience, as they suggest the animal is weighing discomfort against another priority instead of just reacting reflexively. While trade-off behaviors do not prove that crabs experience pain, they offer “reasonably good evidence,” as Peter Godfrey-Smith notes (2020, 91). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) On elephant grief, see, e.g., Pokharel et al. 2022. On chimpanzee grief, see, e.g., Lonsdorf et al. 2020. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For example, Kuba et al. (2006) discuss octopuses showing play-like behavior with LEGO bricks. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Kohda et al. 2022. Recognizing oneself in a mirror is generally considered evidence of self-awareness. A common method for testing this is the mirror mark task, where an animal is given a colorful mark visible to it only in the mirror (in Kohda et al.’s study, the fish were marked on their throats). If the animal attempts to remove the mark upon seeing it, and no plausible alternative explanation for the behavior exists, they are considered to have passed the test. Few animals have passed mirror mark tests, which makes the results of this study all the more remarkable. As the authors themselves conclude, “either self-awareness in animals or the validity of the mirror test needs to be revised.” [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) This represents a major shift from just a few decades ago when skepticism about animal consciousness dominated the scientific community. Today, that skepticism has largely been replaced by a more balanced and open-minded approach. Pioneers like Donald Griffin were instrumental to this shift. In the introduction to the second edition of his book *Animal Minds*, Griffin wrote: “In a sharp break with the traditional conviction that the mental experiences of animals cannot be studied scientifically, some of us have begun to try” (2001, xiii). Ideally, behavioral data is complemented by additional forms of evidence. As Marc Bekoff writes about research on animal emotions, “​​A broad and motivated assault… will require that researchers in various fields—ethology, neurobiology, endocrinology, psychology, and philosophy—coordinate their efforts. No one discipline will be able to answer all of the important questions that still need to be dealt with…” (2000, 867) For a discussion of the complexities involved in the attribution of conscious emotions to animals, see Dawkins 2000. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) You might wonder why such research is necessary in the first place. It may seem clear that animals think, given their ability to navigate their environment and perform various tasks. However, it’s possible that they are simply responding mechanistically to stimuli without engaging in true thinking. To rule out these alternative explanations and provide compelling evidence of complex cognition, we need scientific methods. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See, e.g., Hunt 1996, Boeckle et al. 2020. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See Jackson et al. 2020. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For a balanced discussion of the research on chimpanzee mindreading, see Andrews 2017. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) In the wild, dolphins engage in cooperative hunting and herding. In a controlled experiment, Jaakkola et al. (2020) found that bottlenose dolphins were able to work together with “extreme precision” on a simultaneous button-pressing task, even when it meant waiting for their partner. Successful joint action may require understanding your partner’s intentions, which would qualify as mindreading. While some instances of joint action might be explainable in terms of responses to environmental cues alone, Jaakkola et al. suggest that the precision observed in their study “makes it virtually impossible that the dolphins were reacting to a general cue like ‘press when a partner is near the apparatus,’ and highly unlikely that they were responding to a more specific perceptual cue indicating their partner had pressed the button.” It is also worth considering why animals may have evolved mindreading abilities in the first place. The Social Intelligence Hypothesis suggests that the evolution of complex cognitive abilities in humans and some other animals was driven by the challenges of living in complex social groups. There are two main versions of this hypothesis. The Machiavellian version suggests that intelligence—including social intelligence and mindreading—evolved to outsmart rivals and gain a competitive advantage. In contrast, the Mengzian version emphasizes cooperation as the driving factor and suggests that mindreading evolved to help individuals understand the intentions of others (see Andrews 2020, Ch. 7). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) You might wonder whether animals have languages that we simply do not understand. While many animals appear to communicate—bees dance, chimpanzees vocalize and gesture, and birds sing—it remains an open question whether any nonhuman animal communication systems qualify as genuine language. Language, in this sense, is more than just communication; it is a structured system of symbols and rules that allows for the creation of new meanings. For a discussion of animal communication, see Andrews 2020, Ch. 6. For an in-depth discussion of non-linguistic thought, see Bermúdez 2003. For a discussion geared toward a general audience, see Grandin and Johnson 2005. The common tendency to use human cognition as the baseline for comparative psychology has attracted increasing criticism. For example, Bräuer et al. (2020) write that “we tend to overrate those cognitive skills that are human-like… and… run the risk of overlooking cognitive skills that play only a minor role or no role in human psychology.” [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) For a deeper exploration of the moral significance of animal pain and suffering, see [“Can They Suffer?”: Jeremy Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman. For additional discussion of moral considerability, see [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Though many scientists and laypeople alike agree that mammals—and perhaps birds—experience pain, there is more debate over whether invertebrates, reptiles, amphibians, and fish have conscious experiences. Jonathan Birch (2017) argues that when evidence for an animal’s capacity for conscious experience is inconclusive, we should err on the side of caution and assume the animal is conscious when formulating animal protection laws (he calls this the “precautionary principle”). Even if we accept that many nonhuman animals are owed moral consideration by us, it does not automatically follow that their interests should be weighted equally with those of humans. For example, Michael Tye defends a view he calls “centered speciesism,” which holds that moral value is distributed in a way that favors members of one’s own species. 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(2022). ](https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3001529)[Further evidence for the capacity of mirror self-recognition in cleaner fish and the significance of ecologically relevant marks. ](https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3001529)[*PLOS Biology*](https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3001529)[ 20(2): e3001529](https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.3001529) [Kuba MJ, Byrne RA, Meisel DV et al. (2006). When do octopuses play? ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003)[Effects of repeated testing, object type, age, and food deprivation on object play in ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003)[*Octopus vulgaris*](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003)[.](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003) [*Journal of Comparative Psychology* ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003)[120](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003)[(3): 184–190](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003) [Lonsdorf](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931)[ EL, ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931)[Wilson](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931)[ ML, ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931)[Boehm](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931)[ E et al.](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931) [(2020). Why chimpanzees carry dead infants: an empirical assessment of existing hypotheses. ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931)[*Royal Society Open Science* ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931)[7: 200931](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200931) [Magee B, Elwood RW (2016). Trade-offs between predator avoidance and electric shock avoidance in hermit crabs demonstrate a non-reflexive response to noxious stimuli consistent with prediction of pain. ](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27374025/)[*Behavioral Processes*](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27374025/) [130: 31](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27374025/)[–](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-09888-003)[5](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27374025/) [Morgan CL ](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174177/mode/2up)[(1903).](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174177/mode/2up) [*An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174177/mode/2up)[, ](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174177/mode/2up)[2nd Ed.](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174177/mode/2up)[ Walter Scott Publishing](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174177/mode/2up) [Pokharel](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740)[ SS, ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740)[Sharma](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740)[ N, ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740)[Sukumar R (2022).](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740)[ Viewing the rare through public lenses: insights into dead calf carrying and other thanatological responses in Asian elephants using YouTube videos. ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740)[*Royal Society Open Science* ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740)[9: 211740](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.211740) [Roth G (2015). Convergent evolution of complex brains and high intelligence. ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2015.0049)[*Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society B* ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2015.0049)[370: ](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2015.0049)[20150049](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rstb.2015.0049) [Tye M (2016). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/tense-bees-and-shell-shocked-crabs-9780190278014?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Tense Bees and Shell-shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious?*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/tense-bees-and-shell-shocked-crabs-9780190278014?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford University Press](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/tense-bees-and-shell-shocked-crabs-9780190278014?cc=us&lang=en&) ### Related Essays [The Mind-Body Problem: What are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [“Can They Suffer?”: Jeremy Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali ### Acknowledgment I’m grateful to the students in my Animal Minds (WI25) course at Dartmouth College, whose discussions and discoveries helped shape this essay. I’d also like to thank Nathan Nobis, Dan Peterson, Matthew Sanderson, and Chelsea Haramia for their insightful comments and suggestions, which made the essay better. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/animal-minds.pdf). ### About the Author [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) is an assistant professor of philosophy at Rowan University, New Jersey. She specializes in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of medicine, with particular interests in color vision, pain, and chronic illness. [TiinaRosenqvist.com](https://www.tiinarosenqvist.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Mind & Language, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** animal, animal ethics, animal minds, animal rights, animal welfare, animals, Rosenqvist --- ### [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) **Published:** October 26, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is color? Where, if anywhere, is it? Why do we see it? When do we see it correctly? And how should we go about answering these surprisingly difficult questions? This essay surveys philosophical work on color and color perception. **Content:** Author: [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) Categories: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/); [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/) Word Count: 999 Most things we see look colored to us. But what is color? Where, if anywhere, is it? Why do we see it? When do we see it correctly? And how should we go about answering these surprisingly difficult questions? This essay surveys philosophical work on color and color perception. ![A scene with blueberries. The letters have identical surface properties but might appear differently colored to you.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/color-illustration-_-blueberries.jpg?resize=656%2C491&ssl=1)A scene with blueberries. The letters have identical physical surface properties but might appear differently colored to you.### 1. Color Metaphysics *Metaphysics* is the study of what exists and how some things cause or explain other things.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Three important metaphysical questions concerning color are: is color *real*, *what* is it, and *where* is it? Is color *real?* Usually the reality of color is seen as hinging on it being a property of external objects and scenes. We assume that if color is real, then things like blueberries, cornflowers, and Smurf dolls are *really* blue. Some philosophers argue that color is an illusion created by our brains,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) but many others accept that blueberries and other objects do have real colors. *What* is color? According to the simplest answer, *color primitivism*, color is a primitive, unique sort of property that cannot be identified with any other property that objects have. Primitivism, though intuitive, is often considered scientifically unacceptable. Primitive colors are not the kind of properties that scientists normally include in their description of the world. To accommodate color within the scientific worldview, some philosophers seek to identify it with some stable physical property of the environment, such as the disposition of object surfaces to reflect light in specific ways.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) For example, the skin of a ripe blueberry reflects light in a way that normally looks blue to us.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The main challenge for these *reductive physicalist* views is the existence of widespread variation in color perception. Imagine, for example, that you’re viewing a blueberry in bright sunlight. The blueberry looks blue to you. Now imagine that dark clouds appear. The blueberry will continue to look blue but probably not the exact same shade of blue. This is perceptual variation due to changes in viewing conditions. Additional perceptual variation stems from the differences in perceivers’ visual systems. The blueberry that looks a specific shade of blue to you will look a different hue to another perceiver whose photoreceptors respond to light in different ways or whose brain processes those responses differently from yours.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Because perceptual variation is so common, there is no neat-and-tidy correlation between color experiences and any stable physical properties of objects, which suggests that color might not be physical after all. In fact, perceptual variation has led many philosophers to argue that color is a *relation* of objects to perceivers, such as the power of object surfaces to cause specific kinds of color experiences in perceivers. The idea is that colors depend on the perceiver as “secondary qualities” and are fundamentally different from qualities that don’t depend on the perceiver, the so-called “primary qualities,” such as shapes.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) One criticism of *relationalism* is that its analysis of color seems circular. If we define ‘blue’ as the power to cause blue experiences, the word ‘blue’ appears also in the definition—we still don’t know what blue is. Finally, *where* is color? Is it out in the world, in our minds, or somewhere in between?[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Though it is often assumed that color is either in the external world or in our minds, this assumption has been challenged. For example, according to some *color adverbialists*, colors are ways of perceiving the objects in the world, and neither entirely internal nor entirely external to us.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) One worry with adverbialism is that it is counterintuitive and inconsistent with how we normally speak of colors. We normally say that blueberries are blue, not that we’re perceiving them blue-*ly*. ### 2. The Goal of Color Vision and the Correctness of Color Experiences In addition to the three metaphysical questions, philosophers also theorize about the “goal(s)” of color vision. They ask why we experience color in the first place—what color vision is *for*. Some think that the goal of color vision is to enable the perception of stable colors; others argue that the goal is to help animals see better in general.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) A related question has to do with the correctness of color experiences. Consider the image below illustrating the effect of background color on the perceived color of the photograph icon. The color of the icon appears to change when it’s placed over different backgrounds. [![An illustration of the simultaneous color contrast effect. The color of the photograph icon in each row appears to change when placed over different backgrounds.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/simultaneous-color-contrast.jpg?resize=656%2C356&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/simultaneous-color-contrast.jpg?ssl=1)An illustration of the simultaneous color contrast effect. The color of the photograph icon in each row appears to change when placed over different backgrounds.If you believe that color experiences are correct when they match the “true” colors of things, you might think that there is only *one* way to correctly perceive the icon’s color. Many color primitivists and reductive physicalists agree.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) But if you think that color experiences are correct when they make perception easier in general, you need not view the shift—which makes the icon “pop out” by increasing the contrast with its background—as illusory. Some color relationalists and adverbialists take this stand. ### 3. Methodology When theorizing about color, philosophers employ different methods. Some consult their intuitions, which they view as reliable guides to truths about color. You might have intuitions that each object has just one true, perceiver-independent color. For example, you might intuitively think that an object cannot be simultaneously yellow all over and pink all over.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Then again, your intuitions might be more inclusive. Imagine an alien race that sees red when we see green and squares when we see circles. If you intuitively attribute error to the aliens’ square perceptions but not to their red perceptions in this (somewhat bizarre) thought experiment, these intuitions might provide evidence for the perceiver-dependence of color.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Other philosophers emphasize empirical research. For example, it is common to cite experimental data from psychology when answering the question about the goal(s) of color vision.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Evidence from neuroscience, visual ecology, and computer vision is also considered relevant.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. Conclusion Philosophers generally agree that a satisfactory theory of color is both empirically informed and intuitively plausible. But this is where the agreement ends. When it comes to the metaphysical questions concerning color, the goal of color vision, and the correctness of color experiences, views diverge, often dramatically. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For an introduction to this and other areas of philosophy, see Tom Metcalf’s [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For example, C.L. Hardin (1988) is a *color* *eliminativist* who argues that color is merely a useful illusion. On Hardin’s view, your perception of a blueberry as blue is just as illusory as the flashes of colorful lights you might experience if you close your eyes and press your fingers on them. Other philosophers (e.g., Boghossian & Velleman, 1989) and many scientists (e.g., Palmer, 1999) also think that the external world is devoid of color. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For a defense of reductive physicalism, see Byrne & Hilbert, 2003. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Many things that look blue to us reflect relatively more shorter wavelengths of light than they do medium and long wavelengths. Ripe blueberries, however, often reflect more of the longer wavelengths. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Different species of animals have different color visual systems and different color perceptions. Normal human color perceivers have three types of cone photoreceptors. Dogs and cats tend to have two types of cones, much like human perceivers with common color vision deficiencies, such as red-green color blindness. On the other hand, some birds have four (or more) types of cones, one of which is sensitive to ultraviolet light. This suggests that these birds see a broader spectrum of colors than humans do and make more subtle color discriminations (see Gerl & Morris, 2008). It is a well-known fact that people with color vision deficiencies experience the world differently from normal human color perceivers. A less known fact is that there is substantial perceptual variation even among the “normal” perceivers. This variation has been demonstrated by studies in which subjects are asked to pick the color chip that they perceive as being a “unique” hue, e.g., a green that is *just* green with no mixing of blue or yellow (see, e.g., Kuehni, 2001). The fact that the participants in these studies often pick different chips suggests that they experience the colors of the chips differently. These behavioral differences are mirrored in differences in the underlying biology and physiology (see, e.g., Verrelli & Tishkoff, 2004). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The distinction between primary and secondary qualities goes all the way back to the 17th century. For a useful overview, see Bolton, 2022. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) If color is out in the world, then it could be in objects (and perhaps in volumes and light sources) or in the light entering our eyes. That said, because our color experiences correlate *better* with the stable properties of *things* in the world than they do with the properties of the incoming light (e.g., Shevell & Kingdom, 2008), very few philosophers defend the view that color is a property of light. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) M. Chirimuuta (2015) offers a sophisticated, empirically informed defense of adverbialism. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Of course, color visual systems don’t have goals in the sense that people have goals. But they likely have goals in the sense of having specific functions or tasks that they are meant to perform. David Hilbert (1992) argues that the function of color vision is to represent the stable reflectance properties of surfaces. Kathleen Akins & Martin Hahn (2014) defend the idea that the function of color vision is to help us see better in general. They point out that having a color visual system allows us to perceive form, motion, depth and texture faster and more accurately than we would if we only saw the world in black and white. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) That said, there are different versions of both primitivism and reductive physicalism and some of these versions are consistent with the possibility of there being many different *correct* color experiences of the same surface (see, e.g., McLaughlin, 2003; Gert, 2017). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See, e.g., Tye 2006. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Levin, 2000. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For example, Hardin (1988), Hatfield (1992), Thompson (1995), Cohen (2009) and Chirimuuta (2015) emphasize research on perceptual variation. Hilbert (1992), Tye (1995), Byrne & Hilbert (2003), and Allen (2016) emphasize research on color constancy, i.e., the perceived stability of the colors of objects across lighting conditions. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Akins & Hanh (2014) and Chirimuuta (2015) focus on what we currently know about color visual processing in the brain. Hatfield (1992) and Thompson (1995) emphasize the kinds of animal-environment interactions that color vision enables. ### References [Akins, K. A. & Hahn, M. (2014). “More than Mere Colouring: The Role of Spectral Information in Human Vision.” ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1093/bjps/axt060)[*The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1093/bjps/axt060)[ 65(1): 125–171.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1093/bjps/axt060) [Allen, K. (2016). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-naive-realist-theory-of-colour-9780198755364?cc=us&lang=en&)[*A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-naive-realist-theory-of-colour-9780198755364?cc=us&lang=en&)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-naive-realist-theory-of-colour-9780198755364?cc=us&lang=en&) [Oxford: Oxford University Press](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-naive-realist-theory-of-colour-9780198755364?cc=us&lang=en&). [Boghossian, P. A. & Velleman, J.D. (1989). ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255062)[”Colour as a Secondary Quality,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255062)[*Mind* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255062)[98(389): 81–103.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255062) [Bolton, M. (2022). “Primary and Secondary Qualities in Early Modern Philosophy” in E. N. Zalta & U. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/qualities-prim-sec/)[Nodelman (Eds.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/qualities-prim-sec/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/qualities-prim-sec/) [Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. (2003).](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X03000013) [“Color realism and color science.”](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X03000013) [*Behavioral and Brain Sciences*](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X03000013)[ 26(1): 3–21.](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X03000013) [Chirimuuta, M. (2015). ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262534574/outside-color/)[*Outside Color: Perceptual Science and the Puzzle of Color in Philosophy.*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262534574/outside-color/)[ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262534574/outside-color/) [Cohen, J. (2009). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-red-and-the-real-9780199556168?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Red & The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-red-and-the-real-9780199556168?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-red-and-the-real-9780199556168?cc=us&lang=en&) [Gerl, E.J. & Morris, M.R. (2008). ](https://evolution-outreach.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1007/s12052-008-0088-x)[“The Causes and Consequences of Color Vision.” ](https://evolution-outreach.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1007/s12052-008-0088-x)[*Evolution: Education and Outreach* ](https://evolution-outreach.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1007/s12052-008-0088-x)[1: 476–486.](https://evolution-outreach.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1007/s12052-008-0088-x) [Gert, J. (2017). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/primitive-colors-9780198785910?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-Pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/primitive-colors-9780198785910?cc=us&lang=en&)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/primitive-colors-9780198785910?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford: Oxford University Press](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/primitive-colors-9780198785910?cc=us&lang=en&). [Hardin, C. L. (1988). ](https://hackettpublishing.com/color-for-philosophers)[*Color for Philosophers:* ](https://hackettpublishing.com/color-for-philosophers)[*Unweaving the Rainbow*](https://hackettpublishing.com/color-for-philosophers)[.](https://hackettpublishing.com/color-for-philosophers)[ Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.](https://hackettpublishing.com/color-for-philosophers) [Hatfield, G. (1992).](https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192778) [“Color Perception and Neural Encoding: Does Metameric Matching Entail a Loss of Information?” ](https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192778)[*PSA; Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association* ](https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192778)[1: 492–504.](https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192778) [Hilbert, D](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00694851)[.](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00694851)[ (1992). ](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00694851)[“What is color vision?” ](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00694851)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00694851)[ 68(3): 351–370.](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00694851) [Kuehni, R. G. (2001). ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/1520-6378(200102)26:1%3C61::AID-COL6%3E3.0.CO;2-P)[“Determination of Unique Hues Using Munsell Color Chips.”](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/1520-6378(200102)26:1%3C61::AID-COL6%3E3.0.CO;2-P)[ *Color Research and Application* ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/1520-6378(200102)26:1%3C61::AID-COL6%3E3.0.CO;2-P)[26(1): 61–66.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/1520-6378(200102)26:1%3C61::AID-COL6%3E3.0.CO;2-P) [Levin, J. (2000). ](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018660204635)[“Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense.” ](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018660204635)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018660204635)[ 100(2): 151–174.](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018660204635) [McLaughlin, B. (2003). “The place of color in nature” (pp. 254–268) in R. Mausfeld & D. ](https://academic.oup.com/book/27278/chapter/196936107)[Heyer (Eds.), ](https://academic.oup.com/book/27278/chapter/196936107)[*Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World.*](https://academic.oup.com/book/27278/chapter/196936107) [Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/27278/chapter/196936107) [Palmer, S. E. (1999). ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262161831/vision-science/)[*Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262161831/vision-science/)[.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262161831/vision-science/) [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262161831/vision-science/) [Shevell, S.K. & Kingdom, F.A.A. (2008). ](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093619)[“Color in Complex Scenes.” ](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093619)[*Annual Review of Psychology* ](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093619)[59: 143–166.](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093619) [Thompson, E. (1995).](https://www.routledge.com/Colour-Vision-A-study-in-cognitive-science-and-the-philosophy-of-perception/Thompson/p/book/9780415117968)[ *Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception*](https://www.routledge.com/Colour-Vision-A-study-in-cognitive-science-and-the-philosophy-of-perception/Thompson/p/book/9780415117968)[.](https://www.routledge.com/Colour-Vision-A-study-in-cognitive-science-and-the-philosophy-of-perception/Thompson/p/book/9780415117968)[ London: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Colour-Vision-A-study-in-cognitive-science-and-the-philosophy-of-perception/Thompson/p/book/9780415117968) [Tye, M. (1995). ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262700641/ten-problems-of-consciousness/)[*Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262700641/ten-problems-of-consciousness/)[ Cambridge, MA: MIT Press](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262700641/ten-problems-of-consciousness/). [Tye, M. (2006). ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597729)[“The Puzzle of True Blue.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597729)[*Analysis* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597729)[66(3): 173–78.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597729) [Verrelli, B. C. & Tishkoff, S. A. (2004). ](https://www.cell.com/ajhg/fulltext/S0002-9297(07)63309-6)[“Signatures of selection and gene conversion associated with human color vision variation.” ](https://www.cell.com/ajhg/fulltext/S0002-9297(07)63309-6)[*American Journal of Human Genetics* ](https://www.cell.com/ajhg/fulltext/S0002-9297(07)63309-6)[75(3): 363–375.](https://www.cell.com/ajhg/fulltext/S0002-9297(07)63309-6) ### For Further Reading [Logue, H. ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12313)[(2016), “Metaphysics of Color 1: Physicalist Theories of Color.” ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12313)[*Philosophy Compass* ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12313)[11(2): 211](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12313)[–](https://www.cell.com/ajhg/fulltext/S0002-9297(07)63309-6)[219.](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12313) [Logue, H. (2016). ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12312)[“Metaphysics of Color 2: Non-Physicalist Theories of Color.” ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12312)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12312)[ 11(4): 220](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12312)[–](https://www.cell.com/ajhg/fulltext/S0002-9297(07)63309-6)[231.](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12312) [Maund, B. (2022). “Color” in E. N. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/color/)[Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/color/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/color/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/color/) ### Related Essays [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/color.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist) is an assistant professor of philosophy at Rowan University, New Jersey. She specializes in philosophy of psychology and philosophy of medicine, with particular interests in color vision, pain, and chronic illness. [TiinaRosenqvist.com](https://www.tiinarosenqvist.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Metaphysics, Mind & Language **Tags:** color, color metaphysics, philosophy of colors, Rosenqvist --- ### [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) **Published:** February 25, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The Buddhist denial of the existence of the self is known as anātman (or anattā). This essay explores some of the basics of anātman/anattā. **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Categories: [Buddhist Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/buddhist-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 995 What is the self? Philosophers have long puzzled over this question. Some classic answers say that the self is a soul, or a body, or a psychology.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Some Buddhist philosophers have offered a different, surprising answer: *there is no persisting self*—nothing about us that remains the same at all times. On this theory, if we look closely at reality, we do not find anything that could be a self of the sort we imagine ourselves to be. This denial of the self is known as *anātman* (or *anattā*). *Ātman* and *attā* are (respectively) the Sanskrit and Pali words for “self,” and “an-” means “not.” This essay explores some of the basics of *anātman*/*anattā*. [![Woman looking in a mirror: does she see her self?](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/no-self.jpg?resize=656%2C364&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/no-self.jpg?ssl=1) Woman looking in a mirror: does she see her self?### 1. The Self That Doesn’t Exist First, it is important to understand what *anātman*/*anattā* actually says. It does not claim that there are no human beings or that the person who delivers your mail is really a robot or a ghost. Rather, *anātman*/*anattā* is a denial of ordinary claims about human identity. We *think* that our existence is some sort of deep, special fact. We believe ourselves to be unified, persisting beings who continue to exist from one moment to the next. We think we are something like a soul, or a body, or a psychology. Specifically, we think that our self has some sort of *essence*. The essence of something is its core, defining characteristic(s) without which the thing could not exist. A square *essentially* has four sides: if a square loses or gains any sides, there is no longer any square. If our self has an essence, then this essence is what *makes* us us. If you lose your essence, there is no longer any you.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But as long as your essence exists (whether that essence is a body, a soul, a psychology, or something else), you exist. According to *anātman*/*anattā*, this idea of the essentially existing self is mistaken. There *is no* essence of what people often take to be the self. Rather, the self is just the collection of constantly changing features, like the physical parts of your body and the sensations and perceptions that make up your mental life. There is nothing else about us that persists through these changes: all we are is a series of changes. ### 2. No-Self Versus the Psychological View We can contrast the no-self view to another theory of personal identity. John Locke (1632-1704) offers a psychological theory of the self.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) According to Locke, our psychology, which is made of things like our experiences, thoughts and memories, is our essence. As long as our psychology persists, Locke says, we continue to exist. So, if your psychology permanently ends, *you* end, even if your body were to remain alive.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) If, however, your memories, thoughts, and experiences were transferred to my body, and your own body was destroyed, then *you* wouldn’t die: you’d continue to exist, albeit in a new body. The no-self theorist replies that our psychological features are constantly changing, which means that there is no single collection of these features that persists over time. Moreover, there is nothing underlying all of these different psychological features that unifies them into one single thing. The no-self theorists thus agree with David Hume (1711-1776), who argued that our sensations never include a distinct sensation of the self.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Hume says we experience *particular* sensations like the taste of a carrot or the sound of thunder or the warmth of a fire. But Hume and the no-self theorists claim that we only ever experience these particular states of consciousness: we do not have an additional experience of the self on top of these other experiences.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) All we are, therefore, is a bundle of particular intermittent sensations. ### 3. What Kind of Theory and for What Purpose? One key question is what kind of thesis *anātman*/*anattā* is. Some philosophers treat it as a *metaphysical* thesis about *what sorts of things exist*. According to this view, *anātman/anattā* is like a theory about whether unicorns exist. A good unicorn theory will say “no, unicorns don’t exist.” Similarly, *anātman*/*anattā* says that persisting selves do not exist. Other philosophers think *anātman*/*anattā* is a *practical* thesis. It doesn’t tell us what exists but rather how to *understand* ourselves. We should not think of ourselves as having a persisting existence in the form of a soul, a body, a psychology, or anything else. Misconceiving of ourselves as persisting causes us to be attached to ourselves in detrimental ways, they argue. The no-self theorists claim that by adopting this theory we can free ourselves from some of the misunderstandings that prevent us from enlightenment. The philosopher Buddhaghosa (5th century), for instance, describes full understanding as requiring “investigation of impermanence, suffering, and not-self.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The acceptance of the no-self theory will change us in various ways. It will for example help us become less egoistic and perhaps more altruistic.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Finally, some philosophers think we can accept *anātman*/*anattā* without having to say that selves do not exist in any sense. Selves still exist in a *conventional* sense: we can correctly say things like “I exist,” as long as we are merely speaking conventionally about combinations of ever-shifting properties, and not referring to essences with fundamental reality.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 4. Conclusion The idea of *anātman*/*anattā* can be difficult to grasp. There is significant disagreement about it even among Buddhist traditions. For instance, the Pudgalavādin Buddhists argued that persons exist, while selves do not exist.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) By this, they mean that there is a thing we can call a person, with properties distinct from the self, and it is only the latter which does not exist. Whether the thesis is metaphysical or practical, and whether it tells us to deny that selves exist or just asks us to think about selves in a different way, one thing is clear: *anātman*/*anattā* is a striking denial of something that many of us take to be so obviously true that it needs no defense. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For a discussion of these possibilities, see [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For a discussion of what might be essential to our existence, see [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For a contrary view according to which someone’s existence depends *entirely* on their living body and *not* on their psychology or mind, see [Are we Animals? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/)[Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1.4.6.4. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Watson, “Self or No-Self,” 298-9. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Buddhaghosa, *The Path of Purification* (Visuddhimagga), 724. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For a discussion of altruism and the no-self theory, see Harris, “Does *Anātman* Rationally Entail Altruism? On *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 8:101-103,” Sridharan, “Selfess Ethics: The Equality of Non-Existence,” Goodman, “Consequentialism, Particularism, and the Emptiness of Persons: A Response to Vishnu Sridharan,” and Sridharan, “Utility Monsters and the Distribution of Dharmas: A Reply to Charles Goodman.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Siderits, “Buddhist Reductionism,” 456-7; “Buddhist Non-Self: The No-Owner’s Manual,” 299-302; Giles, “The No-Self Theory,” 186-8. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Chadha, “Eliminating Selves and Persons,” 5-6. ### References [Buddhaghosa. ](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf)[The Path of Purification (](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf)[*Visuddhimagga*](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf)[)](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf)[.](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf)[ Translated by Bhikkhu Ñáóamoli. (Buddhist Publication Society, 2010)](https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf) [Chadha, Monima. “Eliminating Selves and Persons.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/eliminating-selves-and-persons/E18C6DCF9E4E295CD31626EA3E3DE215)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/eliminating-selves-and-persons/E18C6DCF9E4E295CD31626EA3E3DE215)[ 7.3 (2021): 273-294.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/eliminating-selves-and-persons/E18C6DCF9E4E295CD31626EA3E3DE215) [Giles, James. “The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399612)[*Philosophy East and West*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399612)[ 43.2 (1993): 175-200.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399612) [Goodman, Charles. “Consequentialism, Particularism, and the Emptiness of Persons: A Response to Vishnu Sridharan.” ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614642)[*Philosophy East and West* ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614642)[66.2 (2016): 637-49.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614642) [Harris, Stephen. “Does ](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/)[*Anātman* ](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/)[Rationally Entail Altruism? ](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/)[On ](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/)[*Bodhicaryāvatāra* ](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/)[8:101-103.”](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/) [*Journal of Buddhist Ethics*](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/)[ 18 (2011): 93-123.](https://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2011/02/25/does-anatman-rationally-entail-altruism/) [Hume, David. ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/bigge-a-treatise-of-human-nature)[*A Treatise of Human Nature.* ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/bigge-a-treatise-of-human-nature)[(Clarendon Press, 1739)](https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/bigge-a-treatise-of-human-nature) [Siderits, Mark. “Buddhist Reductionism.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400298?seq=1)[*Philosophy East and West*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400298?seq=1)[ 47.4 (1997): 455-478.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400298?seq=1) [Siderits, Mark. “Buddhist Non‐Self: The No-Owner’s Manual.” ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548019-e-13)[In ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548019-e-13)[*The Oxford Handbook of the Self*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548019-e-13)[, edited by Shaun Gallagher, 297-315.](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548019-e-13)[ Oxford University Press, 2011.](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548019-e-13) [Sridharan, Vishnu. “Selfless Ethics: The Equality of Non-Existence.” ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614641)[*Philosophy East and West* ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614641)[66.2 (2016): 627-37.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614641) [Sridharan, Vishnu. “Utility Monsters and the Distribution of Dharmas: A Reply to Charles Goodman.” ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614643)[*Philosophy East and West* ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614643)[66.2 (2016): 650-52.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614643) [Watson, Alex. “Self or No-Self. The Ātman Debate in Classical Indian Philosophy.” ](https://ashoka.edu.in/static/doc_uploads/file_1593670502.pdf)[In ](https://ashoka.edu.in/static/doc_uploads/file_1593670502.pdf)[*Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics*](https://ashoka.edu.in/static/doc_uploads/file_1593670502.pdf)[, edited by Jeorg Tuske, 293-317.](https://ashoka.edu.in/static/doc_uploads/file_1593670502.pdf)[ Bloomsbury, 2017.](https://ashoka.edu.in/static/doc_uploads/file_1593670502.pdf) ### Related Essays [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance. [Are we Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley ### Related Resources [*The Questions of King Milinda*](https://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/milinda.htm) [Nagarjuna’s ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-fundamental-wisdom-of-the-middle-way-9780195093360)[*Mulamadhyamakakarika*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-fundamental-wisdom-of-the-middle-way-9780195093360) [Duerlinger](https://www.routledge.com/Indian-Buddhist-Theories-of-Persons-Vasubandhus-Refutation-of-the-Theory/Duerlinger/p/book/9780415406116)[, ](https://www.routledge.com/Indian-Buddhist-Theories-of-Persons-Vasubandhus-Refutation-of-the-Theory/Duerlinger/p/book/9780415406116)[James.](https://www.routledge.com/Indian-Buddhist-Theories-of-Persons-Vasubandhus-Refutation-of-the-Theory/Duerlinger/p/book/9780415406116) *[Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: Vasubandhu’s Refutation of the Theory of a Self](https://www.routledge.com/Indian-Buddhist-Theories-of-Persons-Vasubandhus-Refutation-of-the-Theory/Duerlinger/p/book/9780415406116)*[.](https://www.routledge.com/Indian-Buddhist-Theories-of-Persons-Vasubandhus-Refutation-of-the-Theory/Duerlinger/p/book/9780415406116)[ Routledge, 2003. ](https://www.routledge.com/Indian-Buddhist-Theories-of-Persons-Vasubandhus-Refutation-of-the-Theory/Duerlinger/p/book/9780415406116) ### Translation [Turkish](https://thecurious.tr/yazilar/metafizik-ontoloji/budist-bensizlik-no-self-teorisi-anatman-anatta/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/no-self.pdf "no-self"). ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Buddhism, Global Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics **Tags:** Anattā, Anātman, Anātman/Anattā, Buddhism, Buddhist, no-self, Weltman --- ### [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) **Published:** June 3, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Mary Astell’s (1666-1731) A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of their True and Greatest Interest by a Lover of Her Sex, Parts I and II (1694, 1697) is a philosophical text that argues that women are in an inferior moral condition compared to men, analyses the causes of this problem, and presents a two-part remedy. This essay introduces her serious proposal.  **Content:** Author: Simone Webb Category: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Philosophy of Education](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/) Word Count: 984 Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) is established in the popular imagination as the “first feminist,” but another philosopher provided a systematic analysis of women’s subjugated condition and a call for female education nearly a century before Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792). Mary Astell’s (1666-1731) *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of their True and Greatest Interest by a Lover of Her Sex, Parts I and II* (1694, 1697) is a philosophical text that argues that women are in an inferior moral condition compared to men, analyses the causes of this problem, and presents a two-part remedy. This essay introduces her serious proposal. ### ![Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/astell-graphic.jpg?resize=530%2C465&ssl=1) ### 1. The Problem with Women Astell’s concern is not that women are materially oppressed by a patriarchal society or that they lack rights. Instead, she argues that their *selves* are corrupted, that most women lack autonomy – internal freedom and self-mastery – and are instead governed by the whims of their emotions. Astell claims that rather than exercising the rational capacities that all human beings possess to make accurate judgments on the way things are, women tend to pay attention to appearances instead. They believe that material things such as their bodily beauty or wealth are important, rather than their immaterial and immortal souls. They fall into the predominantly feminine vices of pride and vanity, valuing themselves on the wrong things. Women often concern themselves with the impression that they give to men, valuing themselves according to men’s appreciation of them. Astell doesn’t think that women are *by nature* inferior. This being so, she needs to account for women’s particular subjection to certain vices. ### 2. The Cause The key causes of women’s defects, according to Astell**,** are *poor education* and *custom*. Women are prevented from learning appropriate things – their true natures, the nature of God, etc. – and are educated in mistaken principles, such as the importance of men’s opinions of them. She writes, “Women are from their very Infancy debar’d those Advantages, with the want of which, they are afterwards reproached, and nursed up in those Vices which will hereafter be upbraided to them.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Astell links women’s ignorance with their vices: since they are not taught *how to think*, they lack the “Judgment and Skill to discern between reality and pretence,”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) and so end up valuing themselves on their beauty or money. Custom is responsible for “all that Sin and Folly that is in the World.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) It involves both the formation of *habits* that are difficult to break and *societal forces* that are difficult to counter. By being repeatedly vain and foolish and failing to exercise powers of rationality, women “spoil the contexture and frame of our minds” and “render our selves incapable of any serious and improving thought.”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Women who act counter to prevailing customs and habits are subject to strong social disapproval – “all the Scoffs and Noises of the world” (95) – which functions as a strong motivator against self-improvement. ### 3. Separatism The first part of Astell’s cure is her best-known: the establishment of an all-female educational community. Her intention is that women should retreat from the world and devote themselves to *education* and *virtue* in the company of other women. The seclusion will shield them from the ethical dangers of the everyday world, which tempts them toward vanity, inconstancy and pride. They will also be protected from the inimical effects of custom – instead, they can develop their own, positive habits which will guide the development of their characters toward virtue. They will have the *time and space* for reflection and acquisition of self-knowledge. And, of course, they will be “kept secure, from the rude attempts of designing men.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Astell might be read as prefiguring twentieth-century feminist separatist movements. Such movements saw women’s total removal from institutions and social structures built and maintained by men, as well as from men themselves, as a strategy for personal growth and liberation.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 4. Self-cultivation Part II of *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies* sets out the *method for self-improvement* that readers should follow; this is the regimen in which women inside her community would be instructed. It involves meditation, reading, philosophical reflection, and emotional self-control. By meditating on philosophical topics using the method Astell advocates, drawn largely from *Logic: or the Art of Thinking* (1662), women will develop their powers of rational thought – and also realize how best to govern their lives. For instance, philosophical reflection will bring women to understand that they have an immaterial, immortal soul, and that the material world and their bodies are unimportant by comparison. Realizing this will help women to abandon their concern with fashion and external beauty. The result of Astell’s method won’t be a societal change that provides women with rights and opportunities: rather, it takes the form of individual women’s internal transformation. She maintains that “Men therefore may still enjoy their Prerogatives for us, we mean not to intrench on any of their Lawful Privileges, \[…\] our only endeavour shall be to be absolute Monarchs in our own Bosoms.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) By following Astell’s method, her female reader will attain autonomy, no longer subject to her own shifting emotions or societal customs.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 5. Conclusion Despite her commitment to women’s improvement, Astell’s position as a feminist has been doubted.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Unlike later feminists, she doesn’t argue for women’s access to equal rights, and nor is she concerned to change the fundamental patriarchal structures of society. Her attention is on individual self-improvement, not on communal resistance to oppression. However, in her view that men and women are fundamentally *equal* in terms of intellectual and moral capabilities, her systematic analysis of how women come to lack autonomy in society, and her advocacy of women’s education, she goes beyond many prior proto-feminist writers. Her use of philosophical argument to these ends establishes her as a key forerunner to feminist philosophy today. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Serious Proposal*, Pt I, 60. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Serious Proposal*, 62. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Serious Proposal*, 67. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Serious Proposal*, 68. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) *Serious Proposal*, Pt I, 102. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For discussion of modern feminist separatism, which does not reference Astell, see Frye (1997). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) *Serious Proposal*, 233-4. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For comparisons between Astell’s goal of self-determination and modern feminist approaches to autonomy, see Broad (2015). Broad suggests that both Astell and Marilyn Friedman (2003) emphasize true liberty as “a matter of living life in accordance with the deeper interests of the true self” (Broad 2015, 173), which helps women challenge sexist social norms and practices. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Perry 1986; 8, 13, 97. ### References Arnauld, Antoine and Pierre Nicole, [*Logic or the Art of Thinking*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/antoine-arnauld-and-pierre-nicole-logic-or-the-art-of-thinking/logic-or-the-art-of-thinking/2AE38D4725046E516E1A3C31D5FEAB8F), translated by Jill Vance Buroker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 \[1662\] [Astell, Mary](https://broadviewpress.com/product/a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies/)[,](https://broadviewpress.com/product/a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies/) [*A Serious Proposal to the Ladies. Parts I and II.*](https://broadviewpress.com/product/a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies/)[ Edited by Patricia Springborg.](https://broadviewpress.com/product/a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies/) [Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press Ltd.](https://broadviewpress.com/product/a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies/), 2002 \[1694, 1697\] Broad, Jacqueline, [*The Philosophy of Mary Astell: An Early Modern Theory of Virtue*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-philosophy-of-mary-astell-9780198716815?cc=gb&lang=en&). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 Friedman, Marilyn, [*Autonomy, Gender, Politics*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/autonomy-gender-politics-9780195138511?cc=gb&lang=en&), Studies in Feminist Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 Frye, Marilyn, “Some Reflections on Separatism and Power”. In [*Feminist Social Thought: A Reader*](https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/15622641?q&versionId=18348707+218407806). Edited by Diana Tietjens Meyers, New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 406–414. ### For Further Reading [Broad, Jacqueline, “Mary Astell,” *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](http://www.iep.utm.edu/astell/) [Detlefsen, Karen, ‘Cartesianism and its Feminist Promise and Limits: The Case of Mary Astell’. In *Descartes and Cartesianism: Essays in Honour of Desmond Clarke*. Edited by Stephen Gaukroger and Catherine Wilson, Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017, pp. 191–206.](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779643.001.0001/acprof-9780198779643-chapter-12) [Duran, Jane, *Eight Women Philosophers: Theory, Politics, and Feminism*. University of Illinois Press, 2006](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/j.ctt1xcn4h) [Perry, Ruth, *The Celebrated Mary Astell: an Early English Feminist*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1986](https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Celebrated_Mary_Astell.html?id=-FzGQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y) [Sowaal, Alice, ‘Mary Astell’s Serious Proposal: Mind, Method, and Custom’. In *Philosophy Compass*, 2(2), 2007, pp. 227–243.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00071.x) [Sowaal, Alice, “Mary Astell,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/astell/) [Sowaal, Alice and Weiss, Penny (eds), *Feminist Interpretations of Mary Astell*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2016](http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-07124-4.html) ### Related Entries [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) ### About the Author Simone Webb earned a Ph.D. in Gender Studies at University College London. Her thesis is on Astell’s writing read through the lens of Michel Foucault’s later work on ethics, juxtaposed with a feminist critique. [ucl.academia.edu/SimoneWebb](https://ucl.academia.edu/SimoneWebb) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Education, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** Astell, Mary Astell --- ### [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) **Published:** May 23, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: [Taylor W. Cyr](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Cyr) Category: [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 Time travel is familiar from science fiction and is interesting to philosophers because of the metaphysical issues it raises: the nature of time, causation, personal identity, and freedom, among others.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) It’s widely accepted that time travel *to the future* is possible, but the possibility of *backward* time travel remains hotly debated.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This article will sketch some models of backward time travel (hereafter simply “time travel”) before addressing the main objections to its possibility.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ![time travel art - train coming out of a fireplace, with a clock on mantel.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/time-travel-train.jpg?resize=656%2C521&ssl=1) ### 1. Models of Time Travel According to the standard model of time travel, time is linear so a time traveler’s journey may be depicted along a single timeline, with some events that occur earlier in the timeline’s being experienced as later by the traveler:[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ![Time travel. Hyper time graphic. Reprinted from Wasserman (2018, chapter 3) with kind permission of Ryan Wasserman and Oxford University Press.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/1.jpg?resize=468%2C114&ssl=1) On another model, time travel results in the creation of a new universe that branches out from the same trunk (shared past) as the original: ![Time travel. Reprinted from Wasserman (2018, chapter 3) with kind permission of Ryan Wasserman and Oxford University Press.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2.jpg?resize=528%2C201&ssl=1) A third model of time travel maintains that there is a second temporal dimension, and so, in addition to times, there are “hyper-times.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) On this model, time is more like a plane than like a line, and a time traveler may, in returning to an earlier time, reach that time at a later hyper-time, with the result that the aforementioned time bears different properties at the different hyper-times:[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### ![Time travel. Hyper time graphic. Reprinted from Wasserman (2018, chapter 3) with kind permission of Ryan Wasserman and Oxford University Press.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/3.jpg?resize=565%2C531&ssl=1)2. Changing the Past It is natural to suppose that time travel would change the past, which many believe is impossible. Changing the past would require that the past have a certain property at one “time” and then lack that property at another “time.” This is incoherent on the standard model of time travel, which maintains that time is linear (there is no “second time around”), so the standard model precludes changing the past. But time travel doesn’t require changing the past. We may distinguish *changing* the past from *affecting* the past, where the latter requires only that the time traveler’s travels have effects in the past.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) For example, suppose a time traveler finds her younger self and attempts to convince herself not to time travel.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Assuming the standard model of time travel, she will fail to prevent herself from time traveling, but the attempt will affect how the past was “all along,” so to speak. From the outside, the scene will look like an ordinary conversation between two people, but, assuming the time traveler remembers the scene, she will remember an older version of herself trying to convince her *not* to time travel.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Moreover, according to the other two models of time travel, one and the same time may exist in two different universes or hyper-times, and so it isn’t obviously incoherent to state that some past time may have a property at one “time” (either in one universe, or at one hyper-time) that it lacks at another “time” (in another universe, or at another hyper-time).[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. Causal Loops Consider some events from the television show *Lost*.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) At one point, Richard gives a compass to Locke, telling him to return it the next time they meet. Locke then travels back in time, sees a younger Richard, and returns the compass, which Richard keeps until he gives it to Locke in the aforementioned meeting. The *Lost* compass is strange. It was not created in the usual way—in fact, it has no creator! It appeared (with Locke) at time t1 (when it was given to Richard), remained with Richard at a later time t2, and then was given to Locke at t3, when Locke set out for t1, resulting in a “causal loop.” At each time t1-t3, there is a causal explanation for the compass’s presence by reference to the prior stage in the loop. But no explanation can be given for the loop itself. (Where did the compass come from to begin with? There is no answer.) Now, if such cases are impossible, this might cast doubt on the possibility of time travel. As David Lewis says in response, however, such cases “are not too different from inexplicabilities we are already inured to” such as “God, or the Big Bang, or the decay of a tritium atom,” all of which are “uncaused and inexplicable.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Note that this objection assumes the standard model of time travel, since these strange loops do not necessarily result from time travel on the other models. Moreover, it may be possible for there to be cases of time travel that don’t generate causal loops even assuming the standard model.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 4. Time Travelers’ Abilities Suppose Tim time travels and attempts to kill his Grandfather before his parents are conceived. Assuming Tim has a gun, is a good shot, etc., it would seem that Tim can kill Grandfather. But Tim can’t kill Grandfather, for doing so would preclude his own existence. Tim both *can* and *can’t* kill Grandfather: that’s a contradiction, so we should give up the assumption that led to it, namely that time travel is possible. This is the Grandfather Paradox, and it is the main objection to the possibility of time travel. Here are two responses, both of which assume the standard model of time travel.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) First, one might understand “can” claims like “Tim *can* kill Grandfather” as claims about what is possible in view of certain facts—and which facts are held fixed is determined by the context of utterance.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) For example, in view of Tim’s possession of a gun, his reliable aim, etc., it is true that Tim can kill Grandfather. But if we also hold fixed the fact that Grandfather *lives*, then Tim’s killing Grandfather isn’t possible, and thus he can’t kill Grandfather. So, there is no contradiction; it is true that Tim can kill Grandfather holding certain facts fixed, and it is false holding more fixed, but the claim is not both true and false in the same context.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) A second approach denies that Tim can kill Grandfather.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) This denial follows from certain independently motivated views of agents’ abilities, and it avoids the Paradox by restricting the freedom of time travelers. ### 5. Conclusion Perhaps time travel is (metaphysically) possible, but it doesn’t follow that it’s technologically feasible, or that it will ever actually occur. Only time will tell. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) While not the first philosophical discussion of time travel, David Lewis’s classic 1976 essay “The Paradoxes of Time Travel” popularized the subject in metaphysics. For a recent philosophical discussion of time travel—an excellent summary of several facets of the debate, as well as some new developments—see Wasserman (2018). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) By “possibility” I mean *metaphysical* possibility—consistency with the laws of metaphysics, such as the laws of causation, identity, etc. For more on the discussion of the various senses of possibility we might be asking about in connection with time travel, see Wasserman (2018, chapter 1), and see the rest of the same book for a summary of the debate about the metaphysical possibility of backward time travel. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) There are other objections, but there isn’t space to consider all of them here. One objection concerns its *likelihood* rather than its *possibility*. As we will see below, there are certain things that it would seem time travelers cannot do, and so if time travelers attempted the impossible, something would prevent them from succeeding (perhaps the time traveler would have a change of heart, or perhaps she would slip on a banana peel, or…). Horwich (1987) argues that since backward time travel would result in such improbable events, this casts doubt on the likelihood of time travel. See Smith (1997) for discussion and a response to Horwich. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See the first figure. Reprinted from Wasserman (2018, chapter 3) with permission of Ryan Wasserman and Oxford University Press. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For developments of the hyper-time model, see Meiland (1974), Goddu (2003), and van Inwagen (2010). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) If we graphed the two dimensions of time on a plane, with the temporal dimension along the *x-*axis and the hyper-temporal dimension along the *y*-axis, as in the third figure, time travel would amount to moving leftward (back in time) and upward (forward in hyper-time). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) As Brier explains, “One cannot change the past or undo what has been done. Rather, what is at issue is whether one can affect the past; that is, by a present action cause something to have happened which would not have happened otherwise” (1973: 361). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For a simple example of this from science-fiction, see the film *Interstellar*. After leaving Earth, Cooper is able to send messages back in time, and he uses his first message to try to get his daughter to make him stay on Earth, as seen here. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For another example of affecting (but not changing) the past, see J. K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban*. An especially excellent case of time travel occurs toward the end of the book when Hermione takes Harry back in time, allowing him to save himself from Dementors. In the film version, we see Harry attacked by (but saved from) Dementors [here](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1TEF1-i5iA), and then we see Hermione take Harry back in time [here](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XjPb3ziyYYo), and finally, we see Harry save himself [here](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RezjC4jdbTU). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) It is contentious whether these models of time travel really allow for changing the past. See Smith (1997, 2015) and Baron (2017) for arguments against, and see Law (Forthcoming) for a response. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The first of these occurs in the third episode of season five, “Jughead,” from 39:44-41:19, and the second scene occurs in the first episode of season five, “Because You Left,” from 29:30-34:34. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Lewis (1976: 149). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For example, suppose I travel back in time by twenty seconds but set my machine to a destination on the other side of the planet. Presumably, my appearance in the past will not have any causal consequences across the globe, despite its occurring twenty seconds earlier than my departure, and thus no causal loop will be generated. For a similar example, see Hanley (2004: 130). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) On the other models, there is no reason to think that Tim *can’t* kill Grandfather, for doing so would preclude Tim’s future birth in the new timeline (the new branch or hyper-time), but Grandfather would not have been killed in the original, and thus Tim is still born in that timeline. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Kratzer (1977). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) While Lewis’s (1776: 149-152) influential response to the Paradox also relies on the Kratzer semantics for “can,” his proposed resolution is slightly different, for he sees the fact that Grandfather lives as one that it would be illegitimate to hold fixed. Holding it fixed, he thinks, amounts to “fatalist trickery,” as such a fact “is an irrelevant fact about the future masquerading as a relevant fact about the past” (1976: 151). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See Vihvelin (1996). ### References [Baron, Sam (2017). “Back to the Unchanging Past,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/papq.12127)[*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/papq.12127)[ 98: 129–147.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/papq.12127) [Brier, Bob (1973). “Magicians, Alarm Clocks, and Backward Causation,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1973.tb01151.x)[*Southern Journal of Philosophy* ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1973.tb01151.x)[11: 359-364.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1973.tb01151.x) [Goddu, G. C. (2003). “Time Travel and Changing the Past (or How to Kill Yourself and Live to Tell the Tale),” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9329.00203)[*Ratio* ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9329.00203)[16: 16-32.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9329.00203) [Hanley, Richard (2004). “No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics, and Fiction,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035847.28833.4f)[*Synthese* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035847.28833.4f)[141: 123-152.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035847.28833.4f) [Horwich, Paul (1997). ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/asymmetries-time)[*Asymmetries In Time: Problems In the Philosophy of Science*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/asymmetries-time)[. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/asymmetries-time) [Kratzer, Angelika (1977). “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00353453)[*Linguistics and Philosophy* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00353453)[1: 337-355.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00353453) [Law, Andrew (Forthcoming). “The Puzzle of Hyper-Change,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12197)[*Ratio*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12197)[.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12197) [Lewis, David (1976). “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” ](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009616?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*American Philosophical Quarterly* ](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009616?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[13: 145-152.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009616?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Meiland, Jack (1974). “A Two-Dimensional Passage Model of Time for Time Travel,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00398876)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00398876)[ 26: 152-173.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00398876) [Smith, Nicholas J. J. (1997). “Bananas Enough for Time Travel?” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/688068?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/688068?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[ 48: 363-389.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/688068?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Smith, Nicholas J. J. (2015). “Why Time Travellers (Still) Cannot Change the Past,” ](http://www.jstor.org/stable/43744653?casa_token=QIW2tIjaC-sAAAAA:o8RoU5LibPkQEJUAZ2dRejtcXzAD8Bu4NSs3aCGXPczd5_ztXMK0vGrurpBw72EyOVXjVo-1ipjSGdtRsS0_sFK8PGrGgWriyG7jBPaG-M6nkdhrxJg&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*](http://www.jstor.org/stable/43744653?casa_token=QIW2tIjaC-sAAAAA:o8RoU5LibPkQEJUAZ2dRejtcXzAD8Bu4NSs3aCGXPczd5_ztXMK0vGrurpBw72EyOVXjVo-1ipjSGdtRsS0_sFK8PGrGgWriyG7jBPaG-M6nkdhrxJg&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[ 71: 677–694.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/43744653?casa_token=QIW2tIjaC-sAAAAA:o8RoU5LibPkQEJUAZ2dRejtcXzAD8Bu4NSs3aCGXPczd5_ztXMK0vGrurpBw72EyOVXjVo-1ipjSGdtRsS0_sFK8PGrGgWriyG7jBPaG-M6nkdhrxJg&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [van Inwagen, Peter (2010). “Changing the Past,” in D. Zimmerman, ed., ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-metaphysics-9780199575794?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-metaphysics-9780199575794?cc=us&lang=en&)[, vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-metaphysics-9780199575794?cc=us&lang=en&) [Vihvelin, Kadri (1996). “What Time Travelers Cannot Do,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00372789)[*Philosophical Studies* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00372789)[81: 315-330.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00372789) [Wasserman, Ryan (2018). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/paradoxes-of-time-travel-9780198793335?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Paradoxes of Time Travel*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/paradoxes-of-time-travel-9780198793335?cc=us&lang=en&)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/paradoxes-of-time-travel-9780198793335?cc=us&lang=en&) ### Related Essays [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ the](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ Past and Future Real](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima ### Translation This essay has been translated into Italian for the Italian cultural magazine [*L’Indiscreto*](http://www.indiscreto.org/come-la-pensano-i-filosofi-sui-viaggi-nel-tempo/). ### About the Author [Taylor W. Cyr](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Cyr) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Samford University. His main research interests lie at the intersection of ethics and metaphysics, including such topics as free will, moral responsibility, death, and time. His work has appeared in such journals as *Ethics*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, and *Erkenntnis*. [TaylorWCyr.com](https://taylorwcyr.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics **Tags:** Cyr, Time, Time Travel --- ### [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) **Published:** February 5, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: [Taylor W. Cyr](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Cyr) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 Consider a case of manipulation:[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Beth is a talented student with a well-rounded life. Her professor wants her to focus all her energies on school, at the expense of Beth’s hobbies and relationships. After failing to convince Beth to spend all of her time studying, the professor orders some neuroscientists to secretly “brainwash” Beth to make her care more about school and less about other things. Unaware of what has happened, Beth is surprised by her newfound desire to skip a camping trip that she’d planned and to study instead, but she assesses the reasons for and against her two options and decides to skip the trip and to study instead. As a result, she offends her friends who were expecting her to go camping. Clearly, Beth has been wronged.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But is Beth *morally responsible* for choosing to skip the camping and to study instead? Would it be appropriate for her friends to *blame* her for ditching them? While not everyone agrees, many judge that, since she was manipulated, Beth is not responsible.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Some philosophers argue that this result has important implications for *compatibilist* theories of responsibility. ![Image of string puppets, to illustrate manipulation.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/puppets.jpg?resize=656%2C404&ssl=1) ### 1. Compatibilism *Compatibilists* maintain that we can be responsible for our behavior—i.e., appropriately praised or blamed, rewarded and punished—*even if* our behavior is ultimately the unavoidable result of the past and the laws of nature, i.e., even if *determinism* is true.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) There are different types of compatibilist theories.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Some hold that if a person *wants* to perform a certain action *and* also *wants to want* to perform that action, then she may be responsible for that action; people *without* this “mesh” between desires would not be responsible. A person who does what she wants to want to do *endorses* or affirms the desire that leads to her action, unlike, say, compulsive people (e.g., kleptomaniacs) who act (e.g., steal) despite not wanting to act and so are not responsible. Moreover, a person can meet these conditions even if determined. Compatibilism seems like a natural, default position.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) But it is not without challenges.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. Manipulation Challenges ### 2.1. An Initial Worry Perhaps the biggest challenge for compatibilism stems from cases of manipulation. An initial concern is that many compatibilist conditions for responsibility could be met by manipulated persons—persons who, many think, are not responsible. Consider Beth. After her manipulation, she not only wants to study, but she also *endorses* this desire (she *wants to want* to study). Since Beth meets these conditions but appears not to be responsible, this case seems to undermine this simple endorsement view. Some compatibilists respond by proposing that for a person to be responsible, she must at the very least *not have a history in which she was manipulated*: this is adding historical conditions to their theories of responsibility. Others “bite the bullet” and accept that Beth is responsible despite being manipulated.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 2.2. The Manipulation Argument But some have appealed to manipulation cases not with the aim of undermining *particular compatibilist conditions* on responsibility but rather to undermine *compatibilism itself*—the thesis that responsibility and determinism are compatible. The worry is that manipulated persons (like Beth) seem not relevantly different from ordinary determined persons: just as Beth’s action is the product of factors over which she had no control (namely, the intervention of the manipulators), so too the actions of persons in deterministic worlds are the product of factors over which they had no control (namely, what the world was like before they were born and what the laws of nature are). This concern can be regimented into the *Manipulation Argument* against compatibilism:[\[9\]](#_ftn9) 1. Beth is not morally responsible for choosing to study. 2. There is no responsibility-relevant difference between Beth’s choosing to study and any action performed by an ordinary determined person. 3. Therefore, no ordinary determined person is ever morally responsible (and thus compatibilism is false). ### 2.2.1. The Soft-Line Reply In response, some compatibilists reject premise two and propose some relevant difference between ordinary determined persons and manipulated persons. This is called the “soft-line reply” to the argument.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) One notable difference between Beth and ordinary determined persons is that Beth has been “tinkered with” by the manipulators: her character traits were altered without her consent. Perhaps this explains why we think she’s not responsible for deciding to skip the camping trip. One worry for this response is that the manipulation scenario can be altered such that the “manipulation” occurs before the person develops any character traits.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Suppose that Diana, a goddess in a deterministic world, creates a zygote, *Z*, knowing that *Z* will develop into an ordinary person, Ernie, who will perform some action that Diana wants him to perform thirty years later. In this case, there is no mid-life “tinkering,” yet many judge that Ernie is not responsible for acting as he’s been created to act. (Is he?) And if we modify the Manipulation Argument sketched above to refer to Ernie instead of Beth, it’s harder to see how to maintain a soft-line reply.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 2.2.2. The Hard-Line Reply Others compatibilists take a “hard-line reply” to the Manipulation Argument, accepting the second premise and rejecting the first.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) This might seem counterintuitive, but if we start off thinking that ordinary determined people are responsible, and if we accept the second premise (the “no-relevant-difference” premise), then we should infer that the manipulated person is responsible as well. Moreover, perhaps even ordinary persons undergo radical transformations (e.g., religious conversions, changes upon becoming a parent) that might not seem relevantly different from manipulation.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Some see this response as “biting the bullet,” raising the theoretical “cost” of endorsing compatibilism.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) If so, then the Manipulation Argument would not in itself undermine compatibilism, but it may make a difference in an all-things-considered comparison of positions in debates about responsibility.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 3. Conclusion Manipulation challenges compatibilist accounts of responsibility and perhaps compatibilism itself. To respond, compatibilists must either explain why manipulated people are different from ordinary determined people, or concede that, perhaps surprisingly, manipulated people are responsible for what they do. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The following story is based on the one found in Mele (1995: 145-146). It is an extreme case of manipulation, one that involves covertly changing someone’s character in a way that bypasses their agency or choice on the matter. We can distinguish this case from more common types of manipulation that rely on deception and “playing on” another person’s emotions, to which a person may rightly respond, “You manipulated me!” (Kantian ethics describes this as using someone as a “mere means.” See [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman.) We can also distinguish manipulation from *coercion*, which involves getting a person to do something by means of a threat (e.g., give me your wallet, or else!). There is another related phenomenon, which has come to be called “nudging,” in which people are subtly influenced toward some course of action, and perhaps this is a type of manipulation, though not the kind at issue here. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Some may disagree, but the way Beth is treated appears to undermine her autonomy, or to use her as a mere means, which many find morally problematic. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In fact, many take cases like Beth’s to show that responsibility is an essentially historical concept (i.e., whether an agent is responsible is not just a matter of whether she has certain time-slice properties), though some (e.g., Frankfurt) disagree and maintain that Beth is responsible given her condition at the time of action. More on this to come. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For more on determinism, compatibilism, and related concepts and views, see [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia, [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki, and [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima. It is *possible* (in principle) to be a compatibilist about determinism and free will (or the freedom to do other that what someone actually does) and but *not* about determinism and responsibility, but most compatibilists about free will are also compatibilists about moral responsibility. In fact, many people think “free will” is the name for whatever sort of control is necessary for moral responsibility, and so freedom and responsibility are either both compatible with determinism or both incompatible with determinism. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) What follows is a simplified statement of Frankfurt’s (1971) hierarchical account (hierarchical because responsibility is a matter of having a certain hierarchical psychic structure). Many compatibilist accounts build on Frankfurt’s, but another popular type of account includes “reasons-responsiveness” conditions, which requires that the person be sensitive to reasons for doing otherwise at the time of action (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Sartorio 2016). There’s disagreement about what it means to be sensitive to reasons, but one popular thought is that an agent is sensitive to reasons when she is able to recognize reasons for doing otherwise and also able (in some sense) to translate those reasons into action. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) There are positive arguments *for* compatibilism, too. For instance, some think that whether an agent is responsible depends on whether (it is appropriate for) other agents *hold* her responsible and that determinism is not relevant to such practices. This is a very rough statement of the compatibilist strategy made popular by Strawson (1962). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) There are, of course, other views than compatibilism. *Incompatibilists* deny the compatibility of responsibility and determinism, and some incompatibilists think that we *are* responsible for at least some of what we do (i.e., libertarians about freedom and responsibility \[which is distinct from political libertarianism\]) and some *deny* that we are ever responsible (i.e., hard determinists, hard incompatibilists, or responsibility skeptics). The focus here, following the recent literature, is on challenges to compatibilism that stem from thinking about manipulation. It is widely thought that libertarians (again, not political libertarianism) are not vulnerable to worries about manipulation, since their distinctively incompatibilist conditions for responsibility cannot be satisfied by manipulated persons. However, see King (2013) and Cyr (2016) for a parallel manipulation argument against (some) incompatibilist theories. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) These two types of responses mirror the “soft-line” and “hard-line” replies, respectively, to the Manipulation Argument discussed below. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Mickelson (2016) for an introductory discussion of the current debate about the Manipulation Argument. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Demetriou (2010) for development of this soft-line reply to the argument. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The following case is based on the one found in Mele (2006: 188). I say “manipulation” because, in my view anyway, initial design cases like this one are not actually instances of manipulation, but we can set this point aside. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Though see Waller (2014) for a response according to which the effective intentions of the designer (Diana) makes the original design scenario relevantly different from ordinary determinism. It is worth noting that many compatibilists, including McKenna (2008), Fischer (2011), and Sartorio (2016) do not think the intentions of another agent makes a relevant difference. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See McKenna (2008) for the terms “soft-line” and “hard-line” and for the original defense of the hard-line approach, and see Fischer (2011) for an application of the approach to the Ernie case. Also, see Sartorio (2016, chapter 5) for a more recent defense of the hard-line approach. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Arpaly puts it this way: “There are cases of profound conversions in a person’s values that are just as inexplicable to their possessors, just as uninvited, and just as irrational as Beth’s conversion” (2003: 127). She goes on to give several examples of ordinary persons experiencing such conversions. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Todd (2011). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) It is also worth noting that compatibilists may adopt a hybrid response, maintaining that some (but not all) manipulated persons are relevantly different from ordinary causally determined persons. See Sekatskaya (forthcoming) for a defense of a hybrid view. Another response is to say that the manipulated agent’s responsibility is significantly mitigated in traditional manipulation cases (like the Beth case) but that cases of initial design (like the Ernie case) do not involve mitigation of responsibility. One way to defend this approach would be to argue that the sort of mid-life tinkering that takes place in the Beth case mitigates responsibility, but since there is no such tinkering in initial design cases, responsibility is not mitigated. 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(1962). “Freedom and Resentment,” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/STRFAR)*[Proceedings of the British Academy](https://philpapers.org/rec/STRFAR)*[ 48: 187–211.](https://philpapers.org/rec/STRFAR) [Todd, Patrick (2011). “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9465-8)*[Philosophical Studies ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9465-8)*[152: 127-133.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9465-8) [Waller, Robyn Repko (2014). “The Threat of Effective Intentions to Moral Responsibility in the Zygote Argument,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-013-9476-8)*[Philosophia ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-013-9476-8)*[42:](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-013-9476-8)*[ ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-013-9476-8)*[209-222.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-013-9476-8) [Watson, Gary (1987). “Free Action and Free Will,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255145?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)*[Mind](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255145?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)*[ 96: 145–172.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2255145?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) ### Related Essays [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility.pdf). ### About the Author [Taylor W. Cyr](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Cyr) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Samford University. His main research interests lie at the intersection of ethics and metaphysics, including such topics as free will, moral responsibility, death, and time. His work has appeared in such journals as *Ethics*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, and *Erkenntnis*. [TaylorWCyr.com](https://taylorwcyr.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** Cyr, manipulation, responsibility --- ### [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) **Published:** April 3, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** What is free will? Do we have it? This essay surveys the main three positions on these questions. **Content:** Author: Jonah Nagashima Category: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 997 An auctioneer opens the bidding on a painting. A moment later, your hand raises. Now, consider three backstories: 1. You had no intention to bid, but a spasm caused your hand to raise. 2. You don’t value the painting, but someone put a gun to your head, telling you to bid “or else.” Wanting to live, you raised your hand. 3. You wanted the painting, and so you raised your hand to bid. Were any of these bids made on your own free will? Were they free choices?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This depends on what free will is and whether or not we ever have it.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay surveys the major positions on these issues. ![forking paths](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/forking-paths.jpg?resize=500%2C333&ssl=1) ### 1. Determinism Suppose that the fundamental physical laws determine every event such that, at the moment of the big bang, it was *already settled* that you’d read this essay because the laws and initial conditions of the world *necessitate* that you’d do so; given their presence, it was guaranteed that you would. This describes **physical determinism**, which is a kind of **determinism**, the view that every event is *necessitated* by prior events: current and future events *must* happen as they happen.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Alternatively, if **indeterminism** is true, then not everything is determined: *some* things that happen aren’t necessitated by prior events; there’s some chance in the picture.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Either free choice is compatible with determinism (“**compatibilist**” theories of freedom) or it isn’t (“**incompatibilist**” theories).[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Let’s explore both options, starting with incompatibilism. ### 2.1. Incompatibilism: Libertarianism *Libertarians* believe that free will is incompatible with determinism and argue that we have free will. Let’s motivate both, starting with incompatibilism. Two incompatibilist theories of free will are these: (A) a free choice is one where *the person is able to choose other than what she, in fact, chooses*: she didn’t *have* to do what she actually did;[\[6\]](#_ftn6) (B) a free choice is one where the person is the *ultimate* source of her choice.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Story (3) provides some support for these theories: we might say that you freely bid on the painting because *you could have refrained from bidding* or because *you* were the *sole source* of the choice to bid. These theories are *incompatibilist* theories: having free will in these senses is *incompatible* with determinism. If determinism is true, events that happened long before we were born are the *ultimate* source of our choices, not us, so we lack free will according to theory (B). And, if determinism is true, the past *necessitates* our choices, making it impossible that we do anything other than what we actually do, so we lack free will according to theory (A).[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ***Libertarians***[\[9\]](#_ftn9) accept theories of free will like these. They argue, however, that we sometimes *do* have free will, often in the senses of (A) or (B), and so that shows that determinism is false: sometimes we *can* do other than what we actually do and *we* are the ultimate source of our choices. A worry. Libertarians say that free choice requires indeterminism, but indeterminism doesn’t seem hospitable for free choice. Consider backstory (3) again: if this action is not determined, then you could’ve had the *exact* same desires and reasons for bidding *and* *refraining* from bidding. Indeterminism then seems to introduce *randomness*, which looks inhospitable to free will, as the muscle spasm example (1) suggests: the spasm wasn’t a freely-made bid. Explaining why undetermined actions aren’t ultimately random is a challenge for libertarians.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 2.2. Incompatibilism: Hard Determinism ***Hard determinists*** agree with libertarians that free will is incompatible with determinism, but deny that we have free will. They agree that free will requires something like (A) or (B) but argue that, since our world is deterministic, nobody has free will: nobody can do other than what they actually do and nobody is the ultimate source of their actions.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) A concern. Many think that we are *morally responsible* for our actions *only* when we act from our free will. So hard determinists have the challenge of explaining what justifies practices like punishment and reward, and praise and blame, if we lack free will.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 3. Compatibilism Consider some **compatibilist** theories of free choice: (C) a person chooses freely when she *acts in accordance with her own desires* *and values*;[\[13\]](#_ftn13) (D) a person chooses freely just when the source of her choice is *responsive to reasons*.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Backstory (3) was a free action on either of these theories because you did what *you* wanted to do or what you had reason to do. Backstory (2) we could judge as *not* free, since you bid because of coercion and *someone else’s* desire for the painting, not your own. We could say, however, that you *freely chose* to avoid being shot, since you didn’t want that! These judgments are *compatible* with your action’s being determined. If determinism is true, then your will, values, and desires *are* determined. But you can do what you want to do, act on your own reasons, and yet be determined to act that way. Proposals (C) and (D) then are ***compatibilist*** theories of free will: actions can be free *and* determined. This would be welcome news should we discover that our world is deterministic: our freedom wouldn’t hang on the falsity of determinism.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) A problem. Suppose that a covert manipulator subtly manipulates Eleanor into having certain desires, which *determine* Eleanor to choose in certain ways, based on reasons she’s responsive to, all of which are conducive to the manipulator’s ends.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Would Eleanor be acting freely? It seems doubtful, since she isn’t the source of her actions – the manipulator is. Furthermore, because of the efficacy of the manipulation, Eleanor is unable to do other than what she in fact does. Theories (C) and (D) however, imply she chooses freely. Not great. Compatibilists thereby either need to amend their theories or explain why this kind of manipulation doesn’t undermine freedom.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### 4. Conclusion Each theory above attempts to answer the question of whether we have free will. Which overall position we should accept depends both upon what free will is and what we, and the world, are like.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Some argue that a free *choice* is one made of one’s own free *will*, taking the *will* to be most fundamental. See Robert Kane’s *The Significance of Free Will* for arguments for this position. We’ll address both here, given the close relations between the will and choices. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) What something *is*, or how it is accurately defined, and whether something exists are distinct questions. E.g., we can ask what witches *are*, what the definition of a witch is, but deny they exist. Atheists argue, “The *concept* of God is this . . ., but I think that God does not exist.” Eliminativists about race say, “Races are this . . , but races do not exist,” and so on. So, to *define* something, or explain what it *is*, does not commit one to claiming that the thing in question exists. So, the questions of what free will *is* and whether actually we have free will are distinct. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Physical determinism* is one kind of determinism. Another kind of determinism is *theological determinism*, which comes in varieties. Suppose God exists and infallibly knows the future from the creation of the world. If so, then it seems that God’s knowledge *determines* that future. Or suppose instead that God willed before the creation of the world that you’d read this essay, and that everything God wills must come to pass: could you avoid reading this essay? For discussion, see [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson. A related, but distinct, view is *fatalism*, the view that, very roughly, present truths about the future *determine* that future or make that future inevitable. You might think that some of these types of determinisms, but not others, rule out free will. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indeterminism is consistent with *some* events or actions being determined: indeterminism simply denies that *all* events are determined. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) There is also the question of which theories of free will are compatible with *indeterminism*, which relates to the worry for libertarians below. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Peter van Inwagen’s *An Essay on Free Will* for such a view. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Eleonore Stump develops such a view in chapter 9 of *Aquinas*, and Robert Kane develops such a view in his *The Significance of Free Will.* [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Peter van Inwagen provides a detailed argument for this claim in chapter 3 of *An Essay on Free Will*. See also further developments by Alicia Finch and Ted Warfield in “The *Mind* Argument and Libertarianism.” Kadri Vihvelin provides a compatibilist reply in “How to Think About the Free Will/Determinism Problem.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) This view has no relation whatsoever to the political theory called *libertarianism*. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See chapter 3 of Neil Levy’s *Hard Luck* more a more careful statement of the problem and see chapters 6-7 of Helen Steward’s *A Metaphysics for Freedom* for an incompatibilist reply. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Derk Pereboom’s *Living Without Free Will* defends a view he calls “hard incompatibilism” that agrees with hard determinism’s conclusion that we lack free will, but comes at it in a different way. Rather than hold that determinism is true and that is why we lack free will, they argue that we lack free will for other reasons, e.g., that we lack evidence that any of us satisfy the requirements in (A) or (B), or that concerns about moral luck give us reason to think that nobody has the kind of free will required for moral responsibility. There are few explicit defenses of hard determinism, although many incompatibilists fear that they might end up becoming hard determinists since, for all we know, physicists could announce tomorrow that they have discovered that our world is deterministic. In light of worries like these, Manuel Vargas makes an alternative proposal in *Building Better Beings*: we should acknowledge that we have some incompatibilist intuitions, but we should revise those intuitions in light of the fact that we lack evidence we have the kind of free will incompatibilists want. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For discussion, see [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. Here we have focused on whether free will is *compatible* with determinism (and indeterminism) or not, with compatiblist and incompatiblist theories of free will, but there are distinct, but very much related, questions of whether moral responsibility is *compatible* with determinism (and indeterminism) or not, with compatiblist and incompatiblist theories of moral responsibility. And there are still further questions about the relationship between moral responsibility and free will: many think that we are morally responsible only when we act on free will, but some argue that moral responsibility does not require free will. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Gary Watson’s “Free Agency” and Susan Wolf’s *Freedom Within Reason* develop theories in this vein. So does Harry Frankfurt in *The Importance of What We Care About*, although he focuses on coherence between a person’s *actual* desires, and the desires *she wishes to have*: when they match, a person *identifies* with her desires. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See John Marin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s *Responsibility and Control* for a such a view, and Dana Nelkin’s *Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility* for a proposal in a similar spirit. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Although the most widely accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics (the Copenhagen interpretation) is indeterministic, some live competitors, like the many worlds interpretation or the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, are deterministic. For discussion, see [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Coercion involves an unwilling subject, but here we can suppose that our subject did not will one way or another prior to the manipulation. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For discussion, see [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki. See also chapter 4 (especially pages 110-117) of Derk Pereboom’s *Living Without Free Will* for a fuller statement of this kind of problem, as well as Kristin Demetriou’s “The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument” and Tomis Kapitan’s “Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom” for compatibilist responses to this worry. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Thanks to Andrew Chapman, Nathan Nobis and Chelsea Haramia for helpful comments which improved this essay. ### References [Demetriou, Kristin (2010). “The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument.” ](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048400903382691#.Uy3841FdVsU)*[Australasian Journal of Philosophy](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048400903382691#.Uy3841FdVsU)*[ 88(4): 595-617.](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048400903382691#.Uy3841FdVsU) [Finch, Alicia and Ted A. Warfield (1998). “The ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2660112)*[Mind](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2660112)*[ Argument and Libertarianism.” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2660112)*[Mind](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2660112)*[ 107(427): 515-528.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2660112) [Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza (1998). ](http://www.amazon.com/Responsibility-Control-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521775795/)*[Responsibility and Control](http://www.amazon.com/Responsibility-Control-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521775795/)*[. New York: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Responsibility-Control-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521775795/) [Frankfurt, Harry (1988). ](http://www.amazon.com/Importance-What-Care-About-Philosophical/dp/0521336112/)*[The Importance of What We Care About](http://www.amazon.com/Importance-What-Care-About-Philosophical/dp/0521336112/)*[. New York: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Importance-What-Care-About-Philosophical/dp/0521336112/) [Kapitan, Tomis (2000). “Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.5/abstract)*[Philosophical Perspectives](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.5/abstract)*[ 14: 81-104.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.5/abstract) [Kane, Robert (1998). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-significance-of-free-will-9780195126563?cc=us&lang=en&)*[The Significance of Free Will](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-significance-of-free-will-9780195126563?cc=us&lang=en&)*[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-significance-of-free-will-9780195126563?cc=us&lang=en&) [Levy, Neil (2011). ](http://www.amazon.com/Hard-Luck-Undermines-Moral-Responsibility/dp/0199601380/)*[Hard Luck](http://www.amazon.com/Hard-Luck-Undermines-Moral-Responsibility/dp/0199601380/)*[. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Hard-Luck-Undermines-Moral-Responsibility/dp/0199601380/) [Nelkin, Dana (2011). ](http://www.amazon.com/Making-Sense-Freedom-Responsibility-Nelkin/dp/0199684766/%20)*[Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility](http://www.amazon.com/Making-Sense-Freedom-Responsibility-Nelkin/dp/0199684766/%20)*[. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Making-Sense-Freedom-Responsibility-Nelkin/dp/0199684766/%20) [Pereboom, Derk (2001). ](http://www.amazon.com/Living-without-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521029961/%20Steward,)*[Living Without Free Will](http://www.amazon.com/Living-without-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521029961/%20Steward,)*[. New York: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Living-without-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521029961/%20Steward,) [Steward, Helen (2012). A Metaphysics for Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Metaphysics-Freedom-Helen-Steward/dp/0198706464/) [Stump, Eleonore (2003). ](http://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Arguments-Philosophers-Eleonore-Stump/dp/0415378982/)*[Aquinas](http://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Arguments-Philosophers-Eleonore-Stump/dp/0415378982/)*[. New York: Routledge. ](http://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Arguments-Philosophers-Eleonore-Stump/dp/0415378982/) [van Inwagen, Peter (1983). ](http://www.amazon.com/Essay-Free-Will-Peter-Inwagen/dp/0198249241/)*[An Essay on Free Will](http://www.amazon.com/Essay-Free-Will-Peter-Inwagen/dp/0198249241/)*[. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Essay-Free-Will-Peter-Inwagen/dp/0198249241/) [Vargas, Manuel (2013). Building Better Beings. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Building-Better-Beings-Theory-Responsibility/dp/019969754X) [Vihvelin, Kadri (2011). “How to Think About the Free Will/Determinism Problem.” In Michael O’Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell and Matthew H. Slater (eds.), ](http://www.amazon.com/Carving-Nature-Its-Joints-Contemporary/dp/0262516268/)*[Carving Nature at Its Joints](http://www.amazon.com/Carving-Nature-Its-Joints-Contemporary/dp/0262516268/)*[, 314- 340. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Carving-Nature-Its-Joints-Contemporary/dp/0262516268/) [Watson, Gary (1975). “Free Agency.”](https://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101506!/file/Watson-Free-agency.pdf)*[ Journal of Philosophy](https://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101506!/file/Watson-Free-agency.pdf)*[ 72(8): 205-220.](https://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101506!/file/Watson-Free-agency.pdf) [Wolf, Susan (1990). ](http://www.amazon.com/Freedom-within-Reason-Susan-Wolf/dp/0195085655/%C2%A0)*[Freedom Within Reason](http://www.amazon.com/Freedom-within-Reason-Susan-Wolf/dp/0195085655/%C2%A0)*[. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Freedom-within-Reason-Susan-Wolf/dp/0195085655/%C2%A0) ### Related Essays [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) by Thomas Metcalf [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers ### Revision History This essay, posted 12/24/18, is a revised version of an essay originally posted 4/3/2014. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/free-will-update.pdf). ### About the Author *Jonah is a graduate student at the University of California, Riverside. He is a graduate of Northern Illinois University (M.A.) and Biola University (B.A.), and has interests in metaphysics, especially the metaphysics of free will. [http://philosophy.ucr.edu/jonah-nagashima ](http://philosophy.ucr.edu/jonah-nagashima/)* ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Metaphysics **Tags:** compatiblism, free will, hard determinism, hard determinist, libertarian, libertarianism --- ### [Idealism Pt. 2: Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-kant/) **Published:** August 11, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to Kant's idealism. **Content:** Author: Addison Ellis Category: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/ "Historical Philosophy"), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/ "Historical Philosophy") Word Count: 1000 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the second of two essays in a series authored by Addison on the topic of philosophical idealism. Part 1 on Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism can be read [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/).* In the 18th Century, what has become known as the *empiricist* picture of knowledge took the mind to have a very specific relationship with the world. The mind, empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume thought, was largely passive, conforming to the world around it. Thus, for me to gain knowledge of the world is to have my mind shaped by the world as it interacts with my senses. There is a problem with this, however. Gaining knowledge is a rule-governed enterprise. Our minds sort and categorize incoming information according to mental standards of some sort. However, if all knowledge is gained entirely passively from the world through the senses, then the rules or norms of thinking are also gained this way. But this cannot be true. If the norms of thought are derived from sense experience, then we would have to judge whether the norms we learned were the right ones, whether they fit our experience. But in order to make such judgments, we must already possess a set of norms for thinking! Thus, *the mind itself* must contribute at least one element to knowledge. The mind must therefore be, in part, *spontaneous* – that is, not merely determined by an outside force.1 ![Kant and his Critique of Pure Reason](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/kant-cpr.jpg?resize=656%2C453&ssl=1) ### 1. The Copernican Turn Immanuel Kant, an 18th-Century German philosopher, was dissatisfied with both the empiricists and the rationalists of his time – the former of which believed that *all knowledge was rooted in sensory experience*, the latter of which believed that *knowledge could come from inner reflection alone*. He agreed with the empiricists that knowledge required some element given to us from sense experience. And he agreed with the rationalists that there could be knowledge that transcends sense experience, such as mathematical and moral knowledge. However, he disagreed that knowledge was simply a passive transaction between world and knower. Rather, Kant believed that the knower herself contributes a great deal to what she knows. Consider the following rule of inference: If P, then Q P — Therefore, Q I know that this rule is valid, but it seems unlikely that I have this knowledge as a result of various acts of sense perception. It isn’t as though I saw many positive instances of it, then finally gathered enough evidence to conclude that it must be a valid inference rule. Instead, I know it is a valid inference rule simply by *reflecting on it*. Therefore, the normative *rules* for thinking are not given to me in experience; they are given *by me* through acts of spontaneity. The upshot of this crucial Kantian insight is that the standard model of knowledge is backwards. When we know something, the world does not simply mold the mind. Instead, Kant believed, the world must “conform to” the mind. In other words, the world as we know it is always, in some way, *determined* by the way our minds work. It is in this sense that Kant is an *idealist*—mental structuring activity is necessary for and antecedent to the sensory world we perceive.2 Kant’s reversal of the traditional picture is what he calls his “Copernican revolution” in philosophy, because it is akin to Copernicus’s proof that the solar system is heliocentric rather than geocentric.3 In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR), Kant tells us that knowledge has two sources: (1) the *receptive* faculty of sensibility (what we receive from the senses), and (2) the *spontaneous* faculty of the understanding (what the intellect does with what is received from the senses). In order to have knowledge, then, Kant believes that we must *subsume* what is given by the senses under innate rules for thinking. What we know about is essentially related to how we are equipped to know the world. ### 2. Some Worries One immediate concern about Kant’s project is that it may lead to at least two vicious forms of skepticism. First, if what we can know is necessarily constrained by our spontaneous application of norms of thought, then is it possible that there are different norms of thought for different people? If so, which norms are correct, and how could we possibly know?4 A second skeptical worry is that Kant’s picture entails that we cannot ever know the world *as it truly is*, but only as we are equipped to know it. Indeed, Kant himself states that we cannot know “things in themselves” (i.e., things that are not related to our way of thinking), but only things “as they appear to us.” Many commentators take this to mean that all we can ever know are our internal representations of the world, but never the world itself. ### 3. A Kantian Reply Despite these worries, Kant may have a way out. First, Kant believes that we are universally equipped with the same basic rules for thinking. If he is correct then all properly functioning, e.g., not severely mentally handicapped, etc., human beings are capable of attaining the same knowledge about the world. To be entitled to this claim would take some argumentation that we do not have space for here, but one thing we can point out is that the basic rules of thought are just the rules of logic, and most philosophers will agree that the rules of logic are universally applicable. Second, while it is tempting to read Kant to be claiming that we can only ever know our internal representations, Kant does state throughout the CPR that “appearances” are not *internal* to our minds. There are alternative, more charitable readings of what Kant is thinking. One such reading says that to know things “as they appear to us” is simply to know things that are apt to appear to us when we encounter them. The things that cannot appear to us, because experience of them is ruled out by the structure of the mind, are, as Kant says, “nothing to us.” If so, then arguably we couldn’t hope for a better understanding of reality than the one we already have, because reality *is* simply all the things that are apt to appear to us when we encounter them. ### Notes 1 The receptive faculty is the faculty of sense experience (the sensibility). The spontaneous faculty is the faculty of the *understanding*, according to Kant in CPR. 2 Kant uses the term “transcendental” to refer to innate cognitive structures (or the norms of thought) that make our knowledge possible. Thus, Kant’s idealism is a *transcendental* idealism, since the world-to-mind conformity relation is due to these transcendental structures. 3 That is, in Kant’s Copernican revolution, as in Copernicus’s own revolution, we ought to experience a kind of gestalt shift so that we see that we’ve been looking at the picture backwards all along. 4 According to Hegel, who we will cover in the final essay of this series, our innate conceptual structuring activities are deeply historical and depend on social factors. If so, then one might read Hegel to be claiming that it is indeed possible that some of us will have different ways of carving up the world. ### Reference [Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/eighteenth-century-philosophy/critique-pure-reason) ### Related Essay [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/immanuel-kantin-transandantal-idealizmi-addison-ellis/) ### About the Author [Addison Ellis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ellis) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The American University in Cairo. His interests include Kant and Post-Kantian European Philosophy, with special attention to the topics of self-consciousness, ontology, and cognitive capacities and attitudes. [philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis](https://philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Ellis, Kant --- ### [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) **Published:** April 1, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay explores some key competing philosophical arguments about whether it should be easier for people to immigrate to whatever country they would like. **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Philosophy of Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-law/), [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/) Word Count: 999 Nearly all countries make it hard for many non-citizens to enter. Depending on where you were born, it can be difficult or impossible to get permission to even visit many countries, let alone to move there permanently. Are countries justified in excluding outsiders like this? This essay explores some key competing philosophical arguments about whether it should be easier for people to immigrate to whatever country they would like.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![Border Field State Park, Imperial, California.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/border.jpg?resize=656%2C470&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/border.jpg?ssl=1)Border Field State Park, Imperial, California.### 1. Arguments for Exclusion Few philosophers argue that countries can always exclude absolutely everyone: for example, almost every philosopher thinks that countries must accept refugees fleeing dangerous situations. But many philosophers argue that countries often have a right to exclude immigrants. One argument that countries have a right to exclude is that immigrants from different cultures may dilute or destroy a country’s culture. If a country has a right to preserve its culture, then this gives it a right to exclude immigrants who do not share that culture.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) A second argument in defense of the right to exclude immigrants is based on the idea that it is good for countries to have social welfare programs like socialized health care or strong unemployment benefits. Some philosophers argue that countries cannot sustain these programs unless there is a certain level of social cohesion: people in a country need to feel connected to each other and care about each other. Allowing unlimited immigration could reduce this cohesion, and so countries have a right to exclude immigrants who might break down these bonds.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) A similar argument in defense of the right to exclude immigrants is that countries have duties to their citizens: they must protect and provide for their citizens. Since immigration inevitably involves adding new citizens, which adds additional obligations to the country, it should be up to the country whether it wants to accept these obligations.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) A fourth argument in defense of the right to exclude immigrants is that freedom of association includes the right to *refuse* to associate. Similar to how you and your friends can decide who to invite to a party, you and your fellow citizens should be able to decide whom to allow to immigrate.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) A similar argument defending exclusion is that countries have been created and sustained by their citizens. The country therefore belongs to its existing citizens, and they should get to decide how to run their country. This includes making decisions about whom to let in.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 2. Arguments Against Exclusion Other philosophers think countries should not have the right to block immigration except for immediate health and safety reasons, like excluding people with dangerous infectious diseases like ebola or people who aim to carry out terrorist attacks.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) This position is often known as “open borders” because most people carry neither dangerous infections nor an intent to carry out terrorism. So, according to this position, most people ought to be allowed to freely move to any country. Philosophers who defend open borders oppose the various arguments for exclusion. One argument for open borders is that if arguments *for* exclusion of immigrants are successful, then these reasons would also justify stripping citizenship from existing citizens, and deporting them. But, we think that it is wrong to exclude existing citizens by stripping their citizenship and deporting them. This is true even if existing citizens are, for example, causing the culture to change. So, exclusion must be unjustified, because it’s wrong to do to existing citizens and thus is also wrong to do to immigrants.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Another argument for open borders is that people have a right to move freely. Imagine being told you cannot move between cities in your own country for some reason other than blocking the spread of infectious diseases or preventing you from carrying out a violent attack. That would unacceptably violate your rights. Some philosophers argue the same is true about moving between countries, and so any argument for exclusion must fail.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) A third argument for open borders is that we should be free to associate with whomever we want. If you want to marry a foreigner and have them come live with you, or hire a foreigner to come work with you, this should be legal. Similar to how it would be wrong for your country to say you can’t marry or hire someone from another city, it should not be able to tell you that you can’t marry or hire someone from another country.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) A fourth argument for open borders is that excluding people requires unjust enforcement mechanisms. These mechanisms harm citizens of the country.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) For example, in the United States, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have spied on journalists and killed United States citizens.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Because mistreatment of citizens is wrong, and because it is hard or impossible to avoid this mistreatment and to still enforce immigration restrictions, some argue that countries must refrain from restricting immigration: even if countries technically have a right to exclude immigrants, they shouldn’t exercise this right.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Finally, another argument for open borders is that border restrictions make inequality worse.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) People born in rich countries have much better life prospects than people born in poor countries. One reason for this is that people in poor countries can’t freely move to rich countries where they could earn more money. Preventing poorer people from moving makes the world less equal. If we care about equality, perhaps we should accept open borders.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 3. Conclusion Most philosophers fall on one side or another of the immigration debate: they either accept that countries have a right to exclude immigrants for many reasons, or they endorse open borders and deny that countries have a right to exclude immigrants for most reasons. However, some philosophers defend a middle position, which accepts some rights to exclude but rejects many others.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) There are also many related topics that philosophers discuss, such as what exceptions apply to rights to exclude (like the refugee exception noted above), and whether countries should be able to admit immigrants who are given lesser rights than citizens.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The related question of the right to exit is discussed less by philosophers. For some exceptions see Lenard (2015), Stilz (2016), Wellman (2016), and Sharp (2023). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This argument is made by Miller (2016a) and Joshi (2018) and objected to by Weltman (2020). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The right to prevent immigration in order to defend social bonds is defended by Walzer (1983) and Miller (2016a) and attacked by Lee (2019). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Blake (2013) argues that countries have a right to refuse immigrants if they do not want to take on the obligations of looking after those immigrants. Abizadeh (2016) provides an objection. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The freedom of association argument is defended by Altman and Wellman (2009) and criticized by Fine (2010). A similar argument is made by Song (2017). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The argument about country ownership is made by Pevnick (2011). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Broad arguments against a right to exclude can be found in Cole (2000), Abizadeh (2008), and Sager (2020). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Arguments claiming that exclusion of immigrants would license exclusion of citizens are made by Cole (2000), Lægaard (2013), Hidalgo (2014), Kates and Pevnick (2014), Freiman (2015), Mendoza (2015), Brezger and Cassee (2016), Akhtar (2017), and Weltman (2021). Carnes (2018) objects to some of these arguments. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) This is known as the “cantilever” argument, because it uses the idea of freedom of movement inside the country as a “cantilever” to support freedom of movement between countries (Carens 2013, 237-45). This view is defended by Torresi (2010), Hosen (2013), and Brezger and Cassee (2016) and objected to by Miller (2016b, 23-5) and Song (2018, 93-110). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This is called the “libertarian” argument for open borders. For discussion see Kukathas (2005) and Huemer (2010). For an introduction to libertarianism, see [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For discussion of the ways in which immigration enforcement mechanisms harm people, see Hidalgo (2015), Lindauer (2017), Wang (2024), and Moore (2026). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Jones et al. (2019) and Hellmann (2026). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For discussion of arguments against immigration restrictions based on the objectionable features of enforcement mechanisms, see Mendoza (2014; 2015), Massey and Pren (2012), Jaggar (2020), Finlayson (2020), Lister (2020), Reed-Sandoval (2020), Weltman (2020), and Niño Arnaiz (2024). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) To better understand how *inequality* is often understood, see [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/) by Daniel Weltman and [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For discussion of equality and open borders see Carens (2013, 226), Wellman and Cole (2011), Oberman (2013), Ferracioli (2014), Brock (2016), and Blake (2016). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Defenders of middle positions include Oberman (2016), Song (2018), and Stilz (2019). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For overviews of arguments about immigration, including discussions of other topics like refugees, see Wilcox (2009), Fine (2013), Fine and Ypi (2016), and Wellman (2024). ### References [Abizadeh, Arash. “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20452610)[*Political Theory*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20452610)[ 36.1 (2008): 37-65.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20452610) [Abizadeh, Arash. “The Special-Obligations Challenge to More Open Borders.” In ](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0006)[*Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership*](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0006)[, edited by Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, 105-24. 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Are we about to repeat this ‘ethnic cleansing’?” ](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/03/trump-mass-deportation-plan-1930s-repatriation-program)[*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/03/trump-mass-deportation-plan-1930s-repatriation-program)[ 3 Dec 2024.](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/03/trump-mass-deportation-plan-1930s-repatriation-program) [Wellman, Christopher Heath. “Freedom of Movement and the Rights to Enter and Exit.” In ](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0005)[*Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership*](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0005)[, edited by Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi, 80-102. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676606.003.0005) [Wellman, Christopher Heath. “Immigration.” In ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/immigration/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/immigration/)[(Winter 2024 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/immigration/) [Wellman, Christopher Heath and Phillip Cole. ](https://academic.oup.com/book/4294)[*Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?* ](https://academic.oup.com/book/4294)[(Oxford University Press, 2011)](https://academic.oup.com/book/4294) [Weltman, Daniel. “Illiberal Immigrants and Liberalism’s Commitment to Its Own Demise.” ](https://doi.org/10.2307/26929785)[*Public Affairs Quarterly* ](https://doi.org/10.2307/26929785)[34.3(2020): 271-97.](https://doi.org/10.2307/26929785) [Weltman, Daniel. “Territorial Exclusion: An Argument against Closed Borders.”](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i3.1070)[ *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i3.1070)[ 19.3 (2021): 257–90.](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v19i3.1070) [Wilcox, Shelley. “The Open Borders Debate on Immigration.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x)[ 4.1 (2009): 1-9.](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00230.x) [Yong, Caleb. “Immigration Rights and the Justification of Immigration Restrictions.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josp.12212)[*Journal of Social Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josp.12212)[ 48.4 (2017): 461-80.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josp.12212) ### Related Essays [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/) by Daniel Weltman [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/) by Dan Peterson [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/goc-etigi-genel-bir-giris-daniel-weltman/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Immigration-Ethics.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Race, Social & Political **Tags:** immigrant, immigration, open borders, Weltman --- ### [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) **Published:** February 13, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay introduces some of the standard topics and methods applied ethics or practical ethics.  **Content:** Author: Chelsea Haramia[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/chelsea-haramia/ "Chelsea Haramia")Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics")[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/thomas-metcalf/ "Thomas Metcalf")Word Count: 855 ### 1. What Applied Ethicists Do The modern-day, direct study of applied ethics arguably began with Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 1971 article “A Defense of Abortion.”1 Thomson argued that it is permissible to have an abortion even if the fetus is a person with a right to life. Given that many actual abortion opponents argue from the claim that the fetus has a right to life to the impermissibility of abortion, Thomson not only uncovered important moral considerations embedded in a real-world debate, but also, she did so by paying heed to actual claims common in the discourse. Her work spawned a lively ethical debate about the issue of abortion that is still in progress, and many since have taken up this approach by applying philosophical analysis to concrete ethical issues. This essay introduces some of the standard topics and methods *applied ethics* or *practical ethics*. ![Judith Jarvis Thomson](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/thomson-abortion-1.jpg?resize=656%2C486&ssl=1)Judith Jarvis ThomsonTo date, there are several areas of applied ethical study. Given their situational nature, they are often distinct from one another, though they regularly employ similar methods (detailed below). The following is a representative list of applied ethics foci: - Animal Ethics: e.g.: Is it permissible to eat meat?2 - Biomedical Ethics: e.g.: On whom are we allowed to perform medical tests?3 - Business Ethics: e.g.: Do corporations have moral status?4 - Environmental Ethics: e.g.: Ought we curb climate change for the sake of future generations?5 - Information Ethics: e.g.: May I pirate music?6 - Law: e.g.: Should personal, recreational drug use be illegal?7 - Philosophy of the Family: e.g.: What do children owe their parents?8 - Practical Distributive Justice: e.g.: To what extent ought we give to charity?9 - Procreative Ethics: e.g.: Is it permissible to abort a fetus?10 - Sexual Ethics: e.g.: Should prostitution be legal?11 Notice that applied ethicists *qua* applied ethicists are more concerned with particular cases than with more abstract theoretical questions. They aim to apply their ethical training to the study of actual ethical situations, and to draw conclusions about the moral status of scenarios that people out in the world actually encounter, and of situations that have real, practical import. ### 2. Methods in Applied Ethics Applied ethicists often employ the methods of *argument from analogy* and *bare-difference argument*. Both methods help to uncover the relevant moral components in practical situations, and they thereby help us to draw conclusions about actual cases. Applied ethicists also have the advantage of avoiding arguing from a baseline normative ethical theory, for applied ethicists cannot count on their interlocutors’ adherence to some particular theory; it is preferable to appeal to allegedly widely-shared intuitions. ### A. Arguments from Analogy Here is Thomson’s famous example of an applied ethics question that employs an argument from analogy:12 If you woke up one day to find that you had been kidnapped by the Society of Music Lovers, who had hooked you up to an unconscious, famous violinist who needed to be attached to your body for nine months in order to survive, would it be permissible to unhook yourself and go about your own business? While this case might seem at first glance to be overly fantastical, it is meant to serve as an analogy to certain abortion cases. Of course, there are many ways in which the two cases are disanalogous; the applied ethicist often must explain why a given difference is not a *morally relevant* difference. In these two cases, the similarities match the morally relevant factors—someone ends up connected to another moral subject for nine months in order to ensure that subject’s survival. So, by creating a relevantly analogous case, and by judging the answers provided in response to the questions raised by the analogous case, the applied ethicist can then uncover relevant intuitions and construct an argument regarding a very practical, real-world issue—abortion. ### B. B*are-Difference Arguments* Here also is a famous example that employs the method of bare-difference argument:13 Smith and Jones both stand to split a large inheritance with their respective cousins; each resolves to kill his cousin; Smith drowns his cousin; and Jones lets his cousin drown. Arguably, the only difference—the *bare* difference—between what Smith and Jones did is that Smith killed his cousin and Jones let his cousin die, and we now have a bare-difference argument. Is Smith morally worse than Jones, or are they equally bad? Answering this question will help us to determine whether there is a moral difference between killing someone and letting someone die. If it turns out that there is no moral difference between killing and letting die, then we can apply this discovery to questions of euthanasia, which require us to ask whether it is permissible to kill a terminally ill patient rather than allowing her to die by permitting the illness to take its course. As you can see, both bare-difference arguments and arguments from analogy can be quite illuminating when it comes to assessing applied ethical questions. Ultimately, these assessments can then allow us to go out into the world and act as responsible moral agents when we encounter or judge actual ethical cases. ### 3. Conclusion Philosophers who study applied ethics look to the world around them and analyze the ethical problems they find. By doing so, the applied ethicist is able to use philosophy as a tool to address important moral issues in various practical disciplines. ### Notes 1 [Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion” in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1:1 (Autumn 1971): 47–66](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2265091?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103316286127). Certainly, previous authors had addressed applied-ethics issues, but typically as part of larger works that focus on ethics in general, on social and political philosophy, or on normative ethics. See, e.g.: [Kant, Immanuel. 1999. *Practical Philosophy*. Tr. Mary J. Gregor and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press](http://www.amazon.com/Practical-Philosophy-Cambridge-Edition-Immanuel/dp/0521654084/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390434776&sr=8-1-fkmr0&keywords=Kant%2C+Immanuel.+1999.+Practical+Philosophy.+Tr.+Mary+J.+Gregor+and+Allen+W.+Wood.); [Bentham, Jeremy. 1982. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. London: Methuen](http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Principles-Legislation-Philosophical-Classics/dp/0486454525/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390434843&sr=8-1&keywords=An+Introduction+to+the+Principles+of+Morals+and+Legislation). Notice that our examples of applied-ethics questions in the following paragraph are typically focused on present-day worries, which would be mostly unfamiliar to pre-20th Century writers. 2 See, for example: [Norcross, Alastair. “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases” in *Philosophical Perspectives* 18 (2004)](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00027.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false). 3 See, for example: [Brody, Baruch A. *The Ethics of Biomedical Research: An International Perspective*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1998)](http://www.amazon.com/The-Ethics-Biomedical-Research-International/dp/0195090071/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390432246&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Ethics+of+Biomedical+Research%3A+An+International+Perspective). 4 See, for example: [French, Peter. *Collective and Corporate Responsibility*. New York: Columbia University Press (1984)](http://www.amazon.com/Collective-Corporate-Responsibility-Peter-French/dp/0231058373/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390432276&sr=8-1&keywords=Collective+and+Corporate+Responsibility). 5 See, for example: [Gardiner, Stephen. *A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011)](http://www.amazon.com/Perfect-Moral-Storm-Ethical-Environmental/dp/0199985146/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390432307&sr=8-1&keywords=A+Perfect+Moral+Storm%3A+The+Ethical+Tragedy+of+Climate+Change). 6 See, for example: [Yoon, Cheolho. “Theory of Planned Behavior and Ethics Theory in Digital Piracy: An Integrated Model” in *The Journal of Business Ethics* 100 (2011): 405-417](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-010-0687-7). 7 See, for example: [Huemer, Michael. “America’s Unjust Drug War” in *The New Prohibition,* edited by Bill Masters, St. Louis: Accurate Press (2004): 133-144](http://www.amazon.com/The-New-Prohibition-Dissent-Challenge/dp/1888118105/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&qid=1390432394&sr=8-3&keywords=The+New+Prohibition). 8 See, for example: [English, Jane. “What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents?” in *Aging and Ethics*, edited by Nancy Jecker, The Humana Press, Inc. (1992): 147-154](http://www.amazon.com/Aging-And-Ethics-Philosophical-Contemporary/dp/0896032558/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390432461&sr=8-1&keywords=Aging+and+Ethics+Jecker). 9 See, for example: [Singer, Peter. *The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty*, New York: Random House (2009)](http://www.amazon.com/The-Life-You-Can-Save/dp/0812981561/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390432494&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Life+You+Can+Save%3A+Acting+Now+to+End+World+Poverty). 10 See, for example: [Boonin, David. *A Defense of Abortion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003)](http://www.amazon.com/Defense-Abortion-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521520355/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390494560&sr=8-1&keywords=a+defense+of+abortion). 11 See, for example: [Nussbaum, Martha. *Sex and Social Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999)](http://www.amazon.com/Sex-Social-Justice-Martha-Nussbaum/dp/0195112105/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390432566&sr=8-1&keywords=Sex+and+Social+Justice). 12 [Thomson, Judith Jarvis. *op cit*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2265091?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103316286127). 13 [Rachels, James. “Active and Passive Euthanasia” in *The New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 292 (Jan. 9 1975): 78-80.](http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4615-6561-1_33) ### Related Essays [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/ "Licensing Parents") by Ryan Jenkins [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/ "The Moral Status of Animals") by Jason Wyckoff [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/uygulamali-etik-chelsea-haramia/) ### About the Author [Chelsea Haramia](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Haramia/) is an associate professor of philosophy at Spring Hill College. She has a Ph.D. in philosophy from CU Boulder, a graduate certificate in gender and women’s studies from CU Boulder, and a B.A. in philosophy from the University of Illinois at Chicago. She is currently interested in metaethics, population and procreation ethics, environmental ethics, bioethics, and feminist philosophy. She once did sixteen backflips in a row, but these days she mostly practices mental gymnastics. [ChelseaHaramia.com](http://ChelseaHaramia.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Sex & Gender **Tags:** applied ethics, bioethics, Haramia, meta-ethics, philosophy, practical ethics --- ### [“Can They Suffer?”: Jeremy Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) **Published:** March 18, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An overview of Jeremy Bentham's ethical views on animal rights, including the famous quote “the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 992 Many human beings cause a lot of harm to non-human animals. They hunt them for food and sport, and they poison animals like rats and moles. Scientists inflict injuries and diseases on animals to carry out experiments. And they raise animals in factory farms, ensuring lifetimes of pain.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) argues that when it comes to causing pain, there is no justification for treating non-human animals any worse than we treat humans. He thereby rejects any attempts to ignore or rationalize away the moral significance of animals’ pain and suffering. This essay explores Bentham’s argument. [![A woman scratching a pig under the chin. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/pig.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/pig.jpg?ssl=1)A woman scratching a pig under the chin.### 1. The Suffering of Non-Human Animals and Humans Bentham argues that it is not easier to justify inflicting suffering on sentient non-human animals than it is to justify inflicting suffering on humans. If you try to think of some reason that inflicting pain on humans is somehow worse than inflicting pain on non-human animals, he claims that “no reason can be given,”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) meaning that no *good* reason can be given. One often given reason is that humans are more rational than other animals. Another is that humans use language, while other animals don’t. Bentham replies by providing counterexamples. He notes that “a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month old.” Moreover, Bentham argues that when it comes to suffering, both rationality and language are irrelevant. “Suppose the case were otherwise,” he says, and human infants *were* more rational than adult horses or dogs. That would have no relevance to justifying the infliction of pain, because when asking whether it is morally acceptable to cause pain to someone (human or non-human), “the question is not, Can they *reason?* nor, Can they *talk?* but, Can they *suffer?*” According to Bentham, difference in species, like difference in skin color, is not morally relevant. What matters is whether the individual can suffer. As he puts it, “the French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormenter.” The same is true of “the number of legs,” and of any other difference between humans and non-human animals. To deny this is to defend “speciesism” – the view that mere membership in the human species by itself is relevant to how we should treat someone.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) But, as Bentham’s argument about skin color suggests, bare prejudice for one’s species might not be any more defensible than bare prejudice for one’s race. Speciesism may be no better than racism. ### 2. Utilitarianism Bentham’s views about suffering come from his ethical theory, utilitarianism. Bentham accepts a kind of utilitarianism known as *hedonistic utilitarianism*, which says pleasure is the only thing that is good and pain is the only thing that is bad.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) According to utilitarians like Bentham, we should do whatever causes the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for all sentient creatures. For Bentham, it is bad to cause suffering in itself. Suffering is only justified if it is outweighed by greater pleasure than the suffering brings about. For example, it might be good for a dentist to cause you to suffer through a dental procedure if this will cure your toothache. According to Bentham, it is bad to cause unjustified suffering no matter how rational or talkative the sufferer is. A dog, a horse, and a human can all suffer, so according to Bentham’s utilitarianism, the suffering of a dog or a horse matters just as much as the suffering of a human. Bentham’s utilitarianism was as radical in his day as it is today. It led Bentham to oppose slavery and sexism at a time when race-based slavery was legal in England and women in England were denied equal status to men.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) For instance, married women’s property largely belonged to their husbands. This shows how a moral theory starting from very simple premises like “pleasure is good” and “pain is bad” can lead to conclusions that strike many people as radical, both in the past the present. ### 3. Objections One way to object to Bentham would be to say that utilitarianism is not the right account of morality. Maybe morality is not about pleasure and pain, but about something else, like mutual agreements we make with other humans so that we can stay safe. Maybe non-human animals are excluded from this agreement, so we can do whatever we want to them. This view is known as *contractarianism*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) But, as Bentham points out, human infants are no better at making contracts than non-human animals. We don’t think we can do whatever we want to human infants, so maybe it is mistaken to think that morality is based on mutual agreements. Another objection attacks Bentham for not going far enough. Bentham thinks that it’s wrong to cause pain to non-human animals, but that painlessly killing them for food is fine, because “we are the better for it, and they are never the worse.” Someone might argue that although death itself is painless, it prevents non-human animals from experiencing pleasure in the future – pleasure that would exceed the pleasure we get from eating them. So, the objector says that Bentham *should* oppose killing non-human animals, not just oppose inflicting suffering on them. ### 4. Conclusion Many philosophers, utilitarian or not, agree with Bentham that any creature that can suffer is a creature who deserves moral consideration.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) If Bentham is right, then many of our present practices are deeply immoral. Bentham’s argument presents us with a challenge. *Either* we accept Bentham’s main conclusion, which is that when it comes to suffering, all who can suffer deserve equal consideration; *or*, we identify some difference between all humans and all other animals that explains why it is okay to inflict suffering on them but not on each other. That difference, however, has not been easy to find. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For information on these uses of animals, see, e.g., the Humane Society International’s “Trophy Hunting,” “About Animal Testing,” and “Factory Farming,” and the Humane League’s “Factory Farming: What it is and Why it’s a Problem.” [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Jeremy Bentham’s *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* Chapter XVII §1.IV, note 1. All subsequent quotes from Bentham are from this same note. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Dan Lowe’s [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Shane Gronholz’s [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) and Dale Miller’s [John Stuart Mill on the Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasure](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Dan Lowe’s [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See David Antonini’s [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) and my [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For a prominent Utilitarian defense of non-human animals see Peter Singer’s *Practical Ethics.* For a prominent non-Utilitarian defense of non-human animals see Christine Korsgaard’s *Fellow Creatures* and Tom Regan’s *Empty Cages*. ### References [Jeremy Bentham. ](https://books.google.com/books?id=NhksAAAAIAAJ)[*An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* ](https://books.google.com/books?id=NhksAAAAIAAJ)[(Clarendon Press, 1823)](https://books.google.com/books?id=NhksAAAAIAAJ) [Christine Korsgaard. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fellow-creatures-9780198854876?lang=en&cc=us)[*Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fellow-creatures-9780198854876?lang=en&cc=us)[ (Oxford University Press, 2018)](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fellow-creatures-9780198854876?lang=en&cc=us) [Tom Regan. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742549937/Empty-Cages-Facing-the-Challenge-of-Animal-Rights)[*Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742549937/Empty-Cages-Facing-the-Challenge-of-Animal-Rights)[ (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004)](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742549937/Empty-Cages-Facing-the-Challenge-of-Animal-Rights) [Peter Singer. ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/practical-ethics-3rd-edition?format=PB&isbn=9780521707688#:~:text=%24%2036.99%20(X)&text=For%20thirty%20years%2C%20Peter%20Singer's,ethical%20challenges%20of%20our%20generation.)[*Practical Ethics: Third Edition*](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/practical-ethics-3rd-edition?format=PB&isbn=9780521707688#:~:text=%24%2036.99%20(X)&text=For%20thirty%20years%2C%20Peter%20Singer's,ethical%20challenges%20of%20our%20generation.)[ (Cambridge University Press, 2011)](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/practical-ethics-3rd-edition?format=PB&isbn=9780521707688#:~:text=%24%2036.99%20(X)&text=For%20thirty%20years%2C%20Peter%20Singer's,ethical%20challenges%20of%20our%20generation.) [Humane League. “Factory Farming: What it is and Why it’s a Problem”](https://thehumaneleague.org/article/what-is-factory-farming) [Humane Society International. “Trophy Hunting” ](https://www.hsi.org/issues/trophy-hunting/) [Humane Society International. “About Animal Testing”](https://www.hsi.org/news-media/about/) [Humane Society International. “Factory Farming”](https://www.hsi.org/issues/factory-farming/) ### Related Essays [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [Theories of Moral Considerability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller [John Stuart Mill on the Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasure](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman ### Related Resources [Bentham Project, University College London](https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bentham-project/) ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/aci-cekebilirler-mi-benthamin-hayvanlara-karsi-sorumluluklarimiza-dair-gorusleri-daniel-weltman/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/can-they-suffer-bentham-on-our-obligations-to-animals-1.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** animal ethics, animal rights, animal welfare, Bentham, Jeremy Bentham, speciesism, utilitarianism, Weltman --- ### [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) **Published:** February 3, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** This essay presents a range of viewpoints on the ethics of human-animal relations and some of the reasons in support of each view. **Content:** Author: [Jason Wyckoff](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Wyckoff)[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/chelsea-haramia/ "Chelsea Haramia")Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics")[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/thomas-metcalf/ "Thomas Metcalf")Word Count: 999 Human beings interact with non-human animals in a variety of ways. Some animals, like dogs, cats, and hamsters, live in our homes under our care. Others, like mice, often live in our homes as unwelcome residents. Others, like cows, pigs, and chickens, are bred for human consumption of their flesh, milk, or eggs. Other animals are experimented on by humans in laboratories, hunted for sport, or used for entertainment purposes in circuses and zoos. Some people believe that at least some—maybe all—of these interactions are morally problematic, indeed wrong, while others believe that at least some—maybe all—of them are morally permissible (meaning *not wrong*). This essay presents a range of viewpoints on the ethics of human-animal relations and some of the reasons in support of each view. ![Adam naming the animals](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/adam.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)Adam naming the animals### 1. Exceptionalism: No Moral Duties to Animals We can distinguish between three sets of views on the moral status of animals, arranged on a spectrum. At one end is *exceptionalism*, according to which non-human animals have no moral status, and humans owe no *direct* duties to animals.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In other words, humans are exceptional, and any moral duties involving animals are derivative: if it’s wrong to injure your dog, it’s *only because* doing so wrongs *you* and not because it wrongs your dog. Exceptionalists hold that animals fail to satisfy some necessary condition for being *moral subjects*—those to whom moral duties are owed. Exceptionalists might, for example, believe that moral duties are determined by a social contract and that animals, because they cannot enter into contracts, are excluded.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Or they might believe that in order to have morally considerable interests one must have preferences, or be able to articulate moral claims, or have a capacity to reason about ethics, and that animals lack the relevant feature or capacity.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) We can put the argument this way: 1. We have moral obligations to an individual if and only if that individual has some particular property P. 2. All human beings have P. 3. The non-human animals in question (dogs, pigs, cows, mice, chickens, etc.) all lack property P. 4. Therefore, we owe moral duties to human beings, but not to non-human animals. The exceptionalist’s core task is to tell us what this property P is and why it’s morally significant. This is challenging since if we reflect on *why* human beings have moral status, and *why* there are direct duties to human beings, the more obvious initial answers—that we are conscious beings, that we are sentient, that we have preferences, that we have desires, etc.—very much seem to apply to many other animals. ### 2. Duties to Animals: Abolitionism and Welfarism At the other extreme is *abolitionism*, according to which non-human animals have a moral status that is incompatible with the use of animals as the resources of human beings, and animal use must therefore be abolished.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Abolitionists are committed to veganism—the abandonment of practices that involve the instrumentalization of animals for humans’ ends. Arguments for abolitionism will be explored below. All views in between exceptionalism and abolitionism are versions of *welfarism*. Welfarists reject the exceptionalists’ claim that we owe no direct duties to animals, but are not opposed to using animals as resources provided that the animals are not made to suffer “unnecessarily.” There is tremendous variation among welfarists, depending on how they each elucidate notions like “unnecessary suffering.” Some welfarists are vegans or vegetarians, while many others engage in or support animal farming, hunting, or animal experimentation. ### 3. Arguments for Abolitionism and Welfarism Abolitionists and welfarists may argue as follows: for any criterion (intelligence, self-awareness, ability to use language, etc.), there are some humans who lack this trait to at least the same degree that many non-human animals lack it. If it’s wrong to treat those humans in the ways that we treat non-human animals, then it seems arbitrary to think that we are morally permitted to treat animals in those ways, since the only difference between the two kinds of beings (human and non-human animal) is species membership, which doesn’t seem morally relevant in itself since “species” is a biological category, not a moral one.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) That argument, if sound, would answer the exceptionalist. But what might abolitionists and welfarists say in support of their own positions? Consider a simple example of an argument that animals matter morally: 1. Animals can experience pain. 2. Pain is bad. 3. It is wrong to impose something bad on any being without a good reason for doing so. 4. Therefore it is wrong to cause pain to animals without a good reason. If this or some similar argument is persuasive, then our moral duties to animals will depend on what counts as a *good reason* for causing pain.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Here, abolitionists and welfarists might disagree. Welfarists might, for example, think that if animal experimentation leads to cures for deadly human diseases, then animal experimentation is morally justified because there is a good reason behind the pain caused to animals. Abolitionists maintain that there is not a good enough reason in this case, and the evidence for that claim is that we would think it’s wrong to cause a similar amount of pain to a population of humans against their will in order to develop cures for the same diseases.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Abolitionists and welfarists also frequently disagree about whether premature death is bad for animals in the same way that it is bad for humans. Many welfarists believe that if animals cannot think about their futures, then they cannot be harmed by being (painlessly) killed. Abolitionists tend to hold that animal can have an interest in their futures even if they cannot *contemplate* their futures, and so being killed can be bad for animals. Therefore, abolitionists tend to oppose even the painless killing of animals for human purposes.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 4. Conclusion The moral status of animals is complex and contested terrain. Here we have sketched the contours of that debate. [\[9\]](#_ftn9) Hopefully, this sketch will inspire the reader to further consider these important issues. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) On the concept of “moral status” and relates issues, see [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Carruthers 1992; Cohen 1986; Frey 1979. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Francione 2000, Regan 1983. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/ "Speciesism") by Dan Lowe. Also see Norcross 2004; Singer 1990. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman and Bentham 1988 \[1781\], 310-11. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali. Also see Marks 2012. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Francione and Garner 2010. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See, e.g., MacKinnon 2005 and Adams 2010 for additional perspectives. ### References [Adams, Carol J. 2010. *The Sexual Politics of Meat: 20th Anniversary Edition*. New York and London: Continuum.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Sexual-Politics-Meat-Feminist-vegetarian/dp/1441173285/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391371782&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Sexual+Politics+of+Meat%3A+20th+Anniversary+Edition) [Bentham, Jeremy. 1988 \[1781\]. *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.](http://www.amazon.com/Principles-Morals-Legislation-Great-Philosophy/dp/0879754346/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391371844&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Principles+of+Morals+and+Legislation.+Prometheus+Books) [Carruthers, Peter. 1992. *The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Animals-Issue-Theory-Practice/dp/0521436893/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391371877&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Animals+Issue%3A+Moral+Theory+in+Practice) [Cohen, Carl. 1986. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,” *The New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 315.](https://76f733f2-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/nobisphilosophy/cohen.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cpqbOuweqH47AQ1NzCXhaITZEmnoTI0vkAAtEvNrHPEBRSLWwTnCGXAGUhRfM6ibRqrk28nqBKuGb8BitUsj0raINu2Oq4glcgW0wOXAcFsFsqoP_svU8nNx9dk0Mxbf4DP5tJGPtFL-adyoZmRIgGW10mhNp-mmA9s8VSsJysu61bI6K5SV6edgvyQU4i6LSpEhRYystTiEl1YCRnP3ZeJGuHHnw%3D%3D&attredirects=0) [Francione, Gary L. 2000. *Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Animal-Rights-Your-Child/dp/1566396921/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391372022&sr=8-1&keywords=Introduction+to+Animal+Rights%3A+Your+Child+or+the+Dog%3F) [Francione, Gary L. and Garner, Robert. 2010. *The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation?* New York: Columbia University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Animal-Rights-Debate-Perspectives/dp/0231149557/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391372060&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Animal+Rights+Debate%3A+Abolition+or+Regulation%3F) [Frey, R.G. 1979. “Rights, Interests, Desires and Beliefs,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16:3.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009763?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103375602767) [MacKinnon, Catharine. 2005. “Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights,” in Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein (eds.), *Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Animal-Rights-Current-Debates-Directions/dp/0195305108/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391372195&sr=8-1&keywords=Animal+Rights%3A+Current+Debates+and+New+Directions) [Marks, Joel. 2012. “Accept No Substitutes: The Ethics of Alternatives,” Animal Research Ethics: Evolving Views and Practices*, *Hastings Center Report Special Report* 42:6.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hast.102/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Norcross, Alastair. 2004. “Puppies, Pigs, and People,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 18.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00027.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Regan, Tom. 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Case-Animal-Rights-Regan/dp/0520243862/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391372337&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Case+for+Animal+Rights) [Singer, Peter. 1990. *Animal Liberation, 2nd Edition*. New York: New York Review of Books.](http://www.amazon.com/Animal-Liberation-Peter-Singer/dp/0060011572/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391372361&sr=8-1&keywords=Animal+Liberation%2C+2nd+Edition) ### Related Essays [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/ "Speciesism") by Dan Lowe [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/ "The Badness of Death") by Duncan Purves [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/ "(Im)partiality") by Shane Gronholz [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/ "Applied Ethics") by Chelsea Haramia [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson ### About the Author [Jason Wyckoff](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Wyckoff) earned a PhD in philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder, a JD at Georgetown University Law Center, and a BA from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Over the past several years he has published in the areas of ethics, social and political philosophy, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of religion. [independentresearcher.academia.edu/JasonWyckoff](https://independentresearcher.academia.edu/JasonWyckoff) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** animals, Wyckoff --- ### [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) **Published:** March 20, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** Speciesism typically involves prioritizing the interests of one’s own species over other species’ interests: because animals are not of our species, we may treat them in ways we would never treat human beings. Most people seem to accept speciesism. However, some philosophers argue that speciesism reflects a biased prejudice for our own group, similar to racism and sexism. This essay explains different versions of speciesism and the objections they face. **Content:** Author: [Dan Lowe](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/lowe/) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 994 Human beings use non-human animals in a variety of ways: for scientific experimentation, clothing, and food. These uses typically harm animals, and causing harm is often wrong. So what is it about animals, if anything, that might justify harming them in these ways? One answer is that we are justified in using animals in these ways simply because they are animals. This is the idea of *speciesism.*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Speciesism typically involves prioritizing the interests of one’s own species over other species’ interests: because animals are not of our species, we may treat them in ways we would never treat human beings. Most people seem to accept speciesism. However, some philosophers argue that speciesism reflects a biased prejudice for our own group, similar to racism and sexism. This essay explains different versions of speciesism and the objections they face.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ![Adam naming the animals](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/adam.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)Adam naming the animals.### 1. Species Membership In Itself What is it to be a member of a given species, like *homo sapiens*? It involves membership in a biological group; if one’s DNA is configured in a certain way, then that makes someone a member of the human species.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This raises an objection to speciesism: How one’s DNA is configured is just a fact about the order of molecules in our cells, and that seems morally irrelevant. If you found out that your DNA happened to have a very unusual structure (but this didn’t affect your health or abilities in any way) and so, biologically, you are not literally a member of the human species, that wouldn’t seem to change your moral status. This objection reveals why some philosophers have argued that speciesism is similar to racism or sexism.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Racists say that one race is superior to another; but what race one belongs to (like one’s gender) does not make a difference to one’s moral status. Likewise, the speciesist attaches moral significance to a feature that is, in itself, morally irrelevant. ### 2. Distinctively Human Capacities One might respond to this objection by noting that human beings have very different mental capacities from animals: humans have sophisticated language, the capacity for complex thought, and the ability to live according to moral ideals. Perhaps these capacities justify a preference for our own species. In this case, having the typical mental or cognitive capacities *of our species* is what is fundamentally morally important, not our biology itself.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This account, however, is vulnerable to the *Argument from Species Overlap*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Babies and the severely mentally handicapped, for instance, may not have any of the three capacities listed above. Yet it would be profoundly wrong to use *these* human beings in the ways we use animals – e.g., harvesting the skin of babies as we harvest animals’ hides. This version may also have parallels with racism and sexism. Racists and sexists have an arbitrary preference for their own race or sex. Likewise, we may look favorably on these capacities simply because they’re *ours*; as humans we value language, but if we were bats, we’d probably value echolocation instead. ### 3. Combining Capacities and Species-Membership Perhaps these difficulties can be avoided through a combination of the previous views: a being’s moral status is determined by whether *they are members of a species where the typical members have these important capacities*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) This version of speciesism does not depend on the idea that species membership *itself* gives moral status. And it doesn’t imply that babies or the severely mentally handicapped have inferior moral status; even if they lack these capacities, they are still members of a species in which the typical members *do* have them. So, this version of speciesism avoids the Argument from Species Overlap. However, the view depends upon a dubious combination of ideas: - having certain capacities (e.g., rationality) matters for having another property (e.g., moral status); *But*: - some individuals can entirely *lack* those capacities, and still have that other property – just because typical members of that individual’s group (e.g., species) have those capacities. To illustrate the problem, consider an analogy.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) If a story has an engrossing plot and excellent character development, then it has the property of being a good story. Suppose that most of the Sherlock Holmes stories are like this – except “The Naval Treaty.” It would be wrong to say that, even though “The Naval Treaty” doesn’t have any of those qualities, it is still good because the typical members of the series *do* have those qualities. Likewise, it would be wrong to say that a being has a moral status because the typical members of its species have certain characteristics. Being a member of a group does not mean that one has all, or even many, of the characteristics of other members of the group.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) This version of speciesism also has parallels with racism and sexism. Consider a racist who believes that most members of their race have certain special characteristics. Even if they were right about that, it wouldn’t justify treating *all* members of that race as special, even though this is how racists typically think. Likewise, appealing to the characteristics of typical members of a species doesn’t grant special moral status to all members of that species.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. Conclusion If species-membership is irrelevant to the moral status of a being, then we should oppose speciesism just as we should oppose racism or sexism. But if species-membership doesn’t determine moral status, what does? We have already considered one answer to that question – if the being has certain important capacities. The philosopher Jeremy Bentham famously remarked that animals already have the capacities which most matter for moral status: “The question is not, ‘Can they *reason*?’ nor ‘Can they *talk*?’ but, “Can they *suffer*?”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) And yet we treat some animals, like puppies, very differently from others, like pigs – even though puppies and pigs are likely to have the same morally relevant capacities.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) What, if any, moral obligations do we have toward animals? It turns out that this question cannot be answered simply by the fact that humans and animals are of different species. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The concept of speciesism was introduced to a wide audience by Peter Singer. He presents speciesism this way: “Speciesism … is a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (*Animal Liberation*, p. 7). The formulation used in this essay is different in two ways. First, it is more *neutral* – it does not presuppose that speciesism is a form of prejudice or bias; this seems to suggest that speciesism is wrong or unjustified *by definition*, which would rule out the possibility that speciesism could be morally justified. Here I follow Jaquet (2019), who argues that the term’s function in debate requires that it be understood as purely descriptive. Second, it is *broader* – it says that species-membership is relevant to moral status, but does not specify that it must involve preference for one’s *own* species. Singer is correct that this is how speciesism *typically* functions, but it is not an essential feature of the view; for example, speciesism can take the form of a species-based hierarchy which elevates different, non-human species above others (cats over cows, dogs over pigs, vertebrates over insects, for example). Such a hierarchy may be speciesist, but it need not involve prejudice in favor of one’s own species. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Philosophers who advocate speciesism include Carl Cohen, Tibor Machan, and David Schmitdz; philosophers who contest it include Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Lori Gruen. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) It is controversial whether species exist or *how* they exist: are species *natural kinds* or objective, natural categories, or are they are human-made categories that do not correspond to any deeper reality? In this way, the question of whether or how *species* exist is similar to the question of whether or how *races* exist. (For an overview of whether or how races exist, see [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal.) But if a speciesist is going to say that species-membership is morally significant, then this presumably requires them at least *believing* that species are more than created fictions. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*; Tom Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights.” [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) An interesting implication of this view is that if members of other species, such as intelligent extraterrestrials, had those same capacities, they would also have the same moral status. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) This argument was formerly known as the “Argument from Marginal Cases”; see, for instance, Daniel Dombrowski, *Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases*. It is no longer called that since it risks being rude and disrespectful to call certain human beings “marginal.” The current name of this argument emphasizes that morally-relevant characteristics *overlap*, or are shared by, individuals of different species. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Carl Cohen, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research”; David Schmidtz, “Are All Species Equal?” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Nathan Nobis, “Carl Cohen’s ‘Kind’ Arguments *For* Animal Rights and *Against* Animal Rights”; and Jeff McMahan, *The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life*. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The view also seems to imply, for instance, that human embryos and brain-dead individuals have full moral status, and thereby have all the same rights as fully-developed and typically-functioning human beings. So this view has implication for, at least, abortion and euthanasia. For introductions to those issues, see [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis and [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Lori Gruen, *Ethics and Animals: An Introduction*, 53-55. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Jeremy Bentham, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chapter 37, §1, IV, n. 1. Emphasis in original. See Daniel Weltman’s [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Alastair Norcross, “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases.” ### References [Bentham, Jeremy. ](https://books.google.com/books?id=NhksAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=bentham+introduction+to+the+principles&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjl0prh95HkAhVSgp4KHQiqC_cQ6AEwAHoECAIQAg#v=onepage&q=bentham%20introduction%20to%20the%20principles&f=false)[*Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*](https://books.google.com/books?id=NhksAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=bentham+introduction+to+the+principles&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjl0prh95HkAhVSgp4KHQiqC_cQ6AEwAHoECAIQAg#v=onepage&q=bentham%20introduction%20to%20the%20principles&f=false)[. Clarendon Press, 1879.](https://books.google.com/books?id=NhksAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=bentham+introduction+to+the+principles&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjl0prh95HkAhVSgp4KHQiqC_cQ6AEwAHoECAIQAg#v=onepage&q=bentham%20introduction%20to%20the%20principles&f=false) [Cohen, Carl. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,” October 2, 1986, ](https://animalstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=moreaexp)[*New England Journal of Medicine*](https://animalstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=moreaexp)[; 315:865-870](https://animalstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=moreaexp) [Dombrowski, Daniel. ](https://www.amazon.com/Babies-Beasts-ARGUMENT-MARGINAL-CASES/dp/0252066383/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=beasts+and+babies+argument&qid=1566340911&s=books&sr=1-1)[*Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases*](https://www.amazon.com/Babies-Beasts-ARGUMENT-MARGINAL-CASES/dp/0252066383/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=beasts+and+babies+argument&qid=1566340911&s=books&sr=1-1)[. University of Illinois Press, 1997.](https://www.amazon.com/Babies-Beasts-ARGUMENT-MARGINAL-CASES/dp/0252066383/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=beasts+and+babies+argument&qid=1566340911&s=books&sr=1-1) [Gruen, Lori. ](https://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Animals-Introduction-Cambridge-Applied/dp/0521717736/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=lori+gruen&qid=1566340874&s=books&sr=1-2)[*Ethics and Animals: An Introduction*](https://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Animals-Introduction-Cambridge-Applied/dp/0521717736/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=lori+gruen&qid=1566340874&s=books&sr=1-2)[. Cambridge University Press, 2011.](https://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Animals-Introduction-Cambridge-Applied/dp/0521717736/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=lori+gruen&qid=1566340874&s=books&sr=1-2) [Jaquet, François. “Is Speciesism Wrong by Definition?” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10806-019-09784-1)[*Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics.* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10806-019-09784-1)[2019](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10806-019-09784-1)[. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09784-1](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10806-019-09784-1) [Machan, Tibor. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/978-0-7425-3345-5)[*Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature’s Favorite*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/978-0-7425-3345-5)[. Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/978-0-7425-3345-5) [McMahan, Jeff. ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethics-of-killing-9780195079982?q=The%20Ethics%20of%20Killing:%20Problems%20at%20the%20Margins%20of%20Life&lang=en&cc=us)[*The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life*](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethics-of-killing-9780195079982?q=The%20Ethics%20of%20Killing:%20Problems%20at%20the%20Margins%20of%20Life&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press, 2002.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethics-of-killing-9780195079982?q=The%20Ethics%20of%20Killing:%20Problems%20at%20the%20Margins%20of%20Life&lang=en&cc=us) [Nobis, Nathan. “Carl Cohen’s ‘Kind’ Arguments ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x/abstract;jsessionid=7BA37C08A421A8BB9B46ED93CDC11187.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)[*For*](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x/abstract;jsessionid=7BA37C08A421A8BB9B46ED93CDC11187.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)[ Animal Rights and ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x/abstract;jsessionid=7BA37C08A421A8BB9B46ED93CDC11187.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)[*Against* ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x/abstract;jsessionid=7BA37C08A421A8BB9B46ED93CDC11187.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)[Animal Rights.” ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x/abstract;jsessionid=7BA37C08A421A8BB9B46ED93CDC11187.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)[*Journal of Applied Philosophy*](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x/abstract;jsessionid=7BA37C08A421A8BB9B46ED93CDC11187.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)[, Vol. 21., No. 1, 2004.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x/abstract;jsessionid=7BA37C08A421A8BB9B46ED93CDC11187.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Norcross, Alastair. “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases” in ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethical-life-9780199773527?q=The%20Ethical%20Life:%20Fundamental%20Readings%20in%20Ethics%20and%20Moral%20Problems&lang=en&cc=us)[*The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems*](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethical-life-9780199773527?q=The%20Ethical%20Life:%20Fundamental%20Readings%20in%20Ethics%20and%20Moral%20Problems&lang=en&cc=us)[, 2nd edition, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. Oxford University Press, 2012.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethical-life-9780199773527?q=The%20Ethical%20Life:%20Fundamental%20Readings%20in%20Ethics%20and%20Moral%20Problems&lang=en&cc=us) [Regan, Tom. “The Case for Animal Rights” in ](http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/regan03.htm)[*In Defense of Animals*](http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/regan03.htm)[, ed. Peter Singer. Basil Blackwell, 1985.](http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/regan03.htm) [Schmidtz, David. “Are All Species Equal?” in ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-animal-ethics-9780195371963?q=The%20Oxford%20Handbook%20of%20Animal%20Ethics&lang=en&cc=us)[*The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics*](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-animal-ethics-9780195371963?q=The%20Oxford%20Handbook%20of%20Animal%20Ethics&lang=en&cc=us)[, eds. R.G. Frey and Tom Beauchamp. Oxford University Press, 2011.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-animal-ethics-9780195371963?q=The%20Oxford%20Handbook%20of%20Animal%20Ethics&lang=en&cc=us) [Singer, Peter. ](http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Animal-Liberation-Peter-Singer/?isbn=9780061711305)[*Animal Liberation*](http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Animal-Liberation-Peter-Singer/?isbn=9780061711305)[. 1975. Updated Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, 2009.](http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Animal-Liberation-Peter-Singer/?isbn=9780061711305) ### Related Essays [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. ### Revision History This essay, posted 9/5/19, is a revised version of an essay originally posted 3/24/2014. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/speciesism.pdf) ### About the Author [Dan Lowe](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/lowe/) is a lecturer in the department of philosophy at the University of Michigan. He works on moral and political philosophy, feminist philosophy, and their intersection with moral epistemology. [sites.google.com/site/danlowe161](https://sites.google.com/site/danlowe161/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** animal rights, animals, ethics and animals, Lowe --- ### [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) **Published:** January 1, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to theories of moral considerability, moral status or moral standing, which is about the question of who and what matters morally. **Content:** Author: [Jonathan Spelman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Spelman) Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word count: 999 There is widespread agreement that adult humans deserve *moral consideration*,[\[1\]](#_ftn1) which is to say, roughly, that when deciding whether to perform an action, we should take its effects on adult humans into account.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But what else deserves moral consideration? Fetuses? Nonhuman animals? Plants? Ecosystems? Answering this question is important since it would help us answer ethical questions about abortion, animal testing, meat-eating, species management, and more. Below, we survey five theories of moral considerability.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) They all accept that adult humans deserve moral consideration, but they disagree about *why* that is. As a result, they disagree about what else deserves moral consideration. [![Armed game wardens watch over an endangered northern white rhino at a nature conservancy in Kenya.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/rhino-kenyan-guards-e7xjrd_369095-e1489007210972-1220x810-1.jpg?resize=656%2C436&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/rhino-kenyan-guards-e7xjrd_369095-e1489007210972-1220x810-1.jpg?ssl=1)Armed game wardens watch over an endangered northern white rhino at a nature conservancy in Kenya.### 1. Ratiocentrism According to *ratiocentrism*, adult humans deserve moral consideration because they are *rational* (i.e., they act on reasons, not just on impulses or instincts).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Ratiocentrism has the plausible implication that if rational space aliens exist, they also deserve moral consideration. At the same time, it has the implausible implication that neither infants nor people with severe mental disabilities deserve moral consideration (since they aren’t rational, i.e., they don’t act on reasons). Ratiocentrists could respond to this worry by saying that what matters for moral considerability isn’t being rational but being *potentially* rational. On this view, infants and people with severe mental disabilities deserve moral consideration, not because of the capacities they have, but because of the capacities they *could* have. It is unclear, however, what it takes to be potentially rational. ### 2. Anthropocentrism Another response to the worry described above is to adopt *anthropocentrism,* the view that adult humans deserve moral consideration simply because they are biologically human. Since infants and people with severe mental disabilities are human, anthropocentrism can explain why they deserve moral consideration. But anthropocentrism also has a weakness; it seems to be *speciesist*. What is speciesism?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Speciesism was first proposed as an analogue of racism or sexism.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Racism and sexism are problematic because they use morally irrelevant features (namely, race and sex) to justify treating certain individuals (e.g., black people and women) worse than others (e.g., white people and men). Analogously, speciesism involves using a seemingly morally irrelevant feature (namely, species membership) to justify treating certain individuals (e.g., nonhuman animals) worse than others (namely, humans). Defending anthropocentrism against the charge of speciesism requires arguing *either* that species membership is morally relevant *or* that there is some other morally relevant feature that all and only humans have. The first route isn’t particularly promising as evidenced by the fact that if we found out that some small percentage of the “human” population were actually rational space aliens disguised as humans, we wouldn’t infer from this that they didn’t matter morally. Regarding the second route, there might be some *morally relevant* feature that all and only humans have; however, it’s hard to identify what that feature would be.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Sentientism A third view of moral considerability, *sentientism*, is the view that adult humans deserve moral consideration because they are sentient (i.e., have conscious experiences).[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Unlike ratiocentrism or anthropocentrism, sentientism is able to explain why it’s wrong to harm most nonhuman animals, even if they are unowned or unloved.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) After all, kicking a stray dog seems to be wrong for the same reasons it’s wrong to kick people, namely, because kicking them is disrespectful and causes them pain.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) One criticism of sentientism is that it implies that some of our current practices (e.g., industrial animal agriculture and the use of animals in biomedical research) are deeply problematic. But maybe that’s right. Maybe those practices are deeply problematic. ### 4. Biocentrism Some go even further and argue that all living organisms deserve moral consideration.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This view is *biocentrism*. Biocentrism can explain some intuitions that other theories cannot. Imagine that you’re the last person on Earth. Would it be wrong for you to chop down the last redwood tree, just for fun?[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Many people think it would be wrong for you to do this, and it’s easy for biocentrism to explain why, because your doing so would be bad for a living thing. But biocentrism also has some implausible implications. For example, it seems to imply that it’s wrong to weed one’s flower beds. In response, biocentrists could argue that even though their theory entails that plants deserve moral consideration, it doesn’t entail that plants deserve the same *kind* or *amount* of moral consideration as humans.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 5. Ecocentrism Finally, according to *ecocentrism*, what deserves moral consideration isn’t individual beings but collectives or groups, specifically those that promote the flourishing of ecosystems (e.g., wolf packs and aspen groves). On ecocentrism, most individual plants and animals deserve moral consideration because they promote the flourishing of ecosystems. But not all individual plants and animals deserve moral consideration. Consider, for example, European rabbits, which were introduced into Australia in 1859.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Because they threatened the local ecosystem, ecocentrism entails that they didn’t deserve moral consideration and that Australians would have been justified in exterminating them.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Some see this implication of ecocentrism as a strength, but others see it as a weakness. In fact, some of ecocentrism’s opponents have noted that given the environmental degradation caused by humans, ecocentrism seems to have the implausible implication that it would be morally permissible to kill off a large percentage of the human population.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 6. Conclusion Theories of moral considerability can help us answer a variety of practical ethical questions, but they can’t answer those questions by themselves. For example, even if we knew that sentientism was true and, therefore, that nonhuman animals deserve moral consideration, we couldn’t know whether meat-eating was morally wrong without knowing whether nonhuman animals have rights or how to weigh their interests against the interests of the other things that deserve moral consideration. In order to answer these practical ethical questions, then, we would have to figure out not only *who* or *what* deserves moral consideration but also *how to treat* the things that deserve moral consideration. This requires combining theories of moral considerability, ethical theories, and an understanding of who or what is being considered. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Some philosophers talk about “moral consideration” using the equivalent or closely related concepts of “moral standing” or “moral status.” The claim that all adult human beings deserve moral consideration has been denied throughout much (or most) of human history, but it is clear to us now that their reasons for doing so were not good ones. See, e.g., Dan Peterson’s [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") and Dan Lowe’s [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) In technical terms, to say that adult humans deserve moral consideration is to say that they have inherent value or that they matter for their own sake. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In their strongest form, these theories purport to identify features that are necessary and sufficient for deserving moral consideration. However, these theories also come in weaker forms. So, whereas a strong version of anthropocentrism might say that being human is necessary and sufficient for deserving moral consideration, a weaker version might say simply that human beings deserve a special kind of moral consideration or a greater amount of it than other beings. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is a paradigmatic example of a ratiocentrist. See [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman for an introduction to Kant’s ethics. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For further discussion, see [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) In “The Moral Status of Animals,” Lori Gruen (2017) notes that the word “speciesism” was first coined by Richard Ryder but then popularized by Peter Singer in his article “All Animals Are Equal” (1974) and subsequent book *Animal Liberation* (1975/2009). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Give it a shot. Try to think of some feature that all and only humans have. My guess is that if all and only humans have the feature (e.g., human DNA), then it probably isn’t morally relevant. Alternatively, if it is morally relevant (e.g., intelligence), then it probably isn’t something that all and only humans have. To be clear, this doesn’t mean that humans aren’t special. It just means that even if humans are special, it doesn’t follow that they are the only things that deserve moral consideration. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Jeremy Bentham, an early sentientist, famously expressed this view in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, writing, “The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum*, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. … The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor, Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?” (1789/1988: 311). See Daniel Weltman’s [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) I say “most” here because whether some animals (e.g., insects) are sentient is controversial, and others (e.g., bivalves) are widely thought not to be sentient. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Tom Regan (1985) makes this sort of argument. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Paul Taylor (2011) and Gary Varner (1998) advance versions of biocentrism. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Richard Routley (1973) famously proposed a thought experiment along these lines. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Biocentrists could, for example, draw a distinction between various kinds of interests and then argue that the satisfaction of certain kinds of interests (e.g., psychological interests) matters more than the satisfaction of other kinds of interests (e.g., biological interests). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See “Rabbits introduced.” [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Aldo Leopold, probably the most well-known ecocentrist, famously wrote, “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong if it tends otherwise” (2020: 211). Since exterminating European rabbits would have promoted the integrity, stability, and beauty of the local ecosystem, Leopold’s land ethic entails that exterminating them would have been not only morally permissible, but morally right. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Ronald Sandler (2017: 261) raises this worry. ### References [Bentham, Jeremy. ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Principles_of_Morals_and_Legislation/BcAPAQAAMAAJ)[*An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Principles_of_Morals_and_Legislation/BcAPAQAAMAAJ)[. Prometheus Books, 1789/1988.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Principles_of_Morals_and_Legislation/BcAPAQAAMAAJ) [Gruen, Lori. “The Moral Status of Animals.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/moral-animal/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/moral-animal/)[ (Fall 2017 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2017. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/moral-animal/) [Leopold, Aldo. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-sand-county-almanac-9780197500262?cc=us&lang=en&)[*A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here and There*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-sand-county-almanac-9780197500262?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press, 1948/2020.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-sand-county-almanac-9780197500262?cc=us&lang=en&) [“Rabbits introduced.” ](https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/rabbits-introduced)[*National Museum Australia*](https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/rabbits-introduced)[. 13 August 2020. ](https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/rabbits-introduced) [Regan, Tom. “The Case for Animal Rights.” ](http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/regan03.htm)[*In Defense of Animals*](http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/regan03.htm)[. Edited by Peter Singer, Basil Blackwell, 1985, pp. 13-26.](http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/regan03.htm) [Routley, Richard. “Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp15/content/wcp15_1973_0001_0205_0210)[*Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp15/content/wcp15_1973_0001_0205_0210)[ 1, no. 6 (1973): 205-210.](https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp15/content/wcp15_1973_0001_0205_0210) [Sandler, Ronald. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/environmental-ethics-9780199340729?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Environmental Ethics: Theory in Practice*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/environmental-ethics-9780199340729?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press, 2017.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/environmental-ethics-9780199340729?cc=us&lang=en&) [Singer, Peter. “All Animals Are Equal.” Philosophical Exchange 5, no. 1 (1974): pp. 103-116.](https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6/) [Singer, Peter. ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-peter-singer?variant=32154016415778)[*Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement*](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-peter-singer?variant=32154016415778)[ (Updated Edition). Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1975/2009.](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/animal-liberation-peter-singer?variant=32154016415778) [Taylor, Paul. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150246/respect-for-nature)[*Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150246/respect-for-nature)[. Princeton University Press, 1986/2011.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691150246/respect-for-nature) [Varner, Gary. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/in-natures-interests-9780195108651?lang=en&cc=us)[*In Nature’s Interests? Interests, Animal Rights, and Environmental Ethics*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/in-natures-interests-9780195108651?lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press, 1998.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/in-natures-interests-9780195108651?lang=en&cc=us) ### Related Essays [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/moral-considerability-1.pdf). ### About the Author [Jonathan Spelman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Spelman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ohio Northern University. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder, and he specializes in ethics. When he’s not doing philosophy, he enjoys taking photos and spending time with his family. [J](http://jonathanspelman.com)[onathan](http://jonathanspelman.com)[S](http://jonathanspelman.com)[pelman.com](http://jonathanspelman.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** Anthropocentrism, biocentrism, Ecocentrism, environmental ethics, moral considerability, moral standing, moral status, Ratiocentrism, sentientism, speciesism, Spelman --- ### [Definitions of Art: What is Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) **Published:** May 5, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** What distinguishes art from non-art? This is a central question in the field of study called aesthetics, which focuses on philosophical issues about art. This essay introduces influential philosophical attempts to define art. **Content:** Author: Brock Rough Category: [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/ "Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art") Word Count: 997 In 1964, Andy Warhol made fake Brillo soap boxes that appeared identical to those found in a supermarket and displayed them in a New York art gallery.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Warhol’s boxes were then considered works of art, while the supermarket boxes were not.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Michelangelo’s *David*, da Vinci’s *Mona Lisa*, and Beethoven’s *Ninth Symphony* are widely regarded as obvious examples of art. But a stapler, a traffic cone, or a microwave oven are usually *not* considered art. What distinguishes art from non-art? This is a central question in the field of study called *aesthetics*, which focuses on philosophical issues about art.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay introduces influential philosophical attempts to define art. [![Andy Warhol with his Brillo Boxes in 1964. Photo by Marion De Biasi/Momdadori/Getty.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/warhol.jpeg?resize=656%2C411&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/warhol.jpeg?ssl=1)Andy Warhol with his Brillo Boxes in 1964. Photo by Marion De Biasi / Momdadori / Getty.### 1. The Varieties of Art Art exists in many forms. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, dance, theater, literature, poetry, film, and performance art are commonly recognized as types of art. Some argue that cooking, fashion, and video games are also art, or can be. If we can correctly define “art,” then we should be able to tell what is and isn’t art. Many definitions of art fall into two broad categories: *proceduralist* and *functionalist*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Each tries to capture the defining characteristics of artworks. ### 2. Proceduralist Theories Proceduralist theories say that something is art if people treat or recognize it as art in specific situations, such as art galleries and museums. One influential proceduralist theory is the *institutional theory of art*.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This says something is art if the “artworld”—artists, critics, curators—recognizes it as worthy of aesthetic appreciation.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The institutional theory can explain why Warhol’s Brillo soap boxes were considered art. In the supermarket, they were packaging. In the gallery, they were recognized by the artworld. Critics argue that this definition is circular: art is defined by the artworld which is defined by art. And *why* does the artworld accept some works as art? Presumably because they possess qualities that make them art *prior to* the artworld’s judgment.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Another proceduralist approach is the *historical definition of art*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This says something is art if it is intended to be regarded in the same manner as past artworks. For instance, Jackson Pollock’s drip paintings, though unusual, were still *intended* to be viewed as paintings, and thus this theory says we should consider them art. However, it raises the question of what made earlier (and especially the *earliest*) artworks art if historical precedent is the measure.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 3. Functionalist Theories Functionalist theories define art by *what it does* rather than *how it is recognized*. In particular, functionalist theories say that something is art if it provides or produces *aesthetic value* or *aesthetic experience*.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) An aesthetic experience is an enjoyable perceptual encounter of appreciating something for its form, beauty, or expression, rather than practical use. Feeling wowed by a musical performance, captivated by a movie, or getting lost in a book are examples of aesthetic experience. Functionalist approaches face challenges though. Natural objects, like rainbows and waterfalls; people, like models and celebrities; animals, such as bald eagles and horses, all can produce aesthetic experiences. Yet they are not typically considered artworks.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This suggests that *intentions* matter: if someone carefully arranges stones on a beach, that might count as art, whereas a naturally formed rock formation would not. Functionalist theories must also decide whether art is defined by the artist’s intention, the audience’s experience, or both.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) An artist could create a work without anticipating its aesthetic effect, or people could have aesthetic experiences in response to a created object, *as though* it were art, despite no one *intending* it as art. So, is something art because someone created it to be art, or because it causes people to have aesthetic experiences, or a combination of the two? Functionalist theories must answer this question. ### 4. Can Art Be Defined at All? Some philosophers doubt that a strict definition of art is possible.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) For instance, Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that certain concepts lack a single defining feature. They are instead defined by overlapping similarities, or *family resemblances*.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Games illustrate this idea: chess, soccer, and video games differ significantly, but are grouped together as the same type of thing—games. The definition of art might work the same way. Building on family resemblance, *cluster accounts* have been proposed.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) These say an object is likely art if it possesses enough features from a *cluster* of traits, such as aesthetic value, emotional expression, technical skill, or originality. Not *all* features are necessary; possessing *enough* suffices. For instance, something could count as a work of art if it just shows aesthetic value and technical skill, without any of the other qualities. Cluster accounts allow flexibility, offering the ability to encompass a wide array of types of art. Critics maintain that cluster accounts are not genuine definitions.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) They provide guidelines for identifying art but do not strictly determine what counts as art. Nevertheless, they enable us to understand how things as different as dance, painting, and music can all qualify as kinds of art. ### 5. Why Defining Art Matters Definitions of art have significant consequences. They influence what is displayed in museums. If photography or graffiti aren’t considered art, these works may be neglected. Definitions also affect education. An art history curriculum shaped by a narrow definition could omit entire traditions or artforms. Funding decisions depend on definitions too, as cultural institutions must decide which creative practices deserve support. Definitions also influence interpretation. Experimental performances or digital installations may be accepted as art or dismissed as non-art depending on the criteria used. Proceduralist, functionalist, or cluster-based approaches all shape how society engages with creative works. Understanding these frameworks clarifies the stakes of artistic judgment. Defining art matters on a personal level too: a too-narrow view of what art can be might prevent people from having and appreciating new aesthetic experiences. ### 6. Conclusion The search for a definition of art shows how rich and varied art is. Many forms of art exist today that no one even dreamed of 100 years ago. Even without a universal definition, exploring these theories deepens our understanding of art and its significance. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) In contemporary terms, this would be like if an artist today made a fake Amazon delivery box that looks exactly like the real thing. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Danto (1974) discusses the example of Warhol’s *Brillo Boxes* at length. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Aesthetics also explores what distinguishes aesthetic experiences; whether beauty is in the eye of the beholder; why we enjoy artistic works depicting tragedy and horror; the meaning and value art contributes to our lives; and many more related questions. For an introduction to aesthetics, see [Aesthetics vs. Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough and “Aesthetics” by Barry Hartley Slater at the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. For an introduction to the aesthetics of videogames, see [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher. For an introduction to the topic of the sublime in aesthetics, see [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson. For an introduction to the topic of “subjectivism” in art, regarding whether beauty is “in the eye of the beholder,” see [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For an introduction to each of these types of theories of art, see Davies (1990). In the interest of space, this essay focuses on contemporary philosophical definitions of art (e.g., proceduralist and functionalist definitions). Classical definitions include the ideas that something is art if it imitates or represents objects in the world (mimesis), represents and arouses emotions in the experiencer (expressivism), or possesses a notable or significant form (formalism). For an example of the mimesis theory, see Aristotle (2013/c. 400 BC). Collingwood (1938) provides an influential example of expressivism. Bell (1914) offers what is considered the most important theory of formalism. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Dickie (1984) and Matravers (2000) provide influential institutional theories of art. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Danto (1974) coined the term and defined the concept of “the artworld.” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Levinson (2011) for an example of this criticism. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Carroll (1993) and Levinson (2011) provide two influential historical theories of art. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Davies (1997) for an example of this criticism. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Beardsley (1982) and Zangwill (2007) offer two influential functionalist theories of art. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Shusterman (2000) argues that functionalist theories are insufficient to define art because non-art (e.g., natural objects) can also cause aesthetic experiences. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Beardsley (1982) points out that functionalist theories must decide whether art is defined by the artist’s intention, the audience’s response, or a combination of both. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For instance, Weitz (1956) argues that art cannot be defined. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Wittgenstein (2009/1953) for his theory of family resemblances. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Davies (2004) offers an influential cluster account of art. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Carroll (1999) argues that cluster accounts of art basically just point at examples of art rather than offering a genuine definition. Said differently, cluster accounts can give examples of art, but they can’t explain *why* they should be considered examples, since to do that arguably requires giving a genuine definition of art. ### References [Aristotle. (2013/c. 4000 BC). ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo14522125.html)[*Aristotle’s “Politics.”*](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo14522125.html)[ University of Chicago Press. ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo14522125.html) [Beardsley, Monroe. (1982). ](https://www.amazon.com/Aesthetic-Point-View-Selected-Essays/dp/0801498805)[*The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays*](https://www.amazon.com/Aesthetic-Point-View-Selected-Essays/dp/0801498805)[, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Aesthetic-Point-View-Selected-Essays/dp/0801498805) [Bell, Clive. (1914). ](https://www.amazon.com/Art-Clive-Bell/dp/0192820494)[*Art*](https://www.amazon.com/Art-Clive-Bell/dp/0192820494)[. Oxford University Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Art-Clive-Bell/dp/0192820494) [Carroll, Noel. (1993.) “Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art”, ](https://philpapers.org/rec/CARHNA#:~:text=philosophy%20of%20art-,Noel%20Carroll,(3):313%2D326.)[*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](https://philpapers.org/rec/CARHNA#:~:text=philosophy%20of%20art-,Noel%20Carroll,(3):313%2D326.)[, 51(3): 313–26.](https://philpapers.org/rec/CARHNA#:~:text=philosophy%20of%20art-,Noel%20Carroll,(3):313%2D326.) [Carroll, Noel. (1999). ](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Art-A-Contemporary-Introduction/Carroll/p/book/9780415159647?srsltid=AfmBOorNjqryvvfbDorOigENUZBTXguMCTPKm7AwYeubmWybEibfpGK5)[*Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction*](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Art-A-Contemporary-Introduction/Carroll/p/book/9780415159647?srsltid=AfmBOorNjqryvvfbDorOigENUZBTXguMCTPKm7AwYeubmWybEibfpGK5)[. Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Art-A-Contemporary-Introduction/Carroll/p/book/9780415159647?srsltid=AfmBOorNjqryvvfbDorOigENUZBTXguMCTPKm7AwYeubmWybEibfpGK5) [Collingwood, Robin G. (1938). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-principles-of-art-9780195002096?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Principles of Art*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-principles-of-art-9780195002096?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-principles-of-art-9780195002096?cc=us&lang=en&) [Danto, Arthur, C. (1974). “The Transfiguration of the Commonplace.” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/429082?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897)[*Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/429082?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897)[, 33 (2), 139-148.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/429082?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897) [Davies, Stephen. (1990). “Functional and Procedural Definitions of Art.” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3332789?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897)[*Journal of Aesthetic Education*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3332789?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897)[, 99-106.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3332789?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897) [Davies, Stephen. (1997). “First Art and Art’s Definition.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVFAA-5)[*Southern Journal of Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVFAA-5)[ 35 (1): 19–34.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVFAA-5) [Davies, Stephen. (2004). “The Cluster Theory of Art.” ](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/44/3/297.short)[*British Journal of Aesthetics*](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/44/3/297.short)[, 44 (3), 297-300.](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/44/3/297.short) [Dickie, George. (1984). ](http://www.amazon.com/Art-Circle-A-Theory/dp/1886094705/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1399296820&sr=8-2&keywords=The+Art+Circle%3A+A+Theory+of+Art)[*The Art Circle: A Theory of Art*](http://www.amazon.com/Art-Circle-A-Theory/dp/1886094705/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1399296820&sr=8-2&keywords=The+Art+Circle%3A+A+Theory+of+Art)[. New York: Haven.](http://www.amazon.com/Art-Circle-A-Theory/dp/1886094705/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1399296820&sr=8-2&keywords=The+Art+Circle%3A+A+Theory+of+Art) [Matravers, Derek. (2000). “The Institutional Theory: A Protean Creature.” ](http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=1543088)[*British Journal of Aesthetics*](http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=1543088)[, 40 (2), 242-250.](http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=1543088) [Levinson, Jerrold. (2011). “Defining Art Historically,](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/music-art-and-metaphysics-9780199596621?q=Defining%20Art%20Historically.%20In%20Music,%20Art,%20&%20Metaphysics&lang=en&cc=us)[*”* ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/music-art-and-metaphysics-9780199596621?q=Defining%20Art%20Historically.%20In%20Music,%20Art,%20&%20Metaphysics&lang=en&cc=us)[in](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/music-art-and-metaphysics-9780199596621?q=Defining%20Art%20Historically.%20In%20Music,%20Art,%20&%20Metaphysics&lang=en&cc=us)[ *Music, Art, & Metaphysics*](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/music-art-and-metaphysics-9780199596621?q=Defining%20Art%20Historically.%20In%20Music,%20Art,%20&%20Metaphysics&lang=en&cc=us)[, (pp. 3-25). Oxford University Press. (1975).](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/music-art-and-metaphysics-9780199596621?q=Defining%20Art%20Historically.%20In%20Music,%20Art,%20&%20Metaphysics&lang=en&cc=us) [Shusterman, Richard. (2000). ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/pragmatist-aesthetics-9781461641179/)[*Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/pragmatist-aesthetics-9781461641179/)[. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/pragmatist-aesthetics-9781461641179/) [Slater, Barry Hartley. (No date provided). “Aesthetics.” ](https://iep.utm.edu/aesthetics/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/aesthetics/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/aesthetics/)[](https://iep.utm.edu/aesthetics/)[Zangwill, Nick. (2007). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/aesthetic-creation-9780199645305?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Aesthetic Creation*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/aesthetic-creation-9780199645305?cc=us&lang=en&)[, Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/aesthetic-creation-9780199645305?cc=us&lang=en&) [Weitz, Morris. (1956). “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics.” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/427491?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897)[*Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/427491?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897)[, 15 (1), 27-35.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/427491?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897) [Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (2009/1953). ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Philosophical+Investigations%2C+4th+Edition-p-9781405159289)[*Philosophical Investigations*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Philosophical+Investigations%2C+4th+Edition-p-9781405159289)[. Wiley-Blackwell. ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Philosophical+Investigations%2C+4th+Edition-p-9781405159289) ### Further Reading [Adajian, Thomas. (2024). “The Definition of Art.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-definition/#ConDef)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Art.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-definition/#ConDef) [Bonard, Constant and Humbert-Droz, Steve. (No date provided.) “The Definition of Art.” ](https://iep.utm.edu/definition-of-art/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/definition-of-art/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/definition-of-art/) ### Related Essays [Aesthetics vs. Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis ### Revision History This essay was revised by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* and reposted on 8/30/2025; the original version was posted on 5/5/2014 and is available [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/definitions-of-art-original-version/). ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/estetik-ve-sanat-ayrimi-brock-rough/) ### About the Author [Brock Rough](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rough) earned a PhD in philosophy at the University of Maryland, College Park. His research focuses on the art status and ontology of videogames, their role as a test case for theories of art, and the ontology and intersection of games and art. Before pursuing philosophy, Brock spent several years working as a portrait painter. [BrockRough.com](http://www.brockrough.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics **Tags:** Rough --- ### [Just War Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) **Published:** July 21, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** War is a profoundly destructive institution, yet most of us still believe there are good wars. Authors as far back as Cicero, and in various cultural traditions, have sought to answer this question: When is a war just? This article will explore the criteria of traditional just war theory before briefly discussing the revisionist school’s critiques. **Content:** Author: Ryan Jenkins Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/ "Social and Political Philosophy") Word Count: 1000 War is a profoundly destructive institution, yet most of us still believe there are good wars. Authors as far back as Cicero, and in various cultural traditions,[\[1\]](#_ftn1) have sought to answer this question: When is a war *just*? The *just war tradition* (or *just war theory*) is one subset of military ethics.[\[2\] ](#_ftn2)Recently, interest in just war theory was ignited by Michael Walzer’s 1977 *Just and Unjust Wars*, published in the wake of the Vietnam War. More recently, profound challenges to “traditional” just war theory—under the banner of “revisionism”—have shaken the foundations of the ethics of war.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This article will explore the criteria of traditional just war theory before briefly discussing the revisionist school’s critiques. ![Saint Augustine was the first clear advocate of just-war theory.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/gerard_seghers_attr_-_the_four_doctors_of_the_western_church_saint_augustine_of_hippo_354e28093430.jpg?resize=656%2C527&ssl=1)Saint Augustine was the first clear advocate of just-war theory.### 1. Jus ad Bellum: Justice in the Resort to War Traditional just war theory concerns itself with two questions: (1) when is it just *to* *go to war* and (2) how may a war be *justly fought*? [\[4\]](#_ftn4) (These two areas usually go by their Latin names: *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, respectively.) This way, we can say that a war was just to declare but fought unjustly, or perhaps vice-versa.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) When is it just to resort to war? (Notice this *moral* question is separate from when war is prudent or popular.) Traditionalists hold that a state must satisfy several criteria: *just cause*, *right intention*, *last resort*, *proportionality*, *probability of success*, and *proper authority*. Theorists usually think the only just cause for declaring war is self-defense: that is, as a response to an actual aggression. Pre-emptive war—declaring war on a state because it is believed they will be a threat—is clearly a Pandora’s box. Instead, we must meet a high evidential burden in order to justify war, and a *merely suspected* attack is not enough. In order for a declaration of war to be just, the state must have the right intention in persecuting a war. It is unjust to go to war ostensibly in self-defense if one’s real motive is to seize the adversary’s copious natural resources. Because war is a grave evil, it is just only when all other peaceful avenues to resolving the conflict have been exhausted: [\[6\]](#_ftn6) war must be a last resort. Moreover, there must be a high probability that waging a war will *actually* achieve its goal: it would be wrong to wreak massive destruction if victory were a long shot. For a declaration of war to be just, the good to be sought must be proportionate to the expected amount of damage that will be wrought. It would be unjust, for example, to wage a hugely destructive war over the right to govern a very small territory. Finally, only a proper authority can declare. It is for this reason, for example, that Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, suggested that the US’s 2003 invasion of Iraq was illegal.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Under international law, a war must be authorized by the United Nations in order to be legal, and all other threats or uses of force are illegal.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 2. Jus in Bello: Justice During Warfare *Jus in bello* concerns who may be targeted in warfare and when. Theorists generally agree that violence in wartime must (1) be necessary for securing a strategic goal, (2) be directed against only those who are liable to be attacked (i.e., the target is *not innocent*), and (3) not cause disproportionate harm and suffering. These restrictions are clearly meant to minimize the harms that war inflicts, and to make sure that they are inflicted only for good reasons and only against those who have done something to be liable to attack, like posing a threat to innocent people. Many have held that innocent non-combatants cannot be permissibly attacked no matter the potential strategic gains.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Finally, any weapons *mala in se*, or bad in themselves, are prohibited. Weapons in this category: (1) are indiscriminate by nature, either because they produce massive destruction or have other unpredictable effects and (2) inflict harms in ways that are especially gruesome, even for war. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons plausibly satisfy both of these criteria. Thus, “weapons of mass destruction” are natural candidates for being considered *intrinsically* evil. ### 3. Emerging Issues in Just War Theory A collection of objections found in the “revisionist” work of McMahan, Rodin, and others is currently roiling the just war community. Central to this conflict with traditional just war theory is the *moral equality of combatants*. Traditionalists, along with international law, roughly hold that all soldiers on either side of a war are legitimate targets and are entitled to equal moral protections. Revisionists respond that soldiers fighting for an unjust cause are culpable for posing an unjust threat, and therefore enjoy no moral protections. To deny this would be like insisting that a criminal and the policeman giving chase are equally legitimate targets of violence. Whether revisionists are ultimately correct, many of their arguments have a cogency that makes one question how the traditional view has gone unquestioned for so long. Extending this “law enforcement” analogy to warfare, others are questioning soldiers’ *de facto* license to inflict deadly violence on one another. In law enforcement, we typically think that police are required to warn offenders or give them an opportunity to surrender before targeting them with force. Revisionists argue that our moral duties to one another can’t be changed significantly just by having our leaders declare a state of war. Thus, we need more reason than we usually think to simply kill enemy soldiers.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) One possible result of the revisionists’ arguments is that the position of *contingent pacifism* seems to be rising in popularity. A contingent pacifist believes war *can* be justified, but perhaps (or probably) never *actually* is. As revisionists offer arguments for a host of new moral restraints on warfare, some philosophers have begun to appreciate how very unlikely it is that any war will meet this high burden.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This includes the Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and Hindu traditions. See Sorabji and Rodin (2006) for an excellent anthology across these various traditions. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Military ethics, a broader subfield, also includes questions about the virtues of the ideal warrior, or the duties of a commander to a subordinate, for example. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See McMahan (2009) and Rodin (2005) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This includes the Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and Hindu traditions. See Sorabji and Rodin (2006) for an excellent anthology across these various traditions. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This is controversial. McMahan (2005) has argued persuasively that a war that lacks a just cause cannot be fought justly. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Some worry that last resort is incoherent in the same way that a largest number is incoherent: there could always be another avenue for resolving a conflict. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Ewen MacAskill and Julian Borger, “Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan.” *The Guardian*. September 15, 2004. Internet. Accessed July 16, 2014. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See UN Charter, Article 2(4). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Nagel (1972) and Anscombe (1981). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Statman (2005) and Gross (2006). This is especially relevant to moral debates over unmanned aerial vehicles, which deny enemy soldiers any opportunity to surrender, and therefore might be seen as unjust or excessive. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See, for example, May (2012) and McMahan (2010). ### References [Anscombe, G. E. M. 1981. “Mr. Truman’s Decree.” In *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe*, volume 3 of *Ethics, Religion, and Politics*. Blackwell.](http://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Religion-Politics-Collected-Philosophical/dp/0631129421/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1405969591&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Collected+Philosophical+Papers+of+G.+E.+M.+Anscombe) [Gross, Michael L. 2006. “Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 23 (3):323–335.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00347.x/abstract;jsessionid=7681F467EE59D4878FC057C15D05A5B9.f02t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) May, Larry. 2012. “Contingent Pacifism and Selective Refusal.” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 43 (1):1-18. [McMahan, Jeff. 2005. “Just Cause for War.” *Ethics & International Affairs* 19: 1-21.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7954137&fileId=S0892679400003828) [———. 2009. *Killing in War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Killing-Uehiro-Series-Practical-Ethics/dp/019960357X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1405969850&sr=8-1&keywords=Killing+in+War+McMahan) [———. 2010. “Pacifism and Moral Theory.” *Diametros* 23:44-68.](http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/download/381/377) [Nagel, Thomas. 1972. “War and Massacre.” *Philosophy & Public Affairs*: 123-144.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2264967?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104367335197) [Orend, Brian. 2013. *The Morality of War*, 2 ed. Broadview Press.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Morality-second-Brian-Orend/dp/1554810957/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1405970010&sr=8-2&keywords=The+Morality+of+War+Orend) [Rodin, David. 2005. *War and Self-Defense*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/War-Self-Defense-David-Rodin/dp/0199275416/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1405970036&sr=8-1&keywords=War+and+Self-Defense+Rodin) [Sorabji, Richard, and David Rodin, eds. 2006. *The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Ethics-War-Different-Traditions/dp/0754654494/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1405970062&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Ethics+of+War%3A+Shared+Problems+in+Different+Traditions) [Statman, Daniel 2005. “Targeted Killing.” In Timothy Shanahan (ed.), *Philosophy 9/11: Thinking About the War on Terrorism*. Open Court.](http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-11-Thinking-About-Terrorism/dp/0812695828) [United Nations. 1945. “Charter of the United Nations.” Available at .](http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml) [Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. Basic Books, 1977 1st ed., 2015, 5th ed.](http://www.amazon.com/Just-Unjust-Wars-Historical-Illustrations/dp/0465037070/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1405970125&sr=1-1&keywords=Just+and+Unjust+Wars%3A+A+Moral+Argument+with+Historical+Illustrations) ### Related Essays [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/ "The Ethics of Drone Strikes") by Ryan Jenkins [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/just-war-theory/) ### About the Author [Ryan Jenkins](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Jenkins) is an associate professor of philosophy and a senior fellow at the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo. He studies the ethics of emerging technologies, especially automation, cyber war, autonomous weapons, and driverless cars. His work has appeared in journals such as *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, and the *Journal of Military Ethics*, as well as public fora including *Slate* and *Forbes*. [calpoly.academia.edu/RyanJenkins](http://calpoly.academia.edu/RyanJenkins) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** Jenkins, justice, War --- ### [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/) **Published:** August 21, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay describes a leading approach to philosophical counseling, known as Logic-Based Therapy, that has been developed and used since the 1980s. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Categories: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/ "Philosophy of Mind and Language"), [Metaphilosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphilosophy/) Wordcount: 997 Everyone confronts questions about personal meaning and purpose, family and relationship conflicts, work-related frustrations, midlife crises, life-altering health problems, hard choices, and many more challenges in daily living. Can philosophy help with any of these issues? Advocates of “philosophical counseling” argue it can. Philosophical counseling is the application of philosophical methods, concepts, theories, arguments, and insights to concerns that are traditionally addressed by psychology-based counseling. This essay describes a leading approach to philosophical counseling, known as *Logic-Based Therapy* (LBT), that has been developed and used since the 1980s. [![Detail of "Victory Boogie Woogie" by Piet Mondrian. Oil and paper on canvas. 1944.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Mondrian.webp?resize=656%2C368&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Mondrian.webp?ssl=1)Detail of “Victory Boogie Woogie” by Piet Mondrian. Oil and paper on canvas. 1944.### 1. Understanding LBT LBT has six basic steps:[\[1\]](#_ftn1) 1. identifying the *reasoning* that is leading someone to feel a certain problematic way: what does the person *believe* that’s contributing to how they feel? This often involves identifying unstated assumptions that are essential to their reasoning; 2. evaluating the premises of that reasoning: are any false or unjustified beliefs leading to these unwanted feelings? 3. any problematic beliefs or inferences are identified, reflected on, and acknowledged as worthy of rejection; 4. for each problematic belief that’s identified, corresponding *better—*more reasonable, more justified, more likely to be true*—*beliefs to adopt are identified; 5. a plan is developed to help the person more fully accept these better beliefs and integrate them into their lives; 6. strategies are identified to maintain these better beliefs and their positive results: revising our beliefs often isn’t easy! LBT differs from more typical forms of psychotherapy with its emphasis on using logic to evaluate the arguments we accept. Traditional therapists *do* confront and challenge problematic beliefs and thought processes. LBT is unique in that it helps people do this using philosophical concepts such as valid and invalid argument patterns, counterexamples, consistency, logical fallacies, conceptual analysis, and other tools drawn from logic and critical thinking.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) LBT’s step (1) involves explicitly displaying the reasoning—the *argument*—that’s leading to the troubling feelings. LBT builds on the insight of the ancient Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, who observed that *beliefs* about events, not the events themselves, are what upset people.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) LBT holds that we often upset ourselves by accepting false or unreasonable premises that lead to our own depression, worry, anxiety, guilt, anger, and other forms of unhappiness. For example: 1. “*If* I have been rejected by my friends, *then* I must be worthless.” 2. “I have been rejected by my friends.” 3. “So, I must be worthless” (and so I feel worthless). From these premises, someone *deduces* their own worthlessness (“I *must* be worthess”) and so *feels* worthless and then may *act* like they are worthless (“What’s the point in trying? Nobody cares!”). Steps (2) through (4) involve identifying problematic reasoning and premises and finding better arguments to accept. About the example above, we can critique both premises: - first, *just because* some friends reject you does not mean that you are a worthless person. Those “friends” might be the problem: maybe they rejected you because *they* have bad values. Or maybe it’s just that “people change” and you all are no longer a good match. So premise A is likely false. - second, premise 2 might be false: what seems like rejection could be something that has nothing to do with you: maybe there’s been a misunderstanding. LBT diagnoses flawed reasoning via *types* of false or unjustified beliefs that tend to lead to negative personal consequences.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) People sometimes seem to accept beliefs that suggest that they are *demanding* that the world, or certain aspects of it, conform to some ideal of “perfection”: *if the world—other people’s behavior, my own behavior, etc.—does not fit some ideal, then it is awful!*[\[5\]](#_ftn5) An assumption that the world *must* be a certain way *or else* is common to many harmful ways of thinking: e.g., “If I don’t have the approval of others then I am unworthy,” “If I fail the exam then I’m a total idiot,” “If I have a problem then I *must* keep ruminating on it and can’t do anything else,” and so on. LBT helps people see these assumptions. Responding to such faulty premises often involves identifying beliefs that involve accepting reality as it is, despite its unavoidable imperfections: for example, “I am imperfect, I make mistakes, but I am still a good-enough person,” or “I would *prefer* this, but it doesn’t *have* to be that way: I can be OK without that,” and the like. LBT’s steps (5) and (6) involve adopting better ways of thinking that are more conducive to happiness, often with help from philosophical writings.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) For example: - feeling worthless? Learning how Kant argued that *all* people are of infinite worth might be uplifting;[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - unable to experience pleasure, or feeling guilty experiencing pleasure? Learning about utilitarianism, a happiness-focused ethics, may help;[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - treating yourself *unfairly*—e.g., not forgiving yourself for mistakes you would readily forgive others for? Learning about fairness, logical inconsistency, or exploring the philosophy of forgiveness might help;[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - feeling guilty for *not* believing something you (perhaps falsely) believe you *must* believe? Learning about skepticism can help;[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - feel “stuck” in life? You may be inspired by the existentialists’ insistence that we are always radically free to create new paths for ourselves;[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - have a personal moral dilemma? Learning how different ethical theories might apply to the issue can be illuminating;[\[12\]](#_ftn12) - think your life lacks meaning? Learning what philosophers have said about what might make life more meaningful can help you create or find meaning.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) For almost any personal issue, there are philosophical discussions that may help people. LBT encourages people to engage in relevant philosophical thinking to gain healthier belief systems and thus better lives. Traditional counselors are usually not aware of the many rich insights from philosophy that can be applied to life’s problems. ### 2. Conclusion Philosophical counseling is applicable to many challenges of everyday life, although there are limits in terms of the problems it can effectively address.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) When irrational beliefs lead to harmful, self-defeating results, and there is a need for guidance in seeking more life-affirming goals, philosophical counseling can be useful. We all need help sometimes, and philosophy, and philosophers, can provide helpful wisdom and compassionate support.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The presentation of the methods of LBT in this essay is both a reinterpretation of these methods and a simplification of a simplification. For an extended, but still brief, introduction, see Elliot Cohen’s (2014) “Logic-Based Therapy to Go: A Step-by-step Primer On How LBT Can Work For You” on his *What Would Aristotle Do?* blog at *Psychology Today.* For further discussions of LBT, see Cohen (2025) and other materials by Cohen in the “References” and “For Further Reading” sections. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For an introduction to some of these concepts, see [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores. Traditional therapists often focus on understanding a person’s formative relationships growing up and how that influences the person’s present outlook. LBT therapists are apt to be interested in understanding such relationships primarily for the purpose of understanding how someone’s upbringing has influenced which arguments the person accepts (and why), what beliefs they view as reasonable (and why), and thus what beliefs and assumptions might be influencing their emotional lives. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Epictetus writes: “Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things” (Enchiridion, §5). For an introduction to the philosophy of Stoicism, see [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) LBT identifies better and worse ways of thinking—in terms of how they affect our emotional lives—through a set of “cardinal fallacies” and their corresponding “transcendent” or guiding virtues. For a brief overview, see Elliot Cohen’s *Logic-Based Therapy to Go: A Step-by-Step Primer on How LBT Can Work for You* (2014). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For further discussion of common problematic beliefs that the world—or parts of it—must be “perfect” in various ways, see Cohen (2019), *Making Peace with Imperfection*. Psychologist Albert Ellis (1913–2007), who developed a form of psychotherapy called Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (a precursor to modern Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, *and a precursor to LBT*), described these as false and unreasonable “must” or “should” statements that people often accept. See his classic (originally 1961, 1997 3rd edition) *A Guide to Rational Living* and later writings. *Especially* recommended is Jeffrey Mishlove’s “Thinking Allowed” show video interview with Ellis, available on Youtube, “[Albert Ellis: A Guide to Rational Living – Thinking Allowed DVD w/ Jeffrey Mishlove](https://youtu.be/GyRE-78g_z0?si=Cv5KHfNpUu98J6cX).” [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) These steps involve, in some manner, engaging philosophy as *a way of life*: see [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr for an introduction to this concept and understanding of philosophy. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For an introduction to Kant’s philosophy and the idea that all people are infinitely valuable, see [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For an introduction to Utilitarianism and other philosophical theories of happiness, see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz, [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller, [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk, and [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For an introduction to an influential concept of fairness, see [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies: here some relevant questions are, “In these circumstances, are you treating yourself in ways that you would be OK treating others?” and “In these circumstances, would you be OK with someone being treated this way, *if you didn’t know who you were*?” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For an introduction to skepticism, see [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross. For applications when people disagree on important issues, see [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For introductions to existentialism, see [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.wordpress.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis and [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For an introduction to how to apply moral theories and other critical thinking concepts to real-world problems and issues, see [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For an introduction to philosophical reflections on the meaning of life, see [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) and [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/), both by Matthew Pianalto. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) There are limits to philosophical counseling: philosophical counselors must be prepared to refer clients to licensed mental health professionals when someone’s personal challenges are *not* based on poor reasoning or mistaken beliefs that are *correctable with reason and reflection*, but rather causes other than that, such as neurological or other medical or “organic” causes. For guidelines on the limits and boundaries of philosophical counseling, see the National Philosophical Counseling Association’s page “[Practice Areas/Boundaries](http://npcassoc.org/practice-areas-boundaries/).” [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For further discussion of the value of philosophical counseling, see Elliot Cohen’s (2019) “Did You Ever Consider Consulting a Philosopher? Some problems people have may be helped by consulting a professional philosopher” at his *What Would Aristotle Do?* blog on *Psychology Today*. ### References [Cohen, Elliot D. (Mar 19, 2014). “Logic-Based Therapy to Go: A step-by-step primer on how LBT can work for you” at h](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201403/logic-based-therapy-go)is [*What Would Aristotle Do?*](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201403/logic-based-therapy-go)[ blog on ](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201403/logic-based-therapy-go)[*Psychology Today*](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201403/logic-based-therapy-go)[. ](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201403/logic-based-therapy-go) [Cohen, Elliot D. (](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201903/did-you-ever-consider-consulting-philosopher)[Mar 23, 2019](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201903/did-you-ever-consider-consulting-philosopher)[). “Did You Ever Consider Consulting a Philosopher? Some problems people have may be helped by consulting a professional philosopher” at h](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201903/did-you-ever-consider-consulting-philosopher)is[*What Would Aristotle Do?*](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201903/did-you-ever-consider-consulting-philosopher)[ blog on ](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201903/did-you-ever-consider-consulting-philosopher)[*Psychology Today*](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201903/did-you-ever-consider-consulting-philosopher). [Cohen, Elliot D. (2019). ](https://www.newharbinger.com/making-peace-imperfection)[*Making Peace with Imperfection*](https://www.newharbinger.com/making-peace-imperfection)[ (New Harbinger). ](https://www.newharbinger.com/making-peace-imperfection) [Cohen, Elliot D. (2025). “The Psycholinguistics of Self-Talk in Logic-Based Therapy: Using a Toolbox of Philosophical Antidotes to Overcome Self-Destructive Speech Acts.” *Philosophies* 10, no. 2: 36. ](https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10020036) [Ellis, Albert. (1997). ](https://www.amazon.com/Guide-Rational-Living-Albert-Ellis/dp/0879800429/ref=sr_1_1?crid=191OFPUVC25S7&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.CeeIydNuEvAq2xJ23oKIqo2htssfsJiUuRfP5AOWRPTGjHj071QN20LucGBJIEps.svFLUpPsWh2DZdixBAgtKIwgEdhfnDWd49qNMcqQyR4&dib_tag=se&keywords=A+Guide+to+Rational+Living+3rd+edition&qid=1755533639&s=books&sprefix=a+guide+to+rational+living+3rd+edition%2Cstripbooks%2C133&sr=1-1)[*A Guide to Rational Living*](https://www.amazon.com/Guide-Rational-Living-Albert-Ellis/dp/0879800429/ref=sr_1_1?crid=191OFPUVC25S7&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.CeeIydNuEvAq2xJ23oKIqo2htssfsJiUuRfP5AOWRPTGjHj071QN20LucGBJIEps.svFLUpPsWh2DZdixBAgtKIwgEdhfnDWd49qNMcqQyR4&dib_tag=se&keywords=A+Guide+to+Rational+Living+3rd+edition&qid=1755533639&s=books&sprefix=a+guide+to+rational+living+3rd+edition%2Cstripbooks%2C133&sr=1-1)[, 3rd Edition. Wilshire Books.](https://www.amazon.com/Guide-Rational-Living-Albert-Ellis/dp/0879800429/ref=sr_1_1?crid=191OFPUVC25S7&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.CeeIydNuEvAq2xJ23oKIqo2htssfsJiUuRfP5AOWRPTGjHj071QN20LucGBJIEps.svFLUpPsWh2DZdixBAgtKIwgEdhfnDWd49qNMcqQyR4&dib_tag=se&keywords=A+Guide+to+Rational+Living+3rd+edition&qid=1755533639&s=books&sprefix=a+guide+to+rational+living+3rd+edition%2Cstripbooks%2C133&sr=1-1) [Ellis, Albert. (no date). Interview: “Albert Ellis: A Guide to Rational Living – Thinking Allowed DVD w/ Jeffrey Mishlove.” YouTube. ](https://youtu.be/GyRE-78g_z0?si=Cv5KHfNpUu98J6cX) [Epictetus. (ca. 125 CE). ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45109/45109-h/45109-h.htm)[*The Enchiridion*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45109/45109-h/45109-h.htm)[. (E. Carter, Translator, 1916). Project Gutenberg. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45109/45109-h/45109-h.htm) ### For Further Reading [Cohen, Elliot D. (2003) ](https://www.amazon.com/Would-Aristotle-Self-Control-Through-Reason/dp/1591020700/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1529681375&sr=1-1&keywords=What+Would+Aristotle+Do%3F%3A+Self-Control+Through+the+Power+of+Reason)[*What Would Aristotle Do?: Self-Control Through the Power of Reason* ](https://www.amazon.com/Would-Aristotle-Self-Control-Through-Reason/dp/1591020700/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1529681375&sr=1-1&keywords=What+Would+Aristotle+Do%3F%3A+Self-Control+Through+the+Power+of+Reason)[(Prometheus). ](https://www.amazon.com/Would-Aristotle-Self-Control-Through-Reason/dp/1591020700/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1529681375&sr=1-1&keywords=What+Would+Aristotle+Do%3F%3A+Self-Control+Through+the+Power+of+Reason) [Cohen, Elliot D. (2006). ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/new-rational-therapy-9798765186466/)[*The New Rational Therapy*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/new-rational-therapy-9798765186466/)[ (Rowman & Littlefield).](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/new-rational-therapy-9798765186466/) [Cohen, Elliot D. (2016). ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/logicbased-therapy-and-everyday-emotions-9781498510479/)[*Logic-Based Therapy and Everyday Emotions*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/logicbased-therapy-and-everyday-emotions-9781498510479/)[ (Lexington Books).](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/logicbased-therapy-and-everyday-emotions-9781498510479/) [Cohen, Elliot D.; Zinaich Jr., Samuel; Chaukar, Himani; Lobont, Florin (eds.). (2024). ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/logicbased-therapy-and-consultation-9781666954982/)[*Logic-Based Therapy and Consultation: Theory and Applications*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/logicbased-therapy-and-consultation-9781666954982/)[. Bloomsbury. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/logicbased-therapy-and-consultation-9781666954982/) [Goldhill, Olivia. (July 21, 2022). ](https://qz.com/804534/is-philosophical-counseling-the-new-therapy)[“](https://qz.com/804534/is-philosophical-counseling-the-new-therapy)[Would you ditch your therapist for a ‘philosophical counselor’?” ](https://qz.com/804534/is-philosophical-counseling-the-new-therapy)[*Quartz*](https://qz.com/804534/is-philosophical-counseling-the-new-therapy)[.](https://qz.com/804534/is-philosophical-counseling-the-new-therapy) [Logic-Based Therapy & Consultation Institute. (2025). “Guiding Virtues, Cardinal Fallacies, and Their Philosophical Antidotes.”](https://www.philosophicalpractice.net/philosophical-antidotes/about-philosophical-antidotes) [Love, Shayla. (October 20, 2021). “The Philosopher Will See You Now.” ](https://www.vice.com/en/article/why-some-people-are-talking-to-philosophers-instead-of-therapists/)[*Vice*](https://www.vice.com/en/article/why-some-people-are-talking-to-philosophers-instead-of-therapists/)[. ](https://www.vice.com/en/article/why-some-people-are-talking-to-philosophers-instead-of-therapists/) ### Additional Resource [National Philosophical Counseling Association ](https://npcassoc.org/) ### Related Essays [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.wordpress.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores. [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale ### Acknowledgements Nathan Nobis is grateful to Elliot Cohen for his comments and suggestions on this essay, especially since it offers an interpretation or presentation of LBT that is more general and less specific than Cohen’s: for example, Cohen describes what is here presented as a general category of “better beliefs” in terms of “guiding virtues” and “philosophical antidotes.” See, for example, the Logic-Based Therapy & Consultation Institute’s (2025) “Guiding Virtues, Cardinal Fallacies, and Their Philosophical Antidotes” in the For Further Reading above. ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/felsefi-rehberlik-hayatin-zorluklariyla-basa-cikmak-icin-felsefeyi-kullanmak-nathan-nobis/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Philosophical-Counseling.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is co-author of [*Thinking Critically About Abortion*](http://www.abortionarguments.com/), author of [*Animals & Ethics 101*](http://www.animalethics101.com/), and the author and co-author of many other writings and materials in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Logic & Reasoning, Metaphilosophy, Mind & Language, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** elliot cohen, elliot d. cohen, logic-based therapy, Logic-Based Therapy & Consultation Institute., National Philosophical Counseling Association, Nobis, philosophical counseling, philosophical practice --- ### [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) **Published:** November 5, 2015 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** Ethical realists say that ethical claims such as these are objectively true: their truth does not depend on anyone’s particular opinions, beliefs, preferences, or characteristics. But what are the good reasons for accepting ethical realism? **Content:** Author: [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/)[](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science")Word Count: 1000 ‘Happiness is good.’ ‘We shouldn’t punish innocents.’ ‘Generosity is a good character trait.’[1](#_ftn1) *Ethical realists* say that ethical claims such as these are *objectively true*: their truth does not depend on anyone’s particular opinions, beliefs, preferences, or characteristics. That is, realists believe that there are *right answers* in ethics. They reject *relativism*, according to which there are only *non-objective* ethical facts, and they reject *nihilism*, according to which there are *no* ethical facts (a theory sometimes called ‘error theory’),[2](#_ftn2) and maybe even no ethical *assertions* of any kind (a theory sometimes called ‘non-cognitivism’).[3](#_ftn3) This essay reviews several reasons in favor of ethical realism and then responds to some famous criticisms of the position. ![Honhorst - The Concert](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/honthorst_lg.jpg?resize=656%2C587&ssl=1) ### 1. In Favor of Ethical Realism Ethical realism was more-or-less taken for granted throughout most of the history of philosophy.[4](#_ftn4) Today, most experts agree that it’s true.[5](#_ftn5) Consider three types of argument for realism. #### A. Common Sense or Intuition It seems to lots of us as if *suffering is bad*; the claim is obvious, plausible, commonsensical, and self-evident.[6](#_ftn6) Arguably, everyone at-least-tacitly considers appearances to be evidence.[7](#_ftn7) Similarly, it seems as if stealing is wrong, even if you *like* to steal, and even if you trick someone into *believing that* stealing isn’t wrong. So there’s plenty of intuitive evidence that these ethical truths are objective: their truth doesn’t vary based on any particular person’s situation or preferences. #### B. Ethical Normativity and Epistemic Normativity If you think that moral facts are suspect in some way, then you might have to worry that facts about *evidence* are suspect for analogous reasons. There’s a similarity between moral claims, about what we *ought* to do from the perspective of morality, and epistemological claims, about what we *ought* to do from the perspective of knowledge and evidence.[8](#_ftn8) Both seem *normative*: they’re telling us that some course of action or belief is the *correct* one, or *better* than others, or that there is *good* evidence for something. Therefore, arguments that target normativity in general may undermine themselves. They may apply just as well, or better, to the idea that some or theories are simply more objectively rational or justified or supported-by-the-evidence than other theories.[9](#_ftn9) And so if you reject normativity, you’re rejecting the idea that your own position is justified. #### C. Indispensability Arguably, much of our discourse is committed to the existence of genuinely normative properties and facts. Compare the case of mathematics, which might be a discourse about abstract objects that don’t clearly have any direct causal contact with people’s minds. Mathematicians continue to make progress and devise theories that can be applied to many particular projects. Maybe mathematicians are talking about nonexistent objects—numbers—and somehow, coincidentally, all this talk has paid off. But maybe mathematics is so successful because it’s making *true* statements about numbers. Similarly, much of our discourse seems to assume the existence of ethical truths, and maybe the best explanation for this fact is that some of these truths really exist.[10](#_ftn10) ### 2. Defending Realism Ethical realism inspires many counter-arguments. We have space to survey three.[11](#_ftn11) Throughout, we should continually consider a general reply that Moorean[12](#_ftn12) realists have offered: that any argument against ethical realism, in order to justify us in rejecting the claim (e.g.) ‘you shouldn’t kill every living thing in the world, even if you want to,’ will have to be such that *all* of its premises have more overall-evidence than ‘you shouldn’t kill everyone in the world, even if you want to.’ One might offer this Moore-Bambrough-Huemer-style[13](#_ftn13) response to each of the three anti-realist arguments, but I’ll also gesture at other objections. #### A. Strangeness ‘Ethical properties would be strange.’[14](#_ftn14) Objections: It’s not clear what strangeness is, why it should matter (given how many other things are strange),[15](#_ftn15) nor why ethical properties would be strange; indeed, goodness and badness seem normal and familiar. #### B. Disagreement ‘There’s too much disagreement about ethics for there to be facts about it.’[16](#_ftn16) Objections: Many apparently ethical disagreements are merely descriptive disagreements in disguise;[17](#_ftn17) just because people disagree about something, that doesn’t normally mean there’s no *fact* of the matter (compare the disagreement about whether Earth is the center of the Solar System)[18](#_ftn18); and such arguments run the risk of generalizing too far.[19](#_ftn19) #### C. Evolutionary Debunking ‘Our ethical intuitions are the product of evolution, and are therefore *a priori* unlikely to produce true beliefs.’[20](#_ftn20) Objections: If commonsense morality is true, then we should expect a reliable faculty of moral knowledge to be *adaptive*; thus the debunker at least can’t assume that accurate moral beliefs are non-adaptive.[21](#_ftn21) In addition, if moral truths are known through reason,[22](#_ftn22) then it’s to be expected that we would have the ability to learn these truths, even if it wasn’t adaptive; compare calculus, which didn’t help our ancestors survive. This argument, like others, may also prove too much.[23](#_ftn23) #### D. A Note on Epistemic Justification As noted, all three of these objections can also be seen to inspire arguments targeting epistemic justification in general,[24](#_ftn24) with the consequence that the objector must admit that her position is no more justified than its denial. And as the Moorean will argue, if, for each anti-realist argument, we are *more* justified in affirming ‘You shouldn’t kill everyone in the world, even if you want to,’ then we are arguably justified in putting more confidence in ethical realism than in nihilism. ### 3. Conclusion: Naturalism and Non-Naturalism Even if we agree with most historical and contemporary philosophers that ethical realism is true, we face one more very important question: Are these truths natural, physical, or merely-descriptive facts, such as facts about pleasure or survival? *Naturalists* say ‘yes.’ Or are these truths (instead) irreducibly, inherently normative? *Non-naturalist* or *robust* realists take this option. This is a complicated topic and an area of a great deal of contemporary research.[25](#_ftn25) For now, simply note that most naturalists concede that ethical facts aren’t conceptually *definable* as descriptive facts, but add that these facts are nevertheless identical to descriptive facts, perhaps like how water is H2O, even though people once knew about water without defining it as H2O.[26](#_ftn26) This form of naturalism—*ontological* or *synthetic* naturalism—is the most popular form today.[27](#_ftn27) But both naturalists and non-naturalists are, once again, realists: they hold that there are right answers in ethics. ### Notes [1](#_ftnref1) Perhaps these claims are strictly true only when there are ‘in general,’ ‘*ceteris paribus*,’ (meaning: everything else being equal) and other, similar conditions attached. [2](#_ftnref2) For more, see Mackie 1977 and Olson 2014. Also, see [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/ "Moral Error Theory") by Ian Tully. [3](#_ftnref3) For more, see Ayer 1952: 102 ff and Gibbard 1990. Also, see [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco. [4](#_ftnref4) It’s rare, until the Twentieth Century, to find philosophers seriously defending anything other than realism. The debate itself may go back to Plato (1888 \[–370\]: Bk. I). A possible exception is Hume (2000 \[1738\]: 301), although there is substantial debate about what his metaethical position was, and he seems to have thought far more about the epistemology and psychology of moral belief than about the existence of moral facts; cf. Cohon 2015. [5](#_ftnref5) Most metaethicists “accept or lean toward” realism; see Bourget and Chalmers 2014. [6](#_ftnref6) Robert Audi (2004) and Michael Huemer (2005) defend ethical intuitionism. Similarly, Renford Bambrough (1969) appeals to common sense and Russ Shafer-Landau (2003) to self-evidence. [7](#_ftnref7) See Huemer 2001: ch. 5. [8](#_ftnref8) See for example Cuneo 2007. [9](#_ftnref9) There may also be important and interesting similarities between instrumental and moral claims, providing yet another argument for ethical realism; here, see Huemer 2013. [10](#_ftnref10) Enoch 2011. Wedgwood 2007 may also be interpreted in a roughly similar way. See also Cuneo 2014. One might see Suikkanen’s (2013) argument as making a similar point. [11](#_ftnref11) For reasons of space, we’re setting aside relativism (but see [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis for an introduction to that theory). But some of these replies work well against relativism too. One might just recast some of these statements to contain denials of relativism. Also, one sort of argument that didn’t make the cut here is the claim that ethical properties or facts would add too much to our ontology. For example, Ruse 1986: ch. 3; Olson 2014: 147 ff. Such arguments are often presented along with an evolutionary-debunking story; see below. In response, of course, it’s not clear why we should think parsimony matters here; Cf. Huemer 2009; Sober 2009. [12](#_ftnref12) See Moore (1939: 166). [13](#_ftnref13) Again, see Bambrough 1969 and Huemer 2005: 115. For a reply to this strategy, see Olson 2014: ch. 7. In reply, the realist will argue that Olson has misunderstood or failed to take seriously the Moorean argument’s force, because he has appealed to highly controversial debunking-hypotheses in order to reject overwhelmingly commonsensical claims. [14](#_ftnref14) They might be strange in several ways: metaphysically (Mackie 1977: 38-40), epistemologically (Mackie 1977: 38-41), or in terms of motivation (Mackie 1977: 40; Joyce 2001: 37-42; Olson 2014: ch. 6). [15](#_ftnref15) Such as quantum-mechanical phenomena (Albert 1992), numbers (if they exist), duck-billed platypuses, and so on. [16](#_ftnref16) Mackie 1946. [17](#_ftnref17) Cf. Rachels 1999: § 5; Huemer 2005: 134-40. [18](#_ftnref18) Huemer 2005: 128-31. [19](#_ftnref19) Decker and Groll 2013. [20](#_ftnref20) Street 2006. Notably, we’re talking about non-skeptical realism now, not just realism *per se*. Street intends her argument most centrally to challenge our ethical knowledge, not the existence of ethical facts in general. See also Joyce 2006. [21](#_ftnref21) Enoch 2011: 167 ff. [22](#_ftnref22) Huemer 2005: 215. [23](#_ftnref23) Vavova 2014. [24](#_ftnref24) Again, Cuneo 2007. [25](#_ftnref25) Here, see e.g. Lenman 2015 for elaboration. See also Moore 1903: § 13 for an argument that ethical terms aren’t intensionally, conceptually definable as merely descriptive terms. [26](#_ftnref26) It’s not obvious how to show that ethical facts are nevertheless identical to descriptive facts. Perhaps we discovered that goodness is pleasurableness the same way—empirically—that we discovered that water is H2O: we can electrolyze water and see that it’s H2O. But how could we “electrolyze” goodness and “see” that it’s pleasurableness? See e.g. Huemer 2005: 84 ff. for elaboration of this sort of argument. [27](#_ftnref27) Some versions of this form are called ‘Cornell realism.’ See e.g. Brink 1989 and Lenman 2015: § 4.2. ### References [Albert, David Z. 1992. *Quantum Mechanics and Experience*. 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Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Error-Theory-History-Critique/dp/0198701934/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1440302952&sr=8-1&keywords=Moral+Error+Theory%3A+History%2C+Critique%2C+Defence&pebp=1440302956131&perid=0WE22EPN9KCHEXMMBHDV) [Plato. 1888 \[–370\]. *Republic*. Tr. Benjamin Jowett. Oxford: Clarendon Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Republic-Plato-B-Jowett/dp/B0010Y32NM/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1440303010&sr=8-1&keywords=Jowett+republic+clarendon) [Ruse, Michael. *Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.](http://www.amazon.com/Taking-Darwin-Seriously-Naturalistic-Philosophy/dp/1573922420/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1440303042&sr=8-1&keywords=Taking+Darwin+Seriously%3A+A+Naturalistic+Approach+to+Philosophy&pebp=1440303045275&perid=0A750F4RRFHGSCB92C9V) [Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. *Moral Realism: A Defence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Realism-Defence-Russ-Shafer-Landau/dp/0199280207/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1440303068&sr=8-1&keywords=Moral+Realism%3A+A+Defence&pebp=1440303070149&perid=04S6PDQ0NG7YRHE3TTAN) [Sober, Eliot. 2009. “Parsimony Arguments in Science and Philosophy—A Test Case for Naturalism.” *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 83 (2): 117-55.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/25656206) [Street, Sharon. 2006. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” *Philosophical Studies* 127 (1): 109-66.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-005-1726-6?LI=true) [Suikkanen, Jussi. 2013. “Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem.” In Russ-Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 168-94.](http://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Studies-Metaethics-Russ-Shafer-Landau/dp/0199678049/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1440303263&sr=8-1&keywords=oxford+studies+in+metaethics+8) [Vavova, Katia. 2014. “Debunking Evolutionary Debunking.” In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 9* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 76-101.](http://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Studies-Metaethics-Russ-Shafer-Landau/dp/0198709307/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1440303285&sr=8-1&keywords=oxford+studies+in+metaethics+9&pebp=1440303288172&perid=16FGGJ66BEY27K4M9D2M) [Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007. *The Nature of Normativity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Nature-Normativity-Ralph-Wedgwood/dp/0199568197/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1440303334&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Nature+of+Normativity.) ### Related Essays [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/ "Moral Error Theory") by Ian Tully [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk [Philosophy and its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/)[ by Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/ethical-realism/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ethical-realism.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** ethical realsim, meta-ethics, metcalf, moral realism --- ### [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) **Published:** May 14, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What if you could steal, cheat, and violate any other moral norm without fear of punishment? Would you still have reason to do what’s right? The ancient Greek philosopher Plato (427—347 B.C.E.) considered this question in his dialogue, the Republic, which offers a blueprint for an ideal society. Plato thinks that you should do what’s right, even in these circumstances. This essay explains one of the strongest objections to his position. **Content:** Author: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word count: 995 What if you could steal, cheat, and violate any other moral norm without fear of punishment? Would you still have reason to do what’s right? The ancient Greek philosopher Plato (427—347 B.C.E.) considered this question in his dialogue, the *Republic*, which offers a blueprint for an ideal society. Plato thinks that you should do what’s right, even in these circumstances. This essay explains one of the strongest objections to his position. [![The Ring of Gyges.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ring-of-gyges-plato.png?resize=640%2C409&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ring-of-gyges-plato.png?ssl=1) The Ring of Gyges.### 1. A Conversation about Justice In the *Republic*, at the opening of Book 2, Plato’s teacher, Socrates, and brother, Glaucon, are discussing justice, though much of what they say in the ensuing conversation applies to ethics in general. Socrates says justice is both good in itself and good as a means to other good things such as individual security and prosperity.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Glaucon is inclined to agree, but he wants Socrates to prove it. So Glaucon plays the devil’s advocate. Socrates, who isn’t known for passing up opportunities to debate, agrees to hear Glaucon out. Glaucon sketches a philosophy of justice—which philosophers now call “contractarianism”—that’s at odds with Socrates’ view.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) On this view, what’s *ideal* is to be able to commit injustice without getting caught or punished, and without having to worry that others might do the same to you. The problem though is that if there weren’t enforced rules against injustices, no one would be safe from the wrongdoing of others. It’s to everyone’s advantage, therefore, to have fair rules. That, however, doesn’t mean that justice is *good in itself*, only that it’s useful for protecting things we really care about. ### 2. Glaucon’s Challenge To motivate his view, Glaucon introduces the “Ring of Gyges” thought experiment: A man named Gyges is a humble shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia. One day, an earthquake opens a hole in the ground where he’s tending his flock. He descends into it to find, among other strange things, a ring, which Gyges takes and puts on. Later, at a shepherd’s meeting, Gyges discovers that when he turns the ring toward the inside of his hand, others can’t see him. He’s invisible! Gyges, realizing this, gets up to some really bad stuff. He finds an excuse to deliver a message to the court, then seduces the queen. The two of them conspire to murder the king to whom Gyges has sworn loyalty, and Gyges takes his place as ruler. Many have noted the similarity between this story and J.R.R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) But unlike the ring in that fantasy epic, Gyges’ ring has no special power over the wearer. The ring doesn’t corrupt Gyges; it reveals *what he was all along:* someone who only ever restrained himself out of fear of punishment. Glaucon thinks that this thought experiment exposes human nature generally. we’d all act like Gyges—stealing, murdering and raping according to our fancies—if we could get away with it. ### 3. The Argument What does this psychological speculation have to do with justice? Glaucon’s argument seems to go something like this: The only evidence we could have that justice, or anything, is valuable in itself is that it seems good *even when* there are no other goods that come along with it. But when we isolate justice from goods like being thought well of by others, it no longer seems good to us. The good things that justice (usually) brings fully explain our belief that justice is good. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that justice is more than instrumentally valuable. Glaucon has one more twist to add: Imagine a perfectly unjust person and a perfectly just person whose normal fates are reversed. Perhaps Gyges frames someone else for his misdeeds. That innocent person is then tortured and executed for crimes he didn’t commit, while Gyges relishes all the advantages of a good reputation. Surely, no one would prefer to be this hapless just person when they could be Gyges instead! Just as the moon doesn’t shine by its own light, justice only seems bright, so to speak, because of the goods it helps us (individually) to obtain. Valuing justice when it doesn’t get us those things is like valuing money that has no purchasing power. ### 4. Criticism Does this argument succeed in showing that justice isn’t good in itself? There’s room for doubt. It’s unclear whether Glaucon is really so cynical about humanity. Regardless, he’s overstating things. True, most people would cross some moral lines if they had the ring—there’s surely some politician you’d be sorely tempted to punch. But we wouldn’t all act like psychopaths. Presumably, some people would even use the ring to do good, like superheroes. Humans are self-interested, but most people also care about others to some degree. It’s true that not many would prefer to be punished as a just person rather than rewarded as an unjust person. That could show any number of things. It might show, as Glaucon implies, that we don’t always have the most reason to be just. Even if that’s right, it’s compatible with thinking that justice is valuable in itself, though our reasons for doing the just thing can sometimes be overruled by countervailing reasons. But it might also show that it can be extremely difficult to do what we should do. ### 5. Conclusion: Plato’s Reply to Glaucon The rest of the *Republic* constitutes Plato’s extended reply to Glaucon. In a nutshell, Plato agrees that we ought to do what’s in our own best interests, but insists that it’s ultimately always in our interest to do what’s just, or right, because wrongdoing damages our souls, or characters as persons. Plato also defends this idea in an earlier dialogue, *Gorgias*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Some have thought that there’s no ultimate answer to the question of what we ought to do when our reasons of self-interest and moral duties conflict.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The intuitive possibility of a rational person who doesn’t care about morality continues to make the question “why be moral?” a pressing philosophical topic. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [Plato, ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm)[*Republic*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm)[. Trans. by Benjamin Jowett. The Project Gutenberg eBook.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For an introduction to views similar to contractualism, see David Antonini’s [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) and Daniel Weltman’s [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [Tolkien, J.R.R. ](https://www.tolkienbooks.us/lotr/us/mmpb/bb1965/green-slipcase-1965)[*Lord of the Rings*](https://www.tolkienbooks.us/lotr/us/mmpb/bb1965/green-slipcase-1965)[, with a new forward by the author. New York: Ballantine Books, 1965. ](https://www.tolkienbooks.us/lotr/us/mmpb/bb1965/green-slipcase-1965) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) [Plato, ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm)[*Gorgias*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm)[. Trans. by Benjamin Jowett. The Project Gutenberg eBook.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) 19th Century British utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick famously thought that the perspectives of self-interest (“egoism”) and impartial morality couldn’t be reconciled, so that whenever our duties of self-interest and moral duty conflict, there’s no one thing that we ought to do *all things considered*. ([Sidgwick, Henry. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm)[*The Methods of Ethics*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm)[, 7th ed. London: MacMillan and Co. LTD, 1963, 508](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm)). David Copp argues that this is precisely the lesson that we should take from the tale about Gyges. (See [Copp, David](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/ring-of-gyges-overridingness-and-the-unity-of-reason/633A129111BA803417B23F66C8AE8AA3)[ “The ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the unity of reason,” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/ring-of-gyges-overridingness-and-the-unity-of-reason/633A129111BA803417B23F66C8AE8AA3)[*Social Philosophy and Policy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/ring-of-gyges-overridingness-and-the-unity-of-reason/633A129111BA803417B23F66C8AE8AA3)[ 14 (1) (1997): 86-106](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/ring-of-gyges-overridingness-and-the-unity-of-reason/633A129111BA803417B23F66C8AE8AA3).) ### References [Copp, David “The ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the unity of reason,” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/ring-of-gyges-overridingness-and-the-unity-of-reason/633A129111BA803417B23F66C8AE8AA3)[*Social Philosophy and Policy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/ring-of-gyges-overridingness-and-the-unity-of-reason/633A129111BA803417B23F66C8AE8AA3)[ 14 (1) (1997): 86-106](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/ring-of-gyges-overridingness-and-the-unity-of-reason/633A129111BA803417B23F66C8AE8AA3). [Plato, ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm)[*Gorgias*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm)[. Trans. by Benjamin Jowett. The Project Gutenberg eBook.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm) [Plato, ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm)[*Republic*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm)[. Trans. by Benjamin Jowett. The Project Gutenberg eBook.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1497/1497-h/1497-h.htm) [Sidgwick, Henry. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm)[*The Methods of Ethics*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm)[, 7th ed. London: MacMillan and Co., LTD, 1963](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm) [Tolkien, J.R.R. ](https://www.tolkienbooks.us/lotr/us/mmpb/bb1965/green-slipcase-1965)[*Lord of the Rings*](https://www.tolkienbooks.us/lotr/us/mmpb/bb1965/green-slipcase-1965)[, with a new forward by the author. New York: Ballantine Books, 1965. ](https://www.tolkienbooks.us/lotr/us/mmpb/bb1965/green-slipcase-1965) ### Related Essays [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [Practical Reasons](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/20/practical-reasons/) by Shane Gronholz [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins ### Translations [Turkish](https://medium.com/@hacettepefelsefe/%C3%A7eviri-neden-ahlaki-olsun-platonun-gyges-in-y%C3%BCz%C3%BC%C4%9F%C3%BC-d%C3%BC%C5%9F%C3%BCnce-deneyi-spencer-case-c8a08fdba5f3), [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/nicin-ahlakli-olmaliyiz-platonun-gygesin-yuzugu-dusunce-deneyi-spencer-case/), [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/platos-ring-of-gyges/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/why-be-moral-platos-ring-of-gyges.pdf). ### About the Author [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) has a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder, where he is currently a lecturer. He hosts [*Micro-Digressions: A Philosophy Podcast*](https://www.buzzsprout.com/956725) and does a lot of writing, academic and otherwise. [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](http://www.spencercasephilosophy.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** Glaucon, Plato, Ring of Gyges, Socrates, Why be moral? --- ### [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) **Published:** February 2, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The ethical theory known as ethical egoism states that we are always morally required to do what’s in our own self-interest: the view is sometimes called an “ethics of selfishness.” This essay introduces ethical egoism. This essay explores ethical egoism and the main arguments for and against it. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 999 Selfishness is often considered a vice and selfish actions are often judged to be wrong. But sometimes we ought to do what’s best for ourselves: in a sense, we sometimes *should* be selfish. The ethical theory known as *ethical egoism* states that we are always morally required to do what’s in our own self-interest. The view isn’t that we *are* selfish—this is *psychological egoism*[\[1\]](#_ftn1)—but that we *ought* to be. This essay explores ethical egoism and the main arguments for and against it. ![Narcissus](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/echo-and-narcissus-copy.jpg?resize=656%2C399&ssl=1) Narcissus### 1. Understanding Egoism Selfish people often have nasty dispositions towards other people, but ethical egoism generally discourages that: such selfishness is rarely to our advantage, especially in the long run. And egoism does not suggest that we never help others: egoists might be quite generous. Egoism does entail, however, that what *makes* acting like this right, when it is right, is that it’s for our own benefit: it makes us better off. So, if you *must* help someone else, this is *only because* doing so would be good for you; and if you should refrain from harming someone that’s also *only because* doing so is for your benefit. ### 2. Why Egoism? #### 2.1. Individuals Know Themselves Best Some egoists argue that, since we each know our own wants and needs best, everyone should focus on themselves: people meddling in other people’s lives tend to go badly. #### 2.2. The Unique Value of Your Own Life Also, some claim that egoism uniquely recognizes the value of individuals’ lives and goals. Other ethical theories can require altruistic sacrifices of your interests for the sake of other people or abstract standards, whereas egoists maintain that each person has their own life to live *for themselves*, not anyone or anything else.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) #### 2.3. Egoism’s Explanation of Right and Wrong Finally, some egoists argue that their theory best explains what *makes* wrong actions wrong and right actions right. Kantians say it’s whether anyone is used as a “mere means”; consequentialists say it’s an action’s consequences; egoists say it’s really how someone’s actions impact their self-interest.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Let’s respond to these arguments by reviewing some objections. ### 3. Why Not Egoism? #### 3.1. Egoism and What’s Good for Everyone First, in response to the claim that egoism is desirable because everyone adopting it would be good for all, we should notice that this isn’t an *egoistic* argument since the motivating concern is *everyone’s* interests, which aren’t important if egoism is true: only *you* should matter to you. And are we really *always* “meddling” with people when we help them—say by trying to help feed people who are starving to death or are living in dire poverty—as some egoists say we are? #### 3.2. Egoism and Contradictions One objection assumes that ethical theories should help resolve conflicts: e.g., for consequentialists, who should win a presidential election? Whoever will produce the best consequences as president. Egoists, however, say that each candidate should do what’s in their best self-interest, which is winning the election. But, critics argue, they can’t both win, so egoism requires the impossible, so it can’t be correct.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Egoists might respond that not everyone can do what’s right: if you win, you do what’s right; if you lose, you’ve done wrong. They can also use this objection to refine egoism: you must *try* to do what’s best for you, not necessarily achieve that. Actual success is often difficult, but everyone can try. #### 3.3. Egoism and Wronging Others for Your Own Gain Another objection takes us to the heart of the matter. Imagine this: Your credit card bill is due tonight, but you won’t be able to pay the full amount until next month, so you will be charged interest and a late fee. You just saw someone, however, accidentally leave their wallet on a park bench with *a lot* of cash hanging out of it. You saw where they went, but you could take the cash to pay the bill and *nobody* would ever know. Also, you know of an elderly person who always carries a lot of cash on their evening walk. You know you could rob them, pay your bill, *certainly* never get caught and then buy dinner at a fancy restaurant. If ethical egoism is true, not only *can* you permissibly take the wallet and rob someone, you *must*: *not* doing so would be wrong, since these crimes are in your self-interest. (If you’d feel guilty doing this, egoists respond that you shouldn’t since you’ve done nothing wrong on their view.) Many believe that, since actions like these are clearly wrong, this shows that egoism is false and the argument at 2.3 fails: egoism does *not* best explain our moral obligations *even if* we sometimes must do what’s best for ourselves. An egoist might respond that we are just *assuming* their theory is false: they don’t agree that we shouldn’t steal the wallet and refrain from assault.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) But we aren’t “assuming” anything: we just have better reason to believe that *assault for personal gain is wrong* than that *egoism is true*. Recall that racists and sexists do not agree that their forms of discrimination are wrong either, but this doesn’t *justify* racism or sexism. People sometimes hold false moral views; this might be true of egoists. #### 3.4. Egoism and Discrimination Finally, racists and sexists think that people of their group are entitled to special benefits and are even justified in harming people not of their group. Egoists think something similar, but about *themselves*: harms they allow for and inflict on other people just don’t matter. But is there anything *about* one’s race or sex or oneself that justifies treating others badly? No, so egoism is a form of prejudice, in favor of your own group of one, *you*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This objection agrees with the argument at 2.2, that everyone *does* have their own life, but corrects it with the fact that *everyone’s* life matters, not just the egoist’s. ### 4. Conclusion Doing what’s right *is* sometimes in our self-interest. If the above discussion is correct, though, that an action benefits us is never the sole reason it is right. And, more importantly, if an action is *not* in our own self-interest, we might be obligated to do it, nevertheless.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) There are other arguments about egoism. Reviewing them might be in our self-interest. Should we? ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Psychological egoism presents itself as an empirical, scientific, observational, or descriptive claim about our motives: *everything we do is an attempt to make ourselves better off*. The problem though is that there is no good scientific evidence for this claim. We are *sometimes* selfish, or seek our own best interest, but what kind of observations could show that we are *always* selfish? Our many motives have never been adequately examined to conclude anything like that: furthermore, it’s often hard to conclusively determine what anyone’s motives are, especially since motives are often mixed. Advocates of psychological egoism simply don’t have any such evidence, and perhaps couldn’t have such evidence, so the view is usually proposed as a kind of dogma or unsupported hypothesis, and so should not be accepted. It’s worthwhile, however, to note that if *psychological* egoism were true (and we always did what we believe to be in our own interest), *and* ethical egoism were true (and so we must do what’s in our best self-interest, or try), then we would always do what’s right and could do no wrong we would always do what’s in our best self-interest. Since it seems clear that we don’t always do what’s right, or even try, at least one of these theories is false, if not both. Also, if psychological egoism were true, then, since most other ethical theories require some altruism (that is, actions that benefit others, for their own sake), these other theories demand the impossible. And since some of us sometimes seem to be altruistic, psychological egoism seems to be false. Furthermore, since ethical egoists advise making choices that benefit ourselves, that acknowledges that we might fail at doing that, and not even try, which suggests that even ethical egoists recognize that psychological egoism is false. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For a presentation of this and related concerns, see Rand (1964). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For an introduction to these theories, see [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman and [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For a presentation of this and related arguments, see Baier (1973). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Egoists might consider this a “question-begging” response to their theory. To “beg the question” is to offer an argument that in some way assumes the conclusion of the argument as a premise: it’s a type of circular reasoning. So here the charge is that this response *assumes* that egoism is false in arguing that egoism is false. In the main text of this essay, I respond to this charge and explain why this argument against egoism is not question-begging. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) This argument was developed by [James Rachels](http://www.jamesrachels.org/) (1941-2003). For its most recent presentation, see Rachels and Rachels (2019). Also see [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson. Beyond racism and sexism, another *potential* form of discrimination that can be compared and contrasted with egoism is “speciesism”: see [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe for discussion. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Related, but more subtle ethical questions, beyond the egoism-inspired question of whether others’ interests must be given *any* moral consideration or moral weight, are whether, and to what extent, we can ever be justifiably “partial” to anyone’s interests: e.g., can I permissibly act in ways that favor the interests of my family and loved ones, over the interests of, say, strangers? For an introduction to these questions, see [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/ "(Im)partiality") by Shane Gronholz. ### References [Baier, Kurt. “Ethical Egoism and Interpersonal Compatibility.” ](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318804)[*Philosophical Studies*](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318804)[, vol. 24, no. 6, 1973, pp. 357–368](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318804). [Rand, Ayn. ](https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Selfishness-Fiftieth-Anniversary/dp/0451163931)[*The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism*](https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Selfishness-Fiftieth-Anniversary/dp/0451163931)[. New York: New American Library,](https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Selfishness-Fiftieth-Anniversary/dp/0451163931) [1964.](https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Selfishness-Fiftieth-Anniversary/dp/0451163931) [Rachels, James and Rachels, Stuart. ](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/1259914259.toc.html)[*The Elements of Moral Philosophy*](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/1259914259.toc.html)[, 9th Edition (1986, 1st edition). Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2019.](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/1259914259.toc.html) ### For Further Reading [Shaver, Robert, “Egoism”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism)[(Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism) [Moseley, Alexander, “Egoism,” the ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/egoism/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.iep.utm.edu/egoism/)[. ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/egoism/) ### Related Essays [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/ "(Im)partiality") by Shane Gronholz [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/ethical-egoism/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/egoism.pdf "egoism"). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is the author of *[Animals & Ethics 101](http://www.animalethics101.com)*, co-author of *[Thinking Critically About Abortion](http://www.abortionarguments.com)*, a co-author of *[Chimpanzee Rights](https://www.routledge.com/Chimpanzee-Rights-The-Philosophers-Brief-1st-Edition/Andrews-Comstock-GKD-Donaldson-Fenton-John-Johnson-Jones-Kymlicka-Meynell-Nobis-Pena-Guzman-Sebo-Gruen-Wise/p/book/9781138618664)* and author or co-author of many other articles, chapters, and reviews in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** altruism, ayn rand, bioethics, egoism, ethical egoism, james rachels, medical ethics, Nobis, objectivism, psychological egoism --- ### [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) **Published:** December 28, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay is an introduction to what arguments are and how they can be good or bad. **Content:** Author: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Categories: [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word count: 998 If someone says what they believe about an issue, and provides a reason for why they believe this, then they are giving an *argument*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) *Arguments* are sets of statements or reasons (“premises”) that are offered to try to support some other statement (a “conclusion”).[\[2\]](#_ftn2) People make and encounter arguments every day, about all sorts of issues.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay is an introduction to what arguments are and how they can be good or bad. [![From "Monty Python and the Holy Grail" (1975)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/holygrail026.jpg?resize=656%2C362&ssl=1)](https://youtu.be/zrzMhU_4m-g?t=86)[From “Monty Python and the Holy Grail” (1975)](https://youtu.be/zrzMhU_4m-g?t=86)### 1. The Parts of Arguments: Premises and Conclusions An argument has a conclusion and at least one premise. The *conclusion* of the argument is the thesis that the argument is intended to convince you of.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The *premises* are meant to provide reason to believe the conclusion.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Philosophers often number premises and conclusions to make discussing the argument easier. Example: 1. All horses are mammals. 2. Sebastian is a horse. 3. Therefore, Sebastian is a mammal.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) It’s usually clearest to place the conclusion at the end of the list. Authors often use language such as “therefore,” “thus,” “hence,” “so,” and “it follows that” to indicate conclusions. To indicate premises, language such as “since” and “because,” and “the best evidence is that,” and “after all” is common. ### 2. Validity and Strength Structure, not just content, is crucial to the quality of an argument. Good arguments’ premises are appropriately related to the conclusion: they lead to and support the conclusion. This can happen in two ways. #### 2.1. Valid Arguments When the premises, if they *were* true, *guarantee* that the conclusion is true, then the argument is *valid*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) “Valid” has a special meaning in philosophy: it means that *it’s impossible for an argument’s premises to be true but the conclusion false.* Example: 1. If a shape is a cube, then it has corners. 2. This shape is a cube. 3. Therefore, this shape has corners. You can see that it’s *impossible* for (1) and (2) to be true without (3)’s being true. But in this argument, it *is* possible for (1) and (2) to be true without (3)’s being true: 1. If a shape is a cube, then it has corners. 2. The Empire State Building has corners. 3. Therefore, it’s shaped like a cube. Most buildings have corners but aren’t cube-shaped, so the argument is *invalid*: *the premises can be true while the conclusion is false*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Importantly, both of these arguments’ premises are true.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) An argument could have only true premises and still be invalid. Validity is *not* about whether the premises *actually are* true: it’s about whether, *if* they were true, they would guarantee the conclusion. Consider: 1. There are seventy-two planets in the Solar System. 2. Seventy-two is a prime number. 3. Therefore, there is a prime number of planets in the Solar System. These premises are false. But if they *were* true, then the conclusion would have to be true. So it’s valid (in the technical sense of “valid” used in philosophy). #### 2.2. Strong Arguments Arguments’ premises sometimes support the conclusions in this manner: given our background knowledge, *if the premises were true, then the conclusion would probably be true*.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Such arguments are described as *strong*. Example: 1. Someone released zebras in the Louvre. 2. The Mona Lisa displayed zebra bitemarks. 3. Therefore, the Mona Lisa was damaged by a zebra. In real life, from what we know of zebras and the Mona Lisa, if (1)–(2) were true, then (3) would probably be true. The argument is strong. In a strong argument, the premises (if reasonable in themselves to believe) *sufficiently support* the conclusion, but, unlike a *valid* argument, don’t *guarantee* it: it’s *possible* here that the bitemarks were from another animal, or forged, or from some other cause. So, the argument above is strong but not valid. #### 2.3. Reminders Strength and validity are requirements for good arguments, but just because an argument is strong or valid, that doesn’t mean its conclusion is in fact true. And neither weakness nor invalidity means a conclusion is false. Strength and validity are about the *relationship* of the premises to the conclusion. Whether the premises are reasonable to believe, or whether there is good evidence for the premises, or whether someone is justified in believing all the premises, is another, separate issue.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 3. Soundness and Cogency When arguments are valid *and* their premises are all true, they are *sound*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Example: 1. If something contains water, then it contains hydrogen. 2. The ocean contains water. 3. Therefore, the ocean contains hydrogen. Sound arguments always have true conclusions.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) After all, when arguments are valid, the premises’ truth *would* guarantee the conclusion’s truth, and so if the premises *are* true (and the argument is valid), then the conclusion is true. When an argument is strong *and* its premises are true, the argument is *cogent*. Example: 1. In many randomized, controlled trials, people who take aspirin rather than placebo have lower fevers. 2. Therefore, aspirin reduces fever. The argument isn’t *valid*, because it’s possible that the aspirin itself isn’t what’s reducing the fever. But the argument is still strong and cogent, at least for most audiences.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Cogent arguments always have conclusions that are probably true.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) If they’re strong, then the premises’ truth would make the conclusion probably true, and so *if* the premises are true (and the argument is strong), then the conclusion is probably true. To *object* to an argument, try to show that the argument is unsound or uncogent: that the argument is invalid or weak, has a false or unjustified premise, or both. ### 4. Conclusion: Using Arguments Philosophers study how arguments *justify* people in believing conclusions. Arguments can convince an audience when they accept the premises but not yet the conclusion.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) If someone believes the premises of an argument *are* true, and that *if* they’re true then the conclusion is true (or probably true), then it seems contradictory or irrational for them to not also believe that the conclusion is true.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) The question of how to *cause,* or persuade or convince, your audience to believe you is also important, but unfortunately, good arguments don’t always accomplish that goal.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) But sometimes they do. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Here “reasons” are understood to be the claims (such as beliefs or experiences, or beliefs about those experiences) that a person would appeal to as *evidence* for their view. Sometimes, however, when people make a claim about the “reason” someone believes or think something, they attempt to state the cause of their belief: “He believes that because he’s *jealous*,” “She thinks that because she *wants to fit in with her friends*,” “They think that because *their goal is to control people*,” “She believes that because she feels guilty,” and so on. It’s important to notice that these claims about the (alleged) psychological *causes* of people’s beliefs are not *arguments*: these are not the claims that people offer, or would offer, in support of their beliefs. It is also important to notice that when we make claims about the causes of people’s beliefs such as these, we are often mistaken: when people make claims about what motivates you to believe something (about an important issue), are they often correct, or are they often incorrect? [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Colloquially, we also simply “argue” with each other when we disagree with each other, or even yell at each other. But in philosophy, “arguments” are those sets of statements presented to try to convince someone of something. This definition implies that sets of sentences are only *arguments* when there is some intention behind them: someone is trying to do something with the argument, for instance, convince people of the conclusion. For example, suppose a computer program randomly generates a set of sentences that, if presented by a person, would have been a sound argument. But the program itself is very simple; it’s certainly not an artificial intelligence, and it has no intentions, nor goals, nor beliefs. Still, is that randomly-generated set of sentences itself an argument, even though there was no intention behind it, because no intelligent person was trying to use the argument to convince anyone of anything? The question of whether arguments require intentions is interesting, but there’s little reason to go into it here; interested readers can consult other sources (McKeon, n.d., sect. 1). Also, by this definition, we are taking premises to be *statements*, but strictly speaking, we might think that arguments could have (for example) *questions* as premises (such as rhetorical questions), or imperatives (commands) as conclusions (“Therefore, clean your room!”). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For example, you encounter an argument whenever someone tells you something that’s intended to be evidence, as part of the project of convincing you of something. So if you’ve read a product review, or an opinion tweet, or your child tries to explain why they should stay up past bedtime, you’ve probably encountered at least one argument. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Strictly speaking, an argument as presented might not contain an explicitly stated conclusion at all. For example, I might approach you and say, “For a donation of $20, you can fund a water filter to protect children from disease,” and wait, expectantly. That looks like I offered an argument, even though I only gave you one premise and never explicitly stated a conclusion. In this case, the tacit conclusion might be, “Therefore, you should donate $20.” Note, also, that we may or may not define arguments as requiring some intention behind them; see n. 2. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Note that some of those premises might be conclusions from previous premises as well. They can be called “sub-conclusions.” Overall, the description in text applies to most arguments you will encounter in philosophy, but there’s room for dispute about whether other things might count as arguments. More precisely, one might say: An argument is a set of sentences, such that the conclusion is exactly one sentence in the set. This allows that some premises may be irrelevant to the conclusion. This also allows that a set of sentences can generate as many distinct arguments as there are combinations of premises and conclusions. Also precisely, we might say that if there are *n* sentences in the set, then there are *n* × (*n*−1)! possible arguments that can be built out of that set: for every conclusion, there is a set of arguments, one for each possible arrangement of the premises. This definition is compatible with standard definitions of strength and validity. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) It’s also common to note premises and conclusions with corresponding letters. In this case, for example, we might see: “(P1) All horses are mammals; (P2) Sebastian is a horse; (C1) therefore, Sebastian is a mammal.” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Trivially, then, it’s also strong. But it can be misleading to describe a valid argument as (merely) “strong,” in the same way that describing a pot of boiling water as “warm” is misleading, potentially very much so. Note that validity and soundness are normally defined in terms of truth (for example, in valid arguments, the premises cannot be true without the conclusion’s being true), but arguably, we tend to approach premises from whether they are justified. This distinction usually doesn’t matter in practice; when people assert that a premise is true, arguably, they’re tacitly asserting that they’re justified in believing that it’s true. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This argument commits a “formal” (form-based) fallacy called “Affirming the Consequent.” That occurs when an argument contains if-*p*-then-*q* and *q*, and on that basis, infers *p*. A similar fallacy is Denying the Antecedent: when an argument contains if-*p*-then-*q* and not-*p* and on that basis, infers not-*q*. No argument of those forms (when *p* and *q* are not logically equivalent) is valid. These forms do, however, bear some superficial resemblance to some valid argument forms. *Modus ponens* is the form in which an argument affirms if-*p*-then-*q* and affirms *p*, and on that basis, concludes *q*. *Modus tollens* is the form in which an argument affirms if-*p*-then-*q* and affirms not-*q*, and on that basis, concludes not-*p*. For a long list of fallacies, see Dowden (n.d.). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Most philosophers believe that “true” generally means “corresponds to the facts of the world” (PhilPapers n.d.): this is the *correspondence theory of truth* (Glanzberg, 2022, sect. 1.1). For example, if someone says, “There is at least one desk in the classroom,” what they say is true if, and only if, there is at least one desk in the classroom: that there is a desk in the room is a fact of the world that makes what they say true. If someone says, “There are twelve elephants in the classroom,” this is not true, or is *false*, when there are *not* twelve elephants in the classroom: it is a fact of the world that there are not twelve elephants in the room. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Here, it is important to note that whether the conclusion would be probably true also depends on the rest of the audience’s knowledge. Additional, new evidence might be evidence against the conclusion and render it no-longer-justified. A basic principle of rationality is that you need to take into account *all* the evidence available to you. For example, apparently-well-established scientific conclusions can be overturned by new evidence, but it is difficult to imagine how new evidence could ever show that some cubes don’t have corners. Thus, for cogent-but-unsound arguments, new evidence can in fact change whether the conclusion is justified or probably true. We sometimes refer to the Requirement of Total Evidence or the Total-Evidence Requirement: that one must take into account all available evidence in order to be justified in one’s beliefs. After all, if a conclusion isn’t proven by the premises, then there remains the possibility that new information should change our credence in that conclusion. For recent discussions of this requirement and an application to a present-day debate, see Barrett and Sober (2022) and Draper (2020). For a more-general discussion, see Wilson (1999, sect. 13.1.2) and Howson & Urbach (2006, p. 164). The fact that whether a conclusion is probably true depends on the rest of the audience’s knowledge implies that cogency of an argument is relative to an audience. But this is plausible; different audiences have different total-evidence available to them, and different people can be reasonable or unreasonable in accepting the same argument. For example, a defendant may secretly know that he committed a crime, but the jury might be rationally persuaded by the defense attorney’s arguments, in part because they don’t have the secret knowledge the defendant has. But it would probably be irrational for the defendant (who, for example, remembers committing the crime) to change his belief based on the defense attorney’s arguments. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Strong arguments and valid arguments can have unjustified premises, and they can have justified ones as well. Most philosophers assume that we can be “justified” in believing something without being justified in being certain of it: see [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli and [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. However, there’s room for debate here. Suppose that I count as “justified” in believing something if I’m justified in putting 67%-or-higher confidence in it. Suppose I’m justified in 67% confidence in believing that *p*, and justified in 67% confidence in believing that if *p* then *q*. Suppose that those two premises are statistically independent of each other. Then I would be only 44% justified in believing that *q*, and thereby not count as “justified.” But it might seem strange to say that I could be “justified” in believing that *p* and “justified” in believing that if-*p*-then-*q* without thereby being “justified” in believing that *q*. This problem disappears if justification requires certainty or something very close to it. See Collins (n.d.) and [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This is another point at which there’s room for some debate. Someone might argue, for example, that not *all* the premises need be true, but only the proper subset of the premises *required* to deliver the conclusion deductively validly. Indeed, deduction is *monotonic*: adding a premise to a deductively valid argument cannot render it invalid. Example: “All humans are mortal. Socrates was human. Water is composed of uranium and plutonium. Therefore, Socrates was mortal.” This argument clearly demonstrates its conclusion deductively validly, and someone who was justified in believing all the premises would be justified in believing the conclusion. Therefore, we might either want to *keep* our standard definition of soundness but add that some unsound arguments nevertheless *do* demonstrate their conclusions, or we might want to *revise* our definition to say that sound arguments are those arguments that are valid and that there is some *subset S* of premises such that: (1) an argument with *S* as its premises and the original argument’s conclusion would be valid and (2) all the premises in *S* are true. This may be a merely terminological dispute, but it does at least remind us of the important point that deductive arguments are monotonic. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Similarly, valid and sound arguments have conclusions that are no less justified than the set of premises. In contrast, strong (but not valid) arguments sometimes have conclusions that *are* less justified than the set of the premises. The premises, even if justified, do not prove the conclusion. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) It’s conceivable that someone have access to evidence we don’t, and that person might actually be justified in rejecting the conclusion. As noted, whether an argument is strong seems to be relative to the audience. See note 10 above. Notice that we don’t normally talk about the validity of arguments as relative to an audience, because whether it’s possible for premises but not a conclusion to be true is independent of the audience’s knowledge, except perhaps their knowledge of how deduction works; see Carroll (1895). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Counterevidence would be evidence against that conclusion, for example from *another* argument (but not by a criticism of the original argument itself, which by hypothesis is cogent). See n. 10. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) If one’s audience wouldn’t accept the premises, then they have no reason to be persuaded. If they already accept the conclusion, then there’s no point in trying to persuade them. And if the premises don’t provide good evidence for the conclusion, then there’s no point in using those premises to justify that conclusion. Thus, arguments work best when the audience accepts the premises but not yet the conclusion. Indeed, if one tries to convince one’s audience of a conclusion by offering premises that they would accept only if they already accept your conclusion, then one may be committing the fallacy of “Begging the Question.” For a detailed investigation of that fallacy, see Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See Carroll (1895) for an entertaining discussion. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) This isn’t necessarily a problem with the argument; some audiences are simply unreasonable. How to *persuade* your audience is largely a topic for psychology; see e.g. Psychology Today (n.d.). Theoretically, if your audience is rational and you offer them a cogent argument, they’ll change their minds. But many people are irrational about many issues. A well-studied area of this phenomenon is politics; see e.g. Caplan (2008) and Somin (2016). ### References [Barrett, Martin and Sober, Elliott. (2020). The requirement of total evidence: A reply to Epstein’s critique. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/requirement-of-total-evidence-a-reply-to-epsteins-critique/DD182818ABDFBFF7D465F14867677E6A)[*Philosophy of Science, 87*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/requirement-of-total-evidence-a-reply-to-epsteins-critique/DD182818ABDFBFF7D465F14867677E6A)[(1), 191–203.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/requirement-of-total-evidence-a-reply-to-epsteins-critique/DD182818ABDFBFF7D465F14867677E6A) [Caplan, Bryan. (2008). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691138732/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter)[*The Myth of the Rational Voter*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691138732/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter)[ (new ed.). Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691138732/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter) [Caroll, Lewis. (1895). What the tortoise said to Achilles. ](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/IV/14/278/1046872?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false)[*Mind*](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/IV/14/278/1046872?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false)[, ](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/IV/14/278/1046872?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false)[*4*](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/IV/14/278/1046872?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false)[(14), 278–280.](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/IV/14/278/1046872?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false) [Collins, John M. (N.d.). Epistemic closure principles. In B. Dowden & J. Fieser (Eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/epis-clo/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/epis-clo/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/epis-clo/) [Dowden, Bradley. (N.d.). Fallacies. In B. Dowden & J. Fieser (Eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/fallacy/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/fallacy/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/fallacy/) [Draper, Paul. (2020). In defense of the Requirement of Total Evidence. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/in-defense-of-the-requirement-of-total-evidence/DA5D27E8393FE160582046BEAF3AE1A1)[*Philosophy of Science, 87*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/in-defense-of-the-requirement-of-total-evidence/DA5D27E8393FE160582046BEAF3AE1A1)[(1), 179–190.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/in-defense-of-the-requirement-of-total-evidence/DA5D27E8393FE160582046BEAF3AE1A1) [Glanzberg, Michael. (2022). Truth. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/truth/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/truth/)[ (Winter 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/truth/) [Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter. (2006). ](https://www.amazon.com/Scientific-Reasoning-Bayesian-Colin-Howson/dp/081269578X)[*Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach*](https://www.amazon.com/Scientific-Reasoning-Bayesian-Colin-Howson/dp/081269578X)[ (3rd ed.). Open Court.](https://www.amazon.com/Scientific-Reasoning-Bayesian-Colin-Howson/dp/081269578X) [McKeon, Matthew. (N.d.). Arguments. In B. Dowden & J. Fieser (Eds.),](https://iep.utm.edu/argument/)[ *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/argument/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/argument/) [PhilPapers. (N.d.). Survey results: Truth. ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4926)[*Philpeople.org*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4926)[. ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4926) [Psychology Today. (N.d.). Persuasion. ](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/persuasion)[*Psychologytoday.com*](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/persuasion)[. ](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/persuasion) [Shanahan, Timothy. (N.d.). Deductive and inductive arguments. In B. Dowden & J. Fieser (Eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/deductive-inductive-arguments/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/deductive-inductive-arguments/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/deductive-inductive-arguments/) [Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. (1999). Begging the question. ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409912348921)[*Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409912348921)[(2), 174–191.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409912348921) [Somin, Ilya. (2016). ](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26809)[*Democracy and Political Ignorance*](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26809)[ (2nd ed.)](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26809)[. Stanford University Press.](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26809) ### Further Reading [Feldman, Richard. 1998. ](https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Argument-2nd-Richard-Feldman/dp/0136246028)[*Reason & Argument*](https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Argument-2nd-Richard-Feldman/dp/0136246028)[, 2nd Edition. Pearson. ](https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Argument-2nd-Richard-Feldman/dp/0136246028) [Pryor, James. “What is an Argument?”](http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/vocab/argument.html) [Wilson, David Carl. 1999 ](https://open.umn.edu/opentextbooks/textbooks/929)[*Good Reasoning: Cultivating Intellectual Virtues*](https://open.umn.edu/opentextbooks/textbooks/929)[*.* ](https://open.umn.edu/opentextbooks/textbooks/929)[University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.](https://open.umn.edu/opentextbooks/textbooks/929) ### Related Essays [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a critical thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation Korean ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/arguments.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Arguments, Logic, metcalf, reasoning --- ### [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) **Published:** May 26, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** This essay is currently unavailable. Check back later for an updated discussion of this topic. For introductions to induction, see: - [*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, The Problem of Induction](https://iep.utm.edu/problem-of-induction/) - [*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, The Problem of Induction](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** induction --- ### [Arguments from Religious Experience: Richard Swinburne’s ‘Principle of Credulity’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) **Published:** March 14, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Philosopher Richard Swinburne (b. 1934) attempts to categorize these different types of religious experience. He argues that such experiences are usually some evidence for the existence of whatever people believe they encounter. This essay summarizes Swinburne’s philosophy of religious experience. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/ "Epistemology") Word Count: 1000 Religious experiences are alleged encounters with what some consider to be spiritual realities such as God or gods, angels, Nirvana, or other spiritual beings and forces. These experiences reportedly occur through ordinary physical sensations, *non*-physical sensations such as spiritual “visions,” or perceptions that involve no sensations of any kind. Philosopher Richard Swinburne (b. 1934) attempts to categorize these different types of religious experience. He argues that such experiences are usually some evidence for the existence of whatever people believe they encounter. This essay summarizes Swinburne’s philosophy of religious experience, which is important and influential in philosophy of religion.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [!["Moses and the Burning Bush," Keith Haring, 1985](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Keith-Haring-Moses-and-the-Burning-Bush.jpeg?resize=656%2C469&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Keith-Haring-Moses-and-the-Burning-Bush.jpeg?ssl=1)“[Moses and the Burning Bush](https://www.haring.com/!/art-work/16),” Keith Haring, 1985### 1. Types of Religious Experience Swinburne defines religious experience as a conscious mental event that *seems* to the experiencer to be an encounter with a supernatural reality (e.g., God, etc.).[\[2\]](#_ftn2) He argues there are exactly five totally distinct types of such experience.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The first two kinds are of “public” objects, i.e., objects that any person with the right equipment (e.g., eyes, etc.) and abilities (e.g., sight, etc.), and who is properly positioned and attentive, can experience.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) One kind is seeming to perceive a supernatural reality through an *ordinary* sensory object, such as experiencing God through a sunset.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Here the alleged reality (e.g., God, etc.) is experienced only indirectly (i.e., *via* the sunset), like perceiving love solely through a smile.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The second type consists of purportedly experiencing something supernatural in a public sensory object that is extremely *unusual*, such as a bush that is burning but not being consumed by the fire.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The remaining three kinds of religious experience are entirely “private” to the experiencer, i.e., something other people are unable to experience simultaneously.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The third type is seeming to encounter a supernatural reality through private “spiritual” (i.e., *non*-physical) sensations which are nonetheless describable in normal sensory vocabulary.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) An example is seeming to spiritually “see” and “hear”—i.e., *not* through the physical eyes and ears—an angel speaking to you.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The fourth kind occurs through private “spiritual” sensations which *cannot* be described using typical sensory language.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This is because such sensations seem to be perceived through a spiritual “sixth” sense.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) The fifth and last type happens privately without *any* sensations, even of the non-describable variety.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) It seems to the experiencer that she is aware of a supernatural reality, and yet not by having any sensations whatsoever.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 2. The Argument From Religious Experience Imagine you have one of those types of religious experience in which you seem to encounter God. Is your experience some evidence that God exists? Swinburne thinks it generally is. He thus gives an “argument from religious experience,” based on the premise that *seeming* to have a religious experience is good evidence for the existence of the supernatural reality supposedly encountered during the experience.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 3. The Principle of Credulity Critics disagree. They require some further evidence (e.g., replicability, cross-checkability, etc.) beyond just *seeming* to experience a supernatural reality.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Swinburne, however, thinks that requirement is too strict. He argues that we should evaluate religious experiences based on the same standard he claims we use to judge *all* human experiences, i.e., “the principle of credulity.” This principle says that if it seems to someone that something exists, then it probably exists: they should believe that unless there are strong reasons to doubt their experience.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) After all, Swinburne reasons, we give the same benefit of the doubt to all *other* experiences.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) For instance, seeming to experience your keys is usually enough to believe you likely did. Thus, seeming to encounter a supernatural reality should also be sufficient for believing that you probably did, unless you know you were under the influence of drugs, etc.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) This means we should consider religious experiences “innocent until proven guilty,” i.e., likely real until shown to be very *un*likely.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) The burden of proof is thus on the critic to demonstrate that religious experiences are *not* genuine encounters with supernatural realities.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 4. The Principle of Testimony But many people have never had religious experiences and instead rely on the testimonies of others who have. Swinburne thinks such reports can usually be trusted, based on “the principle of testimony:” things probably are as others describe them, unless there are significant reasons for doubt.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Thus, if you tell me you experienced God, I should believe you probably did, unless you were having a manic episode, etc.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) ### 5. Reasons for Doubt In addition to mania, another reason for doubt is that different people report experiencing what seem like vastly different supernatural realities (e.g., God, Nirvana, etc.). It might seem then that it’s nearly impossible to ever figure out who (if anyone) is correct.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) Swinburne argues they are *all* essentially correct. Most descriptions of supernatural realities are similar enough to think that the overwhelming majority of people probably encounter the same reality. They just understand and name that reality differently based on their religious beliefs.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) But some claim religious experiences are all in a person’s head, i.e., literally nothing more than brain events. Swinburne argues that if a supernatural reality exists, it is likely the cause of all natural processes, including brain events. Thus, a religious experience caused by a brain event would still be an authentic experience of the supernatural reality.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) ### 6. Conclusion Let’s say you’ve never had a religious experience before, i.e., you’ve seemed to experience only the *absence* of supernatural realities. Some might say your alleged experience of their absence, according to Swinburne’s principles, is just as probably real as purported experiences of their presence. In other words, if something seems absent (e.g., clothes on your body, etc.), then it probably is.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) Swinburne responds that experiences of presence are always more convincing than those of absence, because the latter can be due simply to not having “looked hard enough.”[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Certainly that can be true for your keys, but whether it’s also why many people haven’t seemed to experience supernatural realities is perhaps a matter for further debate.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay summarizes Swinburne’s essay entitled, “The Argument from Religious Experience,” in his book *The Existence of God* (2004). See Davis (1989), Peterson (2009), and Netland (2022) for other helpful summaries of Swinburne’s views in that essay. Swinburne’s essay is important and influential: most philosophers of religious experience find it necessary to explain in great detail how their theories compare and contrast with Swinburne’s. See, for example, Alston (1991), Gellman (1997), Netland (2022), among others. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Swinburne (2004: p. 293) writes, “An experience is a conscious mental event.” Swinburne (2004: p. 295) defines a religious experience as “an experience that seems (epistemically) to the subject to be an experience of God (either of his just being there, or of his saying or bringing about something) or of some other supernatural thing. The thing may be a person, such as Mary or Poseidon; or Heaven, or a ‘timeless reality beyond oneself,’ or something equally mysterious and difficult to describe.” Swinburne’s discussion appeals to how things *seem* to a person or “seemings”: for a discussion of what this means, see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj Andre Zeller, discussed in note 17 below. Note that Swinburne’s definition of religious experience might be overly narrow since it specifies that religious experience is always an experience of something supernatural. There may be some people, such as those who identify as religious naturalists, who regard experiences solely of the natural world as genuine religious experiences. Note that defining religious experience as an event is typical of philosophers who almost universally view such experience as momentary or transient in nature, i.e., typically lasting only a few hours, minutes, or even seconds. However, one should not conclude from this that religious experience always feels dramatic or like it happens suddenly, or that there are always sharp boundaries separating it from ordinary, *non*-religious experience. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Swinburne (2004: pp. 298-303) for his discussion of the five kinds of religious experience. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Swinburne (2004: p. 297) defines public perceptions or experiences as follows: “An object x may be such as to cause all persons rightly positioned with certain sense organs and certain concepts who pay a certain degree of attention to have the experience of it seeming to them that x is present. In that case we shall say that the perception of x is a public perception. Almost all our perceptions – for example, my seeing a material object such as a desk – are in this sense public perceptions. For a desk is such as to cause all persons close to it (without any material objects between it and them) whose eyes are pointing at it, who are attentive, and who have normal vision and the concept of a desk, to have the experience of its seeming to them that there is a desk there.” [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Swinburne (2004: pp. 298-299) writes, “First, we have experiences that seem (epistemically) to the subject to be experiences of God or something else supernatural, but where she seems to perceive the supernatural object in perceiving a perfectly ordinary non-religious object.” An interesting example of this type of religious experience might be the experience of the sublime where one seems to perceive the infinite (e.g., God, etc.) in and through incredibly large and powerful natural phenomena such as the night sky and erupting volcanoes. For an introduction to the sublime, see [Immanuel Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) In this type of experience, the supernatural reality is not experienced directly, but rather only indirectly *through* the ordinary, public object (e.g., the sunset), just as one might experience a fox indirectly by only perceiving paw prints in the snow. Swinburne (2004: p. 299) writes that “someone may look at the night sky, and suddenly ‘see it as’ God’s handiwork, something that God is bringing about (in the way in which someone may see a vapour trail in the sky as the trail of an aeroplane.)” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Swinburne (2004: p. 299) writes, “Secondly, there are experiences that people have in perceiving very unusual public objects…The experiences had by those who witnessed ‘the Resurrection appearances of Jesus,’ or ‘the appearance of Mary’ at Fatima, or…St. Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus are in this category, if the accounts of these events are in any minimal way reliable.” Unlike the first kind, the second kind involves an extraordinary rather than ordinary object, but the object is still non-religious in the sense that skeptics or atheists would perceive the same sensation – i.e., the sight of a man, or the sight of a burning bush – and yet not consider it a religious experience. In this kind, then, the religious experiencer takes the extraordinary object to be religious in nature – i.e., interprets the sight of the man as the perception of Jesus, or interprets the burning but unconsumed bush as an act or appearance of God. As Swinburne (2004: p. 299) writes, “A sceptic might have had the same visual sensations (described comparatively) and yet not had the religious experience.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Swinburne (2004: p. 299) writes, “The other three classes of religious experiences are ones that do not involve taking public phenomena religiously. In them the divine is apprehended via something private to the subject.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Swinburne (2004: p. 299) writes, “In the third place we have cases where the subject has a religious experience in having certain sensations private to himself, sensations of a kind describable by the normal vocabulary used for describing the sensations that result from the use of our five senses.” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Swinburne (2004: p. 299) writes, “In his dream described in Matthew 1: 20-1. Joseph dreamed he saw an angel who said to him certain things. Here there were no public phenomena, but Joseph had certain private sensations that he might have been able to describe by means of normal sensory vocabulary – for example, he had the visual sensation like the sensation that he would have had if he had been looking at a man dressed in white, and the auditory sensations that he would have had if someone had been saying such-and-such to him.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Swinburne (2004: p. 300) writes, “Fourthly, we have the case where the subject has a religious experience in having certain sensations private to himself, yet these are not of a kind describable by normal vocabulary.” [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Swinburne (2004: p. 300) writes, “The subject has some sensation analogous to sensations of normal kinds – for example, visual or auditory sensations, but only analogous – such that, if his experience was of a public phenomenon, we might say that it was the experience of a sixth sense.” [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Swinburne (2004: p. 300) writes, “Fifthly and finally we have religious experiences that the subject does not have by having sensations.” Note that the first four types of religious experience are mediated in the sense that the supernatural reality is experienced by means of (i.e., through the mediation of) something else – either public objects, physical sensations, or private spiritual sensations. Only the fifth kind is immediate or unmediated, with nothing standing between the experiencer and the supernatural reality, unless we view the experiencer’s conscious awareness (i.e., consciousness) as a form of mediation, as Alston (1991) does. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Swinburne (2004: p. 300) writes, “It seems to the subject, perhaps very strongly, that he is aware of God or of a timeless reality or some such thing, and yet not because he is having certain sensations; it just so seems to him, but not through his having sensations – just as it may seem to me strongly that my hand behind my back is facing upward rather than downward, yet not because of any sensations.” In Swinburne’s view, the fourth and fifth kinds of religious experiences are perhaps typical of mystics who claim their experiences are ineffable or indescribable in any language. Regarding the fourth kind, Swinburne (2004: p. 300) writes, “Presumably mystics and others who find it difficult if not impossible to describe their religious experiences, and yet feel that there is something to be described if only they had the words to do the describing, are having experiences of this kind.” On the fifth kind, Swinburne (2004: p. 300) writes, “Many mystics who claim to experience God via ‘nothingness’ or ‘darkness’ may be making the point that their experience of God is not mediated via any sensations.” For an introduction to mysticism, see [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) and [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/), both by Matthew Sanderson. According to Swinburne (2004: p. 301), his five types of religious experience encompass every possible kind of religious experience (i.e., they are exhaustive), and they never coincide or overlap with one another (i.e., they are mutually exclusive). Swinburne (2004: p. 301) summarizes his classification as follows: “…clearly an experience that seems to be of God may or may not be mediated by something sensory…If it is mediated by something, the something may be public or private. If it is private, it may or may not be describable by normal sensory vocabulary. If it is public, it may be a common, well-known phenomenon; or something very odd, the occurrence of which may be disputed.” Note that one can argue that all five of Swinburne’s types are “private” experiences. This is because the first and second types are only “public” in the sense that the sensory object (e.g., sunset, burning bush, etc.) involved in the experience is publicly available. However, in both types, the real “object” or focus of the experience is arguably the supernatural reality, and that is only privately experienced. Swinburne (2004: p. 299) himself perhaps admits this in explaining that, in the first and second types, atheists would experience the exact same sensory objects (because those are “public” objects), but wouldn’t regard the experiences as religious in nature, precisely because they wouldn’t perceive a supernatural reality in either experience, which arguably indicates that both types are ultimately “private” experiences. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) After having presented his classification of religious experiences, Swinburne (2004: pp. 302-303) writes, “The question must now be faced as to the evidential value of all this. Is the fact that all these religious experiences have occurred evidence for the existence of God (or some other supernatural reality)?” For Swinburne, religious experience plays an important role in a broader “cumulative case” argument for God’s existence, that is, an argument which says that, taken together or cumulatively, various forms of evidence collectively add up to provide persuasive rational support overall for the existence of God. Swinburne thinks that, combined with other forms of evidence (such as the cosmological argument, and so forth), religious experiences can help “tip the scales” in support of the conclusion that it is more likely than not that God exists. Franks Davis (1989) puts forth a similar argument. For more on the argument from religious experience, see Griffioen (2021) and Peterson (2009). For examples of arguments closely related to the argument from religious experience – such as the argument that religious experiences can justify religious beliefs, or the argument that it’s rational to form and hold religious beliefs based on religious experiences: see [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie Turner; [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) and [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) both by Matthew Sanderson. As the argument from religious experience is an argument for God’s existence, it belongs in the same general category as other such arguments, including cosmological, ontological, teleological, and fine-tuning arguments for God’s existence. It is also perhaps closely related to pragmatic arguments for believing in God. For more on these types of arguments, see the following essays: [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf; [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf; [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf; [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman; [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/)by Thomas Metcalf; and [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Critics here can be understood as viewing religious experiences with skepticism. For an introduction to skepticism, see [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross and [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman. Note that it’s arguably inappropriate to demand physical evidence to “prove” that a supernatural reality was genuinely experienced because such a reality is precisely *non*-physical. Also, lack of physical evidence isn’t usually considered a reason for doubting many other types of human experiences, such as the experience of love, morality, rational intuition, creativity, etc. Also note that it is arguably possible to cross-check religious experiences, albeit in a different manner than is possible with sense experiences. Religious experiences can be cross-checked by religious guides and authorities who can check an experience for conformity with religious texts, the past religious experiences of others, etc. It is true that religious experiences can’t be cross-checked in the exact same manner as sense perceptions—for instance, someone can’t just “take a look” to see if what you allegedly experienced in a religious experience is really there—but that is also arguably true of many other human experiences (e.g., beauty, love, morality, etc.) that we nonetheless typically accept as authentic. Religious experiences *can* be replicated in the sense that certain spiritual preparations—e.g., meditation, prayer, letting go of one’s ego, etc.—can sometimes enable people to undergo the same religious experiences as those who undertook the same preparations in the past. It is true that such preparations never *guarantee* a religious experience will happen or serve as the sole cause of religious experiences. However, once again, this is also arguably true of many other human experiences (e.g., falling in love, having an aesthetic experience, etc.) that we nonetheless accept as genuine. Furthermore, it’s perhaps unreasonable to expect religious experiences to be replicable in the same manner as sense perceptions given that what is allegedly experienced in a religious experience—especially in the case of a personal God who supposedly possesses agency and free will—is thought to have some say in whether or not he is experienced, unlike the inert objects often encountered in sense perceptions. For further discussion of this topic, see Alston (1991), Gellman (1997), and Netland (2002). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Swinburne (2004: pp. 303-304) summarizes the principle of credulity as follows: “Quite obviously having the experience of it seeming (epistemically) to you that there is a table there (that is, your seeming to see a table) is good evidence for supposing that there is a table there…So generally…I suggest it is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special considerations), if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present (and has some characteristic), then probably x is present (and has that characteristic); what one seems to perceive is probably so…This principle, which I shall call the Principle of Credulity, and the conclusion drawn from it seem to me correct…From this it would follow that, in the absence of special considerations, all religious experiences ought to be taken by their subjects as genuine, and hence as substantial grounds for belief in the existence of their apparent object—God, or Mary, or Ultimate Reality, or Poseidon.” Swinburne argues that one of the major reasons we should accept the principle of credulity is because failure to do so—for instance, insisting that experiences can serve as a reliable basis for forming beliefs only if they can be “proven” with indubitable certainty—would result in the loss of almost everything we think we know about the world. Swinburne’s view here can be understood as a form of the epistemological position called “phenomenal conservatism” which, in general, is the view that how things seem (i.e., the presence of “seemings”) is typically sufficient to justify believing that’s how things really are. For more on this position, see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj Andre Zeller. Swinburne argues that, in general, there are four types of what he calls “special considerations” that count as strong reasons to doubt the authenticity of any given religious experience. First, if the purported religious experience occurred under conditions that we have good reason to believe are unreliable, such as the experiencer under the influence of alcohol or LSD. Secondly, if one can show that the experiencer is claiming to have perceived an object of a particular kind in circumstances in which similar claims have proven false. A third consideration is if it can be shown that it is highly unlikely that a religious reality was present during the subject’s experience based on other things we know or have good reason to believe. The fourth consideration involves showing that, even if the religious reality were present, the reality was probably not the cause of the purported experience of that reality. Swinburne believes that these special considerations do not apply to all, or perhaps even most, religious experiences. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) This is clear in the claim by Swinburne (2004: p. 303) that the principle of credulity is a basic principle of rationality for *all* human experiences. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) The idea that religious experiences can justify believing in supernatural realities raises the question of “epistemic justification:” what rationally justifies holding certain beliefs? For more about this topic, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Other philosophers who, influenced by Swinburne’s principle of credulity, have proposed different versions of this “innocent until proven guilty” approach to religious experience include Franks Davis (1989), Alston (1991), Yandell (1993), Gellman (1997), and Netland (2002). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Swinburne (2004: p. 315) writes that “the onus of proof is on the atheist \[i.e., the critic\]; if he cannot make his case, the claim of religious experience stands.” [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) See Swinburne (2004: pp. 322-324) for his discussion of the principle of testimony. (For introductions to testimony, see [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case and [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis). The principle of credulity applies to people who have religious experiences, whereas the principle of testimony applies to people who learn about religious experiences from the testimony of those who’ve had them. Note that one major reason to accept this principle is, just like with the principle of credulity, failure to accept it would result in the loss of much of what we think we know. After all, just think about all the things you’ve learned solely through the testimony of others! [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Note that the principle of testimony is, at least in part, based on the principle of credulity: just as my seeming to experience something should be granted an initial presumption of accuracy, so should the experiences of others, and thus their testimonies about those experiences should be presumed accurate as well. The major difference, of course, is that I learn about my experiences first hand, whereas I learn about others’ experiences only second hand. Thus, I am one step further removed from others’ experiences than from my own experiences. Swinburne seems to think that the same “special considerations” that can call into question your religious experience are also good reasons for doubting someone’s testimony. In other words, he doesn’t suggest a unique set of “special considerations” or reasons for doubt that are specific only to testimonies. Netland (2022: 89) argues that there are unique questions we must ask about testimonies that do not apply to one’s own first-hand experience: “Is the report from the person who had the experience or has it been handed down from an oral tradition? How many persons are involved as links in the chain of transmission? What is known about the trustworthiness of each person transmitting the report? How much time has elapsed between the initial experience and the subsequent description of the event? Are there reasons to believe that either the person who had the experience or those reporting it might be motivated to embellish the report in significant ways?” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) This is commonly called in philosophy “the problem of religious diversity,” applied here specifically to religious experience, which is a common objection to the argument from religious experience. For discussion on how to respond to diversity and disagreement, see [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Swinburne (2004: p. 316) notes that “of course, devotees of different religions describe their religious experiences in the religious vocabulary with which they are familiar. But in itself this does not mean that their different descriptions are in conflict – God may be known under different names to different cultures.” Furthermore (2004: p. 318), “Religious experiences in non-Christian traditions are experiences apparently of beings who are supposed to have similar properties to those of God, or experiences apparently of lesser beings, or experiences apparently of states of affairs, but hardly experiences apparently of any person or state whose existence is incompatible with that of God. If there were vastly many experiences apparently of an omnipotent Devil, then that sort of evidence would exist; but there are not such experiences.” Note that Swinburne is arguing that all concepts of supernatural reality can be understood as really just different conceptions of the same one Christian God. Members of other religions could probably argue equally well that the Christian God is just a different conception of *their* ideas of supernatural reality. For instance, a Buddhist might argue that the Christian God, Brahman, and the Dao are just different names for Nirvana, the one true supernatural reality. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Swinburne (2004) writes, “My religious experience may or may not be caused immediately by some brain event…But, if there is a God, he is omnipresent and all causal processes at all that bring about my experience will have God among their causes; and any experience of him will be of him as present at a place where he is. And so, if there is a God, any experience that seems to be of God, will be genuine – will be of God…The mere fact that a religious experience apparently of God was brought about by natural processes has no tendency to show that it was not veridical. To show this, you need to show that God did not cause these processes. That can be attained only by showing that there is no God – for, if he exists as defined, clearly he is responsible both for the normal operation of natural laws and for any occasional violation.” There are other possible responses to this brain event challenge. For instance, one can point out that *all* human experiences are based in brain events, and yet that does not lead us to doubt sense perception, for instance. Another response is that it’s always possible that God or some other supernatural reality uses the brains of people to produce religious experiences. It’s also possible that supernatural realities such as God simply don’t exist. However, Swinburne (2004: p. 315) argues that there are persuasive arguments for God’s existence, and he claims there is not a universally compelling argument for God’s *non*-existence. Additionally, it’s possible that a given religious experiencer is known to be an unreliable reporter of experiences in the past or in general. Swinburne responds that most religious experiencers are likely not unreliable reporters. Religious experiencers could be high on drugs, but it’s unlikely that most people have their experiences as the result of ingesting LSD, for instance. Swinburne (2004: p. 315) writes, “Most religious experiences are had by people who normally make reliable perceptual claims, and have not recently taken drugs.” In response to the challenge that there might be good reasons to think God was not present to be perceived during a particular religious experience, Swinburne (2004: p. 319) argues that God is omnipresent, or present everywhere, and so if God exists, God is always present to be perceived. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) See Martin (1990: p. 166) for discussion of this objection. He proposes a “negative” principle of credulity which says that if something (e.g., God, etc.) seems absent, then it probably is absent. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Swinburne (2004: p. 304) writes that, according to the principle of credulity, “how things seem positively to be is evidence of how they are, but how things seem not to be is not such evidence. If it seems to me that there is present a table in the room, or statue in the garden, then probably there is. But if it seems to me that there is no table in the room, then that is only reason for supposing that there is not, if there are good grounds for supposing that I have looked everywhere in the room and (having eyes in working order, being able to recognize a table when I see one, etc.) would have seen one if there was one. An atheist’s claim to have had an experience of its seeming to him that there is no God could be evidence that there was no God only if similar restrictions were satisfied.” Swinburne (2004: p. 326) writes, “One who has not himself had an experience apparently of God is not in as strong a position as those who have. He will have less evidence for the existence of God; but not very much less, for he will have testimony of many who have had such experiences.” Note that, in the case of religious experiences, “not looking hard enough” arguably takes a different form than in cases of sense perception, for instance. In the latter case, not looking hard enough might mean that you’ve not looked with your physical eyes in a sufficient amount of relevant locations. However, with regard to religious experiences, not having looked widely enough with one’s physical eyes might be irrelevant, especially if the supernatural reality one is seeking to encounter is not perceivable in that manner. Instead, it might take the form of not sufficiently letting go of one’s ego, or failing to open one’s heart to the divine, and so on. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) For instance, one reason to think that “not looking hard enough” doesn’t explain every purported experience of the absence of supernatural realities is that there are deeply pious religious people (e.g., monks, mystics, etc.) who devote their entire lives to undertaking the preparations believed to be necessary for undergoing religious experiences and yet still never have one. If such a person can’t be said to have “looked hard enough” for supernatural realities, then arguably *no one* is capable of looking hard enough. Exerting a sufficient amount of effort in looking for supernatural realities also does not seem to be a necessary condition for seeming to experience them as there are many atheists and non-religious folks who have undertaken no spiritual preparations whatsoever and yet still have religious experiences. Swinburne’s response to this objection is to argue that some people might not have religious experiences – no matter how hard they have looked – because God, if he exists, may not choose to appear to everyone (assuming that all concepts of supernatural realities can, as Swinburne believes, be understood as different versions of the theistic God who possesses the free will and agency necessary for *choosing* to appear or not appear). Swinburne (2004: p. 319) writes, “As we have seen, it will not do to show that some people with similar equipment and concepts to those who do have experiences of God do not have such experiences. For we do not know that all persons with similar equipment and concepts could be expected to have experiences of God, if he was there. Clearly, if he so chose, an omnipotent God could cause a private experience, in the way a table could not.” ### References [Alston, William P. (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cornell University Press.](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801425974/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1) [Davis, Caroline Franks. (1989). The Evidential Force of Religious Experience. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-evidential-force-of-religious-experience-9780198250012?cc=us&lang=en&) [Gellman, Jerome I. (1997). Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief. Cornell University Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Experience-Rationality-Theistic-Philosophy-Religion/dp/0801433207) [Griffioen, Amber. (2021). Religious Experience. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/religion/philosophy-religion/religious-experience?format=PB&isbn=9781108742252) [Martin, Michael. (1990). Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Temple University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Atheism-Philosophical-Justification-Michael-Martin/dp/0877229430) [Netland, Harold A. (2022). Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God: The Evidential Force of Divine Encounters. Baker Academic. ](https://bakeracademic.com/p/Religious-Experience-and-the-Knowledge-of-God-Harold-A-Netland/382668) [Peterson, Michael (et al.). (2009). Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Religious-Belief-Introduction-Philosophy/dp/0195335996) [Swinburne, Richard. (2004). The Existence of God. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-existence-of-god-9780199271689?cc=us&lang=en&) [Yandell, Keith E. (1993). The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-general-interest/epistemology-religious-experience?format=PB&isbn=9780521477413) ### Related Essays [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Immanuel Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/)by Thomas Metcalf [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/ "Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj Andre Zeller ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/dini-deneyim-argumanlari-richard-swinburneun-safdillilik-ilkesi-matthew-sanderson) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Swinburne.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Arguments from Religious Experience: Richard Swinburne’s ‘Principle of Credulity’, Principle of Credulity, religious epistemology, richard swinburne, Sanderson, swinburne --- ### [Quantum Mechanics & Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/) **Published:** June 23, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science") Word Count: 1000 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the first in a series authored by Tom on the topic of quantum mechanics and philosophy. Read the [second essay here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations") and the [third essay here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications").* ### I. Introduction: A Story I’m going to tell a complicated and counter-intuitive story.1 The real-world situations the story is describing (by analogy)—measurements of microscopic particles and systems—are complicated and counter-intuitive, so the story must be as well. Suppose you’re having a party at your house. There are two doors: a front door and a side door. You asked 60% of the guests to bring food and 40% to bring drinks. ### 1. Paths Here is the first strange thing that happens. It has to do with the *paths* the guests take to get into your house. You are in the kitchen when guests begin arriving. You ask the first guest which door she came through, and she reports that she went 70% through the front door, but 30% through the side door. Does she mean that *most* of her body went through the front door, and the *rest* through the side? No; the *way* she entered the house was a *combination* comprising 70%-*front-door-way*, and 30%-*side-door-way*. That is, 100% of her went 70% through the front, and 100% of her went 30% through the side. ### 2. Watching That’s weird, so you start watching the front door. Then you notice the second strange thing. It has to do with what happens when you *watch for* (measure the position of) the guests. You observe several guests arrive. About 70% of the guests overall are coming in through the front door. And they look *perfectly normal*; when you ask them, they have no idea what the other guests were talking about. ‘I’m 100% coming in through the front door,’ they say. Your friend has been monitoring the side door, and she reports the same thing: 30% of the guests come in that way, but they are all 100% using that entrance and 0% using the other one. ### 3. The Effect of Observation The third strange thing you observe has to do with the *effect* of watching the guests enter on the *item* (food or drink) they bring. When no one is monitoring the entrances, then 60% of the guests arrive in the kitchen having brought food, and 40% brought drinks, as you requested. But when you start watching the front door, you notice that 50% of the guests walking through that entrance bring food, and 50% bring drinks, and the items arriving in the kitchen are indeed split 50-50 that way. Yet when you *stop* monitoring the entrance, the ratio *goes back to* 60-40. You conclude that somehow, going 100% through a particular entrance *changes* which item a guest brought, *sometimes*. (Suppose you see a guest parking her car across the street, carrying food. If you don’t monitor which door she uses, then she’ll reach the kitchen with food at 100% certainty. But if you watch which door she uses, she’ll be 50% likely to turn out to be bringing drinks instead.) ### 4. Knowledge The fourth strange thing you observe is as follows. It has to do with whether the guests use 100% one door and 0% the other, or instead use 70% one and 30% the other. It seems to show that it’s your *knowledge itself* that determines which item the guests bring, and that guests are *affected* by regions of space that they don’t have any *causal contact* with. Suppose you try another experiment. You lock the front door, but then go back to the kitchen and don’t watch either door. And now only about 30% of the guests are arriving. And 50% are bringing food and 50%, drinks. Why would this be? Well, you *know* which door they’re using, now, since you know they’re *not* using the (locked) front door. And remember, having 100% used one door “resets” which item they brought. (These guests are all using the side door and not going *anywhere near* the front door, but somehow, having the *front* door locked changes which item the *side*-door guests bring. It seems to do so instantly, even, as if the *information* about the front door being locked was transmitted to the side-door guests at *faster than the speed of light*.) A bunch of guests who are *not passing through* the front door are still *affected by* whether it was locked. When you unlock the side door, the ratio of items brought goes back to 60-40 food-drinks. (Why do side-door guests “care” or even know whether the front door is locked?) (Notably, when you watch the entrances—and the food and drink ratio is “reset” to 50-50—the guests have absolutely no explanation for why they happened to bring food, or drinks. Nothing about them (including whether they left their houses with food or drink) can predict which one they’ll bring.) ### 6. Conclusion: Superposition So when you’re not monitoring the entrances, how, overall, are the guests getting into your kitchen? They’re not entering 100% through the *front* door, nor 100% through the *side* door. If they were, they’d be 50-50 bringing food or drinks. They’re not entering through *both* at once. When you look for them, you always see them enter either through the front or through the side. They’re not using *neither*. When you lock both doors, no one gets in. The guests enter in what physicists call a “superposition” comprising 70%-front-door and 30%-side-door. When someone actually looks, the guests don’t seem to be in superpositions anymore. Why does *looking* matter? (What counts as “looking”?) ### II. The Math versus the Physics The “party” story corresponds to real experiments about microscopic systems.2 Everyone agrees about the measurement results. Quantum theory allows us to predict results of experiments with a higher certainty than anything else we’ve ever developed.3 Where people disagree is about what’s going on in the real world. Indeed, everyone agrees that the Schrödinger equation4 is extremely accurate when it comes to predicting how systems will evolve over time. But no one is sure what these particles are actually *doing*, before and after when we measure them.5 The answer is, in some ways, a philosophical choice, with philosophical implications. We’ll talk more about those in the next article in this series.6 ### Notes 1 This example is a version of the metaphor in Albert (1992: ch. 1). 2 Usually photons and electrons, and most commonly, spin-properties; cf. Albert 1992: 1, n. 1. 3 Ismael 2014; Polkinghorne 2002: 39-40; Greene 2011: 201. 4 Here’s the equation, if you’re curious (Polkinghorne 2002: 104-05): [![Equation 1](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/screen-shot-2014-06-20-at-11-40-47-am.png?resize=141%2C60)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/screen-shot-2014-06-20-at-11-40-47-am.png?ssl=1) It’s a way of taking the state of a system at one time and predicting its state at a future time. 5 We don’t have empirical instruments that can tell us, either. Indeed, we may *never* have adequate instruments to empirically discover this. See Albert 1992: 84-92. 6 It’s non-empirical, at least. Partisans sometimes appeal, for example, to the value of simplicity or intuition, or to positivistic considerations; cf. Greene 2011: 209 and Polkinghorne 2002: 46-56. ### References Albert, David Z. (1992). *Quantum Mechanics and Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greene, Brian. (2011). *The Hidden Reality: Parallel Universes and the Deep Laws of the Cosmos*. New York: Random House. Ismael, Jenann. (2014). “Quantum Mechanics.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 edition), Polkinghorne, John. (2002). *Quantum Theory: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press. ### Related Essays [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations") by Thomas Metcalf [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications") by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson ### Translation [Turkish](https://thecurious.tr/yazilar/bilim-felsefesi/kuantum-mekanigi-felsefe-i-yollarin-superpozisyonu-thomas-metcalf/) ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [Shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Science **Tags:** metcalf, Quantum Mechanics --- ### [Quantum Mechanics & Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) **Published:** April 28, 2015 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** We’ve already discussed some of the experimental phenomena that inspire competing interpretations or theories of what’s going on in the real world during quantum-mechanical experiments. In this final installment of a three-article series, we’ll look in very broad strokes at some of the philosophical implications of these views of quantum mechanics. **Content:** Author: [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Category: [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science")Word Count: 1000 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the third in a series authored by Tom on the topic of quantum mechanics and philosophy. Read the [first essay here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths") and the [second essay here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations").* We’ve already discussed some of the [experimental phenomena](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/) that inspire [competing interpretations or theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/) of what’s going on in the real world during quantum-mechanical experiments. (In brief: Observing microscopic particles seems to either: cause them to randomly take one result or the other; create a branching world for every possible outcome; or require hidden variables and allow for faster-than-light, nonlocal communication. Particles seem not to take one path, not the other, not both, and not neither, and even act as if they “know” when we’re observing them.) In this final installment of a three-article series, we’ll look in very broad strokes at some of the philosophical implications of these views of quantum mechanics. ![Ernst - The Elephant of Celebes](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ernst-the-elephant-of-celebes.jpg?resize=656%2C762&ssl=1) ### I. Logic Standard logic is *two-valued*. That just means that each sentence in the logic is true or false, not both, and not neither. ‘My cat’s breath smells like cat food’ is either true or false; it can’t both smell that way and *not* smell that way at the same time to the same person, and surely it either does or it doesn’t. But as we’ve seen, some interpretations of quantum mechanics might suggest adding in a new value.1 Perhaps Copenhagen-style interpretations indicate that we should have a value of *neither*—a truth-value “gap”—and Copenhagen *and* many-worlds interpretations indicate that we should have a value of *both*: a truth-value “glut.”2 As it happens, there are independent philosophical reasons to explore three- or four-valued logics (and their semantic counterparts: their claims about the *metaphysical laws* of the *real world*)3 as well. Nevertheless, defenders of standard logics can reply that Copenhagen-style interpretations might simply show that it is sometimes false that the particle took one path and false that it took the other; that doesn’t mean it’s actually *true and false at the same time* that it took a particular one. Many-worlds interpretations might suggest that all possibilities are realized, but *not* that all possibilities are realized *in a single branch* of the world, and traditionalists about logic can simply say that their logic is always intended to range across one branch at a time. ### II. Time Most philosophers of time hold that *backward causation* is impossible.4 That is, nothing that happens now can change or affect what happened in the past; necessarily, if *x* causes *y*, then *x* happened before or at the same time as *y,* not after. But a set of interesting quantum-mechanical experiments may also throw this view into doubt. Briefly put, these experiments seem to show that a choice about measuring a particle *now* can affect whether the particle was measured in the *past*.5 It’s worth noting that the backwards causation we’ve discovered here—if that’s what it really is—only applies to very small systems and very short distances in time. No one can use an experimental apparatus to, e.g., prevent the Kennedy assassination. ### III. Modality Philosophers often interpret modal operators (‘possible,’ ‘impossible,’ ‘necessary,’ ‘contingent’) in terms of *possible worlds*: ways the world could have been, one of which is the way the world actually is. The dominant view is that non-actual possible worlds aren’t concrete; they are hypothetical, or abstract, or otherwise ‘ersatz.’ But a minority viewpoint has it that every possible world is concrete; they’re just separate from the actual world. A version of the many-worlds view might be thought to lend support to this sort of modal concretism, a theory that is sometimes called ‘modal realism.’6 In reply, it’s not at all clear that the best many-worlds theories commit us to saying that all possibilities are realized. Instead, at best, all *physical* possibilities *in quantum-mechanical experiments* are realized. This doesn’t provide a concrete branch for every logically possible outcome of every event ever, which is what modal concretism actually needs.7 ### IV. Personal Identity and Survival Returning again to many-worlds theories: If every possibility is realized in some branch of the world, then this may make room for something philosophers have called ‘quantum immortality.’8 Suppose a nuclear bomb goes off right next to you. In principle, according to some many-worlds theories, it’s possible that the energy from the bomb passes through you harmlessly, without disturbing any of the particles in your body. (Possible, but of course extremely unlikely.) So there’s a branch of the world, then, in which you survive the blast, no worse for wear. If so, then perhaps no matter what happens to you, as long as it’s possible for you to survive, then you will survive in some branch or other. Recall that no branch is any more real than any other, so it’s genuinely *you* who will survive everything that happens to you. This intriguing possibility is by no means certain, however. One problem is that, as mentioned above, there’s debate about whether every observation leads to branching, or instead, merely observations *in experimental conditions*.9 Another is that this immortality may be cold comfort, given that in many branches, you will survive, but severely wounded. ### V. Determinism and Free Will Suppose we accept an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics, such as Copenhagen. Does this imply that we have libertarian free-will, since for some of our choices, we really are choosing between multiple, live options?10 At the very least, this indeterminism seems to make more room for free will than we thought there was. But of course, many have argued that indeterministic choices aren’t really “free” anyway; they’re random in an important sense. Maybe those who believe in free will should hope that *determinism* is true.11 So there is still more work to do to use indeterminism to defend libertarian free will. ### VI. A Caveat As we’ve seen, quantum mechanics may tell us interesting things about traditional philosophical debates. Yet there is still enormous debate about which, if any, of the prevailing views of quantum mechanics is correct. Indeed, the prevailing views are actually incompatible with another very well-tested theory: relativity.12 So the jury is certainly still out on the truth of the prevailing interpretations, and certainly about their philosophical implications. But those implications are clearly important enough to be worth exploring. Further scientific and philosophical work will shed additional light on this exciting topic. ### Notes 1 Cf. Putnam (1968). 2 For much more, cf. Wilce (2014). 3 Cf. Priest (1997); Beall and Ripley (forthcoming). By ‘semantic counterparts,’ I mean views of the world according to which some sentences really are true and false (or neither) in real life. 4 Cf. Dummett (1954). 5 E.g. Kim (2000). 6 Lewis (1986). 7 Vaidman (2014): §6.1. 8 Tegmark (1998): §IV.B. 9 See, for example, Tegmark’s (2015) remarks on the ideal experimental apparatus. 10 Atmanspacher and Rotter (2011). See also Balaguer (2010). 11 Cf. Smart (2003): 63. See also Dennett’s (2003) view of freedom here. 12 For more, see Monton (2011). ### References [Atmanspacher, Harald and Stefan Rotter. 2011. “On Determinacy or its Absence in the Brain.” In Richard Swinburne (ed.), *Free Will and Modern Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/British Academy), pp. 84-101.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/free-will-and-modern-science-9780197264898?cc=us&lang=en&) [Balaguer, Mark. 2010. *Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.](http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/free-will-open-scientific-problem) [Beall, JC and D. Ripley, forthcoming, “Non-classical Theories of Truth.” In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Truth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).](http://philpapers.org/rec/BEANTO) [Dennett, Daniel C. 2003. *Freedom Evolves*. New York: Viking Penguin.](http://www.penguin.com/book/freedom-evolves-by-daniel-c-dennett/9780142003848) [Dummett, Michael. 1954 “Can an Effect Precede its Cause?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 28 (Supplement): 27–44.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4106593?uid=3739568&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21106143176911) [Kim, Yoon-Hoo. *et al*. 2000 “A Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser.” *Physical Review Letters* 84: 1–5.](http://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.84.1) [Lewis, David. 1986. *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Oxford: Blackwell.](http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0631224262.html) [Monton, Bradley. 2011. “Prolegomena to any Future Physics-Based Metaphysics.” *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume III* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 142-65.](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4094/) [Priest, Graham. 1997. “Sylvan’s Box: A Short Story and Ten Morals.” *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 38: 573-82.](http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039540770) [Putnam, Hilary. 1979. “The Logic of Quantum Mechanics.” In Hilary Putnam (ed.), *Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers Volume 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 174-97.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/logic/philosophical-papers-volume-1-1?format=PB) [Smart, J. J. C. 2003. “Atheism and Theism.” In Smart, J. J. C. and Haldane, J. J., *Atheism and Theism, Second Edition* (Malden, MA: Blackwell), pp. 6-75.](http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0631232591.html) [Tegmark, Max. 1998. “The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words?” *Fortschritte der Physik* 46: 855-62.](http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9709032) [Tegmark, Max. 2015. “Quantum Immortality.” URL = , accessed 21 February 2015.](http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/quantum.html#immortality) [Vaidman, Lev. 2014. “Many-Worlds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 edition).](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/qm-manyworlds/) [Wilce, Alexander. 2014. “Quantum Logic and Probability.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Winter 2014 edition).](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/qt-quantlog/) ### Related Essays [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths") by Thomas Metcalf [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations") by Thomas Metcalf [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/ "Personal Identity") by Chad Vance [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson ### Translation [Turkish](https://thecurious.tr/yazilar/bilim-felsefesi/kuantum-mekanigi-ve-felsefe-iii-cikarimlar-thomas-metcalf/) ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** metcalf, Quantum Mechanics --- ### [Quantum Mechanics & Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/) **Published:** July 29, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science")Word Count: 1000 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the second in a series authored by Tom on the topic of quantum mechanics and philosophy. Read the [first essay here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths") and the [third essay here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications").* ### I. Measurement The story in the previous article in this series corresponds to real experiments about properties of microscopic particles.1 Recall that these experiments seem to show that particles can be partly in one position and partly in others, and that measuring their positions seems to change other properties about them. Thus there seems to be something very strange about measuring the properties of these particles. Let’s talk about what happens, physically, when someone makes a measurement. Suppose you’ve flipped a coin at *t*1 and haven’t looked at the result yet; it’s apparently in a superposition2 of Heads and Tails.3 You’ll look at the result at *t*2. Here’s what an analogue of the Schrödinger equation would say about what happens: *t*1: The coin is in a superposition: a combination of 50%-Heads and 50%-Tails. Then … *t*2: *You* are in a superposition: a combination of 50%-*observing*-Heads and 50%-*observing*-Tails. Of course, no one has ever seemed to find herself in a superposition of two observations.4 It turns out that there are roughly three5 things we could say as the physical story about what happens when you make the observation. When you look at the coin … (Copenhagen) … the superposition “collapses” (indeterministically!)6 into 100%-Heads *or* 100%-Tails, but not both.7 (Many-Worlds) … the universe *branches* into: U1: 100%-you observes 100%-Heads. U2: 100%-you observes 100%-Tails.8 (Bohm) … you observe what was true all along: the coin was 100%-Heads (or 100%-Tails) even before you looked at it.9 Again, the Schrödinger equation predicts that measurement will *not* collapse a superposition; it predicts that the observer will now be in a superposition. But we don’t find ourselves to be in superpositions. So what is measurement, and does it really violate the best-confirmed equation we’ve ever used? ### II. Interpretations There are several ways of interpreting measurement itself, corresponding to several hypotheses about what’s actually going on in the physical world with these particles. #### A. Copenhagen When we look for particles, we don’t seem to find them in superpositions. But of course when we *don’t* look for them, they seem to stay in superpositions. So there must be something *special* about measurement; it must cause superposed things to *stop* being superposed. Copenhagen-theorists say that observation “collapses” superpositions, and as noted, this collapse is indeterministic; nothing predicts or can predict whether the particle will be found *here* or *there*.10 A nice thing about this interpretation is that it seems very much like classical physics. There are particles, and they might do strange things when we’re not looking for them, but when we do look for them, they “become” classical: they just *are* in a particular place. The coin just *is* ‘Heads’ or ‘Tails.’ A not-so-nice thing about this interpretation is that there is simply no direct experimental evidence that collapse ever actually happens.11 Indeed, collapse is incompatible with the Schrödinger equation. Copenhagen-theorists conclude that collapse *must* have happened (since otherwise, we’d see the particles in superpositions), but we actually don’t have a mathematical or a physical story that tells us how or why it happens. This interpretation also makes measurement mysterious. How does the coin “know” I’m looking at it? Could a cat’s observation “cause” this collapse? A bacterium’s?12 It would be better overall if we didn’t have to say that observation itself causes physical changes in the thing observed. #### B. Many-Worlds Roughly speaking, the Many-Worlds interpretation says that superpositions remain after observation. When you look at the coin, the world evolves into a superposition of you observing ‘Heads’ and you observing ‘Tails.’ A nice thing about this interpretation is that the mathematical side is completely straightforward.13 The best-confirmed equation we have turns out to be *true*. Measurement and observation aren’t really “special”; they’re simply further ways of the world evolving. Nothing collapses. A not-so-nice thing about this interpretation is that it’s incompatible with our experience unless we say that the *universe itself* is branching into an outcome for every observation. We don’t ever *see* superpositions, so it must be that each branch of the universe gets its own “outcome” of the observation. This conclusion seems very strange to many people. As it happens, this interpretation also makes probability very mysterious.14 #### C. Bohm The third interpretation to consider is the most “classical” of the lot. According to David Bohm and his followers, the coin was definitely ‘Heads’ or definitely ‘Tails’ before you measured it. The reason is that in addition to the coin, there was also another *thing*: a sort of guiding probability-wave that caused the coin to land on ‘Heads’ or ‘Tails.’ The world evolves deterministically, and superpositions, in a sense, aren’t real.15 Particles just *seem* to behave in a “superposition” way because we don’t have a way of monitoring everything about them. A nice thing about this interpretation is, as mentioned, that it’s very classical. Most of the mystery in quantum mechanics evaporates. There’s nothing special about observation. The Schrödinger equation merely tells us how to predict how deterministic systems evolve. A not-so-nice thing about this interpretation is that in the details, it turns out to need *nonlocality*.16 Basically, that means that things can affect each other at faster than the speed of light, even if they’re nowhere near each other. I observe ‘Heads’ on a coin here, and *instantly*, somehow, a coin ten light years away “becomes” ‘Tails.’ And there’s no obvious particle or mechanism to convey that causal signal, if it is a causal signal. Another thing some people don’t like about this interpretation is that it seems to require the existence of an object we have no way of empirically detecting: the “pilot wave” that guides the particles to do what they do.17 ### IV. Next Steps We don’t have any empirical tests that can easily decide between these and other interpretations. We might never.18 So again, the choice between interpretations is at least partly a philosophical choice. It turns out that the choice between interpretations also has many other implications for traditional philosophical questions. The last article in this series will take a look at some of those questions. ### Notes 1 Usually photons and electrons, and most commonly, spin-properties; cf. Albert 1992: 1, n. 1. 2 In the “party” metaphor, this is like watching a guest arrive (at *t*1) through the front door before you’ve seen which item they brought, and then looking (at *t*2) at which item they brought. 3 Coins in the real world don’t actually end up in superpositions. The reason is something called ‘decoherence’: big objects such as coins interact with their environments in lots of ways, constantly, enough to push them out of superpositions. On this, see Polkinghorne 2002: 43-44 and Ghirardi 2014: § 5. However, our best physics says that in principle, a coin could be placed in a superposition of ‘Heads’ and ‘Tails.’ See, e.g., O’Connell *et al*. 2010. 4 What would it look like, to the observer? I have no idea. If the coin is an American quarter, would you be seeing 50% of George Washington’s face and 50% of an eagle? Would it look like a double-exposed photograph? Cf. Albert 1992: 112 ff. and Greene 2011: 207-08. 5 There are different ways of dividing things up, but this sort of division is one of the most common in introductory-level works. See, e.g., Polkinghorne 2002: 46-56. 6 Indeterminism can be construed as the thesis that a particular state of the universe does not physically entail any future state. See, e.g., Hoefer 2014; Haramia 2014: § 3; and Nagashima 2014: § 2. On the indeterminism in the quantum world, see Greene 2011: 191-192. 7 This is sometimes called the ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation, after its main proponent, Niels Bohr (Bohr 1987a; Bohr 1987b; Bohr 1987c; Greene 2002: 208-09). Cf. Albert 1992: 80 ff. Notably, no one has ever found any direct experimental evidence that collapse of this sort actually happens (Albert 1992: 110-11). 8 This is sometimes called the ‘Many-Worlds,’ ‘Everett,’ or ‘Everett-De Witt’ interpretation, after its main proponents, Hugh Everett and Brice De Witt (Everett 1957; De Witt 1970; Albert 1992: 112-13). 9 This is sometimes called the ‘Bohm’ interpretation, after its main proponent, David Bohm (Bohm and Hiley 1993; Albert 1992: ch. 7). 10 Albert 1992: 36; Polkinghorne 2002: 24-25. 11 Albert 1992: 110-11. It’s possible to chart the evolution of a system that looks the way it would if the wavefunction is collapsing, but this is not an observation *of* collapse; see Murch *et al*. 2013. See also Greene 2011: 201-02 on the incompatibility of this interpretation with the mathematical formalism. 12 For some discussion of measurement and this “macro-objectification problem,” see especially Ghirardi 2014: § 3. See also Albert 1992: 79 on the “measurement problem” and Greene 2011: 202 for the “bacterium” example. 13 Albert 1992: 112-13; Greene 2011: 203-09 and 212. 14 Suppose a certain quantum-mechanical process is known (empirically) to be 10% likely to result in outcome *X* and 90% likely to result in outcome *Y*. Now we run the process 1,000 times, and sure enough, about 100 times, the outcome is *X*, and about 900 times, the outcome is *Y*. But according to Many-Worlds, each of those 1,000 iterations caused the universe to branch into *two* universes: one for *X* and one for *Y*. Why, then, did we not observe about 500 *X*s and about 500 *Y*s? See Green 2011: 228-37 and Greaves 2007. 15 Polkinghorne 2002: 53-54. 16 Bell 1964; Albert 1992: 155 *ff*. 17 Polkinghorne 2002: 54-55. 18 Polkinghorne 2002: 55-56; Ghirardi 2014: § 13. ### References [Albert, David Z. (1992). *Quantum Mechanics and Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Mechanics-Experience-David-Albert/dp/0674741137/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1406674159&sr=8-1&keywords=Quantum+Mechanics+and+Experience) [Bell, John. (1964). “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox.” *Physics* 1: 195-200.](http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/bell/Bell_On_EPR.pdf) [Bohm, David and Basil J. Hiley. (1993). *The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory*. Oxford and New York: Routledge.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Undivided-Universe-Ontological-Interpretation/dp/0415065887/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1406674220&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Undivided+Universe%3A+An+Ontological+Interpretation+of+Quantum+Theory) [Bohr, Niels. (1987a). *The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, Vol. I: Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Volume-Atomic-Description-Philosophical-Writings/dp/0918024501/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1406678307&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Philosophical+Writings+of+Niels+Bohr%2C+Vol.+I%3A+Atomic+Theory+and+the+Description+of+Nature) [———-. (1987b). *The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, Vol. II: Essays 1932-1957 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge*. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Atomic-Physics-Human-Knowledge-Dover/dp/0486479285/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1406678420&sr=8-1&keywords=Atomic+Physics+and+Human+Knowledge) [———-. (1987c). *The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr, Vol. III: Essays 1958-1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge*. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Niels-Bohr-Vol/dp/B00CDXM3MA/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&qid=1406678470&sr=8-5&keywords=The+Philosophical+Writings+of+Niels+Bohr+Atomic+Physics+and+Human+Knowledge) [De Witt, Bryce Seligman. (1970). “Quantum Mechanics and Reality,” *Physics Today* 23(9): 30-35.](http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/magazine/physicstoday/article/23/9/10.1063/1.3022331) [Everett, Hugh. (1957). “Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics,” *Review of Modern Physics* 29: 454-62.](http://journals.aps.org/rmp/abstract/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454) [Ghirardi, Giancarlo. “Collapse Theories.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 edition), URL =](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/qm-collapse) [Greaves, Hilary. (2007). “Probability in the Everett Interpretation.” *Philosophy Compass* 2: 109-28.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00054.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Greene, Brian. (2011). *The Hidden Reality: Parallel Universes and the Deep Laws of the Cosmos*. New York: Random House.](Parallel%20Universes%20and%20the%20Deep%20Laws%20of%20the%20Cosmos) [Haramia, Chelsea. (2014). “Free Will and Moral Responsibility.” In Andrew Chapman (ed.) *1000-Word Philosophy*. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) [Hoefer, Carl. (2014). “Causal Determinism.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 edition).](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/determinism-causal/) [Ismael, Jenann. (2014). “Quantum Mechanics.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 edition).](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/qm) [Murch, K. W. *et al*. (2013). “Observing Single Quantum Trajectories of a Superconducting Quantum Bit.” *Nature* 502: 211-14.](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v502/n7470/abs/nature12539.html) [Nagashima, Jonah. (2014). “Free Will and Free Choice.” In Andrew Chapman (ed.), *1000-Word Philosophy.*](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) [O’Connell, A. D. *et al*. (2010). “Quantum Ground State and Single-Phonon Control of a Mechanical Resonator.” *Nature* 464: 697-703.](http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v464/n7289/abs/nature08967.html) [Polkinghorne, John. (2002). *Quantum Theory: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Theory-Very-Short-Introduction/dp/0192802526/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1406679008&sr=8-1&keywords=Quantum+Theory%3A+A+Very+Short+Introduction) ### Related Essays [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths") by Thomas Metcalf [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications") by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://thecurious.tr/yazilar/bilim-felsefesi/kuantum-mekanigi-felsefe-ii-olcum-ve-yorumlari-thomas-metcalf/) ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Science **Tags:** metcalf, Quantum Mechanics --- ### [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/) **Published:** July 17, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Here we consider philosophers’ attempts to explain "time’s arrow," which typically identify its source in one of three places: the laws of nature, the initial conditions of our universe, or the nature of time itself. **Content:** Author: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) Categories: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/) Word Count: 999 In our experience, some sequences of events *always* happen in the same order. For instance, after pouring cream into coffee, the cream and coffee are separated. When stirred, they mix together. The opposite sequence of events, stirring cream *out* of coffee, never happens. But why? This example suggests that time has an “arrow,” or special direction, that explains the unique time-ordering of such sequences and distinguishes the past from the future. We can imagine time being symmetric, meaning that the past and future are mirror images of each other. But time’s arrow suggests that time (in our universe, at least) isn’t like that, so time’s arrow is sometimes called a *temporal asymmetry*. Many processes exhibit this arrow, such as the following, among many others:[\[1\]](#_ftn1) - causes’ coming before, never after, their effects; - remembering the past but not the future; - Our always expanding, never shrinking universe. Time’s arrow may seem strange for two reasons. First, though space is similar to time, at least in how it’s treated by some contemporary physical theories, space *doesn’t* seem to have an arrow: time’s arrow requires that causes always come before their effects, for instance, but there’s no “space’s arrow” that requires causes to come to the left or right of their effects. Second, not all sequences of events are like stirring cream into coffee. Consider a pendulum like this: [![Clock with pendulum. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/times-arrow.gif?resize=498%2C376&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/times-arrow.gif?ssl=1) Clock with pendulum.A video of such a pendulum and the same video run in reverse look almost[\[2\]](#_ftn2) the same: you can’t tell which is which! So we need an explanation for why some sequences of events, like stirring cream into coffee, exhibit a temporal asymmetry while others, like the pendulum, don’t. Here we’ll consider philosophers’ attempts to explain time’s arrow, which typically identify its source in one of three places: the laws of nature, the initial conditions of our universe, or the nature of time itself. ### 1. Laws of Nature *Laws of nature*[\[3\]](#_ftn3) are features of our universe that allow us to predict or explain one state of affairs by reference to another. Some are temporally asymmetric,[\[4\]](#_ftn4) meaning that one particular temporal “direction” is singled out as special by the laws. One such law is the second law of thermodynamics,[\[5\]](#_ftn5) which says that, for closed systems, a physical quantity called “entropy” always increases over time, explaining why heat flows from hot objects to cooler ones. This temporally asymmetric law tells us something about the future (namely, its higher entropy) that isn’t true of the (lower entropy) past. If some laws of nature are temporally asymmetric, then perhaps we can use these laws to explain where the arrow of time comes from. Processes like stirring cream into coffee are governed by the time-asymmetric laws of thermodynamics while processes like the pendulum are governed by the time-symmetric laws of Newtonian mechanics. However, the “laws of nature” explanation isn’t always satisfying, as we can see in the case of stirring cream into coffee. The laws of thermodynamics which govern this process are themselves dependent on a more fundamental theory, statistical mechanics,[\[6\]](#_ftn6) whose laws don’t exhibit the same time-asymmetry. Put differently, the laws of statistical mechanics don’t seem to distinguish between the past and the future. If we rely on laws of nature to explain our arrow of time, then we may find ourselves needing to explain why thermodynamic laws are temporally asymmetric when more fundamental laws aren’t,[\[7\]](#_ftn7) which may be just as difficult to explain as time’s arrow. ### 2. Initial Conditions If the arrow of time cannot be explained by time-asymmetric laws of nature, another reasonable explanation might rely on the *initial conditions* of the system being considered. Consider a game of pool: if I show you a pool table where the cue ball is on one end of the table and the other balls are in a triangle on the opposite end, you know that we are witnessing the *beginning* of a game. [![Billiard balls being racked.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/billiard_balls_and_rack.jpg?resize=656%2C436&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/billiard_balls_and_rack.jpg?ssl=1) Billiard balls being racked.You know that the game of pool hasn’t started yet, *not* because the laws that govern the balls on the pool table make this configuration impossible later on, but because this highly ordered state of the pool table is extremely unlikely given those laws late in the game. Some philosophers believe that the universe, like a pool table, started off in a highly organized state that can help explain time’s arrow. This position is called *the Past Hypothesis*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Its proponents argue that it can explain not just many, if not all, of the phenomena we’ve previously discussed, but also the time-asymmetry of laws like the second law of thermodynamics. However, some worry that the Past Hypothesis, in focusing on the large-scale behavior of the universe, lacks the resources to explain a *local*, or small-scale, arrow of time: e.g., the mere fact that the entropy of the *universe as a whole* is bound to increase in the next minute doesn’t guarantee that the entropy of *my coffee* must do so. ### 3. Spacetime Structure Our final proposal suggests that the best explanation for the arrow of time is an asymmetry in the nature of time itself.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) So the answer to the question “Why is there an arrow of time but not an arrow of space?” is that the 4-dimensional spacetime we live in has a temporal, but not a spatial, asymmetry baked into it. Time’s arrow may be a fundamental fact about our universe that can’t be explained further. Like “initial conditions” explanations, one advantage of this strategy is that a temporal asymmetry in spacetime itself could explain temporal asymmetries in the laws of nature: the laws of nature that are temporally asymmetric are responsive to this temporal asymmetry while those that are temporally symmetric aren’t. Of course, this “feature of spacetime” explanation for temporal asymmetry may also leave us wondering why some laws, but not all laws, reference this fundamental temporal direction. ### 4. Conclusion Time’s arrow calls out for explanation, but it remains unclear whether it tells us something important about how matter and the laws that govern it behave or about time itself, independent from matter. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Price (1996) and Dainton (2001) provide fairly exhaustive lists of differences between past and future attributable to time’s arrow. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) I say “almost” here because, eventually, dissipative forces like friction lead to the pendulum’s motion changing. However, in a video of a few seconds, these dissipative forces would be unobservable to the naked eye. For those readers concerned that the existence of dissipative forces undermines this example, we can make the point a different way by noting that some laws of nature are temporally asymmetric while others are not, as I discuss in section 2. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For more on what philosophers mean by laws of nature, see [Laws of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) What it means for a law of nature to be temporally asymmetric is something a bit more specific than what most philosophers mean when they say that a sequence of events is temporally asymmetric – it’s a well-defined, formal property of the laws and the equations that describe them. Without getting too technical, we can define this property for our purposes as follows: take any physically possible sequence of events consistent with a particular law of nature. That law is temporally asymmetric if, when we reverse that sequence of events, the result is a sequence that is inconsistent with the law of nature in question. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Thermodynamics is a branch of physics that deals with concepts like heat, temperature, energy, and work. Classical thermodynamics emerged in the 19th century as the first sophisticated physical science to unite these disparate concepts, and work in classical thermodynamics fueled, and was fueled by, the industrial revolution. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Statistical Mechanics is a branch of physics that, like thermodynamics, deals with concepts like heat, temperatures, energy, and work; however, statistical mechanics advances our understanding of these concepts by treating them as features of large groups, called ensembles, of very small particles or systems. For more, see Eastman (2015). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For those readers knowledgeable about fundamental physics, specifically quantum field theory: you may object here that the fundamental laws of nature *are* time-asymmetric because the laws of physics are invariant not under T-symmetry, which represents time-reversal, but CPT symmetry, which is a charge-parity-time reversal symmetry. However, appealing to T-violations in quantum field theory doesn’t help those who want to rely on the second law of thermodynamics to explain the “cream into coffee” arrow of time because the phenomena which violate T-symmetry, namely weak interactions between leptons and quarks, aren’t the underlying physical phenomena responsible for the large-scale thermodynamic behavior of systems like a cup of coffee. So there is still a further fact that needs to be explained for those who want to rely on time-asymmetric laws of nature to explain all of the temporally asymmetric phenomena we care about, at least given our current best physical theories. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) So named by Albert (2000). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Chapter 4 of Maudlin (2007) lays out a case for this position. ### References [Albert, David. (2000). ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674011328)[*Time and Chance*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674011328)[. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674011328) [Dainton, Barry. (2001). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAITAS-5)[*Time and Space*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAITAS-5)[. McGill and Queens University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAITAS-5) [Eastman, Peter. (2015) ](https://web.stanford.edu/~peastman/statmech/)[*Introduction to Statistical Mechanics*](https://web.stanford.edu/~peastman/statmech/)[. Stanford University. Accessed July 2023](https://web.stanford.edu/~peastman/statmech/) [Maudlin, Tim. (2007). ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001/acprof-9780199218219)[*The Metaphysics Within Physics*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001/acprof-9780199218219)[. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.001.0001/acprof-9780199218219) [Price, Huw. (1996). ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195117981.001.0001/acprof-9780195117981)[*Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195117981.001.0001/acprof-9780195117981)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195117981.001.0001/acprof-9780195117981) [Sklar, Lawrence. (1977). ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime)[*Space, Time, and Spacetime*](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime)[. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime) ### Related Essays [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/?fbclid=IwAR3LuoaHJas2uWkVnlhdsKVgrAQdriwt40at1vLAeLbUJXTTSUFr109-F0A) by Dan Peterson [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Laws of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella ### Translation [Turkish](https://thecurious.tr/yazilar/bilim-felsefesi/zamanin-oku-dan-peterson/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/time-arrow.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Morehouse College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Uncategorized **Tags:** Peterson, philosophy of space and time, Philosophy of time, Time, time's arrow --- ### ["Hell Is Other People": Jean-Paul Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people/) **Published:** February 8, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to John-Paul Sartre on Personal Relationships through an examination of his famous quote, "Hell Is Other People." **Content:** Author: [Kiki Berk](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Berk/) Category: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 989 “Hell is other people” is a famous line from *No Exit* (1944), a philosophical play by the French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). *No Exit* is popularly understood as arguing that human relationships are essentially fraught with conflict. This interpretation seems to be supported by Sartre’s pessimistic discussion of relationships in *Being and Nothingness* (1943), his most famous philosophical work. This essay explains why this pessimistic interpretation of Sartre is mistaken. A careful examination of Sartre’s work shows that he was far more optimistic about relationships than his classic one-liner has led many people to believe. [![A "Far Side" cartoon of people in hell; one asks, "Hot enough for ya?"](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/far-side.jpg?resize=656%2C780&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/far-side.jpg?ssl=1)A “Far Side” cartoon of people in hell; one asks, “Hot enough for ya?”### 1. No Exit *No Exit* opens with its three main characters—Garcin, Inez, and Estelle—being led into an old-fashioned living room. They don’t know each other, but they do know that they’re dead and now in hell. Hell isn’t what any of them expected, however. Where are the horned devils with pitchforks? After quickly getting on each other’s nerves, Inez realizes the truth about their situation: “Each of us will act as torturer of the two others.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) To see how this works, let’s consider Garcin. Garcin is a journalist who fled the war, he says, on account of his pacifism. But he worries that the real reason he fled is because he’s a coward. He needs someone to assure him that this isn’t true. He tries to get this assurance from Estelle, but her opinion of him is worthless, he soon realizes, for she would say anything for a man’s affection. Garcin next pins his hopes on Inez, who isn’t interested in men, but her jealous and sadistic nature leads her to simply refuse Garcin’s request to be dubbed a hero. Thus, Garcin is effectively tortured by the other two, with no way out, prompting him to exclaim: “Hell is other people!”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### 2. Being and Nothingness In his difficult work *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre paints a bleak picture of human relationships.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) He says that relationships involve a constant struggle over *freedom,* which is the only thing that really matters.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This tension arises because we either treat other people as *objects* (which undermines their freedom), or we allow ourselves to be treated as objects by them (which undermines ours). Either way, someone’s freedom is threatened, so encountering another person necessarily results in a struggle for dominance. Thus, Sartre’s pessimistic view of relationships seems to be grounded in his broader philosophy. ### 3. Misinterpretation While *Being and Nothingness* seems to support the popular interpretation of *No Exit*, according to which relationships are always bad, this interpretation faces a serious challenge. In [an oral preface](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6-RWlmtqkY&t=4s) for a 1964 recording of the play, Sartre claims that his statement “hell is other people” has been commonly misunderstood.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) In his words: It has been thought that what I meant by that was that our relations with other people are always poisoned, that they are invariably hellish relations. But what I really mean is something totally different. I mean that if relations with someone else are twisted, vitiated \[i.e., corrupted\], then that other person can only be hell.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) In other words, according to Sartre, the statement “hell is other people” is implicitly conditional: other people are hell for us *if* our relationships with them are bad. He explains further: If my relations are bad, I am situating myself in a total dependence on someone else. And then I am indeed in hell. And there are a vast number of people in the world who are in hell because they are too dependent on the judgment of other people. But that does not at all mean that one cannot have relations with other people. It simply brings out the capital importance of all other people for each one of us.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) According to Sartre, other people’s judgments invariably enter into our thoughts and feelings about ourselves. This isn’t bad in itself, for without these judgments we couldn’t truly know ourselves. What’s bad is when we allow ourselves (like Garcin) to become overly dependent on the opinions of other people. This leads to those people being “hell” for us. But although other people *can* be hell for us (if we relate to them in this way), they needn’t be (if we don’t). ### 4. Bad Faith How does this conditional reading of “hell is other people” fit with Sartre’s pessimistic account of relationships in *Being and Nothingness*? The key to answering this question lies in a footnote at the end of his discussion of human relationships: These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we can not discuss here.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The “radical conversion” to which Sartre refers is a transformation from “bad faith” to *authenticity*, which is at the very core of his existentialist philosophy. People are in bad faith when they deceive themselves into thinking they aren’t ultimately free and responsible for their actions. Making excuses for what one does, inaccurately labeling oneself, inventing a role in order to hide behind it (as Garcin does)—these are all ways of being in bad faith.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Relationships between people who are in bad faith are bound to fail; relationships between people who are authentic, however, can succeed. ### 5. Heaven is Each Other Unfortunately, Sartre never tells us what it takes to undergo this “radical conversion” from bad faith to authenticity. All he tells us is that he’ll tackle this problem in a later work, which he began but never finished.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) But he did continue to think about relationships. In a 1971 interview, when asked about his statement that “hell is other people,” he responds: But that’s only that side of the coin. The other side, which no one seems to mention, is also “Heaven is each other.” … Hell is separateness, uncommunicability, self-centeredness, lust for power, for riches, for fame. Heaven, on the other hand, is very simple—and very hard: caring about your fellow beings.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) So, even late in his life, Sartre still thinks that relationships can succeed.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Sartre 1989: 17. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Sartre 1989: 45. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Sartre discusses relationships in Chapter 3 (“Concrete Relations with Others”) of Part 3 (“Being-for-Others”). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Sartre discusses freedom in Chapter 1 (“Being and Doing: Freedom”) or Part 4 (“Having, Doing, and Being”). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [Sartre – L’enfer, c’est les autres “Explications.”](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6-RWlmtqkY&t=4s) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Sartre 1976: 199. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Sartre 1976: 199-200. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Sartre 1958: 412. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Sartre discusses bad faith in Chapter 2 (“Bad Faith”) or Part 1 (“The Problem of Nothingness”). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Extensive notes for this unfinished work were posthumously published as *Notebooks for an Ethic*s. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Sartre in Gerassi 2009: 130. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Large portions of this essay were previously published in my chapter, “Is Hell Other People?” in *The Good Place and Philosophy: Get an Afterlife*. Thanks very much to Open Court for its permission to re-use this material here. ### References [Berk, Kiki. 2020. “Is Hell Other People?” In Benko, Steven and Andrew Pavelich (eds.).](https://shop.aer.io/open_court/p/The_Good_Place_and_Philosophy/9780812694802-8963?collection=TV_SHOWS_AND_PHILOSOPHY/216993)[ *The Good Place and Philosophy: Get an Afterlife*](https://shop.aer.io/open_court/p/The_Good_Place_and_Philosophy/9780812694802-8963?collection=TV_SHOWS_AND_PHILOSOPHY/216993)[. Chicago: Open Court.](https://shop.aer.io/open_court/p/The_Good_Place_and_Philosophy/9780812694802-8963?collection=TV_SHOWS_AND_PHILOSOPHY/216993) [Gerassi, John. 2009. ](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300159011/talking-sartre)[*Talking with Sartre: Conversations and Debates.*](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300159011/talking-sartre)[ New Haven: Yale University Press.](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300159011/talking-sartre) [Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1958. ](https://www.routledge.com/Being-and-Nothingness-An-Essay-in-Phenomenological-Ontology/Sartre/p/book/9780367461409)[*Being and Nothingness*](https://www.routledge.com/Being-and-Nothingness-An-Essay-in-Phenomenological-Ontology/Sartre/p/book/9780367461409)[. London: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Being-and-Nothingness-An-Essay-in-Phenomenological-Ontology/Sartre/p/book/9780367461409) [Sartre, Jean-Paul, Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka (eds). 1976. ](https://www.amazon.com/Sartre-theater-Jean-Paul/dp/0394492471)[*Sartre on Theater*](https://www.amazon.com/Sartre-theater-Jean-Paul/dp/0394492471)[.](https://www.amazon.com/Sartre-theater-Jean-Paul/dp/0394492471) [London: Random House. ](https://www.amazon.com/Sartre-theater-Jean-Paul/dp/0394492471) [Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1992. ](https://www.amazon.com/Notebooks-Ethics-Jean-Paul-Sartre/dp/0226735117)[*Notebooks for an Ethic*](https://www.amazon.com/Notebooks-Ethics-Jean-Paul-Sartre/dp/0226735117)[s. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Notebooks-Ethics-Jean-Paul-Sartre/dp/0226735117) [Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1989. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/160816/no-exit-and-three-other-plays-by-jean-paul-sartre/)[*No Exit and Three Other Plays.* ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/160816/no-exit-and-three-other-plays-by-jean-paul-sartre/)[New York: Vintage.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/160816/no-exit-and-three-other-plays-by-jean-paul-sartre/) ### Related Essays [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A. G. Holdier ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/hell-is-other-people.pdf). ### About the Author [Dr. Kiki Berk](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Berk/) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Southern New Hampshire University. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy from the VU University Amsterdam in 2010. Her research focuses on Beauvoir’s and Sartre’s philosophies of death and meaning in life. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** berk, Sartre --- ### [Conspiracy Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) **Published:** December 17, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What are conspiracy theories? What is a conspiracy theory? Are conspiracy theories always irrational to accept? **Content:** Author: Jared Millson Category: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word count: 998 *NASA faked the first moon landing.*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) *The US government orchestrated the attacks on 9/11.*[\[2\]](#_ftn2) *A secret society of global elites, known as the Illuminati, steers governments, banks, and the media toward a single world government.*[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Each of these claims has been denounced as a “conspiracy theory.”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But what are conspiracy theories? Should we ever accept one? If so, when? This essay offers initial answers to these questions.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) [!["The Pigpen Cipher" by Matthew Phelan.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/conspiracytheories.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://www.instagram.com/fearandloading/)“The Pigpen Cipher” by Matthew Phelan.### 1. Defining Conspiracy Theories First, what’s a conspiracy? Conspiracies are actions or plans undertaken by a small group of individuals working in secret to achieve shared goals. These goals need not be sinister: the African National Congress conspired for decades to bring down the apartheid regime in South Africa—a noble aspiration. Second, what’s a theory? In general, theories try to explain some set of (alleged) facts or events, usually by identifying their causes. The first two examples above (the moon landing coverage and the 9/11 attacks) attempt to explain these events by making claims about what caused them.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Putting these together yields this definition: *a conspiracy theory is an explanation of some alleged fact or event in terms of the actions undertaken by a small group of individuals working in secret*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. Common Misunderstandings Conspiracy theories are often assumed to be inherently irrational or false *by definition*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) But since some accusations of conspiracy have merit, a definition should not assume that conspiracy theories *must* be problematic.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Our proposed definition reflects this and corrects this common misunderstanding. Indeed, most people accept some conspiracy theories—e.g., Watergate or the claim that the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by al-Qaeda. In fact, if you’ve told someone about a recent surprise party you attended, then you’ve explained an event by reference to a small group of individuals working in secret, and so you’ve offered a conspiracy theory! Conspiracy theories need not contradict any “official story” or explanation of events that most people accept.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) If they did, then a conspiracy theory would cease to be one, e.g., when official sources give conflicting stories, when there simply is no official account, or when the conspiracy theory is adopted by officials.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 3. Evaluating Conspiracy Theories So conspiracy theories are *sometimes* true; they are *sometimes* reasonable to accept. But when?[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Conspiracy theories claim the existence of a conspiracy. Conspirators disclosing or “leaking” information about their activities would be good evidence for a conspiracy theory. But few people admit to being directly involved in conspiracies, so conspiracy theories typically lack this support.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Some claim that successful conspiracies won’t have leaks.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) But the absence of such evidence *does* undermine a theory when efforts to find it fail. And the more ambitious a conspiracy, the less likely its activities are to remain secret. It is hard to get people to work together on long-term, complex projects—much less in secret. Conspiracy theories often claim to explain data that contradicts or is left out by the official story. But they rarely end up explaining more data than their rivals, since they tend to have their own “errant data” that they cannot accommodate:[\[15\]](#_ftn15) e.g., conspiracy theories about 9/11 usually cannot explain why there is a video of Osama Bin Laden claiming responsibility for the attacks.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) So conspiracy theories often do not explain more data.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Since they appeal to one cause (i.e., the conspiracy’s goal) rather than to many, conspiracy theories may seem simpler than their rivals—e.g., when an international free-trade agreement is explained by leaders’ secret desire for world government, rather than by many competing national interests. However, conspiracy theories often *add* causes—conspiratorial ones—to explanations offered by their non-conspiratorial rivals: e.g., the “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory[\[18\]](#_ftn18) claimed that kids were at a pizza shop *because of a child-trafficking ring’s activities*. This assumes that kids were there for pizza *and* a malicious cartel’s actions. So this conspiracy theory, like many others, is not simpler.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Some see the problems not in conspiracy theories themselves but with their advocates who rarely make novel predictions and tend to accommodate failed predictions by making *ad hoc* changes to their theory rather than by abandoning it.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Some inflate the scope of a conspiracy to save their theory:[\[21\]](#_ftn21) e.g., when a newspaper’s articles contradict a conspiracy theory, they conclude that the newspaper’s staff is in on the conspiracy too.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Some critics charge conspiracy theorists with failing to properly defer to experts, resulting in theories that contradict expert testimony.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Conspiracy theorists often justify their mistrust by claiming that experts are themselves part of the conspiracy or have been duped by it.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) But this is yet another way to inflate the scope of a conspiracy, which makes its existence less likely. Other critics claim that distrust of experts is a harmful effect, rather than a cause, of conspiracy theorizing. Since much of what we know comes from experts[\[25\]](#_ftn25) and public institutions (e.g., the government, the press, academia, and professional organizations), accepting conspiracy theories deprives us of vital sources of knowledge.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Of course, only those theories that posit conspiracies with pervasive influence on our public institutions require such widespread skepticism.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) So, while conspiracy theories aren’t *inherently* irrational or false, few offer better explanations than their rivals. ### 4. Why Conspiracy Theories? Many people, nonetheless, find conspiracy theories appealing. By urging us to “follow the breadcrumbs”[\[28\]](#_ftn28) and to “think for ourselves,”[\[29\]](#_ftn29) these theories promise to make a complicated world intelligible to those without specialized training or expert knowledge. By claiming that a small group of evildoers are behind tragic events, they offer simple solutions to complex problems.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) Whatever their appeal, we should approach conspiracy theories the way we would any theory—i.e., by comparing their merits to their rivals’. Far-reaching conspiracies are rarely successful, so the more plausible conspiracy theories might be those that try to explain a smaller range of events by appealing to a conspiracy with limited goals.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) These theories also shouldn’t challenge the judgment of experts without providing adequate evidence of their unreliability. Will any of today’s influential conspiracy theories meet these demands? Probably not.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See *Exposed: Apollo 11 Moon Landing Conspiracy Theories,* (2019, June 28). Some versions of this theory even claim that the famed director Stanley Kubrick helped to film the fake moon landing and that his film *The Shining* is a cryptic “confession” (Lamb, 2010). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) There are various versions of this theory. For a consideration of some, see *Was 9/11 an Inside Job?* (2016, September 8). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Illuminati conspiracy theory is arguably among the most long-lasting conspiracy theory in modern history. The Bavarian Illuminati, the real society at the theory’s center, was an Enlightenment group founded in 1776 and suppressed within a decade. The claim that it secretly survived to direct world events arose in the 1790s and played an important role in early American politics (Fea, 2020). The theory has since absorbed countless successors, from “New World Order” lore to QAnon. For scholarly overviews, see Barkun (2013) on its modern forms and Roberts (1972) on its roots in eighteenth-century secret-society mythology. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) While such claims may have increased with the rise of social media, the term “conspiracy theory” has been with us for some time. The term seems to have first appeared in a New York Times article in 1863 (Caulfield, 2018). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For a brief overview of the philosophical thinking about conspiracy theories, see Pauly (retrieved 2020). For more extensive treatments, see Dentith (2014), Coady (2006) and Uscinski (2018). The first philosopher to address conspiracy theories explicitly and at length was Karl Popper (1966; 1972). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Muirhead and Rosenblum (2019) claim that the recent wave of conspiracy theories, what they call the *new conspiracism,* are not really “theories” at all, since they don’t offer explanations or claims about causes: they are mere insinuations of a conspiracy. Clarke (2002; 2007) also contends that some conspiracy theories are not sufficiently developed to count as theories. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is similar to the definition proposed by Dentith (2014; 2018a) and Keeley (1999). The definition has some open-ended elements. How small must a group be to count as a conspiracy? Qualifying as a member of a conspiracy often depends on how much someone knows about the group’s plans and what level of influence they have over them. What counts as working in secret? To act in secret there must be someone who you’re trying to keep in the dark. But secrecy can’t demand that no one knows about your plans, since *you* do. Generally, conspirators act in secret in the sense that they seek to minimize public awareness of their plans. See Mandik (2007) and Dentith (2014) for more on these issues. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) As Keeley (1999) notes, treating conspiracy theories as epistemically suspect by definition is similar to the way Hume defines miracles as running counter to laws of nature and hence, by definition, irrational to believe. For an introduction to the relevant type of rationality or justification here, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) There are other reasons to prefer a neutral definition. Calling something a conspiracy theory seems to be a claim about what the theory is about, not about the presence or absence of evidence to support it. Likewise, having a neutral definition lets us separate the task of evaluating a theory’s epistemic merits from that of deciding what to call it. The debate about the proper definition of “conspiracy theory” reflects a divide in the philosophical literature on the subject between those who believe that conspiracy theories are inherently epistemically suspect—a.k.a. *generalists*—and those who think that each conspiracy theory should be assessed by its own merits—a.k.a. *particularists*. See Buenting, & Taylor (2010), Dentith (2014; 2018a), Coady (2006), Pigden (2006; 2016). In an effort to accommodate the pejorative connotation of the term, some have offered “conspiracism” as a label for the pathological tendency to believe conspiracy theories independently of their epistemic merits (Dentith, 2014; 2018a). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Coady (2003), however, advocates for a definition that requires a contrast with an official story. For criticisms, see Dentith (2014) and Pigden (2007). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For example, Woodward and Bernstein’s claim—the *conspiracy theory* that the Nixon administration was behind the Watergate break-in—initially contradicted the administration’s own account but was later accepted as the official story. It seems odd to say that Woodward and Bernstein’s story ceased to be a conspiracy theory once it was endorsed by officials, since none of its claims changed. So theories can be, or become, widely accepted yet still be conspiracy theories. For more on the Watergate scandal, see Perlstein, (2020). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This section considers how conspiracy theories fare against their rivals when compared according to certain “theoretical virtues”—i.e., criteria that scientists use, at least implicitly, to select the best theories from among available options. These theoretical virtues include internal consistency, coherence with other accepted theories, evidential support, simplicity, and unification, among others. This section addresses the last three. A theory’s evidential support is largely a matter of how well it fits the data. As for simplicity, one theory is simpler than another if it can explain the same data with fewer causes. Conversely, a theory is more unifying than another if it can explain more with the same resources. Some contend that conspiracy theories perform particularly badly when judged by these standards—e.g., Basham (2001) and Räikkä (2009). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Mandik (2007) and Clark (2002) both point to problems with conspiracy theorists’ appeal to conspirators’ mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions). For Mandik, this appeal, when combined with the claim that conspirators’ avowals are untrustworthy, makes it difficult for conspiracy theories to overcome problems associated with intentional explanations. Clark thinks conspiracy theorists are guilty of the “fundamental attribution error”—i.e., the human tendency to overestimate dispositional factors and underestimate situational factors in explaining the behavior of others. This claim, however, has been challenged by Pigden (2006) and Coady (2003). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Indeed, a lack of evidence for a conspiracy is exactly what we’d expect if there is in fact a conspiracy working to keep its activities a secret. Keeley (2003) concludes from this that unfalsifiability (i.e., the inability to identify a type of evidence that would show the theory to be false) is not a good reason to reject conspiracy theories. Basham (2003) makes a similar claim. Keeley (2003) thinks that absence of evidence may be construed as evidence of absence only when diligent efforts to find evidence, efforts that have succeeded in similar cases, fail. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Keeley (1999) was the first to criticize conspiracy theories for an over-reliance on “errant data” (his term). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Clarke (2002) and Dentith (2019) both point this out in response to Keeley’s criticism regarding “errant data”. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Even when a conspiracy theory does explain or unify more data than its alternatives, this may not make it better. Unifying more data is only advantageous when the data explained is true, and not all data will be. So a theory that explains more eye-witness reports of an event like the 9/11 attacks, need not be better, all things considered, than its competitors, since eye-witness testimony is often compromised by the effects of unconscious bias, faulty memory, and the power of suggestion. This is one of the reasons Keeley (1999) thinks the preoccupation with explaining errant data compromises the evidential support for many conspiracy theories. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) For a detailed account of the “Pizzagate” conspiracy theory, see Robb (2017). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Some suggest that just as—all else being equal—we should avoid explaining events with many causes when fewer will do, we should avoid explaining events by appeal to malice when incompetence will do. This rule of thumb is sometimes called Hanlon’s Razor (*Hanlon’s Razor*, 2020)—a nod to Occam’s Razor, which instructs us to select, all else being equal, explanations with fewer causes over those with many. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) This is Clarke’s (2002; 2007) criticism. He claims that conspiracy theories are “degenerating research programmes” in the sense developed by Lakatos (1970). Pigden (2006), however, questions whether there is genuine support for this claim. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) We might liken conspiracy theorists to followers of millenarianism who, in the wake of a prophesied “Second Coming” that fails to materialize, find ingenious ways to reinterpret those prophecies as referring to some date further in the future (Barken, 2018). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) As the conspiracy expands to include the newspaper’s staff, it can seem less likely that one exists, since larger conspiracies are harder to keep secret and offer more opportunities for investigators to find evidence of their existence. This concern relates to other criticisms regarding how likely conspiracies are in general—i.e., their *prior probability*. Dentith (2014; 2016) claims that conspiracies, defined neutrally, are historically quite common. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Levy (2007) makes a claim along these lines, arguing that a conspiracy theory that contradicts the judgment of relevant “epistemic authorities” is *prima facie* unwarranted. In response to this claim, Dentith (2018b) observes that conspiracy theories often make claims that cut across many different disciplines. For instance, some versions of the “9/11 was an inside job” theory not only make claims that only experts in international politics can confirm—e.g., about the operations of Israeli intelligence services—but also claims that only civil engineers and chemists can assess—e.g., about the way buildings collapse and how insulated steel beams behave under extreme heat. Consequently, there are no experts or “epistemic authorities” on conspiracy theories *per se* and hence there is no relevant, accredited community of inquirers, as there is for fields like civil engineering, chemistry, and international politics. Aside from cases like 9/11 in which the government convened a commission of experts to investigate the attacks, there is no single group whose judgment can be appealed to when appraising a conspiracy theory. In the absence of such a community, conspiracy theorists attempt to cobble together what Dentith (2018b) calls “improvised expertise.” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) One reason for this impasse is that trust in experts depends upon how likely we think conspiracies are in the first place, i.e., their *prior probability*. If they are quite common, then there may be good reasons not to trust experts, since the latter are more likely to be part of a conspiracy. See Basham (2001) and Dentith (2016). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) See [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) This criticism has been leveled, in different forms, by Keeley (1999) and Levy (2007). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) This is Clarke’s (2002) response to Keeley’s (1999) criticism. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) This expression, which refers to the trail of breadcrumbs left by Hansel in the classic children’s fairy tale, is what proponents of the QAnon conspiracy theory use to describe their activities. The supposed government insider, Q, leaves clues or “breadcrumbs” in online discussion forum posts—what are known as “Q drops”—that his followers—self-described “bakers”—attempt to decipher. See Schwartz (2018) for more on the QAnon theory and its advocates. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) We should remember that deferring to experts is part of what it means to “think for ourselves”. Many philosophers think that we are always entitled to rely on the testimony of experts unless there is a specific reason to doubt their reliability. See Watson (2018, October 25). [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) Advances in science and technology require an ever-increasing specialization of knowledge and skills that makes it difficult for any one of us to understand how our world works. This broad historical trend may explain, in part, why conspiracy theorizing is gaining popularity. There are, of course, many more reasons why people find conspiracy theories so compelling, including the thrill of solving puzzles, the desire to be among the “enlightened few,” and the tendency many have to seek out meaningful patterns among unrelated or random things (a.k.a. *apophenia*). For a game-designer’s take on the appeal of the QAnon conspiracy, see Berkowitz (2020). [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) Räikkä (2009) offers a helpful distinction among political conspiracy theories according to whether their claims are *local* (e.g., Watergate), *global* (e.g., the Iran-Contra Affair), or *total* (e.g., the Illuminati) in scope. Räikkä claims that conspiracy theories that aim to explain only limited historical phenomena—i.e., local and global ones—tend to be better supported than total ones, which often posit *permanent* conspiracies (i.e., those that have been around for centuries). It’s interesting to consider whether the QAnon theory, which ostensibly only aims to explain events in US politics, would qualify as *local* according to this distinction. [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) For more on the rise of conspiracy theories in social media, including tips on how to spot them, see Ellis (2018). ### References [Barken, M. 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(2018).](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.001.0001/oso-9780190844073)[ *Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them.* ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.001.0001/oso-9780190844073)[Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190844073.001.0001/oso-9780190844073) [*Was 9/11 an Inside Job?* ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEAwYkvZ5og)[*\[Video\]*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPQWGow2YzE).[ (2016, September 8). ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEAwYkvZ5og)[YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEAwYkvZ5og)[, uploaded by Step Back History.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEAwYkvZ5og) [Watson, J. C. (2018, October 25). “Expertise,” ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/)[*1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/)[. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) [*What is QAnon? How the Conspiracy Theory Gained Traction in the 2020 Campaign* ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMcJGnypBuQ)[*\[Video\]*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPQWGow2YzE)[. (2020, August 12). ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMcJGnypBuQ)[YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMcJGnypBuQ)[*,*](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMcJGnypBuQ)[ uploaded by PBS NewsHour](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMcJGnypBuQ). ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. 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Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/) by Michael Zerella [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta ### Translations [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/komplo-teorileri-jared-millson/), [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/conspiracy-theories/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/conspiracy-theories.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Jared Millson is an Associate Professor in the department of philosophy at Rhodes College in Memphis, TN. His work engages issues in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and logic. Much of it focuses on the nature of inquiry, the logic of questions and answers, and the study of scientific explanation and representation. [jamillson.com](https://www.jamillson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Social & Political **Tags:** conspiracies, conspiracy theories, social epistemology --- ### [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** If homosexuality is wrong, there should be a good reason to believe that. Likewise, if homosexuality is not wrong, there should be a good reason to believe that. This essay reviews some of the most influential arguments on the ethics of homosexuality. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Categories: [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Wordcount: 998 In many countries, people who are homosexual face prejudice, discrimination, and harassment. In some countries, homosexuality is a crime, sometimes even punishable by death.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Presumably, these responses are often motivated by the belief that homosexuality is morally wrong. Indeed, a 2026 survey suggests that about 39% of Americans believe that homosexuality is wrong. In some countries, nearly everyone believes that.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) If homosexuality is wrong, there should be a good reason—a good argument, or arguments—to believe that. Likewise, if homosexuality is *not* wrong, there should be a good reason to believe that. This essay reviews some of the most influential arguments on the ethics of homosexuality.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) [![A crowd picture of the participants in the 2023 Pride Run ATL (Atlanta).](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/pride-run.jpg?resize=656%2C415&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/pride-run.jpg?ssl=1)A crowd picture of the participants in the 2023 Pride Run ATL (Atlanta).### 1. Sexuality People who claim that homosexuality is wrong—or that it is not wrong—might mean a number of different things. This is because sexuality in general refers to many things: *sexual orientation*—the types of people a person tends to be attracted to[\[4\]](#_ftn4)—sexual and romantic behaviors, and more.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Some arguments about homosexuality focus on behaviors, others focus on orientation, and others concern both.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) It is always important to identify the exact conclusion being argued for or against.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. Not Wrong? People who believe that homosexuality is not wrong often appeal to moral principles such as these: - non-harmful actions and ways of living are not wrong; - actions and ways of life that consenting people freely engage in are generally not wrong; - people have the right to seek love, happiness, and connection however they reasonably believe they would best find it, *unless* there’s a good reason to think those ways are wrong.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) They further argue or observe that homosexuality is not, or need not be, harmful in any way; that homosexual relationships involve consenting people; that homosexual romantic relationships are the source of love, connection, meaning, and fulfillment for many people; and that there is no good reason to think that homosexuality is wrong. That final judgment depends on finding the arguments against homosexuality to be unsuccessful.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 3. Wrong? We can’t review them all, but many arguments are given against homosexuality. For each argument, we can evaluate the steps in the reasoning and the premises.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) 3.1. Many arguments depend on premises that are *essential* to the reasoning but are often left unstated. *Counterexamples* suggest they are false, such as:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - *all non-reproductive sexual behaviors are wrong*; however, heterosexuals engage in non-reproductive sexual behaviors and that’s not wrong;[\[12\]](#_ftn12) - *all unnatural behaviors are wrong*; however, “unnatural” can mean many different things, and many “unnatural” activities—wearing eyeglasses, receiving health care, using computers—are not wrong;[\[13\]](#_ftn13) - *all behaviors that animals do not engage in are wrong*; but, many things that animals don’t do—reading, writing, etc.—are not wrong; also, some animals engage in homosexual behaviors;[\[14\]](#_ftn14) - *all ways of living that, if universally adopted, would lead to serious problems are wrong*; however, if *everyone* became, say, a priest or nun (or took any one profession), society could not continue; but that doesn’t mean it is wrong for individuals to become priests or nuns (or have that job); - *all behaviors that some people find offensive, disgusting or disapprove of are wrong*; but, behaviors like that need not be wrong; - *all behaviors that the Bible forbids are wrong*; however, the Bible appears to forbid some actions that many people reasonably believe are not wrong, including escaping slavery, women teaching or exercising authority over men, and divorce and remarriage.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) That the Bible condemns a behavior does not by itself show that the behavior is wrong;[\[16\]](#_ftn16) furthermore, the Bible might not condemn homosexuality anyway;[\[17\]](#_ftn17) and: - *all uses of body parts for anything other than their intended functions is wrong,* and *sexual organs’ primary function is reproduction*: however, body parts often have *many* functions, and, even if one function can be identified as a primary function, using them for other purposes is often fine: e.g., walking on your hands is not wrong, and communicating by blinking wouldn’t be wrong.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Moreover, heterosexual people also use sexual organs for pleasure and connection, not merely reproduction; and some heterosexual couples don’t reproduce, yet that is usually not considered wrong. 3.2. Some arguments appeal to false empirical claims and stereotypes, or reason badly from such claims, such as: - *homosexuality is inherently physically harmful or risky*; but homosexuality need not be physically harmful or risky, any more than heterosexuality can be; also, that an action involves risk or causes some harm does not by itself mean that it is morally wrong: e.g., playing football, eating junk food, donating a kidney; - *homosexual people are more likely to experience certain mental health or relationship problems*: however, even if some such claims are true—which are disputed—that wouldn’t show that homosexuality is wrong. Many *heterosexuals* experience similar problems, yet that is not taken to show that heterosexuality is wrong. Furthermore, the personal challenges homosexual people sometimes experience might be due to the stigma and discrimination they sometimes endure from society, not from homosexuality itself;[\[19\]](#_ftn19) - *homosexual people cannot reproduce*: but, homosexual people *are* physically capable of reproduction—albeit, of course, not with someone of the same sex—*and* they can be good parents; - *homosexual people are more likely to be pedophiles*: however, even if that were true, it would not show that homosexuality is wrong. Some *heterosexual* people are pedophiles, yet that is not taken as an objection to heterosexuality in general. More generally, even if *some* members of a group have bad traits or engage in wrong behaviors, that does not show that being a member of that group is wrong. 3.3. Finally, some arguments against homosexuality are “question-begging”: they assume what they are supposed to support: - claims that homosexuality is wrong because *same-sex relationships are wrong*, or because *only male-female relationships are permissible*, merely restate the conclusion rather than support it; - calling homosexuality a “lifestyle choice” sometimes assumes it’s a *wrong* choice; - predicting that accepting homosexuality is a “slippery slope” to accepting wrong actions assumes homosexuality is wrong.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) ### 4. Conclusion The discussion here suggests that the most influential moral arguments against homosexuality are unsuccessful. Given the consequences of these beliefs, understanding why this is so is important.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Casey, Reisner, Findling, et al (2019) and the ILGA World Database (2026), among many other sources of information on these issues. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Pew Research Center (2026): “39% of U.S. adults say homosexuality is morally wrong – far more than take that position in Germany or Sweden (5% each) but far fewer than in Indonesia (93%) or Nigeria (96%).” [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) While this discussion focuses on arguments about homosexuality, many of the points made here can be extended to common arguments against other forms of non-heterosexuality. While different sexual orientations and identities raise unique issues, people who argue that homosexuality is wrong often make similar arguments against other forms of non-heterosexuality as well. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For further discussion of sexual orientation, see [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Of course, someone can have a sexual orientation but have never engaged in any sexual behaviors. And people *can* engage in sexual behaviors that aren’t supported by their sexual orientation. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Lesage and Miner (2026) report that, based on their survey results, “Americans overall make no distinction between the morality of homosexuality and homosexual behavior.” Since behavior is often influenced by desire, and people’s desires often lead to behaviors—even the behaviors of thinking about someone, arranging one’s schedule with the hopes of seeing someone, being especially attentive and kind to someone, and so on—it makes sense that arguments on these issues would consider both sexual orientation and behaviors: the two are often deeply intertwined. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For fuller discussions of many of the arguments reviewed in this essay, and many more, see Corvino’s (2013) book *What’s Wrong with Homosexuality?*, his widely reprinted (1997) essay, and his (2007) video “What’s Morally Wrong with Homosexuality?” and his many other writings and videos on these issues. Although same-sex *marriage* is a distinct issue from the ethics of same-sex relationships, the two are related because many people who oppose same-sex marriage do so on the grounds that homosexuality is morally wrong: see Corvino and Gallagher (2012). Successfully evaluating arguments requires understanding what makes different types of arguments good and bad: see [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores. Many of the arguments discussed in this essay can be stated in logical form often called a “simple syllogism”: see [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing and [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Common principles like these are related to, and derivative of, some of the most historically influential *ethical theories* or answers to the question, “What makes wrong actions wrong?” with answers that focus on harm, disrespect, and unfairness; on the positive, these theories emphasize producing benefits, such as happiness and increased well-being, respect—often understood in terms of informing other people of one’s intentions and seeking their consent, and fairness, meaning not treating some individuals or groups worse than others, unless there’s a justifying reason that *anyone* would accept. For introductions to these theories, see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz, [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman, and [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) There are also some often-heard arguments in defense of homosexuality appear to be unsound: e.g., that *sexual orientations are not under anyone’s control and that nobody should be blamed or judged morally for things beyond their control*, or that *sexual orientations are innate and so cannot be wrong*. The problem is that it’s possible that something morally wrong or bad could be innate to a person and not under their control: e.g., a person could have very violent tendencies that are “innate” to them, yet those are wrong. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Due to space constraints, in this essay for each argument, a stated or unstated premise *or* the reasoning is evaluated, but often not both. But a full discussion would include both, with all premises, for each argument. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) A “counterexample” is an example or case that is given to show, or try to show, that a generalization or general premise is false: e.g., a counterexample to “All As are Bs” is an A that is not a B. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) It is worth acknowledging that some people do, or at least *could*, believe it is morally wrong for heterosexuals to engage in sexual activity that is not reproductive or intentionally seeks to preclude reproduction. However, this is a minority view. And, most importantly, the reasons offered in support of a view like this can be evaluated just like any other moral argument: we can ask for good reasons to believe this. A related claim is that infertile heterosexual couples may permissibly have sex because their sexual behavior is the “kind” or “type” of act that is reproductive, even though it cannot actually result in reproduction. But the reasoning here is suspect. An infertile couple’s sexual activity is, in fact, non-reproductive: it *is* of that “kind” or “type.” Calling it reproductive, or of that “kind” or “type,” seems to depend on what it could do under very different circumstances, rather than on what it can actually do. But this is generally dubious reasoning: even though cars are generally the kind or type of thing that provide reliable transportation, a broken-down car is not reliable transportation: it’s *not* that kind of thing, it’s the kind of thing that is *not* reliable transportation. So there are complications in successfully making this kind or type of argument. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a review of different definitions of “natural” and different arguments resulting from each definition, see the widely reprinted Corvino (1997) and chapter 4 of Corvino (2013). For some general discussion of what “natural” can mean and how that relates to ethics, see [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) On animal homosexuality, see Bagemihl (1999). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Concerning enslaved people obeying their “masters” see [Ephesians 6:5-6](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ephesians%206%3A5-6&version=NIV); on women teaching or having authority over men, see [1 Timothy 2:12](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Timothy%202%3A12&version=NRSVUE); on divorce and remarriage see [Matthew 5:31–32](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+5%3A31-32&version=NRSVUE), [Matthew 19:3–9](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+19%3A3-9&version=NRSVUE), [Mark 10:2–12](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mark+10%3A2-12&version=NRSVUE), [Luke 16:18](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke+16%3A18&version=NRSVUE), and [1 Corinthians 7:10–11](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Corinthians+7%3A10-11&version=NRSVUE). These are just a few examples of actions that the Bible appears to condemn but that many reasonable people do not believe are morally wrong. Some scholars argue that such passages should be interpreted in light of language, culture, and historical context, rather than understood as literally true or binding today. They likewise argue that biblical passages often understood to condemn homosexuality should be interpreted in these ways, rather than read as straightforward condemnations of homosexuality as it is understood today. See Helminiak (2000). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) For a general discussion of appeals to God in ethical arguments, see [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/) by Nathan Nobis; on arguments from the Bible, see note 2; also see [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) A number of biblical scholars argue that the Bible does not directly address homosexuality as it is commonly understood today—as a sexual orientation or as loving, committed same-sex relationships. See Helminiak (2000), among many other sources. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) On the functions of organs, see [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/) by Michael Zerella. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) For empirical information and social-scientific research concerning the issues of this paragraph, see Meyer (2003) and Omoto & Kurtzman (2006). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For discussion of this type of argument, see Corvino (2005). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) On the moral importance of having strong evidence for one’s beliefs, often in the form of good arguments, see [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. ### References [Bagemihl, Bruce. (1999) ](https://archive.org/details/biologicalexuber00bage)[*Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity*](https://archive.org/details/biologicalexuber00bage)[. St. Martins Press.](https://archive.org/details/biologicalexuber00bage) [Casey, Logan; Reisner, Sari; Findling, Mary, et al. (2019). “Discrimination in the United States: Experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer Americans.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13229)[*Health Services Research*](https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13229)[. 54: 1454–1466.](https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13229) [Corvino, John. (1997). “Why Shouldn’t Tommy and Jim Have Sex? A Defense of Homosexuality.” Originally in John Corvino, ed., ](https://philosophyintrocourse.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/john-corvino-why-shouldnt-tom-and-jim-have-sex.pdf)[*Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and Culture of Homosexuality*](https://philosophyintrocourse.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/john-corvino-why-shouldnt-tom-and-jim-have-sex.pdf) [(Rowman & Littlefield): 3-16. ](https://philosophyintrocourse.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/john-corvino-why-shouldnt-tom-and-jim-have-sex.pdf) [Corvino, John. (2005). “Homosexuality and the PIB argument.” *Ethics* 115 (3): 501-534.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/428456) [Corvino, John. (2007). “What’s Morally Wrong with Homosexuality?” video. ](https://youtu.be/5iXA_0MED98?si=sVWmZPQy728cNS9U)[*Paradise Valley Media*](https://youtu.be/5iXA_0MED98?si=sVWmZPQy728cNS9U)[. On YouTube since (2013). ](https://youtu.be/5iXA_0MED98?si=sVWmZPQy728cNS9U) [Corvino, John, and Maggie Gallagher. (2012). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/27651)[*Debating Same-Sex Marriage*](https://academic.oup.com/book/27651)[. Oxford University Press. ](https://academic.oup.com/book/27651) [Corvino, John. (2013). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/whats-wrong-with-homosexuality-9780199856312)[*What’s Wrong with Homosexuality?* ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/whats-wrong-with-homosexuality-9780199856312)[Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/whats-wrong-with-homosexuality-9780199856312) [Helminiak, Daniel. (2000). ](https://openlibrary.org/books/OL8705907M/What_the_Bible_Really_Says_About_Homosexuality)[*What the Bible Really Says about Homosexuality*](https://openlibrary.org/books/OL8705907M/What_the_Bible_Really_Says_About_Homosexuality)[. Alamo Square Press. ](https://openlibrary.org/books/OL8705907M/What_the_Bible_Really_Says_About_Homosexuality) [ILGA World Database. (2026). “Criminalisation of Consensual Same-Sex Sexual Acts.”](https://database.ilga.org/criminalisation-consensual-same-sex-sexual-acts) [Lesage, Kirsten and Miner, William (2026). How question wording affects polling on the morality of homosexuality. ](https://www.pewresearch.org/decoded/2026/05/06/how-question-wording-affects-polling-on-the-morality-of-homosexuality/)[*Pew Research Center Decoded* ](https://www.pewresearch.org/decoded/2026/05/06/how-question-wording-affects-polling-on-the-morality-of-homosexuality/)[blog. ](https://www.pewresearch.org/decoded/2026/05/06/how-question-wording-affects-polling-on-the-morality-of-homosexuality/) [Meyer, Ilan. (2003). “Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations: conceptual issues and research evidence.” ](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2072932/)[*Psychological Bulletin*](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2072932/)[. 129; 5: 674–697. ](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2072932/) [Omoto, Allen & Kurtzman, Howard (Eds.). (2006). ](https://psycnet.apa.org/PsycBOOKS/toc/11261)[*Sexual Orientation and Mental Health: Examining Identity and Development in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual people.*](https://psycnet.apa.org/PsycBOOKS/toc/11261)[ American Psychological Association.](https://psycnet.apa.org/PsycBOOKS/toc/11261) [Pew Research Center. 2025. “In 25-Country Survey, Americans Especially Likely To View Fellow Citizens as Morally Bad.”](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2026/03/05/in-25-country-survey-americans-especially-likely-to-view-fellow-citizens-as-morally-bad/) ### Related Essays [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/) by Nathan Nobis [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/ "Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology") by Michael Zerella [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson ### Acknowledgements The author thanks John Corvino, Valerie Haftel, Scott Hill, Dan Peterson, Matthew Sanderson, and Allen Stairs for reviewing this essay and providing helpful suggestions for improvement. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/homosexuality.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is co-author of [*Thinking Critically About Abortion*](http://www.abortionarguments.com/), author of [*Animals & Ethics 101*](http://www.animalethics101.com/), and the author and co-author of many other writings and materials in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** corvino, homosexuality, john corvino, Nobis, sexual ethics, sexuality --- ### [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/) **Published:** October 18, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** When we talk about living things, we often describe their parts as if they have purposes or goals or functions. Explanations like these are called teleological: they explain biological features in terms of what they are for. Most sciences explain the world without appealing to purposes or goals. So why is biology different? **Content:** Author: [Michael ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella)[Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/) Word Count: 1000 When we talk about living things, we often describe their parts as if they have purposes or goals or functions.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Bones exist *to* support the body. Enzymes work *to* regulate chemical reactions. The immune system fights infections *so that* the organism survives. Explanations like these are called *teleological*: they explain biological features in terms of what they are for. That may sound natural enough, but it raises a puzzle. Physicists don’t say that rocks exist *in order to* fall, or that rivers flow *so that* they can reach the sea. Most sciences explain the world without appealing to purposes or goals. So why is biology different? This essay explores some of the main attempts to answer these questions and the difficulties each faces. [![An illustration of a human heart, from "Gray's Anatomy" by Henry Gray (1858).](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/heart.jpg?resize=656%2C601&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/heart.jpg?ssl=1) An illustration of a human heart, from *Gray’s Anatomy* by Henry Gray (1858).### 1. Scientific Explanations Before the rise of modern science, it was commonly believed that everything in nature had a purpose, and satisfactory explanations for the existence and characteristics of natural objects or phenomena must include their purposes.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Nowadays, scientists typically understand purposes, functions, and goals as requiring a kind of planning or intentionality that does not exist in most natural phenomena, so they are excluded from most scientific explanations.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) For example, while we might speak metaphorically about a river’s goal of getting to the ocean, or its function of draining the land, it’s not like some water *wanted* to get to the sea and that caused the river to arise and to follow a certain path. So scientific explanations should not include such claims. Instead, scientific explanations say that, given the natural forces involved, a river flowing to the ocean is just something that happened.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Contrast this with sciences that study humans, like psychology and archeology, whose causal explanations *are* expected to include purposes, functions, and goals.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Suppose I go to my refrigerator and get food. A psychological explanation for my behavior that leaves out my goal would be inadequate since my behavior is caused, in part, by my goal (purpose, function) of gathering food. Similarly, an archeological explanation for the existence and characteristics of a piece of ancient pottery should include the intended purpose of the humans who made it. ### 2. Biological Explanations Like most other natural sciences, and unlike psychology and archeology, biology largely excludes any pre-planning or intentionality in its causal explanations,[\[6\]](#_ftn6) yet biology does include talk of purposes, functions, and goals. My heart, we might say, has the goal or function of pumping blood, and that seems to be an important part of any satisfactory explanation for why my heart exists and has the characteristics it has. A similar thing can be said about a variety of biological structures and processes such as bones, skin, internal organs, blood cells, aerobic respiration, and reproduction. However, unless we appeal to an intelligent being to create them—and most scientists do not—it isn’t clear how purposes, functions, or goals can be part of the *causal* explanations for such things.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) If they’re not part of the causal explanation, then pumping blood is just something my heart does, along with making a thumping sound,[\[8\]](#_ftn8) and any talk of purposes, functions, or goals would be merely metaphorical, as it was with the river.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 3. Evolutionary Approaches The embryonic development of my heart came before my blood even existed, so the pumping of my blood (my heart’s main goal) could not have helped cause my heart’s existence.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Therefore, many authors try to explain the causal influence of biological purposes, functions, and goals in biology by drawing upon the evolutionary past.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Every organism’s main features came about through its species’ history of adaptive evolution. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that an adaptive goal was part of the evolutionary cause of each functional trait. However, a fundamental tenet of contemporary biology is that mutations do not occur *in order* to produce adaptive traits.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Instead, mutations and their resulting traits are just things that happen, so the functional goal of a trait could not have played a role in the original mutation(s) that caused the trait. A defender of the evolutionary approach may reply that even if original mutations are not goal-directed, it’s still true that the pumping of blood by my ancestors’ hearts helped cause the existence of my heart today: the pumping of blood by my ancestors’ hearts helped them to survive and reproduce, eventually leading to the existence of me and my heart. By contrast, the thumping sounds of those ancestral hearts did not causally contribute to the existence of my heart. Therefore, my heart’s blood-pumping function is part of its causal explanation while sounds are not. That explanation sounds reasonable, but it still has a problem. My heart’s supposed goal is to pump *my* blood, not my ancestor’s blood. Therefore, even if the pumping of my ancestor’s blood helped cause my heart to exist, that is not the goal of *my* heart, so we still have not shown that the goal of my heart is part of the causal explanation for my heart.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 4. Present-Focused Approaches Other approaches claim that presently-existing goals are the cause of every goal-directed feature or action of an organism and its parts.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) This approach requires that goals are present in such a way that they could exert the necessary causal influence. However, it isn’t clear how goals such as circulation or rigid support could be physically encoded into genes or tissues such that the goals could be part of a causal mechanism.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Without such encoding, present-focused approaches have trouble distinguishing the “real” function of a biological feature vs. its mere side-effects, without relying on our human tendency to pick out certain effects as somehow special or important relative to the feature’s other effects.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 5. Conclusion Organisms and their parts definitely *seem* to have purposes, functions, and goals, and including them in our biological explanations does make the life sciences much easier to understand, even if it turns out that causal explanations in biology should not include such notions. Consequently, biologists are likely to continue using them, despite their absence in most other sciences.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Although they may have subtly different meanings and implications, *purposes*, *functions*, and *goals* are considered together here because they all include, or are directed toward, specific end states. That is, they each imply a state of affairs that would count as success, whether that is fulfillment of a purpose, performance of a function, or achievement of a goal. And so, as we see immediately below, these are all *telological* concepts: *teleology* (from the Greek telos, meaning ‘end’ or ‘purpose’) refers to explanations in terms of goals, functions, or ends. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Obviously, many religions have proposed that a divine being or beings designed and created all of nature with certain plans, purposes, functions, or goals in mind. Perhaps the most prominent naturalistic (by which I mean non-religious) theory of nature that includes purposes, functions, and goals, was proposed by Aristotle. He believed that there are four parts to any causal explanation for things found in nature. One of those four was the “final cause” or “telos” of the natural item, which was the function that the item performed. For example, part of the natural explanation for rain might include its function in watering plants. See Falcon (2023) for a good overview of Aristotle’s claims. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/) by Addison Ellis for further elaboration on the role of conscious planning in causal explanations, especially in archeology. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) More specifically, given the local geology, hydrology, rainfall patterns, and topography, water ended up flowing along a course that happened to end at an ocean. No goals or functions are invoked by scientists when providing such explanations. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Most scientific explanations for the existence and specific characteristics of objects, events, or other phenomena include (as much as possible) the physical, causal mechanisms that produce those phenomena. Causal explanations are important because science strives to do more than just discover *that* something exists or that two things are correlated. Science strives to explain *how* or *why* something happened, usually in terms of the interactions between physical objects and forces. Scientists and engineers use those causal explanations to change the resulting phenomena or to develop new technologies. Therefore, this essay assumes that a proper scientific explanation should be a causal explanation. Although fundamental physics is outside the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that explanations in that field may not always be causal in the way described so far. Explanations in physics sometimes involve basic features of the universe such as the geometry of spacetime as part of their explanations, and those are typically understood to be different from the objects and forces used in most causal explanations. Sometimes physicists even invoke goals or purposes in their explanations, such as when they invoke Fermat’s Principle and other extremal principles in classical dynamics and optics. See Sklar (2012) for more on extremal principles in physics. For a more thorough overview of what is needed for causal explanations involving purposes, functions, and goals to be scientifically accurate, see Wright (1973) or Nissen (1993). For a good introduction to causal mechanisms, see Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) I’m setting aside animal behaviors like foraging, nest-building, and tool use that may be causally explained, in part, by the goal-directed mental states of the animals. See [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist for a discussion of the existence of mental states in nonhuman animals. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See [Design Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf for an overview of the famous proposal that the functional complexity of organisms implies the existence of a divine creator. A recent variant of Creationism is so-called Intelligent Design Theory, which claims that at least some biological structures or processes cannot be explained without appeal to an intelligent force of some kind. See Young and Edis (2004) for a deeper explanation of Intelligent Design Theory, along with a variety of arguments against its use in the biological sciences. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) If my heart does have a real function, then the sound it makes is a mere side effect of my heart’s blood-pumping function. If my heart does not have a real function, then its pumping and its sound are just two of the things my heart produces, and the only reason left for saying that pumping is the goal is that we, as intelligent beings with a strong interest in life, consider the pumping effect of a heart to be special. Distinguishing between proper functions and mere side-effects is one of the main challenges faced by any account of goal-directedness, whether in biology or anywhere else. See Wright (1973), Cummins (1975), or Nissen (1993) for a good overview of this issue. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) This is important because it seems to admit that purposes, functions, and goals do not really exist in biology, similar to what is assumed in most other natural sciences. Some authors in this area, such as Mayr (1974) and Wuketits (1980), accept this and argue that the use of purposes, functions, and goals in biological explanations is merely metaphorical or, at most, is a weaker form of goal-directedness compared to the goal-directedness found in fields like psychology and archeology. See [Philosophy of Archaeology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/13/philosophy-of-archaeology/) by Indy Smith for more regarding archeological methods. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Nissen (1993) explains that this would be so-called “reverse-causation” in which a thing that only exists at a later time causes an event at an earlier time, before the supposed cause even existed. That kind of reverse-causation is assumed to be impossible in biology. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For some representative examples, see De Laguna (1962), Ayala (1970), or Wright (1976). This backward-looking approach to identifying purposes, functions, and goals is common in archeology, so perhaps it works in biology, too. For example, archeologists sometimes have to decide whether something found at a dig site is just a random feature resulting from natural processes or is a human artifact with a function. The answer typically comes from considering the time before the thing came into being, to see whether its origin involved human planning or was the just result of purposeless natural forces. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Typically, new anatomical or physiological traits are the result of mutations or other changes at the genetic level. Such genetic changes are “blind” in the sense that the causes of the genetic changes do not (and cannot) take the resulting organism’s needs into account. Consequently, most genetic changes have either a neutral or negative effect on the resulting organism’s ability to survive and reproduce. By pure chance, a genetic change may end up actually improving the resulting organism’s chances of survival and reproduction. If that change is sustained over generations, we refer to it as an “adaptation” even though that may be somewhat misleading, as it implies intentionality or planning when used in other contexts. For example, the claim, “My team adapted to the changing circumstances” implies that my team recognized the changing circumstances and the problems they would cause, then formed and implemented a successful plan to solve those problems. There do not appear to be any biomolecular mechanisms that can do a similar thing at the genetic level. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) A modified version suggests that it is the general pumping of blood (not specifically my blood or my ancestor’s blood) that is the functional goal of all hearts. The general goal of pumping blood existed before my heart developed, and that general goal seems like part of the reason that any hearts exist, so it may be a good basis for the causal explanation for the existence of all hearts, including mine. See Neander (1991) for a good version of this approach. However, Nissen (1993) argues that such a claim shifts from talking about a specific physical action (pumping my blood or a specific ancestor’s blood), to talking about a *type* of physical action (the general pumping of blood). Unfortunately, a *type* is an abstract category, and as such cannot have any causal influence in the way required. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Falk (1981) and Wuketits (1980) for some representative examples of such approaches. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Remember that in psychology and archeology, goals are assumed to be present in a way that *does* allow them to have the necessary causal influences. Human brains (and many non-human brains) can do this because they have highly versatile and malleable neural networks capable of forming or representing goals and then initiating the actions needed to achieve those goals. On the other hand, things like bones, muscles, genes, and metabolic pathways do not seem to have the right kind of complexity needed to encode or represent their supposed goals. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See footnote eleven for an elaboration of this issue. It is a variation on the problem of distinguishing functions vs. side-effects, as discussed in Wright (1973), Cummins (1975), and Nissen (1993). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Mayr (1974) and Wuketits (1980) explain how purposes, functions, and goals provide a very useful heuristic in the life sciences even if they turn out to be fictional. Scientists from a variety of fields employ many such useful fictions in understanding and explaining their fields of study, which is ok as long as we remember that such things are fictional. ### References [Ayala, Francisco J. (1970) “Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/teleological-explanations-in-evolutionary-biology/8138B5E882D974551D987444EFA1E3C1?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[*Philosophy of Science*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/teleological-explanations-in-evolutionary-biology/8138B5E882D974551D987444EFA1E3C1?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[. 37(1) pp. 1-15](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/teleological-explanations-in-evolutionary-biology/8138B5E882D974551D987444EFA1E3C1?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark). [Cummins, R. (1975) “Functional Analysis”](https://doi.org/10.2307/2024640)[ *Journal of Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.2307/2024640)[, 72(20), 741-765](https://doi.org/10.2307/2024640). [De Laguna, Grace. 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Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/aristotle-causality). [Falk, Arthur E. (1981) “Purpose, Feedback, and Evolution.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/purpose-feedback-and-evolution/2F0860DF3880EF16C80E8854AE19151B?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[*Philosophy of Science*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/purpose-feedback-and-evolution/2F0860DF3880EF16C80E8854AE19151B?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[. 48 pp.198-217](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/purpose-feedback-and-evolution/2F0860DF3880EF16C80E8854AE19151B?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark). [Kincaid, Harold (1990) “Molecular Biology and the Unity of Science.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/molecular-biology-and-the-unity-of-science/0AB765B7337B75A1BCD8EAD45401A8A0?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[*Philosophy of Science*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/molecular-biology-and-the-unity-of-science/0AB765B7337B75A1BCD8EAD45401A8A0?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[. v.57 pp. 575-593](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/molecular-biology-and-the-unity-of-science/0AB765B7337B75A1BCD8EAD45401A8A0?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark). [Machamer, P., Darden, L., Craver, C. (2000) “Thinking About Mechanisms”](https://www.jstor.org/stable/188611)[ *Philosophy of Science*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/188611)[, 67, 1-25.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/188611) [Mayr, Ernst (1974) “Teleological and Teleonomic: A New Analysis” ](https://rdcu.be/eAEny)[*Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*](https://rdcu.be/eAEny)[. v.14 pp. 91-117](https://rdcu.be/eAEny). [Neander, Karen (1991) “Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/functions-as-selected-effects-the-conceptual-analysts-defense/F795898C6DCCA8061B63CD4CB1A3AC60?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[*Philosophy of Science*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/functions-as-selected-effects-the-conceptual-analysts-defense/F795898C6DCCA8061B63CD4CB1A3AC60?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[. v.58 pp.168-184](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy-of-science/article/abs/functions-as-selected-effects-the-conceptual-analysts-defense/F795898C6DCCA8061B63CD4CB1A3AC60?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark). [Nissen, Lowell (1993) “Four Ways of Eliminating Mind From Teleology.” ](https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(93)90023-D)[*Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*](https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(93)90023-D)[. 24(1) p. 27-48](https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3681(93)90023-D). [Rudwick, M. J. S. (1964). “The inference of function from structure in fossils.” ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1093/bjps/XV.57.27)[*The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1093/bjps/XV.57.27)[, 15(57), 27-40](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1093/bjps/XV.57.27).. [Sklar, Lawrence. (2012) “Extremal Principles” in ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/philosophy-and-the-foundations-of-dynamics/extremal-principles/D6FDAF941AA1CBC4B843BFDBBFC93E49?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[*Philosophy and the Foundations of Dynamics*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/philosophy-and-the-foundations-of-dynamics/extremal-principles/D6FDAF941AA1CBC4B843BFDBBFC93E49?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[ Ch. 11, pp. 102-109. Cambridge University Press](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/philosophy-and-the-foundations-of-dynamics/extremal-principles/D6FDAF941AA1CBC4B843BFDBBFC93E49?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark). [Wright, Larry (1973) “Functions.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183766)[*Philosophical Review*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183766)[. v.82 pp. 139-168](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183766). [Wright, Larry (1976) ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1977-02169-000)[*Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions*](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1977-02169-000)[. Berkeley: University of California Press](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1977-02169-000). [Wuketits, Franz (1980). “On the Notion of Teleology in Contemporary Life Sciences.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00779.x)[*Dialectica*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00779.x)[. 34(4) p.277-290](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00779.x). [Young, M. and Edis, T. (Eds.). (2004) ](https://a.co/d/70wKO48)[*Why Intelligent Design Fails: A Scientific Critique of the New Creationism.* ](https://a.co/d/70wKO48)[Rutgers University Press](https://a.co/d/70wKO48). ### Related Essays [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Philosophy of Archaeology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/13/philosophy-of-archaeology/) by Indy Smith [Design Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/) by Addison Ellis [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis ### Translation [Turkish](https://thecurious.tr/yazilar/bilim-felsefesi/teleolojik-aciklamalar-biyolojide-amaclar-islevler-ve-hedefler-michael-zerella/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Teleological-Explanations.pdf). ### About the Author [Michael ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella)[Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella) is a philosophy instructor at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He earned a bachelor’s degree in biology in 1993 and a master’s in biology in 1995. He then taught high school science classes for several years before going back to grad school at the University of Colorado to earn his Ph.D. in philosophy in 2011. Unsurprisingly, he specializes in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. Mike also enjoys the classic summertime Colorado activities like hiking, biking, camping, gardening, and going to bluegrass music festivals. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Science **Tags:** teleological, teleology, Zerella --- ### [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) **Published:** January 5, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay focuses on the interplay between sex and gender. **Content:** Author: Raja Halwani Categories: [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word count: 998 Nearly all, if not all, people have *sexual orientations*,[\[1\]](#_ftn1) commonly understood to refer to one’s sexual attraction to members of their same or opposite sex.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) What we can call the “Orthodox Account”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) is that there are three sexual orientations: gay, straight, and bi. These categories, however, might not exhaust all the possible sexual orientations: e.g., there are men attracted to transwomen who have not had genital surgery; people attracted to gender-ambiguous people; women attracted to transmen; and more.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This essay focuses on how examples like these illustrate the interplay between sex and gender, and how this interplay raises doubts about the Orthodox Account of sexual orientation.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) [![sexual orientation](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sexual-orientation.jpg?resize=590%2C333&ssl=1)](#_ftn5) ### 1. Sex and Gender Sex and gender are metaphysical and moral minefields, especially gender. Roughly, *sex* refers to the biological differences between men and women (including primary and secondary sex characteristics), and *gender* refers to the psychological, emotional, or social roles that are typically based on the sex differences. While gender encompasses various aspects of someone’s identity, crucial for our purposes is *gender presentation*, because sexual attraction is usually based on appearance, and gender presentation is an important part of someone’s appearance.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Gender presentation is important also because on its basis one forms beliefs about the sex of the person to whom one is attracted: e.g., John, who is gay, meets Robert, whom he finds attractive. This is both because of Robert’s physical appearance and Robert’s gender presentation as a man, on which John forms the belief that Robert is biologically male (a cisman).[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Beliefs about the sex of the person to whom one is attracted usually play an important role in sexual attraction. This is because sexual attraction typically (though not only) takes primary and secondary sex characteristics as its basis and, often, its target or object.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The difference between basis and object is best seen in the context of love:[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Juana loves Roberta because Roberta makes Juana happy. The basis or reason for Juana’s love—*why* she loves—is that Roberta makes her happy. But the object of her love—*what* she loves—is Roberta herself. So John is attracted to Robert *because*, in part, he believes that Robert is male, and Robert’s sexual parts are (some of) the *objects* of John’s attraction. ### 2. Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender Suppose, however, that Robert is a transman who has had only top (no genital) surgery. What happens when John finds out? Well, his belief that Robert’s sex matches his gender comes to the fore and is falsified. As a result, he might lose his sexual attraction to Robert. But he might not. This raises the question: is sexual orientation based on sex, gender, or both? To answer, let’s consider the contrasts between the views of Robin Dembroff and Kathleen Stock. Dembroff has recently argued for a conception of sexual orientation that they call “Bidimensional Dispositionalism.”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The “bi” in the name refers to the two dimensions of sex and gender.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) On this view, one is sexually oriented to others on the basis of a particular combination of sex and gender. To Dembroff, this is necessary given that people are frequently sexually attracted to individuals with particular primary and secondary sex characteristics, *and* that there is a growing number of people who are attracted to transgender individuals.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) On this view, one can be attracted to only cisgender women, to only post-op transwomen, to both, and so on. What is crucial is that because sexual attraction “tracks both gender- and sex- attraction,” it “tracks various combinations of these attractions,” including being attracted only on the basis of sex (regardless of gender presentation) or gender (regardless of sex).[\[13\]](#_ftn13) By contrast, Stock considers sexual orientation to cause attraction to people of a particular sex.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) She argues that gender presentation or expression is not usually on its own an object of attraction, because attraction to gender presentation is “inevitably inflected with prior understandings of the Sex that the person is and what is stereotypical for that Sex.”[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Even if John is attracted to Cliff, a highly effeminate man, male effeminacy is different from female effeminacy, such that John’s attraction is underpinned by his beliefs about Cliff’s sex. Stock concludes that gender as the object of sexual desire, regardless of beliefs about sex, is not widespread, so there is no reason to believe that the Orthodox Account is wrong.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 3. Further Clarifications One issue between Bidimensional Dispositionalism and the Orthodox Account is the extent to which each reflects the reality of sexual orientations—for example, how many people do have sexual orientations to, say, genderqueer persons compared to those with the “orthodox” sexual orientations? I set this issue aside because it is (partly) an empirical question and one in need of much data.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Another issue is which view is more politically useful or accommodates current political and social goals.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) I also set this question aside because political goals can vary and clash.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Instead, I end by returning to the distinction between the *object* and the *basis* of sexual attraction. If John sexually desires Robert, then Robert himself, alive and embodied, is the object of John’s sexual attraction.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Parts of Robert (e.g., genitalia, thighs) are also objects of sexual attraction.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Is Robert’s gender presentation an object of attraction? It’s unclear that it is, though clearly it is a common basis for someone’s attraction to another. The general point is that if sexual orientation is a concept that revolves around the object, rather than the basis, of sexual attraction, and if it turns out that gender (or sex) is usually the basis rather than the object of attraction, this might help settle some of the questions about the connections between sexual orientation, on the one hand, and sex and gender, on the other. ### 4. Conclusion Both gender and sex are crucial for understanding sexual orientation. But how and in what ways are questions in need of answers. The answers will be difficult to attain given the need for more empirical data, for clearer conceptual work, and the charged politics of it all. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Asexual people, who have no sexual attraction to anyone, might not have sexual orientations, although this is not the case if asexuality is also a sexual orientation. See Bogaert (2015). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The language of “same” and “opposite sex” is part of a popular view of sexual orientation, so it should not be taken to imply the non-existence of intersex people. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The name is from Stock (2019, 295). Stock includes other elements in the orthodox view, including that it refers to the sex of the person with the orientation: a lesbian is a *woman* who is attracted to women. Depending on future empirical and philosophical findings, the Orthodox Account might need to change its language from “same and opposite sex” to something like “same and other sexes.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Transwomen with no genital surgery are people who were born male, have developed female breasts through treatment, but who have not altered their male genitalia. Transmen are people who were born female but who transitioned, medically or not, to become men. A gender-ambiguous person is someone who adopts an identity that has no clear gender (so they could be bigender or all-gender). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Other ways to question the Orthodox Account’s view on the number of sexual orientations are by asking whether there are orientations for age, for non-human animals, and for dead human beings, for example, since it is not obvious that sex or gender must be the only bases of sexual orientation and that some people might be attracted to things regardless of their sex and gender. Questions about the number of sexual orientations are also motivated by pushing against the distinction between *sexual orientation* and *sexual preferences*: the former takes a type of sex or gender as its object (women), and the latter takes specific aspects of that type as its object (blonde or skinny women). The Orthodox Account would consider a man’s attraction to young boys (or older women) a *preference*, but one can deny this and think of it as a *sexual orientation*, though one that takes age-sex as its object. See Wilkerson (2013) for discussion of what makes a sexual attraction an orientation as opposed to a preference. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Giles (2015, 6-25) for why sexual attraction is based on appearance. By “appearance” I mean primarily physical appearance, but physical appearance is also tied to mannerisms (gesticulation, way of talking), which themselves can enhance (or detract from, depending on the case) the attraction. Mannerisms are also part of gender presentation and are, in this respect, diverse. For example, Robert can gender present not only as a man, but also as effeminate or masculine; or he can gender present as a man by wearing male sports attire or a suit. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) A cisman (or a ciswoman) is someone whose gender matches their sex. Note that John need not use the word “cisman” (indeed, outside academic circles, the use of “cis” is not very common). One is not usually aware of this belief formation, which can occur quickly. But when there is a perceived mismatch between one’s sex and one’s gender the belief formation might become conscious. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Giles (2008, ch. 4). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Soble (1990, 4 and *passim*). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Dembroff (2016). A couple of other philosophers, especially Wilkerson (2013), have raised doubts similar to Dembroff’s about the Orthodox Account. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) One crucial aspect of Bidimensional Dispositionalism is that it does not include a reference to the sex or gender of the person with the orientation, an inclusion that is found in the Orthodox Account. For example, a man and a woman attracted to other men would have the same sexual orientation on Bidimensional Dispositionalism (but different ones on the Orthodox Account). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Dembroff (2016). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Dembroff (2016, 17; 38). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Stock defends another part of the Orthodox Account, which is its reference to the sex of the person with the sexual orientation (2019, 295). It is important that a gay man is a *man* who is attracted to other men. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Stock (2019, 304). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Stock (2019, 306). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) “Partly” because conceptual issues are also present: how are we to conceptualize what a genderqueer person is, not to mention other new genders that have recently arrived on the social scene? The empirical studies are also paltry. See Kuper, Nussbaum, and Mustanski (2012) and Morandini, Blaszczynski, and Dar-Nimrod (2017). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Both Dembroff and Stock provide political reasons for adopting their respective views of sexual orientations. Dembroff (2016, 7-10), for example, argues that their view undermines the assumption of cisheterosexuality (the view that non-cis and non-hetero orientations are deviant), while Stock (2019, 307-312) argues that the Orthodox Account is important for addressing various areas (e.g., reproductive medicine, the criminalization of same-sex behavior) that affect, respectively, heterosexual women and lesbians. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) I am also somewhat skeptical of analyzing and defining concepts based on social and political goals—what is sometimes called “ameliorative reasoning” (see Haslanger \[2012, Pt. III, esp. chs. 13 & 14\])—given that such goals can clash and be the product of (potentially fashionable) trends in thinking. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Unless John is a necrophile, a dead Robert would not normally be an object of sexual attraction to him. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Whether non-physical parts, such as someone’s intelligence and accent, can be objects of sexual attraction is more debatable, though they clearly enhance or detract from the attraction to physical parts. See Giles (2015, 13-14) and Nagel (1969). ### References [Bogaert, Anthony (2015). “Asexuality: What It Is and Why It Matters.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00224499.2015.1015713)[*Journal of Sex Research* ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00224499.2015.1015713)[52 (4): 362-379.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00224499.2015.1015713) [Dembroff, Robin (2016). “What Is Sexual Orientation?” ](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0016.003/--what-is-sexual-orientation?view=image)[*Philosophers’ Imprint*](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0016.003/--what-is-sexual-orientation?view=image)[ 16 (3): 1-27.](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0016.003/--what-is-sexual-orientation?view=image) [Giles, James (2008). ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780761840411/The-Nature-of-Sexual-Desire)[*The Nature of Sexual Desire*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780761840411/The-Nature-of-Sexual-Desire)[. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780761840411/The-Nature-of-Sexual-Desire) [Giles, James (2015). ](https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=A4141C)[*Sexual Attraction: The Psychology of Allure*](https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=A4141C)[. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger.](https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=A4141C) [Haslanger, Sally (2012). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/resisting-reality-9780199892624?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/resisting-reality-9780199892624?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/resisting-reality-9780199892624?cc=us&lang=en&) [Kuper, Laura, Robin Nussbaum, and Brian Mustanski (2012). “Exploring the Diversity of Gender and Sexual Orientation Identities in an Online Sample of Transgender Individuals.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00224499.2011.596954)[*Journal of Sex Research*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00224499.2011.596954)[ 49 (2-3): 244-254.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00224499.2011.596954) [Morandini, James, Alexander Blaszczynski, and Ilan Dar-Nimrod (2017). “Who Adopts Queer and Pansexual Identities?” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00224499.2016.1249332)[*Journal of Sex Research*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00224499.2016.1249332)[ 54 (7): 911-922.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00224499.2016.1249332) [Nagel, Thomas (1969). “Sexual Perversion.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024152)[*Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024152)[ 66 (1): 5-17.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024152) [Soble, Alan. (1990). ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xp3txp)[*The Structure of Love*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xp3txp)[. New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xp3txp) [Stock, Kathleen (2019). “Sexual Orientation: What Is It?” ](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article/119/3/295/5573243)[*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article/119/3/295/5573243)[ 119 (3): 295-319.](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article/119/3/295/5573243) [Wilkerson, William (2013). “What Is ‘Sexual Orientation’?” In ](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Sex-Nicholas-Power/dp/1442216719)[*The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings*](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Sex-Nicholas-Power/dp/1442216719)[, 6th ed., edited by Nicholas Power, Raja Halwani, and Alan Soble, 195-214. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Sex-Nicholas-Power/dp/1442216719) ### For Further Reading [Corvino, John (2006). “Orientation, Sexual.” In ](https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=B6128C)[*Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia*](https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=B6128C)[, edited by Alan Soble, 728-734. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.](https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=B6128C) [Halwani, Raja, “Sex and Sexuality”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/sex-sexuality/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/sex-sexuality/)[(Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/sex-sexuality/) [Ruse, Michael (1988). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Homosexuality.html?id=TWWGAAAAIAAJ)[*Homosexuality*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Homosexuality.html?id=TWWGAAAAIAAJ)[. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.](https://books.google.com/books/about/Homosexuality.html?id=TWWGAAAAIAAJ) [Soble, Alan. “Philosophy of Sexuality.” In ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/sexualit/)[*the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.iep.utm.edu/sexualit/)[. ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/sexualit/) [Stein, Edward. (1999). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-mismeasure-of-desire-9780195142440?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-mismeasure-of-desire-9780195142440?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-mismeasure-of-desire-9780195142440?cc=us&lang=en&) ### Related Essays [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sexual-orientation-sex-and-gender.pdf). ### About the Author Raja Halwani is professor of philosophy at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago. He is the author of [*Philosophy of Love, Sex and Marriage: An Introduction*](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Love-Sex-and-Marriage-An-Introduction-2nd-Edition/Halwani/p/book/9781138280205), the lead editor of [*The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, Seventh Edition*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781442261440/The-Philosophy-of-Sex-Contemporary-Readings-Seventh-Edition), and many other writings. [philpeople.org/profiles/raja-halwani](https://philpeople.org/profiles/raja-halwani) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** sexual orientation, sexual preferences --- ### [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) **Published:** December 9, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** We love our friends, our family, and our romantic partners. We love them in very different ways, though, so we might wonder what, if anything, makes all of them cases of the same thing, namely, love. What is it to love someone? **Content:** Author: [Felipe Pereira](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pereira/) Category: [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 1,000 We love our friends, our family, and our romantic partners. We love them in very different ways, though, so we might wonder what, if anything, makes all of them cases of the same thing, namely, love. What is it *to love* someone?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![Kiss of Love photo. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/kiss_of_love.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/kiss_of_love.jpg?ssl=1)Mother kissing a child.### 1. Desiring to care for and to be with someone A natural thing to say is that to love someone is to desire to care for and to be with them.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) However, desiring to care for and to be with someone doesn’t seem *necessary* for loving them. It’s possible to love a cranky grandfather or a smothering parent, even if you don’t want to be in their company, caring for them.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Desiring to care for and to be with someone doesn’t seem *sufficient* for loving them either. Suppose you witness someone getting injured in an accident. You might develop the desire to care for, and to be with, the injured stranger out of benevolence or moral duty. But this doesn’t mean you *love* the stranger.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Taking someone’s well-being as your own Another idea is that to love someone is just to take their well-being as a *part* or an *extension* of your own well-being.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) On this view, loving someone involves finding no distinction between what is in your interest and what is in theirs—finding that to benefit them *just is* to benefit you, and to harm them *just is* to harm you. An advantage of this account is that it helps us make sense of how we tend to speak about our loved ones. We often hear people say things like, *“If you’re messing with someone I love, you’re messing with me!”* and *“When my beloved died, I lost a part of myself.”* Yet, it’s reasonable to wonder whether this account is taking literally what people mean to say metaphorically.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Also, this view seems to eliminate the possibility of genuine self-sacrifice for our loved ones. How could we make sacrifices for our loved ones, if promoting their interests is just another way of promoting *our own*?[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Being disposed to be affected by someone A weaker, and perhaps more plausible, version of this idea is that to love someone is just to be *disposed* to be affected by changes in their well-being.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) On this view, the well-being of a loved one is distinct from, but can causally impact, your own: e.g., if you were to witness your loved one suffering, that would cause you to suffer. However, most of us would feel bad if we were to witness complete strangers suffering, and we don’t love complete strangers. One might argue, in reply, that although we’d feel bad watching a stranger suffering, we wouldn’t feel bad *enough* for that to count as “love.” But this reply raises the question of *how much* suffering would be enough for love. Is there a good answer to this question? Perhaps not. ### 4. Valuing someone Another proposal is that to love someone is just to value them a great deal. But how so? Your boss might value you a great deal as an employee; this wouldn’t mean they *love* you. So, if this account is going to get off the ground, it has to tell us more about what makes love a distinct way of valuing someone. #### 4.1. Valuing someone *for (certain) qualities* One might say that loving someone involves valuing them for displaying qualities from a more narrow list—a list that doesn’t include qualities like “being a great employee,” but that does include qualities like “being charming,” “being witty,” “being brave,” and so on.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Yet, this view has counterintuitive implications. It implies, e.g., that if you were to somehow come across a perfect clone of one of your loved ones, except *slightly more* charming, witty, and brave, then you would have a reason to switch your love to the clone. But this might be too fickle; it seems incompatible with the deep personal commitment we have with our loved ones.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) #### 4.2. Valuing someone *as a person* Some believe that every person deserves to be loved *simply because* they’re a person. On this view, to love someone is to fully appreciate the value of their personhood.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) We *should* love everyone. We don’t do that because we’re psychologically limited: we can only appreciate so many people. However, claiming to love someone “because they’re a person” sounds strained at best.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Moreover, this proposal seems to conflate love with respect—we don’t have to *love* someone to appreciate their worth as a person; respecting them would suffice.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) #### 4.3. Valuing someone *for being related to you* Another proposal is that loving someone involves valuing them for being *related* to you in some special way—for being, e.g., your mother, daughter, sister, friend, partner, etc.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) But, if loving someone amounts to valuing them because they’re related to you in a special way, then it should be impossible to love someone who *isn’t* related to you in any special way.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) And yet, it *does* seem possible to love someone—someone who isn’t (and doesn’t want to be) your friend, relative, or romantic partner—unrequitedly.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) #### 4.4. Valuing someone *by bestowing value onto them* Finally, one might argue that we don’t value our loved ones because we *recognize* some way in which they are valuable *prior* to our love for them. Rather, we value them because our love *makes* them valuable to us. In other words, the suggestion is that to love someone is just to bestow or project value onto them.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) But, if our loved ones have value for us *because* we love them, then we can’t appeal to someone’s value to *justify* loving them. This means that the question, “Why am I worthy of love?” has no answer—some are uncomfortable with this implication.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Nor can we appeal to the fact that someone’s a genocidal maniac as a justification for *not* loving them—and this seems obviously false.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### 5. Conclusion If none of these views are satisfactory, that might be a reason to reject the assumption that there is something which all cases of love have in common. Perhaps love is undefinable.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Lots of things are hard (or impossible) to define, and that doesn’t mean they aren’t real or important. So we’ll continue to love, even if we don’t know exactly what we are doing or how to define it.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) It is important to note two things about this essay. First, this essay is concerned with what it is to love *someone*, i.e., what it is to love a particular *person*. It may be interesting, however, to think about whether there is anything in common between the way we love people and the way we love things other than persons (e.g., sports teams, mementos, etc.). Second, this essay is *not* concerned with whether love is a biological phenomenon, a socially constructed phenomenon, or some sort of mixture of both. For readers interested in that question, see Jenkins (2017). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Several contemporary philosophers subscribe to some version of this view. E.g., Gabriele Taylor writes, “ if *x* loves *y* then *x* wants to benefit and be with *y”* (1976: 157). Alan Soble argues that “a common feature” of cases where some person x loves some other person y is that “x desires for y that which is good for y, x desires this for y’s own sake, and x pursues y’s good for y’s benefit and not for x’s” (1997: 67). Harry Frankfurt also defends the claim that, “loving something … is not merely a matter of liking it a great deal or of finding it deeply satisfying” but is rather a species of “disinterested concern for the well-being or flourishing of a beloved object.” (1998, chs. 11 and 14). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Velleman (1999: 353). See also Matthes (2016) for a fascinating discussion about loving people *in spite of* their character defects. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Helm (2009). It may be interesting to think about whether it is possible to avoid this objection by specifying the *way* in which one desires to care for and be with loved ones. A promising suggestion along these lines comes from Sophie Grace Chappell, who argues that love is distinct from impartial forms of benevolence because, unlike mere benevolence, love entails the desire to make a *first-personal* contribution to a person’s well-being. “Loving someone,” she writes, “means wanting to be constitutively involved in his well-being: it means wanting to be, myself, part of what makes life go well for him. … To straightforward benevolence towards X, it cannot matter whether it is *me* who brings about X’s well-being. The concern is merely that someone should. To love, by contrast, it typically does matter that it should be me” (2014: 86; her italics). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Robert Solomon writes, “It is often said that to love is to give in to another person’s needs, indeed, to make them more important than one’s own. But to love is rather to take the other’s desires and needs *as* one’s own. This is much more than a merely grammatical point. It is a redefinition of the self itself, as a shared self” (1981: 150; his italics). Along similar lines, Roger Scruton argues that two people love each other “just so soon as reciprocity becomes community: that is, just so soon as all distinction between my interests and your interests is overcome” (2006: 230). Many major figures in the history of philosophy have, at one point or another, suggested that to love someone is just to foster (or to desire to foster) a significant kind of union with them. One way of cashing out this “significant kind of union” is in terms of treating one’s well-being and the well-being of the loved one as two parts of the same whole, of a single unity. It is important to note, however, that philosophers have cashed out this “significant kind of union” in a variety of other ways. See, e.g, Plato’s Aristophanes (*Symposium*: 189c-193e), Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*: IX, 9, 1170b1), Augustine (*Confessions*: IV, 6), and Montaigne (*Essays*: I, 28). Contemporary proponents of the union account of love include: Nozick (1989, ch. 8), Solomon (1981) and (1994), Delaney (1996), Baxter (2005), Scruton (2006, ch. 8), Westlund (2008), and Gilbert (2013, ch. 11). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Several philosophers have noted that, if we take reports like *“I lost a part of myself when my beloved died”* and *“If you’re messing with them, then you’re messing with me!”* to be literally true, then we run the risk of suggesting, implausibly, that you and your loved ones are one and the same person. Also, we would risk putting love in direct tension with individual autonomy. If there is no distinction between your interests and those of your loved one’s, then whenever you make a decision about your interests, you’re also making a decision about *their* interests *for them*. Many philosophers find this result morally unpalatable. For further discussion, see Lugones (1987), Singer (1994, ch. 6), Soble (1997), Friedman (1998), and Whiting (2016: 46-8). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Soble (1997: 86). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Robert Nozick has gestured towards this view. He writes that, “What is common to all love is this: Your own well-being is tied up with that of someone (or something) you love. When a bad thing happens to a friend, it happens to her and you feel sad for her; when something good happens, you feel happy for her” (1989: 68). It is worth noting, however, that Nozick at times seems sympathetic to the account described in section 2 of this essay. He goes on to say, for example, that “When something bad happens to one you love, \[…\] something bad also happens *to you*” (1989: 68; his italics). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) It may be interesting to think about whether it is possible to determine which qualities belong to this restricted set, and which ones do not, without being arbitrary. Simon Keller attempts to accomplish this in his article, “How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count the Properties” (2000: 165-166). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Grau (2004) for an excellent discussion about the relationship between loving someone and finding them irreplaceable. Grau plausibly cashes out the irreplaceability of our loved ones in terms of their historical properties. Some might say that to love someone is just to value them for their historical properties—e.g., for being the person with whom you went on a date in October 2016. The trouble with that proposal is that the historical properties of our loved ones don’t seem to be valuable *prior* to our love for them, in the way the property of “being brave” is. It seems, rather, that the historical properties of our loved ones are valuable for us *because* we love these people. If that’s true, then this proposal is susceptible to the same objections raised against bestowal accounts of love, discussed in section 4.4 of this essay. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) David Velleman, e.g., argues that when we love someone, “we are responding to the value that he possesses by virtue of being a person or, as Kant would say, an instance of rational nature” (1999: 365). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Kolodny (2003: 173-79); Millgram (2004); Bagley (2015: 483-86). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Velleman accepts that love and respect are both responses to the same thing, namely, someone’s value as a person. He distinguishes love from respect in terms of their *effects*. According to him, respect prevents us from being self-interested, while love prevents us from being emotionally defensive—that is, loving someone makes us vulnerable to experiencing emotions we wouldn’t experience towards strangers (1999: 360-61). However, if this is the only difference between love and respect, then love would lose much of its explanatory power. To illustrate the point, imagine one of your loved ones has just lost a race. Presumably, you would feel sad or disappointed. Are there *good reasons* for you to have that emotional response towards your loved one but not towards some stranger who has also lost the race? The intuitive answer is that what warrants that emotional response towards your loved one (but not the stranger) is *precisely* the fact that you love her (and not the stranger). But, as Bennett Helm rightly notes, “this answer is unavailable to Velleman, because he thinks that what makes my response to your dignity \[as a person\] be that of love rather than respect is precisely that I feel such emotions, and to appeal to my love in explaining the warrant of these emotions therefore would be viciously circular” (2010: 27). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Niko Kolodny, e.g., argues that “love consists (a) in seeing a relationship in which one is involved as a reason for valuing both one’s relationship and the person with whom one has that relationship, and (b) in valuing that relationship and person accordingly” (2003: 150). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Stump (2006: 26-7). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) In most cases, when you love someone unrequitedly, they are acquainted with you. Thus, one might suggest that, in such cases, it’s possible to value your loved one for being your acquaintance. See Protasi (2016) for an excellent discussion, and critique, of this sort of response. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Irving Singer, e.g., writes, “In loving persons, … people bestow value upon one another over and above their individual or objective value” (1984: 6). “Insofar as love is bestowal,” he argues, “it creates a kind of value in the beloved that goes beyond appraisal. In loving another, in attending to and delighting in that person, we *make* him or her valuable in a way that would not otherwise exist” (1994: 2; his italics). Harry Frankfurt, along similar lines, has claimed that, “what we love necessarily *acquires* value for us *because* we love it. (2006: 39; his italics). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See Keller (2000). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Many proponents of the bestowal account of love are willing to accept that love isn’t something that can (or need to) be justified. See, for instance, Singer (1984), Frankfurt (2006: 39-40), or Smuts (2015: 101-3). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Ronald de Sousa explicitly defends this view. In “Love Undigitized”, he writes, “Particular loves link particular persons. There is no essence of love” (1997). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See Helm (2010), Bagley (2015), and Protasi (2016), Pismenny and Prinz (2017), and Yao (2020) for some promising alternative accounts of love. ### References [Aristotle (2014). ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/nicomachean-ethics-reeve-edition)[*Nicomachean Ethics*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/nicomachean-ethics-reeve-edition)[. C. D. C. Reeve (trans.). 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(1994). ](https://mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.7551/mitpress/9780262513579.001.0001/upso-9780262513579)[*Meaning in Life: The Pursuit of Love.*](https://mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.7551/mitpress/9780262513579.001.0001/upso-9780262513579)[ MIT Press.](https://mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.7551/mitpress/9780262513579.001.0001/upso-9780262513579) [Smuts, A. (2015). Is it better to love better things? In Tony Milligan, Christian Maurer & Kamila Pacovská (eds.), ](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137383303)[*Love and Its Objects: What Can We Care For?* ](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137383303)[Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 91-107.](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137383303) [Soble, A. (1997). Union, autonomy, and concern. In Roger E. Lamb (ed.), ](https://www.amazon.com/Roger-Lamb/dp/0813332230/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=love+analyzed&qid=1590105765&s=books&sr=1-1)[*Love Analyzed*](https://www.amazon.com/Roger-Lamb/dp/0813332230/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=love+analyzed&qid=1590105765&s=books&sr=1-1)[. Westview Press. pp. 65-92.](https://www.amazon.com/Roger-Lamb/dp/0813332230/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=love+analyzed&qid=1590105765&s=books&sr=1-1) [Solomon, R. (1981). ](https://www.amazon.com/Love-Metaphor-Robert-C-Solomon/dp/0879755695/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1592101641&sr=1-1)[*Love: Emotion, Myth, & Metaphor*](https://www.amazon.com/Love-Metaphor-Robert-C-Solomon/dp/0879755695/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1592101641&sr=1-1)[. Prometheus Books.](https://www.amazon.com/Love-Metaphor-Robert-C-Solomon/dp/0879755695/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1592101641&sr=1-1) [Solomon, R. (1994). ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/about-love)[*About Love: Reinventing Romance for Our Times*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/about-love)[. Hackett Publishing.](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/about-love) [Sousa, R. (1997). Love undigitized. In Roger E. Lamb (ed.), ](https://www.amazon.com/Roger-Lamb/dp/0813332230/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=love+analyzed&qid=1590105765&s=books&sr=1-1)[*Love Analyzed*](https://www.amazon.com/Roger-Lamb/dp/0813332230/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=love+analyzed&qid=1590105765&s=books&sr=1-1)[. Westview Press. pp. 189-207.](https://www.amazon.com/Roger-Lamb/dp/0813332230/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=love+analyzed&qid=1590105765&s=books&sr=1-1) [Stump, E. (2006). Love, by all accounts. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27645191?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27645191?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[80 (2): 25-43.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27645191?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [Taylor, G. (1976). Love. ](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article/76/1/147/1810224)[*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article/76/1/147/1810224)[ 76 (1): 147-164.](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article/76/1/147/1810224) [Velleman, J. (1999). Love as a moral emotion. ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/233898)[*Ethics*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/233898)[ 109 (2): 338-374.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/233898) [Westlund, A. (2008). The reunion of marriage. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=monist_2008_0091_0003_0558_0577&file_type=pdf)[*The Monist*](https://www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=monist_2008_0091_0003_0558_0577&file_type=pdf)[ 91 (3-4): 558-577.](https://www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=monist_2008_0091_0003_0558_0577&file_type=pdf) [Whiting, J. (2016). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/first-second-and-other-selves-9780199967919?cc=us&lang=en&#:~:text=In%20her%20essay%20collection%20First,contemporary%20philosophical%20work%20on%20personal)[*First, Second, and Other Selves: Essays on Friendship and Personal Identity*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/first-second-and-other-selves-9780199967919?cc=us&lang=en&#:~:text=In%20her%20essay%20collection%20First,contemporary%20philosophical%20work%20on%20personal)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/first-second-and-other-selves-9780199967919?cc=us&lang=en&#:~:text=In%20her%20essay%20collection%20First,contemporary%20philosophical%20work%20on%20personal) [Yao, V. (2020). Grace and alienation. ](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0020.016/1)[*Philosophers’ Imprint* ](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0020.016/1)[20 (16): 1-18.](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0020.016/1) ### Related Essays [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [“Hell is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/ "Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control") by Matthew Pianalto [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milone & Katie Stockdale [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani ### Acknowledgments I would like to thank Taylor Cyr, Nikki Ernst, Dan Lowe, Nathan Nobis, Sara Protasi, Parker Rose, Lemuel Tang, Travis Timmerman, and Vida Yao for their kind and attentive comments on earlier versions of this essay. ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/love.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Felipe Pereira](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pereira/) is a PhD student at the University of Pittsburgh. His current research interests are in ethics and moral psychology. He is co-author of “[The (Un)desirability of Immortality](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12652)” in *Philosophy Compass* and “[Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0006.025?view=text;rgn=main)” in *Ergo*, both written with Travis Timmerman. He is also the author of “[Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/)” in *1,000-Word Philosophy*. [felipe-pereira.weebly.com](https://felipe-pereira.weebly.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Sex & Gender **Tags:** love, Pereira, philosophy of love, what is love --- ### [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Imagine throwing a party with delicious food where you and your friends debate what love is. Ancient Greek philosopher Plato (428–348 BCE) tells a similar story in his Symposium. This essay introduces Plato’s Symposium by summarizing the core philosophical views in its speeches. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/) Word count: 1000 Imagine throwing a party with delicious food where you and your friends debate what love is. Ancient Greek philosopher Plato (428–348 BCE) tells a similar story in his *Symposium*. In this work, Plato describes a banquet attended by a small gathering of people—a physician, a poet, a philosopher, among others—who take turns competing to see who can give the best speech about love. The speeches mostly focus on romantic love, but they can apply to other types of love as well. This essay introduces Plato’s *Symposium* by summarizing the core philosophical views in its speeches.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [!["The Kiss" by Gustav Klimt. Oil and gold leaf on canvas. 1907-1908.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The_Kiss_-_Gustav_Klimt_-_Google_Cultural_Institute.jpg?resize=656%2C658&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The_Kiss_-_Gustav_Klimt_-_Google_Cultural_Institute.jpg?ssl=1)“The Kiss” by Gustav Klimt. Oil and gold leaf on canvas. 1907-1908.### 1. Phaedrus Phaedrus speaks first and argues that love can inspire moral excellence or virtue: it can motivate people to try to become the best version of themselves for their beloved because we want to impress them and make them think highly of us.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) For example, Phaedrus claims that lovers might feel intense shame when their beloved discovers that they’ve done something immoral. Phaedrus also says love can inspire the lover to perform great heroic acts, including possibly even dying for one’s beloved. ### 2. Pausanias Pausanias is next and argues that there are two different kinds of love, and Phaedrus’ view of love applies only to *noble* love, the love of another person’s character and values.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) According to Pausanias, there is also *vulgar* love, a desire only for physical bodies and short-term gratification. Pausanias’ view that noble love focuses on humans as *persons* lays the groundwork for later speakers to talk about love as a longing for something that’s profoundly meaningful. The first two speeches also urge us to think of love as a type of desire.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 3. Eryximachus As a physician, Eryximachus seeks to broaden the discussion from focusing on love between humans to viewing love as a cosmic force found in all things—e.g., animals, plants, etc. More specifically, Eryximachus views love as a desire or drive for order and balance at work in the universe. Thus, he sees love as the restorative power in nature. To love is to want to make harmony out of discordance and wholeness out of fragmentation. For instance, loving your romantic partner means that, after an argument, you likely want to “make up” with them. ### 4. Aristophanes Playwright Aristophanes speaks of love as the desire to find your “other half”—to be completed or made whole by your romantic partner. To explain why, he tells a mythical story rich with symbolism.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) He says there were originally three kinds of humans: some male, some female, and some androgynous (i.e., half male and half female). Each had a round body and possessed twice the number of limbs and organs than we do now. Because of their strength and power (twice the amount of biceps!), they became arrogant and challenged the gods. The chief god, Zeus, decided to punish them by cutting them in half. Since then humans have searched for their other half to restore the wholeness of their original form. Each half of an original man seeks another man, while each half of an original woman seeks another woman. The halves of the original androgynous humans search for people of the opposite sex. In short, humans desire to *reunite* with their other half or “soul mate.” Notice that Aristophanes follows Eryximachus in arguing that love is a desire for wholeness or harmony. ### 5. Agathon Agathon, a poet, argues that previous speeches only discussed what love *does* or the effects of love, but not what love *is*. Thus, Agathon seeks to focus on the nature of love itself independent of its consequences. To do this, he speaks in flowery language to emphasize that love is beautiful. ### 6. Socrates Socrates’ speech argues that love *itself* is not beautiful, because love *desires* beauty and therefore lacks it. Socrates further reasons that because love wants to possess beauty always and forever, love is also the desire for immortality. However, because we are mortal beings, the best we can do to achieve immortality, according to Socrates, is to give birth (either literally or metaphorically) to beautiful creations that we “leave behind” after we die. This can include birthing human children, but also great moral deeds and works of art, literature, etc. Perhaps the most famous part of Socrates’ speech is his “ladder of love”—which he says he learned from his teacher, the priestess Diotima—wherein he describes the journey of personal growth from vulgar to noble love. Socrates says that people typically begin in youth by loving *one* beautiful *body*. However, we eventually realize that there are *many* beautiful bodies, and thus come to love *all* beautiful bodies and physical beauty in general. Next we realize that what we really love in beautiful bodies is humans as *persons*, especially their character and values. But then we figure out that what makes persons beautiful is their moral excellence, and thus we begin to love and desire the most impactful form of that excellence: just (i.e., fair) laws and institutions. Next we realize that what makes laws and institutions beautiful is the *thinking* behind them, and so we begin to love learning and seek wisdom. This can ultimately lead us to become philosophers, as philosophy means love of wisdom.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Then we finally realize that what we really love and desire is beauty *itself*, i.e., the idea or concept of beauty in general.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Thus, “true” (or noble) love, for Socrates, leads to philosophical enlightenment. ### 7. Alcibiades The last speech is by Alcibiades who dramatizes the ladder of love by praising Socrates as an exemplar of virtue and wisdom.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Alcibiades also recounts how Socrates rejected his romantic advances, which demonstrates Socrates’ refusal of vulgar love in favor of the higher rungs of the ladder of love. ### 8. Conclusion Overall, Plato’s *Symposium* highlights that love is not just an emotion or feeling, but also a type of desire focused on attaining higher moral and “spiritual” goals such as virtue, beauty, and wisdom. To love well, in Plato’s view, is to desire what is truly profound. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay summarizes *The Symposium* of Plato (385-370 BCE/2013). For a general introduction to Plato’s thought, see Grube (1980). For introductions to other specific works of Plato, see [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins, these essays by Spencer Case: [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/), [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/), and [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/), [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case, and [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/) by Nathan Nobis. For an introduction to the philosophy of love and friendship, see Solomon et. al. (1991), Helm (2021), as well as [What Is It To Love Someone? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/)by Felipe Pereira and [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. For a more detailed introduction to Plato’s philosophy of love and friendship, see Reeve (2021). Throughout history Plato’s *Symposium* has been a source of controversy at various times primarily due to its discussions and depictions of *pederasty* (i.e., mentoring relationships between adult males and adolescent boys in Ancient Greece that had an erotic or sexual element) and homosexuality found throughout the work in both subtle and overt forms. In 2026 it became a source of controversy for a new reason: because of Aristophanes’ mythical story involving three genders. In January 2026, Texas A&M University banned the teaching of the Symposium on the grounds that the work violates a new state law that prohibits teaching that there are more than the two genders of male and female. For an overview of the history of controversy surrounding Plato’s *Symposium*, including the recent controversy at Texas A&M University, see Reeser (2026). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Thus, love can lead to what some philosophers call a “transformative experience.” For an introduction to philosophical reflections on transformative experiences, see [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Sometimes the two types of love are described as “heavenly love” and “common love.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) In other words, Plato thinks of love as what the ancient Greeks called “eros.” We get our word “erotic” from “eros,” but sexual love is only one type of eros and, for Plato, an inferior type. Overall, eros can be understood as any type of love that is fueled by passionate desire. Thus, for example, the philosopher’s passionate search for truth and wisdom is often understood as a kind of eros or erotic pursuit. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) It’s most likely that Aristophanes doesn’t believe this story really took place in history. Instead, he likely makes up the story to dramatically illustrate his view that love is the desire for one’s other half. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For a general introduction to philosophy, including its connection to wisdom, see [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For Plato, beauty is decidedly *not* in the eye of the beholder, i.e., *not* subjective. Instead, Plato believes that the essence or defining characteristics of beauty—what he calls the “Form” of beauty—is objectively real, universal and eternal. For an introduction to Plato’s concept of “Forms,” see [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins. For a discussion of what it means to think of beauty as subjective or in the eye of the beholder, see [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Thus, Alcibiades’ love and speech for Socrates is an important dramatization of Socrates’ views in the context of the story as a whole. ### References [Grube, G.M.A. (1980). Plato’s Thought. Hackett Publishing. ](https://hackettpublishing.com/political-theory/plato-s-thought) [Helm, Bennett. (2021). “Love.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/love/) [Plato. (385-370 BCE/2013). Symposium. The Project Gutenberg. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1600/1600-h/1600-h.htm) [Reeser, Todd W. (January 15, 2026). “Setting Plato Straight All Over Again.” Inside Higher Ed. ](https://www.insidehighered.com/opinion/views/2026/01/15/long-history-censoring-plato-over-gender-opinion) [Reeve, C.D.C. (2023). “Plato on Friendship and Eros.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-friendship/) [Solomon, Robert C., et. al. (1991). The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love. University Press of Kansas.](https://kansaspress.ku.edu/9780700604807/) ### Related Essays [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/) by Nathan Nobis [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Plato-Symposium.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy),* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)[*.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Sex & Gender **Tags:** love, Plato, Sanderson, Symposium, The Symposium --- ### [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) **Published:** February 3, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the theory of personal identity known as a psychological theory of personal identity: the nature of persons is that we are our conscious mind and memories. **Content:** Author: [Kristin Seemuth Whaley](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Seemuth-Whaley) Category: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 996 Think about a memory from childhood: something you did or something that happened to you. That was *you*, right? But what makes you the same person as the kid you remember being? This question concerns *personal identity*, what makes someone one and the same person over time.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Some answers appeal to *biological* sameness: being, in some sense, the same organism over time.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Other answers appeal to *psychological* sameness: having, in some sense, the same mind over time. Personal identity is explained in psychological terms: having conscious experiences and memories of these experiences. This essay explores such psychological approaches. [![An image of "teletransportation" from "Star Trek." Traveling by teletransporter appears to depend on a psychological theory of personal identity.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/teletransporter.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/teletransporter.jpg?ssl=1) An image of “teletransportation” from “Star Trek.” Traveling by teletransporter appears to depend on a psychological theory of personal identity.### 1. Psychological Theories We sometimes think, “I’m not the same person I used to be.” Many of our characteristics change; we are not what’s called *qualitatively identical* over time. But, literally, each of us *is* the same person we used to be. Personal identity is a matter of being what’s called *numerically identical* to who we used to be—being one and the same person, a single individual.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) famously argued that persons are conscious, intelligent beings, capable of rationality and reflection, including self-reflection.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) See for yourself: you are such a being![\[5\]](#_ftn5) Locke then theorized that personal identity is a matter of *consciousness*: “as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This is sometimes understood as a *memory theory* of personal identity: person *A* is numerically identical to some past person, *B*, if and only if *A* remembers experiences had by *B*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) According to memory theory, you are numerically identical to the kid you remember being *because* you remember their experiences. Locke’s theory presumably does not require perfect memory: we forget things we’ve experienced.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Rather, it requires that a continuous series of changing conscious states connects someone to their past and future selves. Today you remember what you did yesterday; yesterday you remembered what you did the day before, etc. Each conscious moment directly connects to those that precede and follow it. So, Locke’s theory is sometimes alternatively understood as a *psychological continuity theory* of personal identity*:* person *A* is numerically identical to some past person, *B,* if and only if *A* is psychologically continuous with *B*. Although you’ve psychologically changed since childhood—you’ve had new experiences, formed memories and forgotten others, gained preferences, abandoned interests—you’re still the same person. These changes contribute to the continuous flow of consciousness, connecting your childhood self to you now. According to psychological continuity theory, that’s why you are the kid you remember being. Psychological continuity theory reflects an important philosophical (and mathematical!) principle, the *transitivity of identity*. For example, I am the author of this essay, and the author of this essay is Kristin Seemuth Whaley. You can therefore conclude that I am Kristin Seemuth Whaley because identity is transitive.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) We can see such transitivity in this scenario: Kelly, a high-school student, thinks back to childhood and remembers dropping an ice cream cone on the ground. Later, in college, they remember being in high school but have forgotten the ice cream. That college-age-Kelly doesn’t remember dropping the ice cream doesn’t mean they didn’t do it. Psychological continuity, too, *is* transitive. The high-schooler is psychologically continuous with the child, and the college student is psychologically continuous with the high-schooler. Therefore, the college student and the child are psychologically continuous with each other, through the high-schooler. Through many years of changing but continuous psychological states, each *is* Kelly. ### 2. The Duplication Case Philosophical thought experiments demonstrate an interesting implication of psychological theories: that multiple people could be psychologically continuous with a single past person![\[10\]](#_ftn10) Imagine this: Kelly is diagnosed with an untreatable illness. Doctors propose a cutting-edge procedure to download Kelly’s consciousness and then “transplant” it, uploading it into another body. Kelly reports to Room A; the doctors perform the procedure on Kelly and a donor body. Afterward, the patient in Room B with Kelly’s consciousness wakes up and thinks, “Amazing! I have a new body and no illness!” In case anything went wrong, the doctors had a backup plan: duplicating Kelly’s consciousness into a *second* donor body in Room C. This patient, too, wakes up and thinks, “Amazing! I have a new body and no illness!”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Each patient is psychologically continuous with Kelly. So, it may seem that the patient in Room B *is* Kelly and, for the same reasons, the patient in Room C *is* Kelly. If each patient is Kelly, then the transitivity of identity entails that the patients are numerically identical to each other. But Kelly cannot be *both*; the patients are *two different people*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Because of these implications, some philosophers have proposed revised psychological theories. ### 3. Revised Psychological Theories Some propose that personal identity is a matter of being psychologically continuous with *at most one* person.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) If so, the doctors’ backup plan causes Kelly’s demise; a patient psychologically continuous with Kelly *is* Kelly as long as uploading happens only once.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Others suggest that *numerical* identity over time isn’t what matters when we consider our pasts and futures: what matters is whether our interests will continue to be pursued, regardless of how many persons who are psychologically continuous with us pursue them.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) If so, the doctors’ backup plan actually *doubles* the likelihood that Kelly’s interests will be satisfied; two distinct patients *who share the same past* can continue living a life Kelly cared about. ### 4. Conclusion Psychological theories are ethically significant.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) They suggest that we never were embryos, which had no conscious experiences. And we will never be patients on life-support with no possibility of regaining consciousness. Without the capacity for consciousness, these beings cannot be psychologically connected to us; they couldn’t be us, for *we* are conscious beings.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Psychological theories may also provide hope for an afterlife, supernatural or technological: once someone physically dies, they can survive as long as their consciousness does. While theories of personal identity cannot guarantee the realization of this possibility, they prompt us toward further inquiry about ourselves, our pasts, and our futures. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For a general introduction to this topic see Chad Vance’s [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For biological accounts of what we are and how we remain the same individual over time, see my [Are we Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) To see the distinction between qualitative and numerical identity, consider the claim: *Laurel’s book is identical to Lenny’s*. If we mean *qualitative* identity, then it’s possible that Laurel has one copy of the book and Lenny has another. Being copies of the same book, they are identical with respect to their qualities. But if we mean *numerical* identity, then Laurel and Lenny are sharing *one and the same copy* of the book. There is just *one* book there. Likewise, mathematical expressions like 1=1 are expressions of *numerical* identity. They express the idea that each side of the equation *is the very same thing,* not that each side of the equation is merely *similar* to the other. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Locke (1690, II.xvii.9). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Philosophers recognize that such beings are persons, but there is debate about which beings who *lack* these features are also persons. For discussion, see Jonathan Spelman’s [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) and Nathan Nobis’s [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Locke (1690, II.xvii.9). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Here ‘*A*’ and ‘*B*’ each refer to a person. These labels remain neutral with respect to whether each refers to the very same person or different persons. If, in this case, *A* remembers experiences had by *B*, then ‘*A*’ and ‘*B*’ would, indeed, refer to the same person. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Thomas Reid (1785) discusses this issue, which elaborates on concerns from Butler (1736). We also sometimes *falsely* seem to remember things that we haven’t done. But a memory theory does not distinguish between false and genuine memories. Plausibly, if it was *not* you who experienced what you seem to remember experiencing, then this is a false memory; if it *was* you who experienced what you seem to remember experiencing, then this is a genuine memory. However, this distinction appeals to personal identity to determine whether a memory is false or genuine, and the memory theory appeals to memory to determine personal identity. A memory theorist who appeals to such a distinction is therefore relying on circular reasoning. For further discussion, see Olson (2019, §4). For debates concerning the interpretation of Locke’s theory and a discussion of objections to them, see Gordon-Roth (2019). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) In general, if identity holds between *A* and *B* and between *B* and *C*, then by the transitive property, *A* is identical to *C*; *A is C*. Other familiar properties, like *being taller than* or *being a sibling of* are also transitive. If Mara is taller than Nelson, and Nelson is taller than Oliver, then Mara is taller then Oliver. If Oliver is a sibling of Nelson and Nelson is a sibling of Mara, then Oliver is a sibling of Mara. For further discussion of the transitivity of identity, see also Graham Seth Moore’s [Frege’s Puzzle and the Meaning of Words](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/11/19/freges-puzzle-and-the-meaning-of-words/). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This possibility is often explored fictionally; consider the movie (especially the [ending](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4Rrj5eRdy0) of) *The Prestige* (2006) or [transporter](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geMGo2P94j4) [mishaps](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnUqGTNezME) in the *Star Trek* series. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For the sake of contrast, consider also the brain transplant case in my [Are we Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/). Analogous implications arise in considering the possibility of an afterlife. If surviving into an afterlife depends on psychological continuity between the person who physically died and the person existing in an afterlife, what happens if *two* afterlife people are psychologically continuous with the person who died? The possibility of duplication would arise here, too. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) If the patients do not have all their features in common, then they are not numerically identical to each other; see Leibniz’s Law (Forrest 2010). Since they are in different places, each patient has at least one feature that the other lacks. Beyond the fact that they are in two different places, even psychological continuity theory entails that they are not identical because they are not psychologically continuous with each other. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For discussion of “fission” cases (where psychological continuity branches into more than one continuer) and responses to them, see, e.g., Lewis (1976), Parfit (1984), and Shoemaker (1984). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) This is referred to as a *non-branching requirement,* which has the counterintuitive consequence that your identity through time depends on something completely external to you: if someone makes a copy of you, then *you* would cease to exist *even if* there is no interaction between the original and the copy, according to a non-branching view. For more discussion of such consequences, see Olson (2019, §5). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Parfit (1984). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Especially relevant are applied issues in bioethics, including abortion, euthanasia, and the use of advance directives. See Nathan Nobis’s [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) and [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) and DeGrazia (1999) respectively. Shoemaker (2019) also discusses the relevance of personal identity to ethics. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Such consequences might prompt us toward consideration of biological approaches to our identity instead, according to which we *were* embryos and *could* be patients with no possibility of regaining consciousness. See my [Are we Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) for discussion. ### References [Butler, Joseph (1736). “Appendix I,” The Analogy of Religion.](http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/butler_identity.pdf) [DeGrazia, David (1999). “Advance directives, dementia, and ‘the someone else problem’,” ](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11658127/)[*Bioethics*](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11658127/)[ (13)5: 373-91.](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11658127/) [Gordon-Roth, Jessica (2019). “Locke on Personal Identity,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-personal-identity/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-personal-identity/) [Forrest, Peter (2010). “The Identity of Indiscernibles,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/) [Lewis, David (1976). “Survival and Identity,” in ](https://books.google.com/books?id=GsxDABuVh9YC)[*Identity of Persons*](https://books.google.com/books?id=GsxDABuVh9YC)[, ed. A. Rorty, University of California Press, 17-40. ](https://books.google.com/books?id=GsxDABuVh9YC) [Locke, John (1690). “On Identity and Diversity” (II.xxvii), ](https://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf)[*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*](https://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf)[.](https://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf) [Olson, Eric (2019). “Personal Identity,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#Fis)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#Fis)[, ed. Edward N. Zalta](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#Fis)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#Fis) [Parfit, Derek (1984). ](https://books.google.com/books?id=SlgY93k936UC)[*Reasons and Persons.* ](https://books.google.com/books?id=SlgY93k936UC)[Oxford University Press.](https://books.google.com/books?id=SlgY93k936UC) [Reid, Thomas (1785). “Memory” (Essay 3), ](https://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1785essay3.pdf)[*Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*](https://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1785essay3.pdf)*.* [Shoemaker, Sydney (1984). “Personal Identity: a Materialist’s Account,” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SHOPIG)[*Personal Identity*](https://philpapers.org/rec/SHOPIG)[, eds. S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Blackwell, 67-132. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SHOPIG) [Shoemaker, David (2019). “Personal Identity and Ethics, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/identity-ethics)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/identity-ethics)[, ed. Edward N. Zalta](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/identity-ethics). ### Related Essays [Personal Identity: How We Exist ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/)[Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Are we Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [Frege’s Puzzle and the Meaning of Words](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/11/19/freges-puzzle-and-the-meaning-of-words/) by Graham Seth Moore [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis ### Acknowledgments Many thanks to my Fall 2021 PHI101 class at Carroll University for their insights and comments on this essay. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/psychological-approaches-to-personal-dentity.pdf). ### About the Author [Kristin Seemuth Whaley](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Seemuth-Whaley) teaches philosophy at Carroll University in Wisconsin. She specializes in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, and she is a recipient of the AAPT Grant for Innovations in Teaching. [KristinSeemuthWhaley.com](http://kristinseemuthwhaley.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [**Facebook**](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [**Bluesky**](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [**Instagram**](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [**Twitter / X**](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [**Threads**](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [**TikTok**](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [**LinkedIn**](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [**1000WordPhilosophy.com**](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** derek parfit, John Locke, Locke, Parfit, personal identity, psychological theories of personal identity, Seemuth-Whaley --- ### [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) **Published:** August 1, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the ethics of Mo Di, or Mozi, (墨子, c. 470 – c. 391 BCE), the founding figure of Mohism, a philosophical, social, and self-defense movement during the Warring States era (479–221 BCE) in China. **Content:** Author: Henrique Schneider Categories: [Chinese Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word count: 994 Mo Di, or Mozi[\[1\]](#_ftn1), (墨子, c. 470 – c. 391 BCE) is the founding figure of *Mohism*, a philosophical, social, and self-defense movement during the Warring States era (479–221 BCE) in China. Mohism, as much of early Chinese philosophy, ties ethics and political philosophy into a system that has as its goal to establish social order.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Mohists argue that the correct ethical standards are the ones that maximize the well-being of the community, that *partiality—*believing our primary ethical obligations are towards our own families*—*does not maximize the well-being of the community, and so the correct ethical standard requires treating people with “impartial care.” Impartial care becomes the main principle for organizing a community or a state. This essay explains their arguments. [![Mozi 墨翟](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/mozi.jpg?resize=656%2C656&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/mozi.jpg?ssl=1) Mozi 墨翟### 1. Rejecting Confucianism Context helps understand the novelty of Mohism, which was the first philosophical alternative to Confucianism. There are many differences between the two. Regarding individual actions, Mohists maintain that the moral value of an act depends on its consequences*:* they are *consequentialists*. Confucians focus on the virtue of the agent, the social role they perform, and the rituals they follow*:* they accept a form of *virtue ethics*. About political and social philosophy, Mohist consequentialism argues that the value of a political system depends on its increasing good consequences or utility for the whole community. Confucians believe that a social system is a network of people acting virtuously, according to their roles and following religious and social rituals.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) These two differences become especially salient regarding Confucian *partiality*. Confucianism focuses on cultivating emotions and attitudes which align agents with their roles in their families.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Confucians believe that people have a primary ethical obligation toward their own families. The virtue determining this relationship is *filial piety*. It requires people to develop and act on emotions of special love for their parents, including putting them above other social relationships: e.g., Confucius explains that a virtuous son supports his father, for example by lying or standing by the father’s actions, even when the elder acts criminally.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) 2. Partiality as a Problem Mohists reject this partiality. Instead, they imagine every person to be part of a community of equals: the correct ethical standard maximizes the utility of this community as a whole also benefits all people in that community. This is because a single person’s well-being is a function of the quality of life of the whole community, and not an individual standard.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The utility of the community can be increased if rules, or laws, were common to all and followed accordingly. The Mohist ideal holds that the scope of a community could extend beyond the border of community, country, or culture to encompass, ultimately, all humans.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Partiality, by contrast, benefits some people at the expense of others and, therefore, at the expense of the community. The core Confucian virtue of filial piety urges people to behave partially to their own families. For Mohists, the Confucian example for filial piety (e.g., the son’s lying to benefit the criminally-acting father) shows how partiality leads to arbitrariness and opposing common rules and laws. For Mohists, a son helping his illegally acting father is unethical: it is detrimental to the common good. The problems of partiality do not end there: it also leads to political factionalism and divisions. People acting with partiality towards their family will try to maximize the family’s political benefits: e.g., they try to endow family members with government posts or with economic stipends. Advancing these partial goals at the expense of the whole community or country is detrimental to the common good, which leads to conflict. Taking this a step further, if each country only watches out for its own benefit at the expense of others, conflict, and even war, results. ### 3. *Jian ai*: Impartial Care The Mohist response to Confucianism focuses on concrete social behavior rather than emotions and attitudes partial to one’s family. The core of these arguments is the concept of *jian ai,* impartial care (兼愛).[\[8\]](#_ftn8) There are two main aspects to this idea. First, addressing individual agents, *jian ai* involves the attitude of dispassionate concern about the welfare of others. Agents should care equally for all the agents with whom they interact; they ought to be concerned for the welfare of others without making distinctions between self, relatives, associates, and strangers. The same ethical standard dictates all actions, regardless of the agents’ personal relationships. Typical Mohist examples are applying the law and exercising charity. The law should be applied to all people equally, including one’s parents. Charity should be directed to those who need it most, even if they are not one’s relatives.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Second, impartial care includes all people in a community and eventually encompasses everybody in human society. The way for doing so is to begin in one’s immediate community. This occurs by treating each person as equal before the law and each’s needs as equally important—without prejudice in distinguishing between nobility and commoners or by family members and outsiders.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) For organizing the community based on *jian ai*, Mohists rely on a formula: the action to always take is the one that increases the common good because by doing so, the community and the single person therein benefit. This formula applies on an individual as well as social level, implementing impartial care in practice. This, in turn, leads to a series of political consequences, such as the rejection of offensive warfare, the call for public duty for “commoners” and “nobles” alike, and the relationship-independent application of the law. In Mohism, ethics lead to the organization of the community. ### 4. Conclusion The community is scalable. The Mohist goal is to turn all communities into one. If all communities were organized along the same principles, they would eventually merge and become a “global” political conglomerate built upon *jian ai*, and therefore, ordered as well as peaceful. While not advocating a “global government” Mohists think of a “global community.” Mohism aspires to be a general philosophy encompassing all-under-heaven, *tian xia* (天下), or, the whole of the world. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mo Di was the name of the person. The attribution of the title *zi*, “Master”, to him, turns his Chinese name into Mozi, “Mo, (the) Master.” According to the contemporary norm, Mo Di refers to the person while the Mozi refers to the book in which the person’s teachings are recorded. Mohism, yet another term, refers to the school of thought based on the book of Mozi. While the book is attributed to the person Mo Di, it is a compilation of his teachings as well as his followers’ interpretations and additions. Both the nomenclature as well as the reception of a master’s oeuvre are usual in early Chinese philosophy. For further biographical and bibliographical history of the Mozi, see Knoblock and Riegel 2013. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Refer to Fraser 2016, “Chapter 3: Political Theory: Order Through Shared Norms.” [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Fraser 2016. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Rosemont 2016. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Confucius, *Analects*, 13:18. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Mohism, and early Chinese philosophy in general, does not have a conception of the individual. The single human person is an agent always embedded in a community. The question is, then, what is the community? Confucians consider it to be the kinship group, Mohists the whole human society. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) In Mohism, there are two ways of understanding the community. Regarding ethics, the community is the whole human society. Regarding political philosophy, the community is the state. This differentiation has to do with the specific context in which Mohism operates. While on the one hand it develops a general philosophy and ethics, on the other, it is practically geared at giving advice to the political states of its time. Mohism, however, does not perceive this dual understanding of the community as a problem, since the aims of both, the increase of welfare, are able to be aligned – and indeed, should be aligned if everyone it to be treated equally. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) “Jian” means together, or jointly; and “ai” means love, or care. “Jian ai” has been translated into English as “universal love” as well as “impartial care”, the latter being more adequate, since Mohism is more concerned with concrete behavior than with emotional or mental states. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Fraser 2016, “Chapter 6: Inclusive Care: For Others as for Oneself.” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Knoblock and Riegel 2013. ### References [Fraser, Chris. ](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-philosophy-of-the-imozii/9780231149273)[*The philosophy of the Mòzĭ: the First Consequentialists*](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-philosophy-of-the-imozii/9780231149273)[. New York City: Columbia University Press, 2016.](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-philosophy-of-the-imozii/9780231149273) [Ivanhoe, Philip J. “Mohist Philosophy.” ](https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mohist-philosophy/v-1)[*Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mohist-philosophy/v-1)[. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. ](https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mohist-philosophy/v-1) [Knoblock, John, and Jeffrey Riegel. ](https://ieas.directfrompublisher.com/catalog/book/mozi)[*Mozi: A Study and Translation of the Ethical and Political Writings*](https://ieas.directfrompublisher.com/catalog/book/mozi)[, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2013. ](https://ieas.directfrompublisher.com/catalog/book/mozi) [Rosemont Jr. “Henry. Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons.” ](https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/30726)[*Confucian Role Ethics: A Moral Vision for the 21st Century?*](https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/30726)[ (Henry, Rosemont Jr. and Roger T. Ames eds.). Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2016: pp. 33-58. ](https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/30726) [Slingerland, Edward (Trans.). ](https://hackettpublishing.com/analects)[*Analects: With selections from traditional commentaries*](https://hackettpublishing.com/analects)[. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003. ](https://hackettpublishing.com/analects) ### For Further Reading [Defoort, Carine, and Nicolas Standaert. ](https://brill.com/view/title/21719?rskey=NKdm2R&result=2)[*The Mozi as an evolving text: Different voices in early Chinese thought*](https://brill.com/view/title/21719?rskey=NKdm2R&result=2)[. Leiden: Brill, 2013. ](https://brill.com/view/title/21719?rskey=NKdm2R&result=2) [Johnston, Ian. ](https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=359)[*The Mozi: A Complete Translation*](https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=359)[. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2009. A reworked translation has been published as a Penguin Classic: ](https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=359)[*Mo Zi: The Book of Master Mo*](https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=359)[. London: Penguin, 2013. ](https://cup.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=359) [Harris, Eirik, and Henrique Schneider (eds.). Special Issue on Chinese Philosophy: The Philosophy of Mozi – Impartial Caring in the Warring States Era. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phil.12241)[*The Philosophical Forum Quarterly*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phil.12241)[ Volume 51, Issue 1, 2020. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phil.12241) ### Related Essays [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [*Wu-Wei*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/)[: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/mozi-ahlaki-uzerine-felsefe-toplumsal-orgutlenme-ve-tarafsiz-sevgi-henrique-schneider/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Mozi.pdf). ### About the Author [Henrique Schneider](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Schneider) is a professor of economics at the Nordakademie in Elmshorn and Hamburg, Germany. His research addresses economics and philosophy, as well as early Chinese philosophy, especially Legalism. His book on a Chinese legalistic philosopher, Hanfei, [*An Introduction to the Political Philosophy of Hanfei*](http://www.cambridgescholars.com/an-introduction-to-hanfeis-political-philosophy) (Cambridge Scholars Press) was published in 2018. [www.nordakademie.de/die-nordakademie/team/](https://www.nordakademie.de/die-nordakademie/team/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Chinese Philosophy, Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** mo di, mohism, Mozi, Schneider --- ### [Hell and Universalism: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) **Published:** October 18, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: A.G. Holdier Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 995 Many religious traditions picture Hell as a place of immense suffering that some people experience after they die. But who might go to Hell, and why, and for how long? And, although many people believe there is a Hell, might they be mistaken? Might it be that a just, good, and loving God could not send people to Hell, especially for eternity? This essay does not assume that Hell (or God) actually exists, but reviews several prominent philosophical responses to questions like these, as well as critiques and objections to these answers. ![Jacob van Swanenburg's painting ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/jacob_van_swanenburg_-_the_harrowing_of_hell.jpg?resize=656%2C452&ssl=1) Jacob van Swanenburg’s painting “The Harrowing of Hell”### 1. What is Hell? In its most simplistic form, Hell is “the Bad Place” where people are punished for sins they’ve committed. Depending on the tradition, “sin” could be anything from disobedient rebellion against a particular deity to the ignorant neglect (or disbelief) of God’s laws, to cruel or otherwise harmful actions, to just simply any immoral act whatsoever. Hell is sometimes described as a fiery torture chamber filled with all manner of horrors; others picture it as a psychological post-mortem state characterized by hopelessness, suffering, and despair. And these views can be combined in various ways.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Across traditions, Hell is often described as a place of pain and suffering: - the New Testament describes Hell as “the unquenchable fire”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) where both the soul and the body can be destroyed;[\[3\]](#_ftn3) later Christians developed pictures of a multilayered Hell, where each level holds sinners grouped by their crimes;[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - Hell, or “Jahannam,” is repeatedly described in the Qur’an as “an abyss…a Fire, intensely hot”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) that has multiple levels;[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - the Hindu scripture *Bhagavata Purana* describes twenty-eight distinct hells (and “thousands of hellish conditions”), each with their own unique form of agony.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Whatever the religious tradition, Hell is always understood as an unpleasant place to be.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 2. How Long Does Hell Last? According to those who believe there is a Hell, how long are its punishments supposed to last? There are two main positions. #### 2.1 Hell is Eternal From one perspective, those in Hell (known as “the damned”) are evildoers who have defied or ignored an *infinite* god and so, as a matter of fairness, their punishment must also be *infinite*: Hell is eternal. Accordingly, from this perspective, Hell’s purpose is primarily a matter of justice: the damned receive what they deserve.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) And sinners are responsible for earning their treatment, given the infinite purity or holiness of a deity who won’t allow an infinite sin to go unpunished.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) #### 2.2 Hell is Temporary Others view Hell as a temporary place or state which “burns off” the unclean sinfulness of the damned. So, like incarcerated people at the end of their sentences, people in Hell *may* eventually be freed from their sufferings. *Annihilationists* believe that, upon their release from Hell, the souls of the damned are extinguished into nothingness.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) The damned are not allowed to enter Heaven, but they are required to suffer only for an amount of time warranted by their previous sinfulness: Hell is not eternal. *Purgatorial* views assert that, after the damned serve their time in Hell, they are *either* free to enter Heaven *or* are freed to experience reincarnation: either way, Hell is not eternal.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Some Buddhist traditions suggest that one’s sentence in Naraka (a Sanskrit name for Hell) can last for millions of years unless the bodhisattva Kṣitigarbha assists one in escaping more quickly.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Some other faiths also teach that repentance in this life can diminish a purgatorial sentence for oneself or others.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 3. Universalism Some theistic traditions argue for *universalism*: the thesis that the ultimate reconciliation of *all* persons with God in Heaven is not only possible, but *likely*, given other beliefs about the nature of the divine, such as God being just, loving, or merciful.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) #### 3.1 God’s Justice Some argue that a God of perfect justice would not sentence sinful persons to infinite punishment for finite offenses. At worst, human beings can only sin for a little over a hundred years, so if justice demands that punishments “fit the crime,” it seems unfair to make even totally depraved sinners suffer for thousands of years or, worse, for eternity. Others argue that divine justice actually requires the *forgiveness* of sins. If justice is fairness, and an all-powerful God allows sinners to suffer serious harm in life, then fairness might require that God compensate them after death for these harms, regardless of their sinful state. Doing this, however, requires addressing their sins. For each sinner deserving both compensation *and* reward, God has two options: - forgive their sins and forego their punishment, or - allow the person to undergo purgatorial cleansing before granting them their deserved reward. Without some further sin, the person would, presumably, be allowed to stay in Heaven indefinitely.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) #### 3.2 God’s Love Others have argued that a perfectly loving God would not abandon any person in Hell. If God is *omnibenevolent* (perfectly good), then God must show goodness and love to every individual. Since this cannot be done by ignoring someone’s suffering or annihilating their consciousness, it would not be possible for any person to either remain in Hell for eternity or to be annihilated upon their exit.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) #### 3.3 God’s Mercy If God, as a perfectly good being, must also be perfectly merciful, then some argue that God must *offer* forgiveness to all sinners.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Although accepting that gift would be the choice of each person, it is assumed that most would want to escape Hell; anyone remaining would be damned by their own choice.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Altogether, these arguments deliver the same conclusion: if God exists as often understood, then God will do everything possible to ensure that Hell is, in the end, unoccupied. ### 4. Conclusion A clearer understanding of what we mean by ‘Hell’ illuminates a host of other metaphysical, ethical, and religious concepts—from God, good, and evil to justice, love, and more. For some, beliefs about Hell provide powerful motivations for religious beliefs. For others, beliefs about an afterlife might justify *rejecting* religious beliefs. Either way, the discussion here is of interest to theists, atheists, and agnostics alike—especially if they might reconsider their positions. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Discussions of hell and the afterlife presume that people can “survive” death, that people can continue to exist after the death of their bodies, that the person before and after death can be the same individual. This presumption involves accepting a view on the topic of “personal identity,” which is about how we remain the same individual over time, despite the many changes that occur to us: some views on personal identity allow for a post-mortem existence, whereas others do not. For an introduction to this topic and some of the main theories, see Chad Vance’s [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/). Eastern Orthodox Christianity, for example, often understands Hell and Heaven as *co-extensive* post-mortem locations where an inhabitant’s willful response to freely-available divine love determines their experience; those who choose to receive God’s love experience the divine presence as Heaven, while those who choose to reject it experience God’s presence as Hell. For more on this perspectival model of the afterlife, see Holdier (2016). In general, the positions and arguments which follow treat “sinfulness” as an essential feature of an agent: even if a person generally lives a virtuous life overall, if they commit even one sin (however negligible) during their life, they will be nevertheless categorized as a “sinner” in the postmortem analysis. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See [Mark 9:43-48](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=mark+9&version=NRSV). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [Matthew 10:28](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=matthew+10&version=NRSV). It remains an open debate within Christianity whether this is hyperbolic metaphor or a literal prophecy of future judgment. For more, see comments on “annihilationism” in Section 2.2. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See, for example, Dante’s *Inferno*, the first part of his famous *Divine Comedy.* [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [Quran 101: 8-11](https://quran.com/101) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) [Quran 4:145](https://quran.com/4) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [Srimad Bhagavatam Canto 5, Chapter 26](http://bhagavata.org/canto5/chapter26.html) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) In contrast, Heaven or Paradise are often described by highlighting the pleasurable experiences had by their inhabitants. These pleasures might be a result of escaping the difficulties of the mortal world, or rewards of sensuous gratification (including, but not limited to, being granted access to the divine presence), or some other blissful forms of existence. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Consider St. Augustine’s discussion in Book XXI, Chapter 11 of [*The City of God*](http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120121.htm) regarding the nature of judgment and condemnation righteously lasting longer than the offenses that require them. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See, for example, the Protestant reformer John Calvin’s defense of the eternal election of the damned in his [*Institutes of the Christian Religion*](http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.v.xxii.html), Book III, chapter 21, section 5. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) One example would be the Buddhist concept of [*nirvana*](https://www.britannica.com/topic/nirvana-religion), or ‘the quenching,’ which frees one from the cycle of rebirth; for a Christian defense of annihilationism, see Fudge (2011). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For a Roman Catholic explanation of purgatory, see Part I, Sec. 2, Ch. III, Art. 12, Subsection iii of the [*Catechism*](http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p123a12.htm). For an example of a Protestant purgatorial view aimed at ultimate reconciliation, see Walls (2016). For one (of many) views of reincarnation, see the [*Bardo Thodol*](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bardo-Thodol). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Regarding Hell as Naraka, see the [*Devaduta Sutta*](https://suttacentral.net/mn130); for a discussion of Kṣitigarbha, see [*The Sutra of the Past Vows of the Earth Store Bodhisattva*](http://www.cttbusa.org/esscommentary/earthstore_contents.htm). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For example, see the Roman Catholic doctrine of *indulgences* (which can, in theory, apply to the person earning them or to someone else who the person selects) in Part II, Sec. 2, Ch. II, Art. 4, Subsection x of the [*Catechism*](http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P4G.HTM). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For an overview of six distinct arguments for universalism, see Crummett (2019). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) As Thomas Talbott (2014:150) explains, divine forgiveness “is one of the essential means by which God protects the innocent from irreparable harm and will eventually vindicate \[God’s\] righteousness in the face of unjust suffering.” This is a variation of what Crummett (2019) calls the *beneficence argument*. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) In the words of Marilyn McCord Adams (1999: 157), “it would be cruel for God to create (allow to evolve) human beings with such radical vulnerability to horrors, unless Divine power stood able, and Divine love willing, to redeem.” See also, Crummett’s (2019) discussion of the *divine love argument*. Many see “the problem of Hell” – how could an all-loving, just, powerful and good God send people to Hell or allow people to be in Hell? – as an instance of the more general *problem of evil*: how could a good God allow evils, or certain types of evils, to occur, if God could prevent those evils? Since being in Hell would likely be very bad, a great evil, it too is an evil that can give rise to the question of the problem of evil: how could a good God allow the evil of Hell, if God could prevent it? For discussion of the problem of evil, see [The Problem of Evil](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/ "The Problem of Evil") by Thomas Metcalf. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Some contend that the viability of this choice is limited only to our premortem existence – that is, that sinners can only receive God’s forgiveness *prior* to death. For discussion and critique of this position, see Hall (2003: 7-9). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) As C.S. Lewis describes in *The Problem of Pain*, “The gates of Hell are locked from the inside.” For philosophical defenses of this position, see Buckareff and Plug (2015, 2005). ### References [Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1999. ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801486869/horrendous-evils-and-the-goodness-of-god/)[*Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801486869/horrendous-evils-and-the-goodness-of-god/)[. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801486869/horrendous-evils-and-the-goodness-of-god/) [Buckareff, Andrei A. and Allen Plug. 2015. “Escaping hell but not heaven.” ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9490-1)[*The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9490-1)[ 77, no. 3 (June): 247-253. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9490-1) [Buckareff, Andrei A. and Allen Plug. 2005. “Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell.” ](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412504007437)[*Religious Studies*](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412504007437)[ 41, no. 1: 39-54.](https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412504007437) [Calvin, John. 1845. ](http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.v.xxii.html)[*The Institutes of the Christian Religion*](http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.v.xxii.html)[, Henry Beveridge (trans.).](http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.v.xxii.html) [Catholic Church. 2012. ](http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc/index.htm)[*Catechism of the Catholic Church*](http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc/index.htm)[, 2nd ed. Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana.](http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc/index.htm) [Crummett, Dustin. 2019. “Eschatology for Creeping Things (and Other Animals).” In ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Lost-Sheep-in-Philosophy-of-Religion-New-Perspectives-on-Disability/Hereth-Timpe/p/book/9780367077471)[*The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion: New Perspectives on Disability, Gender, Race, and Animals*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Lost-Sheep-in-Philosophy-of-Religion-New-Perspectives-on-Disability/Hereth-Timpe/p/book/9780367077471)[, Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe (eds.). New York: Routledge, 141-162.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Lost-Sheep-in-Philosophy-of-Religion-New-Perspectives-on-Disability/Hereth-Timpe/p/book/9780367077471) [Fudge, Edward William. 2011. ](https://edwardfudge.com/written-ministry/books/the-fire-that-consumes/)[*The Fire That Consumes: A Biblical and Historical Study of the Doctrine of Final Punishment*](https://edwardfudge.com/written-ministry/books/the-fire-that-consumes/)[, 3rd ed. Eugene: Wipf and Stock.](https://edwardfudge.com/written-ministry/books/the-fire-that-consumes/) [Hall, Lindsey. 2003. ](https://www.routledge.com/Swinburnes-Hell-and-Hicks-Universalism-Are-We-Free-to-Reject-God-1st/Hall/p/book/9781138718852)[*Swinburne’s Hell and Hick’s Universalism: Are We Free to Reject God?*](https://www.routledge.com/Swinburnes-Hell-and-Hicks-Universalism-Are-We-Free-to-Reject-God-1st/Hall/p/book/9781138718852)[ New York: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Swinburnes-Hell-and-Hicks-Universalism-Are-We-Free-to-Reject-God-1st/Hall/p/book/9781138718852) [Hart, David Bentley. 2019. ](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300246223/all-shall-be-saved)[*That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation*](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300246223/all-shall-be-saved)[. New Haven: Yale University Press.](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300246223/all-shall-be-saved) [Holdier, A.G. 2016. “Pursuing ](https://rowman.com/isbn/9781498512077/the-problem-of-evil-new-philosophical-directions)[*Pankalia*](https://rowman.com/isbn/9781498512077/the-problem-of-evil-new-philosophical-directions)[: The Aesthetic Theodicy of St. Augustine,” in ](https://rowman.com/isbn/9781498512077/the-problem-of-evil-new-philosophical-directions)[*The Problem of Evil: New Philosophical Directions*](https://rowman.com/isbn/9781498512077/the-problem-of-evil-new-philosophical-directions)[, Benjamin W. McCraw and Robert Arp (eds.). Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 69-84. ](https://rowman.com/isbn/9781498512077/the-problem-of-evil-new-philosophical-directions) [Kronen, John and Eric Reitan. 2013. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/gods-final-victory-9781623568498/)[*God’s Final Victory: A Comparative Philosophical Case for Universalism*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/gods-final-victory-9781623568498/)[. New York: Bloomsbury Academic Press.](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/gods-final-victory-9781623568498/) [Talbott, Thomas. 2014. ](https://wipfandstock.com/the-inescapable-love-of-god.html)[*The Inescapable Love of God*](https://wipfandstock.com/the-inescapable-love-of-god.html)[. Eugene: Cascade Books.](https://wipfandstock.com/the-inescapable-love-of-god.html) [Walls, Jerry. 2016. “Hell and Purgatory,” in ](https://www.zondervan.com/9780310516460/four-views-on-hell/)[*Four Views on Hell*](https://www.zondervan.com/9780310516460/four-views-on-hell/)[, 2nd ed., Preston Sprinkle (ed.). Grand Rapids: Zondervan.](https://www.zondervan.com/9780310516460/four-views-on-hell/) ### For Further Reading [LaFollette, H. Living without a God. *Think*. 2025; 24 (71): 41-46. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/think/article/living-without-a-god/7ABAB78D288FF732219EF58C67902475) ### Related Essays [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) *by Spencer Case* [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/ "The Problem of Evil") by Thomas Metcalf [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/hell-and-universalism.pdf). ### Acknowledgments Many thanks to Nathan Nobis, Dan Lowe, and Thomas Metcalf for exceedingly helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. ### About the Author A.G. Holdier is a philosopher of language, religion, and applied ethics, working at the intersection of philosophy and public policy. Currently, he is a research fellow at the [University of Notre Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion](https://philreligion.nd.edu/) studying the sociopragmatics of prayer in a project titled “[Bullshitting God: Polyphonic Prayer and the Virtue of *Parrhesia*.](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/675de4afb9a91d0d7e7dc362/68adc9433e7e2dcd1b909463_ND%20Fellowship%20Project%20Proposal.pdf)” In 2025, he finished his PhD in philosophy at the University of Arkansas, where he is nearly ABD in a second PhD in public policy. He also holds an M.A. in the philosophy of religion from Denver Seminary. [www.AGHoldier.com](http://www.agholdier.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** afterlife, divine, eternal, eternity, God, Heaven, Hell, punishment, salvation, universalism --- ### [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/) **Published:** November 22, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay introduces the Divine Command Theory of ethics, that wrong actions are wrong because God forbids them and right actions are right because God commands them, and the most important responses to it, which date back to Socrates’ discussion in ancient Greece with a man named Euthyphro. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Categories: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word count: 991 ##### *Editors’ note: this is our second essay published on the divine command theory. The first is* [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) *by Spencer Case. We hope readers will appreciate multiple presentations on this theory.* Some people claim that ethics depends on God: unless there’s a God who *makes* actions right and wrong, no actions would be objectively right or wrong, good or bad.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Such people often accept the *Divine Command Theory* of ethics (hereafter, DCT). According to DCT, wrong actions are wrong *because* God forbids them and right actions are right *because* God commands them. This essay introduces this ethical theory and the most important responses to it, which date back to Socrates’ discussion in ancient Greece with a man named Euthyphro. [![Earth, Wind, and Fire. Reasons. 1975. Still image from music video.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/reasons.jpeg?resize=656%2C493&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/reasons.jpeg?ssl=1)Earth, Wind, and Fire. *Reasons*. 1975. Still image from [music video](https://youtu.be/0Qz_b1di3i8?si=9VLsw7rJrKZKv_QS).### 1. Common Misunderstandings To begin, let’s clarify what DCT is not. First, DCT is *not* an appeal to the Ten Commandments, the Bible, or any other religious text.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The idea of “God’s commands” here is what God requires or forbids, *not* what any text claims this is. God’s commands are in “God’s mind,” so to speak: they need not be the same as anything anyone *claims* to be records of these commands. DCT proposes that right and wrong depend on what God actually commands or forbids, not on the accuracy or even *existence* of any records of those commands. If there weren’t any records of God’s commands, how might anyone know what they are? Strictly speaking, DCT itself doesn’t address how, or even *whether*, God makes his commands known. Its advocates could even claim that nobody knows which particular actions are right and wrong: they just think that, whatever those actions are, they are *made* right or wrong by God’s commands. More likely though, DCT advocates might say that God gives us reason and a conscience to help identify what his commands are. It’s worthwhile to understand that if someone claims that they believe some specific action is wrong *because* they accept DCT, they are accepting a claim that is, strictly speaking, not part of DCT itself.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) DCT isn’t a theory about which *particular* actions are wrong and right, since *by itself* it makes no claims about what God specifically commands: it is a *general* explanation of what makes wrong actions wrong and right actions right, i.e., an *ethical theory*. Finally, while some think that only theists might accept DCT, some non-theists accept it: some claim that objective ethics *could* exist *only if* there’s a God who commands us to act in various ways. Since such people *don’t* think God exists, they conclude that *ethics doesn’t exist*: no actions are right or wrong.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Reasons The question then is whether we should agree with anyone who claims that ethics depends on God’s commands. While DCT is popular in some circles, few academic philosophers accept it, even philosophers who believe in God.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) To understand why, we might consider some moral judgments that most people are *extremely confident* in—e.g., that slavery, school shootings, and cheating on one’s spouse are wrong. Here’s an important question: if God commands us to *not* do these actions, *why* would God do that? Here’s a dilemma: either *there are reasons* or *not*. Many people think there would be reasons: actions like these are *harmful*, *disrespectful*, and *unfair*; *that’s* likely why God would condemn them.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) But this type of explanation entails that DCT is false: wrong actions are not wrong *because* God commands them: they are wrong for reasons that don’t depend on God’s commands. Socrates is often interpreted as asking Euthyphro a related question: would God command us to not do wrong actions *because* they are wrong, *or* would wrong actions be wrong *because* God commands us to not do them?[\[7\]](#_ftn7) This type of question is called the “Euthyphro dilemma.” To believe that God would condemn wrong actions *because they are wrong*—and wrong perhaps for reasons such as those above—is to reject DCT. ### 3. No Reasons Suppose someone thinks there’d be *no reason* why God would command us to not be school shooters. Suppose someone thinks wrong actions are wrong solely *because* God commands them, as DCT proposes. To many, these suggest that God’s commands are *arbitrary* or random—they “could have gone any other way”—and so *God could have commanded people to be school shooters*. These also suggest that anything God commanded would be right: so, if God *commanded* school shootings, then—according to DCT—they would be right.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) To many, these implications seem implausible, perhaps impossible, and so they conclude DCT is mistaken.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 4. God’s Character Some respond that an all-good, all-loving being like God *would not* or *could not* command such an action.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) But that is likely to again reject DCT in favor of thinking that *some actions are just wrong, pretty much no matter what*: *that’s* why God could not or would not command them.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Some deeper questions: why would God have a *loving* character rather than a “hating” character? Why would a *loving* being command some actions and not others? Again: either *there are reasons* or *not*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) If there are no *reasons*, then God’s being loving is arbitrary—God could have had an evil character. To many, this isn’t plausible. But if there are *reasons*, is it because it is *just good* to be loving—perhaps because being loving promotes happiness, respect, and fairness? If so, then some things are good and bad, or right and wrong *independently* of God’s commands: so DCT is false. ### 5. Conclusion Some accept DCT because they are unaware of better ethical theories.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) And some might argue that if God created everything, then God created morality. But perhaps not everything is created: e.g., mathematical truths are often taken to be *necessary truths*—true eternally, and true no matter what the world had been like—and not created, even by God.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) *If* moral truths are like mathematical truths—e.g., if “sexual assaults are inherently wrong” is eternally and universally true, just like a triangle always has three sides—then morality would *not* depend on divine commands, *even if God exists*. This would not show that God is irrelevant to morality; but it would show only that God’s commands are not what *make* actions right or wrong. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The language of actions being “objectively” wrong and right here is used, in part, because it is common. A common understanding of what “objectively” wrong actions are is that they are *wrong regardless of what anyone believes about them*: e.g., *kicking babies for fun* would be wrong *even if* (somehow!) everyone believed doing that was right. While this is understandable, it’s good to ask what any contrary or opposite of “objectively” wrong actions might be: *non-objectively* wrong? “Subjectively” wrong? But what would either of these be? People *believing* or perhaps *feeling* that some actions are wrong, yet no such beliefs are true or correct? If there is not a good contrast or opposite to “objectively” wrong and right, then it might be better just to speak of just plain right and wrong, without the “objective.” For related discussion, see [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis and [Moral Error Theory: Are there Moral Facts?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully, and [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Simple ethical arguments from the Bible tend to appeal to these (often unstated) premises: - *if the Bible commands us to do an action, then it would be morally wrong to* not *do the action*: *the action is a moral obligation*: and: - *if the Bible commands us to* not *do an action, then the action is morally wrong*. (An arguments, see [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf; on this specific *form* of argument, see [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing). Such premises, however, appear to be subject to *counterexamples* that show them to be false, some wrong actions that are denied to be wrong and some said to be wrong actions that are not wrong. Here are some morally wrong actions the Bible *seems* to command: - [Leviticus 20:10](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Leviticus%2020%3A10&version=NIV) commands death for adultery: “If a man commits adultery with another man’s wife—both the adulterer and the adulteress are to be put to death.” - [Deuteronomy 20:16–17](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy%2020%3A16-17&version=NIV) explicitly commands genocide: “Do not leave alive anything that breathes” in certain cities. - [Exodus 21:20–21](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus%2021%3A20-21&version=NIV) permits beating slaves as long as they survive: “Anyone who beats their male or female slave… must be punished if the slave dies as a direct result, but not if the slave recovers.” - [1 Peter 2:18](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Peter%202%3A18&version=NIV) commands slaves to obey harsh masters: “Submit yourselves to your masters, not only to those who are good and considerate, but also to those who are harsh.” - [Romans 13:1–2](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans%2013%3A1-2&version=NIV) commands submission to all governing authorities, including unjust ones: “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities… whoever rebels is rebelling against what God has instituted.” And here are some actions that are not morally wrong but the Bible forbids or severely punishes: - [Numbers 15:32–36](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Numbers%2015%3A32-36&version=NIV) commands execution for gathering wood on the Sabbath, a not wrong action: “The man must be put to death; the whole assembly must stone him outside the camp.” - [Deuteronomy 21:18–21](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy%2021%3A18-21&version=NIV) commands execution for a rebellious son who disobeys his parents: “All the men of the town are to stone him to death.” - [Acts 5:1–11](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Acts%205%3A1-11&version=NIV) recounts Ananias and Sapphira being struck dead for lying about donations, an extreme punishment for dishonesty. - [1 Timothy 2:12](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Timothy%202%3A12&version=NIV) forbids women from teaching or having authority over men: “I do not permit a woman to teach or to assume authority over a man; she must be quiet.” So, it seems that *just because* the Bible forbids an action doesn’t mean it’s wrong; *just because* the Bible commands an action doesn’t mean it’s right, and so arguments that depend on the initial premises—*if the Bible commands us to do an action, then it would be morally wrong to* not *do the action*; and *if the Bible commands us to not do an action, then the action is morally wrong*—are unsound. It’s important to understand that one can acknowledge this *and* believe that the Bible contains great moral wisdom. But on the general theme of this essay: *just because* someone—or any text—commands anything doesn’t always mean we should accept or obey that command: *either there are (good) reasons to accept that command or not*. If there are good reasons, then we should obey the command because of those good reasons. But if there are *not* good reasons to justify the command, then perhaps we need not obey it. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) It’s worth observing that appeals to what God commands are not apt to be persuasive to people who do not believe there’s a God or do not believe that God commanded whatever is being said to be commanded. This, however, does not entail that such claims are false: *just because* some people claim God didn’t command something doesn’t entail God didn’t command that or that people are not obligated to obey that command. *That (some) people are unpersuaded by some claim does not entail that claim is false or that it does not apply to them*: e.g., some people reject the claim that *racial discrimination is wrong*, but that does not entail that racial discrimination is not wrong or that it’s morally permissible for such a person to engage in racial discrimination. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For example, atheist philosopher J.L. Mackie claimed that the idea of a moral fact or truth is that of something that only a divine lawmaker or God would make: see [Moral Error Theory: Are There Moral Facts?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully. Nietzsche said similarly: see [“God is dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof. Theistic philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe had a similar claim: see [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman. Of course, the question is whether any such claim is correct and whether there are good reasons to accept it. For further discussion on the relations between the varieties of non-theisms and ethics, see [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/) by Nathan Nobis. DCT can also be appealed to develop a version of what’s often called a *moral argument for God’s existence*: (1) some actions are right and other actions are wrong; (2) these actions are *made* right and wrong *because* of God’s commands; therefore, God exists. A theme of this essay is that premise (2) here appears to be false. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For instance, many of the objections to DCT presented in this essay are standard objections that are presented in most philosophical ethics textbooks. Although it’s not easy to get reliable data on the frequency that philosophers accept different views, in the results of the 2020 PhilPapers survey, for neither of the main questions about which ethical theory or meta-ethical theory, the divine command theory, or even theism, is mentioned as an option or proposed as an alternative view: see the responses to (PhilPapers, 2020) “Normative ethics: deontology, virtue ethics, or consequentialism?” and (PhilPapers, 2020) “Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?” [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Some of the most historically influential ethical theories or answers to the question, “What makes wrong actions wrong?” appeal to harm, disrespect, and unfairness: see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz, [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman, and [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See the *Euthyphro* dialogue, which is widely available, including in Plato (1997 \[380 BC\]). Socrates’ discussion with Euthyphro was not directly about ethics, however; it focused on what is “pious” or “holy.” Their central question was whether the gods think something is *pious* because it is pious, or whether it is pious *because* the gods approve of it. Although the topic was piety, the insights from their exchange are routinely applied to broader questions about what makes actions right or wrong. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For further discussion of God potentially commanding terrible actions, see Morriston (2009). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) It is fair to ask why people think that a being like God—or an all-good, loving being—would not or could not command slavery, school shootings, and cheating on one’s spouse. One answer is that *we have very strong reasons to believe that these actions are wrong*: there are many very good reasons why these actions are wrong (in all or nearly all possible circumstances: they are what’s called *prima facie* wrong), and no good reasons to think these actions are not wrong. Indeed, these reasons are so strong—indeed we might think we *know* that actions like these are wrong—that we think that an all-good being like God could not or would not command any actions like these. For interesting research that small children tend to think that God could not make wrong actions not wrong, see Reinecke and Solomon (2023) It is worthwhile, however, to observe that some people sometimes claim, or seem to claim, that actions like these are actually not wrong: they might claim that when God allows these actions, they are not wrong, perhaps because such actions are necessary to bring about some greater overall good. This is one response to the “problem of evil”: see [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This is related to the “modified” version of DCT proposed by Adams (1987), that the commands of a *loving* God are what makes actions right and wrong, and this being loving would preclude, say, commanding school shootings and other actions that an all-loving being couldn’t command or approve of. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Indeed, perhaps it’s *impossible* for an all-good being to command wrongdoing, since doing that would be wrong. Being “omnipotent” or *all-powerful* is usually not understood to be able to do *anything* but to be *able to do anything logically or metaphysically possible*; and being all-loving constrains those possibilities. See [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson for a discussion of omnipotence and its relation to other divine attributes, including understanding God to be all-good. Understanding what’s meant by “possible” and “impossible” here is key: see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Such a dilemma may be related to the “principle of sufficient reason,” a principle that *there’s some reason for every fact; nothing happens or is the case for no reason*: see [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro. Such a dilemma can be extended to any claims believed on the basis of *testimony* or what someone else tells you: *either* there’s a good reason to believe what the person says *or* not: if there is, that good reason is ultimately why you should accept the testimony, not just because someone tells you it. For discussion of how testimony and appeals to what authorities claim can provide good reason or justification for our beliefs, see [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case. [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis, and [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) It is not uncommon for some types of DCT advocates to claim or assume that the *only* explanations for what makes actions wrong are either *cultural relativism* or *individual subjectivism*—cultural or individual approval—*or* DCT. This is false, however, and ignores the history of ethical thought and the many influential ethical theories, such as those mentioned in note 6 above. For introductions to common ethical relativisms and subjectivisms, see [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) and [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) both by Nathan Nobis. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) On the concept of what are called “necessary truths”—propositions that are true in all possible worlds, and so also at all times—and how we might know them, see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk and [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer. Another not uncommon claim is that “laws require a lawmaker,” and so moral laws (or truths; perhaps necessary truths?) require that someone “make” them (and this someone would be God). While *some* laws require a lawmaker—e.g., the civil and criminal laws of a country—many laws do not: e.g., scientific laws don’t appear to need a lawmaker and neither do any what are often called “normative” laws of reasoning, such that *if some conclusion logically follows from some premises that you should accept, then you should accept that conclusion*: this type of “law” does not appear to require a lawmaker. However, if there were some ethical “lawmaker,” then there would either be *reasons* why that lawmaker would “make” the laws he does, and not contrary, opposite laws, or *no reason*, and the main points developed in this essay would apply to that dilemma. For an introductory discussion of what “normative” truths or facts—e.g., about what should and should not be thought and done—might be like, see [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. ### References [Adams, Robert. 1987. “A Modified Divine Command Theory.” In ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Virtue_of_Faith_and_Other_Essays_in/wich23SBcEwC?hl=en)[*The Virtue of Faith and other essays in Philosophical Theology*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Virtue_of_Faith_and_Other_Essays_in/wich23SBcEwC?hl=en)[. Oxford University Press. 97-102. ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Virtue_of_Faith_and_Other_Essays_in/wich23SBcEwC?hl=en) [Morriston, Wes. 2009. “What If God Commanded Something Terrible? A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics.” ](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5978388)[*Religious Studies* ](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5978388)[45, 249-267.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5978388) [PhilPapers Survey. 2020. ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4890)[“Normative Ethics: Deontology, Virtue Ethics, or Consequentialism?” ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4890) [PhilPapers Survey. 2020. ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4866)[“Meta-ethics: Moral Realism or Moral Anti-realism?”](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4866) [Plato. (1997 \[380 BCE\]). ](http://www.hackettpublishing.com/complete-works)[“Euthyphro.” ](http://www.hackettpublishing.com/complete-works)Translated by G.M.A Grube. In [*Plato: Complete Works*](http://www.hackettpublishing.com/complete-works)[. Edited with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing Company.](http://www.hackettpublishing.com/complete-works) [Reinecke, Madeline G., and Solomon, Larisa. 2023. “Children deny that God could change morality.” *Cognitive Development* 68: 101393.](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2023.101393) ### For Further Reading [Austin, Michael. “Divine Command Theory.” In ](https://iep.utm.edu/divine-command-theory/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://iep.utm.edu/divine-command-theory/) [LaFollette, Hugh. Living without a God. *Think*. 2025; 24 (71): 41-46. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/think/article/living-without-a-god/7ABAB78D288FF732219EF58C67902475) [Murphy, Mark. 2025. “Theological Voluntarism.” In ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2025/entries/voluntarism-theological)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2025/entries/voluntarism-theological)[, Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2025/entries/voluntarism-theological) ### Related Essays [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/ "Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief") by Tom Metcalf [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/) by Nathan Nobis [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis. [Moral Error Theory: Are there Moral Facts?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman [“God is dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism-could-god-sentence-anyone-to-eternal-punishment/)[: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/esitlik-ne-anlama-geliyor-ve-hakkaniyetten-farki-nedir-daniel-weltman/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/divine-command-theory-euthyphro-1.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is co-author of [*Thinking Critically About Abortion*](http://www.abortionarguments.com/), author of [*Animals & Ethics 101*](http://www.animalethics101.com/), and the author and co-author of many other writings and materials in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** divine command theory, Euthyphro, Euthyphro dilemma, Euthyphro problem, God, God and ethics, Nobis, Socrates, Socratic, theism, theistic ethics --- ### [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/) **Published:** September 21, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay introduces some of the core philosophical issues about atheism: what it is, how and why people accept atheism, and the relationships between atheism and meaning in life and ethics. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Category: [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word count: 1000 *Atheists* believe God does not exist.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Atheists reject *theism*, the view that God—an all-powerful, knowing, and good being—exists.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Atheists are not *agnostics*, who suspend judgment on the matter and so neither believe nor disbelieve there’s a God.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay introduces some of the core philosophical issues about *atheism*: what it is, how and why people accept atheism, and the relationships between atheism and meaning in life and ethics.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) [![A photograph of a yellow flower with a bee.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/flower.jpg?resize=656%2C438&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/flower.jpg?ssl=1)A photograph of a yellow flower with a bee.### 1. Defining Atheism Atheists are sometimes defined as *people who do not believe there is a God*.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) But such people are better characterized as *non-theists* or *not theists*. This is because believing that some claim is *not* the case and *not* believing that claim are different: thinking *this medicine is ineffective* is different from *not* thinking *this medicine is effective* when, say, you have never heard of it or have no view on its efficacy.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Atheists affirm the claim “God does not exist” as true; they do not merely lack the belief that God exists. Non-theists include agnostics—since they don’t *believe* there’s a God—but agnostics aren’t atheists since they don’t *disbelieve* there’s a God: they suspend judgment. Non-theists also include people who have never even considered God’s existence, perhaps because the concept is not part of their culture: indeed, some of them might immediately affirm God’s existence if the concept of God were introduced to them. And things that can’t have beliefs about God, like babies, and things that don’t have beliefs at all are not theists either. ### 2. Confidence, Knowledge, and Rationality Like theists, atheists vary in their confidence in their beliefs. Some atheists are very confident—they feel *certain*—thinking atheism has been “proven.” Other atheists believe that God *probably* doesn’t exist, with varying levels of confidence.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) But confidence does not entail truth or rationality: people can confidently hold false or irrational beliefs.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) And people can have true beliefs, yet lack confidence in them. Some atheists think they *know* that God doesn’t exist.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Others think they have *strong evidence* for atheism, but not knowledge. Some atheists could think their evidence for atheism is *weak* but they disbelieve nevertheless.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Some atheists insist that *only* atheism is rational; others hold that, since different people have different evidence, different views on God’s existence can potentially be rational for different people.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) What anyone really knows or reasonably believes here depends on what knowledge is and what’s required for rationality or justification.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 3. Arguments and Atheism Atheists usually believe the overall evidence to believe there is not a God is stronger than the evidence to believe there is a God.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) So, they might think the evidence for theism is *weak*, and the evidence for atheism is *strong*; or they might think the evidence for theism is *strong*, but the evidence for atheism is *stronger*.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Atheists often critique the arguments for theism. They also often argue that what theists try to explain by appealing to God can be explained just as well—or better—without appealing to God.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) They also sometimes argue that the concept of God itself is incoherent: e.g., that there couldn’t be an immaterial being.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Concerning arguments against God’s existence, probably the most important are versions of the “argument from evil”: if there were a God, then there probably would not be as much truly horrendous suffering and evil in our world; yet there is such evil, so probably there isn’t a God.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) And arguments from “divine hiddenness”: if God existed, God’s existence would be more obvious to everyone; since it isn’t, probably there isn’t a God.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) And an argument applying a principle like this to a person’s total evidence: if there’s insufficient reason to believe that some being exists, and some good reason to believe it doesn’t exist, then people are justified in believing that being does not exist. ### 4. The “Presumption of Atheism” Some argue that atheists don’t need to provide arguments that there’s not a God in order for their disbelief to be rational. They argue that we don’t need arguments that unfamiliar things *do not* exist to reasonably believe they don’t. This view is that there is a “presumption of atheism”: the starting point is *not* believing there’s a God and the “burden of proof” lies with theists to provide strong arguments for God’s existence.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Until they do so, non-theists are justified in withholding belief, even without positive arguments for their non-theisms. Whatever the merits of any such presumption, it doesn’t end the discussion: atheists who accept it still must engage arguments for theism to evaluate their strength. And it is often a moot point since most atheists have some positive reasons for their views: they usually don’t just find arguments for theism inadequate. ### 5. Values Some people seem to think that atheists can’t have meaningful lives. Whether this is true or not depends on what makes lives meaningful. If what makes lives more meaningful are things like positive relationships with friends and family, a rewarding job, service to others, and having some fun, then atheists surely can, and often do, have meaningful lives.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Atheists usually reject claims that a meaningful life requires belief in God or belief in an eternal existence, finding no good reason to believe that.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) About ethics, some think atheists are inclined to be immoral, or wouldn’t understand the difference between right and wrong, or won’t care, but this stereotype is unfounded.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Like most people, atheists usually believe that some actions are wrong and others are right. They might explain that many wrong actions are wrong *because* they tend to cause more harm than benefit, or because they disrespectfully “use” people without consent, or because they violate rules that people wouldn’t consistently apply to themselves.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Right actions tend to be those that are beneficial, respectful, and fair. They also might observe that these moral explanations have nothing immediately to do with God’s existence, so ethics doesn’t depend on God or anything religious.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) ### 6. Conclusion All atheists believe there’s not a God. Exactly *why* each atheist believes this, and *what else* they believe because of it, varies. What is this? Ask them! ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This is a traditional, classic understanding of the concept of God, but there are other definitions and understandings of the concept of God. For more on definitions of theism, see [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson. Atheists also usually deny the existence of any proposed God who is less than *all*-powerful, knowing, or good. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For introductions to many arguments for and against theism and theistic belief, see the essays in the [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) category of *1000-Word Philosophy*. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For more on agnosticism, see [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska. A view related to agnosticism is *apatheism*: *apatheists* have considered the question of whether God exists, but do not even suspend judgment on the issue, since they are *apathetic* about the issue: they just don’t care either way; they think having views whether God exists or whether anyone should or shouldn’t believe there’s a God is unimportant or uninteresting. For an introduction to apatheism, see Hedberg and Huzarevich (2017). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) It is noteworthy that the 2020 PhilPapers survey of professional philosophers found that 66.95% report that they “accept or lean toward” atheism. 7.18% reported that they are agnostic or undecided. 18.93% reported that they accept or lean towards theism. See PhilPapers (2020). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For example, the organization *American Atheists* writes this on their “What is Atheism?” webpage: Atheism is one thing: A lack of belief in gods. Atheism is not an affirmative belief that there is no god \[or “there are no gods”\] . . **To be clear: Atheism is not a disbelief in gods or a denial of gods; it is a lack of belief in gods**. While people are free to define “atheism” in different ways—or use the term “atheism” to label whatever grouping they like—there are often better and worse ways to categorize. So putting (a) people who have carefully thought about whether there’s a God and have concluded there (probably) isn’t a God and (b) people who have never considered any idea of God at all—perhaps because their culture just doesn’t have any such concept—is not ideal since the broader category of *non-theists* or *not-theists* better describes the category: e.g., having to respond to a question, “What do atheists think about God?” with “Some atheists have never even considered the idea of God,” is not ideal for many purposes. Furthermore, the *non-theists* or *not theists* versus *atheists* (and *agnostics*) distinction is also readily understood. A further error, however, with a “lack of belief” definition of atheism as it is sometimes *stated* is that physical objects (rocks, plants, electrons, etc.) have a “lack of belief in gods,” since they lack beliefs, *period*. Babies and animals also lack belief in Gods. But, presumably, nobody would want to consider a rock (or any other entity that lacks any beliefs) or a baby or an animal an atheist, or want to group rocks and *thoughtful people who believe there is not a God* into the same category for purposes related to philosophy of religion, politics, or any social scientific investigation. So, at least, such a definition of “atheist” should at least be stated in terms of a *person*, or a being who *could* have belief about Gods, lacking beliefs about gods. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The general theme here is this: for any claim C, *believing not-C* and *not believing C* are not the same: they are importantly different. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) People can believe that something *probably* does not exist with varying degrees of confidence. For more on how this probability can be understood, see [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf. Some people seem to understand atheism in terms of the belief that God does not exist *combined with* some claim about the particular confidence level for that belief—e.g., that atheists are *certain* that God doesn’t exist, or that atheists are *very confident* that God doesn’t exist, etc. But these issues of what is believed and any believer’s confidence are separable: different people believe that God does not exist and their beliefs can be, and are, held with different levels of confidence. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For example, “conspiracy theories” are often false and contrary to the best evidence, yet are confidently accepted and mistakenly believed to be well-justified and even known by their adherents. For discussion see [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Some people seem to define atheism in terms of the belief that God does not exist *combined with* some claim about a particular the “epistemic status” of that belief (*epistemic* concerns knowledge and justification): e.g., that atheists *always* believe God does not exist *and* think they *know* that God doesn’t exist, or that atheists *always* think they are *strongly justified in believing* that God doesn’t exist, or that atheists are *never justified in believing* that God doesn’t exist, etc. But the issues of what is believed and that belief’s epistemic status are separable: different people believe that God does not exist and their beliefs are often held in with different at least *perceived* epistemic statuses. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) There are various versions of theistic “fideism,” views that that theistic belief is or should be held without reason or even contrary to reason (which may or may not be described in terms of an appeal to “faith”): see Clark (n.d.). So, it is *possible* that there could be forms of atheistic fideism. Also, someone could accept atheism “just because” they were raised that way, or they find it emotionally or personally satisfying in some way, see this as not having much in the way of good reasons for their atheism, and either think that’s a problem or not. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The latter position here refers to a distinction between “friendly” and “unfriendly” atheists (*and* theists, and agnostics). “Friendly” outlooks recognize that whether someone’s beliefs are justified for them depends on their evidence, and since different people have different evidence, different beliefs can be justified for different people: so atheism might be justified for some people and theism might be justified for different people. “Unfriendly” thinkers deny this: e.g., a theist thinking that ‘all atheists are unjustified in believing there is not a God’ would be an “unfriendly” theist, and an atheist thinking that ‘all theists are unjustified in believing there is a God’ would be an unfriendly atheist. For a discussion of this distinction, see Rowe (1979) and (2006). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) A common, initial view is that knowledge is *beliefs that are true and rational or justified.* For introductions to these general issues see, [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf, [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman, and [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. On the importance of knowledge and justified belief, see [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Some people insist there is “no evidence” for theism, and others insist there is “no evidence” for atheism. According to most views of what “evidence” is, claims like these are mistaken: evidence provides *some* reason to believe something, not all evidence is strong evidence (and certainly not all evidence is “proof”): indeed, some evidence is weak; and (weak) evidence can be overridden or undercut by stronger evidence for a contrary claim. For more on what evidence is, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. On the importance of knowledge and justified belief, see [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) In contrast, agnostics tend to think the evidence is roughly equal in strength. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) On what arguments are and how they are evaluated, see [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores. For introductions to many arguments for theism, see the essays in the [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) category of *1000-Word Philosophy*. While many people think that beliefs about God’s existence will be rational only if they are based on *arguments* or explicit reasoning, there are arguments against this view for both theism and, potentially, atheism. See [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without An Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) It is commonly thought that minds or mental characteristics depend on a physical basis, such as a brain or, perhaps eventually, a very sophisticated computer system. If this is always the case, then it is unclear how a non-physical, minded being—as the concept of God is often understood—could exist. For relevant discussion of what minds are, see [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For an introduction to the various arguments from evil, see [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) For an introduction to this type of argument, see [Divine Hiddenness: Do Some People Not Find God Because God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) The “Presumption of Atheism” originates in Antony Flew’s (1923–2010) writings on the issue: see Flew (1972) and (1976). However, this original terminology is unfortunately misleading since what Flew means by “atheism” is the broader view “not-theism,” which includes many ways of *not* believing there’s a God: atheism, agnosticism, and other forms of non-theism. Both atheists and agnostics might both accept something like Flew’s presumption, but disagree on the appropriate response to their finding arguments for theism to be inadequate, and so it’s unclear whether there should be a presumption of *atheism* or a presumption of *agnosticism*. It’s perhaps interesting that Flew was an atheist for much of his life, but later rejected atheism: see Flew and Varghese (2007). For further interesting discussion of issues related to presumptions of atheism, see “The Agnostic’s Dilemma” and “What I Don’t Believe” in Hanson (2020 \[1971\]). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For an introduction to theories on what makes life meaningful, see [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) and [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Indeed, some argue that an eternal life would get boring and lose meaning. For discussion, see [Is Immortality Desirable?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) For example, many atheists are involved in the “effective altruism” movement, which is motivated by ethical concerns to address the world’s most pressing problems, such as starvation and poverty: see [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) These are brief statements of some of the most influential *ethical theories* or explanations of what makes wrong actions wrong and right actions right. For introductions to these theories, see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz, [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman, [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies, as well as “pluralistic” approaches that attempt to integrate these ethical foundations, such as [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto and [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. There are a number of options for what “meta-ethical” theory—concerning the philosophical foundations of ethics—atheists might accept, such as ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism, and various forms of ethical irrealism. For discussion, see [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Some argue that if God existed, God would understand that these types of factors are what makes actions right and wrong. Such is a lesson of Socrates’ “Euthyphro dilemma”: e.g., either there would be a *reason* why God would command us to do some action, or *not*. If *not*, the command would be arbitrary, and so God could have commanded a contrary action. But if there is a *reason* why God would command an action, then that reason would be what would make the action wrong. Furthermore, there would either be a *reason* why God would have the character he does not *or* not; there would be a *reason* why God’s character would oppose various actions (e.g., being a school shooter, physically abusing the elderly in a nursing home, etc.) *or* not. For discussion of these issues, see [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case and [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis. ### References [American Atheists. “What is Atheism?” Accessed July 7, 2025. ](https://www.atheists.org/activism/resources/about-atheism/) [Clark, Kelly. (n.d.). Religious Epistemology. ](https://iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/) [Flew, Antony. (1972). “The Presumption of Atheism.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-philosophy/article/abs/presumption-of-atheism/E01DED3450B009C1045D74C58C899EA1)[*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-philosophy/article/abs/presumption-of-atheism/E01DED3450B009C1045D74C58C899EA1)[, ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-philosophy/article/abs/presumption-of-atheism/E01DED3450B009C1045D74C58C899EA1)[2(1): 29-46. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-philosophy/article/abs/presumption-of-atheism/E01DED3450B009C1045D74C58C899EA1) [Flew, Antony. (1976). ](https://archive.org/details/presumptionofath0000flew/page/n5/mode/2up)[*The Presumption of Atheism and Other Philosophical Essays on God, Freedom, and Immortality*](https://archive.org/details/presumptionofath0000flew/page/n5/mode/2up)[. Elek/Pemberton.](https://archive.org/details/presumptionofath0000flew/page/n5/mode/2up) [Flew, Antony, and Varghese, Roy Abraham. (2007). ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/there-is-a-god-antony-flewroy-abraham-varghese?variant=32206765391906)[*There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind*](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/there-is-a-god-antony-flewroy-abraham-varghese?variant=32206765391906)[. HarperOne.](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/there-is-a-god-antony-flewroy-abraham-varghese?variant=32206765391906) [Hanson, Norwood Russell (2020 \[1971\]). The Agnostic’s Dilemma in ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_20)[*What I Do Not Believe, and Other Essays*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_20)[. Springer Dordrecht: 305-309. ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_20) [Hanson, Norwood Russell (2020 \[1971\]). What I Do Not Believe in ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_21)[*What I Do Not Believe, and Other Essays*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_21)[. Springer Dordrecht: 311-327. ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_21) [Hedberg, Trevor & Huzarevich, Jordan. (2017). Appraising Objections to Practical Apatheism. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HEDAOT)[*Philosophia*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HEDAOT)[,](https://philpapers.org/rec/HEDAOT) [45, 1: 257-276.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HEDAOT) [PhilPapers. (2020). PhilPapers Survey. Survey Results: God: Theism or Atheism? ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4842) [Rowe, William L. (1979). The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROWTPO-3)[ *American Philosophical Quarterly*](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROWTPO-3)[,](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROWTPO-3)[ 16 (4): 335-341.](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROWTPO-3) [Rowe, William. (2006). Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil. ](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023383)[*International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023383)[, 59, 2: 79–92.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023383) [Korhonen, Veera. (2024). Share of Americans who would not vote for a presidential candidate belonging to a specific religion, assuming they agree with the general position of the candidate, in the United States in 2024, by party. Statista.com. ](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1411923/share-of-americans-who-would-not-vote-for-a-president-due-to-their-religion-2022/) ### For Further Reading [Draper, Paul. (2002). Atheism and Agnosticism. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/)[(Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/). [LaFollette, Hugh. Living without a God. *Think*. 2025; 24 (71): 41-46. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/think/article/living-without-a-god/7ABAB78D288FF732219EF58C67902475) [McCormick, Matt. (n.d.) Atheism.](https://iep.utm.edu/atheism/)[ *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* ](https://iep.utm.edu/atheism/) ### Related Essays [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/ "Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief") by Tom Metcalf [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without An Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments) by Thomas Metcalf [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [Divine Hiddenness: Do Some People Not Find God Because God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Is Immortality Desirable?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/atheism.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is co-author of [*Thinking Critically About Abortion*](http://www.abortionarguments.com/), author of [*Animals & Ethics 101*](http://www.animalethics101.com/), and the author and co-author of many other writings and materials in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** atheism, atheist, Nobis, what is atheism --- ### [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/) **Published:** September 27, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay provides an overview of these various types of reasons for affirming theism or atheism. **Content:** Author: [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Category: [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word count: 998 A common conception or idea of God is that of a powerful, knowledgeable, morally good creator of the physical universe.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In contemporary philosophy, we say that *atheists* believe that this being does *not* exist and *theists* believe that this being *does* exist.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Many people have been interested in the question of whether theism or atheism (or something else)[\[3\]](#_ftn3) is true. To settle that question, philosophers offer evidence for or against the existence of God. But there are also important arguments that have to do with whether it might be *beneficial* in various ways to believe or disbelieve there’s a God. This essay provides an overview of these various types of reasons for affirming theism or atheism. [![“Doubting Thomas”, c. 1601/02, by Caravaggio.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Caravaggio_-_The_Incredulity_of_Saint_Thomas.jpg?resize=656%2C483&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Caravaggio_-_The_Incredulity_of_Saint_Thomas.jpg?ssl=1)“Doubting Thomas”, c. 1601/02, by Caravaggio.### 1. A Brief History of the Theism-Atheism Debate Philosophy of religion goes back to the ancient world.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Several Medieval Jewish, Christian, and Islamic philosophers developed arguments for the existence of God.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Many European philosophers in the “modern” period (roughly 1600–1800 CE)[\[6\]](#_ftn6) argued for the existence of God,[\[7\]](#_ftn7) although skeptics about religion were present.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) While arguments for atheism can be found as far back as the ancient world,[\[9\]](#_ftn9) the Twentieth Century saw much more argumentation for atheism than ever before.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) In the present day, about 67% of philosophers in the English-speaking world accept or lean toward atheism, but there are plenty of theist philosophers as well.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 2. Evidence for Theism or Atheism The most-discussed way to decide between theism and atheism is to look at what the evidence supports. Many theists appeal to empirical observations of the natural world: they sometimes cite the existence of the universe itself,[\[12\]](#_ftn12) or of design-like features in the universe or in biological organisms,[\[13\]](#_ftn13) as evidence for the existence of God. Atheists often argue that there is a lot of seemingly undeserved suffering in the world: this is the basis of one popular version of the Problem of Evil.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Outside of observations of nature, other types of evidence may be available. Theists sometimes cite the existence of alleged miracles,[\[15\]](#_ftn15) or the reliability of a religious document such as the Bible,[\[16\]](#_ftn16) or widespread reports of religious experiences,[\[17\]](#_ftn17) or a strong intuition that God exists.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Theists sometimes also cite the alleged existence of objective facts about right and wrong,[\[19\]](#_ftn19) and they sometimes argue that reflection on the concept of God itself can show us that God exists. For example, if God is a *perfect* being, and *nonexistence* would be an *imperfection*, then God must exist.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) These would be *a priori* (non-empirically-based) arguments.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) For atheism, one might cite the fact that many people seem to sincerely seek to experience God and never do, and argue that if God existed, God would likely ensure that some of these people find God.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) And some philosophers argue that common conceptions of God are self-contradictory, the way a square circle would be.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Last, some have argued that atheism should be the “default” position: justified until proven otherwise.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) If so, then perhaps atheism is justified simply if the evidence for theism is insufficient. ### 3. The Possible Benefits of Being a Theist or an Atheist We can set aside the question of whether the *evidence* overall supports atheism or theism, and ask whether it’s a *good idea* (or whether it benefits you) to be an atheist or theist.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) Blaise Pascal famously argued that it is very risky to be an atheist: if you believe in God and you’re correct, you go to Heaven; if you’re wrong, nothing happens when you die; if you disbelieve in God and you’re right, nothing happens when you die; but if you’re wrong, then you might go to Hell.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Critics of this argument have pointed out that it doesn’t tell you which God to believe in.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) And, if you choose the wrong religion, you might secure no benefits after all (or even invite punishment for believing in the wrong god)! Yet there might be other benefits to theism. Perhaps theists are often happier, or live longer lives, or are mentally or physically healthier, than atheists.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Similarly, to some people, an atheistic worldview seems pointless, absurd, or depressing: they may think there’s no reason to get up in the morning if there’s no greater purpose, and if when people die they are just gone forever and ultimately forgotten. In reply, some philosophers argue that it’s important to have justified beliefs (and avoid unjustified beliefs), even if those beliefs don’t make you happy.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) And many philosophers have also argued that atheists can reasonably believe that life is meaningful;[\[30\]](#_ftn30) some have even argued that atheists *can* believe that humans are immortal.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) ### 4. Theism, Atheism, and Morality Perhaps theists can best explain why a person ought to be morally good: God wants them to be good, and maybe God will reward good people and punish evil people. As noted, another answer might be that God has created objective facts about right and wrong. However, atheists obviously don’t think that morality comes from God. As a result, one might wonder whether atheists can be good people and whether they have any reason to follow the rules of morality. Empirically, the evidence we have suggests that atheists do not generally behave morally worse than theists.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) But there may be a deeper worry here: that atheism still provides no *reason* to be morally good.[\[33\]](#_ftn33) In reply, some philosophers have argued that the alleged reason theism provides to be morally good—to please God, or to avoid God’s punishment—is selfish and so isn’t a moral reason anyway. Philosophers have also argued that ethics tend to depend on facts about happiness and suffering, benefit and harm, respect, consistency, consent, or moral virtue, and such facts are all arguably independent of whether God exists.[\[34\]](#_ftn34) ### 5. Conclusion Some atheists and theists do not think much about whether their beliefs regarding God’s existence are true. But whether God exists might have deep and far-reaching implications for our everyday lives, and perhaps even our afterlives. Therefore, it is important to carefully consider the reasons for and against believing in God. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This definition arguably follows from St. Anselm of Canterbury’s (1926 \[1077-78\]) view of God as a being greater than which none can be imagined (Williams, 2021, § 3). Many later Christian philosophers largely agree with Anselm, and Anselm’s conception of God is a very popular conception in today’s philosophy of religion (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 2002; Almeida, 2013; Nagasawa, 2017). See [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson for elaboration on divine attributes. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This is standard in recent philosophy (see [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/) by Nathan Nobis for more discussion of the definition), although “atheism” has also been used to mean the denial of the dominant religious beliefs, or even to simply mean insufficient piety. See Draper (2021, § 1) on definitions. There is, however, an alternative definition, according to which atheists are people who do not believe that God exists (McCormick n.d.; Flew 1972). Yet this position, as well as the position of a kind of apathy about whether God exists, may be better-described as “non-theism” (see Bullivant & Lee 2016 for more on this term). We might also say that “agnostics” suspend judgment on the question (see [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska for discussion of agnosticism), and “skeptics” about a religion deny that we can be justified in believing some religion’s central claims. “Deists” are sometimes understood to adopt an alternative to these other positions: they believe in a creator being that doesn’t have the traditionally-believed characteristics of the God of the monotheistic religions. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See previous note. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Epicurus (341-271 BCE) (see O’Keefe n.d.: § 3.e), Plato (428-348 BCE), Aristotle (384-322 BCE), and the Stoics (see for example Baltzly 2021: § 3) all wrote about religion and theology. For the atheism-theism debate, perhaps the most-important entries from ancient philosophy are Plato’s *Euthyphro* and Aristotle’s *Physics* (VIII, 4-6) and *Metaphysics* (XII, 1-6). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Spade (2021: § 7) suggests that philosophy of religion may have been *invented* in the medieval period. Some of the most-important Christian figures in this period in philosophy of religion include St. Augustine, St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus (Spade 2021). As for Jewish, medieval philosophers, the most-important is Maimonides (see Seeskin 2021 for description). Two of the most-important Muslim figures are Al-Ghazâlî (see Griffel 2021 for description) and Ibn Rushd (a.k.a. “Averroes”) (see Ben Ahmed and Pasnau 2021 for description). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The “modern” period is normally understood to comprise the works of Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes through Immanuel Kant (Skirry n.d.; Rohlf 2021; Aries and Watkins 2019). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Descartes (Nolan 2021; Hatfield 2021: sect. 3.2), Spinoza (Nadler 2021: sect 2.1), Leibniz (Look 2021: sect. 7.1; Murray and Greenberg 2021), Locke (book IV), Berkeley, and Kant provided arguments in defense of the existence of God, although they differed in their views of God’s nature and about the natures of those proofs. See also [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) David Hume (see Morris and Brown 2021: sect. 8 for description) was clearly skeptical of “natural religion,” which is the attempt to prove the existence of God by looking at nature, such as through cosmological or design arguments. (See the entries on [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) and [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf.) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The most famous ancient case for atheism is in Epicurus; see O’Keefe (n.d.), § 3.e. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See especially Russell (1927) Irvine (2021: sect. 6); Mackie (1955); Flew (1972), and Rowe (1979) for landmark arguments against theism. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Bourget and Chalmers (2014: 476). In the contemporary period, some of the most-cited defenders of atheism or skeptics of theism include Paul Draper, Michael Martin, Wes Morriston, Kai Nielsen, Graham Oppy, William Rowe, Quentin Smith, and Michael Tooley. Some of the most-cited contemporary defenders of theism include William Alston, William Lane Craig, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alvin Plantinga, Eleanore Stump, Richard Swinburne, and Peter van Inwagen. See e.g. PhilPapers (n.d.) to search for these authors, and see also the other citations in this entry. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) and [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/), by Thomas Metcalf. A similar argument is the Nomological Argument, according to which the existence of laws of nature or regularities is evidence for the existence of God (Hildebrand and Metcalf 2021). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) One occasionally hears the claim that it’s impossible to prove a negative (see Hales (2005) for discussion), but this is false, which is obvious after a moment’s thought. If some hypothesis entails that *p* is true, but we observe that not-*p* is true, then we’ve falsified the hypothesis. For example, it is possible to prove that there are not 500 elephants in the room with you right now. On attempting to prove the nonexistence of God, see for example the [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomás Bogardus for a summary. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See e.g. Swinburne (2004, 273) on the Argument from History and McShane (2015) on prophecy. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See e.g. Webb (2021) for an overview. In general, we can follow Hume (2007 \[1779\]) in distinguishing “natural theology” (arguing for God based on nature) from “revealed theology” (arguing for God based on God’s revealing himself or itself to humanity, for example as in the Bible or miracles). For more on religious or mystical experiences, see also [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism); [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/); [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/); [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/); and [Jean-Luc Marion on “Saturated Phenomena”: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Some authors have argued that we are justified in trusting any particular intuition until we have a good reason not to (Huemer 2001, ch. 5). See Swinburne (2004, ch. 13) for an application to theism itself. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See Evans (2021) for an overview. For more on these metaethical issues, see also [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case, and Evans (2021, sect. 3), as well as [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See the [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman and [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf for introductions to similar arguments. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Some philosophers have also argued that theists can know that God exists without having a clear argument for the existence of God. For elaboration, see [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without An Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) See [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless for an introduction to this argument. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) See [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson. Divine attributes might be in conflict with other views important to theism; see e.g. Hunt and Zagzebski (2021) on foreknowledge and free will. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Flew (1972) and Gutting (2013) discuss this idea. See also Draper (2021, section 6.2) and McCormick (n.d., sect. 3.c). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) See Jordan 2021 for an overview of pragmatic arguments for believing in God. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson. On the assumption that non-belief would be punished, see Hájek 2021 and [Hell and Universalism: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A. G. Holdier. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Hájek 2021, sect. 5.1, summarizes this problem. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) See e.g. Mueller et al. (2001) and Koenig (2012) for discussions of this idea. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) For more explanation, see [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) See Matthew Pianalto, [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) for an introduction. [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) Huemer (2021) provides such a case that humans are immortal. [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) Sharif (2015) is an overview of research on the potential relations between religious belief and moral behavior. [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) See Rosati (2021) for an overview of moral motivation. [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) For the general idea of whether objective moral facts depend on God’s existence, see [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case, [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis, as well as Heathwood (2012), and [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. For elaboration on these particular ethical theories, see the ethical theories under the category [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/). ### References [Almeida, M. J. 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Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/maimonides/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2021 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/maimonides/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/maimonides/) [Sharif, A. F. (2015). “Does Religion Increase Moral Behavior?” ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352250X15001876)[*Current Opinion in Psychology, 6*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352250X15001876)[: 108-113. ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352250X15001876) [Skirry, J. (N.d.). “René Descartes (1596-1650).” In J. Fieser and B. Dowden (eds.),](https://iep.utm.edu/descarte/)[ *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/descarte/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/descarte/) [Spade, P. V. (2021). “Medieval Philosophy.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.) ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/medieval-philosophy/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2021 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/medieval-philosophy/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/medieval-philosophy/) [Webb, M. (2021). “Religious Experience.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/religious-experience/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2021 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/religious-experience/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/religious-experience/) [Williams, T. (2021). “Saint Anselm.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/anselm/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2021 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/anselm/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/anselm/) ### For Further Reading [LaFollette, H. Living without a God. *Think*. 2025; 24 (71): 41-46. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/think/article/living-without-a-god/7ABAB78D288FF732219EF58C67902475) ### Related Essays [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/) by Nathan Nobis [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) By Tomás Bogardus [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A. G. Holdier [Jean-Luc Marion on “Saturated Phenomena”: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/) by Matthew Sanderson [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism) by Matthew Sanderson [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without An Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/) by Matthew Sanderson [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/teizm-ve-ateizm-inanma-ve-inanmamaya-dair-nedenler-tom-metcalf) ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Uncategorized **Tags:** atheism, atheist, philosophy of religion, theism, theist --- ### [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) **Published:** February 13, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An artificial intelligence or “AI” would be an entity that thinks or acts like an average human being—or even surpasses the average human being in cognitive abilities—yet is a machine or computer program. The idea of artificial intelligence is closely connected to several important philosophical discussions about the nature of minds. This essay is an introduction to philosophical thinking about artificial minds and AIs. **Content:** Author: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Categories: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/) Word count: 1000 Many important philosophical discussions are about minds and persons.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) We mainly think about these issues in the context of ourselves: human beings. But an artificial intelligence or “AI” would be an entity that thinks or acts like an average human being—or even surpasses the average human being in cognitive abilities—yet is a machine or computer program.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The idea of artificial intelligence is closely connected to several important philosophical discussions about the nature of minds. This essay is an introduction to philosophical thinking about artificial minds and AIs. [![A cyber brain.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/artificial-intelligence.jpg?resize=656%2C435&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/artificial-intelligence.jpg?ssl=1) An illustration of a brain made of circuitry.### 1. Types of Artificial Intelligence There are many ways of describing AIs, but two of the most common are to distinguish AIs based on the types of tasks they can perform, and to distinguish them based on whether they actually have minds like humans’ minds. Many computers can perform like humans at some task that normally requires complex thought or planning.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Thus, there may already be many examples of *specific* artificial intelligences: computer programs that can play chess or navigate to a destination.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But an artificial *general* intelligence or “AGI” would have a wide variety of intellectual capabilities, probably meeting or surpassing most humans’ capabilities.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) We can also distinguish “strong” from “weak” AI: a strong AI would actually have a mind that’s essentially the same or greater in capabilities as a human mind, and a weak AI would only *appear* to have those capabilities.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Strong AIs would have genuine thoughts, feelings, and experiences. As computing power increases and AIs become more sophisticated, there may be a point at which AIs’ behavior is indistinguishable from humans’.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Still, that would not entail that the AI was actually a conscious person. ### 2. Artificial Intelligence, Consciousness, and Personhood What does it mean to say that something is conscious? Philosophers often describe consciousness in terms of first-person experiences, or what it is *like* to be some organism.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Arguably, there is something it is like, from the first-person perspective, to be a bat, or a horse, but there is nothing it is like to be a rock, or a mushroom.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) So, adult humans, bats, and horses are conscious, but rocks and mushrooms are not. We can also understand consciousness in terms of sensory experiences. Computers can certainly *react* to stimuli, but we don’t normally think they’re having *experiences* of them. By analogy, a thermostat can react to a temperature’s dropping below a certain setpoint, but the thermostat doesn’t *feel* cold. In general, there is no consensus on whether an AI could ever be conscious, but relatively few philosophers are committed to theories that rule it out completely.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) It may be that consciousness necessarily requires some kind of *biological* basis, such as brain cells. Try to imagine whether a system of metal and plastic pulleys, levers, and gears could have conscious experiences.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) If it seems obvious that no such system could be conscious, no matter how complex, then perhaps it may seem that metal and plastic, at least, could not be the site of consciousness.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Yet many philosophers would argue that if something can be coherently imagined, then that’s evidence that it’s possible.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) So, if you can *imagine* a computer or a robot from science fiction having experiences, then that would be evidence that a strong AI (with conscious experiences) is possible. Some philosophers argue that computers, by their very nature, could not engage in conscious thought nor understanding. One example of such an argument is the “Chinese Room Argument,”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) according to which computers are merely manipulating symbols according to rules, without any intentional understanding of what the symbols mean.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) By analogy, you might not know a foreign language, but you could act like it, for example, by running strings of text through a translator website. Even if you could thereby speak in a way that was indistinguishable from a native speaker, arguably, you’re still not understanding the language. The argument holds that computers “speak” languages in that way: manipulating symbols without true understanding. However, the most popular theory of consciousness (although still a minority viewpoint)[\[16\]](#_ftn16) is that mental states are defined by the functional roles they play in some cognitive system.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) According to this theory, *functionalism,* in principle, a computer’s “experiences” could play the right role with respect to its other “mental” features so that the computer would be conscious.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) If an AI were conscious, it might be self-aware, and it might easily be far more rational than the average human.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Thus, AIs might also be *persons* (in a morally important, psychological sense),[\[20\]](#_ftn20) and we would need to think about whether they have moral and legal rights.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 3. Identifying Artificial Consciousness Even if we decide computers *could be* conscious, that would not tell us how to learn or verify that some computer *was* actually conscious. Many things *act* conscious but aren’t: a character in a realistic video game might cry out in pain, but no one is consciously feeling anything.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) A famous conception of a test to decide whether something is an AI is the Turing Test. In a standard version of the test, humans chat with the computer program in question, without being told that it is a computer program. If the humans can’t recognize more than 50% of the time that they’re actually talking to a computer (rather than to a real human), the computer passes the test. Of course, it’s questionable whether passing the Turing Test establishes that a computer program is truly a strong AI.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) As noted, something can *act* conscious but not yet *be* conscious. It’s not easy to know whether some AI is actually conscious, but it is notoriously difficult to be certain that other *humans* are conscious, anyway.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) To conclude that other humans are conscious, we can observe their behavior, but many AIs today can behave in fairly human-like ways.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) ### 4. Conclusion There are many other important philosophical issues related to AIs, especially in the ethics of how we use them.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) We should expect that philosophical analysis will continue to be fruitful as we see what the future holds for AIs and ourselves. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Thomas Metcalf, [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Bringsjord & Govindarajulu (2023); Hauser (n.d.). See also Russell & Norvig (2010, § I.1) for an introduction to the concept. We normally think of AIs built by humans, but of course, they could be built by extraterrestrial beings or by other AIs; see below. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Bringsjord & Govindarajulu (2023, § 1) provide a brief outline of the history of thinking about AIs. For example, chess-playing and *Jeopardy!*-playing computer programs are commonly considered AIs, even though they’re not fully general. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Such AIs have existed for a long time already. Anyoha (2017) provides a useful history of artificial intelligence. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Strictly speaking, what makes the AI “general” is the breadth of its abilities, not that it is far more intelligent than humans. But in most discussions, it tends to be assumed that the AGI will be better than humans at these tasks, presumably because specific AIs tend to be much better than most humans at their specific tasks. See Bringsjord & Govindarajulu (2023, § 5) for a general discussion of AGI. See Heath (2024) for a report on a current effort to build AGI. And if an AGI develops the ability to build even-more-intelligent AGIs, then the capabilities of AIs may increase exponentially; this hypothetical situation is often known as the “singularity.” The idea is that each new, superintelligent AI would use its capabilities to build an even-more-intelligent AI. Chalmers (2010) provides an extensive discussion of the idea and implications of such a singularity. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Nowadays, some of the most commonly used software that could be considered an AI is the large language model. These programs can speak like humans and appear to understand human languages by predicting words and statements that, based on the AI’s training (commonly, “reading” sentences and pages of text), are plausibly something that a human would say that point (Google, n.d.; IBM, n.d.). As far as we know, these are examples of weak AIs. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Bringsjord & Govindarajulu (2023, § 8.1), for example, regard weak AI as obviously possible. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The landmark article is Nagel (1974). See also van Gulick (2023, § 4) for discussion of the phenomenal or qualitative content of consciousness. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Van Gulick (n.d., § 1) regards this as the most fundamental and commonly used notion of consciousness. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For an introduction to theories of the mind, see Jacob Berger, [The Mind-Body Problem: What are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) Presumably, *eliminativism* would rule out the possibility of conscious AIs, as would *type-type identity theory*, but those positions are questionable (Bourget & Chalmers, n.d.a; Van Gulick, 2023, § 8.2). Note that if we discover that computer programs can be conscious, then one important implication might be that some forms of skepticism about the external world are much more plausible than before. After all, if computer programs can be conscious, then we may be computer programs in a simulated environment. Bostrom (2003) argues that if computer programs can be conscious, conscious computer-programs who believe themselves to be biological humans may greatly outnumber genuine biological humans. See also Andew Chapman, [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) This example is a version of one borrowed from Leibniz; see van Gulick (2023, § 1). See Hauser (n.d., § 4.c.iii) on this sub-debate about whether computers can feel or have experiences. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) A sizeable minority of philosophers hold that the mind is not a physical object (Bourget & Chalmers, n.d.b). See also Jacob Berger, [The Mind-Body Problem: What are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) If the mind is not a physical object, then merely constructing physical objects that act like brains may not be sufficient to produce conscious minds. However, this doesn’t actually tell us whether AIs can be conscious, because it doesn’t tell us whether arranging physical objects in the right way would produce (non-physical) minds. See also Gennaro (n.d.) on consciousness, especially § 6. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Kirk (2023, § 5) on whether conceivability or imaginability is evidence of possibility. See Bob Fischer, [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility and Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Cole (2023). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) In the original argument, a person sits in an opaque room and is passed sentences, on a piece of paper, in a Chinese language such as Mandarin. The person looks at the sentence (a string of symbols), finds it in a book next to a corresponding set of symbols, writes the corresponding symbols on a paper, and passes them back out. The person in the room did not grow up speaking Mandarin and has never taken a course in it, nor ever heard it spoken aloud, nor seen it written before, nor ever met a person who speaks Mandarin. But to a person *outside* the room, it appears as if the person in the room speaks Mandarin fluently. Yet we are supposed to conclude that the person in the room does not understand Mandarin, and that computers in general “speak” languages in a similar way, without actually understanding the language. For more on the Chinese Room, see, e.g. Cole (2023). An interesting related question is how we could decide, from our perspective, whether some computer or machine was conscious; see e.g. Borderline Consciousness (n.d.). For more on intentionality, see Addison Ellis, [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Bourget & Chalmers (n.d.a), according to whom 33.04% of philosophers accept or lean towards functionalism (cf. Gennaro 2023, § 3.b.v; Levin, 2023). If functionalism about consciousness is true, then a creature that was physically very different from a biological animal could still be conscious. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See Levin (2023) for an extended discussion of functionalism, according to which minds or mental states are defined by the roles they play in cognitive systems. Also, some philosophers believe that there is consciousness pervading the natural world, even in what we would normally consider inanimate objects, such as the individual atoms in the elements that typically compose computer chips; see Goff et al. (2023) and Skrbina (n.d.). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) For example, if a robot got damaged, it could form the “belief” that something dangerous was nearby, and the “intention” to move away from the danger. Of course, a common criticism of functionalism is that a being could have such “experiences” (defined functionally) without actually having the kinds of conscious, first-person, subjective experiences that we consider paradigmatic of consciousness. See Levin (2023, § 5.5). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Computers might be more epistemically rational in the sense that they have a much higher proportion of true to false beliefs than the average person, and they might be more instrumentally rational in the sense that they make decisions that are better aligned with their goals. On epistemic rationality, see Todd Long, [Epistemic Justification](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/), and Watson (n.d.), and on instrumental rationality, see Kolodny & Brunero (2023). And if some AIs are persons, they might then have moral rights (See Warren (1973, § II.2) for an example of how persons might have moral rights.) [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For some discussion of persons and ethics, see Shoemaker (2023), especially §§ 2.2 and 7. See also Warren (1973, § II.2) for a landmark discussion of the moral implications of considering something to be a person. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) In turn, if some AIs are persons, then this would imply that they have many philosophically interesting features. See, for example, Baker (2000). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) In fact, many philosophers believe that something could be physically just like a human and yet not be conscious. Such a “zombie” might be quite a bit like an AI. See Bourget & Chalmers (n.d.c) on philosophers’ opinions about zombies, and Kirk (2023) for an extensive introduction to zombies. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) The landmark article about the Turing Test was Turing (1950); see also Oppy & Dowe (2023). Arguably, some programs have already passed the Turing Test, but some have argued that this simply shows the limitations of the Test (Oremus, 2022). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) In philosophy, the “Problem of Other Minds” is the problem of whether and how we know that minds other than our own exist. See Avramides (2023, § 1) and Thornton (n.d.). Arguably, while we can perceive other people’s physical bodies and brains, we do not directly perceive their mental states, so there is room to question whether those mental states exist at all. A complicated question is what kind of evidence we might have for belief in others’ minds; see the essays in [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Arguably, a simple version of the Turing Test had already been passed half a century ago; see Weizenbaum (1966) and Oppy & Dowe (2023, § 1). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See Thomas Metcalf, [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/ "Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment"). Coeckelburgh (2020) is an accessible introduction. See also Gordon & Nyholm (n.d.) and Müller (2023). See also van Wynsberghe (2021) and the essays in Voeneky (2022). ### References [Anyoha, R. (2017). ](https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/)[*Can machines think?*](https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/)[ SITN. ](https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/) [Avramides, A. (2023). Other minds. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/other-minds/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/other-minds/)[ (Winter 2023 ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/other-minds/) [Baker, L. R. (2000). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/persons-and-bodies/37247AC7286CDEA6C82DFF25B1805911)[*Persons and bodies: A constitution view*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/persons-and-bodies/37247AC7286CDEA6C82DFF25B1805911)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/persons-and-bodies/37247AC7286CDEA6C82DFF25B1805911) [Borderline Consciousness. (n.d.).](http://www.borderlineconsciousness.com/)[ *Borderline consciousness*](http://www.borderlineconsciousness.com/)[. Borderlineconsciousness.com. ](http://www.borderlineconsciousness.com/) [Bostrom, N. (2003). Are we living in a computer simulation? ](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/53/211/243/1610975)[*The Philosophical Quarterly, 53*](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/53/211/243/1610975)[(211), 243–255.](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/53/211/243/1610975) [Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. (n.d.a). ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5010)[*Survey results: Consciousness: identity theory, panpsychism, eliminativism, functionalism, or dualism?*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5010)[ Survey2020.philpeople.org. ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5010) [Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. (n.d.b). ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4874)[*Survey results: Mind: Physicalism or non-physicalism?*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4874)[ Survey2020.philpeople.org.](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4874) [Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. (n.d.c). ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4930)[*Survey results: Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4930)[ Survey2020.philpeople.org.](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4930) [Bringsjord, S. & Govindarajulu, N. S. (2023). Artificial intelligence. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/artificial-intelligence/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/artificial-intelligence/)[ (Winter 2023 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/artificial-intelligence/) [Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The singularity: A philosophical analysis. ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2010-19844-001)[*Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17*](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2010-19844-001)[(9–10), 7–65.](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2010-19844-001) [Coeckelbergh, M. (2020). ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262538190/ai-ethics/)[*AI ethics*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262538190/ai-ethics/)[. MIT Press.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262538190/ai-ethics/) [Gennaro, R. J. (n.d.). ](https://iep.utm.edu/consciousness/)[*Consciousness*](https://iep.utm.edu/consciousness/)[. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ](https://iep.utm.edu/consciousness/) [Goff, P., Seager, W., & Allen-Hermanson, S. (2023). Panpsychism. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/panpsychism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/panpsychism/)[ (Winter 2023 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/panpsychism/) [Google. (n.d.). ](https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/resources/intro-llms)[*Introduction to large language models*](https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/resources/intro-llms)[. Developers.google.com. ](https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/resources/intro-llms) [Gordon, J. & Nyholm, S. (n.d.). Ethics of artificial intelligence. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/ethics-of-artificial-intelligence/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/ethics-of-artificial-intelligence/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/ethics-of-artificial-intelligence/) [Hauser, L. (n.d.). Artificial intelligence. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/artificial-intelligence/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/artificial-intelligence/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/artificial-intelligence/) [Heath, A. (2024, January 18). ](https://www.theverge.com/2024/1/18/24042354/mark-zuckerberg-meta-agi-reorg-interview)[*Mark Zuckerberg’s new goal is creating artificial general intelligence*](https://www.theverge.com/2024/1/18/24042354/mark-zuckerberg-meta-agi-reorg-interview)[. The Verge.](https://www.theverge.com/2024/1/18/24042354/mark-zuckerberg-meta-agi-reorg-interview) [IBM. (n.d.). ](https://www.ibm.com/topics/large-language-models)[*What are large language models?*](https://www.ibm.com/topics/large-language-models)[ IBM.com. ](https://www.ibm.com/topics/large-language-models) [Kolodny, N. & Brunero, J. (2023). Instrumental rationality. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/rationality-instrumental/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/rationality-instrumental/)[ (Winter 2023 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/rationality-instrumental/) [Kurzweil, R. (2005). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KURTSI)[*The singularity is near: When humans transcend biology*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KURTSI)[. Viking.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KURTSI) [Levin, J. (2023). Functionalism. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/functionalism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/functionalism/)[(Winter 2023 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/functionalism/) [Müller, V. C. (2023). Ethics of artificial intelligence and robotics. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/ethics-ai/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/ethics-ai/)[ (Winter 2023 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/ethics-ai/) [Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914)[*The Philosophical Review, 83*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914)[(4), 435–450.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914) [Oppy, G. & Dowe, D. (2023). The Turing Test. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/turing-test/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/turing-test/)[ (Winter 2023 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/turing-test/) [Oremus, R. (2022, June 17). Google’s AI passed a famous test — and showed how the test is broken. ](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/06/17/google-ai-lamda-turing-test/)[*The Washington Post*](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/06/17/google-ai-lamda-turing-test/)[ (17 June 2022 ed.).](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/06/17/google-ai-lamda-turing-test/) [Russell, S. & Norvig, P. (2021). ](https://www.pearson.com/en-us/subject-catalog/p/artificial-intelligence-a-modern-approach/P200000003500/9780137505135)[*Artificial intelligence: A modern approach*](https://www.pearson.com/en-us/subject-catalog/p/artificial-intelligence-a-modern-approach/P200000003500/9780137505135)[ (4th ed.). Pearson.](https://www.pearson.com/en-us/subject-catalog/p/artificial-intelligence-a-modern-approach/P200000003500/9780137505135) [Shoemaker, S. (2023). Personal identity and ethics. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2023 ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/identity-ethics/) [Skrbina, D. (n.d.). Panpsychism. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/panpsych/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/panpsych/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/panpsych/) [Thornton, S. P. (n.d.). Solipsism and the problem of other minds. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/) [Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence.](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238)[ *Mind, 59*](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238)[(236), 433–460.](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238) [Van Gulick, R. (2023). Consciousness. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consciousness/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consciousness/)[ (Winter 2023 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consciousness/) [Van Wynsberghe, A. (2021). Sustainable AI: AI for sustainability and the sustainability of AI. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43681-021-00043-6)[*AI Ethics, 1*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43681-021-00043-6)[, 213–218.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43681-021-00043-6) [Voeneky, S., Kellmeyer, P., Mueller, O., & Burgard, W. (eds.). (2022). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-responsible-artificial-intelligence/EF02D78934D18B9A22A57A46FF8FFAFC)[*The Cambridge handbook of responsible artificial intelligence: Interdisciplinary perspectives*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-responsible-artificial-intelligence/EF02D78934D18B9A22A57A46FF8FFAFC)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-responsible-artificial-intelligence/EF02D78934D18B9A22A57A46FF8FFAFC) [Warren, M. A. (1973). On the moral and legal status of abortion. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WAROTM-2)[*The Monist, 57*](https://philpapers.org/rec/WAROTM-2)[(1), 43–61.](https://philpapers.org/rec/WAROTM-2) [Watson, J. C. (n.d.). Justification, epistemic. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/) [Weizenbaum, J. (1966). ELIZA—a computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine. ](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/365153.365168)[*Communications of the ACM, 9*](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/365153.365168)[(1), 36–45.](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/365153.365168) ### Related Essays [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/ "Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment") by Thomas Metcalf [The Mind-Body Problem: What are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/) by Addison Ellis [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility and Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Epistemic Justification](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/yapay-zeka-yapay-zihinlerin-olma-ihtimali-thomas-metcalf/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/artificial-intelligence.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Mind & Language, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** A.I., AI, artificial intelligence, artificial minds, metcalf --- ### [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/) **Published:** May 12, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Theories of racism try to answer these questions by trying to identify the essence of racism, the unifying and fundamental feature(s) of all racist things that explains why they are racist. This essay surveys some influential theories of racism. **Content:** Author: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) Categories: [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/philosophy-of-law/) Wordcount: 999 Many things can be racist. What do the many different types of potentially racist things—actions, policies, laws, institutions, language, beliefs, feelings, people, and more—have in common that *makes* them “racist?” What is it for something to *be* “racist?” And why is racism generally wrong? Theories of racism try to answer these questions by trying to identify the *essence* of racism, the unifying and fundamental feature(s) of all racist things that explains *why* they are racist.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Different proposed roots of racism in individuals—their beliefs about, feelings towards, or treatment of others—and social structures suggest differing answers to ethical questions about racism. This essay surveys some influential theories of racism.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### 1. Beliefs and Feelings Some philosophers have argued that racist beliefs, racist feelings, or a combination of both are at the root of racism.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Racist beliefs typically take members of certain racial groups to be morally inferior because of their race.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Racist feelings are negative emotions like hatred, disgust, disregard, and contempt directed towards people because of their race. On these theories, other racist things are racist because of the underlying racist beliefs or feelings that lead to or support them. Racist beliefs may be wrong because they draw moral distinctions between groups of people who aren’t actually different in any morally-relevant way.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Believing that individuals are morally inferior because of their racial group(s) is wrong because racial groups don’t differ from one another with respect to any morally important trait, such as moral character or the ability to reason or live good lives.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Racist feelings, which are often based on (flawed) racist beliefs, may be wrong because they oppose virtues of benevolence and fairness.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) And both may be wrong because they motivate people to treat others badly. We can evaluate our own potential racism on these views, to the extent that we can understand whether our beliefs and feelings inferiorize and demean others because of their race. However, since we can’t always know for certain what people—including even ourselves sometimes[\[8\]](#_ftn8)—believe or feel, we might sometimes not know whether something is racist.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 2. Treatment Some instead argue that racism is *best* understood in terms of behavior: how people *treat* others.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Behavior is often publicly observable, so focusing on it makes it easier to determine what’s racist. We can understand racist people, beliefs, feelings, and other racist things as those that support racist treatment. Racist treatment is, in general, treatment that results in worse outcomes for people of one race compared to people of other races, *plus* some additional condition(s) to avoid cases like this: imagine people of some race end up winning a lottery less frequently than members of other races; if this result is due to truly random chance, this lottery isn’t racist, even if the results disfavor a racial group.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) There are several additional conditions worth considering. One requires that this kind of treatment comes from racist beliefs or feelings. Another is that, in cases of racist treatment, race or beliefs about race must *explain* or *cause* the worse outcomes for one racial group.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Alternatively *or* additionally, we could require that the treatment be unjust, unfair, or otherwise wrong. ### 3. Structural Racism While our discussion has mostly focused on individuals’ psychology and behavior, not all examples of racism are best understood at the individual level. Consider the practice of *redlining*: Black people looking for financial credit were denied it based on their zip code, which, due to segregation, often marked their race.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Many bankers engaged in redlining may have followed this policy *not* because of racial hatred or inferiorization on their part: maybe they unthinkingly followed industry standards or what their boss told them to do without considering *why* people from these zip codes might be denied credit. Yet redlining is understood to be racist because it resulted in preferentially distributing resources to White people, resulting in worse outcomes for Black people.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) [![A map of redlining in Atlanta, Georgia. National Geographic. 2024. "MapMaker: Redlining in the United States."](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/redlining.jpg?resize=656%2C469&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/redlining.jpg?ssl=1)A map of redlining in Atlanta, Georgia. [*National Geographic*. 2024. “MapMaker: Redlining in the United States.”](https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/mapmaker-redlining-united-states/)To rightly call redlining racist, we need an understanding of *structural racism*, racism at a larger scale than just individual person-to-person interactions. Accounts of structural racism typically focus on racial hierarchies, or structures of power, within a given society. It’s possible to have rac*ism*, on this view, even if no individuals engaged in the structure have racist beliefs or feelings.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Nevertheless, not all racism must be structural. Imagine someone who privately holds false, negative racial stereotypes about another racial group that no one else holds. This person isn’t contributing to structural racism since their beliefs don’t support any real-world racial hierarchy or domination, yet their beliefs seem racist.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The same seems true of racial minorities who hate and inferiorize the racial majority: if their feelings and beliefs are racist, they aren’t *structurally* racist. ### 4. Disputed Cases The most obvious instances of racism are clearly wrong, for reasons reviewed above, but should we think that racism is *always* morally wrong? Some philosophers have observed that some instances of racism are due to ignorance rather than malice.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) A person raised in a society where pervasive race “science” convinces them that another race is inferior may have racist beliefs, but their error may be intellectual—since they uncritically accept unreliable sources of information—rather than the result of bad moral character.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Additionally, consider the following: - racial pride and solidarity;[\[19\]](#_ftn19) - *affirmative action*, which*,* to address racism in education and employment, gives preference to certain races;[\[20\]](#_ftn20) and: - preferring to date only (or no) people of a specific race.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) While some people consider *any* racial preferences to be racist[\[22\]](#_ftn22) and thereby wrong, many argue that *some* racial preferences—such as perhaps some of the above—are not racist, *or* that they are not wrong, *or* that they are neither racist nor wrong. Thinking through what makes any racial preference racist (or not) helps us better understand whether racism is *inherently* wrong or whether it is wrong because of features it *usually* has, but not always.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) ### 5. Conclusion Better understanding what racism *is* can help us understand when and why it is wrong and how we might lessen it and its harmful, unjust effects on individuals and societies.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Philosophers interested in defining racism typically have at least one of the following two goals: the first, the *descriptive* goal, is to identify a definition of racism that captures the way that most people use the term “racist.” Alternatively, the *revisionary* goal is to articulate a definition that makes this concept useful for particular projects like those of social scientists attempting to better understand our social world or social critics and activists looking to effect social change. See Mills (2003), Shelby (2014), Urquidez (2020), and Scott (2022) for more on the different goals and approaches taken by philosophers seeking better understanding of racism. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) We will assume here that we understand well enough what races are for the subsequent discussion to make sense. For more on what races might be, see [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf and [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In some of the most influential philosophical texts on racism, those who believe that racist *beliefs* ultimately explain racism often metaphorically describe racism as “in the head” while those who believe that racist *feelings* present racism metaphorically as “in the heart.” See Garcia (1996) for a theory of racism centered on feelings, Appiah (2017) for a theory of racism centered on beliefs, and Blum (2002) for a theory that includes both negative feelings and inferiorizing beliefs. The line between theories of racism that center racist beliefs and those that center racist feelings can be blurry; see Jaggar (1989) for one set of reasons to reject the view that there is a clear distinction between the mental and emotional. It’s interesting to note that a person with racist beliefs need not have racist feelings, or vice-versa. Someone might believe she’s superior to people of another race but be motivated by that belief to try to help people of that race: she may have racist *beliefs* but not racist *feelings*. On the other hand, people of one race may have racist *feelings* towards another race but not racist *beliefs about* them, if, e.g., the first group hates the second because they see them as competent (and maybe even superior) competitors for some good jobs. For more examples like these, see Blum (2002). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) One popular alternative account of racism from Shelby (2003, 2014) requires that racist beliefs be *ideological*, meaning that racist beliefs must be part of a collection of widely-held beliefs that misrepresent the social world in some significant way and which, through that misrepresentation of the world, support oppression. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Appiah (2017) for more on this point. This principle that we shouldn’t treat others differently if there’s no morally relevant difference between them plays an important role in a famous argument against *ethical egoism*, a view that claims that each person is justified in giving moral priority to themselves, even at the expense of others. Interestingly, there are arguments that ethical egoism—preferring yourself—is wrong for reasons similar to why racism—preferring your own racial group—is wrong: see [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis. Racist beliefs are often understood to be wrong because they are false and intellectually or epistemically unjustified: racists generally have no good reason or evidence for their racist beliefs. For instance, they often rely on false stereotypes, hasty generalizations from limited experience, biased interpretation of evidence, selective attention to confirming cases while ignoring counterexamples, and reasoning from claims about groups to conclusions about particular individuals in ways that are unjustified. Racists often consider racial membership as evidence of moral character, intelligence, or human worth without justification. Combined with the view that it is often morally wrong to hold epistemically unjustified beliefs—especially about other people—many philosophers conclude that racist beliefs are both irrational and morally wrong. For arguments to think that *all* epistemically unjustified beliefs are morally wrong to hold, see [The Ethics of Belief: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. Also see [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman for more on what features might matter morally and why. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Garcia (1996) for this argument, which argues for the wrongness of racism from the perspective of virtue ethics. For more on virtue ethics, see [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) One reason to think that we might not always be aware of our own motivations when it comes to issues of race is the phenomenon of *implicit bias*, which suggests that people may act out of prejudice or discrimination unknowingly. For more on implicit bias, see Brownstein (2025). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For further discussion of challenges in identifying others’ thoughts and feelings, and our own, see [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/) by Emma Otterski and [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winoku. One possible benefit of theories that focus on racist beliefs and feelings is that this difficulty in determining when others are being racist may mean that the term “racist” is reserved for only the most egregiously bad things that indicate someone’s poor moral character, which racist beliefs or feelings. Because some think that the term “racist” is overused and so no longer feels as serious a moral condemnation to those who are called “racist,” restricting its use to only the most serious cases might help the term reclaim some of its moral force. See Blum (2002) for more about why “racist” has lost its force as well as Liao and Hansen (2023) for a response to Blum’s worry. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Philips (1984) for one such account. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The motivation for this first part of this definition is the view that, generally speaking, people ought to be treated equally. On what this might mean, see [Equality: What Is It, and How Is It Different From Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/) by Daniel Weltman. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Though he himself does not embrace the view that all racism can be explained by racist treatment, Arthur (2007) inspires this option by requiring that the target’s race must be part of the explanation for why something racist is racist. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a history of redlining and its contemporary consequences, see Egade et. al. (2023). This practice began in the 1930s and was outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Also see National Geographic (2024). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For the purposes of this essay, I will capitalize “Black” and “White,” for example, when referring to racial groups to distinguish this usage from other uses of these terms. Appiah (2020) articulates some excellent reasons for adopting this convention. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For one such view, see Haslanger (2004, 2017). For a critique, see Urquidez (2024). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) This example is adapted from Scott (2025). See also Scott (2022). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Both Appiah (2017) and Shelby (2014) emphasize that racism may be an *intellectual* or *epistemic* wrong (*epistemology* concerns, among other things, what we ought to believe, given the goal of having reasonable beliefs) additionally to or instead of it being a *moral* wrong. For discussion of an influential view that all intellectual or epistemic wrongs are also moral wrongs, since they violate the “ethics of belief,” see [The Ethics of Belief: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) For more on when it’s appropriate to blame others for something, including for their beliefs, see [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller. Also see [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See Appiah (1989) for one philosophical discussion of racial solidarity. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For discussion of the ethics of affirmative action, see Anderson (2010) and Boonin (2011). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See Mills (1994) for a relevant discussion and Zheng (2016) for some moral concerns about racial preferences in romantic relationships. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) For evidence supporting this claim, see Thai et. al. (2019), a study showing that people on a dating site who disclosed racial dating preferences were viewed as more racist by study participants, even those participants who claimed that they didn’t think having a racial dating preference was racist. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Even if we decide that racism is always wrong, one may wonder whether it is wrong *by definition*, meaning that anyone who understands the concept of racism *must* agree that *anything racist is wrong*. We could require, as part of our definition of racism, that racism always be wrong. But the fact that some perhaps competent English-speakers say they are proud to be racists—and so apparently think that some racism isn’t wrong—suggests that the wrongness of racism isn’t established by the definition of the concept itself (see Jaquet (2025): this issue can be motivated by thinking about whether *speciesism* is wrong *by definition*: on speciesism, see [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe). Another way to put this question is whether we should understand the claim “Racism is wrong” to be a *necessary* truth—such that anything that’s racist *must* also be wrong—or a *contingent* one—such that although many things that are racist in fact are also wrong, there is not a *necessary* connection between racism and wrongness, and so there can be things that are racist but not wrong. For more on these concepts, see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) In addition to the questions about racism raised in this article, one might ask how racism intersects with social identities like sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, socio-economic status, and religion. The concept of *intersectionality* (Lorde 2021) proposes that people’s multiple social identities create unique oppressions, and it may help those interested in this question. On sex and gender, see [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani. On misogyny, see [What is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey. 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(2024). “‘Racism without racists’: A clarification and refutation of the hypothesis.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/URQRWR)[*The Philosophical Quarterly*](https://philpapers.org/rec/URQRWR)[.](https://philpapers.org/rec/URQRWR) [Zheng, R. (2016). “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial Fetishes.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/96D2F19F052E8A2625968037BE756FEA/S2053447716000257a.pdf/div-class-title-why-yellow-fever-isnandapos-t-flattering-a-case-against-racial-fetishes-div.pdf)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/96D2F19F052E8A2625968037BE756FEA/S2053447716000257a.pdf/div-class-title-why-yellow-fever-isnandapos-t-flattering-a-case-against-racial-fetishes-div.pdf) [*2*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/96D2F19F052E8A2625968037BE756FEA/S2053447716000257a.pdf/div-class-title-why-yellow-fever-isnandapos-t-flattering-a-case-against-racial-fetishes-div.pdf)[(3). pp. 400-419.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/96D2F19F052E8A2625968037BE756FEA/S2053447716000257a.pdf/div-class-title-why-yellow-fever-isnandapos-t-flattering-a-case-against-racial-fetishes-div.pdf) ### Further Reading [James, Michael and Adam Burgos. “Race.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2025/entries/race/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2025/entries/race/)[(Spring 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2025/entries/race/) ### Related Essays [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal [Equality: What Is It, and How Is It Different From Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/) by Daniel Weltman [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [The Ethics of Belief: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/) by Emma Otterski [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winoku [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanization People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/) by Dan Peterson [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani [What is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/racism-1.pdf). ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a philosophy instructor at Morehouse College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Social & Political **Tags:** Peterson, philosophy of race, philosophy of racism, Race, racism, racist --- ### [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) **Published:** October 3, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay introduces some of the most urgent moral and societal issues related to Artificial Intelligence. **Content:** Author: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word count: 998 Artificially intelligent entities or “AIs” are computer programs or machines that, in some important ways, can communicate, think, feel, reason, or act in ways similar to how humans do. “Weak” AIs merely act or appear as if they have humanlike mental states, but “strong” AIs would genuinely engage in those mental activities.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) AIs hold enormous potential for the future.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But the existence of weak AIs and the possibility of strong AIs both raise important ethical questions. This essay introduces some of the most urgent moral and societal issues related to AIs. [![An AI-generated image of a cyborg hand and a human hand.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Ai-Generated-Cyborg-Hand.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Ai-Generated-Cyborg-Hand.jpg?ssl=1)An AI-generated image of a cyborg hand and a human hand.### 1. How We Treat AIs Most philosophers think that merely being human is not necessary for something to have moral rights or be morally important.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) For example, it is possible to commit a moral wrong against a nonhuman animal, say, by kicking a puppy.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) So, instead of resting moral rights on something’s being human, many philosophers argue that it’s possible to commit a wrong against a creature only if it has *conscious experiences*, meaning that it can perceive and be aware.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) So the question of whether an AI might be conscious, or ever will be, is vital for answering the question of whether an AI would have moral rights or whether we would have moral obligations to it. If we do, then we would have to ask whether it might count as murder to delete or permanently shut down an AI.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) And the question would arise of whether we owe AIs political rights, such as the right to vote and the right of free speech.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Forcing an AI to work, if it has moral rights, might be like slavery.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) But some philosophers have argued that computers, by their nature, cannot genuinely think or understand.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) If we only ever create weak AIs, then for the reasons surveyed above, we could worry a lot less about what we might owe them morally. ### 2. How AIs Treat Us Human wellbeing is very morally valuable, so it is important to ask how AIs could benefit or harm humans. Weak AIs already benefit humanity in many ways. This is obvious simply from the popularity of AI software, such as digital assistants (Alexa, Google, and Siri)[\[10\]](#_ftn10) and chatbots and conversational agents such as ChatGPT.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) AIs often make our lives easier. Malevolent AIs are a popular topic in fiction. For example, two of the best-known science-fiction franchises in history—the *Matrix* series and the *Terminator* series[\[12\]](#_ftn12)—prominently feature AIs that attempt to destroy humanity. AIs might attack humans for the same reasons that humans attack other species and each other: to acquire resources and to protect themselves.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) AIs might also unintentionally harm humanity. They might attempt to achieve some other goal—even a goal that ostensibly benefits humanity—but do so in a way that’s ultimately harmful. For example, an AI that was instructed to end all disease, pollution, or war might simply attempt to kill all biological organisms.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) People who study AI sometimes refer to the “alignment problem” as the problem of ensuring that any AI acts in ways aligned with our interests—that they do not pursue projects that harm humanity.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 3. How Humans Treat Each Other The most urgent ethical issue is how AI will affect humans’ interactions with each other. After all, it remains to be seen exactly what AIs will be created and what their capabilities will be, but we already know that humans don’t always meet our moral obligations to each other.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) We can use AIs in order to improve each other’s lives in various ways. AIs have already helped solve difficult problems in biology,[\[17\]](#_ftn17) and led to the discovery of valuable medicines.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) They could even help invent new sources of clean energy.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Yet we can also use AIs to harm other humans, intentionally or unintentionally. Many nation-states are developing AI-based weaponry.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) On the smaller scale, humans can use AIs to cheat or defraud other humans, for example by using deceptive chatbots,[\[21\]](#_ftn21) creating misleading images or video,[\[22\]](#_ftn22) or committing plagiarism.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) AI use may also allow people to depersonalize some of the emotionally signficant and meaningful activities that are part of close interpersonal relationships, and even engage in emotional relationships with AIs rather than forming valuable relationships with human beings.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) As for unintentional harms, AIs may be biased against vulnerable groups.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) For example, if an AI is trained based on a body of real-life written work, then if some of the written work is racist, then the AI may produce racist output. Similarly, if an AI is trained on data in which certain groups are underrepresented, then the algorithms that the AI ends up using may harm members of these groups.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) For another example, building and operating AIs can be very resource-intensive. Those projects require a lot of electricity and certain minerals.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) When that electricity is generated by burning fossil fuels, that has the potential to harm anyone on Earth, especially people in poor countries—who are also more likely to suffer from the environmental harms of mining.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Widespread availability of AIs may also intensify economic inequality. Rich people and countries can use AIs to increase their own wealth further.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) Relatedly, as AIs increase in capabilities, they may start to replace humans at many jobs. This could cause widespread unemployment and corresponding harms.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) And there are also moral concerns about the jobs that AIs, or the production of AIs, actually do create, even when those jobs are intended to make AIs ethically better. Such jobs may be dangerous or exploitative.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) For these reasons, many companies that use or produce AIs are interested in presenting an image to the world that they are socially conscious of the potential harms of AIs.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) Yet some of these companies may only wish to *appear* aware of the moral complications of AIs.[\[33\]](#_ftn33) ### 4. Conclusion AIs have the potential to produce unimaginable benefits and harms to humanity, many of which haven’t yet been predicted. It would be reckless to proceed in the development and use of AIs without very careful consideration of their potential benefits and harms. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Bringsjord & Govindarajulu (2023); Hauser (n.d.). One may question exactly which types of computers count as AIs; see Thomas Metcalf, [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/), § 1. Today, the most-discussed AIs (and the programs that it is least controversial to regard as artificially intelligent) tend to be machine-learning programs that absorb and digest enormous amounts of data and, based on those data, attempt to behave in humanlike ways (or enhanced humanlike ways). For more on machine learning, see Brown (2021). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For example, they may make our work much more efficient, and create inventions and discoveries that ordinary humans couldn’t achieve (Rotman, 2019; University of Cambridge, 2024). We return to this topic in Section 2 below. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Jonathan Spelman, [Theories of Moral Considerability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Gruen (2023). See also Jason Wyckoff, [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/); Dan Lowe, [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/); and Jacob Berger, [The Mind-Body Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/). As for the empirical claim, many philosophers are vegetarians or vegans (PhilPapers, n.d.). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Again, see Jonathan Spelman, [Theories of Moral Considerability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/). See also Varner (2000). For one thing, if an AI is not conscious, then according to at least one influential theory of well-being, it would be impossible to harm the AI. If mainline hedonism about well-being is true, then creatures that cannot have conscious experiences cannot be harmed nor benefited (Moore, 2023). Other theories of well-being may also entail that non-conscious entities cannot be harmed nor benefited; see Crisp (2023). See also Kiki Berk, [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) It’s also worth noting that the standard theories of moral considerability do not have much to say about whether an AI would be morally considerable, but arguably, theories that consider nonhuman animals to be morally considerable would consider conscious AIs to be morally considerable. See Gruen (2023) and Jonathan Spelman, [Theories of Moral Considerability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/). See also Dan Lowe, [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Coeckelbergh (2020, p. 54 ff.) and Müller (2023, § 2.9.2), and Hatmaker (2017) for an interesting example. If it becomes possible to create AIs that have experiences, then it might become very easy for a malevolent human to torture billions of conscious beings, and it might become correspondingly easy to generate enormous amounts of ethical value by creating billions of simple AIs that can feel pleasure. Indeed, it might be much cheaper to generate ethical value by creating hundreds of simple AIs than it is by creating one biological human. See Jonathan Spelman, [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/), and Shane Gronholz, [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/). Some of these issues are also related to the topic of longtermism; see Dylan Balfour, [Longtermism: How much should we care about the far future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) Such complexities have led some philosophers to call for a ban on “synthetic phenomenology,” i.e., a ban on AIs that have conscious experiences (Bentley et al., 2018, pp. 28–29). See also n. 9 below. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Our decision here may depend on why, if at all, we think that people ought to have the right to vote. If it’s because we think democracy produces the best outcomes, then we would allow AIs to vote if we think that their voting produces good outcomes. Given that AIs would probably have access to much more knowledge than the average human voter does, that’s some reason to expect better outcomes. If we think people ought to be able to vote because we think that people who are *affected by* laws ought to have the right to *affect* those laws, then AIs might have the right to vote in some, but not all, decisions. See, for example, Brennan (2023, § 6), and Thomas Metcalf, [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For more about slavery, see Dan Lowe, [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/). Still, we can imagine intentionally creating an AI that *likes* to work. There is also a philosophical debate about whether it is possible to harm or wrong something by bringing it into existence, if its life is worth living. One might argue that creating AIs in order to perform certain tasks, as long as the AIs’ “lives” are worth living, does not harm the AIs, because they would not otherwise have existed. See Haramia (2014) and Duncan Purves, [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/). But if we acquire the ability to create many copies of conscious AIs that can have good lives, then according to some moral theories, it might be morally good (or even morally required) to create as many copies as possible, even at substantial cost to us. (See Jonathan Spelman, [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/).) Plausibly, for the cost of sustaining one good human life, we might be able to sustain millions or billions of good AI lives. But most philosophers would argue that there are other valuable things in the world than good lives. See also n. 5 above. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Bringsjord & Govindarajulu (2023, § 8) for some discussion on whether machines can be conscious. The landmark paper in this vicinity is Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument (Cole, 2023). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Hoy (2018) provides an introduction to voice assistants. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For an introduction to large language models such as ChatGPT, see Ruby (2023). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Blunden (2016). The popular, recent *Battlestar Galactica* series also stars malevolent AIs as the main antagonists, and they feature prominently in the *Dr. Who* franchise as well. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Daniel Weltman, [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/). If AIs are defined in part by their similarities to humans, then presumably, they would attack us for some of the same reasons that we would attack each other. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) This problem is sometimes called the problem of “Perverse Instantiation.” Basically, the AI has a goal, and it instantiates its goal in a perverse way: extremely harmfully, or in a way that sacrifices the original purpose of the goal. See, for example, Danaher (2014) and Bostrom (2014, p. 120 ff.). A prominent example in fiction is the 2015 movie *Avengers: Age of Ultron* (Whedon, 2015). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See, for example, Gent (2023) and Leike et al. (2022). Some authors have argued against attempting to program AIs to engage in moral reasoning (van Wynsberghe and Robbins, 2019). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Indeed, some authors argue that worrying about malevolent or dangerous AIs as an existential risk to humanity is a distraction from the present-day risks we face because of AI. See, for example, Milmo (2023). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Callaway (2022). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Smith et al. (2021). More generally, see University of Cambridge (2024). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See Rotman (2019) for a discussion of AIs’ potential roles in invention. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See Dresp-Langley (2023) for an introduction to AI weaponry. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Use of chatbots for cheating is a big problem in higher education; see, e.g., Spector (2023). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) “Deepfakes” are extremely convincing, deceptive videos or images that appear to be real photos or videos of real people. They are typically created with AI assistance. See Jones (2023). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Kwon (2024). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Weirich (2023); see also Lam (2023a and 2023b). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) See, for example, Coeckelbergh (2020, p. 125 ff.) and Müller (2023, § 2.4). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) On this “algorithmic bias,” see, e.g., Friis and Riley (2023). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) For introductions to environmental issues about the sustainability of AI, see van Wynsberghe (2021) and OECD (2022). See also Brevini (2021) and Bolte et al. (2022). As an example, constructing an AI can produce CO2 emissions equivalent to several cars over the cars’ lifetimes (Strubell et al., 2019), and use of a popular AI service—ChatGPT—can consume as much electricity as 33,000 U.S. households (McQuate, 2023). While that is only currently equivalent to 0.02% of the households in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.), we should expect AI usage to increase as more AI models are developed, they gain in capabilities, and they become more integrated into other areas of life. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) See Guivarch et al. (2021) and Leichenko & O’Brien (2008) on how climate change affects the poor. See Penke (2021) on mining raw minerals. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) See Burkhardt (2019) and Bushwick (2023). Yet as with other capital goods, increasing productivity may actually improve the absolute position of the relatively poor. See Thomas Metcalf, [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/). [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) See Coeckelbergh (2020, p. 137 ff.), Müller (2023, § 2.6), and Milmo (2024). [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) One example is “ghost work”: work that’s actually performed by a human, but seems to be performed, or is purported to be performed, by an automated process. See Gray and Suri (2019). One might also argue that people employed in training the AIs are commonly exploited; see Williams et al. (2022). In fact, the attempt to fight algorithm bias may produce exploitative or otherwise morally questionable jobs; see Perrigo (2023). [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) For an introduction to “ethics washing” about AI, see Kaspersen & Wallach (2021). That term follows the better-known term “greenwashing,” which refers to when agents wish to appear environmentally conscious or friendly, but make false or misleading claims in order to hide environmental harm (United Nations, n.d.). [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) Still, the fact that consumers do care about ethics (Allen, 2021; Barton, 2018) means that at least some consumers will do enough research that mere “ethics washing” won’t provide the same benefits that genuinely ethical behavior does. ### References [Allen, S. (2021, October 4). ](https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/consumers-care-if-your-product-is-ethical)[*Yes, consumers care if your product is ethical*](https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/consumers-care-if-your-product-is-ethical)[. KelloggInsight. ](https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/consumers-care-if-your-product-is-ethical) [Alonso, C., Kothari, S., & Rehman, S. 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Jamieson (ed.), ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/A+Companion+to+Environmental+Philosophy-p-9781405106597)[*A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/A+Companion+to+Environmental+Philosophy-p-9781405106597)[ (Oxford), pp. 192–203.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/A+Companion+to+Environmental+Philosophy-p-9781405106597) [Weirich, K. (2023, March 22). ChatGPT and emotional outsourcing. ](https://www.prindleinstitute.org/2023/03/chatgpt-and-emotional-outsourcing/)[*Prindle Post*](https://www.prindleinstitute.org/2023/03/chatgpt-and-emotional-outsourcing/)[ (22 March 2023 ed.).](https://www.prindleinstitute.org/2023/03/chatgpt-and-emotional-outsourcing/) [Whedon, J. (Director). (2015). ](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2395427/?ref_=ttfc_fc_tt)[*Avengers: Age of Ultron*](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2395427/?ref_=ttfc_fc_tt)[. \[Film\]. Marvel Studios.](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2395427/?ref_=ttfc_fc_tt) [Williams, A., Miceli, M., & Gebru, T. (2022, October 13). The exploited labor behind artificial intelligence. ](https://www.noemamag.com/the-exploited-labor-behind-artificial-intelligence/)[*Noēma*](https://www.noemamag.com/the-exploited-labor-behind-artificial-intelligence/)[.](https://www.noemamag.com/the-exploited-labor-behind-artificial-intelligence/) ### Related Essays [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Theories of Moral Considerability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources Be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/). by Shane Gronholz [Longtermism: How much should we care about the far future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf [Happiness: What is it to be happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/yapay-zeka-etik-toplum-ve-cevre-thomas-metcalf/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/AI-ethics.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Mind & Language, Social & Political **Tags:** AI, artificial intelligence, metcalf --- ### [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) **Published:** May 18, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** There are many topics related to law that philosophers study. This essay provides an overview of common topics in philosophy of law. **Content:** Author: [Mark Satta](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Satta) Categories: [Philosophy of Law](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-law/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word Count: 999 There are many issues related to law that philosophers study. This essay provides an overview of common topics in *philosophy of law*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![Lady justice.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/philosophy-of-law-lady-justice.jpg?resize=656%2C434&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/philosophy-of-law-lady-justice.jpg?ssl=1)Lady justice.### 1. Analytic Jurisprudence For much of the twentieth century, philosophy of law in the English-speaking world focused primarily on the following questions: - What is law? - What is the relationship between law and morality? Philosophical debates about these questions are sometimes classified as “analytic jurisprudence.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) *Natural law* theorists claim that what makes something law is, in some sense, dependent on moral facts.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In contrast, *legal positivists* deny that something’s status as law depends on moral facts. Legal positivists claim that law’s status as law depends only on facts about how a society distributes power and authority. Thus, natural law theorists sometimes deny that immoral laws are truly laws at all, while legal positivists tend to think that immoral laws are truly laws, which can still be criticized as morally bad. Notable natural law theorists include St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274) and John Locke (1632–1704). Notable legal positivists include John Austin (1790 – 1859) and H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Criminal Law Criminal law is the branch of law in which the state uses legal procedures to make certain acts crimes and to punish persons found guilty of doing those acts. Central questions in the philosophy of criminal law include: When, if ever, is the state justified in punishing people for engaging in criminal acts, and why? There are four dominant theories of criminal punishment:[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - *Deterrence theories*, where punishment aims at discouraging others from engaging in future criminal wrongdoing; - *Rehabilitation theories*, where punishment aims at turning criminals into people who can successfully operate in society without committing crimes; - *Retribution theories*, where punishment aims at giving criminals what they deserve; and - *Restoration or restitution theories*, where punishment aims, as best as possible, at restoring the well-being of victims of crime.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) There are also related questions about what punishments are fair and how punishment can be administered fairly and without bias.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Many questions in the philosophy of criminal law are closely tied to questions in ethics about when we should be held morally responsible and/or morally blameworthy for our actions.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) These include questions about which mental states may need to accompany an act in order for that act to properly be subject to criminal punishment. To be found guilty of many crimes, the state must prove both that you committed the wrongful act (the *actus reus*) and that you had a culpable mental state when committing the act (the *mens rea*).[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Other questions in the philosophy of criminal law are closely tied to questions in epistemology.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) These include questions like: - When should something be admitted into or excluded from evidence during a trial? - Is it ever permissible to convict someone based only on statistical evidence about the likelihood they committed a crime? - How should conventional standards of proof like “beyond a reasonable doubt” be interpreted and applied? Such questions are part of the growing field of *legal epistemology*.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 3. Legal Interpretation There has been a lot of debate over the best way to interpret laws. The two most prominent debates are between (1) *purposivist* and *textualist* theories for interpreting laws, and (2) *originalist* and *living constitutionalist* theories of constitutional interpretation.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Purposivism and textualism each constitute a family of views. Purposivists emphasize determining what reasonable purpose a legislative body would have had in passing a law and interpreting the law accordingly. Textualists emphasize determining the meaning of the text’s words and interpreting the law accordingly, even if such an interpretation seems incongruent with what might be considered the most reasonable purpose of the law. For example, in interpreting a law that reads “No vehicles allowed in the park,” a purposivist might give priority to the purpose that the law was meant to serve in deciding what counts as a “vehicle,” while a textualist might give priority to what they think the ordinary language meaning of “vehicle” is in the relevant community.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Purposivism and textualism can be understood as occupying different ends of a spectrum. In practice, many judges and lawyers are pluralists who rely on both purposivist and textualist reasoning, depending on the case and text under consideration. Originalism and living constitutionalism also each constitute a family of views. Originalists prioritize the meaning of the constitution at the time of ratification.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Living constitutionalists prioritize the ways in which the meaning of the constitution may evolve with other changes (such as moral, social, or linguistic changes) over time.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) For example, in interpreting the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment,” an originalist likely would seek to determine what was meant by cruel and unusual in the 1790s, while a living constitutionalist would likely seek to determine what is considered cruel and unusual today. ### 4. Liberty, Rights, and Justice There are also many philosophical questions connecting law with the philosophical study of just governments and social orders. These include questions about the nature of liberty and about the best way to conceptualize legal rights in relation to other types of rights. These questions can be applied in a variety of contexts. For example, philosophers debate the following: - What theory, if any, best justifies private property rights?[\[16\]](#_ftn16) - What is the scope and justification for the right to contract?[\[17\]](#_ftn17) - How should the law balance the promotion of liberty and equality?[\[18\]](#_ftn18) - What makes something a human right? Who has duties to enforce such rights?[\[19\]](#_ftn19) - What acts of expression should be protected under freedom of speech?[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Philosophers and legal scholars also critique ways the law fails to provide justice. Prominent examples include critical race theory, which examines how law perpetuates systemic racism, and feminist philosophy of law, which examines the influence of patriarchy on legal systems.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 5. Conclusion Philosophy of law provides a valuable way of examining and critiquing law and legal systems. Unlike other forms of legal reasoning—which often require reasoning from unquestioned underlying assumptions about the law and its operation—philosophy of law permits one to question even such underlying assumptions, using a wide variety of philosophical ideas to do so. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay adopts a broad conception of what counts as part of philosophy of law. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See, for example, [Donelson 2021](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3934284) and [Himma 2001](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For more on natural law theory, see [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For more information see [Himma 2001](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/) and [Green and Adams 2019](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For an introduction to theories of punishment, see [Theories of Punishmen](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/)t by Travis Joseph Rodgers. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Some philosophers might deny that restoration theory is about *punishment* but argue instead that this is a way of responding to crimes that focuses on the victims. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For discussions of these kinds of questions and related ones see [Butler 2010](https://thenewpress.com/books/lets-get-free), [Huemer 2021](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-67543-1), and [season 4 of the HI-Phi Nation Podcast](https://hiphination.org/season-4-episodes/). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See, for example, [Lefkowitz 2015](https://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-publications/151/) and [Lacey and Pickard 2015](https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/35/4/665/2472464). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See [Legal Information Institute (n.d.)](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For an introduction to epistemology, see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See, for example, [Gardiner 2019](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0390.xml), [Littlejohn 2020](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4), and [Jorgensen Bolinger 2021](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOLDSI). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See, for example, [Greenberg 2021](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-interpretation/). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The “No vehicles in the park” case is based on a popular example from [Hart 1958](http://www.horty.umiacs.io/courses/readings/hart-1958-positivism-separation.pdf). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See, for example, [Scalia 2018](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691174044/a-matter-of-interpretation). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See, for example, [Strauss 2010](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-living-constitution-9780195377279?cc=us&lang=en&). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See [Waldron 2020](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See [Markovits and Atiq 2021](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contract-law/), [Encarnacion 2018](https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol71/iss1/7/). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See, for example, [Nozick 1974](https://ia801601.us.archive.org/35/items/0001AnarchyStateAndUtopia/0001_anarchy_state_and_utopia_text.pdf), [G.A. Cohen 2009](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/selfownership-freedom-and-equality/26B021AEDD3ECE97D388586C27C90D18#fndtn-information), [Anderson 2015](https://philpapers.org/rec/ANDEAF-2). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See, for example, [Nickel 2021](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/#toc), [Kim 2012](https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMJHR). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For an introduction to freedom of speech, see [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta. See also [West 2012](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pornography-censorship/), [Waldron 2014](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864), [Strossen 2018](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&), [Satta 2021](https://philpapers.org/rec/SATMIT). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See, for example, [Crenshaw et al 1995](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/101/), [Francis and Smith 2021](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-law/). Also see [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson. ### References [“Mens Rea.” Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute.](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea) [Anderson, Elizabeth. 2015. “Equality and Freedom in the Workplace: Recovering Republican Insights.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/ANDEAF-2)[*Social Philosophy and Policy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/ANDEAF-2)[ 31 (2):48-69.](https://philpapers.org/rec/ANDEAF-2) [Butler, Paul. 2010. ](https://thenewpress.com/books/lets-get-free)[*Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice*](https://thenewpress.com/books/lets-get-free)[. The New Press.](https://thenewpress.com/books/lets-get-free) [Cohen, G. A. 2009. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/selfownership-freedom-and-equality/26B021AEDD3ECE97D388586C27C90D18#fndtn-information)[*Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/selfownership-freedom-and-equality/26B021AEDD3ECE97D388586C27C90D18#fndtn-information)[Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/selfownership-freedom-and-equality/26B021AEDD3ECE97D388586C27C90D18#fndtn-information) [Crenshaw et al. 1995. ](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/101/)[*Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement*](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/101/)[. New Press.](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/101/) [Donelson, Raff. 2021. “The Pragmatist School in Analytic Jurisprudence.” Philosophical Issues 31 (1): 85-106.](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3934284) [Encarnacion, Erik. 2018. “Contract as Commodified Promise.” ](https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=vlr)[*Vanderbilt Law Review*](https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=vlr)[ 71: 61-119.](https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=vlr) [Francis, Leslie and Patricia Smith. 2021. “Feminist Philosophy of Law.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-law/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-law/)[, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-law/) [Gardiner, Georgi. 2019. “Legal Epistemology.” ](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0390.xml)[*Oxford Bibliographies.*](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0390.xml) [Green, Leslie and Thomas Adams. 2019. “Legal Positivism.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/#toc)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/#toc)[ Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/#toc) [Greenberg, Mark. 2021. “Legal Interpretation.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-interpretation/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-interpretation/)[, Edward N Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-interpretation/) [Jorgensen Bolinger, Renée. 2019. “Demographic Statistics in Defensive Decisions.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOLDSI)[*Synthese* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOLDSI)[198 (5): 4833-4850.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOLDSI) [Hart, H. L. A. 1958. “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals.” ](http://www.horty.umiacs.io/courses/readings/hart-1958-positivism-separation.pdf)[*Harvard Law Review*](http://www.horty.umiacs.io/courses/readings/hart-1958-positivism-separation.pdf)[ 71 (4): 593-629.](http://www.horty.umiacs.io/courses/readings/hart-1958-positivism-separation.pdf) [Himma, Kenneth Einer. “Philosophy of Law.” ](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/) [Huemer, Michael. 2021. “Justice Before the Law.” Palgrave Macmillan.](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-67543-1) [Kim, Eun-Jung Katherine. 2012. “Justifying Human Rights: Does Consensus Matter?” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMJHR)[*Human Rights Review*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMJHR)[, 13 (3): 261-278.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMJHR) [Lacey, Nicola and Hanna Pickard. 2015. “To Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice.” ](https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/35/4/665/2472464)[*Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*](https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/35/4/665/2472464)[ 35 (4): 665-696.](https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/35/4/665/2472464) [Lefkowitz, David. 2015. “Blame and the Criminal Law.” ](https://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-publications/151/)[*Jurisprudence*](https://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-publications/151/)[ 6 (3): 451-469.](https://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-faculty-publications/151/) [Littlejohn, Clayton. 2020. “Truth, Knowledge, and the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4)[*Synthese*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4)[ 197: 5253-5286.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4) [Markovits, Daniel and Emad Atiq. 2021. “Philosophy of Contract Law.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=contract-law)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=contract-law)[, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=contract-law) [Nickel, James. 2021. “Human Rights.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/#toc)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/#toc)[, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/#toc) [Nozick, Robert. 1974. ](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/)[*Anarchy, State, and Utopia*](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/)[. Basic Books.](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/) [Satta, Mark. 2021. “Multi-Forum Institutions, the Power of Platforms, and Disinviting Speakers from University Campuses.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SATMIT)[*Public Affairs Quarterly*](https://philpapers.org/rec/SATMIT)[ 35 (2): 94-118.](https://philpapers.org/rec/SATMIT) [Scalia, Antonin. 2018. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691174044/a-matter-of-interpretation)[*A Matter of Interpretation*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691174044/a-matter-of-interpretation)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691174044/a-matter-of-interpretation) [Strauss, David. 2010. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-living-constitution-9780195377279?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Living Constitution.* ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-living-constitution-9780195377279?cc=us&lang=en&)[Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-living-constitution-9780195377279?cc=us&lang=en&) [Strossen, Nadine. 2018. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Hate: Why We Should Resist it with Free Speech, Not Censorship*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&) [Waldron, Jeremy. 2014. ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864)[*The Harm in Hate Speech*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864)[. Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864) [Waldron, Jeremy. 2020. “Property and Ownership.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/)[ Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/) [West, Caroline. “Pornography and Censorship.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pornography-censorship/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pornography-censorship/)[, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pornography-censorship/) ### For Further Reading [Edwards, James. 2021. “Theories of Criminal Law.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/)[, Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/) [Gardiner, Georgi. 2019. “Legal Epistemology.” ](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0390.xml)[*Oxford Bibliographies.*](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0390.xml) [Greenberg, Mark. 2021. “Legal Interpretation.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-interpretation/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-interpretation/)[, Edward N Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-interpretation/) [Himma, Kenneth Einer. “Philosophy of Law.” ](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/law-phil/) [Lam, Barry. Hi-Phi Nation Podcast, Season 4. ](https://hiphination.org/season-4-episodes/) ### Related Essays [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Epistemology, ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/)[or](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/)[ Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/hukuk-felsefesine-genel-bir-bakis-mark-satta/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/philosophy-of-law-an-overview.pdf). ### About the Author [Mark Satta](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Satta) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He received his PhD in Philosophy from Purdue University and his JD from Harvard Law School. Some of his philosophical interests include epistemology, philosophy of language, social and political philosophy, and philosophy of law. [MarkSatta.com](http://www.marksatta.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Social & Political **Tags:** Philosophy of Law, satta --- ### [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) **Published:** October 11, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Michael Klenk Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/) Word Count: 999 We often follow what are considered basic moral rules: don’t steal, don’t lie, help others when we can. But *why* do we follow these rules, or any rules understood as “moral rules”? Does evolution explain why? If so, does evolution have implications for which rules we *should* follow, and whether we genuinely *know* this? This essay explores the relations between evolution and morality, including evolution’s potential implications for whether morality or ethics exists at all. ### 1. Why Do We Have Moral Beliefs?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Evolution by natural selection occurs when genetic mutations spread in a population. This happens when individual organisms with a mutation outcompete those without it. For a mutation to spread, it must be working in the individual’s self-interest, e.g., by allowing the individual to run faster than his or her competitors. Actions that are often considered morally good, however, can require sacrificing one’s self-interest. This is partly why “doing the right thing” can be difficult: returning a lost wallet of cash might not benefit us, but it’s the right thing to do. If morality ever requires actions that are not for our own benefit, how could it have evolved? Genes for ethical, other-regarding, behavior can spread when individuals behave morally and thereby benefit their *relatives*, with whom they share genes, or *reciprocators*, who will return the favor. Genes for moral behavior can spread through the individual’s offspring, who share that individual’s genes, or by benefiting the individual him or herself in the long run.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) It is still disputed, however, why moral behavior extends beyond a close circle of kin and reciprocal relationships: e.g., most people think stealing from *anyone* is wrong, not just stealing from family and friends. For moral behavior to evolve as we understand it today, there likely had to be selective pressures that pushed people to disregard their own interests in favor of their group’s interest.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Exactly how morality extended beyond this close circle is debated, with many theories under consideration.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. What Should We Do? Suppose our ability to understand and apply moral rules, as typically understood, can be explained by natural selection. Does evolution explain which rules we *should* follow?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Some answer, “yes!” “*Greed* captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit,” says the fictional character Gordon Gekko in the 1987 film *[Wall Street](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/)*: “[Greed . . is *good*. Greed is *right*](https://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechwallstreet.html).”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### Gekko’s claims about what is good and right and what we *ought* to be comes from what he thinks we naturally *are*: we *are* greedy, so we *ought* to be greedy. But this reasoning is fallacious: an *ought* does not follow from what naturally *is.*[\[7\]](#_ftn7) It is a psychological fact that people tend to prefer their own groups over others, but this does not tell us that we ought to favor our own group:[\[8\]](#_ftn8) e.g., racists prioritize their own racial group, but they shouldn’t. If we think we ought to do what’s “natural,” there is a further problem in that identifying what’s “natural” is often difficult. Do contraceptives prevent the ‘natural’ outcome of intercourse? Animals, like bonobos, have sex for fun: is that a, or *the*, ‘natural’ purpose of sex? It’s often unclear what *the* “natural” purpose of anything is, given the many possibilities. It’s clear, however, that doing what’s “unnatural” is often *not* wrong: e.g., computers aren’t “natural,” but using them isn’t wrong. Understanding evolution’s impact on us, however, *may* help us make better moral decisions.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Evolution explains in-group favoritism: our ancestors depended on their in-group for survival. The view that *we must help people close to us, physically or emotionally, but need not help strangers, especially in faraway countries* may reflect this past. But this view appears unjustified, if we consider the arguments for and against it. Recognizing evolutionary influences as the cause of some moral errors may help us achieve more justified moral beliefs. ### 3. Is there Moral Knowledge? Are there Moral Truths or Facts? We have seen that there are evolutionary explanations for why it would, e.g., *seem* to us that stealing is usually wrong. But it’s possible that we could think that stealing is wrong, *even if it is not*, i.e., even if that belief is not made true by a moral fact. Evolution could cause us to hold *useful* beliefs that are not true. This observation may lead us in two directions. First, perhaps we should be less confident in our moral beliefs since we might hold them because they are *beneficial*, not because they are *true*. Recognizing this might lead to doubts that would prevent justified moral beliefs or knowledge: if we think that we might believe something *only* because it’s useful, that might prevent holding that belief with good reasons and so prevent moral knowledge.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Second, some might argue that, since we have moral beliefs, there *must* be moral facts that make those beliefs true. But evolutionary explanations for the *causes* of our moral beliefs make that argument doubtful: we have moral beliefs, but perhaps there are no moral facts or truths. So, genuine morality may not even exist in the light of evolution. Both arguments can be challenged, however. Evolution does not show that our moral beliefs are *false*, only that they *might be*. Also, evolution may undercut *one* reason to believe in the existence of moral facts, but there are other reasons to believe in their existence that evolution doesn’t threaten: for one, it seems like society has seen moral improvement over the last few hundred years (ending slavery, allowing women to vote, etc.), and that might be difficult to explain without believing there are objective moral facts.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 4. Conclusion Our understanding of morality benefits from understanding its evolutionary origin. Many questions remain, however: e.g., what were the exact mechanisms by which any morality evolved? If evolution threatens moral beliefs’ truth or justifiability, might other influences, e.g., culture, have similar effects? Might understanding our evolutionary origins positively contribute to our moral thinking, e.g., by influencing our views about non-human animals?[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay focuses on moral beliefs*,* but feelings and attitudes can have ethical aspects, too, and similar questions arise about their origin. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Kin selection is the process by which an individual’s actions favor the reproductive success of that individual’s relatives; it was briefly discussed already by Darwin and popularized by Hamilton (1963). Reciprocal altruism refers to the mechanism of how cooperation between non-relatives can evolve, provided that they are engaged in repeated interactions and able to keep track of the outcomes of their previous interactions: see Trivers (1971). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Nobody denies that cultural, social, and personal factors play a role in individuals’ moral judgments: evolutionary processes do not explain everything. The relevant question, however, is whether the basic capacity to think and act morally is a product of natural selection. Our moral sense could be a by-product of another evolved trait that did not, by itself, help to spread the genes of individuals who had the trait in the next generation (biologists call traits that help organisms to spread their genes’ *adaptations*). Reasoning about what we morally ought to do might be an outgrowth of general reasoning abilities about, say, mathematics or causality, along with emotional responses such as empathy. Still, showing that morality is a by-product would count as providing an evolutionary explanation of morality and the same philosophical questions that are discussed in this essay would arise about the implications of it. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Henrich (2017) and Tomasello (2016) for accessible accounts of the evolution of morality that explain how morality could have evolved beyond a close circle of kin and reciprocal relationships. Herich emphasizes the role of cultural evolution (where selective processes operate on culturally transmitted traits), while Tomasello emphasizes the role of interdependence (where individuals quite literally depend on each other for survival). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) What are often called “normative” ethical theories, such as the theories of Kant, Mill and others, attempt to explain *why* actions are right or wrong and what rules we *should* follow: see, e.g., [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz and [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. But they have little to say about why we make moral judgments in the first place. Normative theories might correctly explain the *proximate* causes that lead us to make moral judgments now, but not address the *ultimate* cause for why we are following moral rules in the first place. This is where evolution comes in. Focusing on Kant’s view, e.g., we can as ask why we are creatures capable of the required degree of self-knowledge to properly grasp moral rules. Again, evolution seems to provide an important part of the answer. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Gekko is cited in Morris (2015). Gekko’s sinister but merely fictional character must not obscure that the attempt to derive normative claims from evolutionary premises sometimes have had horrific real-world consequences. The murder of people regarded as ‘unfit for life’ in, e.g., the Third Reich, was often motivated by the thought that the strong or fit *ought* to dominate the weak. Farber (1994) provides a comprehensive introduction to this misuse of appeals to evolution in making ethical judgments or arguments. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) David Hume (1738 \[2007\]) famously argued that arguments with premises *without* normative terms such as ‘should,’ ‘ought,’ ‘right,’ ‘wrong’, and so on cannot validly reach a conclusion *with* such terms: you can’t derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ Hume’s criticism of the *is-ought* fallacy is often mistakenly conflated with G. E. Moore’s (1903) criticism of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Moore in fact raised his criticism against early proponents of evolutionary ethics, but his criticism was based on the claim that ‘goodness’ cannot be further analyzed and thus not ‘naturalized’ (e.g., by equating goodness with happiness). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See the vast literature on in-group preferences, beginning with Tajfel (1970). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Moral decisions would be ‘better’ as understood by theories that attempt to explain the basic nature of wrong actions, such as consequentialism and deontology. See, e.g., [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz and [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Street (2006) and Joyce (2006) for arguments *from* the evolutionary causes of our moral beliefs and the claim that our moral beliefs are probably useful rather than true *to* the conclusion that we have reason to give up our moral beliefs. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See Huemer (2016), as well as [Ethical Realism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Moral Error Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Rachels (1990). ### References [Farber, P. L. (1994). ](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)*[The ](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)[T](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)[emptations of ](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)[E](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)[volutionary ](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)[E](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)[thics](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress)*[. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press](https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft5779p06t;brand=ucpress). [Hamilton, W. D. (1963). 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Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10543.html) [Huemer, Michael. 2016. “A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skepticism: The Empirical Case for Realism.” *Philosophical Studies* 173: 1983-2010.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-015-0588-9) [Hume, David (1738 \[2007\]). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724?cc=nl&lang=en&)*[A Treatise of Human Nature](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724?cc=nl&lang=en&)*[: ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724?cc=nl&lang=en&)*[A Critical Edition](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724?cc=nl&lang=en&)*[. Edited by David Fate Norton, Mary Norton. Clarendon Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724?cc=nl&lang=en&) [Joyce, R. (2006). ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolution-morality)*[The ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolution-morality)[E](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolution-morality)[volution of ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolution-morality)[M](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolution-morality)[orality.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolution-morality)*[ MIT Press.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolution-morality) [Kant, Immanuel (1788 \[2005\].: ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kant-critique-of-practical-reason/6ABE30C4D2DD9511891141879A0A3DA9)*[Critique of Practical Reason](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kant-critique-of-practical-reason/6ABE30C4D2DD9511891141879A0A3DA9)*[. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kant-critique-of-practical-reason/6ABE30C4D2DD9511891141879A0A3DA9) [Moore, George Edward (1903): ](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/53430/53430-h/53430-h.htm)*[Principia Ethica](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/53430/53430-h/53430-h.htm)*[. Cambridge University Press.](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/53430/53430-h/53430-h.htm) [Morris, I. (2015). ](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)*[Foragers, ](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)[F](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)[armers, and ](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)[F](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)[ossil ](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)[F](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)[uels](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html)*[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10419.html) [Rachels, J. (1990). ](http://www.jamesrachels.org/CFA.htm)*[Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism](http://www.jamesrachels.org/CFA.htm)*[. Oxford University Press.](http://www.jamesrachels.org/CFA.htm) [Street, S. (2006). A ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[D](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[arwinian ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[D](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[ilemma for ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[R](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[ealist ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[T](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[heories of ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[V](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)[alue. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)*[Philosophical Studies,](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684)*[ 127, 109–166.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321684) [Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in ](https://asfranthompson.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tajfel-1970-experiments-in-intergroup-discrimination.pdf)[I](https://asfranthompson.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tajfel-1970-experiments-in-intergroup-discrimination.pdf)[ntergroup ](https://asfranthompson.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tajfel-1970-experiments-in-intergroup-discrimination.pdf)[D](https://asfranthompson.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tajfel-1970-experiments-in-intergroup-discrimination.pdf)[iscrimination. ](https://asfranthompson.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tajfel-1970-experiments-in-intergroup-discrimination.pdf)*[Scientific American](https://asfranthompson.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tajfel-1970-experiments-in-intergroup-discrimination.pdf)*[, 223, 96–103.](https://asfranthompson.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/tajfel-1970-experiments-in-intergroup-discrimination.pdf) [Trivers, R. L. (1971). The ](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)[E](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)[volution of ](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)[R](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)[eciprocal ](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)[A](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)[ltruism. ](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)*[The Quarterly Review of Biology,](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf)*[ 46, 35–57.](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Trivers-EvolutionReciprocalAltruism.pdf) [Tomasello, Michael (2016). ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088641)*[A Natural History of Human Morality](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088641)*[. Harvard University Press.](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088641) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/evolution-and-ethics.pdf). ### Related essays [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/ "Moral Error Theory") by Ian Tully [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. ### Acknowledgements I thank the editors for helpful comments on this essay. ### About the Author Michael Klenk is a lecturer in ethics and philosophy of technology at Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. He received his PhD in philosophy from Utrecht University and published on epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology in journals such as *Synthese, Dialectica, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,* and *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. As a PhD candidate, he was a visiting fellow at Oxford University, Columbia University, and Harvard University. [www.michael-klenk.com ](http://www.michael-klenk.com) ##### FOLLOW 1000-WORD PHILOSOPHY ON [FACEBOOK](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) AND [TWITTER](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) AND SUBSCRIBE TO RECEIVE EMAIL NOTICE OF NEW ESSAYS AT THE BOTTOM OF [1000WORDPHILOSOPHY.COM](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** Ethics, Evolution --- ### [Ignorance and Blame: Can Ignorance Excuse?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) **Published:** February 14, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Daniel Miller Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 Sometimes ignorance is a legitimate excuse for morally wrong behavior, and sometimes it isn’t. If someone has secretly replaced my sugar with arsenic, then I’m blameless for putting arsenic in your tea.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But if I put arsenic in your tea because I keep arsenic and sugar jars on the same shelf and don’t label them, then I’m blameworthy for poisoning you.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Why is my ignorance in the first case a legitimate excuse, but my ignorance in the second case isn’t?[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay explores the relationship between ignorance and blameworthiness. ![William S. Jewett (1821–1873) The Promised Land - The Grayson Family, 1850](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/blame.jpg?resize=656%2C469&ssl=1)William S. Jewett (1821–1873) The Promised Land – The Grayson Family, 1850### 1. The Blameless Ignorance Principle The above cases suggest the *Blameless Ignorance Principle*: If a person is blameless for their ignorance, then the person is blameless for acting from that ignorance.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This explains why I’m blameless for poisoning you in the first case (since my ignorance isn’t my fault), but blameworthy for it in the second case (since my ignorance is due to my carelessness). While this principle seems sensible, *why* exactly does blameless ignorance excuse? And does blameless ignorance *always* excuse, as the principle implies? Two competing positions aim to answer these questions. ### 2. The Reasonable Expectation Principle One position focuses on a person’s *ability* to avoid being ignorant or behaving ignorantly. Consider an ancient Hittite lord who owns slaves, treats them poorly, and believes that his behavior isn’t wrong.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Due to the widespread acceptance of slavery in his culture, it would be unreasonable to expect the slaveowner to realize that slavery is wrong. Does the slaveowner’s ignorance excuse him?[\[6\]](#_ftn6) According to the *Reasonable Expectation Principle*: If it is unreasonable to expect a person to avoid something (e.g., being ignorant or behaving wrongly), then the person is not blameworthy for it. One way to understand this is that it’s reasonable to expect a person to avoid something *only if* the person had the ability to avoid it, given their beliefs and cultural setting.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) So, if the slaveowner never had an opportunity to realize that he is mistaken (e.g., by reflecting upon his own moral views, or having a conversation with someone who opposes slavery, etc.), then he is blameless for his ignorance. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect him *not* to keep slaves, given his blameless ignorance that it’s morally wrong, so he isn’t blameworthy for his slaveholding.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The Reasonable Expectation Principle also explains the arsenic cases. In the first case, since someone secretly switched my sugar for arsenic, it’s unreasonable to expect me to avoid my ignorance that I’m poisoning you: I’m blamelessly ignorant of that fact. In the second case, however, it *is* reasonable to expect me to avoid my ignorance: I could have avoided it by simply labeling my arsenic and sugar jars. Since I could have easily avoided that ignorance, it’s reasonable to expect me not to ignorantly put arsenic in your tea.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) According to the Reasonable Expectation Principle, blameless ignorance *always* excuses, since it’s always unreasonable to expect someone to avoid acting wrongly *if* that person is blamelessly ignorant that their action is wrong. ### 3. The Objectionable Attitude Principle A second position on why and when blameless ignorance excuses focuses on the morally objectionable attitudes or beliefs expressed in morally wrong behavior. According to the *Objectionable* *Attitude Principle*: A person is blameworthy for morally wrong behavior *if and only if* it expresses a morally objectionable attitude or belief.[\[10\]](#_ftn10), [\[11\]](#_ftn11) The idea here is that when I blame someone for treating me poorly, I’m responding to the morally objectionable attitudes expressed in or revealed by their behavior. Perhaps their behavior expresses a desire to harm me, a lack of concern for my well-being, or a belief that my interests aren’t important. If this principle is true, then it doesn’t matter whether it’s reasonable to expect someone like the slaveowner to behave differently. All that matters is that his behavior expresses a morally objectionable attitude or belief: insufficient concern for his slaves’ well-being, or a belief that their interests aren’t important. This implies that even people who are blamelessly ignorant of the wrongness of their behavior can be blameworthy for it *if* their actions express a morally objectionable attitude or belief.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) We can now distinguish two kinds of ignorance. If I put arsenic in your tea *while believing it’s sugar*, I’m ignorant that what I’m doing is morally wrong because I’m ignorant of the feature of my action that *makes* it wrong (i.e., that the white substance I put in your tea is arsenic, not sugar). This is *circumstantial* *ignorance*. Importantly, circumstantial ignorance prevents the expression of objectionable attitudes: it’s impossible to perform an action that expresses a desire to harm (or an indifference that the action might harm) if one is blamelessly ignorant that one’s action might cause harm. Accordingly, the Objectionable Attitudes Principle implies that blameless circumstantial ignorance always excuses. The slaveowner’s ignorance is different. He *is* aware of the morally relevant features of his actions (e.g., depriving people of freedom, causing suffering, etc.). But he fails to realize that *these features make his behavior wrong*. This is *moral* *ignorance*: ignorance of relevant moral principles or the moral relevance of various features of one’s behavior.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) The slaveowner’s belief that owning slaves is not wrong, despite its harmful effects, *itself* involves insufficient concern for those affected, and so his behavior expresses this insufficient concern. Proponents of the Objectionable Attitude Principle maintain that, while blameless *circumstantial* ignorance always excuses, this is not so for blameless *moral* ignorance.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. Conclusion Our beliefs and behavior are shaped by our cultures and upbringing, which sometimes influence us for the worse. Sometimes it is reasonable to expect better of people; other times it may not be. When we cannot reasonably expect better should we *not* blame people for ignorant beliefs or behavior, as the *Reasonable Expectation Principle* implies? Or should we blame people for ignorant beliefs and wrongdoing when these express morally objectionable attitudes, as implied by the *Objectionable Attitudes Principle*? These questions are pertinent to potentially problematic beliefs and actions from nearly every aspect of life.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This case and others like it are later described as *morally wrong behavior*. One might reasonably wonder, however, whether these are actually cases of wrongdoing, given there’s no way I could have known that my sugar had been replaced by arsenic. One might think that, if you are blameless for what you did, then you didn’t do anything wrong. While this response is understandable, it’s worth thinking about why (blameless) actions can *really* be wrong. One moral theory, consequentialism, says our actions must have the *best* overall consequences, or else they are wrong. But poisoning someone surely isn’t the action with the *best* consequences, so it would be wrong on that theory. According to most moral theories, if an action actually has certain characteristics, it is wrong — for instance, if the action violates Kant’s Categorical Imperative. However, an action might have wrong-making characteristics, and yet one might reasonably believe that it doesn’t. (For instance, you might reasonably believe that feeding someone a sesame bagel will not harm them, though as it turns out, they have a sesame allergy.) “Subjective” theories of wrongness focus on how an action is judged from someone’s “subjective” perspective, namely, whatever evidence the person has for whether a particular action meets an objective moral standard. “Objective” theories of wrongness, contrast, attempt to state an *objective* moral standard, independent of an individual’s evidence or beliefs. The issues of this essay arise from people doing actions that *are* “objectively” wrong, yet it’s arguable that people are (at least sometimes) blameless for performing those actions, because of ignorance of various types. For an introduction to two influential objective ethical theories mentioned above, see [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz and [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This is based on a case offered by Gideon Rosen (2004). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) It is often argued that an action must be done of someone’s free will in order for that person to be morally responsible, or deserving of blame, for that action (although some deny this). Indeed, one way to understand the debate over free will is as a debate over what kind or degree of control one must exercise over one’s behavior and character in order to be morally responsible (praiseworthy or blameworthy) for these things. Thus, much of the philosophical literature on moral responsibility concerns the “control condition” on moral responsibility (see [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia, [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki and [Free Will and Free Choice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima). Much less of this literature has been devoted to what kind or degree of *awareness* or knowledge is needed to be blameworthy for one’s behavior and character. This is called the “epistemic condition” (*epistemology* concerns knowledge and reasonable belief, so an *epistemic* concern is about that) on moral responsibility. The past ten or fifteen years has seen a surge of new work on this topic by a number of philosophers working on agency and responsibility. In 2017 the first edited volume on the topic was published: *Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition* (edited by Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This principle (or at least a restricted version of it, as will be explained later) is accepted by nearly all philosophers who write about these issues. For articulations and defenses of it, see Gideon Rosen (2003) and Michael Zimmerman (1997). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This case is taken from Gideon Rosen. Rosen argues that the slaveowner is blameless for his ignorance and therefore blameless for his morally wrong behavior (2003, 65-66). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) In [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/), Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis address the question of whether historical philosophers should be blamed and held responsible when they had false moral views or behaved badly. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Gideon Rosen (2004) and Neil Levy (2009) present and defend this type of view in detail. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Cases of blameless moral ignorance are arguably not confined to ancient history. We can point to cases of moral ignorance in more recent history that are plausibly blameless. Gideon Rosen offers the example of a 1950s sexist who, due to prevailing cultural norms, sees nothing wrong with the unfair differential treatment of his son and daughter (indeed, it may seem to him that the permissibility of his differential treatment is self-evident). As Rosen points out, we needn’t suppose that he is unreflective about his false moral views; we only need to suppose that, when he does reflect, the considerations to the contrary are bound to seem “wrong-headed” (2003, 66-68). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Consider another, similar set of cases: two doctors each ignorantly prescribe medicine that a patient is seriously allergic to. The first doctor does so simply because no one is aware of the allergy, while the second doctor does so because he has negligently ignored the patient’s medical records. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Philosophers often understand the term “attitude” broadly, to include beliefs as types of attitudes, in addition to more typical examples of attitudes (e.g., desire, resentment, indifference, gratitude, and so on). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For articulations and defenses of this kind of position, see Elizabeth Harman (2011) and Angela Smith (2005). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Matthew Talbert (2013) develops this response against Gideon Rosen and Neil Levy. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) This distinction is common in the literature, though some theorists use the term “factual ignorance” or “non-moral ignorance” to describe what I have called “circumstantial ignorance.” [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Elizabeth Harman (2011) maintains that moral ignorance *never* excuses, since moral ignorance *itself* always involves a morally objectionable attitude that is then expressed in morally ignorant wrongdoing. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) I am grateful to Nathan Nobis, Dan Lowe, Chelsea Haramania and Taylor Cyr for thoughtful dialogue and helpful feedback on this essay. ### References [Harman, Elizabeth (2011). “Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x)*[Ratio](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x)*[, 24(4):443-468. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x) [Levy, Neil (2009). “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605018?seq=1/analyze)*[Ethics](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605018?seq=1/analyze)*[ 119(4):729-741. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605018?seq=1/analyze) [Robichaud, Philip, and Jan Willem Wieland (2017). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/responsibility-the-epistemic-condition-9780198779667?cc=us&lang=en&)*[Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/responsibility-the-epistemic-condition-9780198779667?cc=us&lang=en&)*[. Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/responsibility-the-epistemic-condition-9780198779667?cc=us&lang=en&) [Rosen, Gideon (2003). “Culpability and Ignorance.” ](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article-abstract/103/1/61/1791905?redirectedFrom=fulltext)*[Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society ](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article-abstract/103/1/61/1791905?redirectedFrom=fulltext)*[103(1):61-84. ](https://academic.oup.com/aristotelian/article-abstract/103/1/61/1791905?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Rosen, Gideon (2004). “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00030.x)*[Philosophical Perspectives](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00030.x)*[ 18(1):295-313. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00030.x) [Smith, Angela (2005). “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426957?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)*[Ethics](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426957?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)*[ 115(2):236-271. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426957?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Talbert, Matthew (2013).” Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame.” In ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-agency-and-responsibility-9780199694860?cc=us&lang=en&)*[Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility: Volume 1](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-agency-and-responsibility-9780199694860?cc=us&lang=en&)*[, David Shoemaker (ed.): 225-245. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-agency-and-responsibility-9780199694860?cc=us&lang=en&) [Zimmerman, Michael (1997). “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2382323?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)*[Ethics](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2382323?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)*[ 107(3):410-426. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2382323?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) ### Related Essays [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Free Will and Free Choice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ignorance-and-blame.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Miller](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Miller) is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at West Virginia University. His research focus lies at the intersection of ethics and the philosophy of action, including blameworthiness and ignorance, the ethics of blame, and free will. His work has appeared in *Philosophical Studies, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Explorations, and Philosophia*. [DanielJamesMiller.com](http://www.danieljamesmiller.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** blame, Dmiller, ignorance --- ### [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/flawed-philosophers/) **Published:** July 17, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past? Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields, and people in general. **Content:** Authors: Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Metaphilosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphilosophy/) Wordcount: 1000 Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. Aristotle thought women were “deformed men” and that some people were slaves “by nature.” Descartes had disturbing views about non-human animals. Hume and Kant were racists. Hegel disparaged Africans. Nietzsche despised sick people. Mill condoned colonialism. Fanon was homophobic. Frege was anti-Semitic; Heidegger was a Nazi. Schopenhauer was sexist. Rousseau abandoned his children. Wittgenstein beat his young students. Unfortunately, these examples are just a start.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) These philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified, and, perhaps, harmful. How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past?[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields,[\[3\]](#_ftn3) and people in general. ![Image: Al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik, whose “Selected Maxims and Aphorisms” addresses a similar question as this article: namely how to understand the teachings of sages, mostly Greek philosophers, whose lives were highly morally flawed according to Islamic viewpoint of his day. - Political Animal Press](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/meister_des_al-mubashshir-manuskripts_002.jpg?resize=656%2C592&ssl=1) Image: Al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik, whose “Selected Maxims and Aphorisms” addresses a similar question as this article: namely how to understand the teachings of sages, mostly Greek philosophers, whose lives were highly morally flawed according to the Islamic viewpoint of his day. – Political Animal Press### 1. Concerns The question raises general concerns: #### A. *People* versus *Propositions*: Philosoph*ers* are distinct from philosoph*ies*: people are not their propositions. But thoughts say *something* about the thinker.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Which then might be of greater concern, the person or their writings? #### B. *Ad hominem* concerns: Some responses to flawed philosophers seem to be attacks on the *person*, not on their ideas. *Ad hominem* attacks are often irresponsible, but are they ever appropriate?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Are they appropriate if a person’s character affects their writings? Might personal moral vice relevantly impact *moral* philosophizing?[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Can it impact *non-moral* philosophizing? #### C. *Major* versus *Minor* ideas: Philosophers are typically known for what has come to be considered their “major” ideas.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Their flaws, however, are sometimes displayed in what’s considered their “minor” writings. But what determines what’s major or minor? Quantity? Quality? Influence? That philosopher’s judgment? Moral evaluation? Is this ‘subjective,’ depending on readers’ perspectives? #### D. *Counterfactual correction*: Philosophies are sometimes developed from, or based on, false (empirical) information. If the thinker had better information, would their philosophy have been better? #### E. *Apology* and *Forgiveness*: Living people can apologize, pledge to do better, and seek to make amends with the hope of forgiveness. Is there any way flawed (dead) philosophers can somehow “make it up” to the present or be “forgiven,” especially if their views eventually improved?[\[8\]](#_ftn8) There surely are other potentially-relevant general concerns to be identified and applied. ### 2. Responses Let’s turn to some general responses. #### A. Acceptance: Take the Good, Ignore the Bad One response is that we are *all* flawed, in thought and deed, and so we should focus on interesting and good aspects of flawed historical philosophers’ thought.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) This is especially appropriate if their writings have no apparent connection to their bad claims or behavior.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) We also often don’t know much about philosophers’ personal circumstances and inner life: this might make what they said or did understandable, if not excusable. However, unless we make it clear to readers that there are bad elements and that we are ignoring them, we risk misleading or deceiving them into believing the philosopher was not flawed: e.g., students may admire a philosopher and think they must have been a paragon of virtue when they surely were not.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) The “take the good, ignore the bad” response has limits: our own flaws, if too serious, should not be overlooked (even if we wish they would), and neither should anyone else’s. What then is “too serious”? #### B. Complete Dismissal: Boycott & Excommunication Another response is that we just stop reading, researching, and teaching offending philosophers’ writings: we boycott.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ‘Zero tolerance’ policies are sometimes invoked for contemporaries, with great confidence.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) It’s comparable to ‘we won’t watch (or sell) any of their movies again, given what they did.’ *If* that has merits, so might this.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) We might wonder though, what the point would be. For dead philosophers, this “punishment” is symbolic, at best. But, removing them from “the canon” *might* show concern for people disrespected by that philosopher: prejudice won’t be tolerated anymore.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) “Ex-communication” might be too much though. Future philosophers and students won’t benefit from that philosopher’s insights, and their legacy may be ruined.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) It also creates a hole in the history of thought, a less-complete and sanitized version of history. This makes it more likely that offenses would be forgotten[\[17\]](#_ftn17) and disrupts our understanding of later thinkers who were influenced by that flawed philosopher.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) We might also be left with very few philosophers! #### C. Historical Apologism: Judge by Past Standards It may be unfair to hold a past thinker to present standards. Nobody can be expected to challenge all the (moral) assumptions that later generations come to regard as indefensible.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Perhaps then we should partially or completely forgive these thinkers. Maybe they weren’t blameworthy for their views: given the standards of their times, they simply didn’t know any better.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) This response really only works when flawed philosophers really didn’t know better.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Even then, though, we might think that they *should have* known better.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Philosophers tend to encourage critical thinking and challenging assumptions: they should better live up to that in their own lives, right?[\[23\]](#_ftn23) #### D. Redemption: Using the Good to Defeat the Bad This response, like (A) above, involves acceptance, but instead of overlooking the bad, we *display* it and try to use the good aspects of a philosopher’s thought to diagnose and correct it. Concealing the bad is misleading and potentially deceptive to people not familiar with that philosopher: people might think the philosopher was like a saint when they really were often a scoundrel. Had the philosopher realized their good claims were in tension with their bad claims, they *might* have rejected the bad in favor of the good.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) But they might not have: they could have favored the bad over the good.[\[25\],](#_ftn25) [\[26\]](#_ftn26) Or they could have just ignored the tension. We can only speculate about how some philosophers would have responded to criticisms they maybe never encountered. But there are not always positive elements within a philosopher’s writings to critique bad claims, so optimism isn’t appropriate for all flawed philosophers. Redemption also has opportunity costs. Lesser-known philosophers (especially minorities) who have ideas comparable to (or perhaps better than) famous philosophers may be overlooked in our efforts to redeem them.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) ### 3. Conclusion There are surely other possible responses; some might overlap with those discussed. Responsibly applying any of these responses requires detailed knowledge of a philosopher’s life and philosophy, as well as the application of general ethical concerns. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) An *[Appendix](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/appendix-to-responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/)* documents these claims about these historical figures. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For a Kant-focused discussion of the issues of this essay, see [Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra’s “How to Deal with Kant’s Racism — In and Out of the Classroom,” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2018_0999_5_11_85)[*Teaching Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2018_0999_5_11_85)[, 41, 2. May 19, 2018, pp 117-135](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2018_0999_5_11_85). His article inspired this more general discussion here. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Of related interest is comparable concerns in responding to any bad behavior and claims of scholars and researchers in other fields, past and present. Some of our discussion below is potentially applicable: e.g., if the wrongdoing is totally unrelated to the area of research, this is likely of a lesser concern – and wouldn’t give rise to the question of whether we should use that research – than, say, social scientists developing factual information about some social problems, yet wrongfully act in ways that contributes to those social problems or privately disparage the people affected by those problems. When empirical or scientific issues have moral dimensions, their researchers and scholars can be seen as likely having moral motivations for their factual investigations. In that way, they approach having philosophical perspectives on the issues, and so their flaws raise similar concerns to philosophers’ flaws. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) It may be tempting to create a sharp division between philosophers and their writings, adopting the maxim “the author is dead,” that is, that we should treat the author’s background and intentions as irrelevant when deciding the merits of their work. But if Nietzsche is correct in viewing philosophy as an author’s autobiographical memoirs, this division may be wrongheaded. See §6 in Friedrich Nietzsche’s [*Beyond Good and Evil*](https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Good-Evil-Prelude-Philosophy/dp/0679724656), Walter Kaufman (trans.), Vintage Books, \[1886\] 1989. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Charges of “hypocrisy” are sometimes *ad hominem* attacks, since whether a person follows the principles he or she advocates, in itself, says nothing about whether these principles are true or reasonable: e.g., if a vocal critic of shoplifting is found to have shoplifted, that gives no reason to think that shoplifting is OK. When controversial principles or claims are advocated for, however, that might suggest that their advocates don’t really believe them, or that they don’t really think there are good reasons for their principles (and, perhaps, that there are no such reasons). Alternatively, this might merely suggest that good principles are often hard to follow, even for those who identify these principles and recognize their goodness. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For a discussion of contemporary ethicists’ unethical behavior, see Oliver Burkeman’s, “[This column will change your life: why are ethicists so unethical?](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/nov/16/change-your-life-unethical-ethicists)” *The Guardian*, November 16, 2013. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) What *we* consider the philosophers’ main ideas may not be what those philosophers considered their major ideas, or what past generations considered their major ideas. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Heidegger became disillusioned with Nazism later in life and some philosophers argue that Kant eventually grew out of his racist views. Should this influence our attitudes towards their earlier views? See [Pauline Kleingeld’s “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race,” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEKST)[*The Philosophical Quarterly*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEKST)[,](https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEKST)[ 57, 229, 2007, pp. 573-592](https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEKST). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) This is roughly the strategy Robert Louden takes when he writes “Kant’s writings do exhibit many private prejudices … but Kant’s theory is fortunately stronger than his prejudices, and it is the theory on which philosophers should focus.” See his [*Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*](https://www.amazon.com/Kants-Impure-Ethics-Rational-Beings/dp/0195130413)[, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 177.](https://www.amazon.com/Kants-Impure-Ethics-Rational-Beings/dp/0195130413) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) As a potential example, is there a connection between, say, Frege’s anti-Semitism and his logic? If not, then perhaps there is no good objection to studying or using his insights on logic. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) If we ignore the bad in a philosopher’s collective writings, however, it is not clear what principled ground we would have for construing *that edited set of writings* as that *thinker’s philosophy*. This is especially the case if the philosopher in question worked extensively on the bad and believed them to be of the utmost importance, even more important than what we consider their good ideas. E.g., Kant who offered over seventy courses in anthropology and geography (where many of his racist views are found), but only twenty-eight in moral philosophy. By continuing to construe the remaining work as that thinker’s philosophy, we not only potentially mislead new philosophers, but also just interpret history incorrectly: e.g., Charles Mills argues that if we cut out the bad, or “sanitize” Kant’s philosophy, then the remainder would quite simply not be Kant’s philosophy, as it is not what Kant *actually* thought. See his “[Kant’s ](http://www.unc.edu/~gsmunc/Colloquium2002/mills.pdf)[*Untermenschen*](http://www.unc.edu/~gsmunc/Colloquium2002/mills.pdf)” which proposes that Kant categorized human beings not just as ‘persons’ but also as ‘*subpersons*.’ In [Andrew Valls (ed.), ](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100570360)[*Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100570360)[,](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100570360)[ Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 169-93](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100570360). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) It’s worth noting that a complete boycott is something that no individuals or groups have the power to do. At best, the offensive-to-many philosopher would remain in memory as a philosopher-who-used-to-be part-of-the-generally-accepted canon, since the philosopher would surely retain some admirers. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See, for instance, online discussions concerning contemporary philosophers accused of sexual harassment. Jenny Saul Sheffield suggests “If you can avoid teaching/discussing \[these philosophers\], that may be the best strategy.” She then goes on to qualify this statement by mentioning, “If you just need a representative of some family of views, you can avoid the whole issue by choosing someone else. If you really need to discuss \[the accused’s\] view, then you discuss \[the accused’s view\].” In light of this, discussing a less known thinker in lieu of the problematic favorite may serve as a way of diversifying the philosophical canon. Some discussions are here: “[How to Discuss Searle, etc.](https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2017/03/28/how-to-discuss-searle-etc/)” *Feminist Philosophers* blog, March 28, 2017, and “[John Searle may be guilty of sexual harassment…](http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2017/03/john-searle-may-be-guilty-of-sexual-harassment.html)” *Leiter Reports* blog, March 28, 2017. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) In light of the #MeToo movement, the idea of boycotting the work of sexual predators has resurfaced. For discussions on this, see Nicole Hemmer’s “[How to think about consuming art made by sexual predators](https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/1/9/16866080/erase-predators-work-spacey-louis-weinstein-morality-art-artist),” *Vox*, January 9, 2018, and Chuck Klosterman’s “[On Boycotting Woody Allen’s Films](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/magazine/on-boycotting-woody-allens-films.html?_r=0),” *The New York Times Magazine*, March 14, 2014, among other discussions. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Habermas has a similar thought to this when engaging with the “Historian’s Debate” in Germany. Habermas however, seems to believe that in order to restore the dignity of historically oppressed populations, we should not brush aside the past, but instead keep it alive. He writes, “There is the obligation incumbent upon us in Germany … to keep alive, without distortion, and not only in an intellectual form, the memory of the sufferings of those who were murdered by German hands … \[I\]f we were to brush aside this Benjaminian legacy, our fellow Jewish citizens and the sons, daughters, and grandchildren of all those who were murdered would feel themselves unable to breathe in our country.” See his “On the Public Use of History,” [*The New Conservatism*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/new-conservatism), 1989, p 233. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Whether dead people can be harmed or wronged is, of course, an interesting and controversial philosophical issue. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See note 15 above. The concern here is similar to the concern of “whitewashing” U.S. History if a teacher fails to discuss chattel slavery, segregation, genocide of Native Americans, etc. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Recall that we are discussing thinkers that have something (indeed, a lot) positive going for them: they are a well-known thinker for good reason. For any thinkers who don’t have this going for them — nearly everything they have to say is bad and wrong — it’s fine to cut them out and ignore them. Elizabeth Barnes discusses the intellectual and moral costs of discussing offensive views that have little to nothing in their favor in her “[Arguments That Harm – and Why We Need Them](https://www.chronicle.com/article/Arguments-That-Harm-and/242543),” *Chronicle Review*, February 18, 2018. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Concerning contemporary people, few people who are “progressive” concerning one issue are comparably “progressive” about all other important issues for which progressive positions are most reasonable: there is a general collective failure of “intersectionality.” This is not an *ad hominem* attack: it’s the observation that we all tend to have (true) and reasonable beliefs about some (moral) issues, but false and unreasonable beliefs about others (and that we tend to resist revising those false and unreasonable beliefs). In this way, most of us are similar to the historical philosophers discussed in this paper. How should we respond to them, and us? For discussion, see an *80,000 Hours* podcast with [Will MacAskill, “Our descendants will probably see us as moral monsters. What should we do about that?” January 19, 2018](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/will-macaskill-moral-philosophy/). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Miranda Fricker discusses this in regards to epistemic injustice when she mentions that sexists of the past “were not culpably at fault until they were in a position to know better,” in her [*Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/epistemic-injustice-9780199570522?cc=us&lang=en&)[,](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/epistemic-injustice-9780199570522?cc=us&lang=en&) [Oxford University Press, 2009](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/epistemic-injustice-9780199570522?cc=us&lang=en&), p. 100. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Kant for instance, likely *did* know better as he “was an avid reader of travel reports of all kinds, written by explorers… He warned repeatedly on the unreliability of such sources, but rely on them he did.” See Thomas McCarthy’s [*Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development.*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Race_Empire_and_the_Idea_of_Human_Develo.html?id=X4tWPgAACAAJ) Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 49. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Although not focused on epistemic or intellectual blame, see [Neal Tognazzini’s and Justin D. Coates’ “Blame”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/blame/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/blame/)[Spring 2016, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/blame/). For an intellectual blame-focused discussion, see [Sanford C. Goldberg’s “Should have known.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLSHK)[*Synthese*](https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLSHK)[,](https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLSHK)[ 194, 8, 2017, pp. 2863-2894](https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLSHK) and his [*To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity,* ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/to-the-best-of-our-knowledge-9780198793670?cc=us&lang=en&)[Oxford University Press, 2018](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/to-the-best-of-our-knowledge-9780198793670?cc=us&lang=en&). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) For that matter, it is not obvious we should hold anyone who studies ethics professionally (e.g., priests) to the same standards as the general population. Eric Schwitzgebel discusses this question in his blog post “[Should Ethics Professors Be Held to Higher Ethical Standards in Their Personal Behavior?](http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2017/02/should-ethics-professors-be-held-to.html)” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) One might imagine, for instance, Kant using his Categorical Imperative in order to dismiss his racist beliefs, or Mill using his principle of utility to defeat his endorsement of colonialism. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) One can begin by looking at Charles Mills’ “[Kant’s ](http://www.unc.edu/~gsmunc/Colloquium2002/mills.pdf)[*Untermenschen*](http://www.unc.edu/~gsmunc/Colloquium2002/mills.pdf)” in Andrew Valls (ed.), [*Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100570360), Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 169-93. Mills’ [*The Racial Contract*](http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100376800) also deals with this issue. See also Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze’s “[The Color of Reason: The Idea of “Race” In Kant’s Anthropology](https://philpapers.org/rec/EZETCO)” in [*Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Postcolonial+African+Philosophy%3A+A+Critical+Reader-p-9780631203407),” in Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze (ed.), Blackwell, 1997, pp. 103-140. Also Robert Bernasconi’s “[Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9780470753514.ch8)*”* in [*Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470753514), Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (eds.), Blackwell, 2002, pp. 145-66. Also see [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) If the bad and good aspects of a philosopher’s thought are conceptually related, meaning that claims about one area have logical implications for claims about the other (and vice-versa), then they might be in tension. Analyzing and speculating on how philosophers reconciled this tension could help us avoid their mistakes in the future. David Livingstone Smith suggests that when populations dehumanize others there is cognitive dissonance between that population’s supposed beliefs (e.g. all people deserve respect) and their desired practice (e.g. to enslave or exterminate a minority). In which case, “the dissonance between theory and practice was resolved by denying the humanity of the oppressed” namely by attributing a less than human essence to the oppressed. See Smith’s [*Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Less_Than_Human.html?id=rWAiRrm3LkcC), St. Martin’s Press, 2011, p. 3. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) See note 13 for more discussion on this. ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/tarihteki-ahlaki-yonden-kusurlu-filozoflara-ve-felsefelere-yaklasimlar-victor-fabian-abundez-guerra-nathan-nobis/)[, Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/flawed-philosophers/) ### Graphical Representation, in French By [Cédric Eyssette](http://eyssette.net/) ![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/cedric.jpg?resize=656%2C478&ssl=1) “Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies” graphical representation, in French.### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies.pdf). ### Video Presentation ### Related Essays [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Ignorance and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia ### About the Authors Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Grossmont College in El Cajon, California. His main research interests are in the intersections of philosophy of race and moral responsibility. His PhD is from UC Riverside; his dissertation was titled “Collective Responsibility for Oppression: Making Sense of State Apologies and Other Practices.” His work has been published in the *Public Philosophy Journal*, *Teaching Philosophy*, and other forums. [VAbundezGuerra.org](https://vabundezguerra.org) [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is the author of *[Animals & Ethics 101](http://www.animalethics101.com/)*, co-author of *[Thinking Critically About Abortion](http://www.abortionarguments.com/)*, a co-author of *[Chimpanzee Rights](https://www.routledge.com/Chimpanzee-Rights-The-Philosophers-Brief-1st-Edition/Andrews-Comstock-GKD-Donaldson-Fenton-John-Johnson-Jones-Kymlicka-Meynell-Nobis-Pena-Guzman-Sebo-Gruen-Wise/p/book/9781138618664)* and author or co-author of many other articles, chapters, and reviews in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphilosophy, Race, Sex & Gender **Tags:** Nobis --- ### [Social Contract Theory: Hobbes, Locke, and the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) **Published:** October 3, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: David Antonini Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 997 When you make an agreement of some significance (e.g., to rent an apartment, or join a gym, or divorce), you typically agree to certain terms: you sign a contract. This is for your benefit, and for the other party’s benefit: everyone’s expectations are clear, as are the consequences of failing to meet those expectations. Contracts are common, and some influential thinkers in the “modern” period of philosophy argued that the whole of society is created and regulated by a contract.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Two of the most prominent “social contract theorists” are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704).[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay explains the origins of this tradition and why the concept of a contract is illuminating for thinking about the structure of society and government. ![hobbes](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/hobbes.jpg?resize=656%2C259&ssl=1) ### 1. The State of Nature and the First Contract To see why we might seek a contract, imagine if there was no contract, no agreement, on what society should be like: no rules, no laws, no authorities. This is called “the state of nature.” What would life in the state of nature be like? Most think it would be very bad: after all, there would be no officials to punish anyone who did anything bad to us, resulting in no deterrent for bad behavior: it’d be every man, woman and child for him or herself, it seems. Hobbes has famously described life in the state of nature as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Locke describes it as where everyone can be judge and jury in their own disputes, meaning they can personally decide when they have been wronged and how to punish the offender; clearly, this could get out of hand.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Historically, we may not have ever been in a state of nature, but contract theorists use this idea to explain why rules for society, a contract, are desirable. It allows us to peacefully live together with the assurance that no one can simply harm us or take our property without consequence. Contract theorists argue that most people would freely enter into a contract to secure these benefits. A contract has some costs though: to receive the advantages of an ordered society, everyone agrees to give up some benefits they had in the state of nature. Hobbes says we must give up “the right of nature” or the ability to judge *for ourselves* what counts as our “preservation.” This means that we could kill someone and *claim* it contributed to our “preservation,”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) truthfully or not. Locke argues we must give up the right to be judge and jury of our own disputes. Suppose, for mutual benefit, people contract to form *some* society. What are the details of that contract? ### 2. The Agreement to Form Government ![locke2](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/locke2.jpg?resize=495%2C370&ssl=1) A newly-formed society needs a mechanism for making decisions: who will make and enforce the rules? This authority needs to be established if the new community is to function together peacefully. Hobbes argues that the sole decision-making authority should be an almighty ruler, who he calls the “Leviathan,” who rules *by force* so that citizens are afraid of whatever the ruler says. As Hobbes forebodingly reminds his readers: “And covenants \[or contracts\], *without the sword*, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The contract means that you obey the ruler and his laws or suffer severe consequences, such as imprisonment or even death. Locke’s proposal for the creation of government reflects a more democratic approach in the sense of majority rule: “. . every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation . . . to submit to the determination of the majority.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) According to Locke, the primary function of government is to pass laws through a majority vote regarding the protection of rights, especially one’s right to property: “The great and chief end . . . of men putting themselves under government is the *preservation of their property*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Government requires our submitting to someone else’s authority. Submitting yourself to be ruled by someone else requires sacrifice: we give up the right to make laws, enforce those laws, and punish transgressions of them. We transfer these rights to some individual or group who does them on our behalf. These three basic activities—making, enforcing and punishing—form the basis for the three branches of government common in many countries. ### 3. Conclusion Living under a contract is likely better than living in the state of nature. Questions remain, however. First, we usually explicitly agree to contracts, but we’ve done no such thing for society. If it’s said we *tacitly* agree, meaning that we’ve implicitly agreed, Locke responds: “The difficulty is what ought to be looked at as *tacit consent*, and . . . how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expression of it at all.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) We haven’t explicitly agreed to any social contract. Do citizens agree simply by enjoying the benefits of things only made possible by living in society? For example, being able to drive on public roads is a benefit. But this is possible only through the existence of government-funded roads. Unless someone refuses to drive on public roads, by accepting such a benefit, is one *tacitly* “consenting”? Locke’s notion of tacit consent is problematic because it *assumes* agreement based on our receiving benefits. However, *explicit* consent is important because this kind of consent is the mark of *voluntarily* entering into a contract. Explicit consent is often extremely important – consider consent in sexual relationships – but it is never obtained, or even sought, to participate in and receive benefits from being part of society. A second, deeper problem with the notion of a social contract is who was and is left out of it. Who was not allowed to sign the contract or help create its terms? In many societies, women and non-Europeans were intentionally excluded, and certainly many individuals and groups of people would not consent to much of many governments’ policies and practices, past or present.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) “Modern,” for the purposes of the history of philosophy, refers roughly to the time period from the mid-17th century to the late-18th century. However, “modern” does not only designate a time period but refers to the beginning of the Enlightenment, the rise of modern scientific thinking (Galileo, Newton), and to a turning away from the established order of the Church. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Generally included with Hobbes and Locke is a third theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau is not discussed here because his views are quite different from Hobbes’ and Locke’s. Rousseau is critical of both Hobbes’s and Locke’s views on the social contract because he is not convinced that society and government are an improvement over the state of nature. He outlines such an argument in his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1754). His own version of the social contract is found in *On the Social Contract* (1762). See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contact* (Penguin Books, 1968) and *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (Hackett, 1992) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan* (1651), ed. Michael Oakeshott (Simon and Schuster, 1962), 100. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Locke, *Second Treatise of Government* (1690), ed. C.B. Macpherson (Hackett, 1980), 10-11. Locke proposes that we give up the right to be judge and jury of our own disputes in order “to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case,” p. 48. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Hobbes, *Leviathan,* 104*.* [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 129 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Locke, *Second Treatise*, 52. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) In Chapter 5 of Locke’s *Second Treatise*, he famously argues we have a natural right to private property by mixing our labor with land. For example, if I pick an apple from the tree, because I own the labor I used (picking the apple), the apple becomes “mine.” Government is created to protect the property I have acquired. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, 64. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For an account of how race factored into the terms of the contract, see Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Cornell University Press, 1997). Also see [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson. For an account of how gender factored into the contract, see Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford University Press, 1988) ### References [Thomas Hobbes ](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/91953.Leviathan)*[Leviathan](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/91953.Leviathan)*[ (1651)](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/91953.Leviathan)[, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Simon and Schuster, 1962)](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/91953.Leviathan) [John Locke, ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Two_Treatises_on_Civil_Government.html?id=zEIqAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false)*[Second Treatise of Government](https://books.google.com/books/about/Two_Treatises_on_Civil_Government.html?id=zEIqAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false)*[ (1690)](https://books.google.com/books/about/Two_Treatises_on_Civil_Government.html?id=zEIqAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false)[, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Hackett, 1980)](https://books.google.com/books/about/Two_Treatises_on_Civil_Government.html?id=zEIqAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false) [Carole Pateman, ](https://books.google.com/books?id=HhVfDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=carole+pateman&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjZo9mZqMrdAhUQ31MKHRaHAs4Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=carole%20pateman&f=false)*[The Sexual Contract](https://books.google.com/books?id=HhVfDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=carole+pateman&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjZo9mZqMrdAhUQ31MKHRaHAs4Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=carole%20pateman&f=false)*[ (Stanford University Press, 1988)](https://books.google.com/books?id=HhVfDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=carole+pateman&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjZo9mZqMrdAhUQ31MKHRaHAs4Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=carole%20pateman&f=false) [Charles W. Mills, ](https://books.google.com/books?id=GnmuAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+racial+contract&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiFnISlqMrdAhXI1lMKHXFMDkgQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20racial%20contract&f=false)*[The Racial Contract](https://books.google.com/books?id=GnmuAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+racial+contract&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiFnISlqMrdAhXI1lMKHXFMDkgQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20racial%20contract&f=false)*[ (Cornell University Press, 1997)](https://books.google.com/books?id=GnmuAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+racial+contract&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiFnISlqMrdAhXI1lMKHXFMDkgQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20racial%20contract&f=false) [Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ](https://books.google.com/books?id=uChiDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+social+contract&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjorOaxqMrdAhXHrVMKHdLNDwcQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20social%20contract&f=false)*[The Social Contract](https://books.google.com/books?id=uChiDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+social+contract&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjorOaxqMrdAhXHrVMKHdLNDwcQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20social%20contract&f=false)*[ (1762)](https://books.google.com/books?id=uChiDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+social+contract&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjorOaxqMrdAhXHrVMKHdLNDwcQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20social%20contract&f=false)[ (Penguin Books, 1968)](https://books.google.com/books?id=uChiDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+social+contract&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjorOaxqMrdAhXHrVMKHdLNDwcQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20social%20contract&f=false) [Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ](https://books.google.com/books?id=uGfoCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=discourse+on+the+origin+of+inequality&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwij69r7oOXdAhVCuFMKHYyGDd0Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=discourse%20on%20the%20origin%20of%20inequality&f=false)*[Discourse on the Origin of Inequality](https://books.google.com/books?id=uGfoCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=discourse+on+the+origin+of+inequality&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwij69r7oOXdAhVCuFMKHYyGDd0Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=discourse%20on%20the%20origin%20of%20inequality&f=false)*[ (1754) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992)](https://books.google.com/books?id=uGfoCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=discourse+on+the+origin+of+inequality&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwij69r7oOXdAhVCuFMKHYyGDd0Q6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=discourse%20on%20the%20origin%20of%20inequality&f=false) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/social-contract-theory-.pdf). ### Related Essays [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [David Antonini](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Antonini) received his PhD from Southern Illinois University Carbondale in 2018. He is the author of [*Public Space and Political Experience: An Arendtian Interpretation*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793626011/Public-Space-and-Political-Experience-An-Arendtian-Interpretation?fbclid=IwAR2mkj12oWJ3ABOsv02oSoMymrlD-0Le8BlEYbwo9XRWshc8DaYwbvFWz8A) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021). He is an instructor at Great Basin College in Pahrump, Nevada. [davidantonini.wordpress.com](https://davidantonini.wordpress.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** Antonini, Hobbes, Locke, Social Contract, social contract theory, state of nature --- ### [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) **Published:** July 21, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the concept of epistemic injustice. **Content:** Author: Huzeyfe Demirtas Categories: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Wordcount: 996 Suppose a jury rejects a Black defendant’s testimony because they believe that Black people are often untrustworthy. Or suppose the male members of a board reject a female colleague’s suggestions because they believe that women are too often irrational. Imagine also a woman whose postpartum depression is dismissed by her doctor as mere ‘baby blues.’[\[1\]](#_ftn1) All three people above suffer what contemporary English philosopher Miranda Fricker calls *epistemic injustice*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) “Epistemic” means *relating to knowledge*. Epistemic injustice refers to a wrong done to someone as a knower or transmitter of knowledge: due to unjustified prejudice, someone is unfairly judged to not have the knowledge or reasonable beliefs that they actually have. Fricker identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: *testimonial* and *hermeneutical*. This essay explains these forms of epistemic injustice and surveys some suggestions for how to prevent them. ![Miranda Fricker, "Epistemic Injustice"](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/epistemic-injustice-miranda-fricker3.jpg?resize=656%2C496&ssl=1)Miranda Fricker, “Epistemic Injustice”### 1. Testimonial Injustice Testimony involves someone sharing their knowledge with someone else. Testimony typically happens when people communicate: e.g., giving directions, reporting the news, writing a research paper. Testimony isn’t just statements in a courtroom: whenever we gain knowledge from other people, we rely on testimony. Testimony is *credible* when there’s good reason to believe that what’s claimed is true, when the person testifying knows what they claim to know.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) A speaker suffers *testimonial injustice* when their testimony is judged to be not or less credible because of *prejudice* and not because the testimony itself is unreasonable.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) These prejudices can be related to race, gender, accent, age, and others and impact people in many areas of life: economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and more. Testimonial injustices caused by such prejudices constitute the central cases of testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice can take various forms. For instance, a female board member’s prediction might be rejected due to the prejudices of her male colleagues: this is called *testimonial quieting*. Alternatively, that female board member might instead silence or limit her assertions beforehand knowing that she’ll receive inappropriately low credibility: this is called *testimonial smothering*.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. Hermeneutical Injustice A second type of epistemic injustice is known as *hermeneutical injustice*. “Hermeneutical” relates to *interpretation and understanding*. Consider sexual harassment. Although this might be surprising, that concept hasn’t always existed. So imagine a woman who is sexually harassed at her workplace before the introduction of the concept in the 1970s.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) She lives in a society where unwanted sexual propositions are typically seen as a form of ‘flirting,’ and rejection of them as a ‘lack of a sense of humor.’ Since she lacks the concept of sexual harassment, she’ll have difficulty understanding her experience adequately or finding the appropriate words to communicate it to others. Hermeneutical injustice then is about cases of lacking the concepts to adequately understand or communicate an experience. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when this failure is due ultimately to prejudices that result in people lacking the concepts needed to understand or communicate their experiences.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The injustice above was due to women’s (partial) exclusion from certain professions—e.g., journalism, politics, academics, law—which tended to result in biased interpretations of women’s experiences, as in interpreting sexual harassment as merely a form of flirting. Some argue that hermeneutical injustice doesn’t require a lack of concepts since it can occur when interpretations of a certain group’s experiences, and the resulting concepts, are unduly dismissed by others. For instance, postpartum depression might be dismissed as a personal deficiency rather than a genuine medical condition: this is called *hermeneutical dissent*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Unlike testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice is not the result of an *individual* hearer’s prejudice: no single agent perpetrates hermeneutical injustice.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In the sexual harassment example, it’s not any individual’s prejudice, but prejudicial practices in society that resulted in people lacking the concept of sexual harassment. ### 3. The Wrong of Epistemic Injustice Producing and spreading knowledge is part of being human. Epistemic injustice results in victims’ being at least partially excluded from participation in these activities. Epistemic injustice can lead to grave practical consequences for both victims and wrongdoers. A wrongly disbelieved defendant might lose their freedom or life. Not listening to a board member who might have crucial knowledge for the future of the company may have dire consequences. Epistemic injustice also harms the victim’s identity. We typically define ourselves partly by our group identities: racial, sexual, religious, political, and more. We construct this part of our identity largely by communicating with others or using the available conceptual resources. So, being considered untrustworthy or lacking the conceptual resources to make sense of our experiences potentially prevents us from constructing our own social identity—from becoming who we are. If a woman who is interested in and has a talent for politics is constantly excluded from political dialogue, she can hardly fulfill her potential to become a politician.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. How to Prevent Epistemic Injustice To prevent epistemic injustice, Fricker suggests that we cultivate reliable character traits—virtues—that neutralize prejudice.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) We should aim to be aware of the potential prejudice in who we judge as credible. If we find that the low credibility we assigned to a speaker is due to prejudice, we should work to change that attitude.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Since victims of prejudice can have undue difficulty articulating their experiences, we should try to make out how their experiences would be understood in a prejudice-free climate. Some argue that individual efforts, though they should prove useful, may not be enough to defeat epistemic injustice. For instance, education is a marker of credibility. But the lack of proper education might be due to the absence of fair opportunities for education. So, some people are unfairly considered not credible and excluded from participation in knowledge-related activities because of underlying injustice in social institutions. The solution then requires changes in social institutions, not just individual efforts.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 5. Conclusion It’s difficult to overestimate the value of being (recognized as) someone with knowledge. So it’s difficult to overestimate the badness of knowledge-related unfairness or epistemic injustice. Addressing and avoiding such injustice, however, requires both social and political change and, often, serious personal effort. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Medina and Pohlhaus (2017) for further discussion on, and examples of, varieties of epistemic injustice. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Fricker (2007, p. 7). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Green, *Epistemology of Testimony*, for further discussion on the epistemology of testimony. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) More specifically, a speaker suffers testimonial injustice when they are given a level of credibility different from what’s appropriate due to prejudice. Hence, a speaker might suffer testimonial injustice also as a result of their testimony being judged as *more* credible than it actually is. Fricker argues that *individual cases* of one’s testimony being judged more credible doesn’t constitute testimonial injustice. However, she accepts that these cases seldom might *add up to* testimonial injustice (Fricker 2007, pp. 20-21). Davis (2016) argues that a speaker’s testimony being judged more credible is a bigger problem than Fricker thought. This is because, Davis argues, testimonial injustice is wrong primarily because the victim is treated merely as a member of a group and not as the unique person that she is. And when a speaker is judged as more credible due to (positive) prejudices that are based on (positive) stereotypes, she’s treated merely as a member of a group and not as the unique person that she is. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Doston (2011). Beyond statements and explanations, asking questions can also be treated unjustly. For instance, questions asked by women might be unjustly dismissed as irrelevant (Hookway 2010). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Fricker (2007, p. 149-152) for a history of how the concept of sexual harassment was introduced. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Fricker (2007, p. 158). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Goetze (2018). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Fricker (2007, p. 159). However, as Fricker notes, “\[w\]hile hermeneutical injustice is not perpetrated by individuals, it will normally make itself apparent in discursive exchanges between individuals” (Fricker, 2007, p. 18). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Fricker (2007, p. 54). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Corresponding to the two forms of epistemic injustice, Fricker identifies two different character traits and calls them *the virtue of testimonial justice*, and *the virtue of hermeneutical justice*. A virtue, roughly, is a relatively stable character trait—like honesty, generosity, or compassion. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This is one way the aim of the virtue of testimonial justice could be achieved. Another way it could be achieved is by plain personal familiarity. Suppose a certain accent presents an obstacle to one’s fair credibility judgment. One could converse with people having that accent, or socialize with them, which can in time eradicate this obstacle. With plain habituation, people’s race, age, accent, etc. can stop being relevant to their credibility (Fricker 2007, p. 96). Fricker also suggests that if “the whole business of judging credibility becomes too indeterminate, we may need to suspend judgment altogether” (Fricker 2007, p. 92). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Anderson (2012). ### References [Anderson, Elizabeth (2012) “](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211)[Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions,” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211)[*Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211)[, 26(2): 163–173.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211) [Davis, Emmalon (2016) “Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice,” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVTTA-7)[*Hypatia*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVTTA-7)[, 31(3): 485-501.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVTTA-7) [Dotson, Kristie (2011) “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x)[*Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x)[, 26(2): 236–257.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x) [Fricker, Miranda (2007) ](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001/acprof-9780198237907)[*Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.* ](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001/acprof-9780198237907)[Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001/acprof-9780198237907) [Green, Christopher R. “Epistemology of Testimony,” ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/)[, ISSN 2161-0002, https://www.iep.utm.edu/, accessed 06 June 2020.](https://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/) [Goetze, Trystan S. (2018) “Hermeneutical Dissent and the Species of Hermeneutical Injustice,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hypa.12384)[*Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hypa.12384)[, 33: 73–90](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hypa.12384)[.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hypa.12384) [Hookway, Christopher (2010) “Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker,” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HOOSVO)[*Episteme*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HOOSVO)[, 7: 151–63.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HOOSVO) [Kidd, I., Medina, J. & Pohlhaus, G. (2017) ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Epistemic-Injustice/Kidd-Medina-Pohlhaus-Jr/p/book/9781138828254)[*The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Epistemic-Injustice/Kidd-Medina-Pohlhaus-Jr/p/book/9781138828254)[. London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Epistemic-Injustice/Kidd-Medina-Pohlhaus-Jr/p/book/9781138828254) ### Related Essays [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long ### Acknowledgments I am greatly indebted to Shane Gronholz, Chelsea Haramia, Kellan D L Head, Sanggu Lee, Dan Lowe, YaoJun Lu, Thomas Metcalf and Nathan Nobis for their invaluable comments on earlier versions of this article. ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/epistemic-injustice/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/epistemic-injustice-pdf-1.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Huzeyfe Demirtas is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy at Harvard University, Department of Philosophy. Before coming to Harvard, he was a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy at Chapman University. He earned his PhD in philosophy at Syracuse University, Department of Philosophy. His primary research interests are moral responsibility, ethics of AI, and applied ethics, especially environmental ethics. [philpeople.org/profiles/huzeyfe-demirtas-1](https://philpeople.org/profiles/huzeyfe-demirtas-1) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Logic & Reasoning, Race, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** epistemic injustice, hermeneutical injustice --- ### [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) **Published:** April 10, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is civil disobedience? Can it be justified? If so, under what conditions? And what should happen to people who engage in civil disobedience? Should they be punished? Or should they be praised This essay reviews some important philosophical answers to these questions. **Content:** Author: Henry Krahn Categories: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#law), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/) Word Count: 999 Sometimes people break the law to try to change a law or policy that they see as unjust. For example, during the American Civil Rights Movement, Black activists sat at “whites-only” lunch counters to protest racial segregation.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) During the 1980s and 1990s, members of the group ACT UP staged ‘die-ins’ where they lay as if dead in public spaces to protest the U.S. government’s neglect of the AIDS crisis ravaging the LGBTQ community.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) More recently, environmental advocacy groups have blockaded roads to protest government inaction on climate change.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) These are cases of *civil disobedience*. But what exactly is civil disobedience? Can it be justified? If so, under what conditions? And what should happen to people who engage in civil disobedience? Should they be punished? Or should they be praised? This essay reviews some important philosophical answers to these questions. [![In Montgomery, Alabama on December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks engaged in civil disobedience by refusing to give up her seat on a public bus to a white man, a violation of the city’s racial segregation laws.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/rosa-parks.jpg?resize=656%2C325&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/rosa-parks.jpg?ssl=1)In Montgomery, Alabama on December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks engaged in civil disobedience by refusing to give up her seat on a public bus to a white man, a violation of the city’s racial segregation laws.### 1. What is Civil Disobedience? Civil disobedience is a form of protest that involves breaking the law to try to change a law or policy that protestors believe is unjust.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) It is commonly understood to be: 1. *illegal*;[\[5\]](#_ftn5) 2. *conscientious*: civil disobedients—people who engage in civil disobedience—are motivated by a sincere belief that a law or policy is unjust; 3. *nonviolent*; 4. *public*: civil disobedience is not anonymous or covert; 5. *persuasive*: civil disobedients aim to change a law or policy by convincing the public that it is unjust through words and actions that express their moral convictions; 6. *non-evasive*: civil disobedients do not try to escape punishment.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This definition is controversial, however. Some think that illegal actions can be civil disobedience even if activists make no attempt to convince the public of anything: e.g., using physical coercion to prevent a decision from taking effect, such as activists chaining themselves to logging machinery to prevent deforestation.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Some think that illegal protest can be civil disobedience even if protestors evade punishment, as the whistleblower Edward Snowden did after leaking information about U.S. government surveillance.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Some even think that *violent* illegal actions can be a part of civil disobedience, such as smashing windows in a protest.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 2. What Justifies Civil Disobedience? Many people think we are usually morally obligated to obey the law.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) But few people think we must obey all laws, no matter how unjust: e.g., it was not morally wrong to help enslaved people seek freedom because slavery was unjust and laws prohibiting helping people escape slavery were also unjust. To say civil disobedience is ‘justified’ means that it is a morally acceptable way to protest. Some argue that civil disobedience can be justified because we have a duty to make society just. This duty requires us to obey just laws which help to protect our individual rights and promote fairness and equality.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) However, when the law is sufficiently unjust, we may be morally justified in using civil disobedience to try to make it more just.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Some argue that civil disobedience might also be justified because we have a moral right to engage in it. On this argument, the right to civil disobedience is part of a more general moral right, such as the right to express ourselves freely.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Some argue that this right includes actions that express our deepest moral beliefs, like a pacifist refusing to be drafted into the army.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) In the same way, they argue that we have a right to express our deepest moral convictions through civil disobedience.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 3. When is Civil Disobedience Justified? Just as almost nobody argues that all laws must be obeyed, few people argue that all civil disobedience is wrong.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) So when might civil disobedience be morally justified? Here there are again controversies. First, civil disobedients must *believe* they are responding to injustice. Whether they must respond to *actual* injustice[\[17\]](#_ftn17)—or whether they can merely reasonably, *but perhaps mistakenly*, believe they are protesting injustice—is debated.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Second, it’s sometimes argued that for civil disobedience to be justified, disobedients must have tried yet failed to change the law or policy through lawful means, like voting and speaking up publicly. Whether this condition is met, however, depends on whether disobedients have tried all lawful options. But it’s always possible to keep trying the same thing,[\[19\]](#_ftn19) and additional lawful measures, like letter-writing campaigns and public assemblies, can be tried too even if they seem unlikely to succeed.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) So, some argue that civil disobedience can be justified when all lawful attempts to change the law *seem* unlikely to succeed.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Some philosophers argue for further conditions, such as that justified civil disobedience must limit negative side effects. This includes not encouraging broader disrespect for the law[\[22\]](#_ftn22) and minimizing harms to anyone not immediately involved in the protests.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) ### 4. Should Civil Disobedience be Punished? It is common to think that people should be punished when they break the law.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) But some philosophers argue that to punish a crime is to express that it is morally wrong, and since *justified* civil disobedience is not morally wrong, it should not be punished.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) Others argue that *all* civil disobedience should be punished, even when it’s morally justified. They reason that if the government did not punish justified civil disobedience, that would encourage people to engage in civil disobedience whenever they think it is justified. Since everyone tends to think that their own actions are justified, there would likely be an increase in *unjustified* disobedience, threatening the stability of society. Punishing all civil disobedience equally would avoid setting a bad precedent.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Finally, some distinguish legal *penalties* from *punishment*: penalties and punishments both discourage illegal conduct, but punishments also condemn the punished act as morally wrong. So, some argue that civil disobedience shouldn’t ever be punished but instead should be penalized by, e.g., minor fines or other penalties that don’t suggest that disobedients did anything wrong.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) ### 4. Conclusion In a world with so much injustice, it’s not surprising that people engage in civil disobedience: indeed, it may be their moral duty. Examining the complexities of civil disobedience—what it is, when it’s justified, and how disobedients should be treated—is as important today as it’s ever been. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The most famous of these protests was staged in Greensboro, North Carolina, in 1960. Four Black students from North Carolina A&T College sat at a lunch counter in a Woolworth department store, violating local segregation policies. The students were asked to leave but they stayed until the store closed. Over several days, more and more students came to sit at the same lunch counter. Afterwards, the Greensboro sit-ins inspired similar protests across the United States. The Library of Congress (1998) and the King Institute discuss the history of these protests in References and Further Readings below. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) ACT UP stands for ‘AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power.’ By the end of the 1980s, AIDS had killed thousands of Americans, including many members of the LGBTQ community. ACT UP staged many die-ins, including one at the vacation home of then-U.S. President George H.W. Bush. To read more about ACT UP, see ACT UP (2025) in References and Further Readings below. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For example, since 2018 the environmental advocacy group “Extinction Rebellion” has blockaded many roads. These blockades have happened all over the world. One 2024 blockade was in the Netherlands: about 500 activists blocked a highway in The Hague, the seat of Dutch government. For details, see Reuters (2024). For more on this group, see the Extinction Rebellion Homepage (2025) in References and Further Readings below. This case suggests that civil disobedience can be used to seek justice for any “morally considerable” beings or entities, like animals and ecosystems, not just human-focused issues: see [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For introductions to leading contemporary theories of justice, see [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies, [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman, and [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers. These introductions concern just laws and policies, and governments that generally promote justice. However, we can also ask why we might want to have a government at all. Typical answers to that question involve thinking about what life would be like if we had no government whatsoever. See [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini and [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman for discussion. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) In some cases, civil disobedients may believe that their actions are in line with a higher law, such as the constitution or moral law, but not the law that is enforced. Civil disobedience can be contrasted with *uncivil obedience*, sometimes called *malicious compliance*, in which people obey the letter of the law but violate its spirit. For more on uncivil obedience, see Kling (2025). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Rawls (1999, 319-323) offers the most widely accepted definition of civil disobedience, which includes these features. Rawls’s account is adapted from Bedau (1961, 661). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Dworkin (1985, 109) discusses what he calls “nonpersuasive” civil disobedience. In his view, *persuasive civil disobedience* involves trying to convince people that there is an injustice by making arguments and demands, but *nonpersuasive civil disobedience* involves activists forcing people to do what they want, without much concern for what those people think about the matter. Physical coercion is one kind of nonpersuasive civil disobedience. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Scheuerman (2014) argues that Snowden’s actions were civil disobedience. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Brownlee (2012) uses the example of firing a gun in the air or catapulting stuffed animals at the police example to illustrate that violence of some types is compatible with civil disobedience. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Rawls (1999, 319) and Lefkowitz (2007, 202-204) think that we usually have a duty to obey the law and argue that there is an exception for civil disobedience. Waldron (1993), Stilz (2009, 85-110), and Christiano (2008, 249-256) argue for a duty to obey the law without focusing on civil disobedience. Some philosophers, namely *philosophical anarchists*, argue that we do not usually have a duty to obey the law: see Wolff (1970) and Simmons (2001, 106-107). Relatedly, some argue that there could be a duty to obey the law, but that current societies are so unjust that there probably is no such duty: see Lyons (1998, 46). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For example, laws against fraud and discrimination are designed to prevent people from treating each other unfairly. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Rawls (1999, 319) writes that the problem of civil disobedience is a conflict between the duty to obey the law and the duty to oppose injustice. Civil disobedience is justified, he thinks, when there is a law or policy that is sufficiently unjust. Similarly, King (1963) writes that people have a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For discussion related to the right to free expression, see [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) On this argument, not all actions that express our deepest moral beliefs are covered by the right. The right does not allow people to violate other people’s rights. For example, someone who believed that the existence of bike lanes was unjust would not be justified to drive in the bike lane and hit cyclists with their car. See Brownlee (2012, 141). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Brownlee (2012, 140-141) thinks that the right to free expression includes civil disobedience, though she uses the term ‘justified’ to mean civil disobedience supported by a balance of reasons. Similarly, Lefkowitz (2007, 203) argues that we have a right to political participation, which gives us a right to vote and support different political causes. On Lefkowitz’s view, the right to political participation also includes civil disobedience, which can make it justified. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Storing (1991, 86) is an example of an opponent of civil disobedience. He argues that civil disobedience is a failed attempt to combine legal political action with revolution, and that disobedients are people who fail to take up the duties of a citizen. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Rawls (1999, 326-327) argues that civil disobedience is justified only when it responds to actual violations of objective principles of justice. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) *Reasonable* beliefs about justice might be beliefs that do not rely on major factual errors or self-serving and clearly unfair principles of justice. But they are not necessarily true: reasonable or justified *but false* beliefs are possible, even about ethical issues: this is an application of *falliblism*—the view that we can be justified in holding beliefs that are, unbeknownst to us, false, if our evidence best supports believing them—applied to beliefs about ethics and justice: see section “3.3. Fallible Justification” in [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. Lefkowitz (2007, 204) argues that civil disobedience is justified when disobedients reasonably believe that the law is unjust, in a way that is free of these errors. Bryan (2023) argues that civil disobedience can be justified when disobedients take steps to make sure that their disobedience is for a just cause. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Rawls (1999, 328) notes that repeating lawful efforts to change a law or policy, and using free speech, is always possible. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Rawls (1999, 327-328) and Greenawalt (1991, 173-174) both think that civil disobedience is justified only once it is clear that the public will not respond to lawful protest or political campaigning. In contrast, Cohen (1971, 125) seems to think that disobedients must have tried extraordinary lawful means like the ones listed here. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) These conditions were first set out in Rawls (1999, 326-331). Similar conditions are found in Greenawalt (1991, 173-181) and Cohen (1971, 124-125). Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963) justified his civil disobedience by emphasizing that he responded to a deeply unjust law, and resorted to civil disobedience only after trying to negotiate with his opponents. See also Lefkowitz (2007). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Rawls (1999 328-329), for example, argues that when there are multiple groups planning civil disobedience, they must coordinate so that the combined effect of their disobedience does not undermine respect for the law and the constitution. Cohen (1971, 126) claims that the justification of civil disobedience may depend on whether it decreases respect for the law in the community. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Greenawalt (1991, 183-185) and Cohen (1971, 126) argue that civil disobedience is less likely to be justified when it causes harm, especially physical injury, and when causing this harm is unlikely to lead to a good outcome. For Cohen, this is relevant to one of the two justifications he considers for civil disobedience. Although Rawls (1999, 330) does not discuss it in detail, he seems to think justification might partly depend on the extent to which uninvolved parties are injured. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) On the topic of when punishment is justified, see [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers. On the relation of law to morality, see [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Delmas (2019, 173-175) discusses several arguments that civil disobedience should not be punished. For example, some argue that justified civil disobedience can fix injustices and help stabilize society. In these cases, Delmas suggests, it might even seem that civil disobedience should be celebrated, not punished. Bennett and Brownlee (2021, 287) discuss the idea that civil disobedience is not wrong, and only things that are wrong should be punished. For a broader discussion of issues in this section, see Delmas and Brownlee (2021). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Greenawalt (1987, 273) argues that justified and unjustified civil disobedience should be punished equally. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Lefkowitz (2007, 218) argues that civil disobedience should be penalized, but not punished. ### References [Bedau, H. A. (1961). On Civil Disobedience. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BEDOCD)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BEDOCD)[, 58 (21), 653-665.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BEDOCD) [Bennett, C. and Brownlee, K. (2021). Punishment and Civil Disobedience. In W. E. Scheuerman (ed.) ](https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.library.nyu.edu/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-civil-disobedience/punishment-and-civil-disobedience/DA0EB3BF10A3B6499EDE602795C1C611?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[*The Cambridge Companion to Civil Disobedience*](https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.library.nyu.edu/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-civil-disobedience/punishment-and-civil-disobedience/DA0EB3BF10A3B6499EDE602795C1C611?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark)[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.library.nyu.edu/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-civil-disobedience/punishment-and-civil-disobedience/DA0EB3BF10A3B6499EDE602795C1C611?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark) [Brownlee, K. (2012). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BROCAC-14)[*Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BROCAC-14)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BROCAC-14) [Bryan, A. (2023). The Epistemic Dimensions of Civil Disobedience. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRYTED)[*The Journal of Political Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRYTED)[, forthcoming.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRYTED) [Christiano, T. (2008). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHRTCO-5)[*The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits.*](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHRTCO-5)[ Oxford: Oxford University Press](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHRTCO-5) [Cohen, C. (1971). ](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015087418722)[*Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, and the Law.* ](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015087418722)[Ann Arbor: MPublishing.](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015087418722) [Delmas, C. (2019). Civil Disobedience, Punishment, and Injustice. In L. Alexander and K. K. Ferzan (ed.) ](https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyulibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5989070)[*The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law*](https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyulibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5989070)[. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.](https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nyulibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5989070)[Delmas, C. and Brownlee, K. (2021). Civil Disobedience. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/) [Dworkin, R. (1985). Civil Disobedience and Nuclear Protest. In ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1pncpxk)[*A Matter of Principle*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1pncpxk)[. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1pncpxk) [Greenawalt, K. (1987). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/GRECOL)[*Conflicts of Law and Morality*](https://philpapers.org/rec/GRECOL)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/GRECOL) [Greenawalt, K. (1991). Justifying Nonviolent Disobedience. In H. A. Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus. London: Routledge.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BEDCDI-2) [King, M. L. (1963). Letter From a Birmingham City Jail. ](https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html)[*University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center*](https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html)[.](https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html) [Kling, J. (2025). The Nature, Ethics, and Politics of Uncivil Obedience. ](https://brill-com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/view/journals/jpn/3/1/article-p1_2.xml)[*Journal of Pacifism and Nonviolenc*](https://brill-com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/view/journals/jpn/3/1/article-p1_2.xml)[e](https://brill-com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/view/journals/jpn/3/1/article-p1_2.xml)[*,* ](https://brill-com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/view/journals/jpn/3/1/article-p1_2.xml)[3 (1), 1-31.](https://brill-com.proxy.library.nyu.edu/view/journals/jpn/3/1/article-p1_2.xml) [Lefkowitz, D. (2007). On a Moral Right to Civil Disobedience. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/LEFOAM)[*Ethics*](https://philpapers.org/rec/LEFOAM)[, 117 (2), 202-233.](https://philpapers.org/rec/LEFOAM) [Lyons, D. (1998). Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/LYOMJH-2)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://philpapers.org/rec/LYOMJH-2)[, 27 (1), 31-49.](https://philpapers.org/rec/LYOMJH-2) [Rawls, J. (1999). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RAWATO-11)[*A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*](https://philpapers.org/rec/RAWATO-11)[. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/RAWATO-11) [Reuters (2024). Climate Protesters Block Dutch Highway While Police Strike.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/climate-protesters-block-dutch-highway-while-police-strike-2024-09-14/)[ *Reuters*](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/climate-protesters-block-dutch-highway-while-police-strike-2024-09-14/)[, September 15th, 2024.](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/climate-protesters-block-dutch-highway-while-police-strike-2024-09-14/) [Scheuerman, W. (2014). Whistleblowing as Civil Disobedience. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWAC-11)[*Philosophy and Social Criticism*](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWAC-11)[, 40 (7), 609-628.](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWAC-11) [Simmons, A. J. (2000). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SIMJAL-4)[*Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations*](https://philpapers.org/rec/SIMJAL-4)[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/SIMJAL-4) [Stilz, A. (2009). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/STILLF)[*Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State*](https://philpapers.org/rec/STILLF)[. Princeton: Princeton University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/STILLF) [Storing, H. J. (1991). The Case Against Civil Disobedience.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203003657-5/case-civil-disobedience-herbert-storing) [In H. A. Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus. London: Routledge.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203003657-5/case-civil-disobedience-herbert-storing) [Waldron, J. (1993). Special Ties and Natural Duties. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WALSTA-2)[*Philosophy and Public Affairs*](https://philpapers.org/rec/WALSTA-2)[, 22 (1), 3-30.](https://philpapers.org/rec/WALSTA-2) [Wolff, R. P. (1970). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WOLIDO-8)[*In Defense of Philosophical Anarchism*](https://philpapers.org/rec/WOLIDO-8)[. Berkeley: University of California Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/WOLIDO-8) ### For Further Reading [ACT UP (2025). ACT UP Accomplishments – 1987-2012. ACT UP.](https://actupny.com/actions/) [Extinction Rebellion (2025). Extinction Rebellion Homepage. Extinction Rebellion.](https://rebellion.global/) [Library of Congress (1998). Greensboro Lunch Counter Sit-In. ](https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/odyssey/educate/lunch.html)[*Library of Congress.*](https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/odyssey/educate/lunch.html) [Raz, J. (1991). Civil Disobedience. In H. A. Bedau (ed.) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BEDCDI)[*Civil Disobedience in Focus*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BEDCDI)[. London: Routledge.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BEDCDI) [Scheuerman, W. (2019). Why Not Uncivil Disobedience? ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWNU-2)[*Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWNU-2)[, 25(7), 980-999.](https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHWNU-2) [The King Institute. Sit-ins. Stanford University Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute.](https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/sit-ins) [Thoreau, H. D. (1991). Civil Disobedience. In H. A. Bedau (ed.) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/THOCD)[*Civil Disobedience in Focus*](https://philpapers.org/rec/THOCD)[. London: Routledge.](https://philpapers.org/rec/THOCD) ### Acknowledgements This essay was completed while in residence as a Global Fellow in the Hauser Global Law School Program at the New York University School of Law. I would like to thank Zain Raza, as well as the editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. ### Related Essays [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) By Spencer Case [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini [John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Civil-Disobedience.pdf). ### About the Author Henry Krahn is a Hauser Post-doctoral Global Fellow at the New York University School of Law where he works on moral, legal, and political philosophy. He has written on civil disobedience, protest more generally, and the way moral accountability figures into these practices. His current project examines the relationship between social movements and moral change. [HenryKrahn.ca](https://www.henrykrahn.ca/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)[*.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** civil disobedience, protest --- ### [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) **Published:** June 19, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Categories: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Author: Travis Timmerman Word Count: 992 The Confederacy (1861-1865) consisted of eleven secessionist states that fought against the United States in the American Civil War in order to try to preserve slavery. Since the Civil War, Confederate monuments have been erected across America.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Confederate monuments were most frequently erected during the Jim Crow era between the 1900s and 1920s and the Civil Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s to intimidate and oppress African Americans.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Currently, around 780 Confederate monuments remain.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Many people, including various politicians, want them removed: they see the monuments as racist and harmful and want to do something recognizably anti-racist. They argue that Confederate monuments inflict unavoidable harm on undeserving persons by serving as a constant reminder of America’s racism.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This is the basis of a harm-based argument against Confederate monuments.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This essay introduces this type of argument.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ![Monument to Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate States Army.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/lee-statue.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)Monument to Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate States Army.### 1. A Moral Argument for Removing Confederate Monuments in Two Parts Part 1: (1) If some monument(s) unavoidably harms undeserving people, then there is moral reason to remove that monument. (2) Public Confederate monuments unavoidably harm at least (i) those who suffer as a result of knowing the racist motivation behind the existence of most Confederate monuments *and* having those motivations made obvious by public Confederate monuments, *and/or* (ii) those who suffer as a result of being reminded of the horrors of the Civil War and the United States’ racist history by public Confederate monuments. (3) Therefore, there is strong moral reason to remove public Confederate monuments. If premises (1)-(2) are true, then the truth of (3) is logically guaranteed. (1) should be uncontroversial since it follows from the more general claim that we have moral reason to avoid harming innocent people. Part (i) of (2) is supported by the ample testimony of the groups fighting to remove Confederate monuments. Many know the history behind them, and are constantly reminded of the racist motivation for their creation, and suffer as a consequence.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In support of part (ii) of (2), consider someone unaware of the racist motivations for creating (most) Confederate monuments and who has a cursory knowledge of the Civil War. Confederate monuments, even ones made for supposedly innocuous reasons, can be harmful by making obvious one of the darkest periods in American history: being non-voluntarily reminded of these facts can make people suffer. This is true *even if* we believe that the monument *itself* isn’t racist. Here is Part 2 of the argument. (4) If there is moral reason to remove some monument(s), then people are morally obligated to remove the monument(s) unless there is equally strong or stronger reason to preserve them. (5) There isn’t equally strong or stronger reason to preserve public Confederate monuments than to remove them. (6) Therefore, people are morally obligated to remove public Confederate monuments. If (1)-(5) are true, then the truth of (6) is logically guaranteed. (4) is obviously true.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This only leaves (5), which is perhaps the most controversial premise. But (5) cannot be rejected unless one can identify a more important reason to preserve the monuments than to remove them. Let’s now consider the best objections to (5), and the best responses to those objections. ### 2. Objections #### 2.1. ‘Confederate monuments have a great deal of aesthetic and historical value.’ In response, it’s worth noting that any aesthetic or historical value worth preserving in Confederate monuments can be done harmlessly by, for instance, placing them in a museum and contextualizing them. Monuments are reverential in nature, so if they’re placed in a museum they’ll cease to be *monuments* but will maintain their aesthetic and historical value.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) They also won’t unavoidably make harmful facts obvious since they won’t be prominently displayed in public. However, many Confederate monuments were cheaply made and mass produced so they likely contain little, if any, aesthetic or historical value.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) #### 2.2. ‘Removing Confederate monuments erases history.’ In response, one may reasonably doubt that Confederate monuments themselves impart much in the way of historical knowledge. They may even distort the historical record.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) More importantly, there doesn’t need to be a net decrease in historical knowledge since whatever knowledge would be lost by removing the monuments could be compensated for by the creation of additional educational resources[\[12\]](#_ftn12) that would harmlessly impart the relevant knowledge. #### 2.3. ‘We can continue to preserve Confederate monuments solely to honor the noble accomplishments of the people they valorize.’ The basic idea behind this objection is that there is moral reason to honor people’s noble accomplishments, and Confederate monuments can do that, and doing that is at least as important as preventing the harm they cause. In reply, it’s first worth questioning what the supposedly noble accomplishments of those depicted in Confederate monuments are. Fighting for an oppressive cause, even at great personal sacrifice, is hardly a noble accomplishment. Second, not all preservationists wish to preserve Confederate monuments to honor anyone’s “noble accomplishments,” as the Charlottesville protest demonstrated.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Third, it’s plausibly more important to prevent the harm such monuments cause than to honor any accomplishments of the Confederacy, since that is what will most likely minimize unavoidable harm. #### 2.4. ’Removing Confederate monuments because they honor people who acted in ways that were gravely morally wrong means we’d have to remove almost all monuments, and that’s absurd.’ This doesn’t follow. There is a morally relevant difference between people like Thomas Jefferson or Mahatma Gandhi and people like Robert E. Lee or Nathan Bedford Forrest. While all of them committed grave moral wrongs,[\[14\]](#_ftn14) only the former group also accomplished a great deal of good and were, with respect to some issues, morally prescient. Indeed, Jefferson and Gandhi are known primarily because of other accomplishments, while Confederate soldiers are known primarily because of their behavior in the Civil War, which means that monuments of the former people tend not to remind people of painful facts while monuments of the latter do. ### 3. Conclusion The above argument is but one possible point of entry into this complex debate. If successful, it shows that we’re obligated to continue removing public Confederate monuments.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Monuments are any physical structures meant to honor or memorialize a person, group, event, and so on. The many sources cited in the References and Further Readings discuss some important aspects of Confederate monuments, such as their history, their intended meanings, and the many objections, as well as defenses of, these monuments. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) During the late 19th century and early 20th century, Jim Crow voting laws were passed to disenfranchise African-American voters. A number of advocates in Southern towns erected Confederate statues because the Confederate mythologies seemingly helped justify the Jim Crow laws. As historian Jane Dailey argued, erecting public Confederate monuments near government buildings (e.g. in front of courthouses) was a “power play” aimed at intimidating African-Americans. See Parks (2017). Segregationists used the same power play tactics in the Civil Rights era. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See the (2019) Southern Poverty Law Center Report for information on the current number of Confederate monuments. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Baltimore mayor Catherine Pugh raises this type of consideration when discussing her decision to remove four Confederate statues. See Nevins (2017). In an interview with Trevor Noah, Mitch Landrieu discusses how Wynton Marsalis raised this point to him, which served as a catalyst for Landrieu to change his mind about whether the statues should be removed. See also Landrieu’s (2018) book *In the Shadows of Statues: A White Southerner Confronts History*. See also Marsalis’s moving (2017) article on why New Orleans should remove their Robert E. Lee statue. Multiple people raise this concern in episode “Re-Righting History” on the documentary series *America Inside Out*. Countless more examples can be found by listening to interviews of counter-protesters who oppose preserving Confederate monuments. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Harm-based arguments are not the only arguments that have been leveled against Confederate monuments. One might argue that Confederate monuments morally ought to be removed for rights-based reasons. See Frowe (2019). One may also argue that they morally ought to be removed for justice-based considerations. See Burch-Brown (2017). It’s worth noting that these arguments are broadly compatible with each other. One may also defend the preservation of Confederate monuments for rights-based reasons. See Demetriou (2020). Our discussion concerns the ethics of removing monuments, but there are legal questions about whether public Confederate monuments should be legal and whether such monuments are constitutional. For a short work on these questions, see Brophy (2015). Alfred Brophy has surprisingly argued that preserving Confederate monuments ought to be illegal because they supposedly violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) An original, more detailed and more robustly defended, version of this argument is in Timmerman (2020). Again, this is but one argument in the Confederate monument debate. Various other positions, and the basis of competing arguments, will be addressed in the next section. However, space constraints make it impossible to consider every possible approach and position concerning this complex issue in any kind of detail. Those looking to explore this issue beyond this short article should first read the articles mentioned in the previous note. If one is interested in a more historical defense of Confederate monuments, they may want to read Shedler’s (1998). That should be paired with Adler’s detailed (2000) book review/reply. One may also be interested in Knight’s (2017) and Cotter’s (2017), each of whom argue for preserving Confederate monuments in museums. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See the (2019) Southern Poverty Law Center Report and Parks (2017). For a helpful discussion of what it might mean for a monument to be racist, see Demetriou and Wingo (2018). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Premise (4) just follows from a necessarily true general claim about how reasons weigh against one another, at least if the reasons in question are understood to have “requiring force.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) To be clear, presentations of statues (and the like) in museums could be reverential too, depending on the display, but they needn’t be. Confederate monuments that are placed in museums and properly contextualized can be presented as an important relic of history or work of art without valorizing the Confederacy itself. They also won’t make people remember painful facts about America’s racist history without warning or consent, since they won’t be prominently displayed in public. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See, for example, Fischer (2017). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Perhaps a better version of this objection requires a metaphorical reading of the worry (cf. Abrahams 2020). For a discussion of the worry that Confederate monuments can distort history, see Landrieu (2018). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This may include, for example, certain requirements in history classes in primary schools, funding documentaries and television series focusing on the Civil War, creating a Civil War museum, as well as a plethora of other options. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The majority of those protesting the removal of the Robert E. Lee statue in Charlottesville were part of the “Unite the Right” rally, which consisted of white supremacists and white nationalists who were clearly motivated to preserve the Lee statue for racist reasons. For more information, see Coaston’s (2019) account of the rally. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) It’s widely known that Thomas Jefferson was a vicious slave holder, though his moral shortcomings extend far beyond that fact. The young Mahatma Gandhi notoriously expressed racist attitudes toward black people and was an unrepentant misogynist. See, for instance, Connellan (2010) and Lakshmi (2015). Robert E. Lee and Nathan Bedford Forrest, of course, were Confederate generals who fought hard to preserve slavery. Though their moral shortcomings also extend far beyond that fact and are too numerous to detail here. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) I would like to thank Chelsea Haramia, Dan Lowe, Thomas Metcalf, Nathan Nobis, Felipe Pereira, and Amanda Timmerman for very helpful and detailed comments on earlier versions of this entry. ### References [Abrahams, D. (forthcoming). The Importance of History to the Erasing-History Defence. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/japp.12422)[*Journal of Applied Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/japp.12422)[,](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/japp.12422) [1-16. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/japp.12422) [Burch-Brown, J. (2017). Is it Wrong to Topple Statues and Rename Schools? ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BURIIW)[*Journal of Political Theory and Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BURIIW)[, 1(1),](https://philpapers.org/rec/BURIIW) [59-88. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BURIIW) [Brophy, A. (2015). Flying the Confederate Flag on Public Property May Violate America’s 14](https://qz.com/437136/flying-the-confederate-flagon-public-property-may-violate-americas-14th-amendment/)[th ](https://qz.com/437136/flying-the-confederate-flagon-public-property-may-violate-americas-14th-amendment/)[Amendment. ](https://qz.com/437136/flying-the-confederate-flagon-public-property-may-violate-americas-14th-amendment/)[*Quartz*](https://qz.com/437136/flying-the-confederate-flagon-public-property-may-violate-americas-14th-amendment/)[, June 25](https://qz.com/437136/flying-the-confederate-flagon-public-property-may-violate-americas-14th-amendment/)[th](https://qz.com/437136/flying-the-confederate-flagon-public-property-may-violate-americas-14th-amendment/)[, 2015. ](https://qz.com/437136/flying-the-confederate-flagon-public-property-may-violate-americas-14th-amendment/) [Coaston, J. (2019). Trump’s New Defense of His Charlottesville Comments is Incredibly False. ](https://www.vox.com/2019/4/26/18517980/trump-unite-the-right-racism-defense-charlottesville)[*Vox*](https://www.vox.com/2019/4/26/18517980/trump-unite-the-right-racism-defense-charlottesville)[, April 26th, 2019. ](https://www.vox.com/2019/4/26/18517980/trump-unite-the-right-racism-defense-charlottesville) [Connellan, M. (2010). Women Suffer from Gandhi’s Legacy. ](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/27/mohandas-gandhi-women-india)[*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/27/mohandas-gandhi-women-india)[, January 27th, 2010. ](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/27/mohandas-gandhi-women-india) [Cotter, H. (2017). We Need to Move, Not Destroy, Confederate Monuments. ](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/arts/design/we-need-to-move-not-destroy-confederate-monuments.html)[*The New York Times*](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/arts/design/we-need-to-move-not-destroy-confederate-monuments.html)[. August 20th, 2017. ](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/arts/design/we-need-to-move-not-destroy-confederate-monuments.html) [Demetriou, D. & Wingo, A. (2018). The Ethics of Racist Monuments. In D. Boonin (ed.) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DEMTEO-12)[*Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DEMTEO-12)[. New York: Palgrave. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DEMTEO-12) [Demetriou, D. (2020). Ashes of Our Fathers: Racist Monuments and the Tribal Right. In B. Fischer (ed.) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DEMAOO)[*Ethics Left and Right: The Moral Issues that Divide Us*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DEMAOO)[. New York: Oxford University Press. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DEMAOO) [Fisher, M. (2017). Why those Confederate Union Soldier Statues Look a Lot Like Their Union Counterparts. ](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/why-those-confederate-soldier-statues-look-a-lot-like-their-union-counterparts/2017/08/18/cefcc1bc-8394-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_story.html)[*The Washington Post*](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/why-those-confederate-soldier-statues-look-a-lot-like-their-union-counterparts/2017/08/18/cefcc1bc-8394-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_story.html)[. August 18th, 2017.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/why-those-confederate-soldier-statues-look-a-lot-like-their-union-counterparts/2017/08/18/cefcc1bc-8394-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_story.html) [Frowe, H. (2019). The Duty to Remove Statues of Wrongdoers. ](http://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Issue73_Frowe_article.pdf)[*Journal of Practical Ethics*](http://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Issue73_Frowe_article.pdf)[,](http://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Issue73_Frowe_article.pdf) [7(3), 1-31. ](http://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Issue73_Frowe_article.pdf) [Knight, C. (2017). What to Do with Confederate Monuments? Put them in Museums as Examples of Ugly History, Not Civic Pride. ](https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-confederate-monuments-20170818-htmlstory.html)[*Los Angeles Times*](https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-confederate-monuments-20170818-htmlstory.html)[. ](https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-confederate-monuments-20170818-htmlstory.html)[August 18th, 2017. ](https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-confederate-monuments-20170818-htmlstory.html) [Landrieu, M. (2018). ](http://www.cc.com/episodes/67ecnt/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-extended---march-19--2018---mitch-landrieu-season-23-ep-23075)[*Confronting Confederate Myths with In the Shadow of Statues*](http://www.cc.com/episodes/67ecnt/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-extended---march-19--2018---mitch-landrieu-season-23-ep-23075)[. Interview by Trevor Noah. The Daily Show, March 19, 2018.](http://www.cc.com/episodes/67ecnt/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-extended---march-19--2018---mitch-landrieu-season-23-ep-23075) [Landrieu, M. (2018). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/575468/in-the-shadow-of-statues-by-mitch-landrieu/)[*In the Shadow of Statues: A White Southerner Confronts History*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/575468/in-the-shadow-of-statues-by-mitch-landrieu/)[. New York: Penguin. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/575468/in-the-shadow-of-statues-by-mitch-landrieu/) [McDonough, C. (2018). ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZ4Y2qlWFr0&list=ELICir4-EJz4Ys_kfcdVBMTw&index=2&t=0s)[*Re-Righting History* ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZ4Y2qlWFr0&list=ELICir4-EJz4Ys_kfcdVBMTw&index=2&t=0s)[America Inside Out, April 11, 2018. ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZ4Y2qlWFr0&list=ELICir4-EJz4Ys_kfcdVBMTw&index=2&t=0s) [Lakshmi, R. (2015). What did Mahatma Gandhi think of Black People? ](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/what-did-mahatma-gandhi-think-of-black-people/)[*The Washington Post*](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/what-did-mahatma-gandhi-think-of-black-people/)[,](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/what-did-mahatma-gandhi-think-of-black-people/)[ September 3, 2015. ](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/what-did-mahatma-gandhi-think-of-black-people/) [Marsalis, W. (2017). Why New Orleans Should Take Down Robert E. Lee’s Statue. ](https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_8d83b0c9-eb7e-5368-8180-65fa1e01d0a0.html)[*The Times Picayune*](https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_8d83b0c9-eb7e-5368-8180-65fa1e01d0a0.html)[, May 17](https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_8d83b0c9-eb7e-5368-8180-65fa1e01d0a0.html)[th](https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_8d83b0c9-eb7e-5368-8180-65fa1e01d0a0.html)[, 2017. ](https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_8d83b0c9-eb7e-5368-8180-65fa1e01d0a0.html) [Nevins, J. (2017). Baltimore Mayor on Confederate Statues: Why Should People Have to Feel That Pain Every Day. ](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/baltimore-roger-b-taney-confederate-statues-catherine-pugh)[*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/baltimore-roger-b-taney-confederate-statues-catherine-pugh)[, August 22](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/baltimore-roger-b-taney-confederate-statues-catherine-pugh)[nd](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/baltimore-roger-b-taney-confederate-statues-catherine-pugh)[, 2017. ](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/baltimore-roger-b-taney-confederate-statues-catherine-pugh) [Parks, M. (2017). Confederate Statues Were Built to Further a ‘White Supremacist Future’. ](https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/confederate-statues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacistfuture)[*NPR*](https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/confederate-statues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacistfuture)[. August 20](https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/confederate-statues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacistfuture)[th](https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/confederate-statues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacistfuture)[, 2017. ](https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/confederate-statues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacistfuture) [Shedler, G. (1998). ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780847686759/Racist-Symbols-and-Reparations)[*Racist Symbols and Reparations*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780847686759/Racist-Symbols-and-Reparations)[. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780847686759/Racist-Symbols-and-Reparations) [Southern Poverty Law Center (2019). Whose Heritage: Public Symbols of the Confederacy. ](https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-confederacy#executive-summary)[*Southern Poverty Law Center*](https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-confederacy#executive-summary)[, February 1](https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-confederacy#executive-summary)[st](https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-confederacy#executive-summary)[, 2019. ](https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-confederacy#executive-summary) [Timmerman, T. (2020). A Case for Removing Confederate Monuments. In B. Fischer (ed.) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMACF)[*Ethics Left and Right: The Moral Issues that Divide Us*](https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMACF)[. New York: Oxford University Press. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMACF) [Torin, A. (2000). On Racist Symbols and Reparations. ](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_2000_0026_0001_0153_0172)[*Social Theory and Practice*](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_2000_0026_0001_0153_0172)[ 26(1), 153-171. ](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_2000_0026_0001_0153_0172) ### For Further Reading [Bicknell, J. (2020). The Physical Legacy of a Troubled Past. In J. Bicknell, J. Judkins, and C. Korsmeyer (eds.) ](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophical-Perspectives-on-Ruins-Monuments-and-Memorials/Bicknell-Judkins-Korsmeyer/p/book/9781138504691)[*Philosophical Perspectives on Ruins, Monuments, and Memorials*](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophical-Perspectives-on-Ruins-Monuments-and-Memorials/Bicknell-Judkins-Korsmeyer/p/book/9781138504691)[. New York: Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophical-Perspectives-on-Ruins-Monuments-and-Memorials/Bicknell-Judkins-Korsmeyer/p/book/9781138504691) [B](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340547466_ON_THE_ETHICS_OF_RECONSTRUCTING_DESTROYED_CULTURAL_HERITAGE_MONUMENTS)[ülow, W. (forthcoming). On the Ethics of Reconstructing Destroyed Cultural Heritage Monuments. ](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340547466_ON_THE_ETHICS_OF_RECONSTRUCTING_DESTROYED_CULTURAL_HERITAGE_MONUMENTS)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340547466_ON_THE_ETHICS_OF_RECONSTRUCTING_DESTROYED_CULTURAL_HERITAGE_MONUMENTS)[. ](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340547466_ON_THE_ETHICS_OF_RECONSTRUCTING_DESTROYED_CULTURAL_HERITAGE_MONUMENTS) [B](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340756134_Risking_Civilian_Lives_to_Avoid_Harm_to_Cultural_Heritage)[ülow, W. (forthcoming). Risking Civilian Lives to Avoid Harm to Cultural Heritage? ](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340756134_Risking_Civilian_Lives_to_Avoid_Harm_to_Cultural_Heritage)[*Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340756134_Risking_Civilian_Lives_to_Avoid_Harm_to_Cultural_Heritage)[. ](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340756134_Risking_Civilian_Lives_to_Avoid_Harm_to_Cultural_Heritage) [Coates, T. (2015). Take Down the Confederate Flag-Now. ](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/what-this-cruel-war-was-over/396482/)[*The Atlantic*](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/what-this-cruel-war-was-over/396482/)[. June 18, 2015. ](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/what-this-cruel-war-was-over/396482/) [Lai, T.-H. (Forthcoming). Political Vandalism as Counter-Speech: A Defense of Defacing and Destroying Tainted Monuments, ](https://philpapers.org/rec/LAIPVA)[*European Journal of Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/LAIPVA)[.](https://philpapers.org/rec/LAIPVA) [Miranda, D. F. (2019). Within the Shadow of Monuments. ](https://blog.apaonline.org/2019/03/26/within-the-shadow-of-monuments/)[*Blog of the APA*](https://blog.apaonline.org/2019/03/26/within-the-shadow-of-monuments/)[. ](https://blog.apaonline.org/2019/03/26/within-the-shadow-of-monuments/) [Liberman, A. (2019) But I Voted for Him for Other Reasons!: Moral Permissibility and the Doctrine of Double Endorsement. In M. Timmons (ed.) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-normative-ethics-volume-9-9780198846253?lang=en&cc=us)[*Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 9*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-normative-ethics-volume-9-9780198846253?lang=en&cc=us)[. New York: Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-normative-ethics-volume-9-9780198846253?lang=en&cc=us) [Moody-Adams, M. (2019). Monuments and Memorials. ](https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-jzfkt-a77f09?utm_campaign=w_share_ep&utm_medium=dlink&utm_source=w_share)[*The UnMute Podcast*](https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-jzfkt-a77f09?utm_campaign=w_share_ep&utm_medium=dlink&utm_source=w_share)[. ](https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-jzfkt-a77f09?utm_campaign=w_share_ep&utm_medium=dlink&utm_source=w_share) [Neiman, S. (2019). ](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374715526)[*Learning from the Germans: Race and the Memory of Evil*](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374715526)[. New York: Macmillan. ](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374715526) [Nguyen, C. T. (2019). Monuments as Commitments: How Art Speaks to Groups and How Groups Think in Art. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/papq.12279)[*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/papq.12279)[, 100 (4), 971-994.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/papq.12279) [Nili, S. (2020). From Charlottesville to the Nobel: Political Leaders and the Morality of Political Honors. ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/707215?af=R&mobileUi=0&)[*Ethics*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/707215?af=R&mobileUi=0&)[, 130(3), 415–445.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/707215?af=R&mobileUi=0&) [Schulz, J. (2019). Must Rhodes Fall? The Significance of Commemoration in the Struggle for Relations of Respect. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jopp.12176)[*Journal of Political Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jopp.12176)[, 27(2), 166–186.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jopp.12176) [Shedler, G. (2001). Are Confederate Monuments Racist? ](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/ijap/content/ijap_2001_0015_0002_0287_0308)[*International Journal of Applied Philosophy*](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/ijap/content/ijap_2001_0015_0002_0287_0308)[, 15(2), 287-308. ](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/ijap/content/ijap_2001_0015_0002_0287_0308) [Tsai, G. (2016). The Morality of State Symbolic Power. ](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_2016_0042_0002_0318_0342)[*Social Theory and Practice*](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_2016_0042_0002_0318_0342)[, 42(2), 318–342.](https://www-pdcnet-org.ezproxy.shu.edu/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_2016_0042_0002_0318_0342) [Willard, M. (2019). When Public Art Goes Bad: Two Competing Features of Public Art. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILWPA-3)[*Open Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILWPA-3)[, 2(1), 1-9. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILWPA-3) ### Related Essays [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/removing-confederate-monuments.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Travis Timmerman is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Seton Hall University who specializes in the philosophy of death, normative ethics, and applied ethics. In applied ethics, he has written on global poverty, animal welfare, and the Confederate monument debate. [www.TravisTimmerman.com](http://www.travistimmerman.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Social & Political **Tags:** confederate monuments --- ### [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) **Published:** September 10, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Aristotle’s defense of slavery illustrates how even the most brilliant people can fail to critically examine their own beliefs and society’s customs. **Content:** Author: [Dan Lowe](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/lowe/) Categories: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/) Word Count: 999 Aristotle (384-322 BC) is one of the greatest philosophers, and his moral and political philosophy remains especially influential. But he also believed that, for some people, being enslaved was just and even beneficial for them. How could Aristotle defend a despicable, abhorrent practice like slavery? How could someone with such philosophical insight get one of the most basic moral issues completely wrong? Aristotle’s defense of slavery illustrates how even the most brilliant people can fail to critically examine their own beliefs and society’s customs. ![Enslaved people working in a mine in Laurium, Greece.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/mines_1.jpg?resize=656%2C486&ssl=1)Enslaved people working in a mine in Laurium, Greece.### 1. Slavery in Ancient Greece In ancient Athens, slaves were not citizens, and they considerably outnumbered male citizens.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Greeks sometimes enslaved other Greeks in wars, but most slaves in Athens were foreigners. Slavery was hereditary, and freeing one’s slaves was rare.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This extensive slave underclass gave the citizen elite time for leisure and contemplation, which was important for political participation in the Athenian democracy.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 2. Aristotle’s Argument Defending Slavery Aristotle’s defense of slavery starts with the idea that in order to be *just*, social norms must reflect what is *natural*. Accordingly, society may practice slavery if there are some people who are naturally suited to be slaves. #### 2.1. The Idea of a Natural Slave In general, human beings have the capacity to reason, which allows us to regulate our appetites and impulses. Sometimes we fail to do so **–** against our better judgment, we give in to temptation **–** but in a fully-developed human being, reason rules. But what if there were some human beings whose reason *couldn’t* rule in this way? Aristotle says such people could understand the reason of others but would lack entirely their own capacity for rational deliberation.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Such a person would be a natural slave, Aristotle claims, meaning that they would inherently lack the capacity to rationally direct their own lives.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Such people would need to be directed by those who can rationally deliberate. Since this authority should be distributed to those most able to exercise it correctly, Aristotle argues that owning such people would be just.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) And since someone without the capacity for rational forethought would choose badly if left to their own devices, slavery is even beneficial for them, Aristotle argues.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) #### 2.2. Are There Any Natural Slaves? Aristotle often discusses natural slaves hypothetically: *if* there are any such people, this is what would be true about them. He is aware that some deny the existence of natural slaves[\[8\]](#_ftn8): some “believe that it is contrary to nature to be a master (for it is *by law* that one person is a slave and another free, whereas *by nature* there is no difference between them).”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) But shockingly, Aristotle says that it is “not difficult”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) to show that there are natural slaves, that there are people “as different from others as body is from soul or beast from human.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) It is not difficult, he claims, because the psychological deficiencies of natural slaves are physically observable: nature “tends to make the bodies of slaves and free people different too, the former strong enough to be used for necessities, the latter useless for that sort of work.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Aristotle even believes that we can often tell who is a natural slave right from the beginning of life: “From the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.”[\[13\]](#_ftn13) #### 2.3. Would This Justify Greek Slavery? What guarantees that whoever is actually enslaved happens to be a natural slave? Most Greek slaves were enslaved by conquest, and Aristotle admits that “it is possible for wars to be started unjustly.”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) The same is true for those born into slavery, since Aristotle states that natural slaves can sometimes give birth to naturally free persons, and vice versa.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Nevertheless, Aristotle seems to think these cases are atypical.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Moreover, Aristotle argues that non-Greeks were natural slaves,[\[17\]](#_ftn17) and so it would be easy to determine who was a natural slave by empirical observation.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) #### 2.4. Aristotle’s Argument in Summary We can now see how Aristotle’s argument comes together: P1. Slavery is just and beneficial (for the slave and for the owner) if the enslaved naturally lacks the capacity to deliberate. P2. There are some human beings who naturally lack the capacity to deliberate. C1. Therefore, there are some human beings whose enslavement would be just and beneficial. P3. Those who are enslaved typically lack the capacity to deliberate. C2. Therefore, the typical slave is enslaved justly. ### 3. Evaluating Aristotle’s Argument Every one of Aristotle’s premises is questionable. The first premise is clearly mistaken: humans who lacked the capacity to deliberate would benefit from competent guardians to look out for their welfare, not a lifetime of forced labor.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Aristotle exhibits astonishing blindness to the abusive and degrading nature of slavery. The second premise, that there *are* human beings who lack the capacity to deliberate, might be true in some cases – perhaps those with severe brain damage or advanced dementia – but they are certainly not who Aristotle had in mind.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) The third premise is similarly mistaken: Aristotle systematically misidentifies who lacks the capacity for deliberation.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) It was probably true that enslaved people, forbidden real education and condemned to forced labor, did not have the intellectual abilities of the free Greek citizen. But Aristotle fails to see that this is not the inherent nature of enslaved people, but the result of slavery itself.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ### 4. The Legacy of Aristotle’s Argument Aristotle’s argument was one of many used throughout history to defend slavery, including in the antebellum United States.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) American slaveholders incorporated much of Aristotle’s argument, claiming that: - slavery was necessary for a leisured aristocracy;[\[24\]](#_ftn24) - slavery benefitted the enslaved – so-called “planter paternalism;”[\[25\]](#_ftn25) - slavery was justified because some people (black people, according to racist whites) were inherently less rational and intelligent.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Slavery was pervasive in both ancient Greek society and the antebellum American south. Accordingly, privileged members of those societies were unable or unwilling to see the profound injustice of slavery. Aristotle’s defense of slavery shows that even the most brilliant philosophers can succumb to the tendency to uncritically accept the practices of one’s own society. Perhaps that same tendency exists in us as well.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Kraut 2002 (279-280). However, it should be noted that reliable numbers are hard to come by in this case. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Ibid. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This is the upshot of Aristotle’s claim that slaves are tools for action, rather than production (Politics I.4, 1254a1-13). The point of having a slave is not merely to have additional material belongings, but to enable one to act in certain ways, in this case, as a contemplative citizen. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Politics I.5, 1254b21-23, and I.13, 1260a12-13. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Aristotle does not deny that slaves are human beings. Rather, he argues they are a kind of subcategory of human beings. This is typical of defenses of slavery throughout history: complete and utter denial of the enslaved person’s humanity is uncommon. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Politics I.5, 1254a22-31. See also *Nicomachean Ethics* Book V for Aristotle’s more general remarks on justice. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Although Aristotle seems to think this is plausible all on its own, he does offer two arguments for it. The first is analogical: “For the soul rules the body with the rule of a master… It is evident that it is natural and beneficial for the body to be ruled by the soul, and for the affective part to be ruled by the understanding (the part that has reason), and that it would be harmful to everything if the reverse held, or if these elements were equal. The same applies in the case of human beings with respect to the other animals” (I.5, 1254b4-10). “For the same thing is beneficial for both part and whole, body and soul; and a slave is a sort of part of his master—a sort of living but separate part of his body. Hence, there is a certain mutual benefit and mutual friendship for such masters and slaves as deserve by nature to be so related” (I.6, 1255b9-13). Aristotle seems to think that it is a reliable generalization that when there are natural *ruling* parts and natural *ruled* parts, it is beneficial for both the whole and the parts to be in their proper relationship. The second is a modified form of the function argument Aristotle makes in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (I.7). In that argument, a good life for a human being is to be found in excellently performing the function distinctive to human beings. Aristotle argues that since reason is distinctive to human beings, a good human life is one in which someone reasons well (throughout a complete life). In the *Politics*, Aristotle argues that: “those people who are as different from others as body is from soul or beast from human, and people whose task (*ergon*), that is to say, the best thing to come from them, is to use their bodies in this condition—those people are natural slaves. And it is better for them to be subject to this rule” (I.5, 1254b16-19). Although reasoning is distinctive to all human beings, Aristotle claims that natural slaves have reason only in some minimal sense. Accordingly, the distinctive way in which natural slaves function is not in deliberating for themselves but rather following the deliberations of others. And since a good life for a human being is to be found in excellently performing one’s distinctive function, then a good life for a natural slave is one in which it listens to others well. Of course, this argument is irrelevant if there are in fact no natural slaves. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) In fact, Aristotle’s discussion is our main evidence that the justice of slavery in Ancient Greece was debated at all. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Politics I.3, 1253b19-21, emphasis added. All translations are from Reeve (1998) unless otherwise indicated. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Politics I.5, 1254a18. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Politics I.5, 1254b16-17. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Politics I.6, 1254b26-29. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Politics I.5, 1254a21-22. Jowett translation. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Politics I.6, 1255a23-24. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Politics I.6, 1255a40-1255b1. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) I say “seems” because Aristotle is unclear on this point. He is mostly concerned with theoretical issues, so he doesn’t broach how common he thought these mismatches between legal and natural slavery were in actual Greek society. The most he concedes is that the categories of legal slave and natural slave, legally free and naturally free, do “not always” match up (Politics I.6, 1255b2-9). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Politics I.6, 1255a28-29, where even the opponents of slavery seem only to be concerned with the slavery of fellow Greeks. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Politics I.2, 1252b4-8. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Miller 2017, §3. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Aristotle claims that the natural slave “shares in reason to the extent of understanding it, but does not have it himself” (Politics I.5, 1254b23-24). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) This is also true of his claims about women, who he claims have the capacity for deliberation but are unable to let it guide their actions. Politics I.13, 1260a13. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) In fact, slaves in Athens were often skilled craftsmen and sometimes occupied what we think of as professional class positions — bankers, accountants, and low-ranking bureaucrats for the Athenian state. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Davis 2006, 188, discusses how American slaveholders were influenced by Aristotle. That said, we cannot conclude that if Aristotle had not made his argument, slaveholders would not have made it. If Aristotle’s arguments had not existed, it probably would have been necessary for slaveholders to invent them. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) E.g., James Henry Hammond, “The Mudsill Speech,” in Finkelman 1997, 86. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) E.g., Thomas R. R. Cobb, *What Is* *Slavery and its Foundation in the Natural Law*, in Finkelman 1997, 154. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) e.g., Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, in Finkelman 1997, 50. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Thanks to Shane Gronholz, Chelsea Haramia, Peter Hunt, Tom Metcalf, and Nathan Nobis for their comments on drafts of this essay. ### References [Aristotle. 2009. ](https://www.amazon.com/Nicomachean-Ethics-Oxford-Worlds-Classics/dp/0199213615/ref=sr_1_5?keywords=aristotle+nicomachean+ethics&qid=1561829227&s=gateway&sr=8-5)[*Nicomachean Ethics*](https://www.amazon.com/Nicomachean-Ethics-Oxford-Worlds-Classics/dp/0199213615/ref=sr_1_5?keywords=aristotle+nicomachean+ethics&qid=1561829227&s=gateway&sr=8-5)[. Translated by David Ross, revised with an Introduction and Notes by Lesley Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Nicomachean-Ethics-Oxford-Worlds-Classics/dp/0199213615/ref=sr_1_5?keywords=aristotle+nicomachean+ethics&qid=1561829227&s=gateway&sr=8-5) [Aristotle. 1998. ](https://www.amazon.com/Politics-Aristotle/dp/0872203883/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=aristotle+politics+reeve&qid=1561829254&s=gateway&sr=8-1)[*Politics*](https://www.amazon.com/Politics-Aristotle/dp/0872203883/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=aristotle+politics+reeve&qid=1561829254&s=gateway&sr=8-1)[. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.](https://www.amazon.com/Politics-Aristotle/dp/0872203883/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=aristotle+politics+reeve&qid=1561829254&s=gateway&sr=8-1) [Davis, David Brion. 2006. ](https://www.amazon.com/Inhuman-Bondage-Rise-Slavery-World/dp/0195339444/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=inhuman+bondage&qid=1561829278&s=gateway&sr=8-1)[*Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery In the New World*](https://www.amazon.com/Inhuman-Bondage-Rise-Slavery-World/dp/0195339444/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=inhuman+bondage&qid=1561829278&s=gateway&sr=8-1)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Inhuman-Bondage-Rise-Slavery-World/dp/0195339444/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=inhuman+bondage&qid=1561829278&s=gateway&sr=8-1) [Finkelman, Paul (ed.). 1997. ](https://www.amazon.com/Defending-Slavery-Proslavery-Thought-Documents/dp/0312133278/ref=sr_1_3?keywords=finkelman+defending+slavery&qid=1561829301&s=gateway&sr=8-3)[*Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South, a Brief History with Documents*](https://www.amazon.com/Defending-Slavery-Proslavery-Thought-Documents/dp/0312133278/ref=sr_1_3?keywords=finkelman+defending+slavery&qid=1561829301&s=gateway&sr=8-3)[. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s.](https://www.amazon.com/Defending-Slavery-Proslavery-Thought-Documents/dp/0312133278/ref=sr_1_3?keywords=finkelman+defending+slavery&qid=1561829301&s=gateway&sr=8-3) [Kraut, Richard. 2002. ](https://www.amazon.com/Aristotle-Political-Philosophy-Founders-Thought/dp/0198782004/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=kraut+aristotle&qid=1561829324&s=gateway&sr=8-1)[*Aristotle: Political Philosophy*](https://www.amazon.com/Aristotle-Political-Philosophy-Founders-Thought/dp/0198782004/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=kraut+aristotle&qid=1561829324&s=gateway&sr=8-1)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Aristotle-Political-Philosophy-Founders-Thought/dp/0198782004/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=kraut+aristotle&qid=1561829324&s=gateway&sr=8-1) [Miller, Fred. 2017. “Aristotle’s Political Theory.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/) ### Related Essays [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Ignorance and Blame: Can Ignorance Excuse?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/aristotle-defense-of-slavery.pdf). ### About the Author [Dan Lowe](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/lowe/) is a lecturer in the department of philosophy at the University of Michigan. He works on social and political philosophy, feminist philosophy, and their intersection with moral epistemology. [sites.google.com/site/danlowe161](https://sites.google.com/site/danlowe161/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Race, Social & Political **Tags:** Aristotle, Lowe, slavery --- ### [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) **Published:** May 8, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Joseph Frigault Category: [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 996 History is marked by large-scale injustice. In the United States alone, Native Americans were violently displaced, Africans were enslaved and their descendants subject to lynchings and Jim Crow laws, and Japanese Americans were interned during World War II, among other major wrongs. Do past injustices ever have moral implications for currently living people? In particular, are living members of victimized groups ever owed anything because of these wrongs, or for their continued effects? That is, do they deserve some form of *reparations*? This essay outlines some general arguments in support of the idea of reparations and responds to some common objections. This discussion focuses on reparations to African-Americans for slavery, but its insights should be applicable to many other historic injustices. [![A Memorial at the Legacy Museum and National Memorial for Peace and Justice, Montgomery, Alabama.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/memorial.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)](https://museumandmemorial.eji.org/memorial)The National Memorial for Peace and Justice, Montgomery, Alabama.### 1. Reparations and Reparative Justice Most arguments for reparations are grounded in the principle of ***reparative justice***, the idea that *victims of wrongdoing or injustice are morally entitled to some form of repair*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) If I wrong you, say by stealing from or physically harming you, you are entitled to my making amends for this wrong, by acknowledging it, returning the stolen property, or paying damages. The underlying idea is that *past wrongs must be made right*. Consider the brutal, centuries-long regime of slavery. Many have argued that a wrong as serious and long-lasting as this demands some form of response even generations later, especially insofar as its impact continues to be felt.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But what kind of response? Reparations for slavery would likely involve a formal apology on behalf of the nation to the living descendants of enslaved people.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) They might also include an economic component, such as direct payments to those descendants, programs to increase educational opportunities, and federally-funded community investments to help overcome the lasting effects of slavery, among other proposals.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Objections to Reparations Many accept the basic principle of reparative justice but deny that it can be applied to historic injustices. Let’s consider some of the most common objections. ### A. Death of Original Victims Many agree that the *original victims* of historic injustices like slavery were owed reparations, but argue that since they are all deceased, a moral claim to reparation can no longer be asserted: no *living* person is entitled to the reparations once due to their ancestors.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) However, at least some kinds of moral entitlements can be handed across generations, as the case of inheritance makes clear. When people die, their rights to their property commonly pass to their heirs. Furthermore, something need not be in one’s possession in order to be one’s property: stolen property is still *your* property. Since enslaved persons had a right to be paid for their labor, that payment can be viewed as *their property*. So, the right to this withheld compensation might pass down to their descendants. Call this *the inheritance argument*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### B. Passage of Time Some might grant that immediate descendants of original victims may have inherited claims to reparation, but argue that these claims are now *too old* to be taken seriously.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) But the fact that the original wrongs of slavery are historically distant does not mean that their effects are not still felt by many. Consider that in 2011 the wealth holdings of the median black household in the U.S. were roughly *fifteen times lower* than those of the median white household.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The vast majority of social scientists see this racial wealth gap as inextricably bound up with generations of social and economic oppression, from slavery on through the post-civil war period and into the twentieth century.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) To the extent that contemporary black Americans have *themselves* been made worse off by the historic wrongs in question, they may be entitled to demand reparations on that basis, *independently* of their having inherited any rights to do so. Call this *the harm argument*.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### C. Owed By Whom? Some might agree with the above arguments, yet argue that reparations can only be properly demanded from those who are personally guilty of some clear wrongdoing: since the original perpetrators of slavery are long dead, there is ultimately no one alive who can be justly held accountable for repairing these moral wrongs.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Notice, however, that people and groups may come to bear reparative obligations *without* having personally done anything wrong. If I accidentally damage your property, I may owe you compensation, even if that damage was not due to any negligence on my part; my child or dog could damage your property, but I have to fix it; the government is obligated to compensate the wrongfully convicted, even if the judge and jury of their case have passed away, and so on. Things are even clearer in cases of *unjust enrichment*, where someone benefits, perhaps unknowingly, from the wrongful actions of another: if you unknowingly receive stolen goods, you must return these items if you learn they were stolen, despite your innocence. In general, people who benefit from injustice are obligated to release those benefits, to compensate victims. This idea can be applied to the vast wealth amassed by slaveholders and passed down to many now living, often in the form of real estate and other financial assets like stocks, bonds and other investments. When assets like these are traceable to the original wrongs of slavery, descendents might be entitled to all or part of their value. Beyond this, however, we must also recall that the practice of slavery and related laws were enforced by the United States government for centuries.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) That same government still exists, and can arguably be called to account for its past misdeeds like any other wrongdoer, even if all the citizens and officials who once composed it are deceased.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 3. Conclusion There are, of course, other objections to the idea of reparations for historic injustice.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) There are *practical* concerns about determining exactly *who owes what to whom*, as well as *political* concerns about the risks of inflaming racial and ethnic tensions. Our discussion suggests, at least, that the *moral* question of reparations might not be as easily dismissed as many believe. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This intuition is widely accepted among moral philosophers. For one influential discussion, see chapter 2 of Ross (1930) 2002. Among the few moral philosophers who reject the principle of reparative justice are consequentialists who reject the idea of “backward-looking” approaches to justice generally and evaluate possible actions *wholly* in terms of their future outcomes. This, however, does not rule out their endorsing proposals designed to compensate those who have suffered some wrongful harm: it means that they will see such programs as warranted only insofar as they represent, or help to produce, the morally preferable outcome, and not merely as a response to the past wrong itself. For discussion of this point, see section 4 of Miller 2017. For an introduction to consequentialism, see [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz. For an introduction to the nature of justice, as presented through a discussion of the most influential twentieth-century theorist of justice, see [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For examples of recent arguments for racial reparations grounded in the wrongs of slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and housing discrimination, see: Robinson 2000, Lyons 2004, and Kaplan and Valls 2007, respectively. For a more popular example drawing upon each of these wrongs, see Coates 2014. See also the call for reparations advanced by the broad coalition of organizations known as the Movement for Black Lives, at: [https://policy.m4bl.org/reparations](https://policy.m4bl.org/reparations/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) As of this writing, no such formal apology for slavery has ever been offered. As far as legislation aimed at further investigating the various wrongs associated with slavery, some version of the “Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act” (also known as House Resolution 40) has been submitted to the House of Representatives every year since 1989 – first by Representative John Conyers, until his retirement in 2017, and most recently by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee. It has never moved beyond committee. See H.R. 40, 116th Congress 2019-2020. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The question of what exactly it means to be a *descendant* of slaves is subject to debate: what kind or degree of relation to an enslaved person is needed for someone to be a descendent, and must this be a biological relation? Although H.R. 40 is primarily aimed at studying the idea of a national reparations program, in the event that it were to acknowledge the need for compensation, among its goals would be to make recommendations concerning “What form of compensation should be awarded, through what instrumentalities and *who should be eligible* for such compensation” (Sec. 3. Establishment and Duties. (b) (7) (F), my emphasis). For further discussion of possible modes of reparation, see part 3 of Martin and Yaquinto 2007. For an argument that moral reparation is not reducible to material compensation, see Boxill 1972. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) It bears emphasizing that what is at issue here is the *moral* claim to reparation rather than the *legal* one, since the former may exist even while the latter does not, in much the same way that enslaved persons had a moral claim to freedom under slavery, but no legal claim. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See section 7 of Boxill 2016 for further discussion. It will be noted that inheritance does not usually involve claims against wrongdoers, let alone wrongdoers who are no longer living, as is the case with slave-holders. We’ll return to this complication in section C – labeled “*Owed By Whom?*” *–* below. It ought to be clear that the very same reasoning could apply to enslaved persons’ rights to moral reparation for the various *other* myriad wrongs associated with slavery (which obviously far exceeded their having been forced to labor without pay), in which case their descendants would be entitled to demand reparation for those wrongs also. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) A related objection, although not about time passing *per se*, is that demands rooted in such historically distant wrongs are outweighed or *superseded* by the competing needs of subsequent or current generations. Waldron 1992 makes such a case against aboriginal land claims in the context of New Zealand, Australia, and North America, for example. While it is true that the original inhabitants of those lands were forcefully and wrongfully removed, according to Waldron, the fact is that the said lands have long since been occupied by settler populations who now depend on them. In this sense, it may be *too late* for their return to the few descendants of those originally displaced. For further discussion of this point, including reply, see section 8 of Boxill 2016. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Sullivan et al. 2015, which lists these figures at roughly $7000 and $111,000, respectively. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For discussion of the deep roots of contemporary racial inequality in the U.S., see Oliver and Shapiro 2006, and Feagin and Ducey 2019. For further discussion of how best to interpret (and to close) the racial wealth gap, in particular, see Darity et al. 2018. For an argument which grants the harmful legacy of slavery, but views reparations as a misguided threat to broad inter-racial political solidarity in the U.S., see Reed 2000. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This kind of intergenerational harm-based reasoning is sometimes thought to come up against what philosophers call the “Non-Identity Problem.” The thought is that contemporary descendants of slaves *would not have existed* were it not for the fact that their ancestors were brought to America as slaves, and thus cannot ultimately claim to have been *harmed* by slavery or its legacy. For an example of this kind of argument, see Morris 1984. For an introduction to this problem, see [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves. While the harm and inheritance arguments are distinct in terms of their moral logic, it ought to be clear that they might overlap in cases where a given party has *both* inherited a moral claim to demand reparation *and* personally suffered as a result of some historic wrong. For further discussion of the harm and inheritance arguments in connection with the Non-Identity Problem, see sections 6 and 7 of Boxill 2016. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For an example of this kind of reasoning, see Kukathas 2006. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Lyons 2007. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Compare the case of long-standing international treaties, for example, which do not become invalid simply because all of the people who made up the government during their passage have died. For an example of this kind of argument, see chapter 2 of Boonin 2011. This reasoning might also apply in the case of other institutions implicated in the wrongs of slavery, such as churches, corporations, and universities, for example. For an argument which takes individual *persons* to be the only proper subjects of moral accountability, but which maintains that racial reparations are warranted all the same, see Boxill 2003. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For further arguments both for and against racial reparations in particular, see Brophy 2006. ### References [Boonin, David. 2011. ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/should-race-matter-unusual-answers-usual-questions?format=PB)[*Should Race Matter? Unusual Answers to the Usual Questions*](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/should-race-matter-unusual-answers-usual-questions?format=PB)[. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/should-race-matter-unusual-answers-usual-questions?format=PB) [Boxill, Bernard. “Black Reparations.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/black-reparations/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/black-reparations/)[. (Summer 2016)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/black-reparations/) [Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/black-reparations/) [Boxill, Bernard. 2003. “A Lockean Argument for Black Reparations.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOXALA)[*Journal of Ethics*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOXALA)[. 7. 63-91.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOXALA) [Boxill, Bernard. 1972. “The Morality of Reparation.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOXTMO-3)[*Social Theory and Practice*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOXTMO-3)[. 2. 113-123.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BOXTMO-3) [Brophy, Alfred. 2006. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reparations-9780195304077?lang=en&cc=us)[*Reparations Pro & Con*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reparations-9780195304077?lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reparations-9780195304077?lang=en&cc=us) [Coates, Ta-Nehisi. “The Case for Reparations.” ](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/)[*The Atlantic*](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/)[. June 2014.](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/) [Darity Jr., William, Darrick Hamilton, Mark Paul, Alan Aja, Anne Price, Antonio Moore, and Caterina Chiopris. 2018. “What We Get Wrong About Closing the Racial Wealth Gap.” ](https://socialequity.duke.edu/sites/socialequity.duke.edu/files/site-images/FINAL%20COMPLETE%20REPORT_.pdf)[Joint Publication by the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity & the Insight Center for Community Economic Development. Duke University.](https://socialequity.duke.edu/sites/socialequity.duke.edu/files/site-images/FINAL%20COMPLETE%20REPORT_.pdf) [Feagin, Joe R. and Kimberley Ducey. 2019. ](https://www.routledge.com/Racist-America-Roots-Current-Realities-and-Future-Reparations-4th-Edition/Feagin-Ducey/p/book/9781138096042)[*Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations*](https://www.routledge.com/Racist-America-Roots-Current-Realities-and-Future-Reparations-4th-Edition/Feagin-Ducey/p/book/9781138096042)[. Fourth Edition. Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Racist-America-Roots-Current-Realities-and-Future-Reparations-4th-Edition/Feagin-Ducey/p/book/9781138096042) [H.R. 40, 116th Congress. 2019-2020. ](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/40)[*Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act. <*](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/40)[https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/40>](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/40) [Kaplan, Jonathan and Andrew Valls. 2007. “Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Black Reparations.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPHDA)[*Public Affairs Quarterly*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPHDA)[. 21. 255-274.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPHDA) [Kukathas, Chandran. 2006. “Who? Whom? Reparations and the Problem of Agency.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00340.x)[*Journal of Social Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00340.x)[. 37. 330-341.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00340.x) [Lyons, David. 2007. “Racial Injustices in U.S. History and Their Legacy.” in Michael Martin and Marilyn Yaquinto (Eds.) ](https://www.dukeupress.edu/redress-for-historical-injustices-in-the-united-states)[*Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States: On Reparations for Slavery, Jim Crow, and Their Legacies*](https://www.dukeupress.edu/redress-for-historical-injustices-in-the-united-states)[. Duke University Press. 33-54.](https://www.dukeupress.edu/redress-for-historical-injustices-in-the-united-states) [—— 2004. “Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow.” ](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/bulr84&div=48&id=&page=)[*Boston University Law Review*](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/bulr84&div=48&id=&page=)[. 84. 1374-1404.](https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/bulr84&div=48&id=&page=) [Martin, Michael and Marilyn Yaquinto (Eds.) 2007. ](https://www.dukeupress.edu/redress-for-historical-injustices-in-the-united-states)[*Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States: On Reparations for Slavery, Jim Crow, and Their Legacies*](https://www.dukeupress.edu/redress-for-historical-injustices-in-the-united-states)[. Duke University Press. ](https://www.dukeupress.edu/redress-for-historical-injustices-in-the-united-states) [Miller, David. “Justice.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice/)[. (Fall 2017) Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice/) [Morris, Christopher. 1984, “Existential Limits to the Rectification of Past Wrongs.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014043)[*American Philosophical Quarterly*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014043)[. 21. 175-182.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014043) [Oliver, Melvin L. and Thomas M. Shapiro. 2006 ](https://www.routledge.com/product/isbn/9780415951678?source=igodigital)[*Black Wealth / White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*](https://www.routledge.com/product/isbn/9780415951678?source=igodigital)[. Tenth Anniversary Edition. Taylor and Francis. ](https://www.routledge.com/product/isbn/9780415951678?source=igodigital) [Reed Jr., Adolph. “The Case Against Reparations.” ](https://nonsite.org/editorial/the-case-against-reparations)[*The Progressive*](https://nonsite.org/editorial/the-case-against-reparations)[. December 2000.](https://nonsite.org/editorial/the-case-against-reparations) [Robinson, Randall. 2000. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/331800/the-debt-by-randall-robinson/9780452282100)[*The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/331800/the-debt-by-randall-robinson/9780452282100)[. Dutton.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/331800/the-debt-by-randall-robinson/9780452282100) [Roithmayr, Daria. 2014. ](https://nyupress.org/9780814777121/)[*Reproducing Racism: How Everyday Choices Lock-In White Advantage.* ](https://nyupress.org/9780814777121/)[New York University Press.](https://nyupress.org/9780814777121/) [Ross, W. D. (1930) 2002. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-right-and-the-good-9780199252657?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Right and the Good.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-right-and-the-good-9780199252657?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Philip Stratton-Lake (Ed.) Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-right-and-the-good-9780199252657?cc=us&lang=en&) [Sullivan, Laura, Tatjana Meschede, Lars Dietrich, and Thomas Shapiro. 2015. “The Racial Wealth Gap: Why Policy Matters.” Demos and The Institute for Assets & Social Policy, Brandeis University. ](https://www.demos.org/research/racial-wealth-gap-why-policy-matters) [Waldron, Jeremy. 1992. “Superseding Historic Injustice.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381493?seq=1/subjects)[*Ethics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381493?seq=1/subjects)[. 103. 4-28.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381493?seq=1/subjects) ### Related Essays [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Ignorance and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/reparations-1.pdf). ### Acknowledgments The editors thank Jared Anthony Loggins for his review of this essay. ### About the Author Joseph Frigault is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College where he teaches moral and political issues and works in critical philosophy of race. He received his Ph.D. from Boston University in 2020 and has taught previously at Coker University in South Carolina, and the University of Colorado, Boulder. [JosephFrigault.com](http://www.josephfrigault.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Social & Political **Tags:** philosophy of race, Race, racism, reparations, reparative justice, social justice --- ### [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/) **Published:** August 10, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Dehumanization involves wrongly treating or viewing some person or group as less than human. But what exactly is it to treat or view some person or group as less than human? And how might these actions and beliefs be related? This essay introduces influential answers to these questions so we might better understand dehumanization. **Content:** Author: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/) Wordcount: 1000 History is full of atrocities. These evils are often accompanied by language comparing victims to animals. For instance, white southerners compared lynching Black men to killing chickens, snakes, and fleas. Nazis called Jews “vermin” during the Holocaust. During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Hutus referred to Tutsis as “snakes” and “cockroaches.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Perpetrators of mass violence have also called their victims diseases—like viruses and cancers—demons, and monsters.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The close historical link between violent atrocities and these comparisons suggests a term, *dehumanization*, which means wrongly treating or viewing some person or group as *less than human*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) But what exactly is it to *treat* or *view* some person or group as less than human? And how might these actions and beliefs be related? This essay introduces influential answers to these questions so we might better understand dehumanization. [![Art representing dehumanizing language: two characters arguing, with one with multiple eyes and horns, resembling a monster.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/dehumanization.jpg?resize=656%2C470&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/dehumanization.jpg?ssl=1)Art representing dehumanizing language.### 1. Characterizing Dehumanization Beyond atrocities like mass rape, genocide, and lynchings, scholars often disagree about what counts as dehumanization. Some have argued that the abusive treatment of prisoners and disabled and elderly people are also examples of dehumanization.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Dehumanizing actions are considered very, very wrong, even evil.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) But not all very wrong actions count as dehumanization: scamming a poor family out of money they need to eat is very wrong, but few would call it dehumanizing.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) A too broad understanding of dehumanization results in the term losing its meaning. Understanding what might make beliefs and treatment dehumanizing may help us better understand what counts as genuine dehumanization.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. Dehumanizing Beliefs Some understand dehumanization as rooted in a kind of *belief* that another person is a *subhuman*—that is, less than human—creature.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Dehumanizing treatment is then any seriously wrong treatment that follows. Some might initially think that believing a person is subhuman means seeing them as *like* a subhuman creature, *metaphorically* speaking, in some negative way that is thought to justify ill-treatment. This proposal requires an explanation of how dehumanized people are allegedly similar to, say, animals and how this alleged similarity could justify treating these people badly. In what ways, for instance, did the Nazis see their victims as vermin, and how could those purported similarities justify their treatment? Without explanation, this approach won’t be helpful for understanding what dehumanizers are thinking and what motivates their behavior. Some scholars argue that dehumanization involves viewing another person as a *literal* subhuman creature.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) They propose that, for example, the Hutus called their Tutsi victims “cockroaches” because they *literally* saw the Tutsis as cockroaches: although the Tutsis *look like* human beings, this view proposes that the Hutus believed that, on the inside, the Tutsis had the essences or “souls” of cockroaches.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) One advantage to understanding dehumanization as rooted in a type of belief is that it explains why violent atrocities happen: dehumanizers think of the dehumanized as subhuman creatures so dehumanizers feel justified in treating them in ways they would never treat anyone they viewed as human.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) However, understanding dehumanization as rooted in belief could make it harder to identify dehumanization since it’s sometimes hard to tell what someone believes: people can treat others terribly even if they don’t view their victims as subhuman. If we focus on dehumanizing *treatment*—overt, observable actions—dehumanization might be easier to identify.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 3. Dehumanizing Treatment What is it to treat people as subhuman? Is it to treat humans *exactly the same way* we treat subhuman creatures? Since many instances of dehumanization, like rape and lynching, aren’t ways that nearly anyone treats, say, animals this isn’t ideal. Is it treating humans *similarly* *to how* subhuman creatures are treated? If so, this “similarity” would need to be explained: similarly feeding one’s children and one’s pets is appropriate, but feeding a child from a dog food bowl on the floor isn’t. So we’d need more details about *which* ways of treating someone count as dehumanizing. Here are three proposals for what makes dehumanizing treatment unique: 1. it profoundly prevents us from realizing our *uniquely human interests*, such as freedom and self-determination: dehumanizers deny their victims’ human nature, which is reflected by these uniquely human interests;[\[13\]](#_ftn13) 2. it furthers the *widespread oppression of a group of people*; 3. it’s motivated by *especially bad intentions or goals*, such as the goal of removing the target from the community of fellow human beings.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) But there are challenges facing each of these proposals. Proposal 1 suggests that all murders are dehumanizing since realizing our interests requires that we continue to live. Thinking that *all* murders dehumanize, even when the victim isn’t compared to a subhuman creature, risks broadening the concept of dehumanization too much. Proposals 1 and 2 suggest it is possible to dehumanize someone by accident or mistake, which some find implausible. If a child who doesn’t know the meaning of a dehumanizing slur utters it to someone, labeling the child a dehumanizer seems harsh.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Proposal 3 suggests that we will never know whether someone dehumanized someone else if we don’t know their intentions. Since we often don’t definitely know what others intend, this proposal may leave us unsure of whether some instances of bad behavior are genuinely dehumanizing. Finally, all three proposals may be unhelpful for explaining *why* human beings commit dehumanizing atrocities. Because such treatment can be driven by many different beliefs and motives, even a clear account of what dehumanizing actions are may still leave us unsure about why they happen.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 4. Further Concerns There are many more questions about dehumanization, such as : - can dehumanization target individuals *as individuals*, or does it only target people as members of, for instance, racial or ethnic groups? - how does dehumanization resemble or involve *objectification*, misogyny, racism, speciesism, and other forms of oppression?[\[17\]](#_ftn17) - while dehumanization is often *defined* as wrong, is it ever morally permissible? If someone in an abusive relationship sees their abuser as subhuman and this helps them end the relationship, is this kind of dehumanization justified? ### 5. Conclusion Better understanding dehumanization may help us understand how and why human beings sometimes treat each other in such horrific ways. This understanding may be among the first steps to stopping future atrocities before they begin. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The examples concerning Black men are discussed in Smith (2022, p. 6). A prominent example of Nazi dehumanization is the 1940 Nazi propaganda film *The Eternal Jew*, whose ending Smith (2022, p. 203) describes as showing rats “swarming through cellars and sewers while the narrator intones, ‘Where rats turn up, they spread diseases and carry extermination into the land. They are cunning cowardly, and cruel, they travel in large packs, exactly the way the Jews infect the races of the world.’” And the Kinyarwanda (the national language of Rwanda) words used were “inzoka” and “inyenzi”: see Tirrell (2012). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Smith (2016, 2020, 2021). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) It is important to note here and throughout this essay that “human” in the scholarly literature on dehumanization is typically understood to be a moral, not biological, category; that is, we call things “human” *when they are entitled to be treated a certain way by others*, not just because they are *homo sapiens*. There may be biological human entities who are not considered “human” on our meaning here (human embryos, for instance), and there could be creatures who are not biologically human who are understood to be “human” in the morally relevant sense (such as sentient aliens from science fiction like Star Trek’s Mr. Spock). For an introduction to what “human” might mean in these contexts, see [Theories of Moral Considerability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman and [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis. It is also important to note that not all philosophers agree that the “human” in “dehumanization” should be understood primarily in moral terms. Kronfeldner (2024), for one, argues that, depending on the context, the “humanity” denied by dehumanizers may refer to the moral property just mentioned, group membership in the human species, exhibition of the properties typical of human beings, or some combination of these three. This initial definition of dehumanization offered here is not one that all scholars of dehumanization accept. There are some accounts of dehumanization, such as Mills’s (2015), that include instances of treating people as *lesser* humans (not just *less than* humans) under the umbrella of the term “dehumanization.” Finally, it should be acknowledged that understanding dehumanization in terms of treating human beings like animals does in any way suggest that the ill-treatment of animals is morally justified: indeed, there are many influential arguments that it is not: see [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff for an introduction to these arguments. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Davis (2023) for a personal account of experienced dehumanization within a prison. Examples of elder abuse and the abuse of people with disabilities are discussed in Killmister (2023) as examples of dehumanization. Killmister uses these examples to support her own favored account of dehumanization that differs from Mikkola’s by taking dehumanization to be the exclusion of others from the category of “human”: however, Mikkola’s and Killmister’s accounts are similarly focused on dehumanization as a kind of *treatment*. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The wrongness of dehumanization can be explained in many ways, including by appealing to ethical theories. Perhaps the most obviously relevant influential ethical theory would be Kant’s ethics, which sees disrespecting persons—seeing rational beings as mere objects—as profoundly wrong. See [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman for an introduction. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) However, we might call it dehumanization if the scammer explicitly compared the victims to animals or monsters as justification for their actions. And there are some philosophers, such as Mikkola (2016), who might call this act dehumanizing whether such a comparison is drawn or not. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Philosophers who try to better understand dehumanization are often motivated to give definitions of dehumanization that will be *useful* to us for other purposes: for instance, Smith (2022) explicitly calls for us to understand dehumanization in ways that will be useful for psychologists who study this phenomenon so that we can come up with useful explanations and interventions. Philosophers are, at a minimum, seeking a definition of dehumanization that agrees, in most cases, with how most people use the term and makes clear how dehumanization differs from related concepts like “bad and wrong treatment” since otherwise, it’s not clear why we’d use the word “dehumanization” instead of some alternative to describe what we’re describing. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) A “subhuman creature” would be one that falls below humans on a moral hierarchy like the medieval Christian “great chain of being.” Within such a hierarchy, some entities, as a group, are treated as morally superior to others. For instance, on the great chain of being, angels were placed above humans, but humans were above apes, dogs, and demons, making these all examples of subhuman creatures. So “subhuman creatures,” in this context, is a term that covers non-human animals as well as demons, devils, and other monsters. Other entities, like robots, machines, and inanimate objects, arguably fall into this category too, but their inclusion is controversial; see the “Open Questions” section towards the end of this essay. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) This is the preferred position of Smith (2014, 2020, 2022) and advocates of his approach. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) One central challenge to this understanding of dehumanization is that dehumanizers are frequently inconsistent in the way they talk about their victims. Many alternate between referring to their targets using non-human language (“cockroach,” “dog,” or “demon,” for example) and human language like “criminal.” If we’re to take dehumanizers literally, as Smith does, then dehumanizers seem to be fundamentally irrational as they view their victims as both human and non-human at the same time. Smith calls the tension between viewing the targets of dehumanization as both human and non-human the “problem of humanity.” Chapter 12 of Smith (2022) explains this problem in response to Manne’s (2016, 2017) criticism. The problem of humanity extends back farther than this debate between Smith and Manne, however, as Kronfeldner (2024) discusses. Smith’s solution to this problem asks us to think more deeply about monsters. Smith describes monsters like horror movie vampires and zombies as “metaphysically threatening,” meaning that they challenge our sense of reality by appearing human when they aren’t really. In the minds of dehumanizers, the dehumanized are like monsters in that they appear human but lack the human essence, making them metaphysically threatening too. If the dehumanized are treated as monstrous, Smith can now explain why the dehumanizer uses both non-human and human language to describe their victim: the Jew, in the eyes of the Nazi, isn’t fully human, nor is he fully vermin. Instead, he is some third kind of entity, a monster, with apparent similarities to the human and deeper similarities to the non-human, making both human and non-human comparison apt at the same time since we lack language for the *exact* kind of “monster” the dehumanized is. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For more on this explanation, chapters 9 and 10 of Smith (2022) cover Smith’s theory of *ideology*, a term Smith defines as *a set of beliefs that functions to oppress others*. Smith’s theory of ideology helps to explain where beliefs about the non-human essences of others come from and how and why they spread. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Additional challenges not discussed in detail in this essay include worries about his claim that all dehumanization must be taken literally rather than metaphorically and his account’s inability to accommodate graded dehumanization (i.e. cases where people are viewed or seen as “lesser humans” instead of “less than human”). Some also worry about the boundaries between dehumanization and related concepts like derogation and objectification. See Phillips (2025) for more on these and other challenges. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) This strategy is adopted by Mikkola (2016) who defines dehumanization as “an indefensible setback to some of our legitimate human interests, where this setback constitutes a moral injury” (Mikkola, p. 164). A “moral injury,” according to Mikkola, is any setback that “damages ‘the realization and acknowledgement of the victim’s value’” (Mikkola, p. 159). Slavery is often argued to be dehumanizing for these types of reasons: see [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) This is similar to the position advocated by Killmister (2023). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Here we might think that the child has engaged in a type of action that would be dehumanizing, if done by someone with different, dehumanizing, beliefs or intentions. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) What sorts of beliefs might these be? Again, perhaps the belief that the target *literally is* a subhuman creature, but also perhaps the belief that that the target is *relevantly like* some subhuman creature. Dehumanizers may also treat their victims like subhuman creatures because they believe that failing to do so may result in bad personal, professional, or other social consequences for the dehumanizer. All of these may need to be considered if we want a good explanation for dehumanization and embrace one of the three proposals for dehumanizing treatment above. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See Phillips (2025) for a detailed breakdown of how different philosophers have understood the relationship between dehumanization and objectification, as well as how they could. See also [What is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey, [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf, [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson, and [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe. A further related question is whether any non-human animals can be dehumanized and, if so, what the best concept (or concepts) to describe that might be since animals clearly are not biologically human: for related discussion, see Haslam and Loughnan (2014, p. 411). Further, if intelligent, friendly space aliens exist (or existed), could they be dehumanized? If such aliens ever treat each other badly, in ways comparable to dehumanization, what do or would they call it? They are not biologically human, so they would not call it dehumanization, so, again, what would the best concept for this be? (For a dramatization of these issues, see the scene from the 1991 film *Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country*, where one of the Klingon characters states, “[*Human* ](https://youtu.be/5bJFkVArHWI?si=T_Y_aIHeDVu7ohNn&t=204)[rights. Why, the very name is racist](https://youtu.be/5bJFkVArHWI?si=T_Y_aIHeDVu7ohNn&t=204)”). Finally, we can wonder if AI—which clearly isn’t human—could ever be dehumanized: see [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf. In sum, the range of these cases suggest that “dehumanization” might not be the ideal terminology here: perhaps *de-personalization* is better, since it applies to beings that aren’t human but can wrongly be treated or viewed in ways comparable to dehumanization. ### References [Davis, Antoine. (2023) “Dehumanization: The Incarcerated Experience.” ](https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=sjsj)[*Seattle Journal for Social Justice*](https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=sjsj)[ 21(3), 689-692.](https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=sjsj) [Haslam, Nick. (2006) “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review.” ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4)[*Personality and Social Psychology Review* ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4)[10(3).](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4) [Haslam, N., & Loughnan, S. (2014). Dehumanization and Infrahumanization. Annual Review of Psychology, 65(1), 399-423.](https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115045) [Killmister, Suzy. (2023). “A Metaphysics of Dehumanisation.” ](https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/2610/)[*Philosophers’ Imprint*](https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/2610/)[, ](https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/2610/)[*23*](https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/2610/)[(22).](https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/2610/) [Kronfeldner, Maria. (2024) “The mirage of a ‘paradox’ of dehumanization: How to affirm the reality of dehumanization.” ](https://philarchive.org/rec/KROTMO-4)[*Journal of Social Philosophy*](https://philarchive.org/rec/KROTMO-4). [Manne, Kate. (2016) “Humanism: A Critique.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24871349)[*Social Theory and Practice*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24871349)[, 42(2): 389–415.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24871349) [Manne, Kate. (2017) ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Down_Girl/Mpc4DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=kate+manne+down+girl&pg=PP1&printsec=frontcover)[*Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Down_Girl/Mpc4DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=kate+manne+down+girl&pg=PP1&printsec=frontcover)[.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Down_Girl/Mpc4DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=kate+manne+down+girl&pg=PP1&printsec=frontcover)[ New York: Oxford University Press.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Down_Girl/Mpc4DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=kate+manne+down+girl&pg=PP1&printsec=frontcover) [McDonald, Lucy. (2024). Dehumanizing Speech. In ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-60537-6_4)[*Harmful Speech and Contestation*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-60537-6_4)[ (pp. 57-81). Cham: Springer International Publishing.](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-60537-6_4) [Mikkola, Mari. (2016) ](https://academic.oup.com/book/12267)[*The Wrong of Injustice: Dehumanization and Its Role in Feminist Philosophy*](https://academic.oup.com/book/12267)[ (Studies in Feminist Philosophy), New York: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/12267) [Mills, Charles. (2015) “Bestial Inferiority: Locating Simianization within Racism” in Wulf D. Hund, Charles W. Mills, Silvia Sebastiani (eds), ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Simianization.html?id=HnZBCwAAQBAJ)[*Simianization: Apes Gender, Class and Race*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Simianization.html?id=HnZBCwAAQBAJ)[. LIT Verlag.](https://books.google.com/books/about/Simianization.html?id=HnZBCwAAQBAJ) [Phillips, Ben. (2025) “Dehumanization.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dehumanization/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dehumanization/) [Smith, David Livingstone. (2011) ](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250003836/lessthanhuman/)[*Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others*](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250003836/lessthanhuman/)[. New York: St. Martin’s Press.](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250003836/lessthanhuman/) [Smith, David Livingstone. (2020) ](https://academic.oup.com/book/36703)[*On Inhumanity: Dehumanization and How to Resist It*](https://academic.oup.com/book/36703)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/36703) [Smith, David Livingstone. (2022) ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674545564)[*Making Monsters: The Uncanny Power of Dehumanization*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674545564)[. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674545564) [Smith, David Livingstone. (2023) “Some conceptual deficits of psychological models of dehumanization.” ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666622723000308)[*Current Research in Ecological and Social Psychology* ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666622723000308)[4.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666622723000308) [Tirrell, Lynne. (2012). “Genocidal Language Games” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/TIRGLG)[In Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan, ](https://philpapers.org/rec/TIRGLG)[*Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech*](https://philpapers.org/rec/TIRGLG)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-221.](https://philpapers.org/rec/TIRGLG) ### Related Essays [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [What is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Dehumanization.pdf). ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Morehouse College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** david livingstone smith, dehumanization, dehumanize, human, humanity, Peterson --- ### [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) **Published:** February 16, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to African American Existentialism and the thought of DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King. **Content:** Author: Anthony Sean Neal Category: African American Philosophy, [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/), [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 996 Race today is often presented as a social construct. But social constructions, as Black people know all too well, can create real existential crises. Philosophers of the Black Experience[\[1\]](#_ftn1) writing during the Modern Era of the African American Freedom Struggle (1896-1975)[\[2\]](#_ftn2) engaged questions of freedom, existence, and the struggles associated with the experiences of being Black in America. During this period, Black socially-minded thinkers focused their energy on the meaning of being human and how the social construction of race, for them Blackness, created very real obstacles for a flourishing life. This essay reviews four thinkers from this era to demonstrate their attention to the existential crisis of Blackness, understood as the oppressive experience of Black people living in America: W.E.B. DuBois, Alain Locke, Howard Thurman, and Martin Luther King, Jr. [![W.E.B. DuBois, Alain Locke, Howard Thurman, and Martin Luther King, Jr.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/african-american-existentialism.png?resize=656%2C214&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/african-american-existentialism.png?ssl=1)W.E.B. DuBois, Alain Locke, Howard Thurman, and Martin Luther King, Jr.### 1. W.E.B. DuBois Plessy vs. Ferguson[\[3\]](#_ftn3) was the 1896 Supreme Court decision that legalized the “separate but equal” educational policy in the United States. It was a pivotal case for cementing into law, at least for the moment, the legal conditions for the social construction of Blackness. W.E.B. DuBois’s 1896 *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade* was published in the same year. DuBois’s work set forth a prototypically new direction and era in the struggle for survival and freedom among Black people in America. Before 1865, within the institution of slavery, escape was the primary focus of the Freedom Struggle. After the end of slavery, the experience of continual discrimination and racial violence made it clear that the fragility of black existence extended beyond the plantation into all areas Black people occupied. This forced the need to rethink the requirements for Black survival in an oppressive society. Education became thought of as a possible weapon for the struggle against Jim Crow, the set of policies and conditions enforced to maintain the separate status and class distinction of Black people, also called Black Codes. DuBois’s advocacy for education as a means of struggle shaped the scholar/activist model among Blacks. The framework used to encourage this effort among others can be found in Du Bois’s essay on “[The Talented Tenth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Talented_Tenth).” In this model, highly educated blacks aimed to use their acquired knowledge for the struggle for freedom and exposing the crisis of anti-Black racism. ### 2. Alain Locke Alain Locke[\[4\]](#_ftn4) also sought and used education to work towards the goal of freedom. His focus was chronicling the artistic productions of contemporary artists, although he also chronicled the artistic achievements of Africans throughout history. He considered this his effort towards freedom and the African American struggle. Locke sought to initiate a discussion about the value of Black folk culture, while simultaneously connecting this culture to its predecessor in Africa. Towards the end of his life, he lamented over what he saw as disappearing Black folk culture. He wrote, “the high cost of prejudice, to which we had all but become accommodated, is now being compounded by the high price of integration. Together they add up to a capital levy \[a drain on resources\], and strain to the utmost on our artistic resources and our intellectual morale.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) For Locke, this loss of Black folk culture was equivalent to the loss of Black communal strivings for freedom. ### 3. Howard Thurman Howard Thurman,[\[6\]](#_ftn6) was struck by how the experience of segregation instigated a feeling of self-rejection. He asked, “What does it mean to have a cheap self-estimate?”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) He argued the experience of being Black in America created a type of fragmented self-consciousness or alienation from the true or human self. His early philosophical activity focused on thinking through whether or not Christianity had anything to say to oppressed people in their oppressed condition. Thurman argued that Christianity, as practiced in America, was fundamentally racist. He argued that the solution for those facing deeply entrenched racism was for Black people, as well as white people, to embrace love as a core value and religious aspiration: anything less might lead to destruction. ### 4. Martin Luther King, Jr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was also concerned that misery constantly haunted Black people.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) He wrote *Why We Can’t Wait* to depict the effects that the experience of blackness was having on even Black children. King’s observation was that the existential crisis of oppression in America was so pervasive that even the imaginations of Black children were being deprived of hope for a good and flourishing life. King’s 1963 [“I have a dream” speech](https://www.youtube.com/watch/vP4iY1TtS3s) and the vigorous repetition of its title phrase imposed an idealist response to the existential concern of the fragility of life. The intent of this response was to establish that the activity of reconceptualizing society was not necessarily a top-down or white-only activity. His goal was to elicit an active response to the conception of reality he put forward. This active response required that community activists began to mobilize grass root activities such as demonstrations, boycotts, and sit-ins to force the new reality into being. The Mississippi Freedom Summer of 1964 is an example of this active response. In defiance of the present reality, white students from the North and Westcoast assisted Black citizens in a grassroots struggle, using education, so that they could gain the right to vote. ### 5. Conclusion This brief overview demonstrates some of the most important efforts of Black thinkers to wrestle with the notion of Blackness and the struggle for survival in America during the Modern Era.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) This struggle is captured in their examination of Black existence and their constant fight for the ability of Black people to live a life of their choosing. Their concerns can be applied to anyone living in an oppressive environment, especially in light of present-day concerns. These concerns include questions about the relationship between education and a flourishing life, the value of immigrant cultures, racism within evangelical Christianity, and the proper methods of struggle. In many ways, the existential concerns of the Modern Era of the African American Freedom Struggle remain part of our current struggle. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Philosophers of the Black experience include writers and thinkers who engaged in philosophically-reflective analyses of the Black lived experience. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Modern Era of the African American Freedom Struggle is defined by the events of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision (1896) to the end of the Vietnam War (1975). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Anthony Neal, *Common Ground: A Comparison of the Ideas of Consciousness in the Writings of Howard Thurman and Huey Newton* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2015), x. The Modern Era is explained here further. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Locke was the first Black Rhodes Scholar and the first Black Harvard Ph.D. in Philosophy, and former chair of philosophy at Howard University. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Alain Locke, 1952. “The High Price of Integration: A Review of the Literature of the Negro for 1951,” The Phylon, 7. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Thurman was a mentor to MLK, Jr. and the first Black Dean of Marsh Chapel at Boston University. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Howard Thurman, *The Luminous Darkness: A Personal Interpretation of the Anatomy of Segregation and the Ground of Hope* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 24. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Martin Luther King, Ph.D., *Why We Can’t Wait*, (Boston, MA: Beacon, 2011), [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Howard Thurman, *The Luminous Darkness: A Personal Interpretation of the Anatomy of Segregation and the Ground of Hope* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), x. ### References [DuBois, William Edward Burghardt. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17700/17700-h/17700-h.htm)[*The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America 1638-1870*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17700/17700-h/17700-h.htm)[. 1896. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17700/17700-h/17700-h.htm)[Longmans, Green, and Co](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17700/17700-h/17700-h.htm)[.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17700/17700-h/17700-h.htm) [DuBois, William Edward Burghardt. ](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486280411.html)[*The Souls of Black Folk.* ](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486280411.html)[1903. McClurg.](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486280411.html) [King, Martin Luther, Jr. ](https://www.harvard.com/book/why_we_cant_wait_signet_classics/)[*Why We Can’t Wait.* ](https://www.harvard.com/book/why_we_cant_wait_signet_classics/)[1963. Signet Classics.](https://www.harvard.com/book/why_we_cant_wait_signet_classics/) [Locke, Alain. “The High Price of Integration: A Review of the Literature of the Negro for 1951.” 1952. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/272271?seq=1)[*The Phylon.* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/272271?seq=1) [Thurman, Howard. ](http://www.beacon.org/Jesus-and-the-Disinherited-P166.aspx)[*Jesus and the Disinherited*](http://www.beacon.org/Jesus-and-the-Disinherited-P166.aspx)[. 1949. Beacon Press.](http://www.beacon.org/Jesus-and-the-Disinherited-P166.aspx) ### For Further Reading [Moses, Greg. ](https://www.brooklinebooksmith.com/book/9781730883149)[*Revolution of Conscience*](https://www.brooklinebooksmith.com/book/9781730883149)[. 2018. Brookline.](https://www.brooklinebooksmith.com/book/9781730883149) [Harris, Leonard. ](http://tupress.temple.edu/book/3423)[*The Philosophy of Alain Locke*](http://tupress.temple.edu/book/3423)[. 1991. Temple.](http://tupress.temple.edu/book/3423) [Chandler, Nahum Dimitri. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823254071/xthe-problem-of-the-negro-as-a-problem-for-thought)[*The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought*](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823254071/xthe-problem-of-the-negro-as-a-problem-for-thought)[. 2013. Fordham.](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823254071/xthe-problem-of-the-negro-as-a-problem-for-thought) [Neal, Anthony. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498552769/Howard-Thurman%27s-Philosophical-Mysticism-Love-against-Fragmentation)[*Howard Thurman’s Philosophical Mysticism: Love Against Fragmentation.*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498552769/Howard-Thurman%27s-Philosophical-Mysticism-Love-against-Fragmentation)[ 2019. Lexington.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498552769/Howard-Thurman%27s-Philosophical-Mysticism-Love-against-Fragmentation) ### Related Essays [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/afro-amerikan-varolusculugu-dubois-locke-thurman-ve-king-anthony-sean-neal/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/African-American-Existentialism.pdf). ### About the Author Anthony Sean Neal is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and a Faculty Fellow in Shackouls Honors College at Mississippi State University. He is the author of [*Common Ground*](http://africaworldpressbooks.com/common-ground-a-comparison-of-the-ideas-of-consciousness-in-the-writings-of-howard-w-thurman-and-huey-p-newton-by-anthony-neal/)[: ](http://africaworldpressbooks.com/common-ground-a-comparison-of-the-ideas-of-consciousness-in-the-writings-of-howard-w-thurman-and-huey-p-newton-by-anthony-neal/)[*A Comparison of the Ideas of Consciousness in the Writings of Howard W. Thurman and Huey P. Newton*](http://africaworldpressbooks.com/common-ground-a-comparison-of-the-ideas-of-consciousness-in-the-writings-of-howard-w-thurman-and-huey-p-newton-by-anthony-neal/) and [*Howard Thurman’s Mystical Philosophy: Love Against Fragmentation*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498552769/Howard-Thurman's-Philosophical-Mysticism-Love-against-Fragmentation). His current book project is entitled, “The Modern Era.”[ msstate.academia.edu/AnthonyNeal](https://msstate.academia.edu/AnthonyNeal) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** African Philosophy, Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Education, Race **Tags:** Alain Locke, Howard Thurman, Jr., Martin Luther King, W.E.B. DuBois --- ### [The Ontology of Race: What are Races?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) **Published:** June 7, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal Category: [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 998 Various racial concepts have been employed at different times in human history – most prominently since the 17th century[\[1\]](#_ftn1) – to classify humans into groups, often to great social, political, ethical, medical, and scientific significance. But what are races, and on what are they grounded? ![1854 map by Charles Pickering, which shows 11 different races](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/r1.jpg?resize=656%2C373&ssl=1) 1854 map by Charles Pickering, which shows 11 different races.### 1. Historical Context: Traditional Racial Naturalism One historically influential notion of race, that we might call *traditional racial naturalism*, held that race reflects a *biological* foundation, that separates humanity into *discrete* groups, that is *transferred* over generations, and *explains* the appearance and behavior of group members. Over the 20th century, however, this idea of race came under sustained criticism by anthropologists and evolutionary biologists. Indeed, following the work of the anthropologist Ashley Montagu,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) the UN issued a statement in 1950 declaring that there was no reason to believe in races. Similarly, an influential 1972 paper by the biologist Richard Lewontin argued that the role of genes in explaining human diversity is extremely small, further undermining the claim that races are biological categories.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 2. Racial Skepticism The accumulated evidence against traditional racial naturalism has led some philosophers to conclude that races are not real. These skeptics, or *racial anti-realists*, typically begin from the premise that a good theory of race must reflect folk notions of race – that is, ‘race’ as understood by most people – and assert that traditional racial naturalism does this best. Then, since traditional racial naturalism is false, it follows that races do not exist.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Some anti-realists argue that using racial concepts is always irrational; others accept races as historical, non-biological categories.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) In any case, the position is that race is ultimately based on an illusion. ### 3. Racial Constructivism An alternative strategy is to accept that there is no biological basis for race, but to hold nonetheless that race does exist as a social construction: this is the *racial constructivist* position. Constructivists deny that for races to exist, they must be biologically grounded. Some things, such as money or marriage, do not depend on a particular physical basis to exist (money can be represented by coins, notes, or virtual figures, and is not identical to any of these); yet, these things clearly exist, and in ways that affect the social world and actual people. Races, the constructivist argues, exist in much the same way: as social objects, grounded not in biology but in social concepts and interactions.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) There are different constructivist theories about what *kind* of existence races have. *Thin constructivists* understand races as generalized categories based on ancestry and superficial traits like skin tone and hair texture.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) For others, what is central is that the act of classifying has an effect on the classified (people) – causing them to have shared experiences – making race an *interactive kind*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Others observe that a person’s racial identity depends on the society they are in, such that a person may not have a sustained racial identity across different communities (or even within one): these observations suggest that the nature of race is *institutional*.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Constructivists also debate whether race is primarily a *political* or a *cultural* construction. ### 4. New Racial Naturalisms A third approach, sometimes called *racial population naturalism*, argues that races really are biologically grounded populations. These positions seek to reaffirm the biology of race – although in ways that differ, sometimes radically, from traditional racial naturalism. One defense of racial naturalism, called *cladism*, uses methods from systematic biology to separate groups based on their degree of genetic isolation over time, such that a race consists of individuals with a certain genetic ‘closeness’ to an immediate ancestor.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The groups thus formed are non-static and, as it turns out, quite different from traditional racial categories.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) More recently, new work in population genetics[\[12\]](#_ftn12) has revived the argument that folk, or common, notions of race might have a biological foundation after all.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Researchers have noted that it is possible to track an individual’s ancestry using genetic data alone, and that when such data is used to create an appropriate number of (usually five or six) clusters (using different methods of grouping than Lewontin \[1972\]), the resultant groups look very much like folk races. While there is an ongoing debate about how best to interpret these findings,[\[14\]](#_ftn14) some philosophers have taken the results to show that biological races, in *some* sense, do indeed exist.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 5. Metaphysics and Beyond The disagreements between these different positions are often treated as a *metaphysical* dispute, that is, concerning *what exists*, regarding whether *and how* races or racial categories exist. However, some have pointed out that most scholars of race actually *agree* about what the world – both biologically and sociologically – is like: they only disagree about what should *count* as races according to some ‘correct’ definition of ‘race.’[\[16\]](#_ftn16) But how do we decide on a definition of race? Race theorists have usually tried to produce a definition that represents folk intuitions, or gives an analysis of them. But some philosophers argue that we need to justify why one definition is better than another by weighing the variety of theoretical and practical, including political, social and ethical, costs and benefits of different racial identifications.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) The nature of the question is then perhaps not metaphysical but *normative*: we are really asking what we want our racial concepts to do, and so what *ought to* count as races.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Some other philosophers, while agreeing that different theories of race rely on different linguistic contexts and frameworks, have suggested that coming to a single definition of race is both unlikely and unhelpful. Thus, they argue, we should be pluralists and take multiple accounts of race to be legitimate in different contexts.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### 6. Conclusion Apart from general philosophical and scientific curiosity, the deep and lasting influence of race on various aspects of people’s lives gives us reason to be interested in its nature. But this also opens race to a variety of claims and controversies that cannot easily be dismissed, from the ethical and social concerns of anti-racists to the scientific practices of medical researchers.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) How, or whether, a theory of race can account for all of these things remains an open – and difficult – question. ![1900 map, which shows only three race](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/r2.jpg?resize=656%2C357&ssl=1) A 1891 map from the philosopher Alfred Caldecott, which shows only three races.### Illustration Notes [The 1848 map](https://i.redditmedia.com/dbZhpVkrljBiXCWRzk3Y1CNjRRwNb3QZX9HdyFKmbSc.jpg?s=0eb7a069dbbc60ae807e838348f25bfb) (the first map, above) was drawn by the American librarian, botanist, and anthropologist, Charles Pickering. Pickering believed that each race had been separately created. He noted that anthropologists of his time often spoke of three, four, or five different races, but that there had thus far been no way of representing their geographical distribution. In an attempt to rectify this, he joined an expedition in 1843 to travel to Africa and South Asia to conduct a study of races. Relying on oral histories and his own observations, five years later, he published his book, *[The Races of Man, and Their Geographical Distribution](https://archive.org/details/cu31924023244993)*, in which he declared he had seen all of the eleven races labeled in the map (page 2). The route and extent of Pickering’s travel is also inscribed upon the map. [The 1891 map](https://i.imgur.com/BFsNIIx.jpg) (the second map, above) is found in *[English Colonization and Empire](https://archive.org/details/englishcoloniza02caldgoog)*, a 1891 book by the English philosopher Alfred Caldecott. In this work, Caldecott, whose interests included theology, psychology, and moral philosophy, tried to give an account of races in relation to the historical development of empires and colonialism – what he calls ‘the diffusion of European civilization over the face of the inhabited and habitable world’ (page 3). Caldecott recognized that others had delineated a greater number of races – including Pickering’s eleven – but decided to boil down the differences to a number that he felt was ‘suitable for ordinary use’ (page 217). Unlike Pickering, Caldecott noted that ‘in the very early childhood of the (human) race uniformity may have prevailed’ (page 1), and that racial differences developed over the course of history. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) While there is evidence for what look like racial attitudes (see Mallon, 2016) and differentiations resembling racial categories in earlier periods, the French physician François Bernier’s 1684 text *A New Division of the Earth* is generally regarded as having first outlined a modern conception of human races. A nineteenth-century translation of this text is cited below. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Montagu published a series of works on the subject through the 1940s, including the book *Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*, and wrote the UN statement in 1950. It should be noted that Montagu did not deny the existence of biological ‘races’ (what might today be called ‘populations’) as such, but rather argued that a biological definition of race did not correspond to any of the generally used (‘folk’) notions of race at the time. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For a good summary of the recent arguments against this traditional view of race, including a walk-through of Lewontin’s paper, see Edouard Machery’s 2013 talk at Rutgers University, [‘Are Races Biologically Real?’](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hc4xh3L6vvY) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) It should be noted that anti-realists do not deny that there really are widely held ideas about race, and that the discourse these ideas generate has real social significance. They may argue, however, that these ideas do not genuinely represent races, but something else that has been confused for races – this is the *mismatch problem* (for example, see Glasgow \[2010\]). They may also argue that some of the categories offered by race realists do not allow any way of identifying the race of a given individual; this also precludes these categories from being genuine races (for example, see Appiah \[1985\]). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For example, a prominent racial skeptic, Kwame Anthony Appiah, has over the years moved from the *eliminativist* position – holding that talk of races should be avoided altogether (see Appiah, 1985) – to holding that ‘the way forward in the racial domain isn’t – as I’m afraid I used to think – just to sort of as it were pretend that racial identities aren’t there. It’s to moderate them, it’s to recognize that you can have profound friendships across races and nations and cultures and religions, and it’s to stop the essentialization (of races)’ (from around 53:40 mins of [his 2016 Reith Lecture on the topic](https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b080t63w) \[[transcript](https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/transcripts/2016_reith3_Appiah_Mistaken_Identities_Colour.pdf)\]). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The analogies used here are from Taylor (2000) in his response to Appiah (1985). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) As described in Mallon (2006) and James (2017). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This approach to social kinds has been laid out and defended by Hacking (1995, 2006), and is described in relation to races in Mallon (2006). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) A view of this sort is defended in Root (2000) and also described in Mallon (2006). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The cladistic conception of race was first outlined and defended in Andreasen (1998). Importantly, Andreasen regards this naturalist view of race as compatible with a constructivist approach. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) One challenge to this position has been that the account of race one gets from a naturalist conception differs so widely from a common-sense conception that it is wrong to call the naturalistic conception a conception of race at all (the ‘mismatch problem’, as noted earlier). For an interesting exchange on this semantic point, see Glasgow (2003) and Andreasen (2005). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The seminal work in population genetics that triggered a new debate about this kind of position is Rosenberg *et al* (2002). It is worth noting that the authors of this paper did not set out to prove a naturalist argument about race, and have generally denied, or declined to assert, that their findings support racial naturalism – the naturalist implications have instead been drawn by other scholars interpreting these findings. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a representative paper, see Spencer (2014). For a survey of recent naturalist arguments and some of their challenges, see Spencer (2018). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For a skeptical critique, see Appiah (2006); for a constructivist critique, see Hochman (2013); and for a naturalist response to these critiques, see Spencer (2015). For general naturalist responses to criticism, in addition to Spencer’s 2015 paper, see also [his closing keynote](https://vimeo.com/95536000) at the ‘Genomics and Philosophy of Race’ conference, UC Santa Cruz (2014), as well as Spencer (2018). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Often, philosophers who argue in favor of the biological reality of race on these grounds will still reject some of the criteria of traditional racial naturalism. Importantly, they may reject the criterion that races need to be *discrete* groups (again, see Quayshawn Spencer’s [closing keynote](https://vimeo.com/95536000) at UC Santa Cruz \[2014\]), or that races explain the kinds of psychological and behavioural traits as asserted by traditional naturalism. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Mallon (2006) lays out eight relevant facts about the world that leading proponents of racial skepticism, constructivism, and population naturalism all seem to agree about. Of course, as in any scientific discussion, new research and technology often brings up new findings about the state of the world, and some papers or specific positions become outdated. The point is that with a few exceptions, philosophers typically accept the data that biologists and social scientists provide – though they may of course disagree about the interpretation of that data. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) So, like some skeptics, we may be *eliminativists* about race, believing that there is nothing socially or politically useful about racial concepts (or that they are harmful), and hold that we ought not to have them. Or, like some naturalists, we might think that racial concepts have medical value, and hold that race should be defined in bio-medical terms; and so on. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) The project of making normative judgements about the existence of race (and gender) was first outlined in an important paper by Haslanger (2000), where to Appiah’s (1985) skeptical proclamation that ‘there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask “race” to do for us’, she offers the rejoinder: ‘we might instead ask “race” to do different things than have been asked before’. The above observations about the current state of the discourse, and the argument that the nature of the dispute itself is normative, were later made by Mallon (2006). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) In addition to Spencer (2014), see [this write-up](http://thetartan.org/2017/4/3/news/race) of a talk he presented at Carnegie Mellon (2017). A version of racial pluralism is also defended by McPherson (2015). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) For research on the possible links between racism and beliefs about racial ontology, see Shulman and Glasgow (2010). For discussions about the relevance of race to medical research, see Burchard et al (2003) and Cooper, Kaufman, and Ward (2003). ### References [‘The Race Question’. ](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128291eo.pdf)[*UNESCO and its Programme*](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128291eo.pdf)[, Publication 791 (1950): 1-11. UNESCO.](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128291eo.pdf) Andreasen, Robin O. [‘A New Perspective on the Race Debate’. ](https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article-abstract/49/2/199/1542909?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*](https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article-abstract/49/2/199/1542909?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[ (49), no. 2 (June 1998): 199-225.](https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article-abstract/49/2/199/1542909?redirectedFrom=fulltext) Andreasen, Robin O. [‘The Meaning of “Race”: Folk Conceptions and the New Biology of Race’. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=jphil&id=jphil_2005_0102_0002_0094_0106)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=jphil&id=jphil_2005_0102_0002_0094_0106)[ 102, no. 2 (February 2005): 94-106.](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=jphil&id=jphil_2005_0102_0002_0094_0106) Appiah, Kwame Anthony. [‘The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race’. ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/448319)[*Critical Inquiry*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/448319)[ 12, no. 1 (Autumn 1985): 21-37.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/448319) Appiah, Kwame Anthony. [‘How to Decide If Races Exist’. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545466)[*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545466)[ 106 (2006): 365-382.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545466) Appiah, Kwame Anthony. [‘Mistaken Identities: Colour’. ](https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b080t63w)[*The Reith Lectures*](https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b080t63w)[ (BBC: November 2016). Podcast.](https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b080t63w) \[[transcript](https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/transcripts/2016_reith3_Appiah_Mistaken_Identities_Colour.pdf)\]. [Bernier](https://archive.org/stream/memoirsreadbefor01anth#page/360/mode/2up)[, F](https://archive.org/stream/memoirsreadbefor01anth#page/360/mode/2up)[rançois](https://archive.org/stream/memoirsreadbefor01anth#page/360/mode/2up)[. ‘A new division of the earth, according to the different species or races of men who inhabit it, sent by a famous traveler to Mons, nearly in these terms’. Translated by T. Bendyphe in ](https://archive.org/stream/memoirsreadbefor01anth#page/360/mode/2up)[*Memoirs Read Before the Anthropological Society of London: 1863-64, Vol. 1*](https://archive.org/stream/memoirsreadbefor01anth#page/360/mode/2up)[. 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[‘On the New Biology of Race’. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=jphil&id=jphil_2003_0100_0009_0456_0474)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=jphil&id=jphil_2003_0100_0009_0456_0474)[ 100, no. 9 (September 2003): 456-474.](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=jphil&id=jphil_2003_0100_0009_0456_0474) Glasgow, Joshua. [‘Another Look at the Reality of Race, By Which I Mean ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230297425_4)[*Race*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230297425_4)[*f*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230297425_4)[’. ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230297425_4)[*New Waves in Metaphysics*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230297425_4)[, edited by Allan Hazlett. Palgrave Macmillan (2010): 54-71.](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230297425_4) Hacking, Ian. [‘The looping effects of human kinds’. ](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001/acprof-9780198524021-chapter-12)[*Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Approach*](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001/acprof-9780198524021-chapter-12)[, edited by Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack. Oxford University Press (1996).](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001/acprof-9780198524021-chapter-12) Hacking, Ian. [‘Kinds of People: Moving Targets’. ](http://britishacademy.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5871/bacad/9780197264249.001.0001/upso-9780197264249-chapter-10)[*Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol 151, 2006 Lectures*](http://britishacademy.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5871/bacad/9780197264249.001.0001/upso-9780197264249-chapter-10)[. 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(What) Do We Want Them To Be?’ ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.00201/abstract)[*Noûs*](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.00201/abstract)[ 34, no. 1 (March 2000): 31-55.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.00201/abstract) [James, Michael. ‘Race’. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/race/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/race/)[(Spring 2017 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/race/) [Lewontin, Richard. ‘The Apportionment of Human Diversity’. ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4684-9063-3_14)[*Evolutionary Biology*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4684-9063-3_14)[ 6, edited by T. Dobzhansky et al. (1972): 381-398.](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4684-9063-3_14) [Machery, Edouard. ‘Are Races Biologically Real?’ (Rutgers University, 2013). Video.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hc4xh3L6vvY) Mallon, Ron. [‘“Race”: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic’. ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/500495)[*Ethics*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/500495)[ 116, no. 3 (April 2006): 525-551.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/500495) Mallon, Ron. [‘Constructing and Constraining Representations: Was ](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755678.001.0001/acprof-9780198755678-chapter-2)[*Race*](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755678.001.0001/acprof-9780198755678-chapter-2)[ Thinking Invented in the Modern West?’ ](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755678.001.0001/acprof-9780198755678-chapter-2)[*The Construction of Human Kinds*](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755678.001.0001/acprof-9780198755678-chapter-2)[. Oxford University Press (2016).](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755678.001.0001/acprof-9780198755678-chapter-2) [McPherson, Lionel K. ‘Deflating “Race”’. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/deflating-race/5712DDD8C4708A56C52C18736D48DB00)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/deflating-race/5712DDD8C4708A56C52C18736D48DB00)[ 1, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 674-693.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/deflating-race/5712DDD8C4708A56C52C18736D48DB00) [Montagu, M. F. Ashley. ](https://archive.org/details/mansmostdangerou032948mbp)[*Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*](https://archive.org/details/mansmostdangerou032948mbp)[. Columbia University Press, New York (1942).](https://archive.org/details/mansmostdangerou032948mbp) [Pickering, Charles. *The Races of Man, and their Geographical Distribution*. London (1851). ](https://archive.org/details/cu31924023244993) [Root, Michael. ‘How We Divide the World’. ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/392851)[*Philosophy of Science*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/392851)[ 67, no. 3 (September 2000): 628-639.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/392851) [Rosenberg, Noah A., et al. ‘Genetic Structure of Human Populations’. ](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/298/5602/2381)[*Science*](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/298/5602/2381)[ 298, no. 5602 (December 2002): 2381-2385.](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/298/5602/2381) [Shulman, Julie L., and Joshua Glasgow. ‘Is Race-Thinking Biological or Social, and Does It Matter for Racism? An Exploratory Study’. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01497.x)[*The Journal of Social Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01497.x)[ 41, no. 3 (September 2010): 244-259.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01497.x) [Spencer, Quayshawn. ‘Philosophy of Race Meets Population Genetics’. ](https://vimeo.com/95536000)[*Genomics and Philosophy of Race*](https://vimeo.com/95536000)[ (UC Santa Cruz, April 2014). Video.](https://vimeo.com/95536000) Spencer, Quayshawn. [‘A Radical Solution to the Race Problem’. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/677694?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Philosophy of Science*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/677694?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[ 81, no. 5 (December 2014): 1025-1038.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/677694?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) Spencer, Quayshawn. [‘Philosophy of race meets population genetics’. ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848615000655?via%3Dihub)[*Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848615000655?via%3Dihub)[ 52 (August 2015): 46-55.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369848615000655?via%3Dihub) Spencer, Quayshawn. [‘Race realism I: Are biological races real?’ ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12468/full)[*Philosophy Compass*](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12468/full)[ 13, no. 1 (January 2018).](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12468/full) [Taylor, Paul C. ‘Appiah’s Uncompleted Argument: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race’. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2000_0026_0001_0103_0128)[*Social Theory and Practice*](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2000_0026_0001_0103_0128)[ 26, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 103-128.](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=soctheorpract&id=soctheorpract_2000_0026_0001_0103_0128) ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ontology-of-race.pdf). ### Related Essays [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### About the Author Abiral has a BA in the Humanities from New York University Shanghai. He is interested in philosophy, history, literature, and their intersections. He lives in Lalitpur, Nepal, and can be found tweeting at [@abiralcp](https://twitter.com/abiralcp). ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Race --- ### [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) **Published:** June 20, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to philosophy and race. **Content:** Author: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Categories: [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word Count: 997 Race is central to many issues about justice and ethics, as well as our identities and lived experience as persons in communities. Race thereby raises many philosophical issues.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay introduces some of the major topics in the *philosophy of race*. [![A map, based on the 2000 census, of racial and ethnic segregation in the Chicago, Illinois area.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/philosophy-of-race-introduction.jpg?resize=656%2C332&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/philosophy-of-race-introduction.jpg?ssl=1)A map, based on the 2000 census, of racial and ethnic segregation in the Chicago, Illinois area.### 1. What Are Races? Many people’s idea of “race” has to do with genetics and biology, which contrasts with “ethnicity,” which is normally understood to refer to groupings of people based on common ancestry and culture.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) And most people understand races to be certain types of groups of people, but this could be false or, at least, misleading. So what are races? Do different races even exist?[\[3\]](#_ftn3) We can summarize major theories about the existence of race as follows:[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - *realist naturalism*: that races are real, and are naturally or biologically individuated groups of people;[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - *constructivism* or *constructionism*: that races are real—they clearly have important social and political roles—but they only exist because human beings create and allow them to exist, much like money exists;[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - *skepticism* or *anti-realism*: that races don’t exist.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Even if there is some biological component of race, there is very little scientific basis to the modern division of races into four or five categories such as “White,”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) “Black,” “Asian,” etc.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) We can also summarize the main theories about *talking about* race:[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - *eliminativism*: that it’s a mistake, or wrong, to think and talk as if races were real;[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - analogy: most psychiatrists are anti-realists and eliminativists about demons: demons aren’t real, and it’s harmful to cite them as explanations for psychological events; - *conservationism*: that it is useful or beneficial in some way to talk about races or behave as if they are real. Last, philosophers study how race and ethnicity fit into the traditional philosophical topic of *personal identity*, that is, the question of what makes someone who they are, as well as questions about the meaning of their existence.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Philosophers of race commonly critique *essentialism*, which is the view that the experiences or identities of members of some group can be reduced to key, invariable traits.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 2. Ethics, Social, and Political Philosophy There are also many ethical topics relevant to philosophy of race. A core question is understanding what racism is. It is often understood as *disregard, prejudice, inferiorization, or antipathy based on race or racial appearance*. Many thinkers add that “racism” exists when that racial prejudice is reinforced by systems of power, which can happen even without overt hatred or disregard of people because of their race [\[14\]](#_ftn14) Some philosophers have connected debates about *political authority and obligation* to the history of racial injustice. Martin Luther King Jr. wrote prolifically in philosophy,[\[15\]](#_ftn15) and his “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” defends civil disobedience and argues against moderation in the fight for justice.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Charles W. Mills’s *The Racial Contract* argues that we can understand recent history and present-day practices and laws in the United States as being based on a social contract to promote white supremacy.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) There is substantial debate about *affirmative action*: in general, to give some preference in hiring or admission to people from historically underrepresented groups. Racial prejudice still exists in hiring,[\[18\]](#_ftn18) so affirmative action might be a morally permissible (if not required) way to help give people of all races a fair chance, or to compensate victims of injustice.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### 3. Public Policy There are several public-policy issues to which race is deeply relevant. Philosophers study *hate-speech* and *hate-crime laws*.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Some jurisdictions punish hate speech, but some philosophers argue that freedom of expression should extend to hate speech.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Similarly, some jurisdictions impose stiffer penalties for hate crimes.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Another important topic is *reparations* for slavery and segregation. Many philosophers have argued that the U.S. government ought to pay compensation to African-American citizens because of these citizens’ lesser (on average) socioeconomic position.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Other legal practices, such as redlining, have also harmed the socioeconomic status of African-American families.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) *Racial profiling*—singling out people with certain racial appearances for heightened investigation or surveillance by authorities—is another topic related to race and public policy.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) There is important philosophical and social-scientific work about ways in which the criminal-justice system is unfairly harmful to non-White people in the United States, including mass incarceration and unfair applications of the death penalty.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) ### 4. Other Theoretical Issues *Intersectionality* is the phenomenon by which different systems of oppression—such as racism, sexism, and ableism—can combine or intersect to create forms of oppression that uniquely affect people from more than one of these oppressed groups.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) For example, Black women are sometimes subject to a unique kind of unfair treatment, beyond what Black men experience and beyond what White women experience.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Other important race-related topics are *critical philosophy of race* and the related field of *critical race theory,*[\[29\]](#_ftn29) which draws attention to racism that is not “merely” overt and individual-versus-individual, but instead, woven (sometimes subtly) into a society’s institutions, laws, norms, and discourse. In some societies, ostensibly neutral concepts such as “fairness,” “citizen,” and “merit,” as well as the legal system itself, may be infected by racism.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) Beyond these, there are the general theoretical topics of privilege and oppression, including the degree to which being White confers privilege in certain ways.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) ### 5. Other Areas of Philosophy Some philosophers of race have described important features of the phenomenology (i.e., the study of first-person experience) of being of a certain race.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) Historians of philosophy study historical philosophers’ views about race.[\[33\]](#_ftn33) In terms of international ethics, race is very relevant to imperialism, colonialism, and immigration.[\[34\]](#_ftn34) And there is an important area of epistemology dealing with race and ethnicity.[\[35\]](#_ftn35) There are also areas of philosophy that focus on the ideas and experiences of people from particular racial or ethnic backgrounds: there are Africana philosophy,[\[36\]](#_ftn36) Asian philosophy,[\[37\]](#_ftn37) and Latin-American philosophy,[\[38\]](#_ftn38) for example, as well as philosophical work about being multi-racial or multi-ethnic.[\[39\]](#_ftn39) ### 6. Conclusion For philosophy to engage with the full range of human experiences, it must engage with race. As we see, philosophy of race is a large, diverse, and important area of philosophy, with extensive relevance in the present day. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Philosophers have not always had enlightened views of race. Aristotle (384-322 BCE), for example, has commonly been cited in defense of slavery, and has been interpreted as arguing for a biological basis for slavery (Fritsche, 2019), and his work has been cited in defense of slavery (de Sepúlveda, 2003 \[1551\]). Other authors argue that at least “proto-racist” beliefs existed in the ancient world (Isaac, 2004). Racist beliefs were clearly present in the Enlightenment world as well (Eze, 1997). See also Taylor (2022, § 2.2) on ancient ideas of race. See also Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis, [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) and Dan Lowe, [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Cornell and Hartmann (2007, p. 19). Still, many philosophers have questioned this division. See especially Gracia (2007b). See Cornell and Hartmann (2007, ch. 1) for an introduction to the concepts of race and ethnicity. See also the other essays in Gracia (2007a). Alcoff (2004) defends the meaningfulness of ethnicity. See also James and Burgos (2022, § 3) for an overview. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Zack (2017c, pp. 135–36) for an overview. See James and Burgos (2022, § 2) for another overview. See Taylor (2022, ch. 4) for a thorough investigation. See also Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal, [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See James and Burgos (2022, § 2) for an overview. Other helpful overviews are Spencer (2018a and 2018b). See Mallon (2004) on constructivism. This division is based on Mallon (2006, pp. 525–26), although I use “constructivism” instead of his “constructionism.” See also Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal, [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/). For the philosophy-of-language side of these questions, see Atkin (2017); Glasgow (2017); Taylor (2022, ch. 4). See Mallon (2006) for a landmark discussion of race terms’ semantics. See Appiah (2007) about ascription of racial and ethnic identities. See Haslanger (2000) about the normative question of how we should use race and gender concepts. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This can come in minimal or robust versions. Minimal realism: “Races are naturally existing populations, but they bear very little resemblance to modernistic ideas of races; and they have very little importance” (cf. Hardimon (2017) and Relethford (2017)). Robust realism: “Races are naturally real and have substantial resemblance to the modernistic view of races.” It is very difficult to find present-day philosophers who believe in this robust realism. However, some authors have argued that there is some genetic basis to sorting certain groups of people into categories based on their ancestry and genetics; see the authors cited in this footnote. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For example, one might argue that there is no biological basis to race, but it obviously has enormous social and political implications, and helps explain various phenomena (such as, especially, racism and other oppression). For introductory sources in this debate, see n. 4. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Some philosophers have argued that there isn’t even enough in common in our ideas of race for there to be shared conceptions of races that would underwrite constructionism or constructivism. For overviews, see n. 4. Others have argued that for eliminativist reasons, we should adopt anti-realism; see n. 10. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Here we follow the APA style guide (American Psychological Association n.d.) in capitalizing “Black” and “White,” except when making explicit references to skin color alone. See also Appiah (2020) about capitalizing “Black.” See Ewing (2020), the National Association of Black Journalists (2020), and Painter (2020) about capitalizing both “Black” and “White.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Atkin (2017, p. 142 ff.). See also Taylor (2022, § 3.4). See Glasgow (2010) for the topic of whether laypersons’ general ideas of race are close enough to anything supportable by science to say that those general ideas are accurate. Such a division goes back at least as far as the fifteenth century. This “Enlightenment” or modern definition held, for example, that there are four or five races individuated by physical characteristics, roughly corresponding to Asian, black (south of the Sahara), indigenous, northern Scandinavian, and European and central Asian white. See Bernasconi and Lott (2000, pp. vii–3). See Taylor (2022, § 2.3) for a very informative discussion and chart. And see also Gracia (2007b, 1–3) for a discussion of the “factual” challenge to race and ethnicity. One major problem for such a division is that genetic variation within modernistic “races” is often higher than across these “races.” For example, many populations of “black” people are far more genetically similar genetically to populations of “white” people than they are to other populations of “black” people. For a summary of the scientific background, see Zack (2002, pp. 87–88), and for an important historical antecedent, see Montagu (1997). See also James and Burgos (2022, § 1) for a history of the concept of race. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See e.g. Mallon (2006, p. 526). Even if races exist, it might be harmful to talk about them or cite them as explanations (Taylor 2022, § 3.2). And even if races don’t strictly exist, it might be useful to talk about them, for example because talking about them helps us identify systems of oppression. For example, it may be useful, in furthering our moral goals, to refer to “White supremacy,” even if we don’t think there is a set of people who are objectively, naturally “White.” See e.g. Taylor (2022, §§ 1.3, 3.2., and 4.4). One other important race-related topic concerning language—in this case, speech acts—is the activity of speaking on behalf of oppressed people (Alcoff 1991). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Appiah (1985) is an influential presentation of this view. And even if If we decide not to refer to traditionally-understood races, and not to talk about “race,” we might want to refer to similar terms, such as “racial identities,” “ethnoraces,” or “racialized groups” (Appiah, 1996; Blum, 2002). See also Hill (2017) who argues against holding racial identities at all. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See for example Appiah (1990). See also Chad Vance, [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/). In brief, one issue is whether race is “essential” to someone’s identity in a way so that, in theory, someone’s race could change, yet they remain the same person. Another way to approach this issue is to ask the question: could *you* have been born as a member of a different race? See also Kristin Seemuth Whaley, [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) and [Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/). Also, see [African American Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) A landmark essay in the discussion of intersectionality and essentialism is Grillo (1995). See also e.g. McPherson (2017) for a discussion of Black identity and essence. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) “Racism” can be defined in many ways. Taylor’s (2022, § 3.3) definition holds that racism is unethical disregard for people who belong to a particular race. Bloom (2002, p. 8) considers racism to comprise inferiorization (viewing others as inferior based on their biology) and antipathy (hatred based on physical traits). Oluo (2018) regards racism as prejudice based on race that is reinforced by systems of power (p. 26). See [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See the essays in Washington (1986). See also Weinberg (2018) for King’s social-philosophy syllabus. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Civil disobedience, generally speaking, is publicly breaking the law in order to make a point and advance the cause of justice. See King (2003). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Mills (1997). See also e.g. Alexander (2010). Philosophers also investigate whether the American electoral system, given the country’s history, can be improved to better-serve the cause of racial justice (Young, 1990, p. 183 ff.; Altman, 2022, § 4.1). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Kline et al. (2021); Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Himma (2001); Cohen and Sterba (2003); Boonin (2011, chs. 4–5); Sterba (2017); Fullinwider (2022). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Boonin (2011, chs. 6–9); See Hertz and Molnar (2012) for essays about hate speech. See also McGowan (2019) and Anderson and Barnes (2022). And see also [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See Parekh (2012) for examples. An obvious example would be to threateningly shout a racial slur at a person apparently of that race, or claim that a certain race is inherently evil and endangers the health of the nation. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Wellman (2006). Boonin (2011, chs. 8–9). See Hall et al. (2017) for an overview on hate crimes. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Douglass (2017 \[1865\]); Fullinwider (2000); Boonin (2011, chs. 2–3); Coates (2014); Lyons (2017); Boxill and Corlett (2022). See also Joseph Frigault, [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Redlining is denying mortgages or subsidies based on the racial or ethnic composition of neighborhoods. See e.g. Coates (2014) and Rothstein (2017). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Risse and (2004); Boonin (2011, chs. 10–11); Alexander (2010); Sheth (2017); Hosein (2018). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Lowery (2016). Relatedly, police generally don’t solve crimes in black-dominated neighborhoods at the rate that they solve crimes in White-dominated neighborhoods (see Vaughn (2020) for discussion). See e.g. Nathanson (1985) on the racial component of the death penalty and Alexander (2010) for a general discussion of race and mass incarceration. See also [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Lorde (1984); King (1988); Crenshaw (1989 and 1991); Taylor (2022, § 3.5). One may also define “intersectionality” as a belief, such as that “our social justice movements must consider all of the intersections of identity, privilege, and oppression that people face in order to be just and effective” (Oluo 2018, 74). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Zack (2017a); Taylor (2022, § 3.5.5); See Sharpley-Whiting (2017) for an example and Oluo (2018, p. 44 and ch. 5) for other examples. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) Critical philosophy of race influences, and is influenced by, critical legal studies and critical race theory. See Alcoff (2022, § 1) for a discussion of the connections. See also [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta. [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) Bell (1987); Delgado and Stefancic (2017); Crenshaw et al. (1996); Mills (2017); Zack (2017a). See also Chelsea Haramia, [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/). [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) For example, White people might find it easier to get jobs and mortgages, might be less suspected of crimes, and more generally, might be considered the standard or “normal” versus other races. See Sullivan (2006) and (2017) for investigations of white privilege, and see Oluo (2018, ch. 4) for a popular overview of privilege and its relation to race discourse. Other landmark essays in discussions of racial privilege and oppression include McIntosh (1989) and Young (1990, ch. 2). See also Lowe (2020) for a general discussion of privilege. See also Chelsea Haramia, [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/). [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) Du Bois (1997 \[1903\]); Fanon (2008 \[1952\]); Henry (2005); Gordon (2017); Taylor (2022, § 5.5). [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) Zack (2017d, pt. I); Taylor (2022, ch. 2). See also Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis, [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/). [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) Whyte (2017); Taylor (2022, ch. 7). [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) For example, some philosophers investigate the possibility that there are ways of knowing, or there is access to knowledge, that depends on one’s race or racialized experiences (Collins, 2000, chs. 2 and 11). Similarly, some philosophers discuss racial injustices that have to do with epistemology; see e.g., [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas. [\[36\]](#_ftnref36) Eze (1998); Gordon (2008); Mosley (2017); Zack (2017d, pt. IV). See also Gyekye (1995, ch. 12) on the concept of African philosophy. [\[37\]](#_ftnref37) Van Norden (2011); Koller (2018). [\[38\]](#_ftnref38) Gracia and Zeibert (2004); Nuccetelli (2017); Gracia and Vargas (2022). [\[39\]](#_ftnref39) Zack (2017b). ### References [Alcoff, Linda Martín. (1991). The problem of speaking for others. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1354221)[*Cultural Critique, 20*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1354221)[(Winter 1991-1992), 5-32.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1354221) [Alcoff, Linda Martín. (2004). Against “post-ethnic” futures. ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/55044)[*Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 18*](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/55044)[(2), 99–117.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/55044) [Alcoff, Linda Martín. (2022). Critical philosophy of race. In E. N. 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(2011). ](https://hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/asian-philosophy/introduction-to-classical-chinese-philosophy)[*Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy*](https://hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/asian-philosophy/introduction-to-classical-chinese-philosophy)[. Hackett Publishing Company. ](https://hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/asian-philosophy/introduction-to-classical-chinese-philosophy) [Vaughn, Paige E. (2020). The effects of devaluation and solvability on crime clearance. ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047235219303848?via%3Dihub)[*Journal of Criminal Justice*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047235219303848?via%3Dihub)[, 68(May–June 2020), 101657.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047235219303848?via%3Dihub) [Washington, James Melvin (Ed.). (2003). ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/a-testament-of-hope-martin-luther-king)[*A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.*](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/a-testament-of-hope-martin-luther-king)[ (pp. 289–302). HarperSanFrancisco.](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/a-testament-of-hope-martin-luther-king) [Weinberg, Jonathan. (2018, January 16). Martin Luther King Jr.’s social philosophy course. ](https://dailynous.com/2018/01/16/martin-luther-king-jr-s-social-philosophy-course/)[*Daily Nous*](https://dailynous.com/2018/01/16/martin-luther-king-jr-s-social-philosophy-course/)[. ](https://dailynous.com/2018/01/16/martin-luther-king-jr-s-social-philosophy-course/) [Wellman, Christopher Heath. (2006). A defense of stiffer penalties for hate crimes. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810992)[*Hypatia, 21*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810992)[(2), 62–80.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810992) [Young, Iris Marion. (1990). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691152622/justice-and-the-politics-of-difference)[*Justice and the Politics of Difference*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691152622/justice-and-the-politics-of-difference)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691152622/justice-and-the-politics-of-difference) [Zack, Naomi. (2017a). Gender theory in philosophy of race. In Naomi Zack (Ed.), ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[*The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[ (pp. 598–607).](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953) [Zack, Naomi. (2017b). How mixed race is not constructed: US identities and perspectives. In Naomi Zack (Ed.), ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[*The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[ (pp. 380–391)](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953). [Zack, Naomi. (2017c). Introduction to Part III. In Naomi Zack (Ed.), ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[*The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[ (pp. 135–38).](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953) [Zack, Naomi (Ed.). (2017d). ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[*The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953)[. Oxford University Press.](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190236953.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190236953) [Zack, Naomi. (2002). ](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Science-and-Race/Zack/p/book/9780415941648)[*Philosophy of Science and Race*](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Science-and-Race/Zack/p/book/9780415941648)[. Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-of-Science-and-Race/Zack/p/book/9780415941648) ### Related Essays [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault. [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost. [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [African American Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal. [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance. [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/felsefe-ve-irk-irk-felsefesine-giris-thomas-metcalf/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/philosophy-and-race-1.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Social & Political **Tags:** metcalf, philosophy of race, Race, racism, racist --- ### [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) **Published:** May 19, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An essay on the ethical and philosophical issues of Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas.” **Content:** Author: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 1,000 When, if ever, is it right to sacrifice someone for the greater good? Ursula K. Le Guin’s (1929-2018) fantasy short story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” raises this question, among others.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay introduces her story and explores its philosophical implications. ### 1. The Dark Secret The story begins with an elaborate description of a summer festival in an exquisitely beautiful and happy city called Omelas. It’s as though we’re being shown a travel brochure for a place that seems too good to be true. Le Guin says if you can imagine an even better city than the one she describes, then think of that instead. Of course, there’s a twist. Somewhere in the city is a closet where an emaciated child, referred to only as “it,” is locked up. It’s smeared with its own feces, covered with sores, and constantly afraid. Occasionally, the door opens and people will look at it, kick it, and make it stand up. It says, “I will be good,” but the door always shuts without anyone making a reply. Why? Because the denizens of Omelas made a deal – with what or whom, we aren’t told, but apparently dark magic was involved. The deal is that Omelas would be a paradise provided that a child’s happiness is sacrificed. Whether this applies to just this one child, or a succession of children, is unspecified. In any event, every adult knows that a single kind word spoken to this child would violate the terms of the deal. We don’t know what the consequences of breaking the deal would be because we don’t know what things were like before. But certainly Omelas would be a much less happy place overall, even though this child would be happier. ### 2. Walking Away When the children of Omelas reach adolescence, they’re told the dark secret, and some see the child. They react with shock and horror. Most get over it eventually. But a few don’t. And some leave Omelas: At times one of the adolescent girls or boys who go to see the child does not go home to weep or rage, does not, in fact, go home at all. Sometimes also a man or woman much older falls silent for a day or two, and then leaves home. These people go out into the street, and walk down the street alone. They keep walking, and walk straight out of the city of Omelas, through the beautiful gates….They go on. They leave Omelas, they walk ahead into the darkness, and they do not come back. The place they go towards is a place even less imaginable to most of us than the city of happiness. I cannot describe it at all. It is possible that it does not exist. But they seem to know where they are going, the ones who walk away from Omelas.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### 3. The Greater Good One question this story raises is *when, if ever, is it permissible to sacrifice one person for the good of a greater number of people*? Different moral theories provide different answers.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) According to *consequentialism*, the morally best actions are those that create the most good. A common version of consequentialism, *utilitarianism*, maintains that happiness is what’s good. So if imprisoning the child creates more happiness overall, then a utilitarian would say that it’s right. Likewise, if releasing this child reduces total happiness, the utilitarian would say that it’s wrong. Some take this to be a counterexample to utilitarianism. According to *deontology*, we ought to obey certain moral rules even when obedience doesn’t create the best outcomes—think of the “Thou Shalts” and “Thou Shalt Nots” like the Biblical Ten Commandments. Some deontologists say these rules can never be violated, others think we may break them in extreme circumstances. Immanuel Kant, an important 18th Century deontological thinker, believed that it’s absolutely wrong to treat people as mere instruments to our own goals, without respecting them as people. Abusing this child so that others could be happy breaks this rule. So Kant would say that the deal’s wrong. Here’s a challenge for Kant: sometimes it seems right to sacrifice innocents for the greater good. For instance, distributing an effective vaccine when we can predict a few people will react adversely to it, and drafting people into fighting just wars against their wills, seem justifiable. Why are these things okay if imprisoning the child is wrong? ### 4. Living with injustice The story also raises the question *how would, and should, we react to the discovery that our society, our livelihood, also depends on something terrible?* Depending on your views, that terrible thing could be racism, abortion, animal cruelty, exploitation of the environment, economic injustices of many types, or something else. Omelasians react with shock when they first learn about the mistreated child. For most of them, the shock wears off. That’s psychologically realistic. We hear about terrible things on the news, but we typically change the channel and go on with our lives. Only a conscientious few continue to be concerned. What’s the point of being concerned if you don’t do anything about it? Those in the story who walked away could have freed the child, but they chose to simply walk away. Maybe that makes them as complicit in the abuse as anyone else. But maybe they’re right to think that the consequences of violating the deal would be unacceptable. So why walk away? Perhaps, even though they think the consequences of freeing the child are unacceptable, they don’t want to participate in the abuse. Maybe they think happiness that comes from *this* isn’t worth having. Or maybe they can’t *truly* be happy in these conditions. Could you? ### 5. Conclusion This story probes our intuitions about what can, and what can’t, be done for the greater good and, indeed, what “the greater good” even is. It also challenges us to ask ourselves what we’d walk away from, and why. If you think you’d walk away from Omelas, what – if anything – should *you* walk away from, in real life? ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) In her prelude to “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas” in her 2015 anthology, *The Wind’s Twelve Quarters & Compass Rose*, paperback ed., (UK: Gollancz, 254-55), Le Guin credits American philosopher and psychologist William James for inspiring her to write this story. She reports that in James’s 1891 essay, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” *International Journal of Ethics* 1(3): 330-354, he had considered a thought experiment in which one innocent person is sacrificed for the greater good, though his brief rendition wasn’t fleshed out in the way Le Guin’s story is. James’s essay can also be found in James, William, 1960, *The Will to Believe, Human Immortality and other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 184-215). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Le Guin, Ursula K. “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas” in *The Wind’s Twelve Quarters & Compass Rose*, paperback ed., (UK.: Gollancz, 262). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The moral theories discussed here are *utilitarianism*, which is a specific form of *consequentialism*, and Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics. For introductions to these, see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz.and [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. The ethical issues raised by the story could also profitably be analyzed from, at least, the perspectives of *virtue ethics –* which sees the development and display of good character or virtue as central to ethics, *John Rawls’ theory of justice* – which requires that ethical decisions be made from an unbiased perspective, seeing the issue from the perspective of each individual affected by the action, to ensure fairness, as well as *the African ethic of Ubuntu –* which values harmonious relationships and the promotion of community. For introductions to these theories, see [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry, [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies, and [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz. Other theories could be used to analyze the story also. ### References [James, William. 1891. “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/intejethi.1.3.2375309)[*International Journal of Ethics*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/intejethi.1.3.2375309)[ 1(3): 330-354.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/intejethi.1.3.2375309) Reprinted in [James, William. 1960. ](https://www.amazon.com/Believe-Immortality-Essays-Popular-Philosophy/dp/0486202917)[*The Will to Believe, Human Immortality and other Essays in Popular Philosophy*](https://www.amazon.com/Believe-Immortality-Essays-Popular-Philosophy/dp/0486202917)[, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 184-215).](https://www.amazon.com/Believe-Immortality-Essays-Popular-Philosophy/dp/0486202917) [Le Guin, Ursula K. 1973. “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas,” in Le Guin, Ursula K. 2015. ](https://www.amazon.com/Winds-Twelve-Quarters-Compass-Masterworks/dp/147320576X/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8)[*The Wind’s Twelve Quarters & Compass Rose*](https://www.amazon.com/Winds-Twelve-Quarters-Compass-Masterworks/dp/147320576X/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8)[, paperback ed. (UK: Gollancz, 254-262).](https://www.amazon.com/Winds-Twelve-Quarters-Compass-Masterworks/dp/147320576X/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8) ### Related Resource [UrsulaKLeguin.com](https://www.ursulakleguin.com) ### Related Essays [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz. [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ursula-le-guins-the-ones-who-walk-away-from-omelas-.pdf). . ### About the Author [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) has a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder. He hosts [*Micro-Digressions: A Philosophy Podcast*](https://www.buzzsprout.com/956725) and does a lot of writing, academic and otherwise. [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](http://www.spencercasephilosophy.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** Case, philosophy and literature, philosophy of literature, The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas, Ursula Le Guin --- ### [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/) **Published:** April 29, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The ability to understand others’ beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and moods is called mindreading. This essay introduces issues in the study of mindreading, the main theories of mindreading, and its place in our understanding of others. **Content:** Author: Emma Otterski Categories: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/), [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word Count: 999 Did that person shove me, or did they slip on the icy ground? Are they smiling, or is that really a sneer? Why is my colleague walking towards the fridge? When we answer these types of questions, we rely on our remarkable ability to think about what other people might be thinking and feeling.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The ability to understand others’ beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and moods is called *mindreading*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Mindreading plays an important role in human social life, helping us to interpret and predict others’ behavior. And there is ongoing research into whether other animals can mindread. Questions about mindreading have brought philosophers and psychologists into close collaboration. This essay introduces issues in the study of mindreading, the main theories of mindreading, and its place in our understanding of others. ### 1. Background to mindreading research In a series of experiments in 1978, a chimpanzee named Sarah successfully selected photographs depicting a human actor’s goals after observing their actions. Primatologists concluded that Sarah could understand at least some of others’ mental states.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) However, Sarah’s success was compatible with her using other strategies, such as recognizing behavioral patterns.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) On seeing someone move their hand towards a cup, one might predict that they will pick it up by attributing to them this intention or the desire to take a drink. However, it is also possible to make this prediction without considering the person’s mental states by noting that people whose hands move toward cups tend to end up holding cups. Philosophers have argued that the best evidence for showing that an agent can mindread comes from tasks that are difficult to complete unless the agent understands another’s point of view.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Situations where someone has a false belief about the world are a good example. Psychologists subsequently designed false-belief tests suitable for children. In one, the Sally-Anne test, children see two dolls, Sally and Anne. Sally puts a marble in a basket and leaves. While she is away, Anne moves the marble to a box. When Sally returns, the child is asked where she will look for it.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Children are typically able to correctly indicate that Sally will look in the basket between the ages of four and five.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) [![The original Sally–Anne cartoon used in the test by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985).](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/false-belief-test.jpg?resize=656%2C1009&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/false-belief-test.jpg?ssl=1)The original Sally–Anne cartoon used in the test by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985).Passing classic false-belief tests requires strong language, memory, and attentional skills. New types of false-belief tests remove these cognitive demands by measuring non-verbal responses, such as where infants look or whether they help someone.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Based on results from these tests, some philosophers and psychologists now think that great apes and human infants in their second year understand others’ false beliefs. The strong focus on false-belief tests in the research means we have limited ways to assess differences in adults’ mindreading abilities.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) This might be a problem, because people seem to differ in how well they understand others. ### 2. How do we mindread? Two theories have dominated the literature on how we mindread: *theory-theory* and *simulation theory*. Theory-theorists think that mindreading requires a psychological theory of the relationship between people’s behavior and their mental states.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Just as we predict that an apple falling from a tree will hit the ground because we have an intuitive theory of physics, theory-theory claims that we also use a theory of how people behave based on their mental states. In Sally’s case, given her belief about where the marble is and her desire to retrieve it, we *infer* where she will look. One criticism of theory theory is that it treats us as if we observe other people like scientists, using a theory to figure out what they’re doing. But real social interactions don’t usually feel like that. According to simulation theorists, when interpreting someone’s behavior, we use the same mental processes we use to perform those actions ourselves. In other words, we step into the actor’s perspective and simulate their mental states. The discovery of mirror neurons, which fire both when an action is performed and when it is observed, was initially put forward as evidence for simulation theory.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) A criticism of simulation theory is that it still seems to require some kind of theory in order to work. Most versions involve the use of mental-state concepts (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions)[\[12\]](#_ftn12) and using these concepts requires at least some understanding of how they relate to each other. As a result, many simulation theorists now offer hybrid accounts that combine aspects of simulation theory and theory-theory. Some researchers argue that we can directly perceive certain mental states, such as emotions and intentions.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) If so, then at least some types of mindreading might be possible without theories or mental simulation. ### 3. The place of mindreading in understanding others Theory-theory and simulation theory assume that understanding others mainly involves mindreading. However, some philosophers disagree. They argue that we often make sense of what people do without directly thinking about their mental states. Instead, we rely on character traits, social roles, and patterns we’ve learned from experience.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) In everyday life, this may mean we understand others mainly by recognizing how people usually behave in certain situations, rather than by figuring out what they are thinking or feeling. However, it remains debated whether this really avoids mindreading altogether. These approaches also emphasize the various functions of mental-state attributions. For example, attributing to Sandrine the belief that her appointment was at 3:00 pm doesn’t just explain her turning up an hour late; it might also justify it. Saying to Sandrine that you know she wants to be on time might also shape her future behavior, as it creates expectations about how someone who wants to be on time ought to behave.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Given these insights, recent work has shifted to thinking about how mindreading relates to the wide range of social practices that regulate both our behavior and our mental lives.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 4. Conclusion Mindreading helps us to navigate the social world. Clarifying its development, its presence in animals, and its relation to other forms of social understanding will deepen our understanding of the mind and might offer a clearer view of the sources of social misunderstandings. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The question of whether we are justified in believing that other people have thoughts and feelings is known as “the problem of other minds.” While mindreading research and the problem of other minds are both concerned with other people’s minds, they ask different questions. Mindreading research looks at, for example, the psychological basis for our understanding of others’ mental states, whereas the problem of other minds asks whether we can ever know that others have minds and what basis we have for that knowledge: see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. Understanding the existence and contents of our own minds is often thought to be easier, but there are some complications even with that: see [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur. For further discussion of the questions being explored in these two philosophical areas see Avramides (2023) and Goldman (2006). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) “Mindreading” is a theoretically-neutral term for the capacity to understand others’ mental states to oneself and others, which used to be referred to as “theory of mind”. The newer terminology enables questions such as when and why we mindread, which do not arise naturally from “theory of mind.” The latter, introduced by Premack & Woodruff (1978) and still common in empirical research, is sometimes used synonymously but is less favored in philosophy. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Premack and Woodruff (1978). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) There are different views about whether a mindreading explanation or a behavior-reading explanation is simpler, as well as the role that simplicity should play in deciding between explanations. For further discussion of some of the philosophical issues in comparative psychology, see [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Daniel Dennett (1978), Gilbert Harman (1978), and Jonathan Bennett (1978) made these comments independently in an open peer commentary responding to Premack and Woodruff’s paper. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The child is also asked two additional questions: “where is the marble really?” and “where was the marble at the beginning?” These check the child’s understanding of reality and their memory of the events. See Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) for full details. The Sally-Anne test was developed to test autistic children’s understanding of others’ false beliefs. Subsequent theorizing about autistic people’s mindreading abilities has contributed massively to conceptions and misconceptions of autism. See Yergeau and Huebner (2017) for an examination of the ethical and political issues involved in thinking about the relationship between mindreading and autism. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Though the age varies across cultures. See Slaughter and Perez-Zapata (2014) and Naito and Kayamo (2006) for evidence of cultural variation in the development of false-belief understanding. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) E.g., see Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Apperly (2012) makes this point. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Theory-theory is influenced by a strand of 20th-century analytic philosophy that treated folk psychology, our everyday understanding of others, as a theory and asked whether it was true or false. Key interlocutors in this debate include Paul Churchland (1981), Patricia Churchland (1986), Fodor (1987), and Dennett (1987). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See Gallese and Goldman (1998); Goldman (2006). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Gordon (1986) for an exception. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) E.g., Gallagher (2008) and Zahavi (2011). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For an introduction to some doubts about explaining behavior by appealing to character, see [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/ "Situationism and Virtue Ethics") by Ian Tully. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) McGeer (2007). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See particularly Zawidzki (2013). ### References [Apperly, I.A. 2012. What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences. ](https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2012.676055)[*Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*](https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2012.676055)[, 65(5), pp. 825–839.](https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2012.676055) [Avramides, A. 2023. “Other Minds.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/)[Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/) [Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A.M. and Frith, U. 1985. Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”](https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8) [? ](https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8)[*Cognition*](https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8)[, 21(1), pp. 37–46. ](https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8) [Bennett, J. 1978. Some remarks about concepts. ](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076573)[*Behavioral and Brain Sciences*](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076573)[, 1(4), pp. 557–560](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076573). [Churchland, P.M. 1981. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025900?origin=crossref)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025900?origin=crossref)[, 78(2), pp. 67–90.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025900?origin=crossref) [Churchland, P.S. 1986. ](https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/4792/NeurophilosophyToward-a-Unified-Science-of-the)[*Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind-*](https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/4792/NeurophilosophyToward-a-Unified-Science-of-the)[brain. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.](https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/4792/NeurophilosophyToward-a-Unified-Science-of-the) [Dennett, D.C. 1987. ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1987-98612-000)[*The intentional stance*](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1987-98612-000)[. Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. pp.xi, 388.](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1987-98612-000) [Dennett, D.C. 1978. Beliefs about beliefs \[P&W, SR&B\]. ](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076664)[*Behavioral and Brain Sciences*](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076664)[, 1(4), pp. 568–570.](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076664) [Gallagher, S. 2008. Direct perception in the intersubjective context. ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053810008000342?via%3Dihub)[*Consciousness and Cognition*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053810008000342?via%3Dihub)[, 17(2), pp. 535–543.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053810008000342?via%3Dihub) [Gallagher, S. and Varga, S. 2014. Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9203-x)[*Topoi*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9203-x)[, 33(1), pp.185–199.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9203-x) [Gallese, V. and Goldman, A. 1998. Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. ](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364661398012625)[*Trends in Cognitive Sciences*](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364661398012625)[, 2(12).](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364661398012625) [Goldman, A.I. 2006. ](https://academic.oup.com/book/7488)[*Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading*](https://academic.oup.com/book/7488)[. Philosophy of Mind Series. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/7488) [Gordon, R.M. 1986. Folk psychology as simulation. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x)[*Mind and Language*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x)[, 1(2), pp. 158–71.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x) [Harman, G. 1978. Studying the chimpanzee’s theory of mind. ](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076743)[*Behavioral and Brain Sciences*](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076743)[, 1(4), pp. 576–577.](http://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076743) [McGeer, V. 2007. The regulative dimension of folk psychology. In: D.D. Hutto and M. Ratcliffe, eds. ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_8)[*Folk Psychology Re-Assessed*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_8)[. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 137-156. ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_8) [Naito, M. and Koyama, K. 2006. The development of false-belief understanding in Japanese children: Delay and difference? ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0165025406063622)[*International Journal of Behavioral Development*](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0165025406063622)[, 30(4), pp. 290–304.](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0165025406063622) [Onishi, K.H. and Baillargeon, R. 2005. Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs? ](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1107621)[*Science* ](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1107621)[(New York, N.Y.), 308(5719), pp. 255–258.](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.1107621) [Premack, D. and Woodruff, G., 1978. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/does-the-chimpanzee-have-a-theory-of-mind/1E96B02CD9850016B7C93BC6D2FEF1D0)[*Behavioral and Brain Sciences*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/does-the-chimpanzee-have-a-theory-of-mind/1E96B02CD9850016B7C93BC6D2FEF1D0)[, 1(4), pp. 515–526.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/does-the-chimpanzee-have-a-theory-of-mind/1E96B02CD9850016B7C93BC6D2FEF1D0) [Slaughter, V. and Perez-Zapata, D. 2014. Cultural variations in the development of mind reading. ](https://academic.oup.com/cdpers/article/8/4/237/8234652)[*Child Development Perspectives*](https://academic.oup.com/cdpers/article/8/4/237/8234652)[, 8(4), pp. 237–241.](https://academic.oup.com/cdpers/article/8/4/237/8234652) [Yergeau, M. and Huebner, B. 2017. Minding Theory of Mind. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12191)[*Journal of Social Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12191)[, 48(3), pp. 273–296.](https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12191) [Zahavi, D. 2011. Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0070-3)[*Review of Philosophy and Psychology*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0070-3)[, 2(3), p. 541.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0070-3) [Zawidzki, T.W. 2013. ](https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/3716/MindshapingA-New-Framework-for-Understanding-Human)[*Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition*](https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/3716/MindshapingA-New-Framework-for-Understanding-Human)[. Cambridge, MA, USA: A Bradford Book.](https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/3716/MindshapingA-New-Framework-for-Understanding-Human) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Mind-Body Problem: What are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) By Jacob Berger [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/ "Situationism and Virtue Ethics") by Ian Tully [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Mindreading.pdf). ### About the Author Emma Otterski is interested in social cognition, philosophy of science, and feminist philosophy. She also has teaching interests in moral philosophy and environmental philosophy. She received her PhD from the University of Edinburgh and has taught there and at Trinity College Dublin. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Mind & Language, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** mindreading --- ### [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/) **Published:** March 10, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Ian Tully](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Tully) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 995 Moral philosophers are no longer merely interested in assessing our conduct (e.g., don’t lie!’) or the outcomes we bring about (e.g., more happiness is better!); many now agree that ethics needs to be concerned with our *characters*, too. What matters isn’t just *what we do*, but *who we are.* This focus on character has been challenged, however, by recent work in experimental psychology reveals that most people might not possess the kinds of traits which would constitute virtues. This empirical challenge to virtue is introduced here. [![Photo from the Milgram Experiment.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Greenwood_MilgramRevisited_0718.png?resize=656%2C365&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Greenwood_MilgramRevisited_0718.png?ssl=1)Photo from the Milgram Experiment.### 1. Situationism According to a large body of research going back to the 1920s—which now goes under the label of “situationist personality psychology” or “situationism”—“seemingly insubstantial situational factors have substantial effects on what people do.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) To illustrate what is meant by “situational factors” consider a classic situationist study, the “dime in the phone booth” experiment.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Here the difference between finding or not finding a dime in a phone booth made a substantial difference to whether individuals chose to help a woman pick up some papers she had just dropped: those who had found the dime were 84% more likely to help the woman out**.** In other words, a very minor difference in the situation—the presence or absence of a dime—played a *significant* role in behavior. Such findings are at odds with an intuitive understanding of people which focuses on an person’s *character* to predict and explain their behavior. On this view, people behave how they do largely because of the kinds of people they are: because they are *kind* or *generous* or *greedy*—because of their *virtues* and *vices*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Situationism challenges this account by revealing the surprising extent to which our behavior is a function of external, situational factors. Examples are legion. Experiments have suggested that being in a hurry significantly decreases the likelihood that passersby will stop to help an apparently distressed individual.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Ambient noises,[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ambient smells,[\[6\]](#_ftn6) and the presence or absence of other people[\[7\]](#_ftn7) also considerably influence helping behaviors. Stanley Milgram infamously found that the polite but firm insistence of an experimenter could induce many participants to administer potentially lethal shocks to an experimental confederate in another room.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Thus, it seems that whether or not people engage in morally praiseworthy or morally deplorable behavior is to a large extent determined by often very insubstantial features of the situations they find themselves in. A number of philosophers have concluded that this evidence undermines traditional accounts of moral character.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) According to Aristotle, the virtuous agent acts from “firm and unchangeable character”; the agent sees what the situation calls for (i.e., honesty, compassion, courage) and performs that action.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The virtuous agent’s character is organized by “robust traits,” that is, traits which issue in behavior that exhibits “consistency across situations.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) The thought is that in a variety of different situations—i.e., regardless of whether or not he is in a hurry, or in the presence of a good-smelling bakery, or whatever—the, e.g., compassionate agent will, when faced with a circumstance which clearly calls for compassion, act compassionately. Yet the experimental evidence seems inconsistent with the average person possessing such global traits, given the situational variability it reveals. Of course, one presumably doesn’t *always* need to behave compassionately in order to be a compassionate person, but certain circumstances seem *diagnostic* or *criterial*: if I leave you drowning in a shallow pond, then I’m *probably* not compassionate—and likewise if I give you a lethal shock. In sum, the experimental evidence seems inconsistent with most people possessing the kinds of robust traits implicated in traditional theories of moral character. But if that’s right, then most people *lack virtues*, at least as Aristotle and many others have understood them. At most, they have merely “local traits,” for instance, “office party sociability.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Now this evidence is still consistent with *some* people possessing global (i.e., non-local) courage, or compassion, or honesty. (Or, conversely, with *some* people possessing global vices.) But it suggests that those global traits are very rare. For most of us, our psychologies are just not adequately described as constellations of such cross-situationally consistent character traits. ### 2. Responses Of course, such pessimistic conclusions have been strongly contested, and the debate over the implications of situationist findings for virtue is ongoing.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Defenders of virtue ethics have developed a number of replies. One prominent response notes that virtue—*full virtue*—is, and was always expected to be, *rare*. Thus, situationist findings merely confirm what we already knew. Yet such a response makes many uneasy, for it reinforces worries that virtue ethics is problematically elitist, advocating as a normative ideal something attainable by only a few.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Others note that virtue is not merely a matter of behavior—it also concerns what one thinks and feels. Thus, situationist findings are in an important sense incomplete.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Critics also worry about the probative value of “one-time performance” data in demonstrating that one does or does not have a given dispositional property.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) After all, we often fail to behave compassionately when we are stressed or tired, but it seems too strong to claim that those occasional failures mean we aren’t compassionate: what is needed, it seems, are *iterated trials.*[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Finally, some critics have argued that contemporary psychology is not nearly so hostile to robust traits: in fact, understood in the right way, people *do* in fact possess such traits.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Details of all these proposals are unfortunately beyond the scope of this essay. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Doris 2002: 28. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Isen and Levin 1972. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For an introduction to concepts of virtues and vices, see [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Darley and Batson 1973) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Matthews and Cannon 1975) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Baron 1997) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Latane and Darley 1970) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Milgram 1974) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Doris 1998, 2002; Harman 1999) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Aristotle 1984: 1105a27-b1) [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See Doris 2002: 23) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Doris 66) [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a very thorough overview, see Miller (2013). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Compare Driver 2001: 54. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) But see Doris (2006, 2009) for evidence that such features are also situationally susceptible. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Sreenivasan 2008: 603. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See Doris (2002: 71-76) for an anticipation and response to these concerns. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See Snow 2010. ### References [Aristotle. (1984) *The Complete Works of Aristotle.* J. Barnes, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.](http://press.princeton.edu/titles/79.html) [Baron, J. (1997) “The Sweet Smell of…Helping: Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on Prosocial Behavior in Shopping Malls,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 23: 498-503. ](http://web.natur.cuni.cz/~houdek3/papers/Baron%201997.pdf) [Darley, J. M. and Batson, C. D. (1973) “From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 27: 100-108.](http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/27/1/100/) [Doris, J. M. (1998) “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” *Nous* 32: 504-30.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.00136/abstract) [———. (2002) *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/logic/lack-character-personality-and-moral-behavior?format=PB) [———. (2006) “Out of Character: On the Psychology of Excuses in the Criminal Law,” Hugh La Follette (Ed.), *Ethics in Practice*. Oxford: Blackwell.](http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470671831.html) [Driver, Julia. (2001) *Uneasy Virtue.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/logic/uneasy-virtue?format=PB) [Harman, Gilbert (1999) “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99: 315-31.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4545312?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103621908737) [Lantane, B. and Darley J. M. (1970) *The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help?* New York: Appelton-Century-Crofts.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Unresponsive-Bystander-Doesnt-Help/dp/0139386130/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1394401906&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Unresponsive+Bystander%3A+Why+Doesn%E2%80%99t+He+Help%3F) [Matthews, K. E. Jr. and Canon, L. K. (1975) “Environmental Noise Level as a Determinant of Helping Behavior,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32: 571-577.](http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/32/4/571/) [Milgram, Stanley 1974: *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*. New York: Harper and Row.](http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Obedience-Authority-Stanley-Milgram/?isbn=9780061765216) [Miller, Christian. (2013) *Character and Moral Psychology.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/character-and-moral-psychology-9780199674367?q=Character%20and%20Moral%20Psychology&lang=en&cc=us) [Isen, A. M. and Levin, P. F. (1972) “Effects of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 21: 384-388.](http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1972-22883-001) [Snow, Nancy. (2010) *Virtue as Social Intelligence.* New York: Routledge.](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415999106/) [Sreenivasan, Gopal. (2008) “Character and Consistency: Still More Errors,” *Mind* 117: 603-612.](http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/117/467/603.short) ### Related Essays [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry ### About the Author [Ian Tully](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Tully) is an Assistant Professor in the School of Nursing and Center for Global Health Ethics at Duquesne University. Prior to that he was a Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy and Mental Disorder at Johns Hopkins University’s Berman Institute of Bioethics. He completed his PhD in philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He is interested in ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of mind. [ianmtully.wixsite.com/iantullyphilosophy](https://ianmtully.wixsite.com/iantullyphilosophy) *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** situationism, Tully, virtue --- ### [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) **Published:** February 3, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What are minds? And what (if anything) is the relationship of the mind to the body/brain—or to anything in nature? These questions constitute the so-called “mind-body problem.” This essay introduces some of the most influential answers to these questions. **Content:** Author: Jacob Berger Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word count: 998 We have minds. We see the world around us; we feel happiness or sorrow; we can think, doubt, believe, remember, wonder, and hope. We also have bodies, which include our brains. But what are minds? And what (if anything) is the relationship of the mind to the body/brain—or to anything in nature? These questions constitute the so-called “mind-body problem,” a core issue in the *philosophy of mind*, the area of philosophy that studies phenomena such as thought, perception, emotion, memory, agency, and consciousness. This essay introduces some of the most influential answers to these questions. [![Yellow-Red-Blue, 1925 by Wassily Kandinsky](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/yellow-red-blue.jpg?resize=656%2C417&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/yellow-red-blue.jpg?ssl=1)Yellow-Red-Blue, 1925 by Wassily Kandinsky### 1. Varieties of Dualism One popular reply to the mind-body problem is *dualism*, which holds that the mental is fundamentally distinct from anything physical.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) There are several versions of dualism. *Substance dualism* holds that minds are mental substances, whereas bodies are physical substances. A *substance* is something that can exist on its own. Physical substances take up space and time: tables, stars, atoms, and human bodies are physical substances. Substance dualism proposes that minds are substances that think, feel, and experience, but do not take up space and could exist without bodies. The view is akin to the religious idea of immaterial and immortal souls.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) *Property dualism* instead holds that the mental and the physical are different types of properties. A property is a way an object can be; a brown dog has the property of being brown. But properties cannot exist without something to modify: brownness cannot exist on its own. Property dualism holds that creatures may have distinct mental and physical properties, although they perhaps cannot have mental features without also having physical ones.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Many considerations support some form of dualism. “Conceivability arguments,” for example, claim that we can *imagine* examples of minds without bodies, as in cases of non-physical ghosts, or examples of bodies without minds, such as *philosophical zombies*: creatures that are physically just like us, but lack conscious experience. If what we can imagine is a good guide to what’s possible, then it seems some type of dualism follows. But such inferences are questionable, since arguably not *everything* we can imagine is possible. For instance, one might imagine proving a mathematical theorem, even if it’s actually unprovable.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) There are also reasons to doubt dualism. A well-known objection to at least substance dualism is the “problem of interaction.” It is easy to understand causal interactions between physical things that take up space and can contact one another: a baseball can break a window. But minds and bodies interact too. For example, stubbing your toe is something physical in your body that causes you to feel pain in your mind, and your mental pain causes you to physically wince. But it is unclear how these mind-body interactions could occur, if mental states do not take up space and so cannot be in contact with the body.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Many therefore defend views that hold that the mind is related to the body insofar as both are physical.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 2. The Identity Theory A notable view that holds the mind is physical is the *identity theory*, which answers the mind-body problem by claiming that mental states are identical to—or the same things as—states of our brains. Brain-scan technology reveals that mentality is tightly correlated with the firing of neurons. The identity theory simply identifies these, holding that a headache is *nothing more* than a pattern of nociceptor activity, just as water is nothing but H2O.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The identity theory avoids the problem of interaction, since it’s clear how the brain can impact one’s body and *vice versa*. But difficulties nonetheless arise. For example, it seems our mental states are what philosophers call “multiply realizable”: different sorts of physical systems can all exhibit the same types of mental states. After all, many people believe that things that have *no brains at all*, such as forms of alien life or artificial intelligence, might one day not only act as though they feel pleasure or fear, but genuinely experience those things. But if so, then such states can’t be identical with patterns of neural activity. ### 3. Functionalism The identity theory explains minds in terms of what they are physically made of. But if we ask, “What is a shoe?” a response in terms of physical make-up is no help since shoes are multiply realizable by leather, plastic, or wood. It is better to characterize shoes functionally: shoes are items whose function is, among other things, to protect our feet when we walk. *Functionalism* likewise claims that mental states should be understood in terms of their function, that is, their characteristic causes and effects.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Functionalism thereby answers the mind-body problem by maintaining that mental states are *whatever* states—be they bodily or otherwise—that play the relevant roles in whatever type of organism. Pains are states typically caused by bodily harms, and in turn typically cause behaviors such as wincing. Functionalism is compatible with mental states’ being nonphysical, but simplicity recommends that in humans such states are realized by brain activity. And if we one day build an artificially intelligent robot that experiences genuine pain, pains would be realized by states of its central processing unit that perform the functions of pain. Functionalism allows for multiple realizability, but it faces problems. Many think, for example, that even if we knew all the physical and functional facts about some creatures such as bats—everything about their physiology and behavior—we still would not know what it’s like to be a bat. Only bats, it seems, can know what the bat experience of echolocation is like. But if that’s the case, then functionalism, which holds that we can understand minds wholly in terms of their functions, is false.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) 4. ### Conclusion Most contemporary philosophers of mind endorse some variety of dualism, identity theory, or functionalism.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) But there are other theories of mind,[\[11\]](#_ftn11) not to mention many versions of each of the above accounts, which have various advantages and disadvantages—too many for a short essay to explore! The mind-body problem thus remains one of the enduring puzzles of human thought.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For further discussion of both substance and property dualism and the arguments for and against them, see Calef (n.d.) and Robinson (2020). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The most famous proponent of substance dualism in the history of philosophy is René Descartes; see Marc Bobro’s [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For a defense of property dualism, see, e.g., Chalmers (1996). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For discussion of the relationship between conceivability and possibility in general, see Bob Fischer’s [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This objection was arguably first raised for dualism by Descartes’ own student, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia; see Princess Elizabeth and Descartes (1643-9/2019). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) It’s worth noting that some have instead endorsed *idealism*, the view that the mind and body are related insofar as both are actually *mental*. On that view, everything is a construction of perceptions and ideas–and so there are no physical bodies, at least as traditionally understood. But idealism remains a minority position. For discussion of it, see Addison Ellis’s [Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For a classic statement of identity theory, see, e.g., Smart (1959). For further discussion of the identity theory and the arguments for and against it, see Schneider (n.d.) and Smart (2007). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For a classic statement of functionalism, see, e.g., Lewis (1972). For further discussion of functionalism and the arguments for and against it, see Polger (n.d) and Levin (2023). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For this much-discussed argument, see Nagel (1974). For a similar argument against not only functionalism, but any view on which the mind is physical, see Tufan Kıymaz’s [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See, for example, Bourget & Chalmers (n.d.), which indicates which theories in the philosophy of mind respondents are sympathetic with. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For example, an issue faced by many theories is that it is unclear why anything physical, including suitably developed brains, would be associated with (much less be identical with) mental phenomena. If atoms don’t have minds, then it is not obvious why any collection of them would have minds either. To avoid this problem, some endorse *panpsychism*—the view that all physical objects, from atoms to tables, exhibit mental properties; for more, see, e.g., the essays in Goff and Moran (2022). Similarly, some endorse *neutral monism*—the theory that both mental and physical phenomena are properties of a more fundamental neutral substance; for more, see, e.g., the essays in Alter and Nagasawa (2015). And other accounts take starker views of the mind. A view that was popular in the early 20th Century was *behaviorism*, on which there are no “inner” mental states; mental states are nothing but observable behaviors or dispositions of bodies to act. Feeling happy, for example, simply is (the disposition to perform) the act of smiling. For a classic statement of behaviorism, see Ryle (1949). And *eliminative materialism* maintains that there is no mind-body relationship because there simply are no minds at all: “mental states” are things we should no longer think exist like witches or phlogiston. For a statement of the view, see Churchland (1981). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The mind-body problem is also highly relevant to many other areas of philosophy and ethics. For example, views on the the metaphysical issue of “personal identity”–how (and whether) we exist as the same being over time, despite the many changes that occur to us—are often informed by views on what the mind is and its relation to the body: see Chad Vance’s [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) and Kristin Seemuth Whaley’s [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/). And whether a being has a mind—and what this means–is often thought to be highly relevant to many ethical issues: see Jonathan Spelman’s [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) and Nathan Nobis’s [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/). ### References [Alter, T. & Nagasawa, Y. (eds.) (2015). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/consciousness-in-the-physical-world-9780199927357)[*Consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/consciousness-in-the-physical-world-9780199927357)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/consciousness-in-the-physical-world-9780199927357)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/consciousness-in-the-physical-world-9780199927357) [Bourget, D. & Chalmers, D. (n.d.). ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5010)[*Consciousness: panpsychism, dualism, eliminativism, identity theory, or functionalism?*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5010)[ Survey2020.philpeople.org.](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5010) [Calef, Scott. (n.d.). Dualism and mind. ](https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/)[*Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/dualism-and-mind/) [Chalmers, D. J. (1996). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-conscious-mind-9780195117899?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-conscious-mind-9780195117899?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-conscious-mind-9780195117899?cc=us&lang=en&) [Churchland, P. M. (1981). ](https://doi.org/10.2307/2025900)[Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes.](https://doi.org/10.2307/2025900) [*Journal of Philosophy,*](https://doi.org/10.2307/2025900)[ 78(2), 67–90.](https://doi.org/10.2307/2025900) [Goff, P. & Moran, R. (2022).](http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157100664540)[ *Is consciousness everywhere? Essays on panpsychism*](http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157100664540)[. Imprint Academic.](http://books.imprint.co.uk/book/?gcoi=71157100664540) [Levin, Janet. (2023). Functionalism. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/)[ (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/) [Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048407212341301)[*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048407212341301)[, 50(3), 249–258.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048407212341301) [Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914)[*The Philosophical Review, 83*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914)[(4), 435–450.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183914) [Polger, Thomas. (n.d.). Functionalism. ](https://iep.utm.edu/functism/)[*Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/functism/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/functism/) [Princess Elizabeth and Descartes, R. (1643-9/2019). Correspondence. In Ariew, R. & Watkins, E. (eds.), ](https://hackettpublishing.com/modern-philosophy-third-edition-4315)[*Modern philosophy: An anthology of primary sources*](https://hackettpublishing.com/modern-philosophy-third-edition-4315)[. Hackett Publishing.](https://hackettpublishing.com/modern-philosophy-third-edition-4315) [Robinson, Howard. (2020). Dualism. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/dualism)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/dualism)[(Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/dualism) [Ryle, G. (1949). ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Concept-of-Mind-60th-Anniversary-Edition/Ryle/p/book/9780415485470)[*The concept of mind*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Concept-of-Mind-60th-Anniversary-Edition/Ryle/p/book/9780415485470)[. Hutchinson.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Concept-of-Mind-60th-Anniversary-Edition/Ryle/p/book/9780415485470) [Schneider, Steven. (n.d.) Identity theory. ](https://iep.utm.edu/identity/)[*Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/identity/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/identity/) [Smart, J. J. C. (2007). The mind/brain identity theory. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/)[ (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/) [Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. ](https://doi.org/10.2307/2182164)[*The Philosophical Review*](https://doi.org/10.2307/2182164)[, ](https://doi.org/10.2307/2182164)[*68*](https://doi.org/10.2307/2182164)[(2), 141–156.](https://doi.org/10.2307/2182164) ### Related Essays [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski [Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis ### Translation [Turkish](https://veritasdergisi.com/2024/06/20/zihin-beden-problemi-zihin-nedir-jacob-berger/), [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/zihin-beden-problemi-zihin-ne-demektir-jacob-berger/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/mind-body.pdf). ### About the Author Jacob Berger is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Lycoming College. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy with a concentration in Cognitive Science at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York in 2013. His areas of specialization are philosophy of mind and cognitive science. [jfberger.wixsite.com/home](https://jfberger.wixsite.com/home) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Mind & Language **Tags:** mind, mind-body problem, minds --- ### [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) **Published:** August 24, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is knowledge? And how do we come to have it? Is it important that we have knowledge? If so, why? The branch of philosophy that attempts to answer these and related questions is known as ‘epistemology’ or ‘theory of knowledge.’ This essay introduces epistemology. **Content:** Thomas Metcalf Category: [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/) Word count: 999 Many people think that they have a lot of knowledge. They also believe that other people sometimes know what they claim to know. But what is knowledge anyway? And how do we come to have it? Is it important that we have knowledge? If so, why? The branch of philosophy that attempts to answer these and related questions is known as ‘epistemology’ or ‘theory of knowledge.’[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay introduces epistemology. ![Books on shelves in the Library of Congress.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/books-in-a-library.jpg?resize=656%2C434&ssl=1)Books on shelves in the Library of Congress.### 1. What is Knowledge?[\[2\]](#_ftn2) One historically popular definition of ‘knowledge’ is the ‘JTB’ theory of knowledge: knowledge is *j*ustified, *t*rue *b*elief.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Most philosophers think that a belief must be true in order to count as knowledge.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Suppose that Smith is framed for a crime, and the evidence against Smith is overwhelming. But Smith is innocent. Does the jury *know* that *Smith committed the crime*? No, because knowledge requires truth; the jury *believed* it, but they didn’t *know* it.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Also, most philosophers think that the belief must be *justified*. We don’t normally consider a lucky guess to be knowledge. (If you flip a coin but don’t look at the result yet, and just find yourself believing that it’s Heads, and in fact it *is* Heads, we don’t think you *knew* that it was Heads.) Yet there is substantial debate about what justification is. ### 2. Analysis of Justification What would be required to transform the *lucky guess* that the coin came up Heads into *knowledge*? One standard answer is ‘justification.’[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Intuitively, you would have to acquire *good reason* to believe that the coin came up Heads: for example, you look at the coin.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In general, theories of justification either say that the factors that justify your belief must be available within your own first-person, conscious experience, or that they don’t need to be. We call the former theories ‘internalist’ and the latter ‘externalist.’[\[8\]](#_ftn8) For example, some internalists are *evidentialists*: roughly, they say that your justification depends on the evidence you have, for example the awareness of the image of a president’s head on a coin. And some externalists are *reliabilists*: roughly, they say that whether you are justified depends on whether your belief was formed by a reliable belief-forming mechanism, for example, the physical process of vision. For evidentialists, the *evidence* you have seems “internal” to your first-person awareness: it’s what you’re aware of. And whether the *process that formed your belief* is reliable seems “external” to your first-person awareness: you might not even have any beliefs about photons and how they work. ### 3. Sources of Knowledge and Evidence We’ve thought about what it *means* to have justified beliefs.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) But when our beliefs *are* in fact justified, what is the *source* or *explanation* of that justification? Surely we get some justification from *empirical observation*: using our five senses, the tools of science, and introspection (looking inside your own mind, for example learning that you believe that 2+2=4).[\[10\]](#_ftn10) This justification is ‘*a posteriori*’ or ‘empirical,’ for example, looking at the coin-toss result. Maybe there is some knowledge that we acquire through intuition, definitions, or some other putative *non*-empirical evidence. We call this ‘*a priori*’ knowledge or justification: justified but independently of any particular empirical observation or awareness of the evidence or justification required.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) I seem to know, just by thinking about it, that there can be no coins that are both square and circular; I don’t need to consult scientists.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Roughly speaking, *rationalists* (about justification) believe that we have important, valuable *a priori* knowledge about the world, knowledge that’s not merely about the meanings of our words or concepts. *Empiricists*, in contrast, believe that all of our important knowledge of the world is empirical.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Beyond this, *feminist epistemologists* have argued that one’s knowledge, and whether one is taken seriously as a knower, can depend on one’s particular social position, including one’s gender.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) To the traditional list of sources of knowledge, we might add one’s standpoint and situation, and also add emotion.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 4. The Structure of Knowledge, Justification, and Inference Normally, we think we can *infer* new beliefs from our existing beliefs: we believe some propositions, and *on the basis of* those beliefs, conclude that some *other* propositions are true. If someone *asks* you to justify a belief, you’re likely to cite other beliefs you have. I know that Antarctica exists because I believe that maps are generally trustworthy and that maps claim that Antarctica exists. But can this regress of inference go on forever?[\[16\]](#_ftn16) One popular position is *foundationalism*. Foundationalists say that the regress stops at justified beliefs and, since the regress has stopped, those beliefs aren’t justified by any inference from any *other* belief.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Another popular position is *coherentism*, according to which one’s beliefs are justified by being part of a web or network of coherent beliefs.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) We think a set of inferences can give us justified beliefs. But it’s possible to acquire false or unjustified beliefs, which wouldn’t be knowledge after all. ### 5. Skepticism In general, *skeptics* deny that we have some item of knowledge. There are skeptics about whether we have: - knowledge of the external world, i.e., the world beyond the contents of our conscious experiences;[\[19\]](#_ftn19) - moral knowledge;[\[20\]](#_ftn20) - religious knowledge;[\[21\]](#_ftn21) - knowledge from memory or knowledge of the past;[\[22\]](#_ftn22) - knowledge from induction;[\[23\]](#_ftn23) - scientific knowledge;[\[24\]](#_ftn24) and - knowledge of other minds.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) And some philosophers have endorsed *global* skepticism, according to which we have no knowledge or no justified beliefs at all.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) ### 6. Other Issues Epistemology is a broad field. Other issues include: - the nature of perception;[\[27\]](#_ftn27) - the nature of understanding;[\[28\]](#_ftn28) - whether we should trust our peers when they disagree with us;[\[29\]](#_ftn29) - the relationships between epistemology, trust, and justice;[\[30\]](#_ftn30) - how different reasons for belief (not just epistemic reasons) should affect us or determine whether we have knowledge;[\[31\]](#_ftn31) - what value there is, if any, in having knowledge, especially in contrast to mere true belief;[\[32\]](#_ftn32) - whether ‘knowledge’ means the same thing in all contexts.[\[33\]](#_ftn33) - whether knowledge requires certainty; [\[34\]](#_ftn34) - whether philosophy should be continuous with, or even replaced by, science.[\[35\]](#_ftn35) And many more.[\[36\]](#_ftn36) ### 7. Conclusion Some philosophers believe that epistemology is “first philosophy,” fundamental to the rest of philosophy and inquiry, since all areas of study and learning seek understanding, justified beliefs, and knowledge. If they are correct, an understanding of at least the basics of epistemology is important for all thinking people.[\[37\]](#_ftn37) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) In constructing this overview, I roughly follow online encyclopedias such as in Steup 2019 and Truncellito 2019 and textbooks such as BonJour 2002, Huemer 2002, and Steup and Sosa 2005. ‘Epistemology’ comes from Greek roots meaning the study of, or discourse about, knowledge. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Here, we are talking about what’s sometimes called ‘propositional’ knowledge or ‘knowledge-that.’ But there are other mental facts about you that may count as your having knowledge. Someone might *know how* to ride a bicycle, or *know what it’s lik*e to taste lemon. These aren’t obviously propositional knowledge, but they are natural enough ways of using the term ‘knowledge.’ [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Gettier (1963) attributes this conception or something very much like it to Plato (*Theaetetus* 20 I; *Meno* 98), Chisholm (1957: 16), and Ayer (1956). BonJour (2002: 27) attributes a similar conception to Descartes. Yet as Gettier argues, there may be examples of justified, true beliefs that don’t count as ‘knowledge.’ Suppose that your computer has an error and its internal clock is stuck at 11:49 am. It stays this way all morning and you don’t notice. Then you happen to wonder what time it is, look at your computer’s clock, and see ‘11:49 am.’ Suppose, however, that the time actually just happens to be 11:49 am right when you look at the clock. Your belief that it is 11:49 am might be *justified* (because you have no reason yet to doubt your computer’s clock), and *true* (because you happened to check the clock right at 11:49 am), but many would say it doesn’t count as ‘knowledge.’ Therefore, perhaps there is some fourth property that a belief must have to count as knowledge. For more, see Zagzebski 1994 and Chapman 2014 (“[The Gettier Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/)” in *1000-Word Philosophy*). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Sometimes a person might say, ‘I just *knew* I wasn’t going to get that job–but I did!’ But arguably, that use of ‘knew’ is intended to emphasize the person’s certainty, not to say that they really knew something false. But see Hazlett 2010 which argues that knowledge doesn’t require truth. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) And see n. 4. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For an introduction to the concept of epistemic justification, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. Although the term of art for ‘whatever has to be added to true belief to create knowledge’ is ‘warrant.’ Cf. Plantinga 1993. Perhaps Gettier (1963) showed that warrant isn’t merely justification. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See e.g. BonJour 2004: 5 on what epistemic justification is. Philosophers have described justification as occurring when a belief is likely to be true, or when a person who wants to have true beliefs ought to believe that belief, or when one has good reason to believe the belief, or when the belief is best-supported by the evidence. This question is actually fairly complex, however, because some (e.g. possibly Foley 1987: ch. 1; but see Kelly 2003 for critique) believe that epistemic justification is just a species of prudential or instrumental justification. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) I generally follow Pappas 2019; refer there for more information. In more detail: an internalist might say (as ‘accessibilists’ say) that justification depends on what you are aware of from the first-person perspective, or (as ‘mentalists’ say) on the current content of your mental states, or (as ‘evidentialists’ say) on the evidence available to you. Externalists might say (as ‘reliabilists’ say) that justification depends on one’s belief’s having been formed by a reliable belief-forming mechanism, or (as ‘proper functionalists’ say) by the proper functioning of your cognitive apparatus. Most generally, evidentialism, accessibilism, mentalism, and deontology are usually thought of as ‘internalist’ theories of epistemic justification, since they say your justification depends on factors internal to your mind or first-person awareness. And reliabilism, proper-functionalism, and virtue epistemology are normally thought of as ‘externalist’ theories of epistemic justification, since whether a belief was reliably formed, for example, may depend on factors you have no first-person access to. See e.g. Fumerton 1995 and BonJour and Sosa 2003, as well as Pappas 2019. One might also take the position that internalists and externalists are simply describing two different phenomena, both philosophically important, that are sometimes both referred to as ‘justification; cf. BonJour 2002: 233-7 and Pasnau 2013: 1008 ff. For more about specific internalist and externalist theories, see Conee and Feldman 2004 for evidentialism; Chisholm 1977: 17 for accessibilism; Conee and Feldman 2001 for mentalism; Alston 1989: 115-52 for deontology; Goldman 1979 for reliabilism; Plantinga 1993: 41 ff. and Bergmann 2006: ch. 5 for proper-functionalism; and Turri et al. 2019 for an introduction to virtue epistemology. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) One more note: There could be justified, false beliefs. For example, someone might do a really great job of framing you for a crime you didn’t commit, and so people would be justified in believing that you committed the crime, yet you really are innocent and so their justified belief is false. Such beliefs are part of the standard presentation of Gettier (1963) cases. Of course, a few philosophers have questioned whether justified or warranted false beliefs are possible (Sturgeon 1993; Merricks 1995). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See for example Steup 2019: § 4.2. I assume that introspection is fundamentally empirical, at least in the sense necessary to make the *a priori*-empirical distinction most illuminating (BonJour 1998: 7). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) But not normally independent of any empirical observation at all. For example, we might need empirical observation to acquire the relevant concept in the first place. See e.g. BonJour 1998: 9. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Perhaps moral knowledge, if it exists, is also *a priori* (cf. Huemer 2005). It’s difficult to imagine seeing, with my *eyes*, that stealing is wrong. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Some famous rationalists include Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz; some famous empiricists include Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Yet these categorizations aren’t 100% neat; for example, Locke and Berkeley are normally counted among the empiricists, but they may have made some limited room for *a priori* knowledge as well. See Markie 2019: § 1.2. Also, strictly speaking, when I talk about these different types of sentences, what I’m referring to is the distinction between analytic sentences (*very* roughly, sentences that are true by definition, e.g. ‘all red squares are red’) and synthetic sentences (sentences that are not merely true by definition, e.g. ‘all red squares are somewhere on Earth’), such that rationalists believe in the synthetic *a priori* and empiricists don’t. For a general introduction to this debate, see Markie 2019. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Anderson 2020 for an overview. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Jaggar 1988. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Infinitists (e.g. Klein 1998) say that the regress goes back forever, but that our beliefs can still be justified. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) One of the most-important historical presentations of foundationalism is in Descartes (cf. Newman 2019: § 2.1). More-recent defenders include Pryor (2000) and Huemer (2001). Foundationalists face the challenge of explaining what could justify a belief other than an inference from some other belief. One answer that has received much attention recently is to appeal to some principle of conservatism; see e.g. Huemer 2001. Perhaps, for example, if it appears to you as if something is true, that appearance is enough to justify the belief. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) To say that these beliefs are coherent might mean, for example, that they are all logically consistent and mutually supporting. Thus for coherentists, in some sense, the regress of inference “circles back” on itself. Influential coherentists include Lewis (1946); Quine and Ullian (1970) and the early BonJour (1985). A more recent example is Poston (2014). Coherentists face their own challenges, for example, why there needs to be any “input” from outside one’s own mind (cf. BonJour 1985: ch. 6) in order to have a set of justified beliefs. Why isn’t mere coherence with the rest of one’s beliefs enough? [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See e.g. Descartes 1984 \[1641\]: 13. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Sinnott-Armstrong 2020. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Forrest 2020. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Cf. Russell 2019 \[1921\]: 71-84. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Hume 1896 \[1739-40\]: bk. I, part III, § VI. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) See e.g. Chakravartty 2019 for an overview of scientific realism and anti-realism. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Mill 1872: 243; Duddington 1919; Ayer 1953. Also see [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Comesaña and Klein 2019: § 5. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) See e.g. Berkeley 1904 \[1710\]; Austin 1962; and Lyons 2019 for an overview. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Gordon n.d. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) See e.g. Frances and Matheson 2019: § 5. [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) Fricker 2007; Alcoff 2010. [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) See e.g. Stanley 2005. Also see [Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/03/19/pragmatic-encroachment/ "Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?") by Alexandra Lloyd [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) Prichard et al. 2019. [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) See e.g. Cohen 1986; DeRose 1992. [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) Butchvarov 1970. [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) Quine 1969; Kornblith 2002. [\[36\]](#_ftnref36) For excellent overviews, see Steup 2019; Truncellito 2019; Steup, Turri, and Sosa 2013; BonJour 2002; and Huemer 2002. [\[37\]](#_ftnref37) Perhaps in order to know whether one has acquired any knowledge, one must know what knowledge is and how we achieve it. 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New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/evidentialism-9780199253739?cc=us&lang=en&) [DeRose, Keith. 1992. “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107917?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107917?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[ 52(4): 913-29.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107917?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [Descartes, René. 1984 \[1641\]. “Meditations on First Philosophy.” In John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (tr. and ed.), ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/philosophical-writings-descartes-volume-2?format=PB&isbn=9780521288088)[*The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II*](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/philosophical-writings-descartes-volume-2?format=PB&isbn=9780521288088)[ (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-6.](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/philosophical-writings-descartes-volume-2?format=PB&isbn=9780521288088) [Duddington, Nathalie A. 1919. “Our Knowledge of Other Minds.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4543969.pdf)[*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4543969.pdf)[ 19: 147-78.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4543969.pdf) [Foley, Richard. 1987. 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Quine, ](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/ontological-relativity-and-other-essays/9780231083577)[*Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/ontological-relativity-and-other-essays/9780231083577)[ (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), pp. 69-90.](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/ontological-relativity-and-other-essays/9780231083577) [Quine, W.V.O. 1951. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” Philosophical Review 60(1): 20-43.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2181906?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [Quine, W.V.O. and J.S. Ullian. 1970. ](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_web_of_belief.html?id=lSvXAAAAMAAJ)[*The Web of Belief*](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_web_of_belief.html?id=lSvXAAAAMAAJ)[. New York, NY: Random House.](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_web_of_belief.html?id=lSvXAAAAMAAJ) [Rey, Georges. 2019. “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/analytic-synthetic/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/analytic-synthetic/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/analytic-synthetic/) [Russell, Bertrand. 2019 \[1921\]. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2529/2529-h/2529-h.htm)[*The Analysis of Mind*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2529/2529-h/2529-h.htm)[. Whithorn, UK: Anodos Books.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2529/2529-h/2529-h.htm) [Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2020. “Moral Skepticism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/skepticism-moral/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2020 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/skepticism-moral/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/skepticism-moral/) [Stanley, Jason. 2005. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-and-practical-interests-9780199230433?cc=it&lang=en&)[*Knowledge and Practical Interests*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-and-practical-interests-9780199230433?cc=it&lang=en&)[. New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-and-practical-interests-9780199230433?cc=it&lang=en&) [Steup, Matthias. 2019. “Epistemology.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology/) [Steup, Matthias, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds.). 2013. ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Contemporary+Debates+in+Epistemology%2C+2nd+Edition-p-9780470672099)[*Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Second Edition*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Contemporary+Debates+in+Epistemology%2C+2nd+Edition-p-9780470672099)[. Malden, MA: Blackwell.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Contemporary+Debates+in+Epistemology%2C+2nd+Edition-p-9780470672099) [Sturgeon, Scott. 1993. “The Gettier Problem.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328464?seq=1)[*Analysis*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328464?seq=1)[ 53(3): 156-64.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328464?seq=1) [Turri, John, Mark Alfano, and John Greco. 2019. “Virtue Epistemology.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology-virtue/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology-virtue/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology-virtue/) [Zagzebski, Linda. 1994. “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.” The Philosophical Quarterly 44(174): 65-73.](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/44/174/65/1563539?redirectedFrom=PDF) ### Related Essays [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. 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He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology **Tags:** Epistemology, knowledge, metcalf, theory of knowledge --- ### [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) **Published:** February 15, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** We usually know our own mental states better than others know them. And we usually come to know them in different ways than how others come to know them. How do we come to possess self-knowledge? **Content:** Author: Benjamin Winokur Categories: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) Word Count: 998 One night you are considering dinner options. After scratching your itchy arm, you decide on sushi. Do you *know* that you are considering dinner, are itchy, or want sushi? If so, how? Having *self-knowledge* of these mental states requires having true and justified beliefs about them.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But self-knowledge seems to have additional, special features. First, we usually know our own mental states *better* than others know them.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Second, we usually come to know them in *different ways* than how others come to know them:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) unlike how we learn about other peoples’ mental states, we don’t usually engage in self-*observation* or *hypothesizing* about what we ourselves are thinking, feeling, and the like.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) How do we come to possess self-knowledge of this special sort?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This essay surveys some influential answers. !["Self-Knowledge" by Tanya Kostochka](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/self-knowledge2.jpg?resize=656%2C474&ssl=1)“Self-Knowledge” by Tanya Kostochka.### 1. The Value of Self-Knowledge To begin, let’s think about why having self-knowledge would be important. First, suppose that you usually know your mental states better than others do. If so, you will usually have control over when and where you reveal your mental activity to others:[\[6\]](#_ftn6) e.g., if you dislike your job, your being in a better position to know this than your boss means that you can keep this feeling hidden from them. Does it also matter that you know yourself *differently* from how others know you? Yes, at least if the special way in which you know yourself is part of *why* you know yourself best. If your boss cannot know your feelings in the same way that you know them, and if this way of knowing your feelings is generally more accurate than your boss’s ways of knowing them, then your boss won’t generally be as knowledgeable about your feelings as you are.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. Introspective Self-Knowledge What, then, is the source of self-knowledge? Perhaps self-knowledge is unique because it comes from *introspection*—a kind of “looking inward.” One theory of introspection is that each of us possesses a special mechanism or ability to “scan” and thereby reveal our own mental states to ourselves.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This ability is sometimes called “inner sense.” Inner sense is supposed to be far more reliable than “outer” senses, like hearing or sight, that give us knowledge of other people’s minds. It explains why we know ourselves both better and differently from how others know us. One concern, however, is that the inner sense is a highly speculative capacity, unlike our mechanisms for hearing, seeing, and the rest, each of which we know to exist. If we really have an inner sense capacity, we don’t know where it is located or how it works.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Worse still, without a clearer understanding of how inner sense works, we cannot be sure that it is more reliable than our outer senses.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Inner sense may exist, and it may be more reliable than our outer senses, but that’s disputable. ### 3. Extrospective Self-Knowledge Whereas introspection is a matter of looking inward,[\[11\]](#_ftn11) *extro*spection is a matter of looking *outward* in order to know your mind: e.g., to know whether *you believe* that the sky is blue, you can focus on whether *the sky is blue*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) If your answer is *yes*, then this is what you believe, and you can self-attribute this belief. You gain self-knowledge through extrospection by thinking about *the sky* rather than about *yourself*. Extrospection seems exceptionally reliable since, even if your belief about the sky were false, it would still be *your belief*, which means that you are correct in attributing it to yourself. Furthermore, if another person answers *yes* to “Is the sky blue?”, this does not reliably tell them what *you* believe. These points suggest that extrospection provides a better and different route to self-knowledge than to knowledge of others’ minds. This account does not require us to propose the existence of inner sense mechanisms either. One issue is that focusing on the outside world seems useless in some cases, such as for gaining self-knowledge of your tickles and pains. These sensations seem entirely “inner,” unlike beliefs or other mental states that are about the outside world. Extrospection may sometimes explain what is better and different about self-knowledge as compared to other-knowledge, but it may not do so for every case.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 4. Self-Knowledge for Free Perhaps self-knowledge is not based on introspection, extrospection, or *any* mediating process or mechanism. In other words, perhaps there is no real difference between knowing what is on your mind and *being* in that state of mind:[\[14\]](#_ftn14) e.g., maybe part of what it is to *feel* hunger is to be *aware* of your hunger sensations, and that part of what it is to *intend* to go shopping is to *know* that you intend to do this. If this is true, then self-knowledge is very different from knowledge of others’ minds, since others are never immediately aware of your mental states. Moreover, if it is in the very nature of your mental states that you are aware of them, then self-ignorance is out of the question, which ensures that you know yourself better than others know you. However, the idea that you are never mistaken about your mental states is implausible. Suppose you notice yourself acting harshly toward a friend. Is this driven by jealousy or tough love? The reflection process may not be easy; you may even end up self-deceived. And imagine someone who cries out “It hurts!” before the dentist’s drill even touches their mouth. Presumably, they are just *afraid*, not hurt.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Good explanations of self-knowledge should leave room for occasional self-ignorance. The present explanation may fare poorly in this regard. ### 5. Conclusion Here we have assumed that the best explanation of our special self-knowledge should explain *all* cases of it. Some philosophers, however, argue that some explanations explain some cases, and other explanations explain other cases, so putting complementary explanations together may explain all cases.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Alternatively, the inadequacy of each account might lead to skepticism about the uniqueness of self-knowledge. If the skeptics are right, then perhaps we cannot claim that self-knowledge plays such a valuable role in our lives.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This is, at least, a standard view, considerations about Gettier’s (1963) concerns for the ‘justified true belief’ account of knowledge notwithstanding: see [The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman and [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. Some philosophers, like Campbell 2018, prefer to see self-knowledge as an *ability* that does not require having belief about yourself. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Various other labels for this have been proposed. Perhaps most frequent is the label of “privileged access” to denote the special reliability of self-knowledge. For further discussion and references, see Byrne (2018, sect. 1.3.2). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Just as different labels for ‘better’ self-knowledge have been proposed, different labels for ‘different’ self-knowledge have been proposed as well. For instance, many philosophers describe self-knowledge as ‘peculiar’ insofar as it seems to have a different source than knowledge of other minds (and, indeed, our knowledge of the world more generally). For further discussion and references, see Byrne (2018, sect. 1.3.3). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) I follow Eric Marcus (2021) in using the labels ‘better’ and ‘different’ here, despite alternative possibilities as indicated in notes 2 and 3. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For two long-form surveys of how we acquire self-knowledge so well and so uniquely, see Gertler (2011) and Coliva (2016). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Peterson (2021, p. 4) calls this “epistemic control”. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For further discussion of the importance of such self-knowledge, see Shoemaker (1996), Burge (1996), Nguyen (2015), Sorgiovanni (2019), Peterson (2021), and Winokur (2021a, 2021b, 2021c, and forthcoming). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Perhaps this is a literal ‘inner eye’, or perhaps it is a mechanism that has its basis somewhere in the architecture of the brain. For further discussion, see Armstrong (1968) and Lycan (1996). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For both further defenses and criticisms of the inner sense account, see Byrne (2018). For further criticisms see, e.g., Burge (1996) and Shoemaker (1996b). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Shoemaker (1996) has argued at length that there could never be an agent, with normal rational abilities, that never knows her mental states better and differently than others know them. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Fernández (2003) coined the term ‘extrospection’, though the idea of extrospection is described by Evans (1982). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Byrne (2018) for the most detailed, systematic treatment of how we move from thinking about the world to thinking about ourselves in this extrospective way. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Byrne (2018) does attempt to extend his extrospective account to self-knowledge of all sorts of mental states, though his arguments have met with significant resistance. See, e.g., Bar-On and Johnson (2019). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) This view is often referred to as “constitutivism” about self-knowledge, because it is the idea that one’s mental states are constituted by one’s awareness of them. Some proponents of this view include Shoemaker (1996a), Bilgrami (2006), Coliva (2016), and Marcus (2021). Notably, constitutivists do not always claim that *all* of our mental states are self-known by nature. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) This case is adapted from Locke (1967) and Barz (2018). See Bar-On (2004, p. 8) for a similar case. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Boyle (2009) and Coliva (2016) for arguments that we should be pluralists about the sources of privileged and peculiar self-knowledge. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See Cassam (2014) for an elaboration of skepticism in this domain. For an earlier proponent of skepticism, see Ryle (2009 \[1949\]). Notably, Bilgrami (2006) and Coliva (2016, ch. 8) have sought to show that, while self-knowledge *can* require no mediating mechanism, this is not *always* the case. So, self-ignorance is possible some of the time, because sometimes we must use a process or mechanism to gain self-knowledge, and we can go wrong in the application of this process or mechanism. ### References [Armstrong, David. (1968). ](https://www.routledge.com/A-Materialist-Theory-of-the-Mind/Armstrong/p/book/9781032355412)[*A Materialist Theory of Mind*](https://www.routledge.com/A-Materialist-Theory-of-the-Mind/Armstrong/p/book/9781032355412)[. 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(2003). “Self-Knowledge and Rationality: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness,” In ](https://www.routledge.com/Privileged-Access-Philosophical-Accounts-of-Self-Knowledge/Gertler/p/book/9781138258136)[*Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge*](https://www.routledge.com/Privileged-Access-Philosophical-Accounts-of-Self-Knowledge/Gertler/p/book/9781138258136)[, ed. Brie Gertler, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 131-143.](https://www.routledge.com/Privileged-Access-Philosophical-Accounts-of-Self-Knowledge/Gertler/p/book/9781138258136) [Silins, Nico. (2012). “Judgement as a Guide to Belief,” In ](https://academic.oup.com/book/5466/chapter-abstract/148362967?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*Introspection and Consciousness*](https://academic.oup.com/book/5466/chapter-abstract/148362967?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[, eds. 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(2021a). “Critical Reasoning and the Inferential Transparency Method.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/resphilosophica/content/resphilosophica_2021_0098_0001_0023_0042)[*Res Philosophica*](https://www.pdcnet.org/resphilosophica/content/resphilosophica_2021_0098_0001_0023_0042)[ 98(1): 23-42.](https://www.pdcnet.org/resphilosophica/content/resphilosophica_2021_0098_0001_0023_0042) [— (2021b). “Inference and Self-Knowledge.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/logos-episteme/content/logos-episteme_2021_0012_0001_0077_0098)[*Logos & Episteme*](https://www.pdcnet.org/logos-episteme/content/logos-episteme_2021_0012_0001_0077_0098)[ 12(1): 77-98.](https://www.pdcnet.org/logos-episteme/content/logos-episteme_2021_0012_0001_0077_0098) [— (2021c). “Davidson, First-Person Authority, and Direct Self-Knowledge.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03381-4)[*Synthese*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03381-4)[, 199(5-6): 13421-13440.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-021-03381-4) — (Forthcoming). Self-Knowledge and Interpersonal Reasoning. *Dialectica*. ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Semantic Externalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/24/semantic-externalism/) by Rachel Bourbaki [The Extended Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/19/the-extended-mind/ "The Extended Mind") by Rachel Bourbaki [“I Think, Therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/#_ftn5) by Charles Miceli [The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement) by John Matheson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/self-knowledge-1.pdf). ### About the Author Benjamin Winokur is a Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Macau, China. He received his Ph.D. from York University in 2021. His interests span across epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and applied ethics (especially technology ethics). He has published articles about self-knowledge, self-expression, the nature of reasoning, metaethics, and the epistemology of social media. [BenWinokur.com](http://benwinokur.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Mind & Language **Tags:** self-knowledge --- ### [Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/06/01/godel/) **Published:** June 1, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems—discovered by Austrian logician, mathematician, and philosopher Kurt Gödel (1906-1978)—are central to many philosophical debates about the limits of logical and mathematical reasoning. This essay introduces the Theorems and explains their importance. **Content:** Author: Jon Charry Category: [Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word count: 1,000 *Gödel’s*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) *Incompleteness Theorems*—discovered by Austrian logician, mathematician, and philosopher Kurt Gödel (1906-1978)—are central to many philosophical debates about the limits of logical and mathematical reasoning.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay introduces the Theorems and explains their importance. [![Kurt Friedrich Gödel (1906-1978)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/godel.jpg?resize=656%2C867&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/godel.jpg?ssl=1)Kurt Friedrich Gödel (1906-1978). Photo by Marcel Natkin; reproduced by permission of Stephane and Laurent Natkin.### 1. Theories and Completeness For logicians, a theory is a set of *axioms*, or basic statements, used to deduce things about a specific domain. For example, theories of chemistry use axioms—“laws of chemistry”—to predict how chemicals might react when mixed. The Incompleteness Theorems reveal limitations of a different kind of theory, *arithmetical* theories. These theories use axioms to infer things about numbers, like that 1+1 equals 2. Ideally, a theory will be both *consistent* and *complete*. It’s consistent if its axioms can’t be used to prove a contradiction,[\[3\]](#_ftn3) and it’s complete if every true statement about its domain can be proven using the theory.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The First Theorem reads: (1st) Any sufficiently powerful and consistent theory is not complete (it’s *incomplete*).[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Gödel’s insight is that “sufficiently powerful”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) arithmetical theories—theories able to prove *a lot* of facts about numbers—are also able to prove facts about *themselves*. He showed that the concept of *provability*—whether a statement can be deduced from some axioms or not—can be represented by arithmetical statements like “1+1=2.” To do this, we need a *Gödel code*. ### 2. Gödel coding Since arithmetical theories are intended to prove statements like “1+1=2”, we don’t expect them to prove things about *themselves*, like “I can prove ‘1+1=2’”. The latter statement doesn’t seem to be about just numbers, but also about the theory itself. We can, however, use a clever trick to interpret certain *arithmetical* statements as statements about the theory itself. We do this by first stipulating a *Gödel code*: to each basic symbol of the theory, we assign a different natural number (its *Gödel number*). Let’s illustrate this by encoding the formula 1+1=2. There are four kinds of symbols in this formula: “1” (repeated twice), “+”, “=”, and “2”. We assign each of them a different number as follows: | **Symbol:** | 1 | 2 | + (plus) | = (equals) | |---|---|---|---|---| | **Gödel number:** | 31 | 33 | 35 | 37 | The numbers we picked in the second row are pretty arbitrary.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) What matters is that *different* symbols get *different* Gödel numbers. Now that each symbol in “1+1=2” has a Gödel number, we can encode the whole formula. There are five symbols (with repeats) in this formula, so we’ll write down five empty slots: \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ \_\_ Now we fill in the slots with the first five prime numbers: 2 3 5 7 11 Then raise each number to the power of the Gödel number of the symbol whose slot that is, and multiply everything together: 231 × 335 × 531 × 737 × 1133 This number is gigantic, but it uniquely labels the formula 1+1=2.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) We can think of this number as code for the formula 1+1=2. Gödel also extended the code so that any *collection* of formulas, such as a *proof* of some statement, can be given a unique Gödel number. ### 3. The provability predicate Where *p* is any formula, we’ll denote *p*’s Gödel number by G(*p*). We’ll now see how our theory is able to talk about itself. We define a relationship between numbers—the *provability predicate*, Proves(*x*,*y*)—as follows: Proves(*x*,*y*) =df *x* is the Gödel number of a proof of the formula whose Gödel number is *y*. Our theory, if it’s any good, could already prove basic things like “1+1=2”. With the introduction of the provability predicate, it can now also talk about what it can prove: The proof of “1+1=2” will be encoded as an enormously large number, say *n.* We showed already how to encode the formula “1+1=2” as the number 231 × 335 × 531 × 737 × 1133, or *m* for short. Our theory will now be able to prove the statement “Proves(*n*, *m*)”, which really just means “I can prove ‘1+1=2’”.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 4. The Gödel sentence We can finally build a sentence, a *Gödel sentence* we’ll call φ, that is not provable. The idea is to adapt the famous liar sentence: instead of “This sentence is false,”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) our Gödel sentence will say “This sentence is unprovable”. We define φ as:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) φ =df ~∃*x* \[ Proves(*x*, G(φ)) \]. That is, φ simply states that φ (itself) is unprovable. Suppose φ is provable. Then, since there is a proof of φ, there exists a (huge!) number *x* which is the Gödel code of this proof of φ. In other words, “∃*x* \[Proves(*x*, G(φ))\]” is true. But this is just the opposite of φ! If our theory really is consistent, it must be that we can’t prove φ to begin with. Since we can’t prove φ, what φ says is true.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) [\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 5. The Second Incompleteness Theorem We can now also convince ourselves of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, which reads: (2nd) Any sufficiently powerful theory cannot prove its own consistency. In the last section, we used the assumption that our theory is consistent to show that is unprovable. If our theory could prove that it is consistent, it would be able to encode our line of reasoning in the last section—once again, using Gödel coding—and would, just as we did, come to the conclusion that φ is not provable. But this means it would be able to prove φ, since this is just what φ says! This would violate the first Incompleteness Theorem. So, our theory cannot prove its own consistency.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 6. Conclusion We’ve learned that no matter how good a given mathematical theory is—no matter how many facts it is able to spit out—there will always be mathematical facts it cannot prove. The Gödel sentence is an example. Among these will also be the theory’s own consistency. Gödel’s results dashed the hopes of three towering giants of early 20th-century philosophy and mathematics: David Hilbert, Gottlob Frege, and Bertrand Russell.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) They wanted to “automate” math so that *all* mathematical facts could be deduced from a carefully built, consistent theory. The Theorems, however, seem to crush these hopes. More recent discussions apply Gödel’s results to the question of whether human minds are essentially just complex machines. Some, for instance, have argued that Gödel’s Theorems suggest a negative answer, and that human reasoning will always surpass computers. Others have countered this view, and the debate continues.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) In English, “Gödel” is pronounced like “Grr-dle”. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This article includes logical notation that some readers may be unfamiliar with. Readers might benefit from first reading [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing and [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf. These articles provide a good introduction to symbolizing English statements using logical symbols. The latter article especially is a good place to read about *theories* (there called *systems*), even if what we are talking about here has little to do with modality (the logic of possibility and necessity). Readers are also encouraged to peruse the accessible biography of Gödel *Incompleteness* by Rebecca Goldstein. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) A contradiction is a statement of the form “P and ~P”. For example, “It is raining and it is not raining”. In classical logic, inconsistent theories are bad—in the sense of being undesirable—because of the principle of explosion: any inconsistent theory, using usual inference rules afforded to us by classical logic, will be able to prove *any* statement whatsoever. This is undesirable because it will mean the theory is able to prove a bunch of falsehoods in addition to a bunch of statements that may happen to be true. We won’t be able to sift through the falsehoods and true statements ourselves . . . that’s what we wanted the theory for in the first place, to tell us which statements are true! It is possible to move to certain *non-classical* logics for which the principle of explosion doesn’t hold. See (Priest, 2022) for more on this. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) A different definition of *complete* is that a theory is complete when, for any sentence, it or its negation can be proven from the theory. Nothing turns on this discrepancy: Gödel’s Theorems imply that any sufficiently powerful theory of arithmetic will not be complete (in both senses). See also n.12 for a bit more of a technical clarification of the notion of “true” in the given definition of *complete*. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Actually, Gödel’s original statement of the theorem assumed that the theory in question is *omega-consistent*, which is a more stringent requirement on theories than mere consistency. But the way we’ve stated the result here is also correct. J. Barkley Rosser is credited with improving Gödel’s result by showing that the assumption of omega-consistency can be relaxed to just consistency. See Rosser’s original article (Rosser, 1936). See also (Smith, 2013) and (Smullyan, 1992) for more details. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) We won’t specify here exactly what is meant by “sufficiently powerful”. The goal is for this article to explain how the Incompleteness Theorems work for theories that are powerful enough to prove “a lot” about arithmetic. We’d certainly expect the statement “1 + 1 = 2” to be provable in any such sufficiently powerful theory. There are various ways a logician might define what “sufficiently powerful” means, but the least technical way is perhaps the following: a theory is sufficiently powerful if it can prove a set of seven fairly straightforward axioms known as [*Robinson arithmetic*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic). These axioms establish very basic properties of the ordinary counting numbers (0,1,2,…) and the successor function *s.* For example, one of the axioms states that 0 is not the successor of any number (after all, we start counting at 0!). This definition is still not entirely satisfactory, but for our purposes this is what a sufficiently powerful arithmetical theory should look like. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) If we had more space, we would also provide a Gödel code for the other more traditional symbols used in logic, like ∀ meaning “for all” and ~ meaning “not”. [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing reviews many of these symbols. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Notice a subtlety we’re not addressing here: with this Gödel code, we can assign to any formula of our theory of arithmetic a unique Gödel number, but it may be that there are numbers which do not encode a corresponding formula. It’s possible to specify a different code for which every number is the code of some formula. See (Smullyan, 1992, p. 6) for some details on this. On that note, the uniqueness of Gödel numbers is easy to verify. That is, whenever a number *is* the Gödel number of some formula, it is unique (i.e., there is no other number that is the Gödel number of that formula). This can be seen by noticing that every number can be uniquely factored into primes. For example, the number 12 can be factored into 4 and 3 (since 4 times 3 is 12); and 4 can be further factored into 2 and 2. Now, 2 and 3 cannot be further factored; they are *prime* numbers. No number, other than 12, can be factored into these three primes (2, another 2, and a 3). So these three primes uniquely label the number 12 in much the same way that the big number from above uniquely labels the formula “1+1*=*2”. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) We’re unrealistically personifying the theory here, but no harm done. It can be useful to think of a theory as a machine that spits out facts about some “target system” (if it’s any good). A sufficiently strong arithmetical theory is a machine that is also “aware” of what it can and can’t prove by being able to Gödel-encode statements and proofs of statements. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The liar sentence states “This sentence is false.” If true, then the sentence is false. And if false, then it must be true. This is a paradox. See (Beall, 2020) for much more on this. Although it may be helpful to think of the Gödel sentence as related to the liar sentence, this is not an exact connection; the Gödel sentence talks about provability—whether or not something can be proven or demonstrated using a theory—whereas the liar is related to truth and falsity. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Strictly speaking, we do not simply “define” this sentence to be this way. Similarly, we do not simply “define” the provability predicate Proves(x,y) the way we did above. Rather, what’s important is making sure that once all the formulas have been given a label according to some Gödel code, there exist formulas with these properties, i.e., that there actually exists a formula like Proves(x,y) which is true just in case x is the Gödel number of a proof of a formula whose Gödel number is y, and that there actually exists a formula φ which is true just in case there does not exist a proof (with Gödel number x) of y. Here we’ve simply defined these to be the way they are, without rigorously demonstrating that these formulas always exist for any sufficiently powerful arithmetical theory. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) There’s a subtle point here. When we say that the Gödel sentence is *true*, we don’t mean that it is a *tautology* or that it is *valid* (i.e., always true). Since the Gödel sentence (and its negation) is unprovable, there will be some interpretations of the theory in which it is true and some in which it is false. However, in the “target system” of arithmetic (the standard counting numbers 0, 1, 2,…), it is true. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Similarly, ~φ is also unprovable. We could offer a very similar sketch of a proof of why the negation of the Gödel sentence is not provable. But we will in fact have to assume that the theory in question satisfies a condition which is actually stricter than just merely being consistent. This is called *omega-consistency*. The reader is encouraged to consult (Smith, 2013) or (Smullyan, 1992) for details. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Here are two more details we’ve omitted, though they are treated in more (even if just a little more) advanced sources. First, notice that self-reference is important to the First Theorem. The Gödel sentence references *its own* provability, much like the liar sentence (see footnote 9) references its own truth. In order to be sure that theories of arithmetic are able to express statements that are self-referential in this way, we need to do more work. Second, it is actually possible to prove that theories of arithmetic can define a wide variety of provability predicates. For some of these, the Second Incompleteness Theorem will not hold. Fortunately, we need not worry about them; if we impose very reasonable rules (called the *Hilbert-Bernays conditions*) on how exactly a provability predicate should behave, the Second Incompleteness Theorem will follow from *these* kinds of provability predicates. These nuances can be found in (Smith, 2013) and (Smullyan, 1992). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) In a little more detail: in 1900 the mathematician David Hilbert issued a set of twenty-three unsolved math problems he felt were central to mathematical thinking at the time. The second problem on the list challenged mathematicians to prove the consistency of the most powerful theories of arithmetic of the time. Similarly, the logician-philosophers Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell were early advocates of *logicism*, which roughly states that all mathematical truths are reducible to statements which can be proved by an appropriate theory. These two projects are often cited as having taken the biggest hit when Gödel published his results. See (Raatikainen, 2022) for much more on the philosophical upshots of the Theorems. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) For much more on this debate, see David Chalmers’ article “Minds, Machines, And Mathematics: A Review of *Shadows of the Mind* by Roger Penrose”. Physics Nobel laureate Roger Penrose’s argument is detailed in his book, *Shadows of the Mind*. A similar argument was given much earlier by philosopher J.R. Lucas in his paper “Minds, Machines and Gödel.” Since then, there have been a host of philosophical arguments inspired by Gödel’s results. ### References [Beall, J. (2020). “Liar Paradox.” In E. Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/)[ (Fall 2020 ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/) [Chalmers, D. (1995). “Minds, Machines, And Mathematics: A Review of ](https://consc.net/papers/penrose.html)[*Shadows of the Mind*](https://consc.net/papers/penrose.html)[ by Roger Penrose”. ](https://consc.net/papers/penrose.html)[*PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness*](https://consc.net/papers/penrose.html)[, 2, 11-20.](https://consc.net/papers/penrose.html) [Gödel, K. (1992). ](https://monoskop.org/images/9/93/Kurt_G%C3%B6del_On_Formally_Undecidable_Propositions_of_Principia_Mathematica_and_Related_Systems_1992.pdf)[*On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems*](https://monoskop.org/images/9/93/Kurt_G%C3%B6del_On_Formally_Undecidable_Propositions_of_Principia_Mathematica_and_Related_Systems_1992.pdf)[. Dover. ](https://monoskop.org/images/9/93/Kurt_G%C3%B6del_On_Formally_Undecidable_Propositions_of_Principia_Mathematica_and_Related_Systems_1992.pdf) [Goldstein, R. (2005). ](https://www.rebeccagoldstein.com/publications/incompleteness-proof-and-paradox-kurt-g%C3%B6del)[*Incompleteness: The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel*](https://www.rebeccagoldstein.com/publications/incompleteness-proof-and-paradox-kurt-g%C3%B6del)[. W.W. Norton & Company. ](https://www.rebeccagoldstein.com/publications/incompleteness-proof-and-paradox-kurt-g%C3%B6del) [Lucas, J.R. (1961). “Minds, Machines and Gödel”. ](https://philomatica.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/lucas1961.pdf)[*Philosophy*](https://philomatica.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/lucas1961.pdf)[, 36(137), 112-127.](https://philomatica.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/lucas1961.pdf) [Penrose, R. (1994). ](https://www.amazon.com/Shadows-Mind-Missing-Science-Consciousness/dp/0195106466)[*Shadows of the Mind*](https://www.amazon.com/Shadows-Mind-Missing-Science-Consciousness/dp/0195106466)[. Oxford University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Shadows-Mind-Missing-Science-Consciousness/dp/0195106466) [Priest, G. (2022). “Paraconsistent Logic.” In E. Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/)[ (Summer 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/) [Raatikainen, P. (2022). “Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems.” In Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/)[ (Spring 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/) [Rosser, J. Barkley. (1936). “Extensions of some theorems of Gödel and Church”. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/extensions-of-some-theorems-of-godel-and-church/0461E34DC1F219C459EE84CC2FA89068)[*Journal of Symbolic Logic*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/extensions-of-some-theorems-of-godel-and-church/0461E34DC1F219C459EE84CC2FA89068)[, 1(3), 87–91.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/extensions-of-some-theorems-of-godel-and-church/0461E34DC1F219C459EE84CC2FA89068) [Smith, P. (2013).](https://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Theorems-Cambridge-Introductions-Philosophy/dp/1107606756)[ *An Introduction to Gödel’s Theorems*](https://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Theorems-Cambridge-Introductions-Philosophy/dp/1107606756)[. Cambridge](https://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Theorems-Cambridge-Introductions-Philosophy/dp/1107606756). [Smullyan, R. (1992). ](https://www.brucewatkins.org/math/docs/Smullyan.pdf)[*Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems*](https://www.brucewatkins.org/math/docs/Smullyan.pdf)[. Oxford.](https://www.brucewatkins.org/math/docs/Smullyan.pdf) ### Related Essays [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/06/01/godel/) by Jon Charry ### Translation [Italian](https://adscienza.it/kurt-godel-teoremi-di-incompletezza/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Godel.pdf). ### About the Author Jon Charry is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara specializing in philosophy of physics and logic. [philosophy.ucsb.edu/people/jon-charry](https://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/people/jon-charry) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Gödel, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems --- ### [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/) **Published:** December 20, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is a cause? What is it for something to cause something else? This essay presents three of the most important philosophical theories of causation. **Content:** Author: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Wordcount: 998 Suppose every time you drank almond milk, you got sick. The first time you got sick, you might not know why. But eventually, you might come to think almond milk was *causing* your sickness: maybe you’re allergic to almonds. But what is a *cause* anyway? What is it for something to cause something else? Answers to these questions matter for scientific explanation and prediction as well as holding others responsible for what they do. This essay presents three influential philosophical theories of causation. [![An image of a glass of almond milk.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/causation.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/causation.jpg?ssl=1) An image of a glass of almond milk.### 1. Constant Conjunction and Theories of Causation To understand theories of causation, it helps to understand the concept of a *constant conjunction. Conjunctions* are series of *events*—things that happen—where one event happens after the other. A *constant* conjunction is when one event *always* follows —is conjoined with—another event, as far as anyone has observed. Constant conjunctions matter because *A* causing *B* seems to require that *B* *always* follows *A*. For instance, if you get sick only once after drinking almond milk, then drinking almond milk doesn’t *cause* your illness.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But causation must be something *more* than just constant conjunction since some constant conjunctions are just accidents: maybe you always drink almond milk when you eat dates, and *dates* make you ill. Most philosophers, following Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), understand causation as constant conjunction plus *something else*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Theories proposing that this extra condition is something mind-dependent are called *Humean*—since, as we will see, Hume held such a view; theories referring to facts about the world outside of our minds for this extra condition are called *non-Humean*. ### 2. Hume on Causation Hume believed that the extra condition is something our minds impose onto our observations. When we watch one billiard ball slam into another, we *expect* the second ball to move. Because we have seen many balls move after collisions with other balls, we anticipate *this* ball will move *after* another ball collides with it.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Hume was an *empiricist* about knowledge of the physical world: knowledge ultimately comes from some sensory experience.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But we can’t see, or otherwise observe, a causal connection between the two balls; we can only observe one ball rolling and then the next. So when we think that one ball’s motion *causes* the other’s, this is something our mind imposes on our observations: it is not an observation itself. One challenge for Hume’s theory is this: we often try to determine what causes what—e.g., what causes various diseases. But if causation is just about our own psychological habits—and not about the world outside of our own minds—it’s unclear why we would, or should, care so much about causation. Those who follow Hume in their thinking about causation owe us an explanation here. ### 3. Causation and Laws of Nature One non-Humean alternative to Hume’s theory relies on *laws of nature* to define and explain causation.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Laws of nature are features of our world that connect facts in one region of space and time to those elsewhere.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Frequently, laws of nature establish a *necessary connection* between a past and future state of the world: they tell us what the future *must* be given a specified past.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) One simple non-Humean view defines causation as a constant conjunction where the (past) cause is necessarily connected to the (future) effect by a law of nature. Laws of nature ensure that effects *must* follow whenever their causes are present. To return to the almond milk example, we might identify a law like “When someone allergic to almonds drinks almond milk, they are likely to be sick afterwards.” Then, the fact that you are allergic to almonds *and* the fact that you just drank almond milk would both constitute causes of your illness. This theory seems promising, but it faces a problem: *many* conditions must be satisfied in order for laws to necessarily connect the past and future. For instance, the previously-mentioned law only connects your almond milk-drinking with your illness if other assumptions hold, like that you didn’t take medicine that would have neutralized your body’s response to the almond milk. Yet only your drinking almond milk seems to cause your illness; your not taking medicine doesn’t. We need some way to separate causes from non-causal *background conditions* like not taking medicine. Natural law-focused non-Humean theories of causation don’t clearly give us a way to do this. ### 4. Counterfactual Causation Another theory of causation appeals to *counterfactuals* to anchor our understanding of causation.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Counterfactuals are claims about what the world would be like if something were different. For instance, “If I were two feet taller, then I could dunk a basketball.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) This theory may be Humean or Non-Humean, depending on whether one thinks counterfactual claims are about how we judge the world to be or about how the world really is. The *Counterfactual Theory of Causation* says that *A* causes *B* just in case there is a constant conjunction between them, and, *if A did not happen*, *B would not happen*. On the counterfactual theory of causation, we’d say that the almond milk caused your illness when we additionally know that, if you had *not* consumed that almond milk, then you would *not* have gotten sick.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) This theory aligns with some of the ways people think and talk about causation, but it also faces serious challenges. Here’s one: imagine everything in your refrigerator, including your almond milk, contains the same illness-inducing bacteria. So even if you didn’t drink almond milk, you would have gotten sick anyway from consuming something else illness-inducing. Counterfactual theorists cannot say that the almond milk caused your sickness because, if you had consumed anything else available, then you would still have gotten sick. This is an example of *preemption*, where one cause blocks another cause of the same effect. Cases of preemption reveal that counterfactual theories of causation require further refinement.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 5. Conclusion Though each theory has its advocates, all face challenges. Engaging these challenges and better understanding causation is essential given how common, and important, it is to try to identify causes in daily life, the sciences, and more. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Hume is called a “regularity theorist,” which means he believes that the relationship between cause and effect is a *regularity*, a pattern that always repeats in nature the same way. So, for Hume, effects *always* follow their causes. But not all causal theories agree with Hume about this —see, for instance, Hitchcock (2021) for a discussion of *probabilistic causation*, which happens when effects *often*, but not *always*, follow from their causes. (For an introduction to different understandings of probability, which could be applied to theories of causation, see [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf). You may find such theories appealing if you disagree with the claim that almond milk doesn’t cause your illness if you only get sick sometimes after drinking it. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature*, specifically 1.3.6-10, and Hume’s *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, specifically sections 4 and 5 of the first enquiry, for Hume’s discussion of causation. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Specifically, according to Hume, it is the psychological forces of *custom* and *habit* that lead me to expect this outcome. See section 5 of Hume (1748). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For a brief introduction to empiricism, see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See [Laws of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella for more on what these might be. Mill (1843) is one of the first to prominently ground his understanding of causation in laws of nature. Mackie’s (1965) theory of causation offers a more nuanced update of Mill’s approach. I follow (and simplify) Mackie’s approach in this section. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Not all philosophers understand laws of nature as capturing facts about the world as opposed to facts about our minds; the “best systems” account of lawhood, for instance, holds that laws of nature differ from other kinds of claims we might make because of the central role laws of nature have in our thinking about the natural world, not because they have some independent, physical reality. Those who think about laws this way could use laws to understand causation too, but the resulting theory would be a Humean, not a non-Humean, theory of causation. See Carroll (2020) for more on this and alternative theories of laws of nature. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Not all laws of nature conform to this generalization—for instance, a law of nature might establish a necessary connection between two regions of space (for instance, a law might tell us how strong an electric field is one meter away from an electric charge of a certain strength), or it might establish only a probabilistic connection between some past state of the world and the future (for instance, a law might tell us a radioactive isotope has a certain percentage chance of decaying in the next year). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The most popular and thorough contemporary counterfactual theory of causation comes from Lewis (1973). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Counterfactual claims are common but tricky to assess because it’s not always apparent what makes them true or false. I am not over seven feet tall, for instance, so what makes it true that, *if I were*, I could dunk a basketball? One way to understand what makes true counterfactual claims true is to think about *possible worlds:* see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andrew Leo Rusavuk for an introduction to this concept. Possible worlds are ways that the world could be; they are large, consistent sets of claims about all of the things in the world: so, there are possible worlds where I *can* dunk a basketball, possible worlds where I can’t (this is a special possible world called the *actual* world), and *perhaps* even a possible world where I *am* a basketball (unless this is impossible and so there is no such possible world!): see [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different about You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance. Some possible worlds are said to be “closer” to the actual world than others. Worlds closer to the actual world are ones that share more facts in common with the actual world than worlds that are farther away. For instance, the possible world where I can occasionally dunk a basketball is closer than the possible world where I am a professional basketball player who can nearly always dunk a basketball. We can use this language of possible worlds to help us understand when counterfactuals are true or false. A counterfactual of the form “If A were true, then C would be true,” is true just in case, in the closest possible world where A is true, C is true. This counterfactual is false just in case, in the closest possible world where A is true, C is false. For more on counterfactuals, see Starr and Kocurek (2025) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) It is worth noting that we can complete the circle by clarifying the relationship between laws of nature and counterfactuals—many philosophers take laws of nature to justify which counterfactual claims are true and which are false. There are even theories of natural laws that define these features in terms of counterfactual claims. For one example of such a theory, see Lange (2009). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Cases of preemption are related to a similar challenge for counterfactual theories of causation, *overdetermination*, which occurs when many different causes seem to lead to the same effect instead of one cause blocking another (as happens in the almond milk example). An example of overdetermination is a firing squad. Imagine a prisoner is executed by being shot by 100 different bullets fired from 100 different rifles. Per the counterfactual account of causation, it seems wrong to call any one of those bullets the cause of the prisoner’s death since, had that bullet *not* been fired, the prisoner would still have been shot by 99 bullets and would still have died. Yet this fact seems to lead to the conclusion that *none* of the bullets caused the prisoner’s death, which is also clearly wrong. For more on challenges to counterfactual theories of causation and some of the responses to them that counterfactual theorists have come up with, see Menzies and Beebee (2024). ### References [Carroll, John W., “Laws of Nature,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/laws-of-nature/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/laws-of-nature/)[(Winter 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/laws-of-nature/) [Hitchcock, Christopher, “Probabilistic Causation.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/)[(Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/) [Hume, David (1739). ](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705)[*A Treatise of Human Nature*](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705)[. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705)[Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg. Retrieved November 7, 2026.](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705) [Hume, David (1748). ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm)[*An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm)[. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg. Retrieved November 7, 2026.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9662/9662-h/9662-h.htm) [Lange, Marc. (2009). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/laws-and-lawmakers-9780195328134)[*Laws and lawmakers: Science, metaphysics, and the laws of nature*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/laws-and-lawmakers-9780195328134)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/laws-and-lawmakers-9780195328134) [Lewis, D. (1973). Causation. ](https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LEWC&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2Fpdfplus%2F2025310.pdf)[*The journal of philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LEWC&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2Fpdfplus%2F2025310.pdf)[, ](https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LEWC&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2Fpdfplus%2F2025310.pdf)[*70*](https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LEWC&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2Fpdfplus%2F2025310.pdf)[(17), 556-567.](https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=LEWC&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fstable%2Fpdfplus%2F2025310.pdf) [Mackie, J. L., 1965, “Causes and Conditions”, ](https://philpapers.org/rec/MACCAC-4)[*American Philosophical Quarterly*](https://philpapers.org/rec/MACCAC-4)[, 2(4): 245–264.](https://philpapers.org/rec/MACCAC-4) [Menzies, Peter and Helen Beebee. (2024) “Counterfactual Theories of Causation”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/causation-counterfactual/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/causation-counterfactual/)[(Winter 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/causation-counterfactual/) [Mill, John Stuart, 1843, ](https://archive.org/details/systemoflogicrat01millrich/page/n5/mode/2up)[*A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*](https://archive.org/details/systemoflogicrat01millrich/page/n5/mode/2up)[, two volumes, London: Parker.](https://archive.org/details/systemoflogicrat01millrich/page/n5/mode/2up) [Starr, Willow and Alex Kocurek (2025), “Counterfactuals.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/counterfactuals)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/counterfactuals)[(Winter 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/counterfactuals) ### Related Essays [Laws of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/ "Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology") by Michael Zerella [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andrew Leo Rusavuk [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different about You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) By Chad Vance [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/nedensellik-nedenler-nedir-dan-peterson/), [Turkish](https://thecurious.tr/yazilar/metafizik-ontoloji/dan-peterson-nedensellik-nedenler-nedir/) ### PDF Download Download this essay in PDF. ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Morehouse College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** causation, cause, causes, causing, Peterson --- ### [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) **Published:** January 5, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to agnosticism about God’s existence, an alternative to theism and atheism. **Content:** Author: Sylwia Wilczewska Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word count: 997 One of the main debates in the philosophy of religion is between theists, who believe that God exists, and atheists, who believe there is no God.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) However, not everyone interested in God’s existence is a theist or an atheist. The term “agnosticism”, coined by Thomas Henry Huxley in the 1860s, describes the view of some of the people who do not fit into these two camps. This essay introduces agnosticism. [![Balancing girl standing on a teeter-totter.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/balancing.webp?resize=656%2C436&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/balancing.webp?ssl=1)Balancing girl standing on a teeter-totter.### 1. What is agnosticism? One is agnostic about something when one suspends judgment on it, i.e., is neutral or undecided about the issue in question after considering it: e.g., most people, when they begin wondering whether the number of leaves on a nearby tree is odd or even, become agnostic on the matter.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Within the contemporary philosophy of religion, the word “agnosticism” usually refers to the position of those who suspend judgment on the existence of God. ### 2. What agnosticism is not To avoid common misconceptions about agnosticism, one should note that: - agnosticism is not necessarily incompatible with religious faith. According to some, agnostics can have *non-doxastic faith,* e. faith without theistic belief, with some other positive attitude (e.g., hope) at its core.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Another positive option for an agnostic is to embrace *fictionalism* and treat religion like a fictional narrative that guides one’s actions.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) However, agnosticism does not entail any specific positive or negative attitude towards religion; - agnostics may or may not actively seek or hope to acquire evidence about the existence of God. Agnosticism entails neither being a ‘seeker’ nor spiritual indifference;[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - agnosticism is not the same thing as *apophaticism*, which states that God is essentially unknowable: on most accounts, apophaticists are a subgroup of theists; - agnosticism is not the same thing as *religious non-cognitivism* – the position that the question of whether God exists (like all statements which involve the term “God” or other religious terms) does not make sense (e.g., because it does not refer to anything empirically observable) and thus cannot have a meaningful answer. Both agnostics and non-cognitivists are neither theists nor atheists, but agnostics believe that the question of whether God exists does have an answer, even though they suspend judgment on what it is. ### 3. Why agnosticism? The main argument for agnosticism can be described as *the evidential argument*. One of its premises is the view (called *evidentialism*) that one should *believe* something if evidence supports it, *disbelieve* it if evidence supports its negation, and *suspend judgment* on the matter if evidence is neutral. The other premise states that evidence about whether God exists is neutral between theism and atheism, prompting the agnostic conclusion. Why consider the evidence about God’s existence to be neutral? Some argue that there is an equal amount of evidence for theism and atheism (which includes the view that there is no evidence for any of the two). Others prefer to say that the evidence is ambiguous: it is not clear how much evidence there is on each side or how to measure it – e.g., it is hard to say how the existence of evil, which supports atheism, measures against the ontological arguments for God’s existence.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 4. Why not agnosticism? Every argument for theism or atheism, considered in itself, is also an argument against agnosticism, but there have also been attempts to directly challenge the evidential argument. One answer to the evidential argument for agnosticism is that suspending judgment on the existence of God is psychologically or practically impossible (or identical to atheism in psychological or practical terms). The reason for this would be that whether we are theists or not determines our actions and attitudes (e.g. our expectations about the afterlife) in such a way that one cannot have neutral position on God’s existence – just like one cannot be neutral about performing an action: one can only perform it or not perform it.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Another common answer to the evidential argument is noting that the evidence for a lot of things is ambiguous, but it is generally considered unreasonable to suspend judgment on all of them. Especially in areas such as ethics or politics, where a lot is at stake, we routinely have strong beliefs even though evidence allows for different readings, and it seems counterintuitive to say that these beliefs are not rationally justified. If we are justified in having such beliefs despite neutral or ambiguous evidence, the burden of explaining why this is not the case with theistic or atheistic belief is on the agnostic.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 5. Weak and strong agnosticism Two types of agnosticism, *strong and weak*, have been distinguished. The views on the nature of the difference between them vary. One proposed criterion of the distinction is whether agnosticism is considered to be universally rationally required: *weak* agnostics believe that, for some people at some times (which includes themselves at the current moment), rationality *allows* suspending judgment on God’s existence; *strong* agnostics state that everyone is always *obliged* to do that if they are to remain rational. On this account, weak agnosticism is preferable if *some* people at *some* times may have neutral or ambiguous evidence, and strong agnosticism is the right option if evidence available *always* and *to everyone* is neutral or ambiguous. As a consequence, weak agnostics believe it is *possible* to have evidentially justified theistic or atheistic belief, while strong agnostics take it to be an *impossibility.*[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 6. The future of agnosticism Agnosticism has often been perceived as an “empty” position – nothing more than an inability or unwillingness to take a stance. In spite of that, philosophers are increasingly interested in its positive aspect: the possibility and nature of perspectives resulting from suspending judgment on God’s existence. While some philosophers explore the consequences of combining permanent agnosticism with some form of religious commitment or its absence, others analyze the nature of agnosticism as a stage on the way to a more robust (theistic or atheistic) position. In any case, agnosticism seems to be the key to the epistemic and spiritual borderland which extends between theistic and atheistic realms. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) On an alternative definition of atheism, everyone who does not believe that God exists is a *negative* atheist, while a *positive* atheist is someone who believes that God does not exist. That would make agnostics a subset of negative atheists. See e.g. Martin 2007: 1-3 and Draper 2017. For discussion, see [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For a detailed analysis of the suspension of judgment and its relation to indecision, see Friedman 2013: 166-167. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The nature of non-doxastic faith and its relation to agnosticism are a matter of debate, but the openness to the possibility of God’s existence, which can be the grounds for hope or similar positive attitudes, is often considered to make such faith possible for an agnostic. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) While it may be possible for an atheist to be a fictionalist, it has long been argued that fictionalism is an especially fitting attitude for an agnostic. A recent proposal to combine agnosticism with fictionalism can be found in Le Poidevin 2020. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For an example of the position connecting agnosticism to spiritual inquiry, see Draper 2002. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For a definition of agnosticism in terms of equal amount of evidence on both sides, see e.g. Martin 2007: 3. For the definition in terms of the difficulties with evidential assessment, see e.g. Le Poidevin 2010: 54-57, and Oppy 2018: 50-63. For a general discussion on the role of evidence in epistemically justified beliefs, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This answer, the classic version of which has been presented by William James in his classic “The Will to Believe” (James 1896/1979), lies at the heart of the contention between evidentialists and pragmatists, and its significance for agnosticism is hard to overstate. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) E.g., Van Inwagen 1996. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For more details, see Oppy 1994: 147-148 and 2018: 18-19. See also Kenny 1983: 87-88 and Le Poidevin 2010: 9-10. ### References [Draper, Paul (2017), “Atheism and Agnosticism”. In ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/) [Draper, Paul. (2002). “Seeking But Not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic”. In ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/divine-hiddenness/seeking-but-not-believing-confessions-of-a-practicing-agnostic/2DA323072797E36AD7077F0952B13180)[*Divine Hiddenness: New Essays* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/divine-hiddenness/seeking-but-not-believing-confessions-of-a-practicing-agnostic/2DA323072797E36AD7077F0952B13180)[(eds. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Paul K. Moser, pp. 197-214). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/divine-hiddenness/seeking-but-not-believing-confessions-of-a-practicing-agnostic/2DA323072797E36AD7077F0952B13180) [Friedman, Jane. (2013). “Suspended Judgment”. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y)[*Philosophical Studies,* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y)[162(2), 165-181. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y) [Huxley, Thomas Henry. (1896). “Agnosticism”. ](https://archive.org/details/sciencechristian00huxl_1/page/n9/mode/2up)[*Science and Christian Tradition* ](https://archive.org/details/sciencechristian00huxl_1/page/n9/mode/2up)[(pp. 209-240). New York: D. Appleton and Company.](https://archive.org/details/sciencechristian00huxl_1/page/n9/mode/2up) [James, William. (1896/1979). “The Will to Believe”. In ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674952812)[*The Will to Believe* ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674952812)[(eds. Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, Ignas K. Skrupskelis, pp. 2-32). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674952812) [Kenny, Anthony. (1983). ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Faith_and_Reason/tuIWAAAAIAAJ?hl=en)[*Faith and Reason.* ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Faith_and_Reason/tuIWAAAAIAAJ?hl=en)[New York: Columbia University Press.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Faith_and_Reason/tuIWAAAAIAAJ?hl=en) [Le Poidevin, Robin. (2010). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/agnosticism-a-very-short-introduction-9780199575268?cc=pl&lang=en&)[*Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction.* ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/agnosticism-a-very-short-introduction-9780199575268?cc=pl&lang=en&)[Oxford: Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/agnosticism-a-very-short-introduction-9780199575268?cc=pl&lang=en&) [Le Poidevin, Robin. (2020). “The New Agnosticism”. In ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/agnosticism-9780198859123?cc=pl&lang=en&)[*Agnosticism. Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/agnosticism-9780198859123?cc=pl&lang=en&)[ (eds. Francis Fallon, Gavin Hyman, pp. 29-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/agnosticism-9780198859123?cc=pl&lang=en&) [Martin, Michael. (2007). “General Introduction”. In ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-atheism/general-introduction/5A1B9596D7428C825B6A77D22FC56CDE)[*The Cambridge Companion to Atheism* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-atheism/general-introduction/5A1B9596D7428C825B6A77D22FC56CDE)[(ed. Michael Martin, pp. 1-7)](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-atheism/general-introduction/5A1B9596D7428C825B6A77D22FC56CDE)[*.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-atheism/general-introduction/5A1B9596D7428C825B6A77D22FC56CDE)[New York: Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-atheism/general-introduction/5A1B9596D7428C825B6A77D22FC56CDE) [Oppy, Graham. (1994). “Weak Agnosticism Defended”. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01316921)[*International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01316921)[36(3), 147-167.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01316921) [Oppy, Graham. (2018). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/atheism-and-agnosticism/C0D61CA2D386696A43294D440B7F9C11)[*Atheism and Agnosticism.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/atheism-and-agnosticism/C0D61CA2D386696A43294D440B7F9C11)[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/atheism-and-agnosticism/C0D61CA2D386696A43294D440B7F9C11) [Van Inwagen, Peter. (1996). “It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence”. In ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780847681532/Faith-Freedom-and-Rationality-Philosophy-of-Religion-Today)[*Faith, Freedom and Rationality* ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780847681532/Faith-Freedom-and-Rationality-Philosophy-of-Religion-Today)[(eds. Jeff Jordan, Daniel Howard-Snyder, pp. 137-154). Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780847681532/Faith-Freedom-and-Rationality-Philosophy-of-Religion-Today) ### For further reading [Wilczewska, Sylwia (2020). “Agnosticism I: Language, Perspectives and Evidence”. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12666)[*Philosophy Compass* ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12666)[15(6).](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12666) [Wilczewska, Sylwia (2020). “Agnosticism II: Actions and Attitudes”. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12663)[*Philosophy Compass* ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12663)[15(5).](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12663) ### Related essays [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/ "Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief") by Tom Metcalf [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/agnosticism.pdf). ### About the Author Sylwia Wilczewska is an adjunct at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and a research assistant at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin. Her philosophical interests currently focus on the epistemology of religion and the issues surrounding the relation between philosophy and literature. [pan-pl.academia.edu/SylwiaWilczewska](https://pan-pl.academia.edu/SylwiaWilczewska) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** agnostic, agnosticism --- ### [Frege’s Puzzle and the Meaning of Words](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/11/19/freges-puzzle-and-the-meaning-of-words/) **Published:** November 19, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to Frege's puzzle and outline his solution. **Content:** Author: Graham Seth Moore Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) Word Count: 996 We sometimes use multiple names for the same person or thing without realizing it. Imagine an ancient astronomer sees a heavenly body in the evening and names it ‘Hesperus.’ They also see a heavenly body in the morning and name it ‘Phosphorus.’ What they do not realize, however, is that they have named the same planet twice over, the planet that we now know as Venus. Similarly, in the Superman comics, Lois Lane doesn’t doesn’t realize that the person she knows as ‘Superman’ is the same as the person she knows as ‘Clark Kent.’ Also, many people don’t know that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens. These scenarios all raise a puzzle that is pivotal to our understanding of *meaning* and *thought*—two central notions in the philosophy of language and mind. It is called Frege’s puzzle, after the philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). This essay will introduce the puzzle and outline Frege’s solution. [![Clark Kent and Superman](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/superman-and-clark-kent.jpg?resize=564%2C564&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/superman-and-clark-kent.jpg?ssl=1)Clark Kent and Superman### 1. Reference At its core, the puzzle is concerned with the meaning of words. To return to our earlier example, do the words ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ mean the same thing? Or are their meanings different? At first glance, it would appear that the meaning of a name is its *referent*—that is, the meaning of a name is the object that it names. This a compelling account of meaning because the function of a name is to pick out an object. When I say that ‘Hesperus appears at night,’ the name ‘Hesperus’ serves to indicate that I am speaking *about Hesperus*. Moreover, what I have said is true or false depending on whether *Hesperus* (the planet itself) appears at night*.*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) If that’s right, then the meaning of ‘Hesperus’ *just is* Hesperus. The planet itself serves as the meaning. ### 2. Frege’s puzzle However, when we consider the case of our imaginary astronomer, it appears that the meaning of a name *isn’t* just its referent. If the meaning of a name were just its referent, then ‘Hesperus’ would have the same meaning as ‘Phosphorus’ (since they refer to the same object). And ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ would mean the same thing as ‘Hesperus is Hesperus.’ But that doesn’t sound right; these sentences appear to have different meanings to our astronomer. The astronomer can *understand* both sentences perfectly well, but they may accept one and reject the other. Furthermore, if *thoughts* correspond to meanings that are determined by reference, then the thought that *Hesperus is Phosphorus* would be the same as the thought that *Hesperus is Hesperus.* But that seems incorrect: ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is trivial, whereas ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ appears to express *new information,* with the significance of an empirical discovery. The two thus differ in what Frege calls *cognitive significance* and this suggests that they express different thoughts. Thus, *Frege’s puzzle*: we have reasons both for and against identifying the meaning of a name with its referent.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### 3. Sense In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege proposes to solve the problem by proposing that there is not just one, but *two* kinds of meaning. The first kind of meaning is reference. The second kind of meaning is called ‘sense.’ Frege’s idea is that, although ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ share the same referent, they express different *senses* (same for ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent,’ ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ and the like). When Frege hypothesizes the existence of senses, he defines them primarily by the *roles* that they are supposed to perform. Accordingly, the sense of an expression is a feature that can fulfill each of these four tasks:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) 1\. senses are a kind of meaning for linguistic expressions. Specifically, they are supposed to explain: - - - *synonymy* (expressions are synonymous when they share the same sense); - *linguistic understanding* (to understand an expression is to grasp its sense); - the *publicity* of language (speakers share a common language when they associate it with the same senses).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) As a result, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ will *not* be synonyms because they express different senses; 2\. senses are supposed to explain differences in *cognitive significance*: e.g.,‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is trivial while ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is informative *because* ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ possess different senses; 3\. the sense of a name is supposed to determine its referent, not the other way around. Expressions with different senses can share the same referent (e.g. ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’), but expressions with the same sense must thereby share the same referent;[\[5\]](#_ftn5) and: 4\. senses are the constituents of thought. This explains why the thought that *Hesperus is a planet* appears to be distinct from the thought that *Phosphorus is a planet*; these thoughts *really are* distinct because they are composed of different senses.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This definition still leaves it open as to what else senses might be. Frege also says that senses are ‘modes of presentation’ of the referent.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) When the astronomer introduced the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ they were presented with the referent (Venus) in different ways in different circumstances, and this is supposed to determine a difference in sense for these words. However, it must be admitted that the idea of a ‘mode of presentation’ is obscure.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) In subsequent years, other philosophers have given more refined proposals for interpreting Fregean sense—that is, for identifying a kind of meaning that fulfills roles 1 – 4.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 4. Conclusion Frege’s puzzle can arise whenever there are multiple words that represent the same thing, which is a common feature of language. These cases suggest that there is more to meaning than reference—that we need a second concept, sense, to understand the meaning of words. Although Frege’s solution is compelling, it is not without controversy. Many philosophers have challenged Frege’s concept of sense by arguing that no one thing can play all of the four roles that are required of sense; others argue that some of these roles need not be included in the definition of meaning.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) So it remains debatable whether Frege succeeded in defining a kind of meaning apart from reference. Nevertheless, Frege’s puzzle continues to inspire philosophical thinking about meaning and thought. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) There is another (more theoretical) reason for holding that the meaning of a name is its referent. In brief, the systematic theories of meaning that have been developed in logic and linguistics typically assume that the meaning of a name is its referent. Moreover, by making this assumption, these theories are able to explain an important feature of meaning: specifically, how the meanings of complex sentences depend on the meanings of their simplest parts. (They can explain, for example, how the meaning of ‘Hesperus appears at night’ depends on the meaning of ‘Hesperus.’). Frege himself developed such an account in other areas of his work, in his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* (1893). Since it is possible to explain this fact about meaning by assuming that meaning is reference, we thus have another motivation for holding that meaning is reference. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Frege’s puzzle reveals an internal tension in how we ordinarily think about words’ meaning.On the one hand, we sometimes think of meaning as reference: when I say ‘Hesperus appears at night,’ I *mean* to be speaking *about* Hesperus; by ‘Hesperus,’ I *mean* Venus, the second planet from the sun. But on the other hand, we sometimes do not naturally think of meaning as reference: it seems wrong to say that for Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent’ has the same meaning as ‘Superman.’ [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In “On Sense and Reference,” Frege appears to have a fifth role in mind: sense is also supposed to explain the significance of names that lack referents (e.g. ‘Vulcan’ is meaningful because it has a sense, despite lacking a referent). See Frege (1948 \[1892\]), 211. However, some followers of Frege (e.g., Gareth Evans) argue that this role is inessential to the central insight. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Ibid., 210-212. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Ibid., 211. In his (1948 \[1892\]), Frege does not tell us *how* the sense of a term determines its referent. However, we can see how this might work if, e.g., we assume what is called the ‘descriptivist’ interpretation of Fregean sense, which holds that the sense of a name is a *description* of the referent. So, e.g., the sense of ‘Hesperus’ would be a description, perhaps ‘the celestial body that appears at such-and-such location in the evening.’ The referent of the term would then be determined as the unique thing that satisfies this description. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For Frege, this is a thesis about thoughts themself *and* a thesis about the meanings of the sentences that report beliefs (and other kinds of thoughts). According to the first part of the thesis, the senses of simple expressions compose into the senses of sentences. For example, the sense of the name ‘Hesperus’ will compose with the sense of ‘is a planet’ to yield the sense of ‘Hesperus is a planet.’ Furthermore, according to this picture, the sense of ‘Hesperus is a planet’ is the same thing as *what is thought* by someone who thinks that *Hesperus is a planet.* In short: the senses of sentences *are* the contents of thought. As for the second part of this thesis, Frege claims that when a name like ‘Hesperus’ appears within a report of a belief, such as ‘The astronomer believed that Hesperus is a star’, it refers to its usual *sense*, rather than to Hesperus itself. This is called the theory of indirect reference. See ibid., 218-220. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Ibid., 211. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) In “The Thought,” Frege proposes that senses are abstract objects that exist in a realm that is independent of both the material and psychological realm. According to Frege, senses cannot be subjective ideas in the minds of individuals because meanings are essentially *public* (as per role 1). In order for speakers to communicate with each other, they must each associate the same senses with the same words. See Frege (1956), 308. This idea of Frege’s turned out to be influential for subsequent thinking about *propositions.* Many philosophers, following Frege, have held that the meanings of sentences are a kind of abstract object, called *propositions*, that are composed of the meanings of words. These propositions are supposed to be entertainable in thought and capable of truth or falsity. Sentences from different languages—e.g. ‘snow is white’ and ‘la neige est blanche’—can express the same proposition. \[[8](#_ftnref9)\] Frege gave examples of senses that were descriptions and some philosophers have interpreted senses as always consisting of descriptions grasped by the speaker. On this interpretation, the sense of ‘Hesperus’ could be given by the description ‘the celestial body that appears at such-and-such location in the evening.’ Other philosophers have interpreted senses as conceptual roles, whereby the sense of an expression is understood by the patterns in which it is used in inferences and reasoning. There are other options too. Picking up on the idea that the sense of ‘Hesperus’ is a mode of presenting Hesperus, Gareth Evans interpreted the sense of a name as a *way of thinking of or recognizing the referent of the name.* See Evans (1982), ch. 1. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) There are a number of important works that aim to show that no one feature of a word can do all of the jobs that sense is supposed to do. The key texts in this critical tradition are Saul Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* and “A puzzle about belief,” and David Kaplan “On Demonstratives.” Put very briefly, Kripke argues in *Naming and Necessity* that the referent of a name is not generally determined by the speaker’s idea of the referent, and so roles 3 and 4 come apart; he also argues, in “A puzzle about belief,” that words that are synonyms in public language need not have the same cognitive significance for individual speakers, and so roles 1 and 2 come apart; finally, Kaplan argues that we need to make a further distinction between two kinds of meaning, which he calls *character* and *content*, and that Frege’s concept of sense is a conflation of the two. For an overview of these developments, see the chapter “Meaning” in Gillian Russell’s *Truth in Virtue of Meaning.* ### References [Evans, Gareth. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-varieties-of-reference-9780198246862?cc=ca&lang=en&)[*The Varieties of Reference,* ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-varieties-of-reference-9780198246862?cc=ca&lang=en&)[ed. by John McDowell. Clarendon Press, 1982.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-varieties-of-reference-9780198246862?cc=ca&lang=en&) [Frege, Gottlob. “Sense and reference.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FREOSA-2)[*The philosophical review*](https://philpapers.org/rec/FREOSA-2)[ 57, no. 3 (1948 \[1892\]): 209-230](https://philpapers.org/rec/FREOSA-2). [Frege, Gottlob. “The thought: A logical inquiry.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRETTA)[*Mind*](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRETTA)[ 65, no. 259 (1956): 289-311.](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRETTA) [Kaplan, David. “Demonstratives: An essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals” in Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPD)[*Themes From Kaplan*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPD)[. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563 (1989)](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPD) [Kripke, Saul A. “A puzzle about belief.” In ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KRIAPA)[*Meaning and use*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KRIAPA)[, pp. 239-283. Springer, Dordrecht, 1979.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KRIAPA) [Kripke, Saul A. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KRINAN)[*Naming and Necessity.* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KRINAN)[Harvard University Press, 1980.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KRINAN) [Russell, Gillian. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSTIV)[*Truth in virtue of meaning: A defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction*](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSTIV)[. Oxford University Press, 2008.](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSTIV) ### Related Essays [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/ "Intentionality") by Addison Ellis [Gricean Conversational Implicature: What We Say and What We Mean](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/05/gricean-conversational-implicature/) by Thomas Hodgson [Semantic Externalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/24/semantic-externalism/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/14/wittgensteins-private-language-argument/ "Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument") by Ian Tully [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/frege-.pdf "Frege") in PDF. ### About the Author Graham is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of British Columbia, Okanagan. He is primarily interested in the metaphysics of truth and representation, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the history of analytic philosophy. [grahamsethmoore.wixsite.com/mysite](https://grahamsethmoore.wixsite.com/mysite) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Mind & Language **Tags:** Frege, linguistics, meaning, philosophy of language, reference, sense --- ### [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: David Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) **Published:** November 17, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to David Hume's theory of rationality and his famous quote that it's “not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.” **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/ "Epistemology") Word Count: 998 Imagine you’re offered a delicious piece of cake. You know it’s very unhealthy. Your stomach tells you to eat it, but your brain tells you to refuse. Maybe you listen to your brain and you ignore both the cake and your desire to eat it. You don’t follow your *desire*: instead you listen to *reason*. Or, maybe your stomach wins out, and you eat the cake, but you feel like you made an irrational choice: desire wins out over what you know is the rational option. Many think that reason and desire fight over things like the cake. We might say that if reason wins, we act *rationally*, and if desire wins, we act *irrationally*. This common picture of human action is denied by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776). Hume instead claims that acting rationally means going along with our desires. That is a central idea expressed by his famous quote: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay explores Hume’s theory of how rationality and desire work together. [![David Hume](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/hume.jpg?resize=656%2C518&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/hume.jpg?ssl=1)David Hume### 1. Terminology Hume uses “passion” as a technical term to describe things like pride and humility, desire and aversion, happiness and sadness, and fear.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Broadly, passions are our emotions (e.g., feeling happy or sad), feelings (e.g., curiosity and confidence), and desires (e.g., wanting cake). The passions are often contrasted with reason and rationality. In the cake example above, we imagined the brain and the stomach in a contest with each other. Hume agrees that the passions are in a different category from rational thought. But Hume thinks passions on their own are not rational or irrational.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) It is never irrational merely to feel pride, happiness, or any other passion. Feelings are reactions to our experiences. The cake looks good to you, so you want it: you don’t need to reason about it first. Nor do the passions and reason oppose each other. Instead, they work together. ### 2. Reason, Passion, and Action Hume thinks that reason’s role is to help us act on our strongest passions. According to Hume, reason *is* always playing a role in our actions. When you walk to the store to buy food, reason tells you which direction to walk, why you should bring money, and many other things.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But Hume thinks that reason, on its own, never moves us to action.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Hume argues that unless you have a passion that leads you to walk to the store, you will never walk to the store. Reason alone can’t get you to buy food: you need a passion, like an aversion to hunger, or a desire to cook dinner to impress someone.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Passion is in charge, and reason merely serves passion. “Reason,” he says, is “the slave of the passions.” You might think Hume must be wrong, because we act against our passions all the time. If you leave the cake alone, isn’t that an example of reason winning out over passions? Hume would reply that if you leave the cake alone, this is not a case of reason determining your action. Rather, your sudden, violent passion for the cake was beaten by a calmer, more settled passion for staying healthy.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) So, Hume doesn’t think reason and passion are opposed to each other.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Your passions determine what you will do, and you use reason to help you achieve those goals. You use reason to figure out how to best satisfy your strongest passions. ### 3. Irrational Actions Because passions aren’t rational or irrational, the only things that can make actions irrational are false beliefs. For instance, it could be irrational to jump out of an airplane without a parachute if you falsely believe you can fly. But it wouldn’t be irrational to do this if you wanted more than anything to see if you could fly. Indeed, according to Hume, any action, however odd it seems, can never be irrational if it’s driven by a passion that wins out over other passions. He even says it is “not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Nor would it be irrational to allow your entire life to fall into ruin for the sake of making a complete stranger’s life slightly better. Neither of these is irrational because neither passions nor actions based on them are irrational unless they are paired with false beliefs. If your aversion to having your finger scratched is strong and your desire to keep the world from being destroyed is weak, then it’s rational to let the world be destroyed rather than let your finger be scratched! ### 4. The Opposing View In contrast to Hume, some philosophers think reason alone can sometimes tell us what to do. For instance, maybe it is always irrational to hurt yourself, or to hurt other people if they haven’t done anything wrong. According to Hume, it would only be irrational to hurt yourself, or to hurt someone else, if your strongest passions oppose this. If someone doesn’t care about themselves, or they don’t care about other people, then according to Hume, they wouldn’t be acting irrationally if they hurt themselves or others. ### 5. Conclusion Modern theories of action are more sophisticated than Hume’s. Later philosophers distinguished between two main questions addressed by Hume’s claim, both of which are still discussed today. One question is about motivation: do we need passions to motivate us to act? If you don’t care even a tiny bit about your health or appearance, can you ever get yourself to exercise? Another question is about *reasons*: does anyone ever have a reason to do something unless it is supported by a passion? If you don’t care at all about what happens to strangers, is there any reason for you to warn a stranger that they are about to fall off of a cliff? But Hume’s central question of how reason and passions relate to each other is still relevant and passionately debated, and for good reasons. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.3.4. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2. More examples: malice, envy, love, anger. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.3.5. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.3.3. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.3. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.3.3. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.4.9-10. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.3.1. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* 2.3.3.6. ### References [David Hume. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724)[*A Treatise of Human Nature*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724)[, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford University Press, 2007 \[originally published 1739–40\])](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-treatise-of-human-nature-9780198751724) ### Related Essays [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco [Practical Reasons](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/20/practical-reasons/) by Shane Gronholz [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** David Hume, rationality, reason, Weltman --- ### [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) **Published:** July 26, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** People sometimes say that judgments about what’s true, what’s ethical, what others find beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, and more are "subjective." What does “subjective” really mean? Are judgments like these truly “subjective”? This essay introduces different answers to these questions. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Categories: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/), [Philosophy of Education](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/) Word Count: 997 “That’s subjective!” People sometimes respond like this to claims about what’s true, what’s ethical, what others find beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, and more. To call a claim “subjective” *seems* in part to say that *something* important about the claim depends on the *subject*—the person—making the claim.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) What this “something” is varies depending on the claim. Are judgments like these truly “subjective”? What does “subjective” really mean? This essay introduces different answers to these questions.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [!["A scholar in his study" by Rembrandt van Rijn. Oil on canvas. 1634.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rembrandt_van_Rijn_-_A_scholar_in_his_study_1634.jpg?resize=656%2C470&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rembrandt_van_Rijn_-_A_scholar_in_his_study_1634.jpg?ssl=1)“A scholar in his study” by Rembrandt van Rijn. Oil on canvas. 1634.### 1. Truth 1.1. When someone says that truth, or what’s true, is “subjective,” they *might* be thinking something like this: if someone believes some claim, then that claim is true: their believing it *makes* it true.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This can be called *subjectivism about truth*. It appears to be *not true*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) *Belief* and *truth* are *not* the same: *believing* you’re a billionaire doesn’t mean you have a billion dollars; *believing* someone is imprisoned when they’re not doesn’t make that true. In general, beliefs and claims are *true* when they correspond to the *facts* of the world—the way the world is—and false when they don’t.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This is the *correspondence theory of truth*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) When someone says something is “true to me” or “my truth,” they are usually just stating what they *believe*, which *may* be false or based on poor evidence—*even if* they feel confident or the issue is important to them.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) 2.2. A “that’s subjective!” reaction might also be based on someone thinking something like this: there is not *strong evidence* for that belief; it is *not knowledge*; it is not something that everyone *must* accept or agree with. If someone says on Tuesday afternoon that *today is Tuesday*, or that *2+2=4*, or that *most dogs have four legs*, they probably won’t hear “that’s subjective” because claims like these seem obviously *true*: there is strong evidence to believe them and almost nobody would disagree.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) But if someone makes claims about topics of controversy and disagreements—politics, religion, relationships, ethics, health, etc.—a “that’s subjective” reaction isn’t surprising. Sometimes it’s hard to have truly compelling evidence here and so there’s no one view that every rational person *must* believe.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) A challenge though: a “that’s subjective” reaction might *itself* be “subjective,” if it is based *not* on a strong understanding of the issues and arguments. Maybe people sometimes react “that’s subjective!” to avoid the work needed to get that understanding.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 2. Ethics 2.1. It’s common to hear “ethics is subjective.” About some ethical judgments—e.g., claims that some action is wrong—“that’s subjective” is a common reaction. What might people who say this be thinking here? Perhaps this: - if someone *disapproves* of doing an action, it’s *wrong* for them to do it; - if someone *approves* of doing an action, it’s *right* for them to do it.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Since different people approve and disapprove of different actions, this view entails that what’s right and wrong are “subjective” or *dependent on the subject*. This can be called *ethical subjectivism*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Although people sometimes talk like they accept ethical subjectivism, it’s unlikely that anyone *really* accepts it. First, it seems to imply that, e.g., if someone approved of assaulting innocent people for fun, then it’d be *not wrong* for them to assault people.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) But almost nobody agrees with that. Second, suppose we learned that some school shooters *sincerely believed* they did nothing wrong: almost nobody would think that means they *actually* did nothing wrong. Someone might say an action isn’t wrong “*to me*”—meaning they *believe* it isn’t wrong—but that doesn’t seem to mean it’s *actually* not wrong: beliefs about ethical matters *can* be mistaken, just like other beliefs can. Ethical subjectivism denies that and so seems to be false. If ethics (not *beliefs about* ethics) isn’t “subjective,” then it would be “objective”: what *makes* actions wrong is *not* any *subjects*’ beliefs about the action, but “objective” considerations such as whether it’s harmful, or done with consent, or falls under rules all would agree to, among other considerations.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) 2.2. Sometimes it’s difficult to figure out what’s ethical: careful fact-finding and reasoning are required:[\[15\]](#_ftn15) e.g., we can’t know whether a war is ethically justified without knowing about its causes and how it’s being conducted.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Ethical subjectivism, however, implies that ethical questions are always easy: just check your own feelings to find what *you* approve of. That it can be challenging to have informed, well-reasoned ethical judgments suggests that when people say “ethics is subjective,” they might be thinking that our evidence isn’t strong, and so we lack knowledge, and so there are different options for reasonable belief. That’s why appeals to “subjectivity” are more common with complex ethical issues than judgments about, say, school shootings. But sometimes saying “that’s subjective!” just means we’re unsure about what’s true or justified. So, when someone says there aren’t strong reasons for a particular ethical judgment, that may reflect an admirably humble recognition of complexity—*or* an unreflective dismissal of it. ### 3. Aesthetics *Aesthetic subjectivists* understand judgments about what’s beautiful and in good taste as claims about what people prefer and enjoy, which varies from person to person: “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.”[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Suppose someone claims, “this singer has the *most beautiful* voice.” According to subjectivists, what they are *really* saying is that *they most enjoy listening to this singer*. While there is some plausibility here, there are reasons to doubt.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Suppose this singer is off-key and offbeat, but the person insists their voice is more beautiful than Aretha’s, Whitney’s, Mariah’s, or Ariana’s. Many people will think they are simply *mistaken* in that judgment: even if they *like* this singer the most, their voice is not *better* than any world-class singer: this person has *bad taste*. Recognition of artistic excellence suggests that beauty isn’t *simply* “in the eye of the beholder.” What might *make* aesthetic judgments better and worse, however, is a challenging philosophical issue.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### 4. Conclusion Here we tried to better understand some common “subjectivisms.” Are any of the insights we gained “just subjective”? No. At least, hopefully not.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) There is no standard, set meaning of “subjective”: different people use the word in different ways: ask them! (Does that mean it’s “subjective” what *subjective* means?) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This essay focuses on uses of “subjective” that are often made by “ordinary people,” not academic philosophers. There may be some more sophisticated versions of the views discussed here, or different philosophical views that are *called* “subjectivism,” but these are not discussed here. For introductions to some more sophisticated views sometimes called “subjectivisms,” see [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) To *believe* a claim (or sentence, or proposition) is to consider it in your mind and mentally affirm it as true. That doesn’t mean it *is* true, but that it is *considered* to be true. Beliefs can be about important matters, and beliefs can be about trivial matters: what a belief is about—a belief’s “content” does not affect whether it’s a belief or not. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Subjectivism about truth* is a broader view, applicable to seemingly *any* belief: for any belief, it’s true (“true for that someone”) if they believe it. The view also seems to include the idea that the belief is true *because* the person believes it. But there are some claims, called “necessary truths,” that *must* be true: they cannot be false: e.g., it’s true that 2+2=4 and that *all bachelors are unmarried*, and those *must* be true: there’s no way they could be false. But necessary truths are not true *because* people believe them. For an introduction to necessary truths and how we might know them, see Andre Leo Rusavuk’s [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) and Bob Fischer’s [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/). Here I am also setting aside any consideration of any *logically possible* person for whom, due to some miracle or cosmic fluke or good luck, *whenever* they believe something, their belief is true: the author and readers of this essay are not such a person! [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Some might want to call *facts*—the way the world is—“objective facts.” The term ‘objective’, however, invites the question of what “non-objective facts” would be. One might think these would be “subjective facts,” but what would *those* be? People’s *beliefs*? Beliefs that may or may not be true, that may or may not correspond to the facts—to the way the world is? This line of questioning suggests there is no important difference between “facts” and “objective facts.” Likewise, people sometimes talk about “objective truths.” The idea is that, in general, the existence of *facts*—the way the world is—does not depend on any subjects’ or persons’ beliefs about or attitudes toward them. For example, there are facts about what is happening right now on the tallest mountain on planet Mars; yet few, if any, people are currently consider*ing* those facts, few have ever consider*ed* those facts, and probably nobody know what these facts are. Calling some truths “objective” does, however, invite the question of what the contrast would be, such as what “non-objective truths” or “subjective truths” would be. (Sometimes people say that taste preferences could be called “subjective truths,” but this is not a helpful way to talk since, for instance, if your favorite ice-cream flavor is chocolate, then it’s just a fact, or truth that *your favorite ice-cream flavor is chocolate*). If those ideas make no sense, then “objective” truths are better just called *truths*. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For more on truth, including the correspondence theory of truth, see Dowden and Swartz (no date). Also see Huemer (2021) and his other writings on truth. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Sometimes people call beliefs “subjective truths.” But since beliefs need not be true—they are sometimes false—calling beliefs “truths” is confusing: that allows for the possibility of “false truths.” So the phrase “subjective truth” is likely best avoided. Some truths, however, are called “objective” truths, but since “non-objective truth” or “subjective truth” doesn’t make sense—at best, that’s just belief—“objective” truth is better just called *truth*. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Suppose someone does disagree. Should that matter to what we should think? Not necessarily. They may be disagreeing just to be difficult, or just to be a contrarian. Or maybe they are trying to be clever by using the word ‘dog’ for snake. The real issue is whether they have good reasons or evidence to support denying the claim in question or affirming a contrary claim. For discussion of these ideas and their importance, see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf, [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long, and [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) It is often thought that, at least in philosophy and scientific fields, that people should believe what’s supported by their evidence, and so if people lack evidence for some belief, they should not believe this. For discussion of these ideas and their importance, see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf, [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long, and [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) So responding “that’s subjective!” sometimes functions as what Feldman (1999, 19) calls an “argument stopper,” an unreflective saying used to try to stop people in *responsibly* thinking about whether what’s said is true or false, whether arguments are strong or not, etc. The “that’s subjective reaction” is also related to a phenomena that’s been labelled “student relativism,” which often involves people giving argument stoppers to try to establish their intellectual autonomy and freedom to believe what they want to believe: see Satris (1986) and discussions inspired by his article. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) There are details here that would need to be addressed: first, is the person who is disapproving (or approving) of the action in question also thinking about *other people* doing the action, or just *themselves*? Details here might make a difference to how we understand ethical subjectivism. Another issue is that people sometimes accept what we might call “personal principles” that they think would be wrong *for them* to violate—and that accepting those principles can make other actions wrong for them to do—but think that such actions are not wrong at all for people who don’t accept those principles. What we should think about these types of appeals largely depends on the “personal principle,” since it seems that such principles *could* prohibit morally permissible behavior and even require wrong behavior. Finally, it’s worth noting that ethical subjectivism is also sometimes presented as: - if someone *believes* that an action is *wrong* for them to do, then it is *wrong* for them to do; - if someone *believes* that an action is *not wrong* for them to do, then it is *not wrong* for them to do. Such claims, however, require explaining what someone is believing when they think actions are wrong and not wrong: what is the “content” of their thought when they are thinking that an action is wrong? If it’s *that the action is wrong*, what is that “it’s wrong” that they are thinking of, *according to subjectivism*? The answer here is unclear. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Ethical subjectivism might also be called “subjective relativism” or “individual relativism about ethics.” A similar view that claims that what is ethical (not just *believed* to be ethical) is relative to cultures or groups is known as *cultural relativism*. For an introduction, see Nathan Nobis’s [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Of course, the victim here likely will not approve of their being assaulted, and so according to subjectivism, from the victim’s point of view, *assaulting them was wrong*. However, from the perpetrator’s perspective and what they approve of, *assaulting that person was not wrong*. So, ethical subjectivism seems to entail that someone being assaulted can be both *wrong* and *not wrong*. If this type of contradiction can follow from ethical subjectivism, that’s another reason to reject it. Some respond to this reasoning by arguing that while different people *approve* of different actions, *no actions are wrong, for anyone*: actions have the characteristics of *being approved* and *disapproved* by people, but they don’t have the characteristic of being wrong or not wrong. For discussion of such a view, see [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For introductions to some of the most historically influential ethical theories or answers to the question, “What makes wrong actions wrong?” which appeal to harm, disrespect, and unfairness, see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz, [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman, and [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies. For a discussion of whether there might be moral truths or facts, and what they might be like if they exist, see [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For an introduction to the challenges involved in thinking about complex ethical issues, see [Applied Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia and [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Here are further examples to make it clear that ethical issues can be complex and thus require fact-finding and careful reasoning: - we can’t have a reasonable view on whether a company’s actions are exploitative without knowing how it treats its workers and what options those workers have; - we can’t have a reasonable view on whether someone’s lying is wrong without knowing why they lied and what consequences the lie has; - we can’t have a reasonable view on whether abortion is morally permissible without considering details about fetal development, what persons are, and reflecting on ethical principles about personhood and bodily autonomy; - we can’t have a reasonable view on whether euthanasia is morally acceptable in a circumstance without understanding the patient’s condition, their wishes, and the available alternatives; - we can’t have a reasonable view on whether the death penalty could be just without understanding how it’s applied and whether it deters crime or risks executing the innocent; - we can’t have a reasonable view on whether eating animals is morally wrong without considering facts about harms to animals and the environment and whether eating meat is necessary for human health. Introductory discussions of many of these issues above, all of which bring out the complexity of the issues, are available in our [ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/) category. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For an introduction to what aesthetic judgments are, see Brock Rough’s [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Another argument against aesthetic subjectivism as presented here is that it implies that what *seem* to be aesthetic disagreements are *not* disagreements; but they are, so the view is false. E.g., suppose I say, “Chocolate ice cream is the best flavor” and you say “Chocolate ice cream is not the best flavor: it’s the worst.” It seems like we disagree about what’s best. However, subjectivism implies that I have said “*I like chocolate the most*” and you have said, “*I don’t like chocolate the most: I dislike it the most.*” This is then not a disagreement, since both our claims are true (assuming we are speaking sincerely): disagreements involve one person making a claim and another denying that claim—so both claims can’t be true. Since aesthetic subjectivism implies we are not disagreeing on which flavor is best, yet we are, it seems to be false. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) It’s worthwhile to reflect on how there are “formal” characteristics of many arts (these concern the artwork’s *form*) that tend to make them at least judged as better than artworks that are deficient in these characteristics: e.g., a better singer typically demonstrates stronger formal features such as precise pitch control, consistent tone quality, dynamic range, and clear diction. A painter of representational paintings who shows mastery of formal features like accurate proportion, controlled brushwork, realistic color use, and effective composition is likely to be considered a more skilled representational artist. If we can evaluate the quality of art based, in part, on these formal features—features which are characteristics of the artworks themselves—that provides some challenge to the view that beauty is entirely “in the eye of the beholder,” so to speak. For discussions of various alternatives to aesthetic subjectivism—views that hold that aesthetic judgments might be “objective,” so to speak, and so there are truths or facts about aesthetic judgments apart from individuals’ judgments—see Bender (2005), Hanson (2018), Levinson (2005), Slote (1971), and Zangwill (2005) and (2021). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) The discussion here might be adapted to better understand a common claim like “that’s an opinion, not a fact.” What facts are is discussed here, and some of the ideas presented here can be used to better understand different meanings of “opinion.” ### References [Bender, John. 2005. “Aesthetic Realism 2.” In ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-4?fbclid=IwAR0ikG19KJuViyo5TT7cNx47O5GRsG49by2EW2tb4ZfwtIdMIK2NQz2HHEM)[*The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-4?fbclid=IwAR0ikG19KJuViyo5TT7cNx47O5GRsG49by2EW2tb4ZfwtIdMIK2NQz2HHEM)[, ed. Jerrold Levinson. Oxford University Press](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-4?fbclid=IwAR0ikG19KJuViyo5TT7cNx47O5GRsG49by2EW2tb4ZfwtIdMIK2NQz2HHEM). [Dowden, Bradley and Swartz, Norman. No date. Truth. ](https://iep.utm.edu/truth/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* ](https://iep.utm.edu/truth/) [Feldman, Richard. 1999. ](https://archive.org/details/reasonargument00feld/page/n3/mode/2up)[*Reason and Argument*](https://archive.org/details/reasonargument00feld/page/n3/mode/2up)[. Prentice Hall. ](https://archive.org/details/reasonargument00feld/page/n3/mode/2up) [Hanson, Louise. 2018. “Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim.” ](https://doi.org/10.1086/698732)[*Ethics*](https://doi.org/10.1086/698732)[. Volume 129, Number 1, 39-69](https://doi.org/10.1086/698732) [Huemer, Michael. Dec 25, 2021. “Relativism: What Is this Nonsense?” ](https://fakenous.substack.com/p/relativism-what-is-this-nonsense)[*Fake Noûs.*](https://fakenous.substack.com/p/relativism-what-is-this-nonsense) [Levinson, Jerrold. 2005. “Philosophical Aesthetics: An Overview.” In ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-1)[*The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-1)[, ed. Jerrold Levinson. Oxford University Press.](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-1) [Satris, Stephen. 1986. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/teachphil/content/teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205)[“](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-1)[Student Relativism.](https://www.pdcnet.org/teachphil/content/teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205)[”](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-1)[*Teaching Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/teachphil/content/teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205)[ 9.3: 193-205.](https://www.pdcnet.org/teachphil/content/teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205) [Slote, Michael. 1971. “The Rationality of Aesthetic Value Judgments.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024652)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024652)[. Vol. 68, No. 22, 821-839.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024652) [Zangwill, Nick. 2005. “Aesthetic Realism 1.” In ](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-3?fbclid=IwAR2G97Az_eedwIjitgoHxpYxGrB_17Lg2gFTjBKbPmOoIy5vikZ7fVPQ_eU)[*The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-3?fbclid=IwAR2G97Az_eedwIjitgoHxpYxGrB_17Lg2gFTjBKbPmOoIy5vikZ7fVPQ_eU)[, ed. Jerrold Levinson. Oxford University Press](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199279456-e-3?fbclid=IwAR2G97Az_eedwIjitgoHxpYxGrB_17Lg2gFTjBKbPmOoIy5vikZ7fVPQ_eU). [Zangwill, Nick. 2021. “Aesthetic Judgment”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/aesthetic-judgment)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/aesthetic-judgment)[(Winter 2021 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/aesthetic-judgment) ### Related Essays [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”: René Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Applied Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Subjectivism.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is co-author of [*Thinking Critically About Abortion*](http://www.abortionarguments.com/), author of [*A*](http://www.animalethics101.com/)[*nimals & Ethics 101*](http://www.animalethics101.com/), and the author and co-author of many other writings and materials in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Logic & Reasoning, Philosophy of Education **Tags:** aesthetic subjectivism, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, ethical subjectivism, ethics is subjective, Nobis, subjective, subjectivism about truth, subjectivismism, truth, truth is subjective --- ### [Moral Error Theory: Are there Moral Facts?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) **Published:** April 14, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** According to the meta-ethical theory known as “error theory,” it is false that abusing children for fun is morally wrong (and false that it’s morally right, too!). This is because, according to error theory, all moral judgments are false. This essay explores this counterintuitive view. **Content:** Author: [Ian Tully](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Tully) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Wordcount: 998 Though we often disagree about *which* actions are morally wrong, most people agree that some actions really are wrong. One obvious example is abusing children for fun. According to the meta-ethical theory known as “moral error theory,” it is *false* that abusing children for fun is morally wrong (and *false* that it’s morally right, too!).[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This is because, according to error theory, *all* moral judgments are false.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay explores this counterintuitive view. ![John Mackie's (1977) "Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong"](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/220px-ethics-_inventing_right_and_wrong.jpg?resize=220%2C361&ssl=1)John Mackie’s (1977) “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong”### 1. Understanding the Error Theory The error theory originates with Australian philosopher J.L. Mackie (1917–1981).[\[3\]](#_ftn3) It is committed to two central theses: - the *Conceptual Thesis*: moral statements aim to describe moral facts about the world. When we use moral language, we’re not merely expressing attitudes or emotions—we’re trying to state truths about moral reality; - the *Substantive Thesis*: there are no moral facts or properties that *make* moral claims true. Therefore, all claims that something is wrong, bad, unjust, etc. are *false*; they refer to properties that simply don’t exist. A helpful analogy is with talk of witches. When people in Salem accused others of being witches, they were describing individuals as having magical powers. But there are no such magical powers, so those accusations were false. Error theorists think moral language is similar: a claim“this action is wrong” is false because there are no facts about what’s wrong: there is no property or characteristic “wrong” that could *make* such claims true. Moral properties aren’t real, so any claims that appeal to them are in error. ### 2. Moral Realism To better understand error theory, we should understand its main alternative, “moral realism.” Moral realists believe that ethics is *real*: there are moral properties or facts that *make* actions wrong and not wrong. Furthermore, these properties or facts aren’t “created” by any individual or cultures: concerning our initial example, realists think that abusing children for fun is wrong *and* that it would be wrong *even if* somehow everyone thought it was right.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 3. The Arguments Why accept the moral error theory? Mackie offers two main arguments: the *Argument from Queerness* and the *Argument from Disagreement*. #### 3.1. Queerness Mackie claims that if there were moral facts or properties, they would be metaphysically and epistemologically “queer”—that is, unlike anything else in the universe. He claims: “If there were objective values, then they would be entities…of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) What makes them strange is their supposed *intrinsic normative authority*: “\[S\]omething’s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it… just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) In other words, objective moral values would have an inescapable “oughtness” built into them. They would give reasons for action to all rational agents, regardless of anyone’s desires or interests. But this seems mysterious or even unintelligible. Mackie suspects this idea of categorical moral authority is a leftover from religious thinking—like trying to have divine laws without a divine lawgiver.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) So, Mackie argues that because such properties are metaphysically suspect, we should reject them—and thus reject believing that moral claims are ever true. #### 3.2. Disagreements Mackie’s second argument appeals to the widespread and persistent disagreement about moral issues. Unlike scientific disagreements, which tend to diminish over time as evidence accumulates, moral disagreements often seem intractable. According to Mackie, this suggests that moral claims are not tracking any objective reality. If there were moral facts “out there” to be discovered, then—over time—we should expect increasing agreement about them, as with empirical facts. Mackie claims that we don’t see such increasing agreement and thinks this suggests that people are not perceiving any moral truths, because there are none.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 4. Responses Moral error theory is a bold and unsettling view that is highly contrary to common sense—that some actions are profoundly wrong, and that that’s the truth—and most philosophers reject it. Let’s look at some responses to both arguments. #### 4.1. Reply to Queerness Moral realists are reluctant to give up the idea that moral claims aim to describe objective moral facts. So they accept the Conceptual thesis but reject the Substantive Thesis, arguing that categorical moral reasons aren’t so mysterious or “queer” after all.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) One common response is to draw a parallel with “epistemic reasons”—reasons for belief. For instance, the fact that the Earth orbits the Sun—or observations about such matters—are reasons to believe heliocentrism, *regardless of anyone’s desires*. In general, it seems that there are things that should and should be believed, from an intellectual or epistemic point of view—e.g., *we should believe what the best evidence supports*—regardless of how we feel about that. If categorical *epistemic* reasons exist, then categorical moral reasons might too. Thus, the alleged “queerness” of moral reasons may not be so queer after all. #### 4.2. Reply to Disagreements Mackie’s appeal to disagreement also faces challenges. First, disagreement is not unique to ethics. People also disagree about empirical and scientific matters, particularly when evidence is complex, incomplete, or hard to interpret. Disagreement, by itself, does not show that there are no facts to be discovered. Second, moral disagreements sometimes result from non-moral differences, such as factual misunderstandings, poor reasoning, different background assumptions, and conflicts of interest. When people start from very different perspectives, they may arrive at very different moral conclusions, even if there are moral facts. Third, disagreement is compatible with objective facts. Even in mathematics or physics, experts sometimes disagree, yet there seem to be facts of the matter. Persistent disagreement might reflect human limitations, not the nonexistence of truth. Thus, the existence of moral disagreement doesn’t necessarily support error theory. ### 5. Conclusion Mackie’s error theory offers a provocative challenge to both common sense and moral realism. We might wonder if error theory or moral realism is more reasonable for people to believe. If either view is supported by better arguments, and we *should* believe what’s supported by better arguments, that ultimately *might* undermine the case for the error theory. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) “Meta-ethics” is the part of philosophical ethics that investigates whether moral judgements are true or false and, if so, what *makes* moral judgments, or beliefs, true and false. In general, beliefs are made true and false by *facts*, so are there moral facts? Meta-ethics also typically concerns whether and how moral judgments can be reasonably believed or known. What’s often called “normative ethics” investigates different theories of what might *make* actions wrong and not wrong. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Some may be wondering how error theorists can claim that *all* moral statements are false: after all, by the law of excluded middle, a statement *and its negation* can’t both be false. There are a number of ways to address this concern: see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) and Olson (2010) for details. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Other philosophers have developed this type of theory in new ways. See Joyce (2001), Olson (2010) and Garner (2012), among others. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For an introduction to moral realism, and many of the other issues of this essay, see [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. Realists deny that cultural attitudes determine what’s wrong and not wrong (or that moral properties are identical to or depend on facts about cultural approval, etc.), and they usually deny that God’s commands would make actions wrong either (or that moral properties are identical to or depend on facts about what God might command, etc.). See [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis and [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Mackie (1977, p. 77). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Mackie (1977, p. 78). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For similar claims about ethics presupposing a being that gives commands or laws, see [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For a discussion of the steady of increase of ethical agreement over the centuries about, e.g., the wrongness of slavery, the wrongness of torture and cruel and unusual punishment, the wrongness of denying women the right to vote, and more—and thus evidence for progress in widespread moral thinking and action—see Huemer’s (2013) TEDx talk “The Progress of Liberalism.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See, e.g., Shafer-Landau (2005: 111); Kelly et al (2007); Cuneo (2012). Also see Cuneo (2007) and Rowland (2013). ### References [Cuneo, Terence. (2012). “Moral Naturalism and Categorical Reasons.” In Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds. ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/ethical-naturalism-current-debates?format=PB)[*Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates*](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/ethical-naturalism-current-debates?format=PB)[. New York: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/ethical-naturalism-current-debates?format=PB) [Cuneo, Terence](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/ethical-naturalism-current-debates?format=PB)[. (2007). ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-normative-web-9780199581382?q=normative%20web&lang=en&cc=us)[*The Normative Web.* ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-normative-web-9780199581382?q=normative%20web&lang=en&cc=us)[New York: Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-normative-web-9780199581382?q=normative%20web&lang=en&cc=us) [Garner, Richard. (2006). “On The Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts.” In ](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415380270/)[*Arguing About Metaethics*](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415380270/)[, Andrew Fischer and Simon Kirchin, eds. New York: Routledge. ](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415380270/) [Huemer, Michael. (2013). “The Progress of Liberalism.” TEDx Talks. YouTube. ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrZ2DJzbYYo) [Joyce, Richard. (2001). ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/myth-morality?format=PB)[*The Myth of Morality.* ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/myth-morality?format=PB)[New York: Cambridge University Press. ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/myth-morality?format=PB) [Mackie, John L. (1977) ](http://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Inventing-Right-Wrong-Mackie/dp/B00DS9390I/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1397430634&sr=8-2&keywords=Ethics%3A+Inventing+Right+and+Wrong)[*Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.* ](http://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Inventing-Right-Wrong-Mackie/dp/B00DS9390I/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1397430634&sr=8-2&keywords=Ethics%3A+Inventing+Right+and+Wrong)[New York: Penguin Books.](http://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Inventing-Right-Wrong-Mackie/dp/B00DS9390I/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1397430634&sr=8-2&keywords=Ethics%3A+Inventing+Right+and+Wrong) [Olson, Jonas. (2010) “In Defense of Moral Error Theory,” in Michael Brady, ed., ](http://us.macmillan.com/newwavesinmetaethics/MichaelBrady)[*New Waves in Metaethics*](http://us.macmillan.com/newwavesinmetaethics/MichaelBrady)[, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 62-84.](http://us.macmillan.com/newwavesinmetaethics/MichaelBrady) [Rowland, Richard. (2013) “Moral Error Theory and The Argument From Epistemic Reasons.” ](http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jetshy7&div=4&id=&page=)[*Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*](http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jetshy7&div=4&id=&page=)[ Vol 7 No 1.](http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jetshy7&div=4&id=&page=) [Shafer-Landau, Russ. (2005) “Error Theory and the Possibility of Normative Theory.” ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00056.x/abstract)[*Philosophical Issues*](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00056.x/abstract)[ (Normativity) 15, 107-120.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00056.x/abstract) [Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. (2006) ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/moral-skepticism-9780195342062?q=Moral%20Skepticisms&lang=en&cc=us)[*Moral Skepticisms.* ](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/moral-skepticism-9780195342062?q=Moral%20Skepticisms&lang=en&cc=us)[Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/moral-skepticism-9780195342062?q=Moral%20Skepticisms&lang=en&cc=us) ### For Further Reading [Kevin M. DeLapp. “Metaethics.” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* ](https://iep.utm.edu/metaethi/) [Shin Kim. “Moral Realism.” Internet *Encyclopedia* of Philosophy. ](https://iep.utm.edu/moralrea) [Joyce, Richard, “Moral Anti-Realism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/moral-anti-realism) [Sayre-McCord, Geoff, “Moral Realism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/moral-realism) [Tramel, Peter. Moral Epistemology. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* ](https://iep.utm.edu/mor-epis/) [Campbell, Richmond, “Moral Epistemology”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/moral-epistemology) ### Related Essays [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman ### Revision History This essay was revised and updated by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* and reposted on July 23, 2025. The original essay, posted on April 14, 2014, is [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/moral-error-theory/). ### About the Author [Ian Tully](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Tully) is an Assistant Professor in the School of Nursing and Center for Global Health Ethics at Duquesne University. Prior to that he was a Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy and Mental Disorder at Johns Hopkins University’s Berman Institute of Bioethics. He completed his PhD in philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He is interested in ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of mind. [ianmtully.wixsite.com/iantullyphilosophy](https://ianmtully.wixsite.com/iantullyphilosophy) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** error theory, irrealism, meta-ethics, moral error theory, nihilism, Tully --- ### [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/) **Published:** October 1, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Tragic art is creative work that depicts the painful and catastrophic aspects of life. This essay summarizes German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) theory of why we enjoy tragic art. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Categories: [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 Tragic art is creative work that depicts the painful and catastrophic aspects of life. A classic example is the genre of theatre called “tragedy.” Like tragedy in real life, tragic art makes us feel unpleasant emotions, such as fear and sadness. *Unlike* real-life tragedy, however, we also *like* and derive aesthetic pleasure from such art. Philosophers call this “*the paradox of tragedy*.” The bittersweet pleasure caused by tragic art is known in philosophy as the “*tragic effect*,” and there’s much debate about exactly *why* we enjoy such art.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay summarizes German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) theory of why we enjoy tragic art.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [![A painting of the celebrations. Wilhelm von Kaulbach. 1850.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/dionysia-1536x690-1.jpg?resize=656%2C295&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/dionysia-1536x690-1.jpg?ssl=1)“An Artists’ Festival” by Wilhelm von Kaulbach. Oil on canvas. 1850.### 1. Dionysian Reality and Art In his 1872 book *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche says we like tragic art because of its existential value, i.e., how it helps us cope with “the terror and horror of existence”—specifically death and suffering.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Tragic art does this, according to Nietzsche, by allowing us to feel “one” with what he calls the *Dionysian*, the indestructible life force at the heart of nature. Identifying with the Dionysian is comforting because it makes us feel immortal and puts our suffering into perspective. Nietzsche defines the Dionysian as *both* a type of reality *and* a kind of art.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Dionysian art causes an experience of Dionysian reality, which he understands as the undifferentiated, form*less* unity or “oneness” many people seem to perceive in ecstatic experiences such as sex and listening to music.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Nietzsche thinks of Dionysian reality as an eternal energy at the core of nature—a wild and chaotic life force that flows through all things.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Because Nietzsche views this energy as eternal, he thinks ecstatic experiences where we “lose” ourselves and feel “one” with Dionysian life give us a sense of vicarious immortality. They also provide us with a “zoomed out,” big-picture perspective on our suffering.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Dionysian *art* causes us to undergo such ecstatic experiences and thereby feel absorbed in Dionysian reality.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Nietzsche considers music the ultimate Dionysian art because it’s not an object in physical space (unlike, e.g., sculpture). Thus, music seems *formless*, allowing us to feel in touch with formless Dionysian life.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 2. Apollonian Reality and Art Nietzsche contrasts the *Dionysian* with the *Apollonian*, which also refers to both an aspect of reality and a type of art.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Apollonian *reality* is the everyday world of different finite, individual beings (e.g., people, objects, etc.) perceived in space and time by ordinary consciousness.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Apollonian *art* is depictions of these beings made *beautiful* (e.g., still life painting).[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Apollonian art is then Apollonian reality *beautified*.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Nietzsche compares Apollonian art to dreams because, he says, such art consists of beautiful dream-like *illusions*.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Nietzsche thinks they are illusions in the sense that the artworks make Apollonian beings (e.g., people, fruit, etc.) appear more attractive than they really are.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) For instance, portraits typically depict people in a flattering light, omitting flaws (e.g., skin blemishes). Thus, Nietzsche believes a kind of aesthetically pleasing *deception* is involved in Apollonian art.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 3. Tragic Art The best tragic art, for Nietzsche, involves an ideal combination of the Apollonian and the Dionysian.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) That combination gives us a sense of our mortality as finite Apollonian beings, but an even stronger sense of Dionysian immortality and perspective.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) As a result, tragic art helps us to cope with both death and suffering. For instance, in classic tragedies, a person (i.e., a finite Apollonian being) experiences tragic circumstances (e.g., arrogance causes a downfall). This “tragic hero,” according to Nietzsche, represents the weakness and limitations of humanity, thereby symbolizing our finitude and suffering as Apollonian beings. Thus, by identifying with the tragic hero, we feel fearful upon realizing we *too* are finite Apollonian beings who suffer.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) However, Nietzsche says the Dionysian music or “soundtrack” in the tragedy—traditionally, the chorus—intoxicates us, causing us to feel absorbed in eternal Dionysian life.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) This gives us a joyful feeling of immortality that consoles us in response to the fearful realization of our mortality.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Thus, Dionysian art and reality comfort us in the face of Apollonian finitude.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) However, Dionysian reality is *itself* *also* terrifying because it seems formless and therefore overwhelming, like a stormy sea.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Furthermore, Dionysian reality is not a caring heavenly being, but instead a non-personal energy indifferent to the concerns of humanity. As a result, Nietzsche thinks it’s too scary to directly identify with Dionysian life (e.g., via the tragic chorus) without the help of Apollonian beauty.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) Nietzsche says that the genius of classic tragedies is that they allow us to experience and feel “one” with Dionysian life *through* beautiful Apollonian beings.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) They do this simply by being works of Apollonian art. As such, they focus our attention on an imaginary *but familiar* (i.e., ordinary, *non*-Dionysian) world of beautified Apollonian reality: poetic dialogue, captivating performers, and dramatic action.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) This beautiful *illusion* rescues us from staring directly into the terrifying abyss of the formless Dionysian reality (i.e., becoming completely “lost” in the music).[\[27\]](#_ftn27) Thus, in a tragedy, music and the eternal life of Dionysian reality save us from the horrific mortality of Apollonian reality, but the beautiful Apollonian art protects us from the overwhelming formlessness of Dionysian life.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Because Nietzsche also thinks Dionysian reality is universal and therefore everywhere, identifying with it gives us a big-picture, God’s-eye-view perspective.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) From this grand-scheme-of-things viewpoint it appears that everything, including even our suffering, happens for a reason.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) For instance, just as dissonance can contribute to the overall beauty of a song, suffering might seem to happen for the purpose of making life appear more beautiful as a whole—the sour that helps life taste sweeter overall.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) Thus, for Nietzsche, we like tragic art because it soothes and consoles us as mortals who suffer.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) ### 4. Conclusion Nietzsche thinks Dionysian life is too “monstrous”—e.g., uncaring and overwhelming—for us to identify with it in the absence of dream-like Apollonian beauty. Thus, aesthetic *deception* is necessary for Dionysian comfort. The question, though, is whether we still find it comforting once we realize we’ve been deceived.[\[33\]](#_ftn33) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For an introduction to the philosophy of tragedy, see Young (2013), Eagleton (2002), Eagleton (2020), and Poole (2005). The philosophy of tragedy is a sub-field of philosophy called aesthetics and the philosophy of art. For an introduction to this sub-field, see [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) and [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/), both by Brock Rough. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This essay summarizes major ideas in Nietzsche’s book *The Birth of Tragedy*, first published in 1872. For helpful commentary on this book, see Young (1994), Young (2006), Daniels (2013), Burnham and Jesinghausen (2010), Allison (2001), and Ridley (2007). Nietzsche develops his theory primarily to understand the existential value of the genre of drama known as tragedy, but it is clear he believes it applies to other forms of tragic art as well. For instance, Nietzsche wrote *The Birth of Tragedy* in part as a tribute to the music of Richard Wagner, which Nietzsche believed heralded a renaissance of tragic art in society. Thus, it’s possible to view Nietzsche’s theory of tragedy as a *general* theory of tragic art (i.e., tragic art of all kinds), not just a theory of tragedy in drama. For an introduction to some key aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy overall, see [“God is dead”: Friederich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 42) writes that tragic art helps us cope with “the terror and horror of existence.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 42) writes that tragic art was born from “a most profound need”—i.e., the need to cope with suffering and death. Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 43) says that tragic art was designed to help us cope with suffering. For an introduction to philosophical reflections on death and mortality, see [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad/) by Frederik Kaufman, [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves, and [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira. Nietzsche’s focus on the existential value of tragedy can be understood as an attempt to understand the role that tragic art plays in the meaning of life. For an introduction to what philosophers have said on the meaning of life, see [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) and [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/), both by Matthew Pianalto. Nietzsche’s theory of tragedy can be considered an existentialist interpretation of tragedy. For an introduction to existentialism, see [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/existentialism/) by Addison Ellis and [Albert Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 49) says his concepts of Apollonian and Dionysian make up an “aesthetical metaphysics.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 59) refers to “the worlds of everyday reality \[i.e., Apollonian reality, the reality of individuals\] and of Dionysian reality.” [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 37) calls the Dionysian reality “the mysterious primordial unity \[i.e., formless oneness\],” “the truly existent primal unity,” and (p. 132) “the primordially One” which he says (p. 36) we experience in “blissful ecstasy.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 43) writes that Dionysian intoxication consists of “oneness of man with nature \[i.e., Dionysian reality\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 143) describes Dionysian reality as “the foundation of all existence” and the “basic ground of the world \[i.e., the core or heart of all things\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 62) describes Dionysian reality as “the eternal life of this core of existence which abides through the perpetual destruction of appearances.” [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 37) locates Dionysian reality in nature. Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 38) identifies Dionysian reality as an energy from nature. For evidence that Nietzsche thinks of Dionysian reality as wild and chaotic in nature, see his claim (1967/1872: p. 39) that ancient peoples experienced this reality during “festivals centered in extravagant sexual licentiousness” where “the most savage natural instincts were unleashed, including even that horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty…” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 127) also compares Dionysian reality to a “thundering current.” Nietzsche (see, e.g., 1967/1872: p. 104) can also be interpreted as arguing that Dionysian reality is equivalent to Schopenhauer’s concept of the will as the thing-in-itself. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 36) writes that it is in “blissful ecstasy” that “we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 38) writes that we experience Dionysian reality in “a mystic feeling of oneness” and “mystical self-abnegation.” For an introduction to the philosophy of mysticism, see [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) and [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/), both by Matthew Sanderson. Mystical experiences are a type of religious experience. For an introduction to the philosophy of religious experience, see [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) and [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/), both by Matthew Sanderson. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Nietzsche (1967/1872: pp. 33-37) refers to the experience of Dionysian art as intoxication. Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 36) writes that in Dionysian intoxication “everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness \[i.e., we ‘lose’ ourselves\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 46) writes of “the self-oblivion \[i.e., the loss of self or ‘ego-death’\] of the Dionysian states.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Paintings and sculptures appear as finite objects located in and limited to specific physical locations in space. They have clear boundaries and borders demarcating where they leave off and other things begin. For instance, when viewing them, it is clear where they leave off and the surrounding space in which they appear begins, and it is clear where they leave off and the viewers who are experiencing them begin. When I view paintings and sculptures, I am aware of a basic difference between myself *here* and the paintings and sculptures *over there*. Music, on the other hand, seems to be everywhere all at once; it seems to surround listeners on all sides; we feel immersed in it, and it even seems to be inside our bodies, the sound reverberating in our ears and the bass thumping in our chests. When I’m listening to music, there seems to be no difference between myself and the music—no sense that I am here but the music is over there. Instead, the music seems to be all around me and even *in* me: I feel “one” with the music. While the speaker from which the music is emanating might be a visible, finite object located in physical space, the *music itself* does not appear as an object limited by its own form; instead, music seems formless, even infinite. Thus, music, for Nietzsche, puts us in touch with the formless reality of the Dionysian. Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 100) says that music is “the Dionysian art” which is (p. 33) “nonimagistic \[i.e., formless\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 40) writes, “The very element which forms the essence of Dionysian music (and hence of music in general) is carefully excluded as un-Apollonian—namely, the emotional power of the tone, the uniform flow of the melody, and the utterly incomparable world of harmony.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 49) writes that musicians “\[produce\] the copy of this primal unity \[i.e., the Dionysian reality\] as music.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 55) writes that music symbolizes the Dionysian reality. If Nietzsche (see, e.g., 1967/1872: pp. 51, 103, 107) is interpreted as arguing that Dionysian reality is Schopenhauer’s concept of the will as the thing-in-itself, he can be understood as agreeing with Schopenhauer that music expresses the emotional movement of the will. However, see Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 55) for an example of where he seems to contrast his view with Schopenhauer’s. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) While Nietzsche’s focus in this book is on tragedy, he considers the Apollonian and Dionysian to be the basis of *all* art, writing (1967/1872: p. 33) that “the continuous development of art is bound up with the Apollonian and Dionysian duality.” Nietzsche says (1967/1872: p. 33) he borrows the ideas of the Apollonian and Dionysian from the ancient Greek world that opposed “the Apollonian art of sculpture, and the nonimagistic, Dionysian art of music.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 46) writes that Apollonian reality consists of “the individual, i.e., the delimiting of the boundaries of the individual \[i.e., any individuated object or being\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 65) writes of the “Apollonian world of images \[i.e., individuals or beings\].” [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 36) writes that Apollonian art is “the glorious divine image \[i.e., the beautiful image\] of the principium individuationis \[i.e., the principle of individuation, or Apollonian reality\], through whose gestures and eyes all the joy and wisdom of ‘illusion,’ together with its beauty, speak to us.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 66) writes of “the Apollonian state of dreams \[i.e., the experience of beautiful Apollonian reality\] in which the world of the day \[i.e., the everyday Apollonian reality of ordinary consciousness\] becomes veiled, and a new world, clearer, more understandable, more moving than the everyday world and yet more shadowy \[i.e., more beautiful but also more dream-like and illusory\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 100) identifies Apollonian art as “beautiful forms \[i.e., beautiful beings or objects\].” [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 99) writes that Apollonian art is “the transfiguring genius of the *principium individuationis* \[i.e., the beautifying genius of the principle of individuation or Apollonian individual beings\].” [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Nietzsche (1967/1872: pp. 33-34) compares Apollonian art to dreams. Nietzsche says (1967/1872: p. 34) the “dream worlds” of Apollonian art consist of “beautiful illusions.” Nietzsche writes (1967/1872: p. 34), “In our dreams we delight in the immediate understanding of figures; all forms speak to us; there is nothing unimportant or superfluous.” In other words, everything appears beautiful in pleasant dreams. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 34) writes that Apollonian art, like illusions in dreams, consists of “mere appearance.” [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 104) writes that Apollonian art consists of “lies.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 126) refers to Apollonian art as a “noble deception.” [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 33) writes that tragedy involves a “coupling” of the Apollonian and Dionysian in “an equally Dionysian and Apollonian form of art—Attic tragedy.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 81) writes that tragedy consists of “the expression of two interwoven artistic impulses, the Apollonian and the Dionysian.” [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 131) writes that while a tragedy causes us to “shudder,” it ultimately makes us feel “a higher, much more overpowering joy.” While Nietzsche’s focus is dramatic tragedy, it’s clear that his formula and standards for what counts as good tragic art can apply to any art (e.g., music, painting, sculpture, etc.) that gives the experiencer a sense of their mortality but an even stronger sense of immortality and perspective. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 104) writes that tragedy communicates to us that “\[w\]e are to recognize that all that comes into being \[i.e., all individual Apollonian beings\] must be ready for a sorrowful end \[i.e., death\]; we are forced to look into the terrors \[i.e., the mortality and suffering\] of the individual existence.” [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 56) locates the aesthetic origin of tragedy in the chorus. Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 59) writes, “The metaphysical comfort—with which, I am suggesting even now, every true tragedy leaves us—that life \[i.e., Dionysian life\] is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable—this comfort appears in incarnate clarity in the chorus…” [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 104) writes, “The metaphysical joy in the tragic is a translation of the instinctive unconscious Dionysian wisdom \[i.e., that Dionysian life is eternal\] into the language of images \[i.e., beautiful Apollonian reality\]: the hero…is negated for our pleasure, because he is only phenomenon \[i.e., a finite Apollonian being\], and because the eternal life \[i.e., Dionysian life\]…is not affected by his annihilation. ‘We believe in eternal life,’ exclaims tragedy; while music is the immediate idea \[i.e., expression\] of this life.” [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 131) writes that the spectator of tragedy “shudders at the sufferings which will befall the hero, and yet anticipates in them a higher, much more overpowering joy \[i.e., the metaphysical comfort provided by identifying with Dionysian reality\].” [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) This is a common example of what philosophers call an experience of the sublime. Nietzsche (1967/1872: pp. 45, 47, 60, 62, 124) compares the experience of Dionysian reality to the experience of the sublime. For an introduction to the philosophy of the sublime, see [Immanuel Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson. As sublime, Dionysian reality would be an example of what philosopher Jean-Luc Marion calls a “saturated phenomenon.” For an introduction to Marion’s concept of “saturated phenomena,” see [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Nietzsche (1967/1872: pp. 39-40) writes of how scary it is to directly identify in experience with Dionysian life, that “horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 45) writes that experiencing Dionysian reality requires the “pleasurable illusion” of Apollonian art. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) In other words, tragedy involves the Apollonian beautification of Dionysian life, like an Instagram filter laid over a photo of a hurricane. Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 48) calls the specific combination of Dionysian and Apollonian elements in tragedy “genius.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: pp. 64-65) writes, “we must understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian chorus which ever anew discharges itself in an Apollonian world of images.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 65) writes that in tragedy the Apollonian elements of characters, actions, and scenes ultimately serve as vehicles for the Dionysian chorus, thereby shielding spectators from the full brunt of Dionysian reality. Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 92) says that the “essence of tragedy” is “a manifestation and projection into images \[i.e., beautiful Apollonian beings\] of Dionysian states, as the visible \[i.e., the Apollonian\] symbolizing of music, as the dream-world \[i.e., the beautiful Apollonian reality\] of a Dionysian intoxication.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 131) writes that tragic art is “a symbolization of Dionysian wisdom through Apollonian artifices.” [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 128) writes that, in a tragedy, “thought and word save us from the uninhibited effusion” of Dionysian reality. “Thus the Apollonian tears us out of the Dionysian universality and lets us find delight in individuals \[i.e., Apollonian beings\]; it attaches our pity to them, and by means of them it satisfies our sense of beauty which longs for great and sublime forms; it presents images \[i.e., Apollonian beings\] of life to us, and incites us to comprehend in thought the core of life they contain.” [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 89) refers to “Dionysian abysses.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 129) writes that part of the purpose of “Apollonian illusion” in a tragedy is “to deliver us from the Dionysian flood and excess.” [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 139) writes, “Among the peculiar art effects of musical tragedy we had to emphasize an Apollonian *illusion* by means of which we were supposed to be saved from immediate unity with Dionysian music, while our musical excitement could discharge itself in an Apollonian field and in relation to a visible intermediary world that had been interposed.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 46) writes that the Ancient Greeks discovered that “Apollo could not live without Dionysus \[i.e., that Dionysian art and reality are necessary for saving us from the finitude of Apollonian reality\].” [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 71) says that the spectator of a tragedy seems “to attain universality \[i.e., to attain a universal perspective\]…to transcend the curse of individuation and to become the *one* world-being \[i.e., Dionysian reality\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 112) writes that via tragedy we attain “a comprehensive \[i.e., big-picture, God’s-eye\] view of the world.” [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 41) writes that, from the standpoint of Dionysian reality, “all things, whether good or evil, are deified.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 43) writes that tragic art provides “the only satisfactory theodicy \[i.e., theory that everything happens for a reason\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 45) writes that experiences of tragic art “show us how necessary is the entire world of suffering \[i.e., necessary for creating the beauty of existence overall\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 52) writes that “it is only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* that existence and the world are eternally *justified* \[i.e., it is only through art that suffering seems justified or as though it happens for a reason\].” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 104) writes that when we attain the Dionysian perspective “the struggle, the pain, the destruction of phenomena, now appear necessary \[i.e., necessary for some purpose or reason\] to us.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 143) writes that music and tragedy help us attain the Dionysian perspective and thereby “justify the existence of even the ‘worst world.’” For an introduction to how philosophers have attempted to make religious sense of death and suffering, see [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 141) explicitly compares musical dissonance to suffering and says that, from the Dionysian perspective, “The joy aroused by the tragic myth has the same origin as the joyous sensation of dissonance in music.” [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 43) writes that tragic art allows us to “\[triumph\] over an abysmal and terrifying view of the world and the keenest susceptibility to suffering through recourse to the most forceful and pleasurable illusions.” Nietzsche (1967/1872: p. 108) writes that without “metaphysical comfort”—i.e., Dionysian immortality and perspective on suffering—“the delight in tragedy \[i.e., why we like tragic art\] cannot be explained at all.” [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) See Young (1994) for this criticism of Nietzsche’s theory. Nietzsche’s answer (1967/1872: p. 5) seems to be “yes” because he claims Ancient Greek audiences knew the metaphysical comfort provided by tragedy was an aesthetic deception and yet, just as we enjoy dreaming even after we’ve become aware that we are dreaming, they still found it life-affirming and inspiring, if only because tragedy offered a vision of, and thereby hope in the possibility of, overcoming death and suffering. ### References [Allison, David B. (2001). Reading the New Nietzsche. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780847689804/Reading-the-New-Nietzsche-The-Birth-of-Tragedy-The-Gay-Science-Thus-Spoke-Zarathustra-and-On-the-Genealogy-of-Morals) [Aristotle. (1997/c. 400 BC). Poetics. Penguin Classics. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/260883/poetics-by-aristotle/) [Burnham, Douglas and Jesinghausen, Martin. (2010). Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy. Continuum. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/nietzsches-the-birth-of-tragedy-9781847065858/) [Daniels, Paul Raimond. (2013). Nietzsche and The Birth of Tragedy. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Nietzsche-and-The-Birth-of-Tragedy/RaimondDaniels/p/book/9781844652433?srsltid=AfmBOooCZL8qrdK0B87h0jeyiFLtFWXBCx4VKfHflU71QptVt5n8qi2j) [Eagleton, Terry. (2002). Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic. Wiley-Blackwell. ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Sweet+Violence%3A+The+Idea+of+the+Tragic-p-9780470765951) [Eagleton, Terry. (2020). Tragedy. Yale University Press. ](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300252217/tragedy/) [Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1967/1872). The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner. Penguin Random House. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/121940/the-birth-of-tragedy-and-the-case-of-wagner-by-friedrich-nietzsche-translated-with-a-commentary-by-walter-kaufmann/) [Poole, Adrian. (2005). Tragedy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/tragedy-9780192802354?cc=us&lang=en&) [Ridley, Aaron. (2007). Nietzsche on Art. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Philosophy-GuideBook-to-Nietzsche-on-Art/Ridley/p/book/9780415315913?srsltid=AfmBOooM-8x9jdZdKCkqEy0zz-BDLo7g9O2R4a9yfP0v8DkBKJ8txLyS) [Young, Julian. (2013). The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Zizek. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/philosophy-of-tragedy/C73FA22B55059A849D55A042DC0AEDBE) [Young, Julian. (1994). Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/history-philosophy/nietzsches-philosophy-art?format=PB) [Young, Julian. (2006). Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nietzsches-philosophy-of-religion/E439DF633826708AD3F11B4B07C36706) ### Related Essays [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) by Brock Rough [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson [Albert Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [“God is dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof [Immanuel Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/) by Matthew Sanderson [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad/) by Frederik Kaufman [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/) by Matthew Sanderson [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/friedrich-nietzscheye-gore-trajedi-neden-trajik-sanati-severiz-matthew-sanderson/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Nietzsche-Tragedy.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)[*.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics, Historical Philosophy, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** paradox of tragedy, Sanderson, tragedy, tragic --- ### [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) **Published:** December 30, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An overview of Plato's "Crito." **Content:** Author: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) Categories: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1,000 Plato’s *Crito* describes a conversation that takes place in 399 B.C.E. in an Athens prison, where Socrates awaits execution. Not long before, an assembly of more than 500 Athenian citizens convicted Socrates of corrupting the youth and *impiety*, essentially failing to respect the gods of the city. Socrates denied these charges. Moreover, he insisted that his public philosophizing, far from being subversive, was for the benefit of Athens and in the service of the god Apollo. The jury wasn’t convinced, however, and found him guilty. They were further incensed when, during the sentencing stage of the trial, Socrates suggested that his “punishment” should be a lifetime supply of free meals at the *prytaneum*, or central hearth, an honor typically reserved for Olympic champions and the like. These antics did not play well and Socrates received the death penalty. A religious observance delayed the execution for a few weeks, but it now appears imminent. Enter Crito, a friend with deep pockets and deeper affection for Socrates. Early one morning, Crito shows up at Socrates’ cell with an escape plan. He bribed the jailer and, with the help of other friends, has arranged for Socrates to be whisked away to Thessaly, another Greek city-state. There Socrates can live out his remaining years in exile with his family, who will also leave Athens. Everything has been taken care of except for the hardest part: convincing Socrates to agree with the plan (43a-44b, 45c). Anyone who knows Socrates knows that this isn’t going to be easy. Crito is determined to save his friend’s life, however, and so he comes armed with a battery of arguments. Crito knows that Socrates isn’t afraid of death, and so he wisely appeals to considerations that are the most likely to resonate with Socrates: his sense of honor and his obligations to others. ![The Death of Socrates](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Jacques-Philip-Joseph_de_Saint-Quentin_-_The_Death_of_Socrates_-_WGA20664.jpg?resize=656%2C536&ssl=1) ### 1. Crito’s Arguments Crito begins personally: if Socrates is executed, then he and others will lose an irreplaceable friend. Moreover, people will wonder why Socrates’ friends didn’t do more to save his life when they had the means to do so. They’ll ask: Is Crito such a cheapskate that he refused to part with a little money to save his friend’s life? (44c) Socrates also has obligations to raise and educate his sons, who will be fatherless if Socrates is executed (45d). Finally, in passively accepting his unjust fate, Socrates will be giving his enemies what they want, allowing evil to triumph. Death is the easy, *cowardly* way out. To continue living is more difficult and courageous. Escaping would deny evil a victory (45e-46a). ### 2. Socrates’ Replies Socrates listens patiently, then carefully dismantles Crito’s reasoning. Appeals to reputation are misguided, he argues. After all, we should care about what is actually just, not what *seems* just to most people. Appeals to personal relationships are no better. Socrates can’t educate his children by setting an example of unjust behavior for them to follow. Nor could he be a good friend. As for aiding his enemies–what they want is to harm him. If Socrates were to behave unjustly, he’d be giving them what they want by harming his own soul. With these arguments, Socrates is able to convince Crito that justice is the only issue that really matters. If Socrates can show that escaping would be unjust, then none of Crito’s points would carry any weight (46b-48d). ### 3. Socrates’ Arguments for Obedience Having neutralized Crito’s arguments for fleeing, Socrates presses his case for remaining in Athens and accepting his fate. Since two wrongs don’t make a right, the injustice of his conviction and sentence shouldn’t affect how we think about this decision. Being treated unjustly doesn’t license Socrates to do something unjust himself, in other words. Crito agrees and so Socrates presses his case that escaping would be unjust to Athens. There are three interrelated argumentative threads here. First, escaping would set a precedent for others, leading to more lawless behavior. Second, Athens’ laws and institutions made his flourishing for 70 years possible; to disobey only now would be ungrateful, like slapping a parent. Finally, Socrates didn’t have to spend his entire adult life in Athens. He could have relocated if he didn’t like the rules there. His decision to stay and participate in Athens’ military and civic institutions amounts to a tacit agreement to respect Athenian laws (49a-54e). Socrates was given a fair chance to persuade his fellow citizens during his trial. Since he failed to do so, he is now compelled to abide by their decision even though he and Crito agree that it was the wrong one. ### 4. Discussion Crito is apparently convinced by Socrates’ reasoning, but that doesn’t mean that we have to be. We might resist Socrates at several points. First, we might reasonably doubt the assumption that Socrates’ obligations to Athens outweigh, and perhaps even define, his obligations to his friends and family. Maybe Socrates has this backward and he should prioritize these other obligations instead. Maybe Socrates can’t be a good citizen unless he is first a good friend and father. Arguably, that requires fleeing in these circumstances. We might also think that the state, like a negligent or abusive parent, can behave so badly as to absolve Socrates of reciprocal obligations. If anything could do this, then it seems like an unjust death sentence could. If that’s right, then the social contract would already be broken and Socrates would owe Athens nothing by the time he’s contemplating escape. Finally, even if the social contract remains intact, it might be that breaking the law is the least bad thing Socrates can do under the circumstances. Allowing an unjust sentence to be carried out might be more harmful to Athens then breaking the law. Obedience to bad verdicts also sets a precedent that Socrates should be worried about. Granted, disobedience comes with risks of its own. But the moral considerations don’t all stack up on the side of obedience, as Socrates suggests. So Socrates’ intriguing arguments remain debatable. As for Crito, we can surmise that the jailer probably didn’t give him his money back. ### Reference [Plato. *Crito*, in *Socrates of Athens: Euthyphro, Socrates’ Defense, Crito and the Death Scene from Phaedo*, translated by Cathal Woods and Ryan Pack. Creative Commons, 2007.](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1023145) ### Related Essays [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/plato-crito.pdf "plato-crito"). ### About the Author [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) has a doctorate in philosophy from CU Boulder. He does a lot of writing, academic and otherwise. He also enjoys swing dancing. [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](http://www.spencercasephilosophy.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Ancient, Case, Crito, Plato, Socrates --- ### [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) **Published:** October 11, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Nozick thinks that a story about the basketball superstar Wilt Chamberlain shows why the government should not take from the rich to help everyone else. This article explains Nozick’s argument which he uses to support “libertarianism,” his view that the government’s role is not to redistribute wealth but to promote liberty. **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 998 Some people are rich. Others are poor. Is this bad? Many argue that it’s unjust for society to be deeply unequal, and that the government should step in to distribute wealth from the very rich to everyone else.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Philosopher Robert Nozick (1938-2002) disagrees. Although it may sound reasonable to redistribute wealth, Nozick thinks that a story about the basketball superstar Wilt Chamberlain (1936-1999) shows why the government should not take from the rich to help everyone else.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This article explains Nozick’s argument which he uses to support “libertarianism,” his view that the government’s role is not to redistribute wealth but to promote liberty. [![Wilt Chamberlain](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/wilt-chamberlain.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/wilt-chamberlain.jpg?ssl=1) Wilt Chamberlain### 1. The Story of Wilt Chamberlain Imagine Chamberlain signs a contract with his basketball team. The contract gives Chamberlain 25 cents for every ticket sold to games he plays in. Over the basketball season, one million people come to watch Chamberlain. At the end of the season, he is $250,000 richer than before.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) It does not seem like anybody does anything wrong by paying to watch Chamberlain. People are entitled to spend their money however they would like. Nobody is harmed by this.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) So, if the government allows people to freely spend their money, there will be nothing to stop anyone from getting as rich as they are able to get based on their talent, hard work, luck, or anything else. ### 2. No Inequality Limits Nozick argues that, because people like Chamberlain can get rich without anything bad happening, there should be no limit on how unequal society can get. The government should not step in to take money from anyone so long as it was given to that person freely by someone who rightly had the money in the first place. So, as long as nobody stole money to give it to Chamberlain, the government shouldn’t take Chamberlain’s money.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 3. Preventing Inequality Stifles Freedom Nozick argues that ensuring equality in wealth would require unduly infringing on freedom.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Any amount of inequality that we think is “too much” is a level that could be reached by something like the Chamberlain example. To stop society from reaching this inequality, the government would have to prevent free transactions, or immediately undo them. It would either have to make it illegal for Chamberlain to sign his deal, or take the money as soon as he earns it. Nozick thinks that this strict regulation, or constant repossession, would be unjust. The government would have to stop people from doing perfectly acceptable things, like paying extra to watch Chamberlain, or it would have to take his money as soon as he earns it.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) But it would be wrong to limit freedom in this way, or to take Chamberlain’s earnings like this. The conclusion, then, is that the government should not try to redistribute wealth. This is true even if the resulting situation is very unequal, like one rich Chamberlain in an otherwise poor society. ### 4. Libertarianism Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain argument is one argument that he uses to defend his view that the best kind of government is one that doesn’t interfere with freedom. The government’s role is to promote everyone’s liberty, not redistribute wealth or promote economic equality. Nozick is therefore known as a “libertarian.” Sometimes the word “libertarian” is used to mean other things. But in political philosophy, it refers to people who think the government should promote freedom. Some libertarians argue that we need economic equality to preserve freedom.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Nozick disagrees. His Wilt Chamberlain argument is meant to show that establishing economic equality would interfere with freedom. Libertarianism contrasts with the view defended by philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002). Rawls thinks that the government is more than just a defender of freedom. It’s also a cooperative venture. Thus we should distribute the benefits of this cooperation fairly, and this includes the money people earn in society. Rawls thinks this requires something close to equal distribution, rather than letting the rich get richer.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 5. Objections Many objections have been leveled against Nozick’s argument. One objection is that Nozick is wrong to claim that as long as everybody acts freely, there’s nothing wrong with the outcome. Maybe certain free choices can lead to unacceptable outcomes. For example, when Wilt Chamberlain ends up much richer than everyone else, he becomes powerful and influential. He can buy up all the apartments and charge us rent to live in them, making him even richer and us even poorer. He can invest money in profitable businesses, and use the returns to expand his investments. He can pass that money to his children who do the same. The result can be deep class divisions lasting centuries. So, some argue that in order to keep him from having too much power, the government should redistribute his extra wealth. Otherwise, people won’t be free. Their lives will be controlled by oligarchs like Chamberlain and his descendants.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Another objection is that Nozick is wrong to claim that free actions will wreck any preferred distribution of resources. Maybe it’s true that we can’t all have equal wealth five minutes after the basketball season ends unless the government uses a heavy hand to redistribute money. But maybe it’s more reasonable to ensure equal wealth over a longer period of time. For example, maybe the government should ensure we all have roughly equal wealth over our lifetimes, rather than equal wealth at all times, including right after the basketball season. The government can tax Wilt Chamberlain a little bit extra each year. Then it can spend that money on things that benefit the least wealthy, like unemployment benefits. Over time, Chamberlain’s extra basketball money will return to others, ensuring equality over everyone’s lifetimes, instead of immediately after the basketball season.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 6. Conclusion The Wilt Chamberlain argument has inspired rich debate about what sorts of relationships exist (or should exist) between the government, freedom, and resources. Because the example effectively dramatizes key topics like how freedom and specific distributions are perhaps in conflict, it has remained an enduring example in political philosophy. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, 149-50. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, 161. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, 161. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, 160. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, 163-4. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, 163. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Vallentyne and Steiner, *Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics*. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See [John Rawls’s ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 267 and Cohen, “Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Schmidtz, “The Right to Distribute,” 205-7. ### References [Cohen, G. A. “Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty.” *Erkenntnis* 11 (1977): 5-23.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00169842) [Nozick, Robert. ](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/)[*Anarchy, State, and Utopia*](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/)[ (Basic Books, 1974).](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/) [Rawls, John. ](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-liberalism/9780231130899)[*Political Liberalism* ](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-liberalism/9780231130899)[(Columbia University Press, 1993).](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-liberalism/9780231130899) [Schmidtz, David. “The Right to Distibute.” In ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-nozicks-anarchy-state-and-utopia/right-to-distribute/2016F1AED712C9CD039914780EA501E2)[*The Cambridge Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-nozicks-anarchy-state-and-utopia/right-to-distribute/2016F1AED712C9CD039914780EA501E2)[, edited by Ralf M. Bader and John Meadowcroft, 197-229 (Cambridge University Press, 2011).](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-nozicks-anarchy-state-and-utopia/right-to-distribute/2016F1AED712C9CD039914780EA501E2) [Vallentyne, Peter and Hillel Steiner (eds.).](https://link.springer.com/book/9780333794661)[*Left Liberalism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate*](https://link.springer.com/book/9780333794661)[ (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).](https://link.springer.com/book/9780333794661) ### Related Essays [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/robert-nozickin-liberteryenizme-dair-wilt-chamberlain-argumani-daniel-weltman/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Nozick.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social),* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** libertarian, libertarianism, Nozick, Weltman, Wilt Chamberlain --- ### [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/) **Published:** November 23, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Many say that we should make society more equal. But what should we equalize? This essay explains two of the most important ones: equality of outcome and equality of opportunity. **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 997 Many say that we should make society more equal.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But what should we equalize? Philosophers have many ideas about what we should make equal. This essay explains two of the most important ones: *equality of outcome* and *equality of opportunity*. [![An image that is said to illustrate equality vs. equity. By the Interaction Institute for Social Change, Artist Angus Maguire.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/IISC_EqualityEquity.png?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/IISC_EqualityEquity.png?ssl=1) An image illustrating the alleged difference between equality and equity. By the [Interaction Institute for Social Change](https://interactioninstitute.org/illustrating-equality-vs-equity/), artist [Angus Maguire](https://beclouded.net/).### 1. Equity and Equality In discussions about equality, some say that we should reject equality and focus on *equity*. For example, the picture above depicts *equality* as giving three people an *equal* number of boxes, so that a short person can’t see over a fence. It depicts *equity* as giving the short person two boxes and the tall person zero boxes, leaving both *equally* able to see over the fence.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) According to the picture, equality is silly. Equity is clearly better! Obviously the tall person does not need any boxes to stand on, and the short person needs two boxes. Philosophers have a different understanding of equality and equity. Philosophers say that both refer to the same kind of idea: *making people equal along some kind of dimension*. For example, the picture with the boxes says that everyone should be *equally able to see over the fence*, and this kind of equality is better than giving each person *an equal number of boxes*. Both sides of the picture depict a type of equality. The question is: equality of *what*? ### 2. Equality of Outcome One kind of equality that philosophers talk about is called *equality of outcome*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Equality of outcome means that *people are made equal to each other in terms of what the end result is*. In the fence example, the end result is being able to see over the fence or not. To make everyone equal with respect to this end result, the short person needs two boxes and the tall person needs no boxes. In real life we are concerned not with boxes and fences, but with things like health care, education, and income. If we want to aim for equality of outcome in health care, we will give more health care to sick people than healthy people. To aim for equal outcomes for everyone—by aiming to make each person as healthy as they can be—sick people need more health care than healthy people. If we want to ensure equality of education, we will try to make sure everyone ends up equally educated. We would try not to have a society where men receive more education than women, or rich people have more education than poor people, or people belonging to one race or religion have more education than people of other races or religions. One objection to equality of outcome is that sometimes we think the outcomes of our actions *should* be unequal. If you and I each get a loaf of bread, and then I throw mine in the trash, this leads to unequal outcomes in how much bread we get to eat. To make the outcomes equal, we would have to devote more resources to me than to you by making more bread for me. That seems like the wrong thing to do: if I threw my bread away, I shouldn’t get to eat as much bread as you: I should have to get by without bread. For reasons like this, many philosophers think equality of outcome is not the kind of equality we should implement. ### 3. Equality of Opportunity Another kind of equality that some philosophers prefer is equality of opportunity. *Equality of opportunity* means that *each person has equal chances at achieving that good outcome if they pursue that outcome*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) For example, equality of opportunity in terms of health care means that each person has an equal chance at being healthy if they work towards it. If someone decides to smoke, while another person does not smoke, they might end up with different levels of health. Equality of opportunity would imply it is okay that they end up differently healthy. They both had the same *opportunity* to be healthy: one person pursued health by avoiding smoking, and the other did not. Imagine instead that neither person smokes. One person might still need more health care than the other in order for their opportunities to be equal. For example, one person might get unlucky and develop a disease that is not their fault. In order for both people to have the opportunity to be healthy, the unlucky person needs more health care. In both cases, whether the two people end up equally healthy depends on their choices. If they both choose to be healthy, both will be equally healthy, even if this requires unequal resources, like giving more health care to the unlucky person. If one chooses to be unhealthy, then they will be less healthy, and we won’t give them extra resources to try to make them as healthy as the person who chose to be healthy. Equality of opportunity can also be applied to education. Imagine a society where a child born to rich parents and a child born to poor parents have an equal chance of securing an education as long as they pursue it. To achieve this, the society might tax rich people and use this money to provide education to poor people. This society has achieved equality of opportunity for education for people born in differently wealthy families. Ensuring equality of opportunity is not the same as ensuring equality of outcome. If people choose to ignore the opportunities they are given, their lives will turn out worse. Some will have better lives than others. If I throw my bread away, my life will be worse than yours. So, equality of outcome and equality of opportunity are different. ### 4. Conclusion Equality of outcome and equality of opportunity are not the only kinds of equality philosophers discuss. There are other conceptions of equality too.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) We can also ask what *should* be equalized: health? Education? Wealth? Happiness? And should we even be seeking equality anyway? These questions and others are all part of the extensive philosophical discussion of equality. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For discussion of other things we might pursue, see [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers, [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies, [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger, and [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For a history of this picture see (Froehle 2016). For discussion of the picture in the context of philosophy, with an emphasis on how philosophers reject the difference between equality and equity, see (Heath 2025). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For a defense of equality of outcome see Phillips (2004). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For a defense of equality of opportunity see Arneson (1989). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Two examples are *relational equality* (making sure people have enough resources to relate to each other as equals) and *equality of resources* (giving people equal shares of the world’s resources). For defenses of these views see (respectively) Anderson (1999) and Dworkin (1981a; 1981b). ### References [Anderson, E. (1999). “What Is the Point of Equality?” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233897)[*Ethics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233897)[ 109(2): 287-337.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233897) [Arneson, R. (1989). “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320032)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320032)[ 56(1): 77-93.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320032) [Dworkin, R. (1981a). “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264894?seq=1)[*Philosophy and Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264894?seq=1)[, 10(3): 185-246.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264894?seq=1) [Dworkin, R. (1981b). “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources”. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265047)[*Philosophy and Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265047)[, 10(4): 283-345.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265047) [Froehle, C. (2016). “The Evolution of an Accidental Meme.” ](https://medium.com/@CRA1G/the-evolution-of-an-accidental-meme-ddc4e139e0e4)[*Medium*](https://medium.com/@CRA1G/the-evolution-of-an-accidental-meme-ddc4e139e0e4)[.](https://medium.com/@CRA1G/the-evolution-of-an-accidental-meme-ddc4e139e0e4) [Heath, J. (2025). “Why philosophers hate that ‘equity’ meme.” ](https://josephheath.substack.com/p/why-philosophers-hate-that-equity)[*Substack*](https://josephheath.substack.com/p/why-philosophers-hate-that-equity)[.](https://josephheath.substack.com/p/why-philosophers-hate-that-equity) [Phillips, A. (2004). “Defending Equality of Outcome.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00188.x)[*Journal of Political Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00188.x)[12(](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00188.x)[1): 1-19.](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00188.x) ### Related Essays [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/esitlik-ne-anlama-geliyor-ve-hakkaniyetten-farki-nedir-daniel-weltman/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Equality-1.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** equality, equality of opportunity, equality of outcome, Weltman --- ### [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) **Published:** July 27, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** A successful theory of justice must explain why clear injustices are unjust and help us resolve current disputes. John Rawls (1921-2002) was a Harvard philosopher best known for his A Theory of Justice (1971), which attempted to define a just society. Nearly every contemporary scholarly discussion of justice references A Theory of Justice. This essay reviews its main themes. **Content:** Author: Ben Davies Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 999 Some people are multi-billionaires; others die because they are too poor to afford food or medications. In many countries, people are denied rights to free speech, to participate in political life, or to pursue a career, because of their gender, religion, race or other factors, while their fellow citizens enjoy these rights. In many societies, what best predicts your future income, or whether you will attend college, is your parents’ income. To many, these facts seem *unjust*. Others disagree: even if these facts are *regrettable*, they aren’t issues of justice.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) A successful theory of justice must explain why clear injustices are unjust and help us resolve current disputes.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) John Rawls (1921-2002) was a Harvard philosopher best known for his *A Theory of Justice* (1971), which attempted to define a just society. Nearly every contemporary scholarly discussion of justice references *A Theory of Justice*. This essay reviews its main themes.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ![John Rawls' A Theory of Justice](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/rawls-and-toj.jpg?resize=562%2C423&ssl=1) ### 1. The ‘Original Position’ and ‘Veil of Ignorance’ Reasonable people often disagree about how to live, but we need to structure society in a way that reasonable members of that society can accept.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Citizens could try to collectively agree on basic rules. We needn’t decide every detail: we might only worry about rules concerning major political and social institutions, like the legal system and economy, which form the ‘basic structure’ of society. A collective agreement on the basic structure of society is an attractive ideal. But some people are more powerful than others: some may be wealthier, or part of a social majority. If people can dominate negotiations because of qualities that are, as Rawls puts it, *morally arbitrary*, that is wrong. People don’t earn these advantages: they get them by luck. For anyone to use these unearned advantages to their own benefit is unfair, and the source of many injustices. This inspires Rawls’ central claim that we should conceive of justice ‘as fairness.’ To identify fairness, Rawls develops two important concepts: the *original position* and the *veil of ignorance.* The original position is a hypothetical situation: Rawls asks what social rules and institutions people would agree to, not in an *actual* discussion, but under *fair* conditions,[\[5\]](#_ftn5) where nobody knows whether they are advantaged by luck. Fairness is achieved through the *veil of ignorance*, an imagined device where the people choosing the basic structure of society (‘deliberators’) have morally arbitrary features hidden from them: since they have no knowledge of these features, any decision they make can’t be biased in their own favor. Deliberators aren’t ignorant about everything though. They know they are self-interested, i.e., want as much as possible of what Rawls calls *primary goods* (things we want, no matter what our ideal life looks like). They are also motivated by a minimal ‘sense of justice’: they will abide by rules that seem fair, if others do too. They also know basic facts about science and human nature.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 2. Rawls’s Principles of Justice Rawls thinks a *just* society will conform to rules that everyone would agree to in the original position. Since they are deliberating behind the veil of ignorance, people don’t know their personal circumstances, or even their view of the good life. This affects the kinds of outcomes they will endorse: e.g., it would be irrational for deliberators to agree to a society where only Christians have property rights since if, when the veil is ‘lifted,’ they turn out not to be Christian, that will negatively affect their life prospects. Similarly, deliberators presumably won’t choose a society with racist, sexist, or other unfairly discriminatory practices, since beyond the veil, they might end up on the wrong side of these policies.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) This gives rise to Rawls’ *first principle* of justice: *all people have equal claims to as much freedom as is consistent with everyone else having the same level of freedom.*[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Rawls further claims that, because their ignorance includes an ignorance of probabilities, deliberators would be extremely *cautious*, and apply what he calls a ‘maximin’ principle: they will aim to ensure that the *worst possible* position they could end up in is *as good as possible* in terms of primary goods. If we imagine ourselves as deliberators, we might be tempted by the idea of *total equality* in primary goods. This ensures, at least, that nobody will be better off than you for arbitrary reasons. However, some inequality *might* be useful: the possibility of earning more might incentivize people to work harder, growing the economy and so increasing the total amount of available wealth. This isn’t a wholehearted endorsement of capitalism, as Rawls’ *second principle*, which addresses social and economic inequalities, makes clear. The second principle has two parts: First, people in the original position will tolerate inequalities only if the jobs that pay more aren’t assigned unfairly. This gives us the ideal of *fair equality of opportunity*: inequalities are allowed *only if* they arise through jobs that equally talented people have equal opportunity to get. This requires, for instance, that young people receive roughly equal educational opportunities; otherwise, a talented individual might be held back by a lack of basic knowledge, either about their own talents, or about the world. Second, since their reasoning is governed by the ‘maximin’ principle, deliberators will only tolerate inequalities that benefit the worst off:[\[9\]](#_ftn9) since, as far as they know, *they* might be the worst off, this maximizes the quality of their worst possible outcome. This is called the *difference principle*. These principles are ordered, which tells us what to do if they clash: *equal liberty* is most important, then *fair opportunity*, and finally the *difference principle*. So, neither freedoms nor opportunity are governed by the difference principle.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. Conclusion We can now see how Rawls’ theory might evaluate the issues raised earlier. At least within specific societies, each seems to violate his basic principles of justice, and so would be condemned as unjust. So, even if we ultimately reject Rawls’ approach, it at least seems to offer intuitively correct answers in several important cases, and for plausible reasons. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For instance, some think that if someone’s money is fairly earned, it is not unjust that she does what she wants with it, such as spending it to increase her children’s opportunities (e.g., Nozick, 1974; Narveson, 2001). Others will say that there are no genuine ‘rights’, and a society should permit or restrict various activities depending on what will promote the ‘common good’: this charge has been made with considerable force against utilitarianism, though it is not one that all utilitarians accept (see Glover (1990), Section 3). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Rawls’ basic view has been importantly extended to several areas which he either did not explicitly comment on: e.g., Daniels’ (2007) extension of the view to healthcare justice, and Rowlands’ (1997) extension to animal rights; or in ways with which he would have himself explicitly disagreed: compare Beitz’s (1979) ‘Rawlsian’ approach to global justice with Rawls’ (1999a) own published views. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *A Theory of Justice* is a work of considerable length and detail, and this essay omits many elements of interest. For instance, this essay does not review Rawls’ discussion of his intellectual debt to the work of Immanuel Kant, e.g., in his criticism of utilitarian theory as failing to respect the ‘separateness of persons’ (191), and his reliance on the idea of grounding justice in a contract that is understood not as a historical event, but as a theoretical constraint (see Kant, 1793). In the discussion below, Rawls’ discussion of qualities that are “morally arbitrary” is found in Rawls (1971, 72-75) and the development of the original position and the veil of ignorance is found in Rawls (1971, 120). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *A Theory of Justice* focuses on ‘domestic’ justice, i.e., justice within a particular society. Rawls (1999a) addresses the distinct question of global or international justice. Rawls suggests that justice at the global level exists between *peoples* (groups bound by, e.g. a common culture, language, or history) not individuals, since there is no common global structure equivalent to the ‘basic structure’ of a society. While international justice is also developed by reference to a veil of ignorance, the deliberators are representatives of societies. As such, Rawls believes that their concerns would be very different, including a strong emphasis on respect for national sovereignty, with exceptions only in cases of severe human rights violations. In addition, so long as all peoples or nations have institutions that enable their members to live decent lives, any remaining inequality is not morally troubling. As outlined below, this is in stark contrast to his theory of domestic justice. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Rawls’ view is therefore a ‘hypothetical contract’ theory (i.e. it rests on what would be agreed under certain idealized assumptions), as opposed to the ‘actual contract’ view (e.g. Gauthier, 1986; Gilbert, 2006). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) One further condition that deliberators know, which Rawls borrows from David Hume (1738: Book 3, Part 2, Section 2), is that they exist in a condition of ‘moderate scarcity’, which according to both authors is a ‘circumstance’ of justice. The basic idea is that justice is only necessary where there are potential conflicts (i.e., when we do not have an abundance of goods), but if there is not enough even to meet everyone’s basic needs (i.e., ‘extreme scarcity’), those who lose out cannot be expected to abide by the rules. So society – and with it our system of justice – will break down. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) In fact, though, Rawls’ is remarkably silent on racial injustice, and there has been considerable debate about whether his system of thought has the space to properly address such issues. See e.g., Mills (2009); Shelby (2013). Related critiques have also been made with respect to other forms of injustice, such as gender-related injustice (e.g. Okin, 1989) and injustice against people with disabilities (e.g. Sen (1980); Nussbaum (2006)). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This was later revised to a weaker requirement: that people have access to a “fully adequate” set of basic rights and liberties (2001: 42-3): these rights cannot be overridden by appeals to the common good. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) However, the ‘worst off’ here are to be understood only in reference to “social and economic inequalities” (Rawls, 1999b: 53). Inequalities of ‘natural’ goods (which includes health) are not included because they are not things we can directly redistribute between people, unlike social goods such as money and opportunity. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) However, there is some apparent inconsistency across Rawls’ work here. Later (2001: 266), he seems to suggest that some inequalities of opportunity are inevitable, and that they must therefore be turned to the benefit of those with the least opportunity: this view looks remarkably like a difference principle for opportunity. ### References Daniels, Norman (2007), [*Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly*](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/political-philosophy/just-health-meeting-health-needs-fairly?format=PB&isbn=9780521699983) Cambridge University Press Gauthier, David (1986) [*Morals by Agreement*](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198249926.001.0001/acprof-9780198249924) Oxford University Press Gilbert, Margaret (2006) ‘[Reconsidering Actual Contract Theory](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199274959.001.0001/acprof-9780199274956-chapter-10)’ in *A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society*. Oxford University Press. 215-238 Glover, Jonathan (1990) [*Utilitarianism and its Critics*](http://www.jonathanglover.co.uk/sites/default/files/docs/utilitarianism-and-its-critics.pdf) Macmillan Publishing Hume, David (1738) [*A Treatise of Human Nature*](http://www.davidhume.org/texts/t/) Mills, Charles (2009) ‘[Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00147.x)’ *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* (2009): 161-184 Moller Okin, Susan (1989) [*Justice, Gender and the Family*](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/susan-moller-okin/justice-gender-and-the-family/9780465037032/) New York: Basic Books Narveson, Jan (2001) *[The Libertarian Idea](https://broadviewpress.com/product/the-libertarian-idea/?ph=520e08a63daa08ffebfa06f6#tab-description)* Broadview Press Nozick, Robert (1974) [*Anarchy, State and Utopia*](https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/Anarchy+State+and+Utopia-p-9780631197805) Wiley-Blackwell Nussbaum, Martha, (2006), [*Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674024106&content=reviews), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rawls, John (1971) [*A Theory of Justice*](https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vcVEPc30ut0C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Rawls, John (1999a) [*The Law of Peoples*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674005426&content=reviews) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Rawls, John (1999b) [*A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674000780) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Rawls, John (2001) [*Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674005112) Erin Kelly ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Rowlands, Mark (1997) ‘[Contractarianism and Animal Rights](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-5930.00060)’ *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 14 (3):235–247 Shelby, Tommie (2013) ‘[Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/critphilrace.1.2.0145?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)’ *Critical Philosophy of Race* 1(2): 145-162. Sen, Amartya, (1980), ‘[Equality of What?](http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf)’ in *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, S. MacMurrin (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ### For Further Reading Beitz, Charles (1979) ‘[Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706427)’ *International Organization*, 33: 405–424. Harsanyi, John (1975) ‘[Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1959090)’ *America Political Science Review* 69(2): 594-606 Kant, Immanuel (1793) ‘[On the common saying: this may be true in theory but it does not apply ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kant-political-writings/F044FA976B84C8BF0268C08583B0DB80)[in practice](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kant-political-writings/F044FA976B84C8BF0268C08583B0DB80)’ in *Kant’s Political Writings* (1970), edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge University Press (61-93) Rawls, John (2002) [*The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-rawls/FA95FC2BE6ABAA6E0B459B8A1BC588B0) edited by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Rawls, John (2005) [*Political Liberalism*](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-liberalism/9780231130899)[: ](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-liberalism/9780231130899)[*Expanded Edition*](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/political-liberalism/9780231130899) Columbia University Press Sandel, Michael (1998) [*Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/liberalism-and-the-limits-of-justice/6800BAC97E92FF5D64FF99DE858A900C) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Sen, Amartya (1992) [*Inequality Re-examined*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674452565&content=reviews) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Taylor, Charles (1985). ‘[The nature and scope of distributive justice](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/philosophical-papers/nature-and-scope-of-distributive-justice/B58DD6EA926F391E9F4617DD3E282633)’ in *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 289-317 Wenar, Leif, (2017) ‘[John Rawls](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls)’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) ### Related Essays [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/ "Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism") by Daniel Weltman [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/ "Immigration Ethics: An Overview") by Daniel Weltman [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Defining Capitalism and Socialism ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/)by Thomas Metcalf [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/1000word-rawls.pdf). ### About the Author Ben completed his PhD in Philosophy at King’s College London in 2015. He is currently a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. His research is mostly in the ethics and politics of health care, including resource allocation, professional ethics, discrimination, and democracy. He also has interests in animal ethics; death; and well-being. [sites.google.com/view/ben-davies-philosophy](https://sites.google.com/view/ben-davies-philosophy) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** fair, fairness, justice, Rawls --- ### [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice/) **Published:** January 7, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** How should goods which contribute to well-being be distributed? This is the question of distributive justice. **Content:** Authors: Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 994 As we write this, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos is worth $188 billion.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) That is about $1 billion more than the day before. And $1 billion is more money than you would have had you earned $1,000 a day, every day, since Jesus died. Meanwhile, hundreds of millions of people around the world live in extreme poverty.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) And for many people extreme poverty is just a hospital bill or failed harvest away. This is an example of the distribution of wealth and economic resources. There are other goods that are relevant here as well, such as education, healthcare, and housing.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The distribution of these goods matters because they contribute to our *well-being*. Yet such valuable goods are scarce: how should goods which contribute to well-being be distributed? This is the question of distributive justice.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) [![Distributing the good of watching a game.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/equality.jpg?resize=656%2C223&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/equality.jpg?ssl=1)Distributing the good of watching a game.### 1. Equality One proposal is that everyone should have the goods that would lead to roughly equal amounts of well-being. This is called *egalitarianism*.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Egalitarianism might seem fair: people are moral equals so they should have equal amounts of well-being.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Equality does not always mean having exactly the *same goods*: we must take certain facts about persons into consideration:[\[7\]](#_ftn7) e.g., people with some physical disabilities might need more money to achieve the same level of well-being to, say, pay for a wheelchair or assisted-living facilities. But thinking that distributive equality is itself valuable has some counterintuitive implications. It means that sometimes making people worse off without making anyone better off is preferable:[\[8\]](#_ftn8) e.g., if a storm destroys houses in a rich part of town, bringing the rich closer to the welfare level of the poor, egalitarianism seems to suggest that this is good because it makes things more equal. To avoid such implications, many people argue that inequalities are sometimes justified. For example, contemporary debates about distributive justice really began with the publication of Rawls’ *Theory of Justice*.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Rawls proposed that inequalities are justified if – *and only if* – they benefit the least well-off in society.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) This is still an egalitarian view in that an egalitarian distribution is seen as the baseline and departures from it need to be justified. Unlike Rawls, others have rejected the idea that distributive equality is the moral baseline altogether. Here we review some influential principles philosophers have defended in response to egalitarianism and its valuing equality in distributive justice. ### 2. Priority One alternative to egalitarianism states that the fewer valuable goods an individual has, the more additional goods matter: e.g., an extra $1000 matters more to someone in poverty than a billionaire.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) So, if I can provide a single benefit *either* to someone with a low level of well-being *or* to someone with a high level of well-being, it makes sense to give it to the person with a lower level of well-being. This view is called *prioritarianism*. Prioritarianism is not concerned with inequality per se: it means that redistribution should often flow towards those who have less. Prioritarians give *weighted,* but not absolute, priority for the least well-off. This does imply, however, that if we could *greatly* benefit the rich at a small cost to the poor, that gain *could* outweigh the reasons we have for benefiting the poor. But in most realistic cases, prioritarians will help the least-well off first. Yet many people believe it is *especially* important that people not live in poverty, which is a different claim than that we should give weighted priority to their needs. That brings us to the third proposal: *sufficiency*. ### 3. Sufficiency This third proposal is that everyone should meet some minimal level or threshold of some valuable goods, such as income, education or healthcare. Everyone should at least have enough to reach that threshold.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) This is called *sufficientarianism*. Its plausibility depends on how it is developed: what counts as ‘having enough’? Common answers are that people must be able to meet their basic needs or be content with what they have.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Those answers raise questions of their own, such as about the vagueness of what it means to have ‘enough.’[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Some defend sufficientarianism on the grounds that we care about inequality because some people are very badly off: when we find cases of disturbing inequality, such as homelessness in a wealthy society, the thing that is objectionable is not the *difference* in wealth, but the fact that the homeless are so badly off. An important objection to sufficientarianism is that it favors lifting people above the threshold over any other possible benefit for others: e.g., a benefit to one person just below the threshold is always preferable to benefiting a thousand people just above that threshold. Many disagree. ### 4. The Libertarian Alternative A final view on distributive justice is that we must focus on how distributions come about, not the distribution itself. This is advocated by *libertarianism*. Robert Nozick gives the now-famous Wilt Chamberlain example.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Nozick has us imagine people freely giving Wilt $1 of their own money to watch him play basketball. In this case, Wilt is legitimately entitled to this money and so it would be unjust for the government to take some of his money, under threat of force, to redistribute it. Nozick, then, argues that if people’s rights are respected in acquiring and transferring goods—ruling out, e.g., acquiring or transferring goods using force, theft, or deceit—then we cannot object to such distributions as being unjust, no matter what the distributions end up looking like. Libertarianism has been heavily criticized.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) And it is questionable whether the current distribution of, say, income, education, and healthcare, is brought about by the kinds of voluntary transactions libertarians require. ### 5. Conclusion Regardless of which view on distributive justice one endorses, our current world does not live up to that ideal. Our world is a world of inequality and insufficiency, but also of waste and excess. Despite their disagreements, these theories all agree that current distributions are far from just and so thoughtfully engaging these issues can only help bring us closer to justice. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See the [Forbes World’s Billionaires List](https://www.forbes.com/real-time-billionaires). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) According to the World Bank, 689 million people lived in such poverty in 2015, meaning they lived on less than $1.90 a day. And according to Oxfam, just over 2000 billionaires possess as much wealth as the poorest 60% of the world’s population. See [World Bank, “Poverty overview”](https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview); [Oxfam, “World’s billionaires have more wealth than 4.6 billion people”.](https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/worlds-billionaires-have-more-wealth-46-billion-people) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See, for example, [Sen 1980](http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf); [Dworkin 1981a](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264894?seq=1); [1981b](http://www.mvopat.people.ysu.edu/courses/philmarkets/philmarketsdownloads/Dworkin_What_Is_Equ_pt2.pdf); [Cohen 1989](http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/GACohenCEJ.pdf); [Gheaus 2009](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01058.x); [Rose 2014](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jopp.12021). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Such distributive principles are often called “patterns” of distributive justice. Such patterns specify who should get what of goods such as income or wellbeing. They are referred to as ‘patterns’ because they indicate what “shape” or “form” the distribution of those goods should take. There are other important questions of distributive justice as well, but we will not cover them here. For example, there is the question among whom we are distributing those valuable goods (e.g. regionally, nationally, or globally), and which institutions are in charge of this distribution (e.g. the state). Here, however, we focus on the pattern of distributive justice. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See [Temkin 2003](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/6TemkinEgalDefended.pdf); [Holtug and Lippert-Rasmussen 2007](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See, for example, [Lippert-Rasmussen 2015](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Egalitarianism-Bloomsbury-Ethics-Lippert-Rasmussen-2015-10-08/dp/B01FEK80W0/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?keywords=Lippert-Rasmussen%2C+K.+2015.+Luck+Egalitarianism&qid=1552387637&s=books&sr=1-1-fkmr0); [Meijers and Vandamme 2019](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2018.1438804). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For endowment sensitivity, see [Dworkin 1981b](http://www.mvopat.people.ysu.edu/courses/philmarkets/philmarketsdownloads/Dworkin_What_Is_Equ_pt2.pdf); [Kymlicka 2002, chap. 3](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/contemporary-political-philosophy-9780198782742?cc=nl&lang=en&). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Furthermore, it would seem to follow that it is better in at least some way that everyone is worse off under an equal distribution than that everyone is better off under an unequal distribution. See, for example, [Parfit 1997](https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/3ParfitEqualityorPriority2000.pdf). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For an overview, see [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See [Rawls 1971](https://www.amazon.com/Theory-Justice-Original-Oxford-Paperbacks/dp/0674017722); [Van Parijs 2003](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-rawls/difference-principles/7EFABE836C502CB479990078B0D62BED). One might think that Rawls’ view is similar to prioritarianism. But there is an important difference. Rawls says that inequalities should be allowed only to benefit the least well-off. But prioritarianism does not say this, because it might well be that a distribution that gives weighted priority to people’s needs does not benefit the least well-off compared to an equal distribution. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See, for example, [Arneson 2000](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/233272?journalCode=et); [Holtug 2007](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See [Frankfurt 1987](https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/prioritarianism_papers/Session3Frankfurt.pdf); [Casal 2007](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/510692?journalCode=et); [Shields 2012](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/prospects-for-sufficientarianism/8121A2D32499602BF43E06C06A854081). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See [Casal 2007](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/510692?journalCode=et); [Frankfurt 1987](https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/prioritarianism_papers/Session3Frankfurt.pdf). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For these and other objections, see [Casal 2007](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/510692?journalCode=et); [Shields 2012](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/prospects-for-sufficientarianism/8121A2D32499602BF43E06C06A854081); [Segall 2016](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/japp.12062); [Fourie and Rid 2017](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385263.001.0001/acprof-9780199385263). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See [Nozick 1974](https://www.amazon.nl/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp/0465051006). Also see [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/ "Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism") by Daniel Weltman [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See [Nagel 1975](https://www.jstor.org/stable/795521?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab2cba34949e78512bbc3be08a8bb07f2&seq=1); [Cohen 1995](https://www.amazon.com/Self-Ownership-Freedom-Equality-Studies-Marxism/dp/0521477514); [Fried 2004](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557982); [Sobel 2012](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/667863?journalCode=et); [Lowe 2020](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698230.2018.1479819). ### References [Anderson, Elizabeth S. 1999. “What Is the Point of Equality?” ](https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/4ElizabethAnderson.pdf)[*Ethics*](https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/4ElizabethAnderson.pdf)[ 109 (2): 287–337.](https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/4ElizabethAnderson.pdf) [———. 2010. “The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.2010.10717652)[*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.2010.10717652)[ 40: 1–23.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.2010.10717652) [Arneson, Richard J. 2000. “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism.” ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/233272?journalCode=et)[*Ethics*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/233272?journalCode=et)[ 110 (2): 339–49.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/233272?journalCode=et) [Casal, Paula. 2007. “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough.” ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/510692?journalCode=et)[*Ethics*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/510692?journalCode=et)[ 117 (2): 296–326.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/510692?journalCode=et) [———. 1989. “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” Ethics 99 (4): 906–44.](http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/GACohenCEJ.pdf) [Cohen, G.A. 1995. ](https://www.amazon.com/Self-Ownership-Freedom-Equality-Studies-Marxism/dp/0521477514)[*Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality*](https://www.amazon.com/Self-Ownership-Freedom-Equality-Studies-Marxism/dp/0521477514)[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Self-Ownership-Freedom-Equality-Studies-Marxism/dp/0521477514) [Dworkin, Ronald. 1981a. “What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264894?seq=1)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264894?seq=1)[ 10 (4): 185–246.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264894?seq=1) [———. 1981b. “What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.” ](http://www.mvopat.people.ysu.edu/courses/philmarkets/philmarketsdownloads/Dworkin_What_Is_Equ_pt2.pdf)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](http://www.mvopat.people.ysu.edu/courses/philmarkets/philmarketsdownloads/Dworkin_What_Is_Equ_pt2.pdf)[ 10 (4): 283–345.](http://www.mvopat.people.ysu.edu/courses/philmarkets/philmarketsdownloads/Dworkin_What_Is_Equ_pt2.pdf) [Fourie, Carina, and Annette Rid, eds. 2017. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385263.001.0001/acprof-9780199385263)[*What Is Enough? Sufficiency, Justice, and Health*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385263.001.0001/acprof-9780199385263)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385263.001.0001/acprof-9780199385263) [Frankfurt, Harry. 1987. “Equality as a Moral Ideal.” ](https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/prioritarianism_papers/Session3Frankfurt.pdf)[*Ethics*](https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/prioritarianism_papers/Session3Frankfurt.pdf)[ 98 (1): 21–43.](https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/prioritarianism_papers/Session3Frankfurt.pdf) [Fried, Barbara H. 2004. “Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay,” in ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557982)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557982)[ 32 (1): 66-92.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557982) [Gheaus, Anca. 2009. “How Much of What Matters Can We Redistribute? Love, Justice, and Luck.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01058.x)[*Hypatia*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01058.x)[ 24 (4): 63–83.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01058.x) [Holtug, Nils. 2007. “Prioritarianism.” In ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&)[*Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&)[, edited by Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 125–56. Oxford: Clarendon Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&) [Holtug, Nils, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, eds. 2007. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&)[*Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&)[. Oxford: Clarendon Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/egalitarianism-9780199296439?cc=nl&lang=en&) [Kymlicka, Will. 2002. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/contemporary-political-philosophy-9780198782742?cc=nl&lang=en&)[*Contemporary Political Philosophy*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/contemporary-political-philosophy-9780198782742?cc=nl&lang=en&)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/contemporary-political-philosophy-9780198782742?cc=nl&lang=en&) [Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. 2015. ](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Egalitarianism-Bloomsbury-Ethics-Lippert-Rasmussen-2015-10-08/dp/B01FEK80W0/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?keywords=Lippert-Rasmussen%2C+K.+2015.+Luck+Egalitarianism&qid=1552387637&s=books&sr=1-1-fkmr0)[*Luck Egalitarianism*](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Egalitarianism-Bloomsbury-Ethics-Lippert-Rasmussen-2015-10-08/dp/B01FEK80W0/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?keywords=Lippert-Rasmussen%2C+K.+2015.+Luck+Egalitarianism&qid=1552387637&s=books&sr=1-1-fkmr0)[. London: Bloomsbury.](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Egalitarianism-Bloomsbury-Ethics-Lippert-Rasmussen-2015-10-08/dp/B01FEK80W0/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?keywords=Lippert-Rasmussen%2C+K.+2015.+Luck+Egalitarianism&qid=1552387637&s=books&sr=1-1-fkmr0) [Lowe, Dan. 2020. “The deep error of political libertarianism: self-ownership, choice, and what’s really valuable in life,” in ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698230.2018.1479819)[*Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698230.2018.1479819)[ 23 (6): 683-705.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698230.2018.1479819) [Meijers, Tim, and Pierre-Etienne Vandamme. 2019. “Equality, Value Pluralism and Relevance: Is Luck Egalitarianism in One Way Good, but Not All Things Considered?” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2018.1438804)[*Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2018.1438804)[ 22 (3): 318–34.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2018.1438804) [Nagel, T. 1975. “Libertarianism without Foundations,” in ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/795521?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab2cba34949e78512bbc3be08a8bb07f2&seq=1)[*The Yale Law Journal*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/795521?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab2cba34949e78512bbc3be08a8bb07f2&seq=1)[ 85 (1): 136-149.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/795521?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab2cba34949e78512bbc3be08a8bb07f2&seq=1) [Nozick, Robert. 1974. ](https://www.amazon.nl/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp/0465051006)[*Anarchy, State, and Utopia*](https://www.amazon.nl/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp/0465051006)[. Oxford: Blackwell.](https://www.amazon.nl/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp/0465051006) [Parfit, Derek. 1997. “Equality or Priority.” ](https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/3ParfitEqualityorPriority2000.pdf)[*Ratio*](https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/3ParfitEqualityorPriority2000.pdf)[ 10 (3): 202–21.](https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/3ParfitEqualityorPriority2000.pdf) [Rawls, John. 1971. ](https://www.amazon.com/Theory-Justice-Original-Oxford-Paperbacks/dp/0674017722)[*A Theory of Justice*](https://www.amazon.com/Theory-Justice-Original-Oxford-Paperbacks/dp/0674017722)[. Original ed. Cambridge: Belknap Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Theory-Justice-Original-Oxford-Paperbacks/dp/0674017722) [Rose, Julie L. 2014. “Money Does Not Guarantee Time: Discretionary Time as a Distinct Object of Distributive Justice: Money Does Not Guarantee Time.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jopp.12021)[*Journal of Political Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jopp.12021)[ 22 (4): 438–57.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jopp.12021) [Segall, Shlomi. 2016. “What Is the Point of Sufficiency?” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/japp.12062)[*Journal of Applied Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/japp.12062)[ 33 (1): 36–52.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/japp.12062) [Sen, Amartya. 1980. “Equality of What?” In ](http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf)[*Tanner Lectures on Human Values*](http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf)[, edited by Sterling M. McMurrin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf) [Shields, Liam. 2012. “The Prospects for Sufficientarianism.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/prospects-for-sufficientarianism/8121A2D32499602BF43E06C06A854081)[*Utilitas*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/prospects-for-sufficientarianism/8121A2D32499602BF43E06C06A854081)[ 24 (1): 101–17.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/prospects-for-sufficientarianism/8121A2D32499602BF43E06C06A854081) [Sobel, David. 2012. “Backing Away from Libertarian Self-Ownership,” ](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/667863?journalCode=et)[*Ethics*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/667863?journalCode=et)[ 123(1): 32–60.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/667863?journalCode=et) [Temkin, Larry S. 2003. “Egalitarianism Defended.” ](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/6TemkinEgalDefended.pdf)[*Ethics*](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/6TemkinEgalDefended.pdf)[ 113 (4): 764–82.](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/6TemkinEgalDefended.pdf) [Van Parijs, Philippe. 2003. “Difference Principles.” In ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-rawls/difference-principles/7EFABE836C502CB479990078B0D62BED)[*The Cambridge Companion to John Rawls*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-rawls/difference-principles/7EFABE836C502CB479990078B0D62BED)[, edited by Samuel Freeman, 200–240. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-rawls/difference-principles/7EFABE836C502CB479990078B0D62BED) ### Related Essays [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/ "Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism") by Daniel Weltman [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/ "Immigration Ethics: An Overview") by Daniel Weltman [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/distributive-justice.pdf) in PDF. ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/distributive-justice/) ### About the Authors Dick Timmer is a Assistant Professor in moral and political philosophy at Technical University Dortmund. His research lies at the intersection of political philosophy and ethics, focusing on questions about distributive justice, equality, climate ethics, moral status, and our obligations to future generations. [DickTimmer.com](http://www.dicktimmer.com) Tim Meijers is Assistant professor of moral and political philosophy at Leiden University. He writes about theories of justice, individual obligations, intergenerational justice, global justice, and reproductive rights. His work has been published in journals like *Ethics & International Affairs; Canadian Journal of Philosophy; Economics and Philosophy; Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy; Journal of Value Inquiry* and *Human Rights Quarterly.* [TimMeijers.com](http://www.timmeijers.com). ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** distributive justice, egalitarianism, equality, justice, libertarian, libertarianism, prioritarianism, sufficientarianism --- ### [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) **Published:** October 23, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Contemporary syllogisms are part of modern day quantificational logic, which is widely regarded as an improvement upon the approach originally described by Aristotle about 2,400 years ago. This essay discusses the contemporary approach to syllogisms. **Content:** Author: [Timothy Eshing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/eshing/) Category: [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/ "Philosophy of Mind and Language") Word Count: 999 Consider this argument: All humans are mortal. Socrates is human. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. It’s an example of a *contemporary syllogism*. Contemporary syllogisms are part of modern day quantificational logic, which is widely regarded as an improvement upon the approach originally described by Aristotle about 2,400 years ago.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay discusses the contemporary approach to syllogisms. A companion essay, [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/), discusses the older, Aristotelian approach. [![The modern "square of opposition."](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/contemporary-square-of-opposition.jpg?resize=656%2C804&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/contemporary-square-of-opposition.jpg?ssl=1)The modern “square of opposition.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2)### 1. Terms Whereas the classical approach admits only one kind of “term”, the *general*, the contemporary approach also admits a second kind of term: the *singular*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Singular terms are also called *particulars*; they pick out specific individuals. General terms are also called *universals*; they describe or put things in a category. Conventionally, we symbolize particulars with lowercase letters and universals with uppercase letters.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Some examples: | **Singular Terms** | **General Terms** | |---|---| | s = Socrates | P = philosophers | | t = this table | F = furniture | | u = the world’s ugliest painting | A = artwork | ### 2. Sentences and Distribution As with classical syllogisms, only sentences that *affirm or deny a predicate of a subject* are allowed in contemporary syllogisms.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) But now singular terms can be subjects and predicates too, so we can use any of the following twelve kinds of sentences: | All **S** is P. | No **S** is **P**. | |---|---| | Some S is P. | Some S is not **P**. | | s is P. | s is not **P**. | | s is p. | s is not **p**. | | All **S** is p. | No **S** is **p**. | | Some S is p. | Some S is not **p**.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) | For the purposes of evaluating syllogisms in the next section, we’ll also need to know when terms are “distributed” or not. Distributed terms refer to every member of a category. Here’s the rule to determine distribution: - Any term immediately after “All” or “not” and every term after “No” is *distributed*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The distributed terms are bold-underlined in the table above. ### 3. Contemporary Syllogistic Validity A contemporary syllogism comprises three such sentences, that is, two premises and a conclusion, where every singular or general term is used exactly twice, just like a classical syllogism. As with classical syllogisms, a contemporary syllogism is said to be “valid” if and only if, were its premises all true, then its conclusion would have to be true, too.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) *Gensler’s test* is a convenient way to check whether a syllogism is valid: 1. Mark (i) all the distributed terms in the premises and (ii) all the *un*distributed terms in the conclusion. 2. If every general term is marked … **\[on the classical approach\]** … *at least once* **\[on the contemporary approach\]** … *once and only once* and there’s exactly one right-hand mark (mark at the end of a sentence), then the syllogism is valid.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Notice how step two may be performed two different ways, depending on whether one adopts the classical or contemporary approach.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Here’s an example of an invalid syllogism: | All doctors are intelligent.Some fishmongers are intelligent. Therefore, some doctors are fishmongers. | All **D**\* is I.Some F is I. ∴ Some D\* is F\*. | |---|---| Per step one of Gensler’s test, the relevant terms above are marked with an asterisk (\*). But one general term, “I”, is never marked! So, per step two, this syllogism is invalid on both the classical and contemporary approaches. Here’s an example of a valid syllogism: | All doctors are intelligent.Some fishmongers are doctors. Therefore, some fishmongers are intelligent. | All **D**\* is I.Some F is D. ∴ Some F\* is I\*. | |---|---| Every general term is marked at least once and only once, and there’s only one right-hand mark, so this syllogism is valid on both the classical and contemporary approaches. Let’s revisit the syllogism that opened this essay: | All humans are mortal.Socrates is human. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. | All **H**\* is M.s is H. ∴ s\* is M\*. | |---|---| Every general term is marked once and only once, so this syllogism is valid on the contemporary approach. But “s” is a singular term! So it’s invalid on the classical approach, which doesn’t permit the use of singular terms.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 4. Existential Import Aristotle required the subjects of sentences to be *non-empty* terms. Aristotelians — that is, so-called “classical” logicians — wouldn’t use a categorical sentence like “All unicorns are herbivores” in a syllogism, because unicorns don’t exist. The unicorn category is empty.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) This requirement produces a feature called *existential import*: sentences starting “All S …” or “No S …” imply there exists at least one thing that is S. Basically, by assuming existential import we can infer a particular positive sentence like “Some humans are mortal” from a universal positive sentence like “All humans are mortal”. The former is tantamount to asserting that (mortal) humans *exist*.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) By contrast, moderns — that is, contemporary logicians — typically don’t assume existential import, which means they’ll let the subjects of universal sentences be *empty*.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) So they’ll use syllogisms to reason about categories of things that may not exist, like unicorns.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) The two different ways to perform step two of Gensler’s test reflect whether or not one assumes existential import.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) This syllogism is valid for Aristotelians, but invalid for moderns: | All fish are aquatic creatures.All aquatic creatures are swimmers. Therefore, some fish are swimmers. | All **F**\* is A.All **A**\* is S. ∴ Some F\* is S\*. | |---|---| Notice “F” is marked twice, which violates the contemporary rule. It just so happens that both the premises and the conclusion are true. However, one must assume existential import to infer the conclusion. Since moderns don’t, they’ll deny this syllogism’s validity. By contrast, this syllogism is invalid for Aristotelians, but valid for moderns: | All unicorns are horned creatures.All horned creatures are herbivores. Therefore, all unicorns are herbivores. | All **U**\* is H.All **H**\* is E. ∴ All **U** is E\*. | |---|---| Moderns think this syllogism is valid. But Aristotelians will deny it, because “U” is an empty term. There are no unicorns. ### 5. Beyond Syllogisms Moderns make other changes too, like letting syllogisms have more or fewer sentences. Gensler’s test will also work for all of these![\[17\]](#_ftn17) And there are many more kinds of syllogisms to explore.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Ultimately, modern logic has moved beyond syllogisms, admitting valid arguments unlike those we’ve discussed herein.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For more information on quantificational logic, see my [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/). For introductory treatments of classical and contemporary syllogistic, see respectively Rescher 1966 part II (chs. 7–11) and Gensler 2017 ch. 2. For a brief history of logic, including discussions of classical and contemporary syllogistic, see Gensler 2017 ch. 16. For more information and resources, see the notes and references of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The modern square of opposition depicts how contemporary logicians think differently about the relationship between the four categorical sentences discussed in §2 of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/); see note 3 of that essay for a description of the traditional square of opposition. Moderns do not assume existential import (discussed in §4 of this essay), so the relations depicted in gray (contraries, subcontraries, and subalternates) no longer hold. On the modern approach, only the relations between contradictories remain, depicted in black. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Furthermore, unlike classical syllogisms, contemporary syllogisms admit *empty terms* — meaning they can refer to things that don’t exist, like unicorns, talking donkeys, and the present king of France. Discussion of this issue is postponed until §4 of this essay (cf. note 14 below). There is one other kind of term, the *indefinite*, which can be ambiguous as to whether they are singular or general terms. Aristotle’s original example of an indefinite term was “pleasure”. Neither the classical nor contemporary approaches to syllogisms permit the use of indefinite terms. For more information on terms, including empty terms, see §1 of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This is just like what we do in quantificational logic. For more information on modern logical symbolism, §1 of my essay [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Cf. §2 of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Here is how we usually translate these twelve sentences into quantificational logic: - “All S is P”: ∀*x*(S*x*→P*x*) - “No S is P”: ¬∃*x*(S*x*∧P*x*) or, equivalently, ∀*x*(S*x*→¬P*x*) - “Some S is P”: ∃*x*(S*x*∧P*x*) - “Some S is not P”: ¬∀*x*(S*x*→P*x*) or, equivalently, ∃*x*(S*x*∧¬P(*x*)) - “s is P”: P(s) - “s is not P”: ¬P(s) - “s is p”: s=p - “s is not p”: s≠p - “All S is p”: ∀*x*(S*x*→*x*=p) - “No S is p”: ¬∃*x*(S*x*∧*x*=p) or, equivalently, ∀*x*(S*x*→*x*≠p) - “Some S is p”: ∃*x*(S*x*∧*x*=p) - “Some S is not p”: ¬∀*x*(S*x*→*x*=p) or, equivalently, ∃*x*(S*x*∧*x*≠p) For more information on the language of quantificational logic, see §2 of my essay [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) To put it a bit more technically: a term is distributed when the context in which it appears includes the whole *extension* of the term, the whole set of things to which the term applies, and not just some part of it. So, for example, in the universal positive categorical sentence “All rodents are mammals”, “rodents” is distributed, because the sentence says something about every member of the set of rodents; but “mammals” is not distributed, because the sentence does not say something about every member of the set of mammals. For more information on distribution, see Rescher 1964 §7.5. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) In constructing and assessing arguments we want to know whether they’re valid, because valid arguments with true premises must have true conclusions: it’s impossible for the conclusion of a valid argument to be false when all its premises are true. (Also consider the inferences without premises discussed in note 17 below: these are “valid” because it’s impossible for their conclusions, which are theorems, to be false when their premises are true. But there are no premises! Which means it’s impossible for theorems to be false, full stop.) Hence, validity is an incredibly important logical notion. It’s discussed in every introductory logic textbook. For more information on validity, see, e.g., Gensler 2017 §1.2. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Originally devised by the late Fr. Harry J. Gensler. He called it the “star test”, because (as depicted above) we add an asterisk to mark all the relevant terms. But how we visually keep track of the behavior of our terms doesn’t matter at all, so we’ve opted for a more neutral name here. For more information on Gensler’s test, including a great many examples and exercises, see his 2017 §2.2. For even more information on Gensler’s test, including a lengthy discussion of *antilogisms* (which are like syllogisms except that their conclusions are contradictory, so they’re always invalid) on which Gensler’s test is based, as well as a link to the original 1973 article in which he first published his test, see Gensler 2009. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The importance of this difference is discussed in §4 of this essay. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Note: what’s here called “classical” is restricted to Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic as originally set out in his *Prior Analytics* 1.1–2&4–7 and its codification in the medieval period, all other developments aside. The kind of argument at issue above is sometimes known as a “quasi-syllogism”, in contrast to a proper “categorical” syllogism, because one of its premises contains a singular term and is thus not a proper categorical sentence. For more information on categorical sentences, see §1 of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/), and of course see that essay as a whole for more information on what are here called “classical” syllogisms. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This is briefly discussed in §1 of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Likewise, we can infer a particular negative sentence like “Some humans are not amphibians” from the universal negative sentence “No humans are amphibians”. The former is tantamount to saying that (non-amphibious) humans exist. Both of these examples concern *subalternation* from a universal to a particular categorical sentence. For more information on how assuming existential import affects the relationships that obtain between categorical sentences, see first note 3 of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) on the traditional square of opposition, and then note 2 of this essay on the modern square of opposition. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) As aforementioned in note 3 above. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) In §4 of the companion essay [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/), nine of the twenty-four classically valid syllogistic forms are singled out for special attention. These nine forms are classically valid, but invalid on the contemporary approach, because their validity depends on the assumption of existential import. While these nine classically valid forms are invalid for moderns, nevertheless a large number of forms that would be invalid on the classical approach are valid on the contemporary approach, including forms with empty or singular terms, forms with more or fewer premises, and many others. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) For more information on using Gensler’s “star test” with or without the assumption of existential import, see Gensler 2017 §2.8. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Thus, on the contemporary approach, we can construct syllogisms with zero, one, three, or any greater number of premises, so long as we otherwise follow all the rules laid out above. Example of a valid syllogism with no premises (i.e., a *theorem*): “∴ All **A** is A\*.” Example of a valid syllogism with only singular terms and only one premise: “a is b. ∴ b\* is a\*.” Example of a valid syllogism with three premises: “All **A**\* is B. All **B**\* is C. All **C**\* is D. ∴ All **A** is D\*.” Notice how, in each example, every term occurs exactly twice, every uppercase letter is marked exactly once, and there is exactly one right-hand mark. This method generalizes to contemporary syllogisms with any number of premises and any number of singular or general terms. Readers may be surprised to learn that, on the contemporary approach, we can have syllogisms that simply consist of a concluding sentence and no premise sentences whatsoever. Yet we can! We normally think of an “argument” as consisting of at least one premise plus a conclusion. But modern logicians render our pre-theoretical notion of an “argument” more precisely with their technical notion of a *logical consequence relation*, sometimes symbolized as a “sequent”. A sequent looks like this: P ⊢ C, where “P” is a set of zero or more premises, “⊢” expresses from left to right the relation of logical consequence (similar to how “∴” expresses “therefore”), and “C” is the conclusion, which is a formula that is *entailed by* and thus a logical consequence of the premises. Now there exists a special class of formulas, called “theorems”, that are entailed by the *null set* of premises — that is, they are logical consequences of any premise set whatsoever, even the empty set, the set of zero premises. This means one can prove theorems without assuming any premises at all. An example acknowledged by Aristotle is the *law of non-contradiction*: ⊢ ~(P&~P). Notice there’s nothing to the left of the “⊢”, signifying that this formula is a theorem. It says that, for any sentence P, it’s not the case that both P and not-P are true. It’s a theorem that all contradictions are false. We may regard this sequent as a kind of argument with zero premises. Granted, some people prefer not to use the word “argument” in this way; but whether or not we call such a sequent as this an “argument” is simply a matter of convention. It’s still correct to say that the law of non-contradiction, just like any other theorem, is a logical consequence of the null set of premises. Accordingly, in the proof theory for “propositional” or *sentential logic*, the law of non-contradiction, just like any other sentential theorem or “tautology”, can be derived without making assumptions about the truth of any premises at all. (For more information on sentential logic, see Thomas Metcalf’s essay [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/).) Now the contemporary approach to syllogisms actually comprises but a fragment of a more robust theory, called “quantificational” or *predicate* *logic*. (For more information on that theory, see my essay [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/).) Contemporary syllogisms are really a kind of shorthand for certain special inferences in quantificational logic, which (just like sentential logic, modal logics, and other modern logical systems) includes theorems that may be proved without assuming any premises. Regardless whether or not one elects to call contemporary syllogisms with zero premises “arguments”, there are exactly two such syllogisms that pass *Gensler’s test* (discussed in the main text above), which means that they correspond to valid inferences from the null premise set in quantificational logic. I gave the first of these as an example in the first paragraph of this note: “Therefore, all **A** is A\*” \[⊢ ∀*x*(A*x*→A*x*)\]. The other is: “Therefore, a\* is a\*” \[⊢ *a*=*a*\]. Also, if we were to use the classical rule in step two of Gensler’s test, thereby permitting *existential import* (discussed in §4 of this essay), then a third syllogism would be validated: “Therefore, some A\* is A\*” \[⊢ ∃*x*(A*x*)\]. But modern logicians don’t usually do that, so that syllogism is still invalid on the contemporary approach. (For more information on this topic, see notes 6, 8, 9, and 16 above.) [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Especially those containing conditional or disjunctive sentences, those featuring statistical claims, and those involving *modal* terms (e.g., necessity and possibility, obligation and permission, belief, knowledge, etc.). For an introduction to modality, see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Following the work of Gottlob Frege and others in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, syllogistic logic was superseded by quantificational (also known as “predicate” or “first-order”) logic, which is much more powerful and flexible. And many more interesting logical systems followed, all of which deserve their own entries. As aforementioned in note 1 above, for more information on quantificational logic, see my essay [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/). ### References [Gensler, Harry: “Why does the star test work?” (2009).](https://www.harryhiker.com/lc/docs/star.htm) [Gensler, Harry: ](https://www.routledge.com/Introduction-to-Logic/Gensler/p/book/9781138910591)[*Introduction to Logic*](https://www.routledge.com/Introduction-to-Logic/Gensler/p/book/9781138910591)[ (3rd ed., Routledge, 2017).](https://www.routledge.com/Introduction-to-Logic/Gensler/p/book/9781138910591) [Rescher, Nicholas: ](https://archive.org/details/introductiontolo00resc)[*Introduction to Logic*](https://archive.org/details/introductiontolo00resc)[ (St. Martins, 1964).](https://archive.org/details/introductiontolo00resc) ### Related Entries [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk ### About the Author [Timothy Eshing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/eshing/) is a philosophy graduate student at Saint Louis University. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Logic & Reasoning, Mind & Language **Tags:** Eshing, syllogism, syllogisms --- ### [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) **Published:** August 28, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay introduces the classical Aristotelian approach to syllogisms. **Content:** Author: [Timothy Eshing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/eshing/) Category: [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 Consider this argument: All humans are mammals. All mammals are animals. Therefore, all humans are animals. It’s an example of a *classical syllogism*. The logic of syllogisms, which are special kinds of deductive arguments, was famously discussed by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle about 2,400 years ago. His approach was developed for nearly two millennia.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Aristotelian syllogistic logic is an important precursor to modern-day quantificational (or “predicate”) logic.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay introduces the classical Aristotelian approach to syllogisms. A companion essay, [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/), discusses the modern approach. [![The traditional "square of opposition."](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/syllogism.jpg?resize=656%2C300&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/syllogism.jpg?ssl=1) The traditional “square of opposition.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3)### 1. Terms Aristotle’s syllogistic logic is also known as “term logic”, because one can use it to reason with special parts of speech called *terms*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Aristotle specified four kinds of terms: 1. *General* *terms* are nouns (or phrases) that refer to whole classes or categories of things.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Examples include: philosophers, architects, houses, horses, race-winners, galaxies, etc. 2. *Singular terms* are proper nouns (names) that refer to individuals who populate one or more categories. Examples include: Socrates (human, philosopher), Frank Lloyd Wright (human, architect), Fallingwater (house, thing-built-by-Wright), Seabiscuit (horse, race-winner), the Milky Way (galaxy), etc. 3. *Indefinite terms* are ambiguous regarding whether they are general or singular. Aristotle’s example was “pleasure”.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Other examples include: hatred, water, gold, space, time, etc. 4. *Empty terms* don’t refer to anything at all that exists. Aristotle’s example was “goat-stag”.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Other examples include: unicorns, talking donkeys, round squares, the present king of France, etc. The classical approach to syllogisms only permits the use of general terms.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 2. Categorical Sentences Only certain kinds of sentences, called *categorical sentences*, are used in classical syllogisms. A categorical sentence has a *subject* and a *predicate*, each of which is a general term, and it *affirms* or *denies* the predicate of the subject. That’s it. We classify the different kinds of categorical sentences based on their *quantity* and *quality:* - Quantity - Universal: the subject refers to all members of a category - Particular: the subject refers to some members (at least one) of a category - Quality - Positive: the predicate is affirmed of the subject - Negative: the predicate is denied of the subject.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Let “S” stand for any general subject term, and “P” stand for any general predicate term; now these are the four kinds of categorical sentences we can use in classical syllogisms:[\[10\]](#_ftn10) | | **Positive** | **Negative** | |---|---|---| | **Universal** | All S is P. | No S is P. | | **Particular** | Some S is P. | Some S is not P. | ### 3. Moods and Figures A classical syllogism consists of exactly three categorical sentences: two premises and one conclusion. One premise contains the subject term of the conclusion, known as the “minor”, and the other contains the predicate term of the conclusion, known as the “major”.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Both premises share a third term, known as the “middle”, which isn’t in the conclusion. We classify the different kinds of classical syllogism based on “moods” and “figures”. The *mood* of a given categorical sentence is just which kind of sentence it is, given its quantity and quality. In the medieval period, scholars labeled each mood with a vowel: - A: universal positive - E: universal negative - I: particular positive - O: particular negative.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) The mood of a syllogism is just the order of the moods of its sentences. For example: AAA, EAO, IAI, etc. The *figure* of a syllogism is just the placement of the middle term (“M”) in the premises: | | **First Figure** | **Second Figure** | **Third Figure** | **Fourth Figure**[\[13\]](#_ftn13) | |---|---|---|---|---| | **First Premise** | MP | PM | MP | PM | | **Second Premise** | SM | SM | MS | MS | | **Conclusion** | SP | SP | SP | SP | There are 64 possible syllogistic moods and 4 possible syllogistic figures, which means that there are 256 logically distinct syllogistic forms. ### 4. Classically Valid Syllogistic Forms A syllogism is said to be “valid” if and only if, were its premises all true, then its conclusion would have to be true, too. While there are 256 logically distinct syllogistic forms, only 24 of these forms are classically valid.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Grouped by figure, they are:[\[15\]](#_ftn15) | **Barbara.** All M is P. All S is M. ∴[\[16\]](#_ftn16) All S is P.**Celarent.** No M is P. All S is M. ∴ No S is P. **Darii.** All M is P. Some S is M. ∴ Some S is P. **Ferio.** No M is P. Some S is M. ∴ Some S is not P. **Barbari.**S All M is P. All S is M. ∴ Some S is P. **Celaront.**S No M is P. All S is M. ∴ Some S is not P. | |---| | **Baroco.** All P is M. Some S is not M. ∴ Some S is not P.**Camestres.** All P is M. No S is M. ∴ No S is P. **Cesare.** No P is M. All S is M. ∴ No S is P. **Festino.** No P is M. Some S is M. ∴ Some S is not P. **Camestros.**S All P is M. No S is M. ∴ Some S is not P. **Cesaro.**S No P is M. All S is M. ∴ Some S is not P. | | **Bocardo.** Some M is not P. All M is S. ∴ Some S is not P.**Datisi.** All M is P. Some M is S. ∴ Some S is P. **Disamis.** Some M is P. All M is S. ∴ Some S is P. **Ferison.** No M is P. Some M is S. ∴ Some S is not P. **Darapti.**M All M is P. All M is S. ∴ Some S is P. **Felapton.**M No M is P. All M is S. ∴ Some S is not P. | | **Camenes.** All P are M. No M is S. ∴ No S is P.**Dimaris.** Some P is M. All M is S. ∴ Some S is P. **Fresison.** No P is M. Some M is S. ∴ Some S is not P. **Calemos.**S All P is M. No M is S. ∴ Some S is not P. **Fesapo.**M No P is M. All M is S. ∴ Some S is not P. **Bamalip.**P All P is M. All M is S. ∴ Some S is P.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) | The names of the forms were chosen to help students remember how they work.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ### 4. Beyond Classical Syllogisms Aristotle’s approach to syllogisms was enormously influential, but nowadays we approach syllogisms a bit differently. For more information, see the companion essay on [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/). ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Aristotle originally defined a “syllogism” \[Greek: συλλογισμός, *syllogismos* = inference\] as “a *logos* \[= account, discourse, speech, text\] in which, certain things being posited, something other than what is posited follows of necessity from their being so” (*Prior Analytics* 1.2.24b8). Aristotle laid out his theory of non-modal (also known as “assertoric”) syllogistic in *Prior Analytics* 1.1–2&4–7. That is basically the theory that is discussed in this essay. He laid out his theory of modal (“apodeictic”) syllogistic in *Prior Analytics* 1.3&8–22. In contrast to his assertoric syllogistic, Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is widely regarded as problematic; scholars continue to debate how best to make sense of it. For a broad discussion of Aristotelian logic, including his syllogistic, see Smith 2017. For an earlier influential treatment of Aristotelian (esp. non-modal) syllogistic, see Łukasiewicz 1957. For compelling alternative treatments, see Corcoran 1973 or Read 2017. For recent treatments of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic specifically, see Rini 2011 or Malink 2013; the latter is arguably the best reconstruction to date. For introductory treatments of classical and contemporary syllogistic, see respectively Rescher 1966 part II (chs. 7–11) and Gensler 2017 ch. 2. For a discussion of the relevance of Aristotelian logic to contemporary philosophy of logic, see Lear 1980. In this essay, I treat “classical” and “Aristotelian” as synonymous. But there was an ancient debate between the followers of Aristotle, called the Peripatetics, and another philosophical school called the Stoics about the proper nature and function of syllogistic. Stoic logic differs in important ways from Aristotelian logic — whereas Aristotelian syllogistic is a logic of *terms* and thus a progenitor of modern quantificational or predicate logic, Stoic syllogistic is a logic of *propositions* and a progenitor of modern sentential or propositional logic. For more information on the difference between Aristotelian/Peripatetic and Stoic syllogistic, see Frede 1987 \[1956\]. Over the centuries, Aristotle’s approach to assertoric syllogistic was tidied and codified, especially by the medieval “schoolmen”. In this essay, such superficial improvements are taken for granted (including how we now express categorical sentences, discussed in §2 of this essay, and the names of the twenty-four classically valid syllogistic forms, discussed in §4 of this essay). To be clear: the presentation of classical syllogisms in this essay differs in notable ways from what you’ll find if you turn to Aristotle’s original texts (cf. note 15 below). For more information on medieval developments, see Lagerlund 2022. For a brief history of logic, including discussions of classical and contemporary syllogistic, see Gensler 2017 ch. 16. For a slightly longer history of logic, including excellent sections on syllogistic, see Hintikka & Spade 2020. For a long and detailed history of logic, including thorough discussions of the same, see Kneale & Kneale 1962. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For more information on quantificational logic (also known as predicate or first-order logic), see my [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The traditional square of opposition depicts the relationship between the four categorical sentences discussed in §§2&3 of this essay, from top left to bottom right: A E I O. It says that A and E are *contraries* (they can both be false, but they can’t both be true), that I and O are *subcontraries* (they can both be true, but they can’t both be false), that A and O as well as E and I are *contradictories* (one but not both must be true), and that I and O are *subalternates* to A and E respectively (the truth of latter entails the truth of the former by *existential import*; see notes 14 and esp. 17 below as well as §4 of the companion essay [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) for more information about that notion). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The term “term” comes from the Latin *terminus*, meaning “boundary” or “limit”. The terms of a categorical sentence (discussed in §2 of this essay) are, as it were, its beginning and end. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Aristotle lays out his theory of categories in a work now fittingly known as the *Categories*. According to Aristotle, there are ten mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, attitude, condition, action, and affection. On the one hand, these may be thought of as ten distinct *kinds* *of* *things that are said*. On the other hand, they may be thought of as ten distinct *ways* *for something to be*. No matter how we ultimately understand this tenfold classification, Aristotle is clear that the terms so-classified are simple parts of speech, without composition or structure, and thus fit to be the subjects and predicates of categorical sentences. By contrast, categorical sentences are complex, possessing composition or structure, and thus fit to be true or false. For more information on categorical sentences, see §2 of this essay. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24a17. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 1.16a16. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) However, the contemporary approach also permits singular and empty terms. For more information, see §1 of the companion essay [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/). Neither approach permits indefinite terms. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Alternatively, we can use “affirmative” and “privative” (or “affirmation” and “denial”) in place of “positive” and “negative” respectively. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This table reproduces the traditional square of opposition described in note 3 above. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The premise sharing the conclusion’s subject term is known as the “minor premise” and the premise sharing the conclusion’s predicate term is known as the “major premise”. Traditionally, the major premise comes first, followed by the minor premise, and then the conclusion. Nowadays we often switch up the order of premises for ease of reading, but such reordering has no effect on a syllogism’s validity. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See, e.g., Lagerlund 2022 §1 for more information. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Though Aristotle was aware of the fourth figure syllogisms, he did not treat them separately, and it’s unclear why. Generations of scholars have pondered the issue and debated whether or not to include the fourth figure as a separate class. The fourth figure is equivalent to the first with the terms in the conclusion converted, i.e., place-swapped. For this reason, the first figure syllogisms came to be known as “direct” and the fourth figure syllogisms as “indirect”. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) More precisely, a classically valid syllogism must obey the following six rules (adapted from Rescher 1964 §10.2): 1. It must (i) have exactly three terms, each of which occurs twice and in the same sense, or (ii) be equivalent to one that does. 2. Its middle term must be distributed in at least one premise. 3. If a term is distributed in the conclusion, then it must be distributed in the premises. 4. It must not have two negative premises. 5. If one of its premises is negative, then its conclusion must be negative. 6. If both of its premises are universal, then its conclusion must not be particular, unless it would still be valid if a universal premise were replaced by the corresponding particular sentence. Regarding rules 2 and 3: a term is said to be “distributed” if it occurs as part of a statement that applies to every member of the category to which the term refers; this notion is discussed in §2 of the companion essay [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/). Regarding rule 6: this is equivalent to the assumption of *existential import*; for more information about that notion, see §4 of the companion essay [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/), as well as note 17 below. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) What you’ll actually find in Aristotle’s texts is a little different, so it’s worth describing what the “true form” of an Aristotelian syllogism actually looks like. First, Aristotle didn’t express categorical sentences the way we do now. For example, in place of “All A is B” Aristotle put either “B is predicated of all A” or “B belongs to all A”. Second, Aristotle didn’t use three separate sentences, nor the entailment indicator “therefore” on conclusions. Instead, he expressed every syllogism as a single complex sentence known as a *conditional* (“If … then …”), where (i) the *antecedent* (“If …” clause) is a *conjunction* (“… and …”) of the two premises and (ii) the *consequent* (“then …” clause) is a *necessary* claim (“it must be the case that …”). So, for example, in place of our: - All A is B. All B is C. Therefore, all A is C. Aristotle would put something like: - If B is predicated of all A and C is predicated of all B, then C must be predicated of all A. For more information on the “true form” of an Aristotelian syllogism, see esp. Łukasiewicz 1957 §1. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Note: the “∴” symbol is read as “therefore”; it indicates which sentence is the conclusion. Cf. §1 of Thomas Metcalf’s [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Nine of these syllogistic forms — those marked with superscripts — are invalid on the contemporary approach, because they depend on a feature called *existential import*, which is discussed in §4 of the companion essay [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/contemporary-syllogisms/). Basically, the validity of some of these syllogisms depends on one of the terms being non-empty. For those marked “S”, the minor term “S” must be non-empty. For those marked “M”, the middle term “M” must be non-empty. For those marked “P”, the major term “P” must be non-empty. (Note: the other fifteen syllogistic forms listed above are still valid on the contemporary approach, as are many other argument forms disallowed by the classical approach, namely those with singular or empty terms or more or fewer premises.) [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Aristotle regarded the first figure syllogisms as self-evident, or “perfect”. The other figures are said to be “imperfect”, because to make it plainly evident how their conclusions follow from their premises they require a reordering of premises or additional (“tacit”) premises that (i) are drawn from the first figure syllogisms, (ii) present a *reductio per impossibile* (an argument which demonstrates the truth of a claim by showing that its negation is impossible by deriving a contradiction or absurdity), or (iii) apply one of three presumably self-evident principles of conversion (discussed in *Prior Analytics* 1.2): - A-conversion: swap the terms of a universal positive and make it particular (i.e., “All A is B” becomes “Some B is A”) - E-conversion: swap the terms of a universal negative (i.e., “No A is B” becomes “No B is A”) - I-conversion: swap the terms of a particular positive (i.e., “Some A is B” becomes “Some B is A”). Now here is how to interpret the medieval names of the classically valid syllogistic forms (adapted from Rini 2011 pp. 14–15, Read 2017 fn. 13, and Hintikka & Spade 2020): - vowels indicate the syllogism’s mood (e.g., the mood of B**a**rb**a**r**a** is AAA, that is, all its categorical sentences are universal positives) - the first letters (“B”, “C”, “D”, or “F”) of the imperfect syllogisms indicate which perfect syllogism is needed to complete their proofs (e.g., the second figure **C**amestres requires the first figure **C**elerent) - “m” means swap the order of the premises (as in, e.g., Disa**m**is) - “c” following a vowel means use a *reductio per impossibile* for that premise (only needed for Baro**c**o and Bo**c**ardo) - “p” after an “a” in the middle means use A-conversion on that premise (as in, e.g., Dara**p**ti); a “p” at the end means use A-conversion on the conclusion of the perfect syllogism involved in the proof (as in, e.g., Bamali**p**) — this was known as *accidental* or ***p****artial conversion* - “s” after an “e” or “i” in the middle means use E- or I-conversion on that premise (as in, e.g., Fe**s**tino and Feri**s**on); an “s” at the end means use E- or I-conversion on the conclusion of the perfect syllogism involved in the proof (as in, e.g., Camene**s** and Dimati**s**) — this was known as ***s****imple conversion* - the other letters (“b” and “d” when not first, plus “l”, “n”, “t”, and “r”) are purely for ease of pronunciation, and don’t indicate anything special (which is why many alternative spellings abound, e.g., B**r**ama**nt**ip). In spite of all this detail, the medieval names lack any indicators for which *figure* a given form is in, so they don’t provide all the information needed to construct an actual syllogism; how they’re classed into the four figures must be memorized separately. For more information on the technicalities discussed above, see Lear 1980 ch. 1, Łukasiewicz 1957 ch. 3, Malink 2013 part I, or Rini 2011 ch. 1. Smith 2017 §5.4 contains a helpful table that shows at a glance the deduction procedure, as described by Aristotle, for fourteen of the figures (excluded are the four forms in the first two figures that require simple conversion, plus all of the forms in the fourth figure). Note: some authors (e.g., Rescher 1964 part II) just name the classically valid syllogistic forms by mood and figure as follows: - AAA-1, EAE-1, AII-1, EIO-1, AAI-1, EAO-1 - AOO-2, AEE-2, EIO-2, AEO-2, EAO-2 - OAO-3, AII-3, IAI-3, EIO-3, AAI-3, EAO-3 - AEE-4, IAI-4, EIO-4, AEO-4, AAI-4. ### References Aristotle: [*Categories*](https://archive.org/details/categoriesdeinte00aris_0)[,](https://archive.org/details/categoriesdeinte00aris_0)[ *De Interpretatione*](https://archive.org/details/categoriesdeinte00aris_0), and [*Prior Analytics*](https://hackettpublishing.com/classics/prior-analytics)*.* [Corcoran, John: “](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249941940_A_Mathematical_Model_of_Aristotle's_Syllogistic)[A Mathematical Model of Aristotle’s Syllogistic” in ](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249941940_A_Mathematical_Model_of_Aristotle's_Syllogistic)[*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249941940_A_Mathematical_Model_of_Aristotle's_Syllogistic)[ 55(2): 191–219 (1973).](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249941940_A_Mathematical_Model_of_Aristotle's_Syllogistic) [Frede, Michael: “Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic” in ](https://archive.org/stream/EssaysInAncientPhilosophy/81539700-frede-m-essays-in-ancient-philosophy11_djvu.txt)[*Essays in Ancient Philosophy* ](https://archive.org/stream/EssaysInAncientPhilosophy/81539700-frede-m-essays-in-ancient-philosophy11_djvu.txt)[(University of Minnesota, 1987 \[1956\]).](https://archive.org/stream/EssaysInAncientPhilosophy/81539700-frede-m-essays-in-ancient-philosophy11_djvu.txt) [Gensler, Harry: ](https://www.routledge.com/Introduction-to-Logic/Gensler/p/book/9781138910591)[*Introduction to Logic*](https://www.routledge.com/Introduction-to-Logic/Gensler/p/book/9781138910591)[ (3rd ed., Routledge, 2017).](https://www.routledge.com/Introduction-to-Logic/Gensler/p/book/9781138910591) [Hintikka, Jaako and Paul Vincent Spade: “history of logic” in ](https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-logic)[*Encyclopedia Britannica*](https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-logic)[ (2020).](https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-logic) [Kneale, William & Martha Kneale: ](https://archive.org/details/developmentoflog0000knea/mode/2up)[*The Development of Logic*](https://archive.org/details/developmentoflog0000knea/mode/2up)[ (Clarendon, 1962).](https://archive.org/details/developmentoflog0000knea/mode/2up) [Lagerlund, Henrik: “Medieval Theories of the Syllogism” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-syllogism/) [Lear, Jonathan: ](https://archive.org/details/aristotlelogical0000lear/page/n5/mode/2up)[*Aristotle and Logical Theory*](https://archive.org/details/aristotlelogical0000lear/page/n5/mode/2up)[ (Cambridge, 1980). ](https://archive.org/details/aristotlelogical0000lear/page/n5/mode/2up) [Łukasiewicz, Jan: ](https://archive.org/details/aristotlessyllog0000ukas_h4i3)[*Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*](https://archive.org/details/aristotlessyllog0000ukas_h4i3)[ (2nd ed., Oxford, 1957).](https://archive.org/details/aristotlessyllog0000ukas_h4i3) [Malink, Marko: ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674724549)[*Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674724549)[ (Harvard, 2013).](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674724549) [Read, Stephen: “Aristotle’s Theory of the Assertoric Syllogism” (2017).](https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~slr/The_Syllogism.pdf) [Rescher, Nicholas: ](https://archive.org/details/introductiontolo00resc)[*Introduction to Logic*](https://archive.org/details/introductiontolo00resc)[ (St. Martins, 1964).](https://archive.org/details/introductiontolo00resc) [Rini, Adriane: ](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5)[*Aristotle’s Modal Proofs:* ](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5)[Prior Analytics](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5)[ *A8*](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5)[***–***](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5)[*22 in Predicate Logic*](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5)[ (Springer, 2011).](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-007-0050-5) [Smith, Robin: ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/)[*Aristotle’s Logic*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/)[ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/) ### Related Essays [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing ### About the Author [Timothy Eshing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/eshing/) is a philosophy graduate student at Saint Louis University. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Aristotle, Classical Syllogisms, Eshing, Logic, syllogisms --- ### [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) **Published:** March 2, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to sentential logic or symbolic logic. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word count: 1000 An argument is a set of statements (the premises) intended to provide evidence for, or prove, some conclusion.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Formal logic is a tool we can use to present and evaluate arguments. Some arguments are better than others and formal logic can help us see exactly how some argument is supposed to work, and whether it is a good or bad argument (and why). To use formal logic, we *symbolize* the arguments: we represent arguments in English (or some other natural language) in some other set of symbols. These symbolic representations can make it much easier to see whether a certain argument is *valid* (i.e. necessarily, if its premises are true, its conclusion is true), and to identify other important properties of arguments. Here we’ll survey the simplest variety of formal logic: sentential logic.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/rosetta.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/rosetta.jpg?ssl=1) [The Rosetta Stone.](https://www.flickr.com/photos/moorina/3126016983) ### 1. Sentence-Letters and Constants In sentential logic,[\[3\]](#_ftn3) it’s standard to symbolize particular declarative *sentences*, i.e. statements,with capital Roman letters, for example: - A: ‘I **a**pologize for tipping over your motorcycles.’ - B: ‘**B**eans are good for the heart.’ - C: ‘In the **c**ity there’s a thousand things I want to say to you.’ Notice that none of A-C contain the words ‘not,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘if,’ or ‘then.’ That’s because those words (sometimes called “logical constants”) are very important in formal logic. We reserve special symbols for them, listed below.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) In contrast, we could use the letter ‘A’ to stand for ‘I apologize for tipping over your motorcycles’ in one argument, and that same letter ‘A’ for ‘The abacus is inferior to the digital calculator’ in another. If a sentence contains one of those words ‘and,’ ‘not,’ and so on, we break it up into its components separated by those words. For example, if my sentence was: - I apologize for tipping over your motorcycles *and* beans are *not* good for the heart then I could write: - A & ¬B. If an individual sentence doesn’t contain any logical constants, we can call it an “atomic” sentence: it can’t be split up any more. Here’s a set of symbols for the constants, along with the English words we use those constants to approximately symbolize, for any sentences φ, ψ, etc. Different languages of logic sometimes use different symbols, so I’ll include all the most common ones with their standard names and meanings.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) | Name | Symbol | Alternative Symbols | English approx. | |---|---|---|---| | ‘Negation’ | ¬φ | ~φ | ‘not φ’[\[6\]](#_ftn6) | | ‘Conjunction’ | φ & ψ | φ ∧ ψ, φ ● ψ | ‘φ and ψ’ | | ‘Disjunction’ | φ ∨ ψ | | ‘φ or ψ’[\[7\]](#_ftn7) | | ‘Conditional’ | φ → ψ | φ ⊃ ψ | ‘if φ then ψ’ or ‘φ only if ψ’[\[8\]](#_ftn8) | | ‘Biconditional’ or ‘Logical Equivalence’ | φ ↔ ψ | φ ≡ ψ | ‘φ if and only if ψ’ (sometimes written ‘φ iff ψ’) | | ‘Conclusion’ | ∴ φ | | ‘therefore φ’ | | ‘Contradiction’ | ⊥ | | \[some false sentence\][\[9\]](#_ftn9) | | ‘Entailment’ | φ, ψ ⊢ χ | | ‘φ and ψ jointly entail χ in the system of logic in use’[\[10\]](#_ftn10) | As you see, another important set of symbols we can use are the lower-case Greek letters. We use them as variables, rather than abbreviations of determinate sentences: they stand in for *some sentence or other*. That sentence doesn’t have to be atomic; it could itself contain logical constants too. The capital letters abbreviate *particular* sentences we’ve *already* defined, while the lower-case stand in for any sentence at all. Here’s a few examples: | | Symbolization | |---|---| | I’m not dreaming or if I’m an elephant, then fire is hot. | ¬D ∨ (E → F) | | If the money is in the envelope and isn’t in the envelope, then a contradiction is true. | (M & ¬M) → ⊥ | | The gate is open if and only if: the helicopter landed and either the ice has melted or you’re not joking. | G ↔ (H & (I ∨ ¬J)) | We can also use parentheses to help make our sentences easier to read and make our meanings clear. For example, in the second sentence just above, if I arranged the parentheses differently, the meaning would change: | The gate is open if and only if the helicopter landed. And, either the ice has melted or you’re not joking. | (G ↔ H) & (I ∨ ¬J) | |---|---| ### 2. Proofs Notice that we used English words to approximate our symbols. That’s no accident. In sentential logic, for example, if you know that A is true and you know that B is true, you can conclude that ‘A & B’ is true. And that’s how we use our English word ‘and’ as well. You can’t have both an Acura *and* a battleship unless it’s true that you have an Acura *and* it’s true that you have a battleship. Notice, then, that if you know that you have an Acura *and* a battleship, you can conclude that you have an Acura. To symbolize this, we would say that if you know ‘A & B,’ you can conclude ‘A.’ Now you can start to see how we might write an entire ‘proof’: a symbolization of an entire argument. We can assume that *if* you have an Acura, *then* you have a car. We might symbolize that with ‘A → C.’ In turn, we can, *assuming* that you have an Acura and a battleship, *prove* that you have a car. It might look like this: | Number | Sentence | Justification | |---|---|---| | 1. | A & B | Assumption. | | 2. | A → C | Assumption. | | 3. | A | Follows from 1. | | 4. | ∴ C | Follows from 2 and 3. | As you can see, we go step-by-step, numbering our steps and indicating how we got our new sentence. This is just a quick example, but you can probably imagine how we can use these symbols to construct more-interesting proofs. But the topic of proofs in general is important and complex. ### 3. Beyond Sentential Logic Once we know the rules for sentential logic, and the logical constants, it’s not difficult to symbolize more-complex sentences. For example, we might want to talk about which objects have which properties, or whether some sentence is necessarily true, or probably true. But those are topics for other essays. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) In this essay we don’t explicitly talk about deduction or induction, because sentential logic can be used for either. However, sentential logic is typically introduced by deductive arguments. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Here we follow the standard way of symbolizing arguments. See for example Huber 2019 and Sider 2010. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This is occasionally called “propositional” logic. But ‘sentential’ is more neutral. It only commits us to the existence of sentences, i.e. grammatical strings of words in some language. It doesn’t commit us to the existence of propositions, which, if they exist, are (roughly speaking) the meanings of sentences, or the contents of thought, or what “it” is that’s “true” when I say, ‘It’s true that electrons are smaller than protons.’ To say “sentential” is also, strictly speaking, more accurate: what we mainly do in formal logic is syntactic rather than semantic. That is, we’re looking at strings of *symbols*, rather than at the *meanings behind* the symbols, and propositions (if they exist) are the meanings of sentences. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) We call the special symbols “logical constants” because, unlike the sentence-letters, they always mean the same thing no matter where they appear. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) There are a few other English words or terms that match up to those symbols too. For example, the string ‘p only if q’ turns out to be equivalent to ‘if p then q.’ And in standard logic, ‘but’ and ‘and’ both follow the same rules; we don’t mention the connotation of contrast that’s inherent in ‘but.’ [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Of course, in English we normally don’t talk about whether ‘not p’ is true or false; we talk about whether ‘not \[some sentence\]’ is true or false. That is, we don’t mention ‘p’ itself; we fill it in with whatever sentence we’re talking about. In order to *mention* a phrase containing a variable but indicate that you’re intending to mention the *value* of the variable, rather than the *name* of the variable itself, you can use corner-quotes (i.e. ‘⌜’ and ‘⌝’) for what is sometimes called “quasi-quotation” (Quine 1981 \[1940\]: 33-37). To avoid confusion, however, I’ve elected to keep the single quotation marks. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Note that in English, our word ‘or’ can mean the inclusive or the exclusive ‘or.’ That is, sometimes we use “or” to imply that either or both can be true, while we sometimes use it to imply that only one can be true. For example, if I ask, ‘Have you ever ridden a scooter, or a motorcycle?’ I probably inflect my voice up at the end of my sentence, implying that the answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ and you’d say ‘yes’ if you’d ridden either one, but also, if you’d ridden both at some point. But if I ask ‘Do you want soup or salad?’ at a restaurant, I might inflect my voice down at the end of the sentence, implying that you must choose, and ‘both’ isn’t an option. In standard logic, our disjunction symbol is for the inclusive ‘or,’ that is, it comes out true even if both p and q are true. If we want to indicate an exclusive or, we can use a negation symbol. For example: ‘(A ∨ B) & ¬(A & B).’ [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This approximation can be particularly confusing. Strictly speaking, the “conditional” symbols (sometimes also called “material conditional” symbols) in standard logic say that *it is false that: p is true and not-q is true*. In real life, we can almost always read this as ‘if p then q,’ but there are somewhat confusing cases as well. We’ll talk more about those in the entries on truth tables. But for now, in standard sentential logic, a conditional statement will be counted true whenever the antecedent (the “if” part) is false, and whenever both the antecedent and consequent (the “then” part) are both true. As I said, that can be a little confusing. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The symbol is normally used to indicate a contradiction, but for the purposes of proofs, that the sentence be false is usually enough. We’ll return to this topic when we look at actual proofs. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) That last line in the table isn’t about the truth of sentences, but about derivability in our system of logic. That may be confusing until we learn about actual proofs using these symbols, so don’t worry too much about it here, but I wanted to include it for completeness. Basically, it says that if you have p on a line and you have q on a line, you can get to r by using the rules of the logic. ### References [Huber, Franz. 2019. *A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction*. New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-logical-introduction-to-probability-and-induction-9780190845391?cc=us&lang=en&) [Quine, W. V. 1981 \[1940\]. *Mathematical Logic*, Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674554511) [Sider, Ted. 2010. *Logic for Philosophy*. New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/logic-for-philosophy-9780199575589?cc=us&lang=en&) ### Acknowledgments The author would like to thank the editors of *1000-Word Philosophy*, plus Michael Ferry, Andrew Lavin, and Daniel Massey for helpful comments on this essay. ### Related Entries [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/06/01/godel/) by Jon Charry [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Arguments, Formal Logic, metcalf, Symbolic Logic --- ### [Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/03/19/pragmatic-encroachment/) **Published:** March 19, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to pragmatic encroachment, the view that the pragmatic or practical stakes of a belief can make a difference to whether that belief is justified or known. **Content:** Author: Alexandra Lloyd Category: [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word Count: 999 Imagine you are having people over for lunch, so this morning you prepared sandwiches to share. You made two types of sandwiches: peanut butter and a nut-free spread that you like. These sandwiches look nearly identical, and you noted that you put them in the fridge in that order, from left to right. Do you *know* that the sandwich on the right is the nut-free sandwich? Ordinarily, people would say that you do. Now, imagine your guests arrive and you learn that one of them has a severe peanut allergy. Do you still know that the sandwich on the right is nut-free? Or does the fact that getting it wrong threatens someone’s life make a difference to whether you *know* that the sandwich on the right is nut-free?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Those who answer “yes” to this last question may accept a view called *pragmatic encroachment* about knowledge. This essay introduces that view. [![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pragmatic-Encroachment-1024x576.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Pragmatic-Encroachment.jpg?ssl=1) A peanut butter sandwich and a nut-free spread sandwich. ### 1. Pragmatic Encroachment It is widely believed that a true belief might be knowledge only if that belief is *epistemically justified* or *rational*—meaning, in some sense, likely to be true. Many philosophers understand this “likely to be true” here in terms of *evidence*: beliefs that are supported by strong evidence are likely to be true and so, given the goal of having true beliefs, we should hold such beliefs.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Those who endorse pragmatic encroachment think that the *pragmatic* or *practical* stakes of a belief—e.g., whether anyone might be harmed or benefitted by the results of holding that belief, especially *acting* on that belief—can make a difference to whether someone is epistemically justified in believing something and so whether they might know it.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) So, about the case above, pragmatic encroachment theorists say that, once you learn that one of your guests has a peanut allergy, you may no longer be justified in believing that the sandwich on the right is nut-free. This is because you are now in what’s called a “high-stakes” situation: there is a lot at risk if you falsely believe that the sandwich on the right is nut-free.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Pragmatic encroachment theorists hold that when the stakes are high, stronger evidence is needed for beliefs to be epistemically justified and, potentially, knowledge.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Importantly, it’s not just that the high-stakes make a difference to what you should do, but that the high-stakes make a difference to what you *know*. The view is called pragmatic encroachment because it says that practical features make a difference to—*encroach on*—epistemic justification. ### 2. Why Pragmatic Encroachment? Some people accept pragmatic encroachment because they just find it plausible that when you enter a high-stakes situation—such as when you find out that one of your guests has a life-threatening allergy—you can lose justification for some things you believe. Because of what is at risk, you need to have more evidence that the belief is likely true before you should believe it, or before it will count as knowledge. This sense is confirmed in other high-stakes situations: e.g., ordinarily you may think that you know that Ottawa is the capital of Canada, but if suddenly you are on a game show and the stakes include $1 million, you might think you no longer know. Pragmatic encroachment is also sometimes defended using a principle linking knowledge and action called a “*Knowledge-Action Link”*: if someone knows some claim *p*, then they can appropriately act as if *p*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) If I *know* that the sandwich on the right is nut-free, then I can give it to my friend with a peanut allergy. If I *know* I have turned off the oven, then I don’t need to get out of bed to double-check that it’s off. On the other hand, if it doesn’t make sense for me to act as if something is true, then I do not know it. If I hesitate to give the sandwich to my friend with a peanut allergy, then I do not know that the sandwich is nut-free. If I need to get out of bed to check that the oven is off, then I do not know that I turned it off. Many philosophers have thought that what we should believe depends only on evidence, while what we should do depends on practical consideration: typically, reasons for or against action are separate from reasons for or against beliefs. Pragmatic encroachment says that our reasons against acting can be reasons against believing, too. ### 3. Why Not Pragmatic Encroachment? Many philosophers reject pragmatic encroachment. They argue that when it comes to knowledge, what primarily matters is whether a belief is true or false and whether the belief is epistemically justified or likely to be true. Given that, *wishful thinking*—believing something just because you *want* it to be true—for example, is *not* a source for epistemically justified beliefs.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Wanting something to be true can be a *practical* reason to believe it, but it cannot give an *epistemic* reason to believe it, the kind of reason relevant to whether a belief is justified and known. Pragmatic encroachment, however, *does* claim that practical factors can affect epistemic justification (although it does not support wishful thinking). *Evidentialists* think that whether we should believe something depends *only* on whether the evidence supports it.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) What anyone stands to gain or lose in believing some claim has nothing to do with whether that claim is likely true or false, given someone’s evidence. So, what is practically at stake in a situation is the *wrong kind of reason* to believe or not to believe something.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) The evidentialist says that you still know that the sandwich on the right is the nut-free sandwich even after you learn that your guest has a peanut allergy because your evidence is the same. What has changed, importantly, is how you should act. ### 4. Conclusion We want our beliefs to be true and supported by evidence. We also want to act in ways that make sense. Pragmatic encroachment says that these two goals are connected in a unique way: that what we should believe is bound up with how we should act. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The example is adapted from Ross & Schroeder, 2014, p. 261. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long for introductions to epistemology. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Stanley, 2005 for a detailed investigation of pragmatic encroachment. For an introduction to some important challenges in defining “knowledge,” see [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) A variation of pragmatic encroachment is *moral* encroachment. Moral encroachment holds that the moral features of a situation can make a difference to whether someone’s belief is justified and so whether it counts as knowledge. See Fritz, 2017 for an argument from pragmatic to moral encroachment. Insofar as a person dying from an allergic reaction would be *morally bad*, the initial case of this essay is a case of moral encroachment. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Pragmatic encroachment is sometimes seen as related to *contextualism*, a somewhat similar view that claims that the word “know” means different things in different *contexts*—meaning features of the situation such as what is at stake, what matters practically, or what possibilities are being considered. Both are often motivated using similar cases that stress the stakes of believing. For an introduction to contextualism, see DeRose, 1992. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For a discussion of the “Knowledge-Action Link,” see Fritz, 2017, p. 646. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) A complication is that a belief’s being true and epistemically justified is usually thought to be *necessary* for it to be knowledge, there are important arguments that meeting these conditions is *not sufficient* for knowledge: see [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Conee & Feldman, 1985 for an explanation of the evidentialist position. Also see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Fritz, 2020 for an argument that practical stakes are not epistemic reasons and so are the wrong kind of reason for or against belief or knowledge. ### References [Conee, Earl & Richard Feldman. (1985) “Evidentialism” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FELE)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://philpapers.org/rec/FELE)[, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 15-34.](https://philpapers.org/rec/FELE) [DeRose, Keith. (1992). “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107917?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107917?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[ 52(4): 913-29.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107917?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [Fantl, Jeremy & Matthew McGrath. (2012) “Pragmatic Encroachment: It’s not just about knowledge” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FANPEI-2)[*Episteme*](https://philpapers.org/rec/FANPEI-2)[, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 27-42.](https://philpapers.org/rec/FANPEI-2) [Fritz, James. (2017) “Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIPEA-3)[*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIPEA-3)[, Vol. 98, No. S1, pp. 643-661.](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIPEA-3) [Fritz, James. (2020) “Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIMEA-5)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIMEA-5)[, Vol.177, pp. 3051-3070.](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRIMEA-5) [Ross, Jacob & Mark Schroeder. (2014) “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSBCA-4)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSBCA-4)[, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 259-288.](https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSBCA-4) [Stanley, Jason. (2005) ](https://academic.oup.com/book/9294)[*Knowledge and Practical Interests*](https://academic.oup.com/book/9294)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/9294) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/pragmatic-encroachment.pdf). ### About the Author Alexandra Lloyd is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tampa. She received her PhD from the University of Colorado, Boulder. Her main research interests are in social epistemology; she works on issues at the intersection of ethics and epistemology, applying epistemological theories to important ethical questions. [ut.edu/directory/lloyd-alexandra](https://www.ut.edu/directory/lloyd-alexandra) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*TikTok*](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology **Tags:** contextualism, pragmatic encroachment --- ### [The Ethics of Belief: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) **Published:** January 28, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief.” **Content:** Author: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) Categories: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/)[, Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/ "Philosophy of Religion"), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word Count: 996 Sometimes to stop arguing with someone, some people say: “You have a right to your opinion.” But is that true? May we believe *whatever* we want to believe? In his essay “The Ethics of Belief,” British mathematician and philosopher W.K. Clifford (1845–1879) argues that the answer is “no.” He claims that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) By “evidence” Clifford seems to mean experiences and reasoning that bear on the truth of a belief: evidence is information relevant to determining whether a belief is likely true or false.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) If Clifford is correct, we don’t have a right to believe whatever we want: indeed, it can be morally wrong to hold certain beliefs, if we lack good evidence for them. This essay explains Clifford’s view. [![A capsized ship.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ethics-of-belief.jpeg?resize=656%2C469&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ethics-of-belief.jpeg?ssl=1)A capsized ship. ### 1. The Ship Case To make his case, Clifford first asks readers to imagine a shipowner who has evidence that his ship might need expensive repairs. He doesn’t want to pay that expense so, through wishful thinking, he convinces himself of what he wants to believe. Clifford writes: In such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes for the success of the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; and he got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) If the shipowner’s belief that his vessel was seaworthy had been based on good evidence, the sinking would have been unfortunate, but he wouldn’t have been blameworthy. We blame him for this outcome, though, because his belief was formed contrary to the evidence available to him. He *should have known better*, or at least he should have *believed* better: his believing against the evidence was *wrong*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. All Beliefs Matter The shipowner’s failure seems especially bad because the outcome was so disastrous. But Clifford thinks that the ethical principle against believing on insufficient evidence applies to *all* beliefs, even those that seem unimportant. He writes: No real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may someday explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our character for ever.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) No belief is isolated, Clifford argues: we’re always in the process of building our own intellectual characters. Sloppy or motivated reasoning, even about something like whether our favorite team is likely to win a game, puts us in danger of developing bad mental habits that will corrupt our thinking about more important things. So believing without or against the evidence *always* imposes unacceptable risks to ourselves and others. ### 3. True Beliefs as a Public Resource Although we tend to think that our beliefs are our own private business, Clifford maintains that “belief… is ours not for ourselves but for humanity”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) in the same way that air and water are public resources. The term “epistemic commons” (“epistemic” means *related to knowledge*) refers to the shared knowledge and trustworthy practices of belief formation we all collectively rely on.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) False and unjustified beliefs in the epistemic commons are a kind of pollution. Just as it’s wrong to dump toxic waste into a river used for drinking water, it’s wrong to degrade the epistemic commons by failing to exercise proper stewardship over our beliefs. We might also have duties to *improve* the epistemic commons by learning more, and developing better reasoning habits, just as we have duties of beneficence toward those in need. And unlike air and water, which can only be made so pure, there’s no limit to how much the epistemic commons can be improved. ### 4. Applying the Ethics of Belief How many of our beliefs are ethically held, according to the ethics of belief? Many people have confident beliefs about politics, religion, philosophy and science. If we’re being honest, we should probably conclude that many of these beliefs don’t satisfy Clifford’s standards: our evidence often isn’t that strong. On the other hand, Clifford doesn’t say much about what counts as “sufficient evidence.” What he says in his essay is consistent with thinking that the available evidence sometimes leaves room for reasonable disagreements.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Does this mean that we must be frantically collecting evidence all the time? Not necessarily; according to Clifford, we’re always free to suspend judgment until we have enough evidence: “But,” says one, “I am a busy man; I have no time for the long course of study which would be necessary to make me in any degree a competent judge of certain questions, or even able to understand the nature of the arguments.” Then he should have no time to believe.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) When we don’t know much about a topic, it’s responsible to *not* have firm views on it. We might learn more about it, or decide that our time is better spent some other way and continue suspending judgment until we learn more. Recognizing when we don’t have enough evidence to form an informed opinion requires discipline, but waiting until we have good evidence before forming beliefs is smart and wise. Some say we *must* have confident beliefs to act on, but Clifford observes that we can “act on probabilities” even where there’s too much uncertainty to form confident beliefs; so, “…we have no reason to fear lest a habit of conscientious inquiry should paralyze the actions of our daily life.”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 5. Conclusion Beliefs are ethically significant: they influence how we behave, and serious wrongdoing can often be traced to believing without adequate evidence. If Clifford is right, then many of us, and perhaps all of us on occasion, are falling short, morally. We might all be more like the shipowner than we’d like to admit. Fortunately, we can all be better by resolving to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Clifford, 1886, p. 175. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Theories of “epistemic justification” attempt to identify what we should and should not believe, what we are *justified* in believing, from an *epistemological* point of view, where the concerns are seeking truth, reasonable beliefs and knowledge. An influential theory of epistemic justification called *evidentialism* is the view that, from an epistemological point of view, *we should believe what, and only what, our evidence supports*. Clifford’s “ethics of belief” claims that there is an *ethical* obligation that our beliefs be justified according to the evidentialist standard and so based on strong, sufficient evidence. For an introduction to evidentialism, see Thomas Metcalf’s [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/). For a focused introduction to the concept of epistemic justification, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Clifford, 1886, p. 164. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Clifford does not explicitly appeal to any particular ethical theory in arguing that it’s morally wrong to believe on insufficient evidence, but his position does fit well with the ethical theory “consequentialism” which holds that *we are obligated to do what produces the best overall consequences*: after all, Clifford does argue that believing on insufficient evidence tends to have bad consequences: see Shane Gronholz’s [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) for an introduction to consequentialism. Clifford’s position can be supported, however, by a variety of ethical theories: theories that focus on virtue and vice are also especially applicable; see [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Clifford, 1886, p. 169. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Clifford, 1886, p. 170. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Hrishikesh Joshi develops the concept of the “epistemic commons” in his *Why It’s Ok to Speak Your Mind*, 2021. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For discussion of the issue of how to respond to disagreements concerning whether some a belief is true or false, especially when the people who disagree seem to be roughly equally-informed and with equally strong evidence for their views, see Jonathan Matheson’s [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/). The basic question is this: if we have such disagreements, should we remain confident and continue believing what we believe, lose confidence and perhaps come to accept the belief(s) of the person(s) we disagree with, lose confidence and suspend judgment on the issue (and perhaps research it more), or something else? [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Clifford, 1886, p. 176. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Clifford, 1886, pp. 177-178. ### References [Clifford, W. K. 1886. ](https://archive.org/details/LecturesAndEssays/page/n167/mode/1up?view=theater)[“The Ethics of Belief.” ](https://archive.org/details/LecturesAndEssays/page/n167/mode/1up?view=theater)[Originally published in ](https://archive.org/details/LecturesAndEssays/page/n167/mode/1up?view=theater)[*Contemporary Review*](https://archive.org/details/LecturesAndEssays/page/n167/mode/1up?view=theater)[, 1877; reprinted in William K. Clifford, ](https://archive.org/details/LecturesAndEssays/page/n167/mode/1up?view=theater)[*Lectures and Essays*](https://archive.org/details/LecturesAndEssays/page/n167/mode/1up?view=theater)[, ed. Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock. Macmillan. 1886, pp. 163-205.](https://archive.org/details/LecturesAndEssays/page/n167/mode/1up?view=theater) (The “Ethics of Belief,” and excerpts from it, is widely [reprinted](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/lectures-and-essays/C0226A1E5A6912989E64711E94EE3D81) and [reposted here](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50189/50189-h/50189-h.htm#ch3); also [here](https://www.people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/Clifford_ethics.pdf) in PDF). [Joshi, Hrishikesh. 2021. ](https://www.routledge.com/Why-Its-OK-to-Speak-Your-Mind/Joshi/p/book/9780367141721)[*Why It’s Ok to Speak Your Mind*](https://www.routledge.com/Why-Its-OK-to-Speak-Your-Mind/Joshi/p/book/9780367141721)[. ](https://www.routledge.com/Why-Its-OK-to-Speak-Your-Mind/Joshi/p/book/9780367141721)[Routledge](https://www.routledge.com/Why-Its-OK-to-Speak-Your-Mind/Joshi/p/book/9780367141721). ### For Further Reading and Listening [Chignell, Andrew, 2018. “The Ethics of Belief”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief/)[(Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief/) [De Cruz, Helen. July 20, 2021. “Clifford’s Ethics of Belief is the evidentialism we need in these denialist times.” ](https://helensreflectionsblog.wordpress.com/2021/07/20/cliffords-ethics-of-belief-is-the-evidentialism-we-need-in-these-denialist-times/)[*Wondering freely: Reflections by Helen De Cruz.* ](https://helensreflectionsblog.wordpress.com/2021/07/20/cliffords-ethics-of-belief-is-the-evidentialism-we-need-in-these-denialist-times/) [Nobis, Nathan. March 22, 2021. “The Ethics of Belief: It’s not just Trump supporters who believe wrongly—it’s all of us.” ](https://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/openfordebate/the-ethics-of-belief-its-not-just-trump-supporters-who-believe-wrongly-its-all-of-us/)[*Open for Debate.* ](https://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/openfordebate/2021/03/22/the-ethics-of-belief-its-not-just-trump-supporters-who-believe-wrongly-its-all-of-us/) [Paytas, Tyler and Case, Spencer. April, 1 2020. “Do you have a right to your opinion? Clifford, James and the ethics of belief.” ](https://www.buzzsprout.com/956725/3453712)[*Micro-Digressions: A Philosophy Podcast.*](https://www.buzzsprout.com/956725/3453712) [Stairs, Allen. March 13, 1996. “Some People Are More Entitled to their Opinions than others.” ](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/1996/03/13/some-people-are-more-entitled-to-their-opinions-than-others/8ac21b0d-1538-438d-a71a-b2b6564b6d6a/)[*Washington Post*](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/1996/03/13/some-people-are-more-entitled-to-their-opinions-than-others/8ac21b0d-1538-438d-a71a-b2b6564b6d6a/)[. ](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/1996/03/13/some-people-are-more-entitled-to-their-opinions-than-others/8ac21b0d-1538-438d-a71a-b2b6564b6d6a/) [Stokes, Patrick. October 4, 2012. “No, you’re not entitled to your opinion.” ](https://theconversation.com/no-youre-not-entitled-to-your-opinion-9978)[*The Conversation.* ](https://theconversation.com/no-youre-not-entitled-to-your-opinion-9978) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/03/19/pragmatic-encroachment/ "Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?") by Alexandra Lloyd [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Expertise: What is it to be an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Conspiracy Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ethics-of-belief.pdf). ### Translation [Azerbaijani](https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/yeterli-delil-olmadan-neyese-inanmaq-yanlisdirmi-vilyam-kliffordun-inam-etikasi/), [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/ethics-of-belief/) ### About the Author [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) has a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder. He hosts [*Micro-Digressions: A Philosophy Podcast*](https://www.buzzsprout.com/956725) and does a lot of writing, academic and otherwise. [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](http://www.spencercasephilosophy.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Case, clifford, ethics of belief, evidence, evidentialism --- ### [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) **Published:** March 19, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Rational or reasonable beliefs are often described by philosophers as "epistemically justified." This is an introduction to the concept of epistemic justification. **Content:** Author: Todd R. Long Category: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word Count: 999 Rose, Josh, and Ann are guests at my party. Each believes there’s almond milk in my refrigerator. Rose believes this because she really wants some almond milk and it makes her happy to suppose she’ll get some soon. Josh is merely guessing: the thought just popped into his mind. Ann has just looked in my fridge, pulled out what she recognizes as almond milk and placed it back in the fridge. Only Ann *knows* there’s almond milk in my fridge. All three guests have the true belief that there is almond milk in my fridge, but Ann has something the others lack: *epistemic justification*; her belief is *epistemically justified*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay introduces the concept of epistemic justification. [![A woman looking in a refrigerator. Is she epistemically justified in believing there is almond milk in the fridge?](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/epistemic-justification.jpg?resize=656%2C436&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/epistemic-justification.jpg?ssl=1)A woman looking in a refrigerator. Is she epistemically justified in believing there is almond milk in the fridge? ### 1. Socrates’s Legacy Although “epistemic justification” is a philosopher’s term, it’s a version of what people have in mind when they say things like, “It’s *reasonable* to believe what good science indicates,” “Believing in fairies is *irrational*,” and “The *evidence supports* the existence of dark matter.” People generally want to have knowledge. And epistemic justification is widely thought to be necessary for knowledge, which is traditionally understood as involving *true beliefs that are epistemically justified*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Long ago, Socrates said that knowledge is true belief plus *an account of the reason why*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Epistemic justification is whatever can provide that “reason why,” or what makes beliefs *rational* in a way that might contribute to their being knowledge.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Types of Justification To better understand epistemic justification, let’s reflect on our initial examples. In our story above, Josh was merely guessing; so he had no reason to believe there’s almond milk in the fridge: his belief was not epistemically justified.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Rose did have *a reason* to believe: it made her happy. While this wishful thinking gave her a *practical* or *prudential reason* to believe there’s almond milk, it did not make her belief even *likely to be true*: her reason didn’t provide epistemic justification.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Ann also had a reason: she saw what she recognized as a carton of almond milk, held it in her hand, and put it back in the fridge. Given her many past experiences with almond milk, this evidence from her senses gave her a good reason to think it was actually *true* that there was almond milk in my fridge. And if it was indeed almond milk then we would likely say she *knew* there was almond milk there. This explains why Ann, but not the others, had *epistemic* justification for her belief: she had the type of reason to believe a claim such that, if that claim were true (and it was), she might know that claim. ### 3. Understanding Epistemic Justification Epistemologists—philosophers who study knowledge and related concepts–seek a deeper explanation, or a theory, of epistemic justification: what is it? *Evidentialism*, the traditional position, says that justification depends on your *evidence*: experiences that give you good reason to believe a claim.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Other theories say that justified beliefs are formed by *reliable* belief-forming mechanisms (such as perception, which is normally likely to give us true beliefs), or by *virtuous* belief-formation (such as beliefs formed with intellectual honesty or care), or by *properly functioning* (the way evolution, or God, intended) cognition.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Despite their differences, most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification provides people with a *good reason* to believe something is true and makes their beliefs, in some sense, *likely to be true*.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) #### 3.1. Justification’s Sources As our examples show, our beliefs have various sources. The standard list includes *sense perception*, *memory*, *testimony*,[\[10\]](#_ftn10) *reasoning*, *introspection* (attending to one’s own mental states), and *rational insight* (mentally “seeing” the truth such as in “all triangles have three sides”).[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This list does not include wishful thinking, tea-leaf reading, or astrology. This is because these don’t tend to get us to the truth, whereas those on the standard list do.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) #### 3.2. Justification’s Relativity Epistemic justification can vary, both from person to person and for the same person, over time. If you’ve studied contemporary physics but I haven’t, then you can be epistemically justified in believing something about quarks, whereas I am not. When people have new experiences or learn new things, they can gain epistemic justification for beliefs that earlier were not justified for them.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) #### 3.3. Fallible Justification The standard sources of justification don’t *always* get us onto the truth: e.g., long ago, people were epistemically justified in believing that Earth didn’t move. So the evidence we get from the standard sources can be misleading or incomplete. Nevertheless, evidence is an indication of truth to a person. So, when your evidence indicates a claim’s truth to you, you have some epistemic justification for believing it. According to *fallibilism*, a belief can be justified even when, unbeknown to us, it’s false.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Although we might prefer sources that unfailingly get us onto the truth, most epistemologists accept fallibilism.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Indeed if our commonsense view of knowledge is correct, then fallibilism is true. For if having knowledge required that our sources *unfailingly* get us onto the truth, then we would know very little. *Infallibilism* about epistemic justification would imply a wide-sweeping skepticism: we could never know that there is almond milk in the fridge or almost anything else![\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 4. Achieving Knowledge-Level Justification Epistemic justification comes in degrees: one can have more or less of it. When I tell Ann there’s almond milk in the fridge, my testimony gives her *more* justification for believing there’s almond milk than before my testimony.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) What degree of epistemic justification is required for *knowledge*? Most epistemologists think the knowledge-level standard is high, but not so high that we rarely have knowledge. After all, “knowledge” and “knows” are words we ordinarily use, and we think we often know things like “that’s a dog” (via sensory experience), “2 + 3 = 5” (via reasoning), or “I had blueberries for breakfast” (via vivid memory experience). ### 5. Conclusion Most people care, not only about whether their beliefs make them happy, but about whether they’re likely to be true and whether they’re supported by strong evidence. For that reason, we care about epistemic justification. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The term “epistemic” means “pertaining to knowledge.” [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) However, since Edmund Gettier’s (1963) “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, most epistemologists now think that epistemically justified true belief is necessary, but not sufficient, for knowledge. See [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Socrates (470-399 BCE), the famous teacher of Plato, says this in section 98a of Plato’s (1980) *Meno*. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) “Rational” means “of or based on reasoning or reason” (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1996, p. 1198). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Some philosophers have argued that it is sometimes, if not always, morally wrong to hold epistemically unjustified beliefs. See [ “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For some topics, we can be *practically or prudentially justified* in holding a belief that may, or may not, be epistemically justified for us. For an overview of an argument in favor of believing there is a God that appeals to claims about practical or prudential reasons to believe in God, see [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For a discussion of one version of evidentialism, see [“The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For an introduction to some evidentialist and non-evidentialist theories of epistemic justification, see Long (2021). Another option is to say that epistemic justification cannot be analyzed without first understanding knowledge; see Silva (n.d.). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For more on widely shared assumptions, see Long (2021) and chapters 1-2 in Feldman (2003). To better understand what it can be for something to be “likely to be true” see [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Epistemologists debate whether *testimony*—beliefs gained from what other people claim, as opposed to first-hand experience—is as fundamental a source of epistemic justification as the others on the standard list. To appreciate the basic debate about this issue, see [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For more on sources of justification, see Steup & Neta (2022, sect. 5). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This does not imply that *every* belief with one of the standard sources is epistemically justified. For example, a *quick glance* (which is an instance of sense perception) would be insufficient to epistemically justify my belief that there are twenty cows in a field (whereas a quick glance might be sufficient to justify my belief that there’s something brown out there). This example shows why epistemologists look for deeper explanations of why and when the standard sources provide epistemic justification. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) These points corroborate the core notion of a central tenet of some feminist epistemologies: everyone has an epistemic standpoint, and thus all knowledge is situated knowledge. See Poole (2021). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Typical non-evidentialists also accept fallibilism. Accordingly, knowledge-level justification requires a belief-forming source that is highly (but not 100%) reliable. Note that fallibilism does not imply that one can *know* something to be true when it’s false, for truth is also a requirement for knowledge. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) A famous exception was René Descartes (2001 \[1641\]), who thought that knowledge required the impossibility of error. See [Descartes’ Meditations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro. A few current epistemologists also accept infallibilism. See [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Take our sensory beliefs, for example. Our evidence from sense perception does not unfailingly get us onto the truth; therefore, we’re not infallible in our sensory beliefs. Furthermore, a vivid dream or hallucination can mimic sense perception; thus, the evidence we get from sense perception does not guarantee the truth of what it indicates. To see why some philosophers have taken these facts to support skepticism, see [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) This example assumes a typical instance of testimony in which the person receiving the testimony has reason to think the testifier is trustworthy about the relevant matter. ### References [Descartes, R, (2001). ](http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/meditations/)[*Meditations on first philosophy*](http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/meditations/)[ (J. Veitch, Trans.). trans. John Veitch, The Classical Library. (1641)](http://www.classicallibrary.org/descartes/meditations/) [Feldman, R. (2003). ](https://www.pearson.com/store/p/epistemology/P100001357098/9780133416459)[*Epistemology.*](https://www.pearson.com/store/p/epistemology/P100001357098/9780133416459)[ Prentice-Hall](https://www.pearson.com/store/p/epistemology/P100001357098/9780133416459). [Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? ](https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article-abstract/23/6/121/109949?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*Analysis, 26*](https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article-abstract/23/6/121/109949?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[(3), 121–123.](https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article-abstract/23/6/121/109949?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Long, T. R. (2021). Epistemic justification. In B. Barnett (ed.), ](https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/epistemic-justification/)[*Introduction to philosophy: Epistemology*](https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/epistemic-justification/)[. Rebus](https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/epistemic-justification/)[. ](https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/epistemic-justification/) [The Oxford English Dictionary. (1996). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Oxford_English_Reference_Dictionary.html?id=qDyxQgAACAAJ)[*The Oxford English reference dictionary*](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Oxford_English_Reference_Dictionary.html?id=qDyxQgAACAAJ)[ (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Oxford_English_Reference_Dictionary.html?id=qDyxQgAACAAJ) [Plato. (1980). ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/meno)[*Meno* ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/meno)[(G. M. A. Grube, Trans.)](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/meno)[ (2nd edition). Hackett.](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/meno) [Poole, M. C. (2021). Feminist epistemologies. In B. Barnett (ed.), ](https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/feminist-epistemologies/)[*Introduction to philosophy: epistemology*](https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/feminist-epistemologies/)[. Rebus.](https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-epistemology/chapter/feminist-epistemologies/) [Silva, P. (n.d.). Knowledge-first theories of justification. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/kft-just/)[*The Internet encyclopedia of philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/kft-just/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/kft-just/) [Steup, M. & Neta, R. (2022). Epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/epistemology/)[*The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/epistemology/)[ (Winter 2022 ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/epistemology/) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [“The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/03/19/pragmatic-encroachment/ "Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?") by Alexandra Lloyd [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson [Descartes’ Meditations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli ### Translation In [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/epistemik-gerekcelendirme-rasyonel-inanc-nedir-todd-r-long/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/epistemic-justification.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Todd R. Long is Professor in the Philosophy Department at California Polytechnic State University where he specializes in epistemology, moral responsibility, and philosophy of religion. He is also an actor (stage & screen), director, screenwriter, rock & roll musician, and public speaker. [ToddLong.net](https://toddlong.net) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology **Tags:** epistemic justification, epistemic rationality, evidentialism, justification, rationality --- ### [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) **Published:** March 6, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** Can moral testimony result in moral knowledge? That is, can someone telling me that lying to protect someone's feelings is morally permissible justify my believing that this is so? Some philosophers say 'yes,' some say 'no,' and here we lay out each basic position. **Content:** Author: Annaleigh Curtis Category: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/ "Epistemology"), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 970 We often trust each other to provide information about the world. What is the weather like? Does this restaurant serve noodles? What is the best way to get downtown without a car? We routinely ask these sorts of questions and rely on the responses of friends, acquaintances, and even strangers. Can do the same for moral questions? For example, if a friend or stranger tells me that lying to protect someone’s feelings is not wrong, should I believe her? Many philosophers have been uneasy with the idea that anyone should accept another’s assessment of a moral issue in the same way that we think it is perfectly fine to accept an assessment of weather or noodles. Others, however, argue that this unease is unwarranted. So can moral testimony—moral claims made by others that we hear or read and understand—result in moral knowledge? That is, can someone telling me that lying to protect someone’s feelings is morally permissible justify my believing that this is so? Some philosophers argue “yes,” and some argue “no.” This essay introduces the basics of their positions.![The Conversation](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/the-conversation.jpg?resize=656%2C390&ssl=1) ### 1. Option 1: No, moral testimony cannot result in moral knowledge. This is the most common answer to the question among philosophers. To see some of this answer’s appeal, consider an example.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Suppose I want to know whether eating meat is morally wrong. I could think about it myself, read up on the issue, and make my own decision. Or I could just ask my friend and believe whatever she tells me to believe. If I take the latter route, am I now entitled to believe that eating meat is wrong? It does not seem like I am. In terms of our question from before, I will not have moral knowledge on this question even if my belief turns out to be correct. If it is true that I will not have moral knowledge even if I get things right, what explains this? The main answer philosophers given is something like this: part of what it means to be justified in believing a moral proposition is that one understands the moral reasons behind.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Imagine asking a person why she believes some proposition. If she believes that it is raining, we would accept as an answer that her colleague told her so. If she believes that eating meat is not okay, we should not accept the explanation that a colleague told her so as a final answer. Instead we would want her to explain the reasons to believe this rather than an alternative position. Part of what is going on here is that exchanging reasons and arguments seems like a very important part of moral engagement. We can and should seek out advice on moral issues, but we should not accept wholesale the judgments of others.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Recall that we had phrased the question initially as asking whether a person can gain moral *knowledge* as a result of accepting testimony, but then we started talking about *understanding*, not knowledge. Allison Hills argues that moral testimony can sometimes result in moral knowledge, but that it cannot result in moral understanding for the reasons already explored above.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) So it may turn out that the terms of this debate need refinement, but the general views expressed by the people I have grouped together in this section are similarly cautious about the role of moral testimony. ### 2. Option 2: Yes, moral testimony can result in moral knowledge. Note that this option does not require that moral testimony always, or even usually, results in moral knowledge. It means that moral testimony may, under some conditions, be able to justify moral knowledge. Karen Jones approaches this question by suggesting that our reactions to some cases of trusting someone else on a moral question are not as clear as others.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Here is a variation of Jones’s example. Ted is at a party with Sally. As they walk home, Sally notes that one of the party-goers made her uncomfortable. Pressed to say why, she finds it difficult to explain that he did not seem to respect her or other women at the party, that he made some offhand comments she interpreted as sexist, and so on. Ted was with Sally all night, but did not notice any of this. Should Ted believe that the party-goer has behaved in a morally objectionable way? What if, instead of a single meeting, Sally is talking about a work colleague she interacts with often? Jones thinks that it would be inappropriate for Ted to not trust Sally on this matter, all else being equal, because Sally is a sort of expert on identifying sexism. Paulina Sliwa provides two sorts of reasons why we might be justified in a moral belief on the basis of testimony.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) First, we might be concerned about our own ability to judge fairly because of bias. Second, there might be some people who are better equipped to make certain kinds of moral judgments.2[\[7\]](#_ftn7) These two reasons account for the above case pretty well. Ted, knowing that he is likely subject to both implicit biases and privilege, should be concerned about his ability to recognize and judge the behavior of others in this area. He may also think that Sally, having experienced sexism in a more systematic way, will be more adept than him at picking out problematic behavior. This explanation also deals nicely with the cases where it does not seem like testimony can result in knowledge, like the meat-eating example above, because I am as capable of working out the answer as my friend. ### 3. Conclusion This topic is a relatively new one in philosophy, and there is a lot of work still to do. I invite the reader to review some of the references below and consider the role testimony should play in their own moral thought. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This example is from McGrath (2009). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Hopkins (2007) and Nickel (2001). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Wolff (1970). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Hills (2009). Some philosophers distinguish between knowledge and understanding. For example, you might know a physics formula without really understanding why it has this constant rather than that one, or why it adds here instead of subtracts. Understanding suggests some deeper grasp of the topic than does knowledge. See Kvanvig (2003) and Hills (2009) for more on understanding as it contrasts with knowledge. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Jones (1999) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Sliwa (2012) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Driver (2006) for more on this point. ### References [Driver, J. 2006. “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.” *Philosophical Studies* 128 (3):619 – 644.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-004-7825-y) [Hills, Alison. 2009. “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology.” *Ethics* 120 (1):94-127.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.1086/648610?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103598800097) [Hopkins, Robert. 2007. “What is Wrong with Moral Testimony?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (3):611-634. ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00042.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Jones, Karen. 1999. “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge.” *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (2):55-78.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2564672?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103598800097) [Kukla, Rebecca. 2006. “Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge.” *Episteme* Vol 3, Issue 1-2 (2006) 80-95.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8355956) [Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2003. *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding*. Cambridge University Press. ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/epistemology-and-metaphysics/value-knowledge-and-pursuit-understanding?format=PB) [McGrath, Sarah. 2009. “The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference.” *Philosophical Perspectives*. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00174.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Nickel, Philip. 2001. “Moral Testimony and Its Authority.” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 4 (3):253-266.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1011843723057) [Sliwa, Paulina. 2012. “In Defense of Moral Testimony.” *Philosophical Studies* 158 (2):175-195.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-012-9887-6?LI=true) [Thomas, L. 1998. “Moral Deference.” *Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate*. Ed Cynthia Willet. Wiley-Blackwell.](http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0631203427.html) [Wolff, Robert Paul. 1970. In Defense of Anarchism. Accessed online: http://www.ditext.com/wolff/anarchy.html](http://www.ditext.com/wolff/anarchy.html) ### Related Essays [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/moral-testimony/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Moral-Testimony.pdf). ### About the Author Annaleigh has a JD from Harvard Law School, a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder, a Graduate Certificate in Women and Gender Studies from CU Boulder, and a B.A. in Philosophy from Washburn University. She is a practicing attorney in Boston; her focus is intellectual property litigation. Her academic interests include social epistemology, moral epistemology and methodology, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of law. [papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=2361641](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=2361641) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics **Tags:** Testimony --- ### [The Extended Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/19/the-extended-mind/) **Published:** May 19, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Rachel Bourbaki Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/ "Philosophy of Mind and Language") Word Count: 1000 Can your mind be outside of your body? Typically we think that the mind—including our thoughts, beliefs, memories, experiences, attitudes, etc.—is internal to our bodies. A number of philosophers challenge this commonsense view. The view of the mind that these philosophers propose is knows as an *extended* view, where the mind actually extends out into the world—being comprised not merely of neurons and synapses, but also of objects external to the body. This may initially seem like a radical (or highly improbably) thesis, but views based on it have compelling reasons in their favor. ### 1. Inga and Otto The mind is comprised of mental states and processes. Beliefs are mental states that comprise part of the mind. So, the belief that ‘dogs are mammals’ is one mental state that comprises part of your mind, along with other things like different beliefs and desires, etc. Compare, for a moment, these two cases. First, let’s consider a typical case of belief embedded in someone’s normal, biological memory. Imagine Inga. One day, Inga hears that there is an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art. She decides to go see it. After thinking for a moment, she recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street. So she walks to 53rd Street and gets to the museum. Clearly, Inga *believes* that the museum is on 53rd Street. She had this belief even before she thought for a moment and consulted her memory. She was not previously conscious of this belief, but we aren’t presently conscious and thinking of many (if not most) of our beliefs at any given time. Like many beliefs, Inga’s belief that the museum is on 53rd Street is simply sitting in her memory, waiting for her to access it. (Did you believe that dogs are mammals before reading this very parenthetical note? Surely you did, even though it was only *during and after* the reading that you became *conscious* of your held belief!) Now let’s consider Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. Because of this disease, he carries a notebook around with him everywhere he goes. This notebook helps him to get around in the world. When Otto learns new information, he writes it down. When he needs old information, he looks it up. For Otto, the notebook plays the role usually played by memories stored in our brains. Now, just like Inga, Otto hears about the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides to go see it. He consults his notebook, which says that the museum is on 53rd Street, so he walks to 53rd Street and goes to the museum. Just like Inga, Otto went to 53rd Street because he wanted to go to the museum and he believed the museum was on 53rd Street. And, further, it seems reasonable to say that Otto believed the museum was on 53rd Street *even before* consulting his notebook. Just like Inga, Otto wasn’t previously conscious of the information, it was merely stored waiting to be accessed. Clark and Chalmers assert that “in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga”. The information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting an ordinary non-conscious belief; it just happens that, in the case of Otto, this information lies beyond the skin.1 These authors conclude that we ought not be biased toward the boundaries of skin and skull when it comes to the boundaries of the mind. After all, aside from these boundaries, there is little difference in the roles that an internal belief and an external belief play. These two types of beliefs function equivalently for Inga and Otto in terms of how they guide behavior, etc. What gives a mental state its status as mental is the role that it plays, not its location. ### 2. Cognitive Extension Clearly, not everything in the world is part of one’s mind. So, what does it take for something to be considered mental? First, it must be the case that an individual is *coupled* to the object that is part of her mind. In order to be so suitably coupled, it must be the case that the item in question be constantly connected to the individual, the information it holds must be directly available, and it is automatically endorsed. Or, the person does not question its reliability. Your smartphone, for instance, might be part of your mind on this account, provided that it is more or less constantly with you, it provides you with information directly, and you don’t question the reliability of that information.2 ### 3. Is the Mind Really Extended? One objection to the extended mind thesis is that coupling does not imply constitution. Yes, Otto is closely coupled to his notebook, but that doesn’t mean that it is actually a part of his mind. Devices like Otto’s notebook lessen the demands that we place on long-term memory, but they don’t make up our memory. Even when something is constantly causally connected with another thing, the two do not all of the sudden become one system. Take for example your kidneys. They filter impurities from your blood, and this filtration is thereby influenced by your heart’s pumping blood, your blood vessels, and other parts of your circulatory system. However, the fact that your circulatory system interacts with your kidneys does not make it the case that the filtration of your blood, the activity of your kidneys, takes place within your circulatory system. Filtration merely takes place in your kidneys, which are causally connected to your circulatory system. So, one process may interact with its environment, but that does not mean that that process extends out into its environment.3 ### 4. Conclusions The hypothesis that the mind is extended may seem like a radical one. But, there is growing support for the idea that the mind is not simply bounded by our bodies. The question remains, however, whether our cognitive systems are merely causally influenced by external objects or whether these external objects are indeed part of our minds. ### Notes 1 Clark and Chalmers (1998) 2 See Clark (2010) Also see Clark (2008). 3 Adams and Aizawa (2008). For additional responses see also Adams and Aizawa (2010). ### References [Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken. “Defending the Bounds of Cognition.” In Menary, ed. *The Extended Mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press (2010). pp. 67-79.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/extended-mind) [———. *The Bounds of Cognition.* Malden: Blackwell (2008).](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Bounds+of+Cognition-p-9781405149143) [Clark, Andy. “Momento’s Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended.” In Menary, ed. *The Extended Mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press (2010). pp. 43-66.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/extended-mind) [———. *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension*. New York: Oxford (2008).](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/supersizing-the-mind-9780195333213?cc=us&lang=en&) [Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David. ”The Extended Mind.” *Analysis,* vol. 58 (1998). pp 10-23.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328150) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Extended-Mind-.pdf). ### About the Author [Rachel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bourbaki) has a PhD in philosophy. She is interested in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, action theory, and free will and moral responsibility. In her free time, she enjoys hiking, cycling, and participating in other outdoor activities. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Mind & Language **Tags:** Bourbaki --- ### [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) **Published:** September 28, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the theory and practice of critical thinking: what is it to be a critical thinker? **Content:** Author: Carolina Flores Categories: [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/), [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word count: 997 We often urge others to think critically. What does that really mean? How can we think critically? This essay presents a general account of what it is to be a critical thinker and outlines both traditional and more recent approaches to critical thinking. [![Know the Facts: A WPA (Works Progress Administration, part of the New Deal) poster, imploring the public to develop critical thinking skills. Circa late 1930-early 1940s.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/critical-thinking-know-the-facts.jpg?resize=317%2C500&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/critical-thinking-know-the-facts.jpg?ssl=1)Know the Facts: A WPA (Works Progress Administration, part of the New Deal) poster, imploring the public to develop critical thinking skills. Circa late 1930-early 1940s. ### 1. What is Critical Thinking? Speaking generally, *critical thinking consists of reasoning and inquiring in careful ways, so as to form and update one’s beliefs based on good reasons*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) A critical thinker is someone who typically reasons and inquires in these ways, having mastered relevant skills and developed the disposition to apply them.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### 2. Traditional Components: Logic and Fallacies Traditional views of critical thinking focus on deductive arguments. *Arguments* are sets of reasons given for a conclusion. *Deductive* arguments are arguments where the reasons given are supposed to be logically conclusive, that is, to guarantee the conclusion. E.g., the following is a deductive argument: 1. Socrates is a man. 2. All men are mortal. 3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. Arriving at new beliefs through deductive arguments is *a* way of forming beliefs based on good reasons. Accordingly, critical thinking traditionally focusses on these skills:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - distinguishing arguments (instances where you are offered reasons for a conclusion) from mere assertions, rhetorical questions, and attempts at manipulation through irrelevant considerations; - identifying *conclusions* of arguments (what the person offering the argument wants to persuade you to believe), and the *reasons* or *premises* for that conclusion; - reconstructing streamlined, complete statements of arguments in standard form (as a numbered list of premises with the conclusion at the end), or using diagrams;[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - assessing the logical structure of deductive arguments: answering ‘Is there any way for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false?’ - understanding arguments’ claims: e.g., defining unclear terms; - determining whether premises are true or likely; - imagining, proposing, and charitably responding to objections, i.e, reasons given to doubt or deny arguments’ logic, premise(s), or conclusion.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) To develop these skills, traditional critical thinking courses typically include propositional logic and the study of common good argument forms.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) They also often teach how to identify *fallacies*—faulty patterns of reasoning that deceptively appear to be good arguments.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) These include: - *affirming the consequent* (“If Kat had won the prize, she would have had an A; Kat had an A; therefore, Kat won the prize”); - the *ad hominem* fallacy—where people attack the *person* making an argument instead of considering their argument; - *begging the question*—offering reasons for a conclusion that *assume* the conclusion, and many others.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 3. Additional Formal Tools: Evidence and Statistics We often form beliefs based on observations that, unlike deductive arguments, do not provide *conclusive* reasons for a belief: e.g., you might conclude that your sibling is angry at you from their facial expressions or come to believe you have a cold because you have a runny nose. Here, these observations or evidence might support the belief formed but do not *guarantee* the truth of your belief. Critical thinkers know how to adjust their beliefs appropriately in light of their evidence.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) So critical thinking requires developing abilities to: - assess evidence without being unduly swayed by what one already believes; - recognize when a claim counts as evidence for (or against) a conclusion; - identify when evidence is strong (or weak); - determine the extent to which people’s views should change, given their evidence. To develop these abilities, drawing on knowledge of probability can be helpful: e.g., basic probability offers a recipe for determining when an observation counts as evidence for a belief: when that observation is *more likely if the belief is true than if it is not*. It also teaches us that updating your beliefs when you get new evidence requires taking into account *both* (a) how confident you were on that belief beforehand and (b) how strongly the evidence supports that (new) belief.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) For these reasons, recent approaches to critical thinking often include instruction in probability.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) And, because we often get evidence in the form of statistics, often presented through diagrams and graphs, such approaches tend to highlight the importance of basic statistical concepts,[\[12\]](#_ftn12) and the ability to interpret diagrams and graphs.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 4. Applied Skills as Part of Being a Critical Thinker Being a critical thinker requires more than having technical tools (such as the tools of logic or probability) stored away. It requires *consistently* applying them *in the real world*. In recent discussions of what it is to be a critical thinker, there has been increased emphasis on navigating our informational environments in savvy ways. This requires avoiding false, misleading, manipulative, or distracting claims online, as well as making sure that one gathers information from a wide variety of reliable sources.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) It also requires calibrating one’s *trust* well: one should remain open to hearing those who disagree and not let prejudice and *implicit bias* affect whom one trusts.[\[15\]](#_ftn15),[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Applying the tools of critical thinking throughout one’s life requires overcoming cognitive biases:[\[17\]](#_ftn17) e.g.: - not always accepting answers that come to mind first; - resisting *confirmation bias* (the tendency to gather and interpret evidence in ways that confirm our beliefs),[\[18\]](#_ftn18) and; - avoiding *motivated reasoning* (the tendency to reason in ways that help us believe what we *wish* were true, and not what is true).[\[19\]](#_ftn19) More generally, becoming a critical thinker requires shifting from a defensive mindset to a truth-seeking one and developing intellectual virtues such as intellectual humility and open-minded curiosity.[\[20\]](#_ftn20),[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Without those, the tools of critical thinking may end up being deployed to entrench false or unreasonable beliefs. ### 5. Conclusion Critical thinking is about reasoning and inquiring so as to form and update one’s beliefs based on good reasons. Because critical thinking skills are valuable in a world that emphasizes the ability to navigate information, becoming a critical thinker is practically useful to us as individuals. It is also of crucial social and political value: e.g., a well-functioning democracy requires citizens who think critically about the world.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) And critical thinking has liberatory potential: it provides us with tools to criticize oppressive social structures and envisage a more just, fair society.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) ### Acknowledgments Thanks to the Teaching Philosophy Facebook Group for literature recommendations. Thanks to Chelsea Haramia, Sabrina Huwang, Izilda Jorge, Thomas Metcalf, Nathan Nobis, Elise Woodard, and anonymous referees for feedback. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This definition is similar to Ennis’s (1991) definition: critical thinking, in his view, is “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis 1991, p. 6). See Hitchcock 2010 for an overview of definitions of critical thinking. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) While I define critical thinking in a general way here, there is disagreement about whether there are any general tools for critical thinking, as opposed to merely topic-specific ones. There are also closely related debates about the extent to which specific critical thinking skills *transfer* to new domains and tasks, and about whether we should teach critical thinking on its own or, instead, in the context of specific disciplines, with discipline-internal standards made clear and an emphasis on content acquisition. See [Willingham 2019](#30j0zll) for discussion, including references to relevant empirical research. People who have mastered critical thinking skills in a domain or subject area tend to be *experts* in those areas. See [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See [this Khan Academy/Wi](https://www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/wi-phi/wiphi-critical-thinking) [Phi Philosophy course](https://www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/wi-phi/wiphi-critical-thinking) for an overview. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) An example of an argument in standard form is: 1. Socrates is a man; 2. All men are mortal; 3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. For other examples of arguments in standard form, see [Anderson’s “Putting an Argument in Standard Form.”](http://academic.depauw.edu/jeremyanderson_web/eteach/101_standardform.html) For examples of argument diagrams, as well as a useful program to construct such diagrams, see[ Cullen’s “Philosophy Mapped” website](https://maps.simoncullen.org/). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Charitably responding involves responding to the strongest version of the objection. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Propositional logic is the simplest branch of logic, i.e. the formal study of arguments and reasoning. See Tom Metcalf’s [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by for an introduction. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Wikipedia has extensive lists of [good argument forms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_valid_argument_forms) and of [common fallacies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fallacies). See Boardman et al. 2017, Howard-Snyder 2020, [Lau 2011](#gjdgxs), Vaughn 2018 for examples of critical thinking textbooks that take the traditional approach. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) To see why these are fallacies, note that, for all that is said, Kat could have had an A without winning the prize; perhaps she simply had high exam scores. And note that morally bad people can give good arguments. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Philosophers also use the term ‘evidence’ in more technical senses than ‘relevant observations’. See Kelly 2016 for discussion of these different senses. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Indeed, we can capture this insight into a domain-general formula for how to update beliefs: Bayes’ theorem. Bayes’ theorem tells us how to weigh our previous confidence and the strength of evidence. For a short explanation of Bayes’ Theorem, see [Better Explained, “A Short and Intuitive Explanation of Bayes’ Theorem”](https://betterexplained.com/articles/an-intuitive-and-short-explanation-of-bayes-theorem/). For more detailed discussion of Bayesianism, see Joyce 2019. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Manley 2019. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Gigerenzer et al. 2007 for discussion of the practical importance of these concepts. An especially important statistical concept is that of *base rate*. The base rate of a feature in a population is what fraction of the population have that feature. Neglecting the base rate leads to the *base rate fallacy*, where one ends up adjusting one’s beliefs incorrectly in response to evidence (for example, taking a fallible positive test for a rare disease to indicate that one is extremely likely to have that disease, where, given the rarity of the disease, that remains unlikely). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Battersby 2016. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See [Bergstorm and West’s “Calling Bullshit” syllabus](https://www.callingbullshit.org/syllabus.html) for a range of helpful tools for avoiding such claims, and [The News Literacy Project](https://newslit.org/) for resources on developing a healthy news diet. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See [Nguyen’s “Escape the Echo Chamber.”](https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult) for helpful discussion of common issues with trust calibration and with information gathering. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Implicit bias involves believing and acting “on basis of prejudice and stereotypes without intending to do so”: see Brownstein 2019. When one discredits members of marginalized groups due to (conscious or unconscious) prejudice, one commits an epistemic injustice: see Fricker 2007. For an introduction to epistemic injustice, see Huzeyfe Demitras’s [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Cognitive biases are systematic deviations from how we should reason. See Kahneman 2011 for an accessible overview of research on cognitive biases. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Nickerson [1998](#gjdgxs). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Kunda 1990. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) An *intellectual virtue* is a personality trait or disposition that is helpful in reasoning well and acquiring knowledge. Some examples are intellectual humility, open-mindedness, curiosity, and perseverance. See Zagzebski 1996. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See [Galef’s TED talk “Why you think you’re right – even if you’re wrong”](https://www.ted.com/talks/julia_galef_why_you_think_you_re_right_even_if_you_re_wrong) for discussion of the importance of these traits. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Dewey 1923. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Freire 1968/2018, hooks 2010. ### References [Anderson, Jeremy. “Putting an Argument in Standard Form.”](http://academic.depauw.edu/jeremyanderson_web/eteach/101_standardform.html) [Battersby, Mark. 2016. ](https://broadviewpress.com/product/is-that-a-fact-second-edition/#tab-description)[*Is That a Fact?: A Field Guide to Statistical and Scientific Information*](https://broadviewpress.com/product/is-that-a-fact-second-edition/#tab-description)[. Broadview Press.](https://broadviewpress.com/product/is-that-a-fact-second-edition/#tab-description) [Bergstrom, Carl T. and West, Jevin. 2019. “Calling Bullshit: Data Reasoning in a Digital World.” (website)](https://www.callingbullshit.org/index.html) [Better Explained. 2020. “A Short and Intuitive Explanation of Bayes’ Theorem.” (website)](https://betterexplained.com/articles/an-intuitive-and-short-explanation-of-bayes-theorem/) [Boardman, Frank, Cavender, Nancy M, and Kahane, Howard . 2017.](https://www.cengage.com/c/logic-and-contemporary-rhetoric-the-use-of-reason-in-everyday-life-13e-boardman/9781305956025/)[ *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life.*](https://www.cengage.com/c/logic-and-contemporary-rhetoric-the-use-of-reason-in-everyday-life-13e-boardman/9781305956025/)[ Cengage Learning.](https://www.cengage.com/c/logic-and-contemporary-rhetoric-the-use-of-reason-in-everyday-life-13e-boardman/9781305956025/) [Brownstein, Michael, “Implicit Bias”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias/)[(Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. 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Macmillan.](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374533557) [Kelly, Thomas. 2016. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/)[“](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/)[Evidence](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/)[”](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/)[, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/)[(Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. 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John Wiley & Sons.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/An+Introduction+to+Critical+Thinking+and+Creativity%3A+Think+More%2C+Think+Better-p-9780470195093) [Manley, David. 2019. ](https://tophat.com/marketplace/arts-&-humanities/philosophy/full-course/reason-better-an-interdisciplinary-guide-to-critical-thinking-david-manley/3425/141193/)[*Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking*](https://tophat.com/marketplace/arts-&-humanities/philosophy/full-course/reason-better-an-interdisciplinary-guide-to-critical-thinking-david-manley/3425/141193/)[. Toronto, ON, Canada: Tophat Monocle.](https://tophat.com/marketplace/arts-&-humanities/philosophy/full-course/reason-better-an-interdisciplinary-guide-to-critical-thinking-david-manley/3425/141193/) [Metcalf, Thomas. 2020. “Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic.” ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/)[*1,000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/). [*The News Literacy Project.*](https://newslit.org/) [Nguyen, Thi. 2018. “Escape the Echo Chamber.” Aeon.](https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult) [Nickerson, Raymond S. 1998. “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises.” ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175)[*Review of General Psychology*](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175)[, 2(2):175-220.](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175) [Pynn, Geoff. 2020. “Critical Thinking: Fundamentals.” ](https://www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/wi-phi/wiphi-critical-thinking)[*Wireless Philosophy/Khan Academy*](https://www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/wi-phi/wiphi-critical-thinking)[.](https://www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/wi-phi/wiphi-critical-thinking) [Vaughn, Lewis. 2018. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-power-of-critical-thinking-9780190852719?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Power of Critical Thinking: Effective Reasoning About Ordinary and Extraordinary Claims*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-power-of-critical-thinking-9780190852719?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-power-of-critical-thinking-9780190852719?cc=us&lang=en&) [Willingham, Daniel T. 2019. “How to Teach Critical Thinking.” ](http://www.danielwillingham.com/uploads/5/0/0/7/5007325/willingham_2019_nsw_critical_thinking2.pdf)[*Education: Future Frontiers*](http://www.danielwillingham.com/uploads/5/0/0/7/5007325/willingham_2019_nsw_critical_thinking2.pdf)[, 1:1-17.](http://www.danielwillingham.com/uploads/5/0/0/7/5007325/willingham_2019_nsw_critical_thinking2.pdf) [Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 1996. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/virtues-of-the-mind/4C29D940655E5EB27FFFA25141F7526B)[*Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/virtues-of-the-mind/4C29D940655E5EB27FFFA25141F7526B)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/virtues-of-the-mind/4C29D940655E5EB27FFFA25141F7526B) ### Related Essays [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Epistemic Injust](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/)[ice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demitras [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Conspiracy Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/critical-thinking/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/critical-thinking-1.pdf). ### About the Author Carolina Flores is an assistant professor at the University of Lisbon. She earned her Ph.D. at Rutgers University, New Jersey. She specializes in philosophy of mind and social epistemology. She is especially interested in why it is so hard to change people’s minds, and in what that tells us about the mind and about human relationships and political persuasion. [CarolinaFlores.org](https://www.carolinaflores.org/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning, Philosophy of Education **Tags:** critical thinking, thinking critically --- ### [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) **Published:** January 27, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to the epistemology of testimony. **Content:** Author: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) Category: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/ "Epistemology")[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/thomas-metcalf/ "Thomas Metcalf")Word Count: 995 Consider two lives. Helen Keller was born blind and deaf, but her access to the written word enabled her to succeed as a writer and activist. Peter the Wild Boy, discovered near Hanover, Germany in 1719, possessed sight and hearing, but was innocent of language. He left the world as innocent as he came. “Without artifice, *particularly the shared human artifice of speech*, an unmeaning silence traps Peter in an unvarying bestiality.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The stark comparison illustrates the degree of our dependence on words, and the words of others. Without language, we cannot communicate with others, at least not about many typical human concerns. Without words, we cannot learn much from others or inform them of much: we cannot give or receive *testimony*. Without testimony, *knowledge or reasonable beliefs gained from the written or spoken words of others*, we cannot transcend the limitations of our individual faculties to borrow from the thoughts, observations, and experiences of others. The kind of knowledge that separates human beings from the rest of the animal world disappears. While a deficiency in one’s sensory faculties can perhaps be compensated for, inability to draw from the knowledge of others forecloses all possibility of higher knowledge. ![Thai art - whispering.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/testimony.jpg?resize=449%2C320&ssl=1) The contemporary philosophical literature on testimony can be viewed as footnotes to the debate between the great rivals of the Scottish Enlightenment: David Hume and Thomas Reid. The positions of Hume and Reid are not exhaustive, but the rift between them represents the continental divide in the intellectual landscape. The main point of dispute between them is whether testimony is a *derivative* source of knowledge (the “reductive theory”), or an *irreducible, basic* source of knowledge (the so-called “non-reductive theory”). To the outsider, this debate might seem pedantic. Even most academic philosophers spend relatively little time on it. So what is the big deal? At stake is whether we should accept a vision of human knowledge that prioritizes autonomy, avoidance of gullibility, and skepticism of external authority, or one that prioritizes trust and acknowledges our inescapable dependence on authority and connection to others. For Hume, we are justified in accepting testimony only to the extent that we have independent reasons for thinking the speaker is telling the truth.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) We must have prior knowledge that the speaker is honest, or recognition that what is said coheres with other things we know. To believe testimony that has not been so accredited is to be guilty of the sin of gullibility. Reid, by contrast, claims there is a standing entitlement to accept testimony, though the entitlement can be nullified by sufficient counter-evidence: beliefs gained from testimony are ‘innocent’ until found ‘guilty.’ This “Principle of Credulity” results in a more egalitarian relationship between testimony and the senses.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Being *told* by a fellow student that Professor Smith has just entered her office and *seeing* her enter her office are both sufficient reasons for believing that she is there, though they are not necessarily of equal weight. In claiming that testimony is a basic source of justification *for the hearer*, Reid isn’t denying that testimony can work only in conjunction with other sources of knowledge. Just as memory extends pre-existent knowledge across time, testimony transfers pre-existent knowledge from one person to another. Testimony, unlike other sources of knowledge, is irreducibly social and morally significant. It cannot operate without trust on the part of the hearer and honesty on the part of the speaker. In the contest between these two views, the reductive theory (Hume’s view) enjoys the advantage of simplicity. It postulates one fewer basic sources of knowledge. Theoretically, we don’t want to add sources of knowledge willy-nilly: each one must be explanatory or we’ll end up postulating psychic powers and the like. So the friend of the non-reductive theory is under pressure to explain how the additional basic source earns its keep. C.A.J. Coady, whose work on testimony played a major role in reviving interest in the topic, claims the non-reductive theory of testimony is essential to avoiding skepticism. Few, if any, have witnessed the complete path of one letter, yet everyone knows how the postal service works. “Similarly,” Coady writes, “that babies are born of women in a certain way, is known to all of us and it is a fact of observation, but very many of us have not observed even one birth for ourselves.”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) We flatter ourselves by thinking knowledge comes by our own devices, and not through implicit reliance on the vast, un-vetted pool of collective experience we take on trust. Ronald Reagan said, “Trust, but verify.” The Gipper would probably concede Coady’s point, though, that we place our trust in far more things than we can possibly verify “off of our own bats.” Given our extensive dependence on trust, attempting that would lead us to skepticism about many ordinary beliefs: that we know very little. Positing testimony as a basic source of knowledge is justified because it is necessary to help us avoid this result. In theory, defenders of the reductive theory could simply “bite the bullet” and embrace skepticism. In practice, that never happens. Philosophers hate to admit that they don’t know things. So instead, they retort that testimony can deliver the goods as a non-basic source of knowledge. Rational acceptance testimony doesn’t require vast amounts of fieldwork, only the recognition that human beings normally tell the truth—something that individual experience *can* establish. Armed with that knowledge, we can infer that particular pieces of testimony are likely to be true without positing testimony as a basic source of knowledge. Variations of this line of response have been convincingly developed by many philosophers.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Such replies serve to blunt the main offensive of the non-reductive theory, but at a cost. Once friends of the reductive theory endorse a norm of accepting what we are told, they are in less of a position to distance themselves from their rivals’ theory on the grounds that it sanctions gullibility. Neutralizing the observation argument does not win the game, it only resets the board. The reductive theorist’s starting advantage is the appeal to simplicity. Given the strength of both sides’ arguments, the game will probably continue for some time. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Newton 2002, 44. Emphasis mine. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Hume \[1738\] 1967, 196. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Reid \[1764\] 1997, 195-200. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Coady 1992, 81. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) E.g., Faulkner 2011, 32-39, Fricker 1994, pp. 125-161, and Lyons 1997, 171, among others ### References [Coady, C.A.J. 1992. *Testimony: a Philosophical Study*. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Testimony-Philosophical-C-A-Coady/dp/0198235518/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390747342&sr=8-1&keywords=Testimony+Coady) [Faulkner, Paul. 2011 *Knowledge on Trust*. New York: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Trust-Paul-Faulkner/dp/019958978X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390747378&sr=8-1&keywords=Knowledge+on+Trust) [Fricker, Elizabeth. “Against Gullibility.” In *Knowing from Words*. Ed. B.K. Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti. 1994. Dordrecht: Klewar.](http://www.amazon.com/Knowing-Words-Philosophical-Understanding-Testimony/dp/9048142873/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1390747573&sr=8-2&keywords=knowing+from+words) [Hume, David. *Treatise on Human Nature.* \[1738\] 1967. Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. USA: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Treatise-Human-Nature-David-Hume/dp/0198245882/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390747730&sr=8-1&keywords=Hume+Selby-Bigge+Treatise) [Hume, David. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Nature.* \[1748\] 1958 ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. USA: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/An-Inquiry-Concerning-Human-Understanding/dp/002353110X/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1390747793&sr=8-2-fkmr0) [Lyons, Jack. “Testimony, Induction, and Folk Psychology.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 75:2, 163-178. 1997.](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409712347771?journalCode=rajp20#.UuUg2mQo4y4) [Newton, Michael. 2003. *Savage Girls and Wild Boys*. Thomas Dunne Books. 1st U.S. Edition.](http://www.amazon.com/Savage-Girls-Wild-Boys-Children/dp/0312423357/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390747891&sr=8-1&keywords=Savage+Girls+and+Wild+Boys) [Reid, Thomas. \[1764\] 1997. *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: a Critical edition*. Ed. Derek R. Brookes. Pennsylvania State University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Inquiry-Human-Principles-Common-Sense/dp/0271020717/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390747939&sr=8-1&keywords=An+Inquiry+into+the+Human+Mind+on+the+Principles+of+Common+Sense%3A+a+Critical+edition) ### Related Essays [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/on-testimony/) ### About the Author [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) has a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Previously, he served as a public affairs specialist for the U.S. Army in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. He also spent nine months in Egypt as a Fulbright Student Grant recipient to study Islamic philosophy. His main interests are ethics, meta-ethics, and comparative philosophy. [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](https://www.spencercasephilosophy.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology **Tags:** Case, Testimony --- ### [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) **Published:** March 31, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to the "Divine Command Theory" of ethics. **Content:** Author: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics"), [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/ "Philosophy of Religion") Word Count: 1000 ##### *Editors’ note: this is our first essay published on the divine command theory. The second is* [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis. *We hope readers will appreciate multiple presentations on this theory.* Assuming God exists, what is the relationship between God’s commands and morality? Assuming that God is morally perfect and so commands all and only good things, we may distinguish between two claims: 1. God commands what He does *because it is good*. 2. What is good is so *because of God’s commands*. If (a) is true, then facts about goodness exist independently of God’s will. God’s commands are a *response to* them. If (b) is true, God’s commands *themselves create* all truths about goodness and badness. The philosophical fork in the road between (a) and (b) is known as the “Euthyphro Dilemma,” since a version of it appears in Plato’s dialogue the *Euthyphro*. To accept (b) is to accept the *Divine Command Theory* about ethics (henceforth DCT), which shall be our focus here. [!["Joshua Commanding the Sun to Stand Still upon Gibeon" by John Martin. Oil on canvas. 1816. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/joshua_commanding_the_sun_to_stand_still_upon_gibeon_2004.64.1.jpg?resize=656%2C431&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/joshua_commanding_the_sun_to_stand_still_upon_gibeon_2004.64.1.jpg?ssl=1)“Joshua Commanding the Sun to Stand Still upon Gibeon” by John Martin. Oil on canvas. 1816. ### 1. What Is Divine Command Theory? Before we continue, let’s first get clear about what DCT *isn’t*. DCT isn’t a theory about *which particular* actions are wrong and right, since it makes no claims about what God in fact commands. It also isn’t a theory of how we come to *know* ethical truths. It is silent on how God makes His commandments known, or even *whether* He chooses to make them known. Finally, DCT isn’t inconsistent with atheism. The two are logically compatible, but together entail that there are no truths about morality, just as there would be no truths about what’s legal in a state of anarchy. We should also take care to distinguish DCT from *Natural Law Theory* (henceforth NLT). According to NLT, moral facts are grounded in the natural order of the universe and in the natures of human beings. Of course, theists who endorse NLT hold that God created that very natural order, thereby creating the moral order, but this position still differs from DCT. Both theories agree that God created a moral order to the universe, but one holds that God created the moral order through his creation of the natural order, while the other maintains he created the moral order by commanding and forbidding things. Another way to look at the differences between NLT and DCT is this: If a defender of NLT decided that atheism was, after all, true, he need not abandon his moral theory in order to retain at least some of his moral beliefs. It is at least conceivable that an uncreated natural order grounds ethical truths. However, if a divine command theorist adopted atheism, then he would *either* have to change his moral theory *or* conclude that there are no moral truths. ### 2. Two Worries for Divine Command Theory While DCT is often appealed to in popular defenses of religion, it’s controversial among religious thinkers. In Christianity, William of Ockham defended DCT, and so did many Protestants, but NLT is a much more common view among Christian philosophers.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In Islam, the ‘Asharite school of theology appeared to accept DCT, but the Mu’tazilite school rejected it. Even the views of most ‘Asharites include important qualifications.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Why do so few really thoughtful believers accept DCT? Well, think about asking *why* God prohibits theft, lying, and adultery. We want to say: “Because these things are bad.” But to give such a justification is to abandon DCT. Per the DCT, *that God wills so* is supposed to be the explanatory foundation of morality. So, DCT makes God’s commands totally arbitrary. While one troubling consequence of DCT is arbitrariness, another is the possibility of God’s commanding really horrible things. Think of the morally worst thing conceivable. Whatever you’ve just thought of, if DCT is true, then God *could* make that thing morally right by commanding it. Wes Morriston formalizes this thought into the following argument against DCT: 1. DCT entails that whatever God commands is morally obligatory. 2. God could command X. 3. So if DCT is true, X could be morally obligatory. 4. But X could not be morally obligatory. 5. Therefore, DCT is false.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) DCT entails (1) and (3), so the defender of DCT must reject at least one of either (2) or (4). One could deny (2) by appealing to God’s eternal and unchanging nature. Perhaps Robert M. Adams could be interpreted as rejecting (2). He endorses a modified version of DCT, according to which the commands must issue from a *loving* God.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) So maybe God is constrained by his own loving nature. The problem surrounding the rejection of (2) is that it arguably undermines God’s omnipotence. Rejecting (4) is a kind of response philosophers call “biting the bullet,” since most people who think about the possibility of X’s being morally obligatory have a visceral intuition against it. Among Christian thinkers, William of Ockham comes close to biting that bullet, but even he seems to have wavered.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Among Muslim philosophers, Al-‘Ashari stands out as the best example of a thoroughgoing bullet-biter.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Are there any good arguments *for* DCT? Perhaps the best way to argue for DCT is to try to show that *if* you believe in God, *then* you should accept DCT as the correct moral theory. An appeal to God’s power might be effective here: 1. God is the most powerful thing conceivable. 2. Something that can make things right or wrong by will is more powerful than something that can’t. 3. So, if God can’t make things right or wrong by will then God is not the most powerful thing conceivable (since we can conceive of something that can). 4. But this is absurd. 5. Hence, God can make things right or wrong by will (definition of DCT). This argument alone won’t convince atheists of DCT, since it only works if you assume God exists. However, it could be employed in tandem with other arguments for God’s existence (maybe one of Aquinas’s five arguments, for instance). Critics of DCT might reject (1) on the grounds that God, as they understand Him, isn’t the most powerful being conceivable FULL STOP, but the most powerful being conceivable *who is consistent with all divine attributes*, including goodness. Most who have thought deeply on the matter would rather make concessions on omnipotence than accept a morally arbitrary God. Might, it is thought, doesn’t make right. Not even God’s might. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See King. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See al-Attar 99-140. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Morriston 251. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Adams 249-276; Morriston 254-259. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See King 239-240. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See al-Attar 111-122. ### References [Adams, Robert Merrihew. *Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics*. Oxford University Press. (1999).](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/finite-and-infinite-goods-9780195153712?q=Finite%20and%20Infinite%20Goods:%20A%20Framework%20for%20Ethics&lang=en&cc=us) [al-Attar, Mariam. *Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought*. Routledge. New York. (2010).](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415656702/) [King, Peter “Ockham’s Ethical Theory.” In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*. Edited by Paul Vincent Spade (1999).](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/medieval-philosophy/cambridge-companion-ockham?format=PB) [Morriston, Wes. “What If God Commanded Something Terrible? A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics” *Religious Studies* 45, 249-267. Cambridge University Press (2009).](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5978388) [Plato. *Euthyphro.* Translated by G.M.A Grube. In *Complete Works*. Edited with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. (1997).](http://www.hackettpublishing.com/complete-works) ### Related Essays [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [Attributes of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/ "Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics") by Andrew Chapman [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/ "Introduction to Consequentialism") by Shane Gronholz [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/divine-command-theory.pdf). ### About the Author [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) has a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Previously, he served as a public affairs specialist for the U.S. Army in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. He also spent nine months in Egypt as a Fulbright Student Grant recipient to study Islamic philosophy. His main interests are ethics, meta-ethics, and comparative philosophy. [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](https://www.spencercasephilosophy.com/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Case, Christian ethics, divine command theory, God, religious ethics, theological ethics --- ### [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) **Published:** May 26, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Plato’s book The Republic is a dialogue about justice. It contains the “Allegory of the Cave”, a fanciful story that illustrates some of Plato’s ideas about education and the distinction between appearance and reality. This essay introduces the Allegory and explains its meaning. **Content:** Author: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) Categories: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/ "Metaphysics"), [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/ "Epistemology") Word count: 998 Plato (428/427–348/347 B.C.E.) was an ancient Greek philosopher who wrote play-like dialogues, often using his late teacher, Socrates, as his mouthpiece. Plato’s book *The Republic* is a dialogue about justice. It contains the “Allegory of the Cave”, a fanciful story that illustrates some of Plato’s ideas about education and the distinction between appearance and reality. This essay introduces the Allegory and explains its meaning. ### 1. The Story In *Republic* Book VII, Socrates is talking with Plato’s brother, Glaucon. Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine a group of people held captive in a cave since childhood, chained so that they can’t move their heads and can only see the cave wall in front of them. A fire blazes behind them, and puppeteers on a platform cast shadows on the cave wall. The prisoners spend their time discussing these shadows and the echoes they hear, which they assume are noises made by the shadows. This is the only “reality” they know. One day, a prisoner is released and made to walk out of the cave. The ascent is arduous. The light from the fire, and then from the mouth of the cave, hurts his eyes. It intensifies until he steps outside into the blinding sunlight. As his eyes adjust, the freed prisoner is gradually able to see the things around him—only shadows at first, then ordinary objects such as trees and rocks. The last thing he’s able to see clearly is the sun because it’s the brightest. Now that the freed prisoner is outside, he wouldn’t return to captivity in the cave for anything. But he pities those still trapped there. So he decides to help them escape. Unfortunately, this story doesn’t have a happy ending. When he returns to the cave, the prisoners find his testimony unbelievable. Worse, his eyes aren’t used to the darkness, so he can’t see the shadows as well as he could before. In time, his eyes would adjust and he’d understand the shadows better than any of the prisoners, since he’d seen the real things that cause the shadows. Still, in the prisoners’ eyes, he’s a fool. If he tried to release them, they’d kill him for his effort. ### 2. Interpretation Socrates tells Glaucon that the prisoners are like us: most of us are ignorant. The journey out of the cave represents our journey from ignorance toward knowledge of what’s *most real*. The words “most real” might sound strange. We usually think that things are either real or unreal. But, for Plato, some things are more “real” than others. Plato thinks that two kinds of things exist: changing things we perceive with our senses, i.e., physical objects, and unchanging *forms* we only “see” intellectually. Physical objects are imperfect imitations of the forms, like shadows. They derive their existence from the forms, and so the forms, for Plato, are *more real* than the objects. To take a concrete example: horses are real, but the *form of the horse*, which we can think of as an ideal horse, is more real than any individual horse can be, since all horses derive their being from “participation” in it. There’s also a hierarchy among the forms. The greatest form, the “Form of the Good”—the sun in the Allegory—is the ultimate source of all that exists. We can almost think of the Form of the Good as God except that it isn’t a person.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Philosophical knowledge, the highest form of knowledge, is knowledge of the forms, and above all, knowledge of the Form of the Good. The Allegory tells us that education of the most noble sort—*philosophical* education—is a painful process for the few who can achieve it, at least in its early stages. For most people, philosophical knowledge will be out of reach. The masses don’t know their own ignorance and resent those who try to enlighten them. Undoubtedly, when Plato made Socrates say that some prisoners would even want to kill the freed companion trying to liberate them, he had in mind Socrates himself. Socrates was famous in the Greek city-state of Athens for asking supposedly knowledgeable citizens hard questions about things like “knowledge” and “holiness.” These interrogations often exposed his interlocutors as being less knowledgeable than they claimed to be and made Socates some enemies. In 399 B.C.E., Athens executed Socrates by forcing him to drink hemlock, a poison, after a jury convicted him of “corrupting the youth” and failing to respect the gods.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Socrates insisted on his innocence but accepted his fate. Athens was a democracy at the time of Socrates’ execution, and Plato thought that this tragic episode highlights the problem with democracy: the majority can’t be entrusted with power. Plato thought political power should instead be concentrated in the hands of an elite like Socrates—and, of course, himself—who were capable of philosophical knowledge. But this would only work in a city prepared for that kind of leadership. ### 3. Conclusion The Allegory of the Cave encapsulates many important and distinctive ideas in Plato’s philosophy. However, elsewhere in his writings, Plato expresses ideas about education that don’t neatly square with the symbolism of the Allegory. According to the Allegory, even the students who are capable of philosophy, whom the freed prisoner represents, are placed in a passive role, struggling *against* the teacher at every step. At least that’s true until they breach the surface, at which point they have philosophical knowledge. The contrast between teacher and student is very stark. The teacher *knows* what’s outside of the cave and the student doesn’t have an inkling, and can contribute little to the journey. Elsewhere, Plato paints a different picture.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In some of his dialogues, Socrates claims not to know the answers to the questions he’s asking, and he views philosophical investigation as a cooperative exercise with his students. He’s open to the idea that his students might provide objections to his ideas, or raise ideas he hasn’t considered. Maybe this cooperative model is a better way to think about education. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Plato’s *Apology* and [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Plato’s *Meno* 79d–80e. Socrates claims he is just as much in a state of aporia—meaning doubt or perplexity—as those he is trying to enlighten through philosophical conversation. ### References [Plato. ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html)[*Apology*](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html)[. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html)[*The Internet Classics Archive*](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html)[.](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html) [Plato. ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html)[*Meno.* ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html)[Translated by Benjamin Jowett. ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html)[*The Internet Classics Archive*](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html)[. ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/meno.html) [Plato](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html)[*. The Republic.* ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html)[T](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html)[ranslated by Benjamin Jowett. Online. ](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html)[*The Internet Classics Archive*](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html)[.](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html) ### Related Essays [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Plato’s Form of the Good ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/platos-form-of-the-good/)by Ryan Jenkins [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/allegory-cave.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case) has a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder. He hosts [*Micro-Digressions: A Philosophy Podcast*](https://www.buzzsprout.com/956725) and does a lot of writing, academic and otherwise. [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](http://www.spencercasephilosophy.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Education **Tags:** Allegory of the Cave, Case, Plato, Socrates --- ### [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) **Published:** July 26, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** For Diogenes and the Cynics, philosophy was not about conjuring hypothetical scenarios or pondering ancient mysteries. Rather, Cynics argued that philosophy studies the lives of actual people and teaches us to live well and prepares us for any fortune. And it does so through training both the body and mind to live as simply as possible. This essay summarizes the main values in ancient Cynicism, especially those present in the life of Diogenes of Sinope. **Content:** Author: G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Category: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Wordcount: 990 Some ancient Greek philosophers only used words to investigate philosophical problems. Others also used their actions. Plato (429-347 BCE) fits in the first group. He thought long and hard about how to define “human” and concluded that humans are featherless, bipedal animals. Diogenes of Sinope (404-323 BCE), the first great Cynic, fit into the second group. He refuted Plato by plucking a chicken, taking it to his lecture, and announcing, “Here’s Plato’s human!”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) He provided a flesh-and-blood example of a featherless, bipedal animal that no one would consider human. The story of Plato, Diogenes, and the chicken is emblematic of Cynicism. Cynics exercised *parrēsia*, or direct, plain, frank, and free speech.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Diogenes didn’t need ornate theory or erudite rhetoric to disprove Plato. He only needed a chicken and a couple of words. Cynics were masters at using spectacle and wit to argue for their positions. Yet their philosophy was more than clever refutations. Cynics foremost rebuked civilization and valued nature. For Diogenes and the Cynics, philosophy was not about conjuring hypothetical scenarios or pondering ancient mysteries. Rather, Cynics argued that philosophy studies the lives of actual people and teaches us to live well and prepares us for any fortune. And it does so through training both the body and mind to live as simply as possible.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay summarizes the main values in ancient Cynicism, especially those present in the life of Diogenes of Sinope.[\[4\]](#_ftn4)![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/diogenes.png?resize=656%2C364&ssl=1) ### 1. The Mangy Dogs of Greece and the Natural Lives They Led Cynic philosophers were easy to recognize in the ancient world. They had three main identifiers. First, they wore a *tribōn*, a threadbare cloak. It served not only as a garment but also as something to sleep on and in, as they had no permanent homes. Second, each carried a *pēra*, a pouch that contained all their material possessions.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) And third, they held a staff—a glorified walking stick that helped them to move from city to city in the ancient world.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Everywhere they went, they tried to convince people to abandon their material possessions and live simply and freely in nature. The word “Cynic” is almost a direct transliteration of the Greek *kunikos*, meaning “dog-like.” To be called “Cynic” is to be compared to a dog. Cynics earned this title by living like dogs, unconcerned for human convention and striving only for bare necessities. Diogenes owned the label, explaining that he earned the nickname by wagging his tail at those who gave him things, barking at those who didn’t, and biting bad people.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Like dogs, Cynics lived carefree—unworried about rent, food, or manners. Like dogs, they judged character well–examining people’s actions, not their titles or purses.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) When Diogenes looked at most people, he scarcely found anyone living up to their human potential. Famously, he walked around cities during the daytime with a lit lantern, saying he was looking for an *anthrōpos*, a human being, a real example of what humanity could become. His search never ended.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) He found only that he was happy being called a ‘dog’ if the people in cities were called ‘humans.’[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Dogs were better people. They lived freely and naturally, unencumbered by possessions or social anxieties.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This natural life is what Cynics wished for all people. ### 2. To Become Free and Self-Sufficient You Have to Practice Like the plucked chicken, the Cynic lifestyle demonstrated the Cynic philosophy instead of just talking about it. Cynics argued that self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) and freedom (*eleutheria*) are the goals of life. To achieve their goals, the Cynics underwent *askēsis*, disciplined training and practice.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Diogenes went as far as to say that such training was central to any success and could overcome any challenge.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Cynics would train every day to become freer and less dependent on others or circumstances. To avoid needing shoes, Diogenes walked barefoot. To avoid expensive taste, he ate scrap lentils and lettuce (or anything he could beg for). To prevent dependence on a house, he slept in the open, most famously in a large clay tub previously used for storing wine. If Diogenes wanted to acclimate to summers, he rolled in hot sand. If he wanted to acclimate to winters, he hugged cold statues. If he wanted to acclimate to rejection, he begged for money from sculptures.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) If the ends are self-sufficiency and freedom, then the means are the actions we practice every day to pursue them. Cynics noticed that human life always involves toil and pain. But, they argued, we can choose which pains to endure. Cynics would openly acknowledge the burden of living without material possessions and against the values of society. But they would also warn that the alternative—the new house, new job, new party, new worry—is worse because it actively undermines the life humans were made to live. Cynic life was neither easy nor popular, but Cynics stuck to it.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) A consistent theme of Cynicism is to prefer nature (*physis*) to convention (*nomos*), to live as a natural human would, not as society demands.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Diogenes “often thundered that the gods had made it possible for people to live easily, but this had been lost sight of, because we demand honey cakes, perfumes, and the like.”[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Society tells you that you need a spouse and kids, a house, a job, a fancy title, and many luxuries to enjoy. Cynics argued: more money, more problems. Society makes you miserable by trapping you in things and social circumstances. Cynic self-sufficiency and freedom provide an escape. This is why Cynics valued their austere lifestyle; it made them free.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Both literally and figuratively, they had nothing to lose, so they could always do and say what was needed. And they thought anyone with something to lose lost their freedom and chance at living well. ### 3. Conclusion Cynics argue two things. First, civilization ruins happiness, so let go of every custom and thing. Second, nature restores happiness, so live simply and freely. In short, live less like an influencer and more like a dog.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Plato later modified his definition, adding “having broad nails.” Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.40. Author’s own translation. For any classical sources cited without direct quotes, the essay cites the author, the title of the work (in English), and the classical pagination (when available). Whenever direct quotes are given, a specific translation will be cited, even if the author’s own. This essay opts to work primarily from Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. It is generally taken as the starting point for scholarship on ancient Cynicism, and it is arguably the best source on Diogenes of Sinope. However, it should be noted that Diogenes Laertius compiled the stories about Diogenes of Sinope some 500 years after his death. Studying the ancient Cynics presents many difficulties because not many of the original Cynic writings survive today, for example Diogenes of Sinope’s *Republic* and tragedies. So, scholars must piece Cynicism’s details together from second-hand accounts of historians and compilers (e.g., Diogenes Laertius), from writers who were Cynic for part of their lives (e.g., Dio Chrysostom), or from writers arguing against the Cynics, their ideas, their social influence, and their disingenuous imitators (e.g., Julian). Cynicism as a philosophical movement spans almost a thousand years, so cultural contexts shift too. Donald Dudley (2003) traces the movement from Diogenes of Sinope in the 5th Century BCE to 6th Century CE. And current anthologies on Cynicism include sources from similar time periods (e.g., Usher 2022). For more information on ancient sources on Diogenes of Sinope and other Cynics, see: Dudley (2003), p. 53; Hard (2012), pp. xxix-xxxiv; or the exhaustive Navia (1995). One last note about translation. This essay substitutes “person” or “human” for Greek uses of *anthrōpos* (which is usually translated as “man”). Some philosophers think that the general androcentrism, masculinism, and misogyny of Greece means that most philosophers thought “men” and “people” were coextensional, referring to the same group. In other words, purportedly, men were the only people for the Greeks, in the full moral, political, and agential sense of the term. But this makes things too simple. Most ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, while nonetheless masculinist and misogynistic, admitted women into their schools and held that women should be treated as equals. For example, in Cynicism specifically, Hipparchia of Maroneia was a devoted Cynic and made important contributions to the school. For an account of her life and contributions, see: Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.96-8. For a discussion of women in Cynicism in general, as well as Hipparchia herself and her relationship with Crates (another key Cynic figure), see: Dudley (2003), pp. 36-7, 49-52. For a parallel discussion of feminism and Stoicism, see: Aikin and McGill (2014). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Once when Diogenes was asked what the most beautiful thing is (*kalliston*), he replied *parrēsia*. This term is difficult to translate, not because it lacked a clear meaning for the Greeks, but because it has gained cultural baggage in the millennia since they used it. For the Greeks, *parrēsia* is something that anyone could use in any context, so long as she spoke directly, openly, and plainly. However, philosophers such as Michel Foucault have argued that *parrēsia* necessarily involves risk and can only be undertaken by people who have something to lose in such plainspokenness, and so it’s not easily done by rulers. Foucault (2001), p. 16. That is, politically motivated historians of philosophy claim *parrēsia* is generally a weapon of the lower classes, or a tool for punching upward. While this is a laudable image–the idea of speaking plain truth to power–it is not how Greeks understood *parrēsia*. For the Greeks, *parrēsia* is about directness and frankness, and it can lash in any direction, punching down as well as up. For example, Diogenes saw a tree from which women had been hanged and wished all trees bore such fruit. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.52. He did not always punch up, and the Greeks still understood him as a paragon of *parrēsia*, even if Foucault and others might not in those instances. Additionally, given Cynic asceticism and self-imposed ostracism, Cynics might not have had enough to lose on the Foucaultian account, which would run opposite to the Greek understanding. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Cynics only studied ethics. They refused to study logic, physics, geometry, astrology, literature, or music. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.73, 103-4. The whole point of philosophical training was to learn to live well. VI.63, 65. Moreover, such a practical focus did not require literacy. One could be a Cynic if one studied with Cynics and lived like them. A man named Hegesias once asked Diogenes for a book of his teachings. Diogenes called him an ass for asking for a book of his teachings instead of training with the person who would’ve written the books. VI.48. A Cynic assumption is that the best way to understand philosophers is to examine their actions. Words are cheap. In fact, Diogenes used to say that literary scholars studied fictional characters but not their own, musicians tuned their instruments but not themselves, mathematicians gazed at the heavens but not at what was in front of them, and orators talked about justice but didn’t practice it. VI.27-8. Theoretical knowledge amounts to nothing if not applied to oneself and one’s actual circumstances. The Cynic tradition bears this out too. One Cynic, Sostratus of Boeotia, was a literal giant who lived in the mountains, built bridges, and killed dangerous animals and robbers. His lifestyle made him Cynic, not his study (which was probably minimal). See: Lucian, *Life of Demonax*; Dudley (2003), pp. 182-3. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Many philosophers assert that Cynicism is not a philosophical school. They range from historical philosophers, such as G.W.F. Hegel, to contemporary philosophers, such as John Cooper. See: Cooper (2012), p. 62, n. 56. However, philosophers who argue that Cynicism isn’t a philosophy or a school make it seem as though Cynics had no common beliefs or theoretical justifications for those beliefs, which is far from the case. Diogenes Laertius called Cynicism a school and not merely a way of life. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.103. And various scholars have offered lists of key features of Cynicism. For example, Donald Dudley holds that Cynicism is most represented by (1) a vagrant and ascetic lifestyle, (2) an assault on all established values, and (3) a body of literary genres used in satire and philosophical propaganda. (2003), pp. Xv-xvi. A. A. Long identifies seven key features of Cynicism: “1. Happiness is living in agreement with nature. 2. Happiness is something available to any person willing to engage in sufficient physical and mental training. 3. The essence of happiness is self-mastery, which manifests itself in the ability to live happily under even highly adverse circumstances. 4. Self-mastery is equivalent to, or entails, a virtuous character. 5. The happy person, as so conceived, is the only person who is truly wise, kingly, and free. 6. Things conventionally deemed necessary for happiness, such as wealth, fame, and political power, have no value in nature. 7. Prime impediments to happiness are false judgments of value, together with the emotional disturbances and vicious character that arise from these false judgments.” (1996), pp. 29-30. Luis Navia identifies twelve features. See: (2005), ch. 4. This essay has tried to distill these debates into an accessible version of the most central features of Cynicism. For discussions about Cynicism’s legitimacy as a philosophy, see: Branham and Goulet-Cazé (1996), p. 21; Long (1996), p. 29; Navia (2005), pp. 130-2; Dudley (2003), pp. 59, 183. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) All of Diogenes’ material possessions fit into his *pēra*. In fact, there is a story that he once owned a cup. But he saw a boy drinking from his hands cupped together, and Diogenes smashed his cup. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.37. An important value for Cynics was frugality (*euteleia*). However, the extent of the frugality seemed to be a matter of debate. Cynics were consistently poor but varied in their destitution. For example, Crates of Thebes, the most famous student of Diogenes, was never said to have begged, which Diogenes did often. See: Dudley (2003), p. 48. And Demonax, another Cynic, was said to have enjoyed great repute in Athens, so much so bakers would compete to see who could entice him to take one of their loaves of bread, and he would simply go uninvited into people’s homes at nighttime, where he would get dinner and a bed to sleep in, which people took as a sign of luck and honor. See: Usher 2022, p. 71, which is Lucian’s *Life of Demonax*. Diogenes, by contrast, lacked such benefactors. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.22-23. This stick was symbolic too; it was a scepter that represented Cynic authority to demand that humans live simply and naturally, made from a tree branch instead of precious metals and stones. The motif of cloak, pouch, and stick was popular, so popular that in an ancient (but fictional) letter from one Cynic to another who just had a kid, the writer recommends giving the infant his own cloak, pouch, and staff. See: Usher (2022), ch. 3, which is Cynic Epistle #33. And in ancient Greece and Rome, people could pose as philosophers by going about unkempt with a shabby cloak, pouch, and staff. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.40, 60. This essay renders *sainōn* as “wagging his tail” (instead of “fawn,” which most other translators use but which is archaic), and *ponērous* as “bad people” (instead of “wicked” as Mensch translates, “scoundrels” as Usher, or “rascals” as Hicks). There are many other dog stories too. Such a character as Diogenes was received poorly by certain people. In public, some would express that they were afraid of Diogenes biting them. Diogenes replied to such expressions by saying that dogs don’t eat beets. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.45, 61. The implication is that dogs don’t eat useless or unsavory things, such as those not valuing Cynics. In one extreme case, some dinner guests threw bones at Diogenes like a dog. So, as he was leaving, he peed on them like a dog. VI.46. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For a discussion on how literally to take the comparison to dogs, see: Navia (2005), pp. 143-53. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Running parallel to the lantern story, when Diogenes left somewhere busy, people would ask him if there were a lot of people there. He often replied that there was a large crowd but not many people. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.32, 40, 41, 60. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) A big part of the Cynic lifestyle was *anaideia*, a Greek word that is usually translated as “shamelessness” but might also be rendered as “impudence” or “irreverence.” The key is that *anaideia* has the alpha privative (the prefix “a” that means whatever follows is negated or absent) and the root *aidōs*, which means “shame,” “modesty,” “reverence,” or “respect.” The point is that Cynics lacked the typical modesty, shame, or respect associated with many things. They wanted to live natural lives, and they felt that any aspect of natural life should not cause shame at all. Diogenes of Sinope was notorious for this. Athenians, for example, did not like when people ate in the marketplace. Diogenes, however, would routinely eat there, refusing to feel shame for the taboo or the transgression of manners in conventional Athenian society. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.58, 61, 69. But the most notorious of Diogenes’ acts concerning shamelessness is the time (perhaps many) that he masturbated in the marketplace. Passersby scorned him. But his reply was, “If only one could relieve hunger by rubbing one’s belly.” Diogenes Laertius (2018), VI.46. See also: VI.69. Diogenes was unashamed for masturbation because sexual urges are perfectly natural, and masturbation, a sexual act concerning only oneself, transgressed no moral boundary and no social convention worth respecting. Eating, using the restroom, satisfying sexual urges, sleeping—Cynics heeded any natural urge in public. It made no sense to Cynics to be ashamed of things that all animals do. Perhaps the best summary of the Cynic view of shamelessness comes from a non-Cynic, Roman Emperor Julian. In his “6th Oration” he explains how Cynics evaluated shame: “Let him \[Diogenes\] trample on pretense. Let him make fun of people who hide under cover of darkness what are necessary, natural functions. What I mean is the secretion of what is superfluous. And yet those same people busy themselves in the middle of our marketplaces and cities with the most outrageous behavior, inappropriate to our nature: stealing money, sycophantic conniving, unjust lawsuits, and the pursuit of other rubbish of this sort. Whereas, when Diogenes farted or shat or did anything else like that in the marketplace, as they say he did, his actions were aimed at trampling on the pretense of those people, to teach them that they were engaged in business much more sordid and problematic than his. For those \[Diogenes’\] activities are natural to us all, whereas their activities, to put it plainly, are natural to no one. To engage in all such things springs from a perversion of Nature.” Usher (2022), pp. 171-3. The point should be clear: Cynics held that doing what animals must do should never lead to shame. And the fact that society treats natural functions as shameful, but doesn’t do much about the ways humans hurt one another or themselves through business or politics shows how backward conventional values are. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For a more detailed explanation of Cynic commitments against materialism, see: Trujillo (2022). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Cynic commitments to freedom and simplicity led them to admire Herakles–the demigod who wore a lion’s pelt, carried a club, and slayed the monsters troubling humanity. Cynics–with their own sticks and pelts–traveled from place to place to slay the social conventions that prevent people from living naturally and freely. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.71. Cynics also routinely argued that Prometheus, the titan who gave humans the gift of fire, made a mistake. Rather than humans using Prometheus’s gift for knowledge, craft, or survival, they used it for luxuries, which made them soft and led to vice. Cynics are therefore anti-Promethean. See: Dio Chrysostom, “6th Discourse,” 25. To put the point starkly, no Cynic would ever accept millionaires or political leaders into their ranks. Cynicism is incompatible with deep involvement in society because society runs opposite to nature. Cynics rejected civilization. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.71. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.22, 49. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See: Aikin and Vollbrecht (2022), p. 282. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) One quintessential Cynic action was *paracharattein to nomisma*, or altering currency. It is a storied phrase for two reasons. First, it refers to how Diogenes ended up in Athens. He was expelled from his home city of Sinope for altering the currency. Kicked out of his home with next to nothing, he had to make his way in the world differently, which led him to philosophy. Second, there is a play on words. *Nomisma* can mean both an official coin for economic transactions, or it can mean anything sanctioned by convention. This second meaning is more important for Cynicism. Cynics took it as their mission to deface the currency of civilization, to deface the values of conventional society and render them useless. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Diogenes Laertius (2018), VI.44. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) There is a Cynic motif surrounding Cynicism as a “shortcut to virtue.” It is mentioned in: Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI.104. It is discussed briefly by Hard (2012), p. xix. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) This essay was improved by comments from Scott F. Aikin, Noah Greenstein, Kristin Seemuth Whaley, Chelsea Haramia, and Nathan Nobis. ### References [Aikin, Scott and Emily McGill. (2014) “Stoicism, Feminism, and Autonomy.” ](https://philpapers.org/archive/POEEOT.pdf)[*Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences*](https://philpapers.org/archive/POEEOT.pdf)[, vol. 1, no. 1: pp. 9-22.](https://philpapers.org/archive/POEEOT.pdf) [Aikin, Scott and Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht. (2022) “On Diogenes and Olympic Victors: Cynic Rhetoric and the Problem of Audience.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/epoche/content/epoche_2022_0026_0002_0273_0286)[*Epoché: A Journal of the History of Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/epoche/content/epoche_2022_0026_0002_0273_0286)[, vol. 26, iss. 2: pp. 273-86.](https://www.pdcnet.org/epoche/content/epoche_2022_0026_0002_0273_0286) [Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé. (1996). “Introduction.” In: ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics)[*The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics)[, eds. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé. Berkeley: California, 1996: pp. 1-27.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics) [Cooper, John D. (2012) ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691138602/pursuits-of-wisdom)[*Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691138602/pursuits-of-wisdom)[. Princeton: Princeton.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691138602/pursuits-of-wisdom) [Dio Chrysostom. (1932) ](https://www.loebclassics.com/view/LCL257/1932/volume.xml)[*Discourses 1-11*](https://www.loebclassics.com/view/LCL257/1932/volume.xml)[. Trans. J.W. Cohoon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard. ](https://www.loebclassics.com/view/LCL257/1932/volume.xml) [Diogenes Laertius. (2018) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780197523391?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780197523391?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Trans. Pamela Mensch. Oxford: Oxford.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780197523391?cc=us&lang=en&) [Dudley, Donald R. (2003) ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/history-of-cynicism-9781853995484/)[*A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century AD*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/history-of-cynicism-9781853995484/)[.](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/history-of-cynicism-9781853995484/)[ London: Bristol Classical.](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/history-of-cynicism-9781853995484/) [Epictetus. (2022) ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo174912060.html)[*The Complete Works: Handbook, Discourses, and Fragments*](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo174912060.html)[. Ed. and trans. Robin Waterfield. Chicago: Chicago.](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo174912060.html) [Foucault, Michel. (2001) ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9781584350118/fearless-speech/)[*Fearless Speech*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9781584350118/fearless-speech/)[. Ed. Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9781584350118/fearless-speech/) [Hard, Robin, Trans. (2012) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/sayings-and-anecdotes-9780199589241?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Diogenes the Cynic: Sayings and Anecdotes with other Popular Moralists*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/sayings-and-anecdotes-9780199589241?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford: Oxford World Classics.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/sayings-and-anecdotes-9780199589241?cc=us&lang=en&) [Long, A. A. (1996) “The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics.” In: ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics)[*The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics)[, eds. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé. Berkeley: California, 1996: pp. 28-46.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics) [Navia, Luis E. (1995) ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Philosophy_of_Cynicism/NmEEAQAAIAAJ?hl=en)[*The Philosophy of Cynicism: An Annotated Bibliography*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Philosophy_of_Cynicism/NmEEAQAAIAAJ?hl=en)[. Westport: Greenwood.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Philosophy_of_Cynicism/NmEEAQAAIAAJ?hl=en) [—. (2005) ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781615921034/Diogenes-The-Cynic-The-War-Against-The-World)[*Diogenes the Cynic: The War against the World*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781615921034/Diogenes-The-Cynic-The-War-Against-The-World)[. New York: Humanity Books.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781615921034/Diogenes-The-Cynic-The-War-Against-The-World) [Trujillo, G. M. (2022) “Possessed: The Cynics on Wealth and Pleasure.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2022_0038_0001_0017_0029)[*Southwest Philosophy Review*](https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2022_0038_0001_0017_0029)[, vol. 38, iss. 1: pp. 17-29.](https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2022_0038_0001_0017_0029) [Usher, M.D., Trans. (2022) ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691229850/how-to-say-no)[*How to Say No: An Ancient Guide to the Art of Cynicism*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691229850/how-to-say-no)[.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691229850/how-to-say-no) ### For Further Reading [Usher, M.D. (2023) “Self-satisfaction,” ](https://aeon.co/essays/from-the-cynics-self-sufficiency-to-an-ecology-of-wanking)[*Aeon*](https://aeon.co/essays/from-the-cynics-self-sufficiency-to-an-ecology-of-wanking)[.](https://aeon.co/essays/from-the-cynics-self-sufficiency-to-an-ecology-of-wanking) ### Related Essays [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad/) by Frederik Kaufman [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Happiness: What Is It to Be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/cynicism.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [G.M. Trujillo, Jr.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Trujillo/) is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. He specializes in ethics, especially virtue ethics and bioethics. [www.Boomert.info](http://www.boomert.info) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Cynicism, Diogenes, Trujillo --- ### [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) **Published:** May 15, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to consequentialism and utilitarianism. **Content:** Author: Shane Gronholz Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 1000 ### 1. Consequences Matter Think about something you did today. Chances are, you did it because you wanted to make something happen or to bring about some *consequence*. It could have been an important end: maybe you gave someone CPR to save their life. Or it could have been relatively insignificant: maybe you had Cap’n Crunch cereal for breakfast because you knew you would enjoy it.1 Upon reflection, it might seem as though everything we do is to try to bring about some consequence.2 What does it mean to *bring about a consequence*? This is a way of changing the world, in a small or a large way: I want the world to be thus-and-so, but it’s not currently thus-and-so, so I will perform this action. If all our actions are done for the sake of bringing about some consequence, then it might make sense to judge actions, that is, to determine the *moral status* of actions (e.g., whether they are wrong, permissible, or obligatory), by their consequences. The ethical theory known as *consequentialism* agrees: what *must* we do, according to consequentialism? We are obligated to do whatever action has the best *overall* consequences, for all who are affected by the action. *Utilitarianism*, the most common version of consequentialism, provides some details on which consequence is the best: it’s the course of action we could take that would *most* increase the total amount of happiness and decrease the total amount of pain in the world. This essay introduces consequentialism. ![Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/utilitarians.jpg?resize=656%2C263&ssl=1) Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick ### 2. Problems for Consequentialism Consequences *do* seem to dominate our moral thinking. Why should I donate to a charity? Because people in need will be made better off. Why is it wrong to vandalize property? Because you will likely make the space uglier, and it would be costly to fix it. It’s difficult to think of an immoral action that has no bad consequences. Why is lying often wrong? Because if I lie, it might cause you to not trust me in the future, or it might hurt your feelings were you to find out. But many of us think that if a lie would truly be harmless, with no bad consequences, then there wouldn’t be anything wrong with it. That is just what a “white lie” is, and many of us think there is usually nothing wrong with white lies. While consequentialism sounds appealing at the outset, it has some troubling implications. If you’ve ever said, “The ends do not justify the means,” you may have been expressing a rejection of consequentialism. There are many actions that consequentialism entails are perfectly fine, or even obligatory, that many people think are very wrong. Suppose your friend, on her deathbed, makes you promise to spread her ashes in the Rocky Mountains. After her death, you realize it would be much more convenient to simply flush her ashes down the toilet. You would save a lot of time and money, and no one would be harmed. Since this act appears to have no bad consequences, consequentialism entails there would be nothing wrong with this. But most of us think there would be. Another example: five “A-list” celebrities need transplant organs, or they will soon die. No viable organs have been found so far, but while reviewing *your* medical records for a routine physical, doctors notice that your organs are perfect matches. A plan is hatched to kill you, in secret, making it look like an accident, to save the celebrities. This is thought to be an *overall better consequence* than your living and the five celebrities dying, and their millions of fans devastated. It’s hard to see how a consequentialist could explain how this is wrong. And yet, we tend to think this would be profoundly wrong. ### 3. Responses How might a consequentialist respond to these cases? One strategy is to argue that, in fact, these actions *will* have bad consequences. Perhaps your friend’s mother will find out what you did with her daughter’s ashes. You might be good at keeping secrets, but keeping secrets is mentally and emotionally taxing. And suppose someone found out that the hospital killed an unsuspecting patient. That would have terrible consequences: fewer sick people would visit hospitals now, for fear of being killed. But these are fairly weak responses. We can sometimes be pretty certain our actions won’t have any bad consequences.3 In that case, the consequentialist must admit that flushing the ashes down the toilet was the right thing to do. But perhaps that’s not so bad. If nothing bad whatsoever follows from your action, why not do it after all? No harm, no foul. This response is more satisfying in some cases than others. It might satisfy some in the ashes case, but it’s much less satisfying when it comes to killing innocent people. ### 4. Rule-Consequentialism Another way to avoid these problems is to resort to rule-consequentialism.4 According to rule consequentialism, we should not simply perform the *individual action* that will produce good consequences. Instead, we should follow rules that, when followed, lead to good consequences. For example, in general, torture has terrible consequences. Always following the rule “do not torture” would have good consequences,5 so we should follow that rule, even if there could be cases of torture that do not have the terrible consequences torture tends to have. But this view has a major problem. If what you care about are indeed the consequences, and you realize you could bring about *better* consequences by breaking the rule, why would you continue to abide by the rule? This view seems to undercut its very motivation. ### 5. Conclusion Consequentialism initially seems a promising and intuitive moral theory, but it can yield strange moral results. This might show that consequentialism is false, or that consequences aren’t *all* that matter in moral assessment: e.g., perhaps people have *rights* that make harming them usually wrong, even if doing so would produce great overall consequences. Or maybe consequentialism is true after all, and true morality doesn’t always jibe with our everyday intuitions.6 ### Notes 1 Of course, sometimes we’re bad at anticipating the consequences of our actions. Maybe I make a bad investment because I am shortsighted. But even in that case, I was thinking about the consequences (getting more money) – I just wasn’t doing a very good job of predicting the consequences. 2 This has led some thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill, to reason, “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.” 3 For example: Maybe your friend has no other loved ones, so there is no one who would know about what you did, no one who would get upset, no one from whom you would have to keep it secret. 4 The view we have been discussing so far is known as act-consequentialism. 5 Or would at least avoid bad consequences. 6 Influential utilitarians include Jeremy Bentham (1823), John Stuart Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1874). G.E. Moore (1903) was an influential consequentialist who argued, against utilitarianism, that more things are *good in themselves* than just pleasure and happiness and *bad in themselves* than pain and sadness. ### References [Bentham, Jeremy, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1823).](http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html) [Mill, John Stuart, *Utilitarianism* (1861).](http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mill-john-stuart/1863/utility/ch01.htm) [Moore, G. E., ](http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica)*[Principia Ethicia ](http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica)*(1903). [Sidgwick, Henry, *The Methods of Ethics* (1874).](http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf) ### Related Essays [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/ "Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics") by Andrew Chapman [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/consequentialism.pdf) ### About the Author [Shane Gronholz](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Gronholz/) has a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He holds a B.A. from Whitworth University where he double majored in philosophy and religion. Shane is interested in metaethics, ethical theory, practical rationality, and philosophy of religion. He lives in Washington with his wife (Stephanie), son (Maxwell), and dog (Benny). [TrivialorFalse.com](https://trivialorfalse.com/) Author: Brandon Boesch Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 998 Imagine you are walking by a shallow pond and see a drowning toddler. Do you have a moral obligation to save the child, even if it means ruining your clothes? It seems so. Now consider that there are millions of people suffering and dying due to *absolute poverty*—the inability to maintain basic standards of living. In 2017, over 700 million people lived on less than USD $1.90 per day[\[1\]](#_ftn1), over 800 million lacked clean drinking water[\[2\]](#_ftn2) and over 800 million people did not have enough to eat.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Over 5 million children died in 2019 from preventable and treatable diseases.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Contemporary philosopher Peter Singer[\[5\]](#_ftn5) famously argues that if you’re obligated to save the drowning child, you are equally obligated to help save people dying due to absolute poverty by donating to effective aid agencies. This essay explains his argument and considers some common objections to it. ### 1. Singer’s Argument Singer’s argument depends on a fairly straightforward moral principle: *if we can prevent something very bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we are morally obligated to do so*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This principle explains why we should save the drowning child: her life is far more important than your outfit. But millions of people are suffering or dying from absolute poverty and many of us could easily do something to prevent this by donating to effective aid agencies. Further, our doing so wouldn’t require that we sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance: we would just need to spend less money on things less important than human life: e.g., vanilla lattes, Netflix, and other luxuries. So, Singer concludes that it is wrong for many of us *not* to donate—it’s like letting the toddler drown in the pond to prevent our clothes from getting ruined. Singer’s argument has radical implications for how many live, since most things routinely purchased in affluent countries are less important than a human life. It has thus given rise to many objections, several of which are discussed below. ### 2. Objections #### 2.1. Too Demanding Some interpret Singer’s argument as too demanding—implying that we must live simplistically, giving away any and all money we would otherwise spend on luxuries. Singer responds that if his argument is sound then it doesn’t matter how radical it is—morality is sometimes challenging.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Others suggest that we consider making a less radical commitment and donate ten percent of our income.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Research suggests this donation wouldn’t negatively affect the average donor (with about a 0.1 drop on a 10-point happiness scale for an average US citizen).[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Indeed, many enjoy helping others and find it *increases* their happiness.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) And it’s worth noting that meaningful good would still be done with an even smaller commitment.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) #### 2.2. Distance Others argue that we would be obligated to help the drowning child because she is part of our local community, arguing that our moral obligations derive from the relationships we have with others, [\[12\]](#_ftn12) and so we are not obligated to help those in far-distant countries. But suppose that there were a button in the pond which, if pressed, would save a toddler’s life in another country. If you think you’re still obligated to ruin your clothes to press it, then distance doesn’t change our obligations. Others argue that we should focus on local poverty first.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) But the costs of helping people in wealthy countries are significantly higher than aid in impoverished countries—making your donation less effective.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) #### 2.3. Whose Responsibility? Some argue that we don’t have an obligation to donate to aid agencies since there are many others who aren’t donating. But suppose in the drowning toddler case, there were people standing at the shore watching and doing nothing.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Virtually no one would stand and watch a toddler die when they could easily wade in and save her, regardless of the inaction of others. Some argue that issues related to absolute poverty are really the responsibility of the government. Others say that absolute poverty is the result of underlying structural problems and so we should solve those structural issues instead. But suppose the reason the toddler is drowning is because there’s a playground right next to the pond and toddlers keep falling in. Surely, we should advocate to move the playground—but not before saving the toddler! Similarly, it seems like we have reasons to both help those who are currently suffering *and* advocate for larger scale solutions.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) #### 2.4. Effectiveness of Donations Others point out that in the pond example, I personally save the child whereas if I donate, my donation could be stolen, embezzled, or otherwise fail to save lives. To address this worry, several organizations have been created which identify aid agencies with a proven track record and monitor their success.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) And suppose that when wading into the pond, you only had a 75% chance to save the toddler’s life. Wouldn’t you still *try* to save her? #### 2.5. Personal Commitments Another objection is that Singer’s argument requires that we ignore our personal commitments. For example, paying your friend’s exorbitant US medical costs is less effective than paying for medical costs in a poor country. But friendship ignores concerns of effectiveness in favor of loyalty and personal commitment.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Arguably, personal commitments and moral identities require that we at least consider donating to less effective causes which support our personal commitments.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) But, Singer might contend that you should do both—donate to effective causes *in addition to* (not in place of) your friend’s medical costs or your other moral identities.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) ### 3. Conclusion The response to global poverty is among the most practical ethical issues that exists. Many reading this *could* do something right now by [making a donation online](https://www.givewell.org), of any amount, to effective aid organizations. Singer’s work, along with that of others,[\[21\]](#_ftn21) has inspired a movement called “effective altruism” which advocates for *altruism*—being concerned for others for their own sake[\[22\]](#_ftn22)—in the most effective ways possible, generally by giving to aid agencies which do the most good.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) If they’re right, then many of us will need to radically change our lives for the good of all. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The World Bank (2020). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) World Health Organization (2019a). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) World Health Organization (2019b). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) World Health Organization (2020). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) To learn more about Peter Singer, see his webpage at [www.petersinger.info](http://www.petersinger.info). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Singer’s 1972 essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” is the first and most famous exposition of the effective altruism movement. Singer offers two versions of his principle (see pages 231 and 235)—this formulation combines them. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is the first response Singer offers on page 236 of his (1972). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord make this argument in their 2018 essay. Singer (1972, 235) makes a similar move by considering a weaker version of his original principle: that our moral obligation is to prevent something *very* bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord offer an even weaker (but still meaningful) suggestion that we draw the line at 10% of income, which is quite a bit over the average amount donated in the United States each year of about 2%. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord spend quite a bit of time outlining their evidence for their claim that giving is not demanding. See their (2018, 186). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) MacMillan (2017) discusses a study in which generosity was shown to lead to higher reported levels of happiness. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For example, in 2016, only 44.3% of Americans gave more than $25 to charity (Michigan Institute for Social Research 2017). If those people were to give $50, that would amount to several billion dollars in additional donations. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For example, Friedman (1991); Reader (2003); and Abelson (2005). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Angus Deaton (2018), for example, argues that there is a sufficiently high number of people in absolute poverty in the US to merit focusing attention on eliminating that poverty. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Singer (2018) makes this argument in response. He discusses this objection in conversation with Julia Taylor Kennedy in this [2011 “Extreme Poverty” video.](https://youtu.be/IKJoqVoC5JA) [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Singer offers this modification in his original 1972 essay, page 233. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Ashford (2018) argues that we have a primary duty to help resolve the structural problems, but a back-up duty to help those suffering in the meantime. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See, for example, Giving What We Can (<https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/>), Give Well (<https://www.givewell.org/>), and The Life You Can Save (<https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/>). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) This argument is made by Amia Srinivasan (2015) in her review of MacAskill’s (2015) book. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) I make this argument in Boesch (2018). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) This response works particularly well if we are working with a weaker proposal, like that given by MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord (2018). It is less effective if you take the stronger version of Singer’s argument. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See, as important examples: Unger (1996); Singer (2015); and MacAskill (2015). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Contrast altruism with ethical egoism, an exclusive concern for one’s own self, potentially at the expense of others. See [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis for an introduction to egoism. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) “Most good” is typically understood as the greatest amount of reduction in death or suffering due to lack of basic necessities (adequate food, water, medical care, shelter, etc.) ### References [Abelson, Raziel. 2005. “Moral Distance: What Do We Owe to Unknown Strangers?” In ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x)[*The*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x) [*Philosophical Forum*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x)[, 36:31–39.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x) [Ashford, Elizabeth. 2018. “Severe Poverty as an Unjust Emergency.” In ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5)[*The Ethics of Giving:*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5) [*Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5)[, edited by Paul Woodruff, 103–48. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5) [Boesch, Brandon. 2018. “Integrity, Identity, and Choosing a Charity.” In ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6)[*The Ethics of Giving:*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6) [*Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6)[, edited by Paul Woodruff, 149–77. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6) [Deaton, Angus. 2018. “The U.S. Can No Longer Hide from Its Deep Poverty Problem,” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html)[*The New York Times,* ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html)[Jan. 24, 2018.](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html) [Friedman, Marilyn. 1991. “The Practice of Partiality.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*Ethics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[ 101 (4): 818–35.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [MacAskill, William. 2015. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/316786/doing-good-better-by-william-macaskill/)[*Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/316786/doing-good-better-by-william-macaskill/)[. New York: Penguin Random House.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/316786/doing-good-better-by-william-macaskill/) [MacAskill, William, Andreas Mogensen, and Toby Ord. 2018. “Giving Isn’t Demanding.” In ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-7)[*The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-7)[, edited by Paul Woodruff, 178–203. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-7) [MacMillan, Amanda. “Being Generous Really Does Make You Happier.” ](https://time.com/4857777/generosity-happiness-brain/)[*Time*](https://time.com/4857777/generosity-happiness-brain/)[, Jul. 14, 2017. ](https://time.com/4857777/generosity-happiness-brain/) [Michigan Institute for Social Research. 2017. Panel Study of Income Dynamics.](https://simba.isr.umich.edu/default.aspx) [Reader, Soran. 2003. “Distance, Relationship and Moral Obligation.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903830?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*The Monist* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903830?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[86 (3): 367–81.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903830?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[, 229–43.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2018. “Is Extreme Poverty Being Neglected in the U.S.?” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/extreme-poverty-us.html)[*The New York Times,* ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/extreme-poverty-us.html)[Jan. 28, 2018. ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/extreme-poverty-us.html) [Srinivasan, Amia. 2015. “Stop the Robot Apocalypse.” ](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse)[*London Review of Books* ](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse)[37 (18).](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse) [———. 2015. ](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[*The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically*](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do) [The World Bank. 2020. “Measuring Poverty.”](https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/measuringpoverty.) [Unger, Peter K. 1996. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195108590.001.0001/acprof-9780195108590)[*Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195108590.001.0001/acprof-9780195108590)[. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195108590.001.0001/acprof-9780195108590) [World Health Organization. 2019a. “Drinking-Water.”](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/drinking-water.) [———. 2019b. “World Hunger Is Still Not Going down after Three Years and Obesity Is Still Growing – UN Report.”](https://www.who.int/news/item/15-07-2019-world-hunger-is-still-not-going-down-after-three-years-and-obesity-is-still-growing-un-report) [———. 2020. “Children: Improving Survival and Well-Being.” 2020.](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/children-reducing-mortality.) ### For Further Reading and Viewing [Ilingworth, Patricia, Thomas Pogge, and Leif Wenar. 2011. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739073.001.0001/acprof-9780199739073)[*Giving Well: The Ethics of Philanthropy.* ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739073.001.0001/acprof-9780199739073)[Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739073.001.0001/acprof-9780199739073) [MacAskill, William. “What Are the Most Important Moral Problems of Our Time?” Youtube.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WyprXhvGVYk) [Moody, Michael and Beth Breeze. 2016. ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philanthropy-Reader/Moody-Breeze/p/book/9781138903593)[*The Philanthropy Reader.* ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philanthropy-Reader/Moody-Breeze/p/book/9781138903593)[Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philanthropy-Reader/Moody-Breeze/p/book/9781138903593) [Reich, Rob. 2018. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691183497/just-giving)[*Just Giving: Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better.* ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691183497/just-giving)[Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691183497/just-giving) [Singer, Peter](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html)[. 1999. “The Singer Solution to World Poverty.” ](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html)[*The New York Times,* ](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html)[Sept. 5, 1999.](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2010. “The Life You Can Save in 3 Minutes.” Youtube.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onsIdBanynY) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2011. “Extreme Poverty.” Youtube.](https://youtu.be/IKJoqVoC5JA) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2013. “The Why and How of Effective Altruism.” Youtube. ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Diuv3XZQXyc&t=1s) [Zunz, Olivier. 2012. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691128368/philanthropy-in-america)[*Philanthropy in America: A History.* ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691128368/philanthropy-in-america)[Princeton University Press](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691128368/philanthropy-in-america). ### Related Essays [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meikers [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ethics-and-absolute-poverty.pdf). ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) ### About the Author Brandon Boesch, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morningside University in Sioux City, IA. His research focuses on the nature and role of models and representation in scientific practice as well as issues in applied ethics, including ethics of philanthropy and biomedical ethics. [sites.google.com/view/boeschb](https://sites.google.com/view/boeschb) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** consequentialism, Gronholz, utilitarianism --- ### [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) **Published:** March 5, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the ethical arguments from Peter Singer on absolute poverty and effective altruism. **Content:** Author: Brandon Boesch Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 998 Imagine you are walking by a shallow pond and see a drowning toddler. Do you have a moral obligation to save the child, even if it means ruining your clothes? It seems so. Now consider that there are millions of people suffering and dying due to *absolute poverty*—the inability to maintain basic standards of living. In 2017, over 700 million people lived on less than USD $1.90 per day[\[1\]](#_ftn1), over 800 million lacked clean drinking water[\[2\]](#_ftn2) and over 800 million people did not have enough to eat.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Over 5 million children died in 2019 from preventable and treatable diseases.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Contemporary philosopher Peter Singer[\[5\]](#_ftn5) famously argues that if you’re obligated to save the drowning child, you are equally obligated to help save people dying due to absolute poverty by donating to effective aid agencies. This essay explains his argument and considers some common objections to it. ### 1. Singer’s Argument Singer’s argument depends on a fairly straightforward moral principle: *if we can prevent something very bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we are morally obligated to do so*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This principle explains why we should save the drowning child: her life is far more important than your outfit. But millions of people are suffering or dying from absolute poverty and many of us could easily do something to prevent this by donating to effective aid agencies. Further, our doing so wouldn’t require that we sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance: we would just need to spend less money on things less important than human life: e.g., vanilla lattes, Netflix, and other luxuries. So, Singer concludes that it is wrong for many of us *not* to donate—it’s like letting the toddler drown in the pond to prevent our clothes from getting ruined. Singer’s argument has radical implications for how many live, since most things routinely purchased in affluent countries are less important than a human life. It has thus given rise to many objections, several of which are discussed below. ### 2. Objections #### 2.1. Too Demanding Some interpret Singer’s argument as too demanding—implying that we must live simplistically, giving away any and all money we would otherwise spend on luxuries. Singer responds that if his argument is sound then it doesn’t matter how radical it is—morality is sometimes challenging.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Others suggest that we consider making a less radical commitment and donate ten percent of our income.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Research suggests this donation wouldn’t negatively affect the average donor (with about a 0.1 drop on a 10-point happiness scale for an average US citizen).[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Indeed, many enjoy helping others and find it *increases* their happiness.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) And it’s worth noting that meaningful good would still be done with an even smaller commitment.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) #### 2.2. Distance Others argue that we would be obligated to help the drowning child because she is part of our local community, arguing that our moral obligations derive from the relationships we have with others, [\[12\]](#_ftn12) and so we are not obligated to help those in far-distant countries. But suppose that there were a button in the pond which, if pressed, would save a toddler’s life in another country. If you think you’re still obligated to ruin your clothes to press it, then distance doesn’t change our obligations. Others argue that we should focus on local poverty first.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) But the costs of helping people in wealthy countries are significantly higher than aid in impoverished countries—making your donation less effective.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) #### 2.3. Whose Responsibility? Some argue that we don’t have an obligation to donate to aid agencies since there are many others who aren’t donating. But suppose in the drowning toddler case, there were people standing at the shore watching and doing nothing.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Virtually no one would stand and watch a toddler die when they could easily wade in and save her, regardless of the inaction of others. Some argue that issues related to absolute poverty are really the responsibility of the government. Others say that absolute poverty is the result of underlying structural problems and so we should solve those structural issues instead. But suppose the reason the toddler is drowning is because there’s a playground right next to the pond and toddlers keep falling in. Surely, we should advocate to move the playground—but not before saving the toddler! Similarly, it seems like we have reasons to both help those who are currently suffering *and* advocate for larger scale solutions.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) #### 2.4. Effectiveness of Donations Others point out that in the pond example, I personally save the child whereas if I donate, my donation could be stolen, embezzled, or otherwise fail to save lives. To address this worry, several organizations have been created which identify aid agencies with a proven track record and monitor their success.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) And suppose that when wading into the pond, you only had a 75% chance to save the toddler’s life. Wouldn’t you still *try* to save her? #### 2.5. Personal Commitments Another objection is that Singer’s argument requires that we ignore our personal commitments. For example, paying your friend’s exorbitant US medical costs is less effective than paying for medical costs in a poor country. But friendship ignores concerns of effectiveness in favor of loyalty and personal commitment.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Arguably, personal commitments and moral identities require that we at least consider donating to less effective causes which support our personal commitments.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) But, Singer might contend that you should do both—donate to effective causes *in addition to* (not in place of) your friend’s medical costs or your other moral identities.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) ### 3. Conclusion The response to global poverty is among the most practical ethical issues that exists. Many reading this *could* do something right now by [making a donation online](https://www.givewell.org), of any amount, to effective aid organizations. Singer’s work, along with that of others,[\[21\]](#_ftn21) has inspired a movement called “effective altruism” which advocates for *altruism*—being concerned for others for their own sake[\[22\]](#_ftn22)—in the most effective ways possible, generally by giving to aid agencies which do the most good.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) If they’re right, then many of us will need to radically change our lives for the good of all. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The World Bank (2020). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) World Health Organization (2019a). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) World Health Organization (2019b). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) World Health Organization (2020). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) To learn more about Peter Singer, see his webpage at [www.petersinger.info](http://www.petersinger.info). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Singer’s 1972 essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” is the first and most famous exposition of the effective altruism movement. Singer offers two versions of his principle (see pages 231 and 235)—this formulation combines them. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is the first response Singer offers on page 236 of his (1972). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord make this argument in their 2018 essay. Singer (1972, 235) makes a similar move by considering a weaker version of his original principle: that our moral obligation is to prevent something *very* bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord offer an even weaker (but still meaningful) suggestion that we draw the line at 10% of income, which is quite a bit over the average amount donated in the United States each year of about 2%. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord spend quite a bit of time outlining their evidence for their claim that giving is not demanding. See their (2018, 186). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) MacMillan (2017) discusses a study in which generosity was shown to lead to higher reported levels of happiness. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For example, in 2016, only 44.3% of Americans gave more than $25 to charity (Michigan Institute for Social Research 2017). If those people were to give $50, that would amount to several billion dollars in additional donations. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For example, Friedman (1991); Reader (2003); and Abelson (2005). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Angus Deaton (2018), for example, argues that there is a sufficiently high number of people in absolute poverty in the US to merit focusing attention on eliminating that poverty. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Singer (2018) makes this argument in response. He discusses this objection in conversation with Julia Taylor Kennedy in this [2011 “Extreme Poverty” video.](https://youtu.be/IKJoqVoC5JA) [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Singer offers this modification in his original 1972 essay, page 233. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Ashford (2018) argues that we have a primary duty to help resolve the structural problems, but a back-up duty to help those suffering in the meantime. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See, for example, Giving What We Can (<https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/>), Give Well (<https://www.givewell.org/>), and The Life You Can Save (<https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/>). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) This argument is made by Amia Srinivasan (2015) in her review of MacAskill’s (2015) book. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) I make this argument in Boesch (2018). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) This response works particularly well if we are working with a weaker proposal, like that given by MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord (2018). It is less effective if you take the stronger version of Singer’s argument. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See, as important examples: Unger (1996); Singer (2015); and MacAskill (2015). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Contrast altruism with ethical egoism, an exclusive concern for one’s own self, potentially at the expense of others. See [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis for an introduction to egoism. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) “Most good” is typically understood as the greatest amount of reduction in death or suffering due to lack of basic necessities (adequate food, water, medical care, shelter, etc.) ### References [Abelson, Raziel. 2005. “Moral Distance: What Do We Owe to Unknown Strangers?” In ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x)[*The*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x) [*Philosophical Forum*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x)[, 36:31–39.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00187.x) [Ashford, Elizabeth. 2018. “Severe Poverty as an Unjust Emergency.” In ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5)[*The Ethics of Giving:*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5) [*Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5)[, edited by Paul Woodruff, 103–48. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-5) [Boesch, Brandon. 2018. “Integrity, Identity, and Choosing a Charity.” In ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6)[*The Ethics of Giving:*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6) [*Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6)[, edited by Paul Woodruff, 149–77. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-6) [Deaton, Angus. 2018. “The U.S. Can No Longer Hide from Its Deep Poverty Problem,” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html)[*The New York Times,* ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html)[Jan. 24, 2018.](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html) [Friedman, Marilyn. 1991. “The Practice of Partiality.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*Ethics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[ 101 (4): 818–35.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381666?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [MacAskill, William. 2015. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/316786/doing-good-better-by-william-macaskill/)[*Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/316786/doing-good-better-by-william-macaskill/)[. New York: Penguin Random House.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/316786/doing-good-better-by-william-macaskill/) [MacAskill, William, Andreas Mogensen, and Toby Ord. 2018. “Giving Isn’t Demanding.” In ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-7)[*The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-7)[, edited by Paul Woodruff, 178–203. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190648879.001.0001/oso-9780190648879-chapter-7) [MacMillan, Amanda. “Being Generous Really Does Make You Happier.” ](https://time.com/4857777/generosity-happiness-brain/)[*Time*](https://time.com/4857777/generosity-happiness-brain/)[, Jul. 14, 2017. ](https://time.com/4857777/generosity-happiness-brain/) [Michigan Institute for Social Research. 2017. Panel Study of Income Dynamics.](https://simba.isr.umich.edu/default.aspx) [Reader, Soran. 2003. “Distance, Relationship and Moral Obligation.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903830?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*The Monist* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903830?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[86 (3): 367–81.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903830?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)[, 229–43.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2018. “Is Extreme Poverty Being Neglected in the U.S.?” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/extreme-poverty-us.html)[*The New York Times,* ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/extreme-poverty-us.html)[Jan. 28, 2018. ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/opinion/extreme-poverty-us.html) [Srinivasan, Amia. 2015. “Stop the Robot Apocalypse.” ](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse)[*London Review of Books* ](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse)[37 (18).](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse) [———. 2015. ](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[*The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically*](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do) [The World Bank. 2020. “Measuring Poverty.”](https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/measuringpoverty.) [Unger, Peter K. 1996. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195108590.001.0001/acprof-9780195108590)[*Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195108590.001.0001/acprof-9780195108590)[. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195108590.001.0001/acprof-9780195108590) [World Health Organization. 2019a. “Drinking-Water.”](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/drinking-water.) [———. 2019b. “World Hunger Is Still Not Going down after Three Years and Obesity Is Still Growing – UN Report.”](https://www.who.int/news/item/15-07-2019-world-hunger-is-still-not-going-down-after-three-years-and-obesity-is-still-growing-un-report) [———. 2020. “Children: Improving Survival and Well-Being.” 2020.](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/children-reducing-mortality.) ### For Further Reading and Viewing [Ilingworth, Patricia, Thomas Pogge, and Leif Wenar. 2011. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739073.001.0001/acprof-9780199739073)[*Giving Well: The Ethics of Philanthropy.* ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739073.001.0001/acprof-9780199739073)[Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739073.001.0001/acprof-9780199739073) [MacAskill, William. “What Are the Most Important Moral Problems of Our Time?” Youtube.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WyprXhvGVYk) [Moody, Michael and Beth Breeze. 2016. ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philanthropy-Reader/Moody-Breeze/p/book/9781138903593)[*The Philanthropy Reader.* ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philanthropy-Reader/Moody-Breeze/p/book/9781138903593)[Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philanthropy-Reader/Moody-Breeze/p/book/9781138903593) [Reich, Rob. 2018. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691183497/just-giving)[*Just Giving: Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better.* ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691183497/just-giving)[Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691183497/just-giving) [Singer, Peter](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html)[. 1999. “The Singer Solution to World Poverty.” ](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html)[*The New York Times,* ](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html)[Sept. 5, 1999.](https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/05/magazine/the-singer-solution-to-world-poverty.html) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2010. “The Life You Can Save in 3 Minutes.” Youtube.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onsIdBanynY) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2011. “Extreme Poverty.” Youtube.](https://youtu.be/IKJoqVoC5JA) [———](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300219869/most-good-you-can-do)[. 2013. “The Why and How of Effective Altruism.” Youtube. ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Diuv3XZQXyc&t=1s) [Zunz, Olivier. 2012. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691128368/philanthropy-in-america)[*Philanthropy in America: A History.* ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691128368/philanthropy-in-america)[Princeton University Press](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691128368/philanthropy-in-america). ### Related Essays [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meikers [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ethics-and-absolute-poverty.pdf). ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) ### About the Author Brandon Boesch, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morningside University in Sioux City, IA. His research focuses on the nature and role of models and representation in scientific practice as well as issues in applied ethics, including ethics of philanthropy and biomedical ethics. [sites.google.com/view/boeschb](https://sites.google.com/view/boeschb) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** absolute poverty, effective altruism, Peter Singer, poverty --- ### [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant's Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/kantian-ethics/) **Published:** June 9, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to Kantian ethics, the ethics of Immanuel Kant. **Content:** Author: Andrew Chapman Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 “Trolley problems” are philosophical thought experiments where we make an imaginary choice that usually ends in someone getting, well, run over by a trolley. Here we will use trolley problems to introduce *Kantian Ethics*, which is the ethical theory developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and introduce *deontological* ethical theories in general. ### 1. Trolley Problems Imagine this: Five people are tied to a trolley track. An out-of-control trolley is coming down the track. The trolley can’t be stopped, but you can pull a lever to divert the trolley to a side track, saving five but killing one.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) ![Trolley problems: should he pull the switch?](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/trolley1.jpeg?resize=600%2C317&ssl=1)Trolley problems: should he pull the switch? What should you do? Most people respond: *Switch*! *We should try to save as many lives as possible*. But consider a modification to this experiment: The story is the same except now there is no switch and no side track. However, on a footbridge, farther up the track, before the five tied-up individuals, is a precariously perched giant man. If you give the giant a push, he will fatally fall on the track, stopping the trolley and sparing the five tied-up souls. ![Trolley problems: should he push the man?](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/trolley2.jpg?resize=506%2C269&ssl=1)Trolley problems: should he push the man? What should you do? Most people insist: *Don’t Push*. But in both cases, it’s one life versus five lives. If we were solely concerned with *total* lives saved, then *Don’t Switch* and *Don’t Push* should be morally equivalent and *Switch* and *Push* should be morally equivalent. Are they? ### 2. Kantian Deontology and the Categorical Imperative To many people, these actions don’t seem to be equivalent, despite their consequences’ being the same.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) *Deontology* is a type of moral theory that denies that morality is solely about consequences.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The most famous *deontological* theory was developed by Immanuel Kant.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Kant’s ethics, and the overall philosophical system in which it is embedded, is vast and incredibly difficult, but we can see his ethics as grounded in a view about what we are, namely *persons*. ![Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/kants-ethics-image.jpg?resize=656%2C497&ssl=1)Immanuel Kant’s “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” According to Kant, *persons* are, essentially, rational creatures who are deserving of respect.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This rationality grounds what Kant calls *The Categorical Imperative*, the fundamental ethical rule from which all particular ethical rules derive. This *imperative* is *categorical* in that we must follow it, even if we don’t want to.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Kant argues that there is one Categorical Imperative that can be expressed in three different formulations, although the first two are, by far, the most important.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The “first formulation” is based on the idea of a *maxim*: a principle for acting in a certain way to achieve a certain goal.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) If a maxim were a *universal law*, then everyone would act on that maxim. In turn, Kant’s first formulation goes like this: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. The basic idea of this formulation is that it’s wrong to make a special exception to some rule for yourself. If your maxim is, ‘I will sneak into a movie without paying, so I can see the movie for free,’ then you are trying to make a special exception for yourself: the maxim wouldn’t work if it were a universal law, because almost no one would show movies, because it wouldn’t be profitable. But of course, ‘I will buy a ticket to a movie so I can see the movie’ is perfectly universalizable: if everyone followed that maxim, movies could still exist.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Its “second formulation” is this: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end. This means that we are never allowed to *merely use people*: people must be respected as *ends in themselves*. Using people as “mere means” involves treating them as mere objects or in ways to which they could not or would not consent, which is to disrespect them.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. Applying the Categorical Imperatives The “second formulation” of the Categorical Imperative helps justify the common trolley-problem intuitions above. In the first experiment, while flipping the switch would kill someone, we are not thereby *using* the person we kill. His death is an unfortunate and unintended consequence of our attempt to save five lives. In the giant-man variant, pushing him in front of the train *does* use him—as a mere sack of sinew and bones, no better than a rock. This difference, says the Kantian, accounts for our moral intuitions and the differing moral status of the two cases. To apply the “first formulation” here we must determine which rules we would be following with different courses of action, such as the rule ‘I will kill to save lives,’ which may not be universalizable.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 4. An Objection Many objections have been raised to Kantian Deontology, but we’ll review just one. Kant argued that, given the Categorical Imperative’s “second formulation,” lying *always* involves using someone as mere means, since that manipulation disrespects their rationality. So, Kant maintained that even if a known murderer asks you where someone is (presumably, to murder them), it would be wrong to lie to the murderer about where that person is. But most people say it’s not morally required to tell the truth to the murderer. At this point, the Kantian deontologist has some options. They might agree with Kant and insist that lying to the murderer is wrong. Or they might argue that while Kant was right that ‘I will lie whenever I want’ cannot be willed as a universal law, ‘I will lie *when doing so will very likely save innocent people’s lives*’ can: neither chaos nor contradictions result from universalizing that rule. Furthermore, helping the murderer might be treating the potential victim as a mere means and so not respecting them as a person. ### 5. Conclusion To many, there seems to be something essentially right with a Kantian brand of ethics, i.e., that respect and rationality are fundamentally important for our ethical lives. Nevertheless, Kant’s theory, like all ethical theories, does come with its theoretical and practical challenges. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) These thought experiments are work of hypothetical fantasy meant to stoke your ethical intuitions. Leave aside any implausibilities and notice that these situations are at least *possible*. Also, assume that all of the tied-up persons are morally equivalent, e.g., it’s not the case that one is a murderer and another is about to cure cancer. Finally, assume that the choices presented are the only possible choices. For the original presentation of the trolley problem, see Foot (1978). For extensive analysis, see Thomson (1976). For further discussion of the trolley problems, see [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Consequentialism* is a moral theory that evaluates actions solely in terms of their consequences. A consequentialist should argue that since the consequences in terms of lives saved are the same in *Don’t Switch* and *Don’t Push* and in *Switch* and *Push*, we have morally equivalent pairs. See Shane Gronholz’s [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) for an overview of this popular moral theory. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Greek root, *deont—*, means a certain sort of *necessity* and has been interpreted as *duty* or *obligation*. A safe characterization of deontological ethics is that these types of theories alway deny that *only* consequences matter to determining the morality of actions: deontology can also be understood as *non-consequentialism*. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See especially the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, the *Metaphysics of Morals*, and the *Critique of Practical Reason,* all in Kant (1999). While here we will only look at the most famous deontological ethical theory, there are many more deontological theories. Some of them are modifications of Kant’s account, and some of them explicitly non-Kantian. For an overview and taxonomy of such theories, see Alexander & Moore (2012). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) It is a mistake to read “persons” as *Homo sapiens*. In Kant’s ethical sense, any self-conscious, reasons-responsive, autonomous creature will count as a *person* in the relevant sense. Accordingly, some non-human animals, e.g., apes, might count as persons. Similarly, potential future artificially intelligent computer systems could count as persons. Finally, some *Homo* *sapiens*, e.g., the very young and the severely mentally enfeebled, will not count as persons in the relevant moral sense. For related discussion, see [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe. Relatedly, you might wonder what it is about persons that makes us so deserving of value. The basic answer, for Kant, is that rational beings are the only creatures that can act with a good will: recognize the existence of moral reasons and act such that one’s reason for acting is that the action is morally required. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) *Categorical* imperatives, which we must follow *no matter what we want*, contrast with *hypothetical* imperatives, rules that we need to follow only if we have certain desires. Consider the rule, “Work on difficult math problems every night.” Someone would have to follow that rule *only if* they want to learn to learn challenging math: if they don’t want that, they don’t have to follow that rule and study math. A rule like “Don’t lie to other people and manipulate them for your own personal gain,” however is a *categorical* rule, at least on Kant’s view: you *must* follow that rule, even if you don’t want to. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The third formulation is very similar to the first but emphasizes one’s role as choosing or willing rather than merely being bound by rules or the existence of those rules. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Here we follow Russ Shafer-Landau (2012: 157-9 ff.) in our specific definition of a maxim. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For example, if someone is going to steal (for fun), their maxim or rule might be “I will steal whatever I want, so I can obtain it.” Can this be willed, as a universal law, that everyone follows? No. Kant’s explanation for why it cannot be willed, however, is *not* that bad consequences would follow from everyone doing this, but that everyone doing this would undo the whole idea of stealing in the first place: if everyone could steal whatever they wanted, then nothing really belongs to anyone (nobody really owns anything), and so the whole idea of ownership, which stealing requires, is undercut. On the other hand, the rule “Help people in dire need, when you can, so as to benefit them” can be willed as a universal law: we can will that everyone do that. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) All persons are just like you in their rational capacities, and so are deserving of respect. To treat them differently, all evidence to the contrary, is both to treat them *incorrectly* by denying them the very thing that makes them moral persons *and* to lie to yourself, to mis-use your own rationality. Thank you to R. Jenkins and D. Purves for pressing me on this point. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For example, because everyone would have been killed, so everyone would be dead anyway, so there would be no one to save. Kant’s discussion of why killing violates the first formula is somewhat more obscure, but he says that there couldn’t be a world in which the same principle both preserves and ends life. ### References [Alexander, Larry, and Michael Moore. “Deontological Ethics.” ](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/)[. Stanford University, 2016.](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/) [Foot, Phillippa, and Doris Schroeder. “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.” ](http://www.amazon.com/Applied-Ethics-Critical-Concepts-Philosophy/dp/0415208386/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1402311975&sr=8-1-fkmr0&keywords=Applied+Ethics%3A+Critical+Concepts+in+Philosophy%2C+Volume+2)[*Critical Concepts in Philosophy*](http://www.amazon.com/Applied-Ethics-Critical-Concepts-Philosophy/dp/0415208386/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1402311975&sr=8-1-fkmr0&keywords=Applied+Ethics%3A+Critical+Concepts+in+Philosophy%2C+Volume+2)[. Ed. Ruth Chadwick. Vol. 2. New York: Routledge, 1978.](http://www.amazon.com/Applied-Ethics-Critical-Concepts-Philosophy/dp/0415208386/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1402311975&sr=8-1-fkmr0&keywords=Applied+Ethics%3A+Critical+Concepts+in+Philosophy%2C+Volume+2) [Kant, Immanuel. ](http://www.cambridge.org/br/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB)[*Practical Philosophy*](http://www.cambridge.org/br/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB)[. Trans. Allen W. Wood. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1999.](http://www.cambridge.org/br/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB) [Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2012. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-fundamentals-of-ethics-9780190058333?cc=us&lang=en)[*The Fundamentals of Ethics*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-fundamentals-of-ethics-9780190058333?cc=us&lang=en)[, Second Edition. Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-fundamentals-of-ethics-9780190058333?cc=us&lang=en) [Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.”](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27902416?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Monist*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27902416?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[ 59.2 (1976): 204-17.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27902416?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) ### Related Essays [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson ### Acknowledgments Thank you to Addison Ellis, Ryan Jenkins, and Duncan Purves for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. ### Revision This article was originally posted on 6/9/2014. A revision was posted on 6/29/2020: this update mainly involved including the “first formulation” of the Categorical Imperative. The “objection” section was updated on 6/5/2025. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/kant-ethics-1.pdf "kant ethics"). ### About the Author [Andrew Chapman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Chapman/) holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder, an MA in philosophy from Northern Illinois University and a BA in philosophy and a BM in bassoon and sound recording technology from Ithaca College. He specializes in epistemology, metaethics, and the history of philosophy (especially Kant and the 20th Century Anglophone and Phenomenological traditions). When not philosophizing, Andrew is skiing, hiking, listening to great music, or playing the bassoon. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Chapman, deontology, Kant, Trolley Problem, Trolley Problems --- ### [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) **Published:** July 14, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to Thomas Hobbes and his views on life in the State of nature, including his quote that life in that state would be “Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Categories: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 995 What would life be like without any government? Would it be a utopia, or would it be miserable? The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) famously leaned in the latter direction. He argued in his book *Leviathan*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) that, without government, life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay explains why he thinks this, and it presents his solution, which is to create a government with absolute power. [![Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/hobbes-state-of-nature.jpg?resize=516%2C379&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/hobbes-state-of-nature.jpg?ssl=1)Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). ### 1. The State of Nature Hobbes imagines what life would be like in the “state of nature,” a hypothetical world without governments. Hobbes thinks all humans are equal when it comes to matters of survival. Nobody is powerful enough to be immune to attack. Even the weakest person can kill the strongest if there’s nobody around to stop them.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In the state of nature, this equal ability to kill each other leads to mistrust. All of your belongings, and your life itself, might be taken at any moment, because there is no greater power to stop anyone from attacking you. Some people would attack you because they need your resources to survive. Others would attack you because they want to be more powerful than everyone else. Even those who don’t need or want to attack you are a danger, because they can’t trust that you will leave them alone, so to be safe, they must attack you first.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The end result is that the state of nature consists of a war of all against all.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) You must constantly be ready to fight, even if you’d prefer not to, because the only way to ensure your safety is to go after others before they go after you.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) In this state of nature, projects like farming, manufacturing, science, and the arts are a waste of time, because there’s no guarantee you’ll enjoy the fruits of your labor. Someone can take it from you at any moment. Everyone lives in “continual fear and danger of violent death.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) It’s awful! Hobbes says that if you doubt it would be so bad, think about how you act under your existing government. Even with the police just a phone call away, don’t you lock your doors when you sleep at night? According to Hobbes, if you can’t trust your neighbors to leave you alone even when there are laws against theft and assault, imagine how much worse it would be if people were free to do *anything* they thought was necessary to survive in the state of nature.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 2. Hobbes’s Solution If life in the state of nature would be intolerable, then what is the solution? To escape the state of nature, Hobbes proposes that it would be rational to establish a government.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Hobbes thinks that humans are rational creatures, and we can all see that it would be better if we agreed not to rob from and murder each other.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) But without a government, these agreements will fall apart, because there’s nobody to ensure that all parties stick to the deal. In the state of nature, agreements “are but words.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) To secure peace, we will need to form a government that is strong enough to enforce these agreements, says Hobbes. We do this by forming a special sort of contract or agreement with each other. The contract Hobbes imagines goes like this: if everyone else agrees to obey some sovereign ruler, you too will obey that sovereign.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) This creates a government ruled by a sovereign that we have all agreed to obey. The sovereign will make and enforce laws. Chaos will be replaced with order.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) According to Hobbes, the state of nature is so terrible that any sovereign will do, as long as it can protect you.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) You must obey the sovereign whether it is a king, an aristocracy, or a democracy, even if the sovereign passes oppressive laws that you dislike.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Even under an oppressive sovereign there can be trade, and art, and industry, and you won’t have to worry that your neighbor will murder you. In order to keep the peace, Hobbes thinks the sovereign must have power over *everything*: the army, the treasury, the judiciary, what’s taught in schools, and anything else that it needs to prevent the state of nature.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Hobbes thinks that these powers are all linked together: if the sovereign doesn’t control the army, it’s no use to control the judiciary, because they can’t enforce the laws. If they don’t control the money, they can’t pay the army. If they don’t control the schools, people will be taught false things that will cause them to rebel.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### 3. Hobbes’s Legacy Hobbes’s theory defends the right of rulers to do anything, and leaves little space for citizens to object. Unless the sovereign is not powerful enough to protect us from the state of nature, we have a duty to obey completely. This means that Hobbes’s views are very deferential to government authority. Indeed, Hobbes wanted to defend the English government of his time against rebellion. For this reason, most contemporary philosophers disagree with Hobbes’s overall theory. But Hobbes also planted the seeds of what was, at the time, a very revolutionary approach to government. Indeed, one of Hobbes’s contemporaries accused the *Leviathan* of being a “rebel’s catechism”—a book that would teach people to rebel.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Hobbes’s views were revolutionary because he sees the sovereign as created by equal individuals, each acting freely and rationally in their own self-interest. Sovereigns, according to Hobbes, are not appointed by god, nor is anyone naturally suited to rule over the rest. Hobbes argues that sovereigns are created by the people for their sake, and the only reason the people should obey is that the sovereign keeps them safe. If the sovereign doesn’t defend your life, you are justified in rebelling.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) The ideas that the government must justify its power over its citizens in terms that are good for them, and that only consent of the governed justifies governmental authority, were revolutionary at Hobbes’s time, and many still find them compelling today. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The title of the book comes from the name of a powerful sea creature mentioned in parts of the Hebrew Bible (e.g., Isaiah 27:1; Job 41:1). Hobbes picked the title because it is a provocative, irreverent way to describe the government: like the leviathan, the government is very powerful. See Hobbes, *Leviathan* XVII.13. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Hobbes, *Leviathan* XIII.9 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XIII.1-2 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XIII.3; XIII.5-7. See [The Prisoner’s Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/) by Jason Wyckoff for another example of how rational people might end up in conflict even when cooperation would be better for everyone. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Hobbes, *Leviathan* pg. 77 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XIII.4; XIII.8 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XIII.9 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XIII.10 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For discussion of the idea that it is rational to establish governments to escape the state of nature, see [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XIII.14; XIV-V [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Hobbes, *Leviathan* XVII.2 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XVII.13 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XVII [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Hobbes*, Leviathan* XVIII.20 [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Hobbes, *Leviathan* XIX.1-2 [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Hobbes, *Leviathan* XVIII [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Hobbes, *Leviathan* XVIII.16 [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Bramhall, *Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied* 515 [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Hobbes, *Leviathan* XXI.2 ### References [John Bramhall, ](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A29193.0001.001)[*Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied*](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A29193.0001.001)[ (London: Printed by E.T. for J. Crook, 1657)](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A29193.0001.001) [Thomas Hobbes, ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/leviathan)[*Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/leviathan)[, ed. Edwin Curley (Hackett, 1994)](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/leviathan) ### Related Essays [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case [The Prisoner’s Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/) by Jason Wyckoff [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider ### For Further Reading and Viewing [Lloyd, Sharon A. and Susanne Sreedhar, “Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/hobbes-moral/>.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/hobbes-mora) [“12. The Sovereign State: Hobbes’ Leviathan”](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3S1uqgGfB4) by Steven B. Smith (Youtube) [“13. The Sovereign State: Hobbes’ Leviathan](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oE1eU4Ilgdo)” by Steven B. Smith (Youtube) [“14. The Sovereign State: Hobbes’ Leviathan](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyZJ1lDULNw)” by Steven B. Smith (Youtube) ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/berbat-acimasiz-ve-kisa-hobbesun-doga-durumunda-yasama-dair-gorusleri-daniel-weltman/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/hobbes-on-state-of-nature.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** anarchy, Hobbes, Leviathan, state of nature, Thomas Hobbes, Weltman --- ### [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) **Published:** October 21, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay introduces the Philosophy as a Way of Life approach to philosophy and offers examples of what it can look like to live philosophically in the present day. **Content:** Author: Christine Darr Category: [Metaphilosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphilosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/ "Phenomenology and Existentialism") Word Count: 998 If you have ever learned a philosophical idea and tried to incorporate it into your daily living, you may be interested in an approach called *philosophy as a way of life* (PWOL). Instead of analyzing concepts or arguments, or constructing a theory of the world, PWOL’s approach emphasizes the practice of *living* philosophically. This involves critical reflection on ourselves and the world and practical exercises meant to align our behaviors with our worldview. It is the difference between, for example, analyzing Aristotle’s arguments about living a virtuous life and trying to develop virtuous habits yourself.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay introduces the PWOL approach and offers examples of what it can look like to live philosophically in the present day. [![Edmund Tarbell's (1098) painting "Josephine and Mercie" of two women reading.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/josephine_and_mercie_2014.136.8.jpg?resize=656%2C574&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/josephine_and_mercie_2014.136.8.jpg?ssl=1) Edmund Tarbell’s (1098) painting “Josephine and Mercie” of two women reading. ### 1. Pierre Hadot Many contemporary philosophers have adopted a PWOL approach to philosophy because of the work of French philosopher Pierre Hadot (1922-2010). Hadot observes that many ancient philosophers believed their philosophical thinking should shape how they lived their lives. For example, Stoics[\[2\]](#_ftn2) and Epicureans[\[3\]](#_ftn3) formed schools that encouraged both intellectual engagement and living in accordance with one’s intellectual commitments. Hadot claims that living philosophically is a practice accessible to anyone who desires to live consistently with their evolving understanding of the world.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Critical Reflection about the Good Life Living philosophically is partly a matter of critically reflecting on the good life: how should I spend my time? What kind of career should I pursue? What responsibilities do I have to myself and others? Questions like these elicit lively philosophical debate with people offering us reasons to accept or reject their views.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) We then have the opportunity to engage in *critical reflection*. Critical reflection involves considering the merits of these views, how they compare to others, which views align with our values, and whether we should reconsider those values.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Engaging in critical reflection when confronted with new ideas about how we ought to live is a life-long pursuit—it’s a way of life! Our circumstances might change, causing us to reexamine our views. Remaining open and thoughtful is crucial for living philosophically, but other things are required as well. ### 3. Spiritual Exercises While critical reflection is necessary for living philosophically, it is not sufficient: we may have a compelling vision of the good life yet fail to act on that vision. For example, if I believe that mindless consumption detracts from the good life, you might expect me to at least try to limit my mindless consumption.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Yet, as humans have observed throughout history, we often fail to fully live up to our ideals.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) So intellectual acceptance of ideas is not enough; the change should also include our actions, our emotions, and so on. Hadot argues that what he calls “spiritual” exercises should transform how we see and participate in the world around us. He explains that these exercises are *spiritual* not in the sense that they are religious, but in that they are meant to be personally transformative. And they are *exercises* because they are activities people must practice habitually, much like physical exercise, to develop their philosophical practice of acting in accordance with their worldview. ### 4. A Formula for PWOL and Contemporary Examples To understand how critical reflection and spiritual exercise work together, let’s consider some examples. *Step One: Learning about a new theory.* Say you are learning about Epicureanism, and read that the key to a happy life is to pursue pleasure which, in part, requires us to think carefully about which desires contribute to our pleasure and which cause us harm.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) *Step Two: evaluating our current habits — in this case, evaluating our desires in light of this theory.* Some desires, say for money or popularity, can never be fully satisfied and therefore cause us pain. This insight may lead me to see that my social media activity is driven by a desire for popularity. *Step Three: With this realization, I adopt a new habit.* I stop posting to social media for a week. *Step Four: while I engage in this habit, I notice my reactions, reflecting on how this new habit has changed me.* I am now in a more informed position to assess how this view can help me attain the sort of life I desire.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) [![A "Philosophy as a Way of Life" understanding, reflection, and application process.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/pwolformula.png?resize=512%2C512&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/pwolformula.png?ssl=1) A “Philosophy as a Way of Life” understanding, reflection, and application process. Let’s consider another example from Stoicism. Following the formula above, the process can look like this: 1. A commonly-held Stoic belief is that much of our fear and anxiety arises from fixating on things beyond our control.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) 2. When a situation arises that brings up difficult feelings, say I fail a test, I should ask myself: what in this situation is inside of my control and what is outside of it? That I can’t change the grade I received and I can’t change the impact on my GPA are outside my control. 3. To combat this anxiety—when our plans fail, when we feel disappointed by a particular outcome, and so on—Stoics argue that we ought to develop “equanimity” or mental calmness. We do that by reflecting on what is inside of our control and what is outside of it, and to focus our attention and efforts on what is within our control. 4. After some reflection, we have a new perspective from which to reevaluate the theory and begin the process again. ### 5. Conclusion This process can be adopted for many theories.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Learning about *effective altruism*, or other arguments regarding how we should spend our money?[\[13\]](#_ftn13) See how changing your spending habits for a month changes your understanding. Animal rights? Adopt a vegetarian diet and reflect on your new perspective.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Trying to develop an intellectual virtue, such as intellectual carefulness,[\[15\]](#_ftn15) could help you gain new insight into logical fallacies and your commitment to believing what’s true. Whatever the philosophical theory, the intention of PWOL is to help us put those ideas into practice. *Practicing* philosophy, in this sense, helps us understand the theory better. It helps us to align our intellectual commitments and our actions. The best way to learn about PWOL is to try out the process yourself and come to your own conclusions! ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For more about Aristotle and virtue, see [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Aurelius’s *Meditations* or Epictetus’s manual *The Enchiridion* are both accessible primary texts regarding Stoicism. For an excellent introduction to Stoicism for the contemporary world, see Pigliucci (2017). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For an extensive discussion of Epicureanism as a way of life, see Austin (2022). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Hadot (1995: p. 275). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This debate includes the question of whether there is a specific model of the good life that everyone ought to adopt or whether each of us individually determines for ourselves what our version of the good life consists in. For related discussion of these issues, see [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Spencer Case’s [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) provides a useful explanation of the “ethics of belief” and could be a helpful guide for engaging in the sort of critical reflection recommended here. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For a robust discussion of the practices of consuming and the potential impact of those practices on our wellbeing, see Darr (2022). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Plato’s *Protagoras* is an extended reflection on this issue. The Apostle Paul also wrestles with problem in Romans 7:15-20. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For a more extensive explanation of these views, see Austin (2022) especially chapter five: “What do you want?” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) While these examples are simplified for the purposes of demonstrating how PWOL could look, I hope they will inspire you to try it out on your own! [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) To learn more about this Stoic belief, see “What Many People Misunderstand About the Stoic Dichotomy of Control” by Michael Tremblay. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This would even include non-philosophical work. For example, Robin Wall Kimmerer is an environmental biologist. However, her work challenges her readers to critically reflect on their beliefs and engage in ways of life that are transformative such that she is an excellent example of living philosophically. See Kimmerer (2013) and Kimmerer (2015). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For more about effective altruism, see [Ethics and Absolute Poverty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch. Also see Singer (2015). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For an introduction to some ethical issues concerning animals, see [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff, [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe, and [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For a great introduction to intellectual virtue, see King (2021). ### References [Aurelius, Marcus (2003).](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/6367/meditations-by-marcus-aurelius/)[ *Meditations*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/6367/meditations-by-marcus-aurelius/)[. Translated by Gregory Hays. Penguin Random House. (2003).](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/6367/meditations-by-marcus-aurelius/) [Austin, Emily A (2022). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/living-for-pleasure-9780197558324?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Living for Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/living-for-pleasure-9780197558324?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford UP. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/living-for-pleasure-9780197558324?cc=us&lang=en&) [Darr, Christine (2022). ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781978707054/The-Production-of-Consumers-and-the-Formation-of-Desire-A-Neo-Thomist-Perspective)[*The Production of Consumers and the Formation of Desire: A Neo-Thomist Perspective*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781978707054/The-Production-of-Consumers-and-the-Formation-of-Desire-A-Neo-Thomist-Perspective)[. Lexington Books.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781978707054/The-Production-of-Consumers-and-the-Formation-of-Desire-A-Neo-Thomist-Perspective) [Epictetus. ](https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/epicench.html)[*The Enchiridion*](https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/epicench.html)[*,* ](https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/epicench.html)[trans. Elizabeth Carter. ](https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/epicench.html)[*Internet Classics Archive*](https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/epicench.html)[. ](https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/epicench.html) [Hadot, Pierre (1995). ](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophy-as-a-Way-of-Life-by-Pierre-Hadot-Arnold-I-Davidson/9780631180333)[*Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophy-as-a-Way-of-Life-by-Pierre-Hadot-Arnold-I-Davidson/9780631180333)[. Blackwell.](https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Philosophy-as-a-Way-of-Life-by-Pierre-Hadot-Arnold-I-Davidson/9780631180333) [Kimmerer, Robin Wall (2015). ](https://milkweed.org/book/braiding-sweetgrass)[*Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants*](https://milkweed.org/book/braiding-sweetgrass)[. Milkweed.](https://milkweed.org/book/braiding-sweetgrass) [Kimmerer, Robin Wall. (2015) “](https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/together-earth/2015/03/30/alternative-grammar-a-new-language-of-kinship)[Nature Needs a New Pronoun: To Stop the Age of Extinction, Let’s Start By Ditching ‘It’.” ](https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/together-earth/2015/03/30/alternative-grammar-a-new-language-of-kinship)[*Yes! Magazine*](https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/together-earth/2015/03/30/alternative-grammar-a-new-language-of-kinship)[, Spring. ](https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/together-earth/2015/03/30/alternative-grammar-a-new-language-of-kinship) [King, Nathan (2021) ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-excellent-mind-9780190096267?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Excellent Mind: Intellectual Virtues for Everyday Life.* ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-excellent-mind-9780190096267?cc=us&lang=en&)[Oxford UP. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-excellent-mind-9780190096267?cc=us&lang=en&) [Pigliucci, Massimo (2017). ](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/massimo-pigliucci/how-to-be-a-stoic/9780465097968/?lens=basic-books)[*How to Be a Stoic: Using Ancient Philosophy to Live a Modern Life*](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/massimo-pigliucci/how-to-be-a-stoic/9780465097968/?lens=basic-books)[. Hachette Book Group. ](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/massimo-pigliucci/how-to-be-a-stoic/9780465097968/?lens=basic-books) [Plato. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1591/1591-h/1591-h.htm)[*Protagoras*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1591/1591-h/1591-h.htm)[, trans. Benjamin Jowett. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1591/1591-h/1591-h.htm)[*Project Gutenberg*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1591/1591-h/1591-h.htm) [Singer, Peter (2010). ](https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/the-book/)[*The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty*](https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/the-book/)[. The Life You Can Save. (2019). ](https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/the-book/)[www.thelifeyoucansave.org](https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/the-book/) [Tremblay, Michael (2021). ](https://modernstoicism.com/what-many-people-misunderstand-about-the-stoic-dichotomy-of-control-by-michael-tremblay/)[“What Many People Misunderstand About the Stoic Dichotomy of Control.”](https://modernstoicism.com/what-many-people-misunderstand-about-the-stoic-dichotomy-of-control-by-michael-tremblay/) [*Modern Stoicism*](https://modernstoicism.com/what-many-people-misunderstand-about-the-stoic-dichotomy-of-control-by-michael-tremblay/)[. ](https://modernstoicism.com/what-many-people-misunderstand-about-the-stoic-dichotomy-of-control-by-michael-tremblay/) ### A Further Resource [The *International Society for Philosophy as a Way of Life*](https://www.ispwl.com/) ### Related Essays [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/bir-yasam-tarzi-olarak-felsefe-christine-darr/), [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/pwol.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Christine Darr is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dubuque. She is the author of *The Production of Consumers and the Formation of Desire: A Neo-Thomist Perspective*. Her interests include environmental ethics, breaking down complex ideas into understandable ones, making art and being awed by nature. [dbq.edu/Academics/OfficeofAcademicAffairs/AcademicDepartments/PhilosophyPoliticsandHistory/Faculty](https://www.dbq.edu/Academics/UndergraduatePrograms/PhilosophyPoliticsandHistory/FacultyandStaff/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphilosophy **Tags:** Philosophy as a way of life, PWOL --- ### [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) **Published:** October 31, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is a meaningful life? This essay reviews some influential answers to this question. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Pianalto](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pianalto) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism,](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 997 ##### *Editors’ note: this essay and its companion essay,* [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) *both explore the concept of meaning in relation to human life. This essay focuses on meaning in individual human lives, whereas the other addresses the meaning of life as a whole.* Imagine becoming so fed up with your job and home life that you decide to give it all up. Now you spend your days lounging on a beach. One day, your friend Alex finds you on the beach and questions your new lifestyle: “You’re wasting your life!” says Alex. You tell Alex that you were unhappy and explain that you are much happier now. However, Alex responds: “There’s more to life than happiness. You aren’t doing anything *meaningful* with your life!”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But what *is* a meaningful life? Here we will review some influential answers to this question. [![A group of people doing yoga on a beach, at sunset.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/meaning-in-life.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/meaning-in-life.jpg?ssl=1) A group of people doing yoga on a beach, at sunset. ### 1. Cosmic Pessimism vs. Everyday Meaning *Pessimists* might say that life has no ultimate or cosmic meaning and thus that a beach bum’s life is no more or less meaningful—in the grand scheme of things—than the lives of Beethoven, Martin Luther King, Jr., or Marie Curie.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) However, many philosophers argue that even if there is no ultimate meaning *of* life, there can be meaning *in* life. Our lives can be meaningful in ordinary ways, ways that don’t require that we play a special role in some kind of grand cosmic narrative. Call this *everyday meaning*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) What might give our lives this kind of meaning? ### 2. Subjectivism *Subjectivists* say that someone’s life is meaningful if it is deeply fulfilling, engaging, or satisfying.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) And different people find different things meaningful; a challenging career might be engaging and fulfilling for others, but boring and unsatisfying to you: you may find life on a beach much more fulfilling. Some subjectivists distinguish between the *judgment* that one is fulfilled and actually *being* fulfilled. Fulfillment feels good, but it seems possible to be mistaken about whether we are fulfilled. Perhaps, as you lounge on the beach, you confuse being merely *content* with fulfillment.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) If you tried other things like writing poetry, volunteering, or starting a business, they might end up being more fulfilling, and hence more meaningful for you.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Subjectivism, however, has counterintuitive implications. Suppose someone found it fulfilling to spend *all* their time gazing at the sand. This may seem too bizarre, aimless, or trivial to credit as meaningful. And what if someone found meaning in ethically monstrous activities, like torturing babies or puppies? Vicious projects like these don’t seem to add *positive* meaning to someone’s life.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Someone would have to be a rather atypical sort of human being to be truly fulfilled by sand-gazing or puppy-torturing. Could such strange lives count as meaningful? Subjectivists may say yes, but many would reject that answer and conclude that subjectivism is false. ### 3. Objective Meaning *Objective* accounts hold that meaningful lives involve projects of positive value, such as improving our character, exercising our creativity, and making the world a better place by pursuing and promoting truth, justice, and beauty.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Being a beach bum doesn’t really make the world *worse*, but it doesn’t make much of a positive contribution either. Your friend Alex is concerned that you are squandering your potential and thereby failing to make something meaningful of your life. However, your decision to become a beach bum *could* be a way of rebelling against the “rat race” of a workaholic and overly competitive society. Perhaps you are choosing to cultivate a life of mindfulness and aesthetic contemplation of natural beauty, in protest against superficial or soul-crushing social norms. Framed that way, your life seems to align with important, enduring, *objective* values. Objective accounts of meaning, however, must explain why some activities are objectively more meaningful than others. The difficulty is that what seems frivolous or pointless from one point of view may seem valuable and worthwhile from another. For some, climbing Mount Everest might count as an admirable exercise of physical and mental endurance, an inspiring achievement. Others may think it is stupid to climb big rocks, risking death and wasting resources that could be directed toward other more valuable causes. But perhaps such people are just being narrow-minded. The meaningfulness of being a beach bum, a mountain-climber, or anything else might depend on our motives or options and not just on what the activity involves.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 4. Hybrid Theory The *hybrid theory of meaning in life* combines insights from subjectivism and objective accounts: a meaningful life provides fulfillment *and* does so through devotion to objectively valuable projects.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Hybrid theory differs from objective accounts because it insists that a meaningful life must also be fulfilling for the person living it. There are *many* such projects available to us, since there are many fulfilling ways, given our distinctive personalities and abilities, that we can engage with values like truth, justice, and beauty. However, just as a subjectively fulfilling life might seem trivial or despicable, perhaps a meaningful life doesn’t always feel fulfilling.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Consider George Bailey in the classic film *It’s a Wonderful Life*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) George thinks his life has been wasted and wishes that he’d never been born. Luckily, his guardian angel Clarence rescues George from a suicide attempt and helps George understand how meaningful *his* life choices have been. Hybrid theory implies that George’s life now *becomes* meaningful because he is finally fulfilled by all his good works, but objective accounts suggest that George’s life was meaningful *all along* even though he didn’t realize it![\[13\]](#_ftn13) Recall the opening scenario: did you ditch a meaningful (but sometimes frustrating) life for the beach? ### 5. Conclusion The psychiatrist and Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl held that the search for meaning is the fundamental human drive.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) He claimed that a sense of meaning in life gives people the strength to persevere and even thrive despite the adversity and injustice we must sometimes confront.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Questions about meaning in life often arise when we suspect that something is missing from our lives. Despite their differences, the theories surveyed above seem to agree that there are many things we might do—or try—that would be meaningful. Talking about it with your friend Alex may be a good place to start.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Why? Because good relationships frequently rank as important sources of meaning: perhaps meaning is often made—or discovered—together. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Emily Esfahani Smith (2017) uses this distinction between happiness and meaning in life in her survey of psychological research on meaning in life. See also her TED Talk, “There’s More to Life Than Being Happy.” [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See, e.g., Benatar (2017) and Weinberg (2021) for defenses of the pessimistic outlook. At least one theist agrees with the pessimists that if life has no *divine* meaning or purpose, then nothing we do or become has any lasting significance and that our lives are all equally absurd: see Craig (2013). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Many philosophers who propose theories of meaning in life are either agnostic or skeptical of the idea that life as a whole has any divine meaning or purpose. See, e.g., Wolf (2010). Of course, if one does think life as a whole has divine meaning or purpose, then having meaning *in* one’s life might well involve living in accord with the supernatural point of existence. Some of the accounts of meaning in life are consistent with religious ideas about the meaning of life; I leave it as an exercise to the reader to work out which views will or will not cohere with their own religious convictions. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This idea is developed in the final chapter of Taylor (2000). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) John Stuart Mill issues a similar warning against conflating happiness and contentment in *Utilitarianism*, Chapter 2. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) This point is developed in more sophisticated subjectivist accounts of meaning in life. See, e.g. Calhoun (2015) and Parmer (2021). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Campbell and Nyholm (2015) or their contribution in Landau (2022) for discussion of “anti-meaning”: activities, projects, and lives that have negative and destructive significance. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Metz (2013) for discussion of several different accounts of this sort; Metz defends his own version in the final chapter. On creativity, see Taylor (1987) and Matheson (2018). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Examples like the beach bum are often under-described–including in this essay! It is worth taking such examples and considering variations of intentions, motives, circumstances, and so forth in order to consider how changes in these various elements may alter our assessment of the meaningfulness of the life or activity. Whole lives are usually, if not always, more complex than these brief examples. Philosophers who endorse *narrative theories of meaning in life* would suggest that the focus on particular activities and roles fails to consider that a meaningful *life* might also need to make holistic sense as a meaningful story. See Kauppinen (2012). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The term “project” here includes not just completable activities like painting a picture but also open-ended activities such as maintaining strong relationships with friends and family. This approach is developed by Susan Wolf in *Meaning in Life and Why It Matters*, and in three essays collected in Wolf (2014): see the essays in Part II: “The Meanings of Lives,” “Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life,” and “Happiness and Morality.” The text of *Meaning in Life and Why It Matters* is available at the Tanner Lectures website. See the print edition for excellent commentaries on Wolf’s position and a response by Wolf. A similar view is developed by Peter Singer in *How Are We to Live?* (1993), Chapter 10. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Another potential problem is that while hybrid theory aims to take the attractive features of subjective fulfillment and objective accounts of meaning in life, it inherits the possible *problems* with both views, too. Furthermore, if subjective and objective accounts contradict each other, hybrid theory might be inconsistent. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This point is developed, using the example of George Bailey, in Smuts (2013). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a similar study in a life that seems very meaningful from the outside (a successful career, prosperity, and a happy family), but is wracked by unhappiness, existential dread, and moral guilt within, see Leo Tolstoy’s *My Confession* (2005). Tolstoy’s crisis of meaning is often discussed in the literature on meaning in life, both for the gripping way in which he describes his fear of death and his feeling that life is meaningless, and for his discussion of the solution to the problem to be found in religious faith. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Frankl (2006). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Of course, this does not *justify* the actions of those who have put others in despicable situations. For Frankl, the point is about motivation rather than justification. Revolting against oppressors, for example, may be a highly meaningful project for those who are oppressed. See also Camus (2018). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) On relationships and other sources of meaning in life, see Smith (2017). Further recommended reading: Landau (2017), Landau (2022), and Singer (2009). For discussion of how ordinary “folk” intuitions about meaning relate to various philosophical theories of meaning in life, see Fuhrer and Cova (2022). ### References [Benatar, David (2017). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Human Predicament*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?cc=us&lang=en&) [Calhoun, Cheshire (2015). “Geographies of Meaningful Living,” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12089)[*Journal of Applied Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12089)[32(1): 15-34.](https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12089) [Campbell, Stephen M. and Sven Nyholm (2015). “Anti-Meaning and Why It Matters,” ](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.9)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.9)[ 1(4): 694-711.](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.9) [Camus, Albert (2018). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/23470/the-myth-of-sisyphus-by-albert-camus/)[*The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/23470/the-myth-of-sisyphus-by-albert-camus/)[. Trans. Justin O’Brien. Vintage.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/23470/the-myth-of-sisyphus-by-albert-camus/) [Craig, William Lane (2013). “The Absurdity of Life Without God.” In: Jason Seachris, ed. ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Exploring+the+Meaning+of+Life%3A+An+Anthology+and+Guide-p-9780470658796)[*Exploring the Meaning of Life*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Exploring+the+Meaning+of+Life%3A+An+Anthology+and+Guide-p-9780470658796)[. Wiley-Blackwell: 153-172.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Exploring+the+Meaning+of+Life%3A+An+Anthology+and+Guide-p-9780470658796) [Frankl, Viktor E. (2006). ](http://www.beacon.org/Mans-Search-for-Meaning-P602.aspx)[*Man’s Search for Meaning*](http://www.beacon.org/Mans-Search-for-Meaning-P602.aspx)[. Beacon Press. Originally published in 1946.](http://www.beacon.org/Mans-Search-for-Meaning-P602.aspx) [Fuhrer, Joffrey and Florian Cova (2022). “What makes a life meaningful? Folk intuitions about the content and shape of meaningful lives,” ](https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2046262)[*Philosophical Psychology.*](https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2046262) [Kauppinen, Antti (2012). “Meaningfulness and Time,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210081)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210081)[84(2): 345-377.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210081) [Landau, Iddo (2017). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/finding-meaning-in-an-imperfect-world-9780190092221?q=landau%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[*Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/finding-meaning-in-an-imperfect-world-9780190092221?q=landau%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/finding-meaning-in-an-imperfect-world-9780190092221?q=landau%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us) [Landau, Iddo (2022). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-meaning-in-life-9780190063504?lang=en&cc=us)[*The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-meaning-in-life-9780190063504?lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-meaning-in-life-9780190063504?lang=en&cc=us) [Metz, Thaddeus (2013). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780198748014?q=metz%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[*Meaning in Life*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780198748014?q=metz%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780198748014?q=metz%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us) [Mill, John Stuart (1863). ](https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm)[*Utilitarianism*](https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm)[.](https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm) [Parmer, W. Jared (2021). “Meaning in Life and Becoming More Fulfilled,” ](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i1.978)[*Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i1.978)[20(1): 1-29.](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i1.978) [Singer, Irving (2009). ](https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2351/Meaning-in-LifeThe-Creation-of-Value)[*Meaning in Life, Vol. 1: The Creation of Value*](https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2351/Meaning-in-LifeThe-Creation-of-Value)[. MIT Press.](https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2351/Meaning-in-LifeThe-Creation-of-Value) [Singer, Peter (1993). ](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9780879759667)[*How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest*](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9780879759667)[. Prometheus.](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9780879759667) [Smith, Emily E. (2017). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/)[*The Power of Meaning*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/)[.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/) [Crown.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/) [Smith, Emily E. (2017). “There’s More to Life Than Being Happy.” TED.com.](https://www.ted.com/talks/emily_esfahani_smith_there_s_more_to_life_than_being_happy?language=en) [Smuts, Aaron (2013). “The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life,” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12044)[*The Southern Journal of Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12044)[41(4): 536-562.](https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12044) [Taylor, Richard (2000). ](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529)[*Good and Evil*](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529)[. Prometheus. Originally published in 1970.](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529) [Taylor, Richard (1987). “Time and Life’s Meaning,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128521)[*The Review of Metaphysics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128521)[ 40(4): 675-686.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128521) [Tolstoy, Leo (2005). ](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html)[*My Confession*](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html)[. Translated by Aylmer Maude. Originally published in Russian in 1882.](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html) [Weinberg, Rivka (2021). “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have It, We Can’t Get It, and We Should Be Very, Very Sad,” ](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004)[*Journal of Controversial Ideas*](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004)[ 1(1), 4.](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004) [Wolf, Susan (2010). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters)[*Meaning in Life and Why It Matters*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters) ([Wolf’s lecture is also available at the Tanner Lecture Series website](https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_resources/documents/a-to-z/w/Wolf_07.pdf)). [— (2014). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us)[*The Variety of Values*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us) ### Related Essays [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/ "Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control") by Matthew Pianalto [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. 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Trujillo, Jr. [What Is It to Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/): by Nathan Nobis [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof ### Translations [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/hayatin-anlami-yasaminiza-anlam-katan-sey-nedir-matthew-pianalto/), [Turkish](https://medium.com/@hacettepefelsefe/%C3%A7eviri-hayat%C4%B1n-anlam%C4%B1-hayatlar%C4%B1m%C4%B1z%C4%B1-anlaml%C4%B1-k%C4%B1lan-nedir-matthew-pianalto-4d3b04866935), [Thai ](https://philososerious.wordpress.com/2023/12/30/%e0%b8%84%e0%b8%a7%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a1%e0%b8%ab%e0%b8%a1%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a2%e0%b9%83%e0%b8%99%e0%b8%8a%e0%b8%b5%e0%b8%a7%e0%b8%b4%e0%b8%95-%e0%b8%ad%e0%b8%b0%e0%b9%84%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%97%e0%b8%b3%e0%b9%83/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/meaning-in-life.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Pianalto](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pianalto) is a Professor of Philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University. He is the author of *On Patience* (2016) and numerous articles and book chapters on ethics. [philosophy.eku.edu/pianalto](https://philosophy.eku.edu/pianalto) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** meaning, meaning in life, meaning of life, Pianalto --- ### [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/) **Published:** November 6, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay presents and explains what’s called Avicenna’s ‘proof’ for the existence of God. It is likely the most influential argument in the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. **Content:** Author: Farbod Akhlaghi Categories: [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Islamic Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/islamic-philosophy/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 If someone told you that they could prove that God exists simply because something*—anything*!*—*exists, would you believe them? Probably not. But the Persian and Muslim philosopher, physician, and polymath Avicenna (980–1037) would.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) He argued that God’s existence can be established from the mere fact that anything exists at all.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay presents and explains what’s called Avicenna’s ‘proof’ for the existence of God.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) It is likely the most influential argument in the history of philosophy in the Islamic world.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) [![Robert Alan Thom. "Avicenna – the 'Persian Galen'," 1953. Oil on Masonite.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Avicenna.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Avicenna.jpg?ssl=1)Robert Alan Thom. “Avicenna – the ‘Persian Galen’,” 1953. Oil on Masonite. ### 1. Necessary and Contingent Existence The argument relies upon a distinction between how something—an *existent*—can exist *necessarily* or *contingently*.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Sadly, it seems the world could have existed without you or me in it. So, we exist contingently. The same also seems true of tables, cats, this essay, and the rest of the physical universe. These things can and do exist, but they need not have. Contingent things, Avicenna thinks, have essences or natures that do not guarantee their existence.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This is true of you and me: after all, lots of possible humans do not exist![\[7\]](#_ftn7) Contingent things require something to cause and sustain their existence.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) A ‘necessary existent’ would have an essence that guarantees its existence. If so, then that entity’s existence is uncaused, and its continued existence depends upon nothing.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Avicenna calls such a thing ‘necessary-in-itself.’[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 2. Why Proving the Existence of a Necessary Existent Allegedly Proves God Exists Abrahamic faiths take God to have several divine attributes, including uniqueness, simplicity, perfection, and necessity.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) For Avicenna, one divine attribute is special: necessity. He argues that God’s being a necessary existent is what entails that God is *unique* (there is only one God), *simple* (lacks proper parts[\[12\]](#_ftn12)), and more.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) So, to establish God’s existence, Avicenna wants to show that something exists that is necessary-in-itself with his ‘proof.’ Then, he wants to show that all the other divine attributes follow from that entity existing necessarily.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 3. The ‘Proof’ At its most simplified, the ‘proof’ is this: (1) Something exists; (2) If something exists, then there is a necessary existent; (3) So, there is a necessary existent.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Avicenna expands upon this argument in multiple ways.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The version most often called his ‘proof’ is the following: Suppose *something* exists. If it exists necessarily, then there is a necessary existent.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) If it exists contingently, then Avicenna considers the collection of everything that exists contingently—everything that exists but may not have—like you, me, and the rest of the universe. Call that collection ‘X.’[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Next, Avicenna argues that either X exists necessarily—so there is a necessary existent[\[19\]](#_ftn19)—or contingently. The latter would mean X’s existence has a cause. That cause will be a necessary or contingent thing. If necessary, there is a necessary existent. If contingent, then that cause must be a part of the collection of everything that exists but may not have, namely X. But this means X would be causing itself to exist![\[20\]](#_ftn20) That is impossible. So, if *anything* exists, it follows that *something necessarily exists*. Thus, something necessarily exists! More precisely: (P1) Something exists. (1) (P2) If something exists, then either that thing exists necessarily or contingently. (P3) If that thing exists necessarily, then there is a necessary existent. (P4) If that thing exists contingently, then the totality or collection of everything that exists contingently—X—exists. (P5) If X exists, then it exists necessarily or contingently. (P6) If X exists necessarily, then there is a necessary existent. (P7) If X exists contingently, then what causes X to exist is either necessary or contingent. (P8) If the cause of X’s existence is necessary, then there is a necessary existent. (P9) If the cause of X’s existence is contingent, then X must cause its own existence. (P10) Nothing can cause itself to exist. (C1) So, if X exists contingently, what causes X to exist is a necessary existent. (C2) So, if something exists, then there is a necessary existent ((2)). (C3) So, there is a necessary existent ((3)).[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Whether Avicenna thought reason alone justifies (1) and (2)––or if experience was needed––is controversial.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) This complicates comparisons with other arguments for God’s existence. Still, Avicenna’s argument comes centuries before similar ‘contingency arguments for God’s existence’ from Aquinas (1225-1274) and Leibniz (1646-1716); avoids appealing to infinite regresses, unlike many ‘cosmological arguments’; and, unlike many ‘ontological arguments’, God’s perfection plays no role.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) ### 4. Three Objections In general, a property enjoyed by every part of a whole is not *always* enjoyed by the whole itself. Think of a large building made of many small bricks: each brick is small, but the whole building is not! Thinking that what’s true of the parts must also be true of the whole is the *fallacy of composition*. (P5) suggests that X itself is either necessary or contingent. But even if parts of X—e.g., you or me —can be necessary or contingent, why think *the collection* of all contingent things itself can? We should be careful here: if every brick was red, it would not be a mistake to say the whole building was red![\[24\]](#_ftn24) (P7) assumes that if something exists contingently, then something caused it to exist.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) Why couldn’t the universe exist contingently without a cause, and yet not be necessary? Avicenna thinks this is incoherent. Contingently existing things must be caused to exist because what they are (their essences) does not guarantee their existence. An alternative account of contingency is required to make this objection coherent.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Avicenna’s proof also suggests that God *necessarily created* the world. As God *necessarily* exists, God is always causing and sustaining the world: everything that, without God, would not exist. Creation thus becomes not a ‘freely willed, gratuitous, \[or\] generous’ divine act, but something God *had* to do.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) A Muslim might think this false, perhaps even heresy.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) ### 5. Conclusion If Avicenna is right, God’s existence follows from a seemingly undeniable premise: something exists. His ‘proof’ promises to take us from the undeniable to one of the most controversial claims imaginable. If successful, this would be, mildly put, one of the greatest discoveries ever made. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) ‘Avicenna’ is a latinization of ‘Ibn Sīnā,’ from the full name ‘Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn Abdallāh Ibn Sīnā.’ He was arguably the most important philosopher in the history of the Islamic and Persianate world, and he was a physician of monumental significance to the history of medicine. He also left us a fascinating autobiography (Avicenna 1974 \[ca. 1037\]). See Adamson (2023) and Gutas (2025) for an overview of Avicenna’s life and work. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Avicenna thought God’s existence was neither self-evident nor something you should believe without proof: ‘how can an existence which one despairs of demonstrating be legitimately admitted?’ (Avicenna 2005 \[ca. 1020s\]: Ch.1.1., §1.1.). Proving God’s existence, he insisted, was a job for metaphysics. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Avicenna’s name for his ‘proof’ is ‘*burhān al-siddīqīn*.’ This is translated as ‘proof of the sincere’ (Legenhausen 2005), ‘the Demonstration of the Faithful’ (Adamson 2016: 126) and ‘the Proof of the Veracious’ (Rizvi 2019: §3.3.). Avicenna, in the last section of the fourth Class of his *Remarks and Admonitions* (see Zarepour 2022: 8 for translation of the relevant passage), sees two ways of proving God’s existence: *arguing by appeal to God’s actions*, or *by reflection on existence itself*. The latter, he claims, is the most secure and noble way to prove God’s existence, reflecting on existence itself and not indirectly through God’s creation and action. He calls this the way of the ‘sincere’ or ‘veracious,’ or those most ‘faithful.’ This raises the question of whether Avicenna’s argument is an ‘ontological’ or ‘cosmological’ argument. I return to this in §3. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) After Avicenna, it is very common for God to be described by Muslim philosophers and theologians by Avicenna’s term ‘necessary existent’ (*wağib al-wuğud*) found in his ‘proof.’ See Davidson (1987, Chs. IX and X), Legenhausen (2005), and Morvarid (2008; 2021) for the reception of the argument by philosophers, theologians, and others after Avicenna. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For an introduction to these what are called ‘modal’ concepts or categories, see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Avicenna (2005 \[ca. 1020s\]: Ch. 1.5., §§9–10). Often translated as ‘essence,’ Avicenna uses *māhīya*, *dāt*, *ḥaqīqa*, and on occasion *tabī’a* throughout his work. See Bertolacci (2012), Marmura (1980), and Morewedge (1972) for discussion of Avicenna’s distinction between the essence of something and whether that thing exists. Some find precursors of this distinction in Aristotle (e.g., in *Posterior Analytics* 2.1, 89b23–25), in Plotinus (Gerson 1994; Corrigan 1996), and in earlier Islamic philosophy (e.g., Adamson 2002 in al-Kindi) and theology or *kalām* (Winovsky 2003: Chs. 7–9). Avicenna undoubtedly introduced novel terminology to draw this distinction in its until-then most explicit form and wielded it pervasively in his metaphysics. See Adamson & Benevich (2023) for translations of some relevant passages from Avicenna, of many in the Islamic world who reacted to Avicenna’s essence-existence distinction, and for more general discussion of the existence-essence distinction in Islamic philosophy (also see Benevich 2025). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Think of any fictional human character you like. It is part of the nature of that character to be human; without being human, they would be a different character. But their being human doesn’t seem to be enough for them to exist! [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) By ‘cause’, Avicenna means something stronger than what we typically mean by physical causation: ‘X causes Y if and only if Y’s existence is bestowed by and dependent on X’s existence’ (Zarepour 2022: 16). So while your parents physically caused you to exist, they are not the cause of your existence in Avicenna’s sense because your continued existence doesn’t depend upon them. See Richardson (2013) for Avicenna’s notion of an ‘efficient cause.’ [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) ‘Necessary existent’ is Avicenna’s term—*wağib al-wuğud*—meaning something that necessarily exists. His term for contingent things is ‘possible-in-itself.’ It is admittedly unclear if Avicenna thought that necessary entities are *uncaused* or *cause themselves to exist*. This article follows Zarepour (2022: §3.5) and takes Avicenna to think that (a) a necessary existent has an essence, and (b) a necessary existent is an uncaused entity, the essence of which guarantees it exists and depends upon nothing to continue existing. See Zarepour (2022: §3.5) for discussion of these and other details concerning how to read Avicenna’s account of a necessary existent. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) A subtle but important point: Avicenna distinguishes between being ‘necessary-in-itself’ or ‘necessary-through-another’. Whilst you and me contingently exist, we are, Avicenna argues, ‘necessary-through-another’ because something makes us exist and sustains our existing, since our essences do not guarantee our existence. Avicenna wants to prove that something exists that is ‘necessary-in-itself,’ which he calls a ‘necessary existent.’ Interestingly, since everything for Avicenna is either necessary-in-itself, or possible-in-itself but necessary-through-another, Avicenna maintained that everything exists necessarily (even if only one thing, which will turn out to be God, exists necessarily because of its own essence). A contemporary defender of a version of the view that everything exists necessarily, called *necessitism*, is Williamson (2013). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) On a traditional concept of God, see [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes by ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/)[Bailie Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/). Also see Schlesinger (1988); Hestevold (1993), and Zarepour (2022: §2). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) X is a *proper part* of Y if X is a part of Y but not vice versa. For example, my arm is a proper part of me because my arm is a part of my body, but my body is not a part of my arm. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Compare Avicenna with Anselm of Canterbury (1033/4-1109) on God’s attributes: see [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman. Anselm thinks there is a special divine attribute, but it is not *necessity*: it is *perfection*. It is special because God’s being perfect is taken to entail that he is necessary, simple, and more (see Zarepour 2022: §2 for the Anselm-Avicenna comparison; see Nagasawa (2017) for a contemporary defense of Anselm’s view). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) So ‘proof’ here and throughout refers to Avicenna’s argument for at least one necessary existent, not his arguments that this necessary existent uniquely possesses the divine attributes (i.e., is God). See Adamson (2013; 2016, Ch. 18) and Zarepour (2022: §5) on how Avicenna argues that the divine attributes follow from God’s necessary existence. Of particular concern for Avicenna was establishing the *uniqueness* and *simplicity* of the necessary existent. This is because the central Islamic doctrine of *tawhīd*— the ‘oneness’ of God—is often interpreted as the claim that God is unique (there is exactly one God) and that God’s nature does not admit of multiplicity (that God lacks proper parts). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Recall here and throughout that, since Avicenna argues elsewhere that a necessary existent would be God, ‘necessary existent’ ultimately means ‘God’ for Avicenna. But, again, the argument called his ‘proof’ is, strictly speaking, for the existence of something that exists necessarily. You could, in principle, agree that his argument demonstrates that something necessarily exists and reject his other arguments for thinking that a necessary existent would be God. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Zarepour (2022: §4) identifies four argument types in Avicenna for a necessary existent (also see Morvarid 2022). They appeal variously to the idea of a necessary being and Avicenna’s account of necessity, the nature of necessitation, the impossibility of actual infinities, and the version I will present here that is found in the Metaphysics section of *The Salvation* (*al-Nağāt*, Avicenna 1985 \[ca. 1030s\]; see Zarepour 2022: 37–38 for a translation of the crucial passage). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) To be clear: Avicenna does not think that any random thing you pick—like you or me—is necessary-in-itself, since our essences do not guarantee our existence (e.g., being human does not guarantee that we are *existing* humans; again, recall any fictional human you like!). He is trying to show how assuming the existence of anything will lead to acknowledging the existence of at least one necessary existent, before giving independent arguments to think that if something is a necessary existent, then it has all the divine attributes. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) X is a whole, the parts of which are every contingently existing thing. If only one contingent thing exists, then X is a whole made up of only one part. If more than one contingent thing exists, then X is a whole where all its proper parts are things that exist contingently. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) It may seem strange to imagine Avicenna ending the argument there. It sounds like Avicenna would, in principle, accept that the universe—X—is God! Avicenna, however, denies that X exists necessarily. For it seems implausible that a group composed of things that only contingently exist itself exists necessarily. Remember, Avicenna also independently argues that if something is a necessary existent, then it has all the divine attributes. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Avicenna claims that ‘a cause of the totality is *a fortiori* a cause of the existence of its parts.’ (Avicenna 1985 \[ca. 1030s\]: 567–8, translated by Zarepour 2022: 38). So, if some contingent entity causes the collection of all contingent things, X, to exist, then it is a cause of the existence of every contingent thing that makes up that collection—which would include itself! [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) My reconstruction is indebted to a longer, detailed reconstruction by Zarepour (2022: §4.4.) that he calls ‘Argument D.’ Notice that no claims about infinite regresses or the impossibility of actual infinities are involved in this argument. It is worth noting that the argument is sometimes presented like this: we can ask if the cause of X’s existence is part of X or not. If it is not, then it necessarily exists, since X is the collection of all contingent things. If it is part of X, then it is contingent. But if so, then X would be causing itself to exist and that is impossible. So, the cause of X’s existence must not be a part of X. Since X just is the collection of all possible things, that means that the cause of X’s existence is a necessary existent! [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Each view roughly corresponds to whether the argument is an ontological or a cosmological argument, respectively. For the former view, see Morewedge (1970), Johnson (1984), and Zarepour (2022: §4.5.); for the latter, see Davidson (1987). Mayer (2001) and McGinnis (2010) think it a ‘hybrid.’ The argument might look obviously like a cosmological argument since ‘something exists’ sounds like an empirical observation. But there are reasons to think Avicenna may have thought that you could know something exists by reason alone. Avicenna could suggest that you know the claim ‘I exist’ by reason alone via his famous ‘Flying Man’ thought experiment of a man without sense perception and no experimental data, and ‘I exist’ entails ‘something exists.’ See Zarepour (2022: §4.5.) for this suggestion and related discussion. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Note that Aquinas was influenced by Avicenna (see Adamson 2013). See [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf, [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman, and [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) for the details of many related arguments for God’s existence. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Zarepour (2022: 39–40; 2025) directly responds to the charge that Avicenna commits the fallacy of composition in his proof. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Zarepour (2022: 24) calls this a version of the ‘principle of sufficient reason’ he labels ‘PSR\*’: ‘every existent whose existence is not necessary in itself has a cause.’ Also see Bäck (1992) and Richardson (2014). (For discussion of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz, see [Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro). If it is false that everything that is not necessary-in-itself has a cause, then it looks like the proof fails. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Adamson (2016: 131). There are, of course, many other views of the metaphysics of modality, that is, of necessity, contingency, and possibility. The point is simply that the force of this objection depends in part on the provision of a specific, plausible account of contingency that makes sense of something existing contingently without a cause and yet without thereby being necessary. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Adamson (2016: 131). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) In particular, this was the view of the Persian, Muslim philosopher and theologian Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī (2000 \[1095\]). In that book, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (*Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*), al-Ghazālī examines twenty doctrines associated with Avicenna and maintains that three of them—that the universe is necessarily created; that God only knows particulars ‘in a universal way’; and that only soul-based resurrection and not bodily resurrection will occur—constitute heresy in Islam. Misunderstanding the title of this book, and its contents, has created seemingly-still-pervasive myths that al-Ghazālī thought that what we call ‘philosophy’ today was incoherent, or that he somehow ended philosophy *the subject* in the Islamic world. These are nothing but myths. The term ‘falāsifa’ here refers to *those who held a specific set of doctrines and claims* and not the subject we call ‘philosophy.’ See Griffel (2021) and Hadisi (2025) for further helpful discussion. ### References [Adamson, Peter. (2002). Before Essence and Existence: Al-Kindi’s Conception of Being. ](https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/13423/pdf)[*The Journal of the History of Philosophy* ](https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/13423/pdf)[40: 297–312.](https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/13423/pdf) [Adamson, Peter. (2013). From the Necessary Existence to God. In ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/interpreting-avicenna/34B35864C0D2EE6690863CD7C3B9912A)[*Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/interpreting-avicenna/34B35864C0D2EE6690863CD7C3B9912A)[, edited by Peter Adamson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 170–189. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/interpreting-avicenna/34B35864C0D2EE6690863CD7C3B9912A) [Adamson, Peter. (2016). ](https://www.amazon.ie/Philosophy-Islamic-World-history-philosophy/dp/0198818610)[*A History of Philosophy Without any Gaps: Philosophy in the Islamic World*](https://www.amazon.ie/Philosophy-Islamic-World-history-philosophy/dp/0198818610)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press](https://www.amazon.ie/Philosophy-Islamic-World-history-philosophy/dp/0198818610) [Adamson, Peter. (2023). ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/ibn-sina-avicenna-9780192846983)[*Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/ibn-sina-avicenna-9780192846983)[.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/ibn-sina-avicenna-9780192846983)[ Oxford: Oxford University Press](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/ibn-sina-avicenna-9780192846983) [Adamson, Peter. & Benevich, Fedor. (2023). ](https://brill.com/display/book/9789004503991/BP000003.xml?language=en&srsltid=AfmBOoqschXDf2cL0zrt9mQvv8Q_fpDNB-XR98jEjPyPIUZ5FDsDUfOz#FN000038)[*The Heirs of Avicenna: Philosophy in the Islamic East, 12*](https://brill.com/display/book/9789004503991/BP000003.xml?language=en&srsltid=AfmBOoqschXDf2cL0zrt9mQvv8Q_fpDNB-XR98jEjPyPIUZ5FDsDUfOz#FN000038)[*th*](https://brill.com/display/book/9789004503991/BP000003.xml?language=en&srsltid=AfmBOoqschXDf2cL0zrt9mQvv8Q_fpDNB-XR98jEjPyPIUZ5FDsDUfOz#FN000038)[*-13*](https://brill.com/display/book/9789004503991/BP000003.xml?language=en&srsltid=AfmBOoqschXDf2cL0zrt9mQvv8Q_fpDNB-XR98jEjPyPIUZ5FDsDUfOz#FN000038)[*th*](https://brill.com/display/book/9789004503991/BP000003.xml?language=en&srsltid=AfmBOoqschXDf2cL0zrt9mQvv8Q_fpDNB-XR98jEjPyPIUZ5FDsDUfOz#FN000038)[ *Centuries*](https://brill.com/display/book/9789004503991/BP000003.xml?language=en&srsltid=AfmBOoqschXDf2cL0zrt9mQvv8Q_fpDNB-XR98jEjPyPIUZ5FDsDUfOz#FN000038)[. London: Brill, Chapter 2: The Essence-Existence Distinction.](https://brill.com/display/book/9789004503991/BP000003.xml?language=en&srsltid=AfmBOoqschXDf2cL0zrt9mQvv8Q_fpDNB-XR98jEjPyPIUZ5FDsDUfOz#FN000038) [al-Ghazālī, Abu Hamid. (2000 \[1095\]). ](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Incoherence-Philosophers-Hamid-Muhammad-al-Ghazali-ebook/dp/B083V6GCKT)[*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Incoherence-Philosophers-Hamid-Muhammad-al-Ghazali-ebook/dp/B083V6GCKT)[. Edited and translated by Michael E. Marmura. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press. (Originally written ca. 1095).](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Incoherence-Philosophers-Hamid-Muhammad-al-Ghazali-ebook/dp/B083V6GCKT) [Avicenna. (1974 \[1037\]). ](https://books.google.ie/books/about/The_Life_of_Ibn_Sina.html?id=01J8-oh4COgC&redir_esc=y)[*The Life of Ibn Sina: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*](https://books.google.ie/books/about/The_Life_of_Ibn_Sina.html?id=01J8-oh4COgC&redir_esc=y)[. 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(2022). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/necessary-existence-and-monotheism/CA986360A2187D0D23483B173BA7A781)[*Necessary Existence and Monotheism: An Avicennian Account of the Islamic Conception of Divine Unity*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/necessary-existence-and-monotheism/CA986360A2187D0D23483B173BA7A781)[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/necessary-existence-and-monotheism/CA986360A2187D0D23483B173BA7A781) [Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh. (2025). Avicenna + Zorn = Necessary Existent. In ](https://academic.oup.com/book/59814/chapter-abstract/511171539?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*The Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 11*](https://academic.oup.com/book/59814/chapter-abstract/511171539?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[, edited by Lara Buchak and Dean W. Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72–91.](https://academic.oup.com/book/59814/chapter-abstract/511171539?redirectedFrom=fulltext) ### Related Essays [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/) by Tom Metcalf [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Avicenna.pdf). ### About the Author Farbod Akhlaghi is Assistant Professor in Moral Philosophy at Trinity College Dublin. Previously, he was Stipendiary Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, and received his DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford. His primary research interests are in moral philosophy, metaphysics, and their intersections, with wider interests including the philosophy of religion, culture, epistemology, political philosophy, meta-philosophy, and the history of philosophy. 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These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Islamic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Avicenna, Farbod Akhlaghi --- ### [Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) **Published:** March 27, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: [Marc Bobro](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bobro) Category: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word count: 999 Imagine that your bicycle keeps dropping its chain. Annoyed, you take it to a bike shop to determine the cause in order to fix the problem. The mechanic informs you that the problem cannot be fixed because there is *no reason* why your bike drops its chain: it just does. It’s not that the cause of the chain dropping has not been determined: it’s that there is *no cause* why this is happening. Gottfried Leibniz’s *Principle of Sufficient Reason* (PSR) entails that the bike mechanic’s claim is patently false: “No fact can hold or be real, and no proposition can be true, unless there is a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) According to the PSR, there are no brute, unexplained facts; no uncaused events or anything happening without a cause; and no claims or beliefs are true without there being a *reason* why they’re true. This essay will explain why Leibniz accepted the PSR, its various applications, and its place in contemporary philosophy. ### 1. Leibniz’s PSR Leibniz (1646 – 1716) is the *Principle of Sufficient Reason*’s most famous proponent, but he’s not the first to adopt it. The earliest recorded application of the PSR seems to be Anaximander c. 547 BCE: “The earth stays at rest because of equality, since it is no more fitting for what is situated at the center and is equally far from the extremes to move up rather than down or sideways.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Also prior to Leibniz, Parmenides, Archimedes, Abelard, Spinoza, and Anne Conway were all proponents of some form of the principle. Leibniz never explicitly offers an argument for the PSR, but it’s suggested by his definition of truth in this passage: “… it is evident that all truths … have an a priori \[i.e., not sensory-based\] proof, or some reason why they are truths rather than not. And this is just what is meant when it is commonly said that nothing happens without a cause, or, that there is nothing without a reason.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Other remarks suggest that he might accept some reasoning like this: All statements involve a subject and a predicate, e.g., ‘Washington crossed the Delaware.’ ‘Washington’ is the subject. ‘Crossed the Delaware’ is the predicate. Leibniz claims that a *true* statement is one where the predicate “belongs” to the subject. Since Washington *did* cross the Delaware River, the statement ‘Washington crossed the Delaware’ is true.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Now, it isn’t a *necessary* truth that Washington crossed the Delaware: it could have been the case that Washington didn’t cross the Delaware; his crossing is a *contingent* truth: true, but could have been false. In the case of a *necessary* truth, e.g., ‘Mary the bachelorette is unmarried,’ it’s obvious why the predicate belongs to the subject: the predicate ‘is unmarried’ belongs to Mary because it would be a contradiction to assert otherwise. To be a bachelorette is to be unmarried. But how is it that ‘crossing the Delaware’ belongs to ‘Washington’? *There must be a reason*. Voila! We have the PSR.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. Applications of the PSR Leibniz draws some important consequences from the PSR. His ‘Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles,’ that *if what seem to be two distinct things share all of their properties, then they are actually one and the same thing*, follows from the PSR. Suppose there seemed to be two indiscernible spheres, sharing all of their properties: “each made of chemically pure iron, had a diameter of one mile, had the same temperature, color, and so on….”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) But then there would be no sufficient reason for either one of the indiscernible spheres to be in the place it currently occupies and not the other. Therefore, by the PSR, if what seem to be two things share *all* of their properties, then they are actually one and the same thing: there’s only one sphere. ![two_spheres](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/two_spheres.jpg?resize=656%2C326&ssl=1) Leibniz also uses the PSR to develop a *cosmological* argument for God’s existence. Returning to the bicycle example, say that you’re able to explain the dropping of its chain because of misaligned gears. But then a further question arises: Why were the gears misaligned? And so on and on. Explaining a contingent truth with another contingent truth faces an infinite chain of “why” questions. A chain of answers to “why” questions that fizzles out or continues indefinitely cannot constitute a sufficient reason. Such a reason must go *outside* the series of contingencies. Indeed, Leibniz claims that any successful pursuit for reasons must end with a “necessary substance”—a substance that exists necessarily, namely, God. The PSR plays an important role in Leibniz’s account of God’s creation: “Since there is an infinity of possible universes in God’s ideas, and since only one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God’s choice, a reason which determines him towards one thing rather than another.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In other words, there is no other possible universe on par with our own, because otherwise God would have created neither.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Leibniz also employs the PSR to reject Newton’s absolutist conception of space and time: “\[Newton believed that\] space is something absolutely uniform, and without the things placed in it, one point of space absolutely does not differ in any way from another point of space. Now, it follows … that it is impossible there should be a reason why God, preserving the same situations of bodies among themselves, should have placed them in space after one certain particular manner and not otherwise …. The case is the same with respect to time.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Leibniz’s own view is that space is the order of co-existing things and their states, and nothing more. Time is simply the order of successive things and their states. ### 3. Conclusion Wolff and Schopenhauer, among others, defended versions of the PSR after Leibniz, but the PSR has never been the consensus view of philosophers; Plato, Descartes, and Hume were all detractors, to name just three.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Leibniz’s concern to avoid brute facts, uncaused events, and truths without reasons, however, remains a living concern for contemporary philosophers, although the terminology often differs.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Leibniz (1), *Monadology* §32, 217. He also writes, “The fundamental principle of reasoning is that *there is nothing without a reason;* or to explain the matter more distinctly that there is no truth for which a reason does not subsist” (Leibniz \[2\], “Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason,” 172). See also Leibniz’s *Discourse on Metaphysics* §13 and his Fourth and Fifth letters to Samuel Clarke. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.13 295b11-16. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In a 1716 letter to Samuel Clarke §5.125. Leibniz may be writing this because he is frustrated with Clarke at this point in his correspondence and doesn’t want to engage in defending the principle itself. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Strictly speaking, according to Leibniz, in every true statement, the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. This is called Leibniz’s concept-containment theory of truth. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For Leibniz, every truth has its determining reasons, even those that obtain in merely possible worlds, for possible worlds too have their own sets of truths. This way of thinking seems to point to the PSR as a *necessary* truth—true in every possible world. But there is controversy over its modal status, i.e., whether it is *necessarily* true or *contingently* true. Is Leibniz saying that there cannot be a universe that has two, or more, indiscernible spheres? Or is he saying merely that *our* universe cannot contain such things? The great majority of commentators favor the former, but Owen Pikkert and Julia Jorati, for example, argue for the latter. In a letter to Bernoulli, Leibniz seems to point to the latter: “I don’t say that the vacuum, the atom, and other things of this sort are impossible, but only that they are not in agreement with divine wisdom. For even if God were to produce only that which is in accordance with the laws of wisdom, the objects of power and of wisdom are different, and should not be confused” (Leibniz \[1\], 170f.) This passage seems to indicate that indiscernible entities, such as vacua and atoms, are possible—that God has the power to actualize them—and that therefore the PSR is contingent. But this is the only passage of its sort, so the jury is still out over the modal status of Leibniz’s PSR. Anthony Savile points to another way of reading Leibniz: “To the best of my knowledge, Leibniz never explicitly chooses between these two alternatives—Sufficient Reason as a necessary truth or as a necessary methodological postulate—and commentary can do little more than point out the attractions of each…. \[T\]he methodological proposal is rooted in the thought that unless Sufficient Reason holds in full generality the world of fact will scarcely be comprehensible at all” (Savile, 37). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Black, 156. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Leibniz (1), *Monadology* §53, 220. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This move is reminiscent of the famous example of “Buridan’s Ass,” where a donkey, trying to choose between two equally enticing piles of hay and therefore lacking sufficient reason to act, starves to death. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Leibniz (1), Third Letter to Clarke, 325. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Plato says in the *Timaeus* that it is impossible for anything to come to be without a cause. This *sounds* like the PSR, however he also believes that there are things that don’t “come to be,” and some of these things (e.g., the pre-existent disordered motion before mathematical order is imposed on it by the demiurge) have no cause or reason. Regarding Descartes, even though he sometimes insists that “nothing comes from nothing,” he also claims that God “creates” metaphysical and mathematical truths. They aren’t independently true apart from God’s choosing. Descartes adds that God creates these truths by a genuinely free and indifferent act of will; there can be no reason for God’s will to create any of these truths. This is in violation of the PSR. As for Hume, although it may be in fact true that all things that exist actually do have a cause, the claim that all things that exist *must* have a cause is problematic. Hume argues that since the ideas of cause and its effect are separable, we can clearly imagine an object without its cause. In other words, even though everything that exists *may* have a sufficient reason, it is careless to judge that they in fact *do* or *must*. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Dasgupta, 12, for example, argues for a version of the PSR that is formulated in terms of “grounds.” ### References [Black, Max. “The Identity of Indiscernibles,” *Mind* 61, 1952: 153-163.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252291) [Dasgupta, Shamik, “Metaphysical Rationalism,” *Noûs* 50/2, 2016: 379–418.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nous.12082) [Jorati, Julia. “The Contingency of Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles” *Ergo* 4/31, 2017: 899-929.](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/idx/e/ergo/12405314.0004.031/--contingency-of-leibnizs-principle-of-the-identity?rgn=main;view=fulltext) [Leibniz, Gottfried. (1) Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (ed. and trans.). *G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays*. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 1989.](https://www.amazon.com/Leibniz-Philosophical-Essays-Hackett-Classics/dp/0872200620) [Leibniz, Gottfried. (2) G.H.R. Parkinson and Mary Morris (ed. and trans.). *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings*. London: Everyman, 1995.](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Leibniz-Everymans-Library/dp/0460875469/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1522189222&sr=1-1&keywords=Gottfried+Wilhelm+Leibniz%3A+Philosophical+Writings) [Melamed, Yitzhak and Martin Lin, “Principle of Sufficient Reason,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/), 2016.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/) [Pikkert, Owen. “The Modal Status of Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason.” Unpublished.](https://owenpikkert.com/) [Savile, Anthony. *Leibniz and the Monadology*. London: Routledge, 2000.](https://www.amazon.com/Routledge-Philosophy-GuideBook-Monadology-Guidebooks/dp/0415171148) [Schopenhauer, Arthur. *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.* La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974.](https://www.amazon.com/Fourfold-Principle-Sufficient-Library-Philosophy/dp/0875482015/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1522189372&sr=1-1&keywords=Schopenhauer%2C+Arthur.+On+the+Fourfold+Root+of+the+Principle+of+Sufficient+Reason) [Spinoza, Baruch. *Ethics* *and Selected Letters*. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982.](https://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Selected-Letters-Baruch-Spinoza/dp/0915145197/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1522189404&sr=1-2-fkmr0&keywords=Spinoza%2C+Baruch.+Ethics+and+Selected+Letters.+Indianapolis%3A+Hackett%2C+1982.) ### Related Essays [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson ### About the Author [Marc Bobro](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bobro) is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Santa Barbara City College in California. He holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Washington, Seattle, an MA in philosophy from King’s College London, and a BA in philosophy from the University of Arizona, Tucson. He specializes in the history of modern philosophy, especially Leibniz. Bobro is also the bassist and tubist for the mythopoetic punk band Crying 4 Kafka and collaborates on art with Elizabeth Folk. [https://marcbobro.academia.edu](https://marcbobro.academia.edu/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Bobro, Leibniz --- ### [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) **Published:** November 14, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to cosmological, often first-cause, arguments for the existence of God. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Categories: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Islamic Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/islamic-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word count: 1000 Why is there something rather than nothing? Intuitively, it could have been that nothing existed at all. Yet you and I are here, plus a whole universe of other stuff. We had parents, and our parents had parents, who had parents, and on and on, back to prebiotic chemicals, stars, and the Big Bang. Yet where did *that* come from? Surely there has to be some sort of ultimate explanation, right? *Cosmological* arguments for God’s existence propose that God is the ultimate explanation or cause of everything. Such arguments begin with an empirical observation of the world—that there is motion, or causes, or just ordinary things that exist—and conclude this observation is explained by God’s existence.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay surveys three types of cosmological arguments. ### 1. First-Cause Cosmological Arguments St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE) argued that all the causation and motion we observe can be traced back to God, who is an uncaused cause or unmoved mover.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) In summary: 1. Causes and motion exist. 2. All causation or motion requires some prior cause or motion; things can’t happen nor move for no reason. 3. But this chain of causation or motion cannot go back infinitely; this seems impossible. 4. Therefore, there must be a first, uncaused cause, or first, unmoved mover. 5. The most plausible example of an uncaused cause or unmoved mover would be God. 6. Therefore, God exists. To challenge (2), one might argue that things *can* just happen for no reason.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) To challenge (3), one might question why exactly there can’t be an infinite regress of causes or motion: while this is puzzling, so are uncaused causes.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Some also argue that there’s a contradiction in the argument: if *every* cause or motion requires some prior cause, then how would God or anything else be an exception?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) To challenge the inference from (4) to (5), the existence of God, one might ask why the first cause or unmoved mover can’t be a mindless event: it wouldn’t have to be God or a god.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 2. The Kalām Cosmological Argument While the First-Cause Argument holds that God is the ultimate originator of *all* causation or motion, the kalām cosmological argument is more limited: it’s only about God’s being the cause of the universe’s *beginning to exist*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In summary: 1. If something begins to exist, its existence was caused by something. 2. The universe, including time and space, cannot go back infinitely far in time. 3. Therefore, the universe began to exist. 4. Therefore, the universe’s existence was caused by something. 5. The most-plausible example of a creator of time and space would be something like God. 6. Therefore, God exists. The standard support for (1) is both intuitive and empirical. If things could begin to exist uncaused, why doesn’t that happen more often? In terms of our experience, that just doesn’t happen. Following William Lane Craig, the leading contemporary proponent of this argument, we can distinguish both philosophical and scientific evidence for (2).[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The main philosophical evidence is that, allegedly, infinities cannot exist in the real physical world: e.g., a hotel with infinitely many rooms could be full, and yet accommodate infinitely many buses each containing infinitely many passengers without having to kick anyone out.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) The main scientific evidence comes from cosmology and thermodynamics, both of which suggest that the universe cannot have an infinite past. Still, philosophers and scientists have challenged both of these alleged lines of evidence: e.g., there is some scientific evidence that the universe did not begin to exist after all.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) As for (5), again, why would the creator have to be God? Why couldn’t it have been some mindless force instead? Defenders of the argument sometimes reply as follows:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) All causes we know of are either mechanical or personal, where mechanical causes are just events that follow laws of nature, and personal causes are intentional—perhaps freely-willed—choices. Yet laws of nature seem to be a part of time, and the creation of the universe was allegedly the creation of time itself. Therefore, defenders allege, the creation couldn’t have been a consequence of a simple law of nature. ### 3. Contingency Arguments Cosmological arguments from contingency depend on the concepts of contingency and necessity. *Contingent* beings actually exist, but could have not existed. In contrast, a *necessary* being exists and could not possibly not have existed. The same terms describe truths or facts: A contingent fact is actually the case but could have not been the case, and a necessary truth is true, must be true and couldn’t have been false.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716 CE) developed the most famous contingency cosmological argument.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) In summary: 1. Every contingent being needs an explanation for its existence, the cause or reason for its existence. 2. Contingent beings can’t be the cause or reason for their own existence. 3. Therefore, the explanation for the existence of contingent beings must be some non-contingent being; and since it’s non-contingent, that being must exist necessarily. 4. The most-plausible necessarily existing explanation for all the contingent beings would be God. 5. Therefore, God exists. The support for (1) is a principle sometimes called the ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason,’ according to which things don’t just happen for no reason at all.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) The support for (2) is intuition or experience: it seems strange for a contingent being to somehow explain its own existence, and that certainly doesn’t happen in our experience. Some critics challenge the Principle of Sufficient Reason. A few others argue that a being could potentially explain itself.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) One might also question (4). Perhaps this necessary being could be some sort of mindless entity or law of nature. ### 4. Conclusion Cosmological arguments enlist both scientific and philosophical evidence to make their cases. The only general objection to all of them challenges the last step: to conclude that the ultimate explanation is God, and not something else. To claim that the universe began to exist is counter-intuitive, but so is claiming that it never began to exist. It’s mysterious to think that God caused it and mysterious to imagine that there’s no first cause. Cosmological arguments attempt to make progress against these mysteries. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Cosmological arguments are *a posteriori* arguments, meaning that the justification for at least one premise of the argument is empirical or sensory-based, in contrast to *a priori* arguments, which depend on thought and reflections alone for the justification for their premises. An example of an *a priori* argument for God’s existence is the ontological arguments; further examples of *a posteriori* arguments for God’s existence include design arguments. See [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman, [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Tom Metcalf and [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Tom Metcalf for further discussion of the *a priori* and *a posteriori* distinction. Note that philosophers generally regard cosmological arguments to be the most-persuasive arguments for the existence of God (PhilPapers n.d.). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Aquinas (2017 \[1920\], I, q.2, a3). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Smith (1993: 121-23) on quantum mechanics, plus [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Cameron (2021) on infinite regress arguments and see below at n. 9 for some discussion of whether actual infinities are possible. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) A version of this objection is sometimes stated in the form of a question: “What caused God?” Defenders of cosmological arguments typically argue that God, unlike the events in the universe, does not need a cause after all, perhaps because he is a necessary being, or did not begin to exist. See the following two types of cosmological arguments in this entry. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See e.g. O’Connor (2004) and Rasmussen (2009) for attempts to bridge this gap. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Craig (1979: 42); Richardson (2021). The argument goes back at least as far as al-Ghazālī (c. 1058-1111 CE). For more on Al-Ghazālī see also [Al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Craig (1979: 65); see Reichenbach (2021: Section 7) for more-detailed discussion of these steps. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Oppy et al. (2021, Section 5.1). Here’s the example in more detail: If infinitely many people arrive and want rooms at the hotel, the hotel management can move all the existing guests into the room that’s double their current room number, thereby freeing up infinitely many new rooms without having to kick anyone out. As for infinitely many infinitely-large buses, imagine that each room at the hotel is numbered by a positive integer: 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. Imagine that each of these infinitely large buses is numbered by a prime number greater than 2 as in 3, 5, 7, 11, and so on. And each passenger in each of the buses is numbered by a positive integer, as in 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. Now when the infinitely many buses arrive, move the hotel guest in room 1 into room 21 = 2; the hotel guest in room 2 into room 22 = 4; the hotel guest in room 3 into room 23 = 8, and so on. Move the first passenger in bus #3 into room 31 = 3; the second passenger into room 32 = 9; the third passenger into room 33 = 27; and so on. Move the first passenger in bus #5 into room 51 = 5; the second passenger into room 52 = 25; the third passenger into room 53 = 125; and so on. Move the first passenger in bus #7 into room 71 = 7; the second passenger into room 72 = 49; and so on. The infinitely many infinitely-large buses’ passengers can all get rooms at the hotel without kicking anyone out. See Pires (2016) for more discussion. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) It may go back infinitely in time after all, or it may be wrong to consider it an event (Grünbaum 1991). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See e.g. Craig (1994: 117) and compare Morriston (2000). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk for more explanation of these concepts. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Aquinas (2017 \[1920\], I, q.2, a3) offered a sort of contingency-based argument too. See also Gale and Pruss (1999). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro for an overview. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Maybe there could be closed loops in time. See e.g. Lewis (1976) and [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor Cyr, § 3. ### References [Aquinas, T. (2017 \[1920\]). ](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/)[*The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas*](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/)[ (2 ed.). Ed. Kevin Knight. Tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. ](https://www.newadvent.org/summa/) [Cameron, R. (2021). Infinite Regress Arguments. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/infinite-regress/) [Craig, W. L. (1979). ](https://wipfandstock.com/9781579104382/the-kalam-cosmological-argument/)[*The Kalām Cosmological Argument*](https://wipfandstock.com/9781579104382/the-kalam-cosmological-argument/)[. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock.](https://wipfandstock.com/9781579104382/the-kalam-cosmological-argument/) [Craig, W. L. (1994). Reasonable Faith. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books.](https://www.crossway.org/books/reasonable-faith-tpb/) [Gale, R. M. and Pruss, A. R. (1999). A new cosmological argument. Religious Studies, 35(4), 461-76.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/new-cosmological-argument/FC234A68C63ECB3D7CB78F88F9C4C572) [Grünbaum, A. (1991). Creation as a Pseudo-Explanation in Current Physical Cosmology. ](https://www.proquest.com/docview/1303453496)[*Erkenntnis*](https://www.proquest.com/docview/1303453496)[, 35(1), 233-254.](https://www.proquest.com/docview/1303453496) [Lewis, D. (1976). The paradoxes of time travel. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009616)[*American Philosophical Quarterly*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009616)[, 13(2), 145-152.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009616) [Morriston, W. (2000). Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. ](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol17/iss2/1/)[*Faith and Philosophy*](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol17/iss2/1/)[, 17(2), 149-169.](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol17/iss2/1/) [O’Connor, T. (2004). “And This All Men Call God.” ](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss4/1/)[*Faith and Philosophy*](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss4/1/)[, 21(4), 417-35.](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss4/1/) [Oppy, G.; Hájek, A.; Easwaran, K.; and Mancosu, P. (2021). Infinity. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 edition.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/infinity/) [PhilPapers. (N.d.). Survey results. ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all)[*2020 PhilPapers Survey*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all)[. ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all) [Pires, A. (2016). Hospitality at the Grand Hilbert Hotel. ](https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2016/pires-hilbert-hotel)[*The Institute Letter*](https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2016/pires-hilbert-hotel)[, Spring 2016. ](https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2016/pires-hilbert-hotel) [Rasmussen, J. (2009). From a Necessary Being to God. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40270260)[*International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40270260)[, 66(1), 1-13.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40270260) [Richardson, K. (2021). Causation in Arabic and Islamic Thought. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/arabic-islamic-causation/) [Reichenbach, B. (2021). Cosmological Arguments. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/cosmological-argument/) [Smith, Q. (1993). ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.001.0001/acprof-9780198263838)[*The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.001.0001/acprof-9780198263838)[. In W. L. Craig and Q. Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 108-140.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.001.0001/acprof-9780198263838) ### Related Essays [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Mark Bobro [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Tom Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Tom Metcalf [Al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** cosmological arguments, God, metcalf, natural theology, theism --- ### [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) **Published:** June 2, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Chelsea Haramia Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics"), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 You probably shouldn’t steal. Common sense tells us that stealing is wrong. But sometimes stealing seems less wrong, or not wrong at all, after we discover the *cause* of the stealing behavior. For example, if the fact that your family is starving causes you to steal a loaf of bread, many would say that you are not as blameworthy as someone who steals out of greed or spite. And imagine a kleptomaniac who cannot control her stealing behavior. We probably shouldn’t blame her for those actions (though we might encourage her to consult a therapist about her condition). But why shouldn’t we blame the kleptomaniac? That is to say, how are we justified in holding the kleptomaniac morally responsible? One good reason not to blame the kleptomaniac is that she cannot help her behavior. She possesses a psychological problem that is out of her control. That’s why some defendants are acquitted on grounds of insanity. If you are not in control of your actions, you are not *responsible* for those actions. But what if *every one* of our actions is actually out of our control? That is, what if only *seems* as if we have the freedom to choose between actions, but we are in fact as undeserving of blame as, say, the severely mentally ill? There are many philosophically interesting answers to this question, and they deal with some famous and famously difficult problems surrounding the concept of free will. The concept of free will brings with it the idea that at least some of our choices are ours alone— we are fully in control of them, and therefore we are fully responsible for them. Free will is the basis for moral responsibility, or so many have argued. Philosophers commonly say that ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’ What does this mean? To justifiably tell someone that she (morally) ought to do something, it would also have to be the case that she *can* do that thing. Suppose I tell you that you ought to cure cancer. If you did cure cancer, you could prevent large amounts of suffering and many premature deaths. It would be a really good thing. Nonetheless, given that, in all likelihood, it would be impossible for you to cure cancer, it seems absurd to say that you have a moral responsibility to do so, or that you *ought* to. Importantly, then, you are not blameworthy for your failure to cure cancer. It seems that we are only justified in blaming (or praising) people for their actions—or believing that they are responsible for their actions—when they are able to *freely* *choose* one action over others. As we have seen, this freedom is the subject of extensive philosophical analysis, but our everyday sense of moral responsibility hangs in the balance.1 ![Praising someone for what they did.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/praise-and-encouragement.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1) Praising someone for what they did. ### 1. Libertarian Free Will Those who claim that we have *libertarian* free will argue that we make free choices when it is possible that we could have done otherwise than what we actually did.2 When this condition obtains, we are justified in blaming (or praising) the person who made the choice, i.e., holding that person morally responsible for the action. The idea that we possess free *in this sense* will has a lot of intuitive force behind it, but philosophers have struggled with the question of what could allow for free will in the face of concerns about the causal laws of the world. ### 2. Hard Determinism *Hard determinists* appeal to the causal laws of the world in order to challenge the claim that we have free will, in the sense of ‘free will’ that both they and libertarians accept. Everything that happens can be fully explained by the causal history of what happened before. Though it seems as if we have choices, it is always the case that, for any choice we are faced with, only one of the seemingly available paths will ultimately be taken, and the other paths were never truly available: we cannot do otherwise.3 To suggest that we have free will is to suggest that we are somehow outside of and unaffected by the causal chain of events—that we can be the sole source of our actions—and the hard determinist argues that this is unsupported by facts about how the world works.4 ### 3. Compatibilism The hard determinist may then find this to be proof that moral responsibility is an illusion, or she may attempt to retain a viable sense of moral responsibility in the face of determinism. *Compatibilists* argue for the latter: they claim that *determinism* and *moral responsibility* are actually compatible.5 By appealing to claims about an agent’s internal states, compatibilists argue that people can be held responsible when they are acting according to certain sorts of dispositions, e.g., their own beliefs and desires. And others have pointed out that we still have strong intuitions of responsibility even about cases that are explicitly deterministic.6 ### 4. Revisionism/Illusionism The power of these intuitions of responsibility cause some hard determinists to argue for a revisionist approach. They accept that appeals to moral responsibility are theoretically unjustified, but they nonetheless assert that we are pragmatically justified in accepting the illusion that people actually have moral responsibility, because practices of praising and blaming are still useful, and abandoning them could lead to chaos.7 ### 5. Incompatibilism Finally, there are those who maintain that determinism and moral responsibility are utterly incompatible. Importantly, both hard determinists and libertarians about free will may hold this view. The libertarian can then tout this incompatibility as a virtue of his view. If the two really are incompatible, then only libertarian free will allows us to retain our very commonsense intuitions of moral responsibility.8 The hard determinist will bite the bullet and claim that, if the two really are incompatible, we are being intellectually dishonest by maintaining practices of moral responsibility, given that we can always trace the causes of an action to something that is ultimately fully outside of the control of the agent.9 This is an ancient philosophical problem that has given rise to an expanding and ever more nuanced set of views. But we can all agree that anyone who grapples with the problem of free will must also take seriously questions of moral responsibility. ### Notes 1 See Jonah Nagashima’s [Free Will and Free Choice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") for more philosophical analysis of freedom of the will, and for the metaphysical details underlying some of the views discussed here. 2 See [Robert Kane’s *The Significance of Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-significance-of-free-will-9780195126563?cc=us&lang=en&) for more information on libertarian free will. 3 Some interpretations of quantum-mechanical results suggest that the outcomes of some measurements are indeterministic, but it is difficult to argue that (1) decisions are quantum-mechanical measurements and (2) wholly random events count as “free” choices. 4 See [Baron d’Holbach’s *System of Nature* (translated by H.D. Robinson, New York: Burt Franklin, 1970)](https://www.amazon.com/System-Nature-Vol-1/dp/1406813591/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=5N9KH60NPXK8273WV3EJ) or [Galen Strawson’s “The Bounds of Freedom” (in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will,* edited by Robert Kane, Oxford University Press: New York, 2002)](http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548) for more information on the determinist position. 5 See [Daniel Dennet’s “I Could Not Have Done Otherwise—So What?” (in *Free Will,* edited by Robert Kane, Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 2002)](https://www.amazon.com/Free-Will-Robert-Kane/dp/0631221026) or [John Martin Fischer’s “Compatibilism” (in *Four Views on Free Will*. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 2007)](https://www.amazon.com/Four-Views-Free-Martin-Fischer/dp/1405134860) for more information on the compatibilist position. 6 These are commonly referred to as “Frankfurt-style cases,” made famous in [Harry Frankfurt’s “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (in the *Journal of Philosophy* 66: 829-39, 1969)](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2023833). See also [John Martin Fischer’s “Frankfurt-style Examples, Responsibility and Semi-Compatibilism” (in *Free Will,* edited by Robert Kane, Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 2002).](https://www.amazon.com/Free-Will-Robert-Kane/dp/0631221026) 7 See [Saul Smilansky’s “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusionism” (in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will,* edited by Robert Kane, Oxford University Press: New York, 2002)](http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195178548) and [Manuel Vargas’ “Revisionism” (in *Four Views on Free Will*, Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 2007)](https://www.amazon.com/Four-Views-Free-Martin-Fischer/dp/1405134860/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1533231359&sr=1-1&keywords=four+views+on+free+will) for more information on the revisionist position. 8 See [Peter van Inwagen’s *An Essay on Free Will* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983)](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/an-essay-on-free-will-9780198249245?cc=us&lang=en&) for more information on the libertarian incompatibilist. 9 See [Derk Pereboom’s “Hard Incompatibilism” (in *Four Views on Free Will*, Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 2007)](https://www.amazon.com/Four-Views-Free-Martin-Fischer/dp/1405134860/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1533231359&sr=1-1&keywords=four+views+on+free+will) for more information on the determinist incompatibilist position, also known as “hard incompatibilism” or “hard determinism.” ### Related Essays [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson ### About the Author [Chelsea Haramia](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Haramia/) is an associate professor of philosophy at Spring Hill College. She has a Ph.D. in philosophy from CU Boulder, a graduate certificate in gender and women’s studies from CU Boulder, and a B.A. in philosophy from the University of Illinois at Chicago. She is currently interested in metaethics, population and procreation ethics, environmental ethics, bioethics, and feminist philosophy. She once did sixteen backflips in a row, but these days she mostly practices mental gymnastics. [ChelseaHaramia.com](http://ChelseaHaramia.com) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** free will, Haramia, responsibility --- ### [Laws of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) **Published:** February 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Michael Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella/) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science") Word Count: 1000 This essay will present the main reasons that scientists and philosophers of science have considered laws of nature to be an integral part of scientific knowledge. It will discuss some of the difficulties associated with the practical application of laws of nature, and will conclude with a brief description of the contemporary debate over whether laws of nature actually exist. ### 1. Securing Scientific Knowledge Laws of nature, examples of which include Newton’s laws of motion and the law of conservation of energy, are *exceptionless regularities that are assumed to be fundamental features of nature*.1 Once we know the fundamental features of nature, we can use them to explain (or predict) all sorts of phenomena, which is what makes science so successful. As a simple example, suppose we observe a one-kilogram object accelerate at 5 m/s2 after being subjected to a 5 N force.2 If we want to know why the object accelerated in that way, we can explain it using Newton’s 2nd law of motion. According to the Traditional View3 of science (going at least as far back as Aristotle), science is capable of supplying incontrovertible truths about nature. The only style of reasoning that philosophers believe to be capable of supplying incontrovertible truths about anything is deductive logic, and so it was assumed that scientific reasoning must follow deductive logic in order to deliver its truths about nature (e.g. Carnap, 1966; Hempel, 1962). Deductive logic usually takes the form of an argument in which a series of premises supports a conclusion in a way that *if the premises of a deductive argument are true, then the conclusion is guaranteed to be true*. Arguments with this form are called “deductively valid.” Our example above can be converted into a deductively valid argument like this: 1. This object has a mass of 1 kg and is subjected to a force of 5 N. 2. For any object, if the object is subjected to a force of X and the object’s mass is Y, then the object’s acceleration is X divided by Y. 3. Therefore, this object’s acceleration is 5 m/s2. Premise 1 describes the starting conditions, Premise 2 is Newton’s 2nd law of motion, and the conclusion is a description of the phenomenon. If both premises are true, then they guarantee that the conclusion (3) must also be true, and what better explanation for a phenomenon could we expect than a demonstration of why the phenomenon is *guaranteed to happen* given the initial conditions? The explanation becomes a prediction if we know the initial conditions but have not yet observed the results. By the end of the Enlightenment, repeated success in using laws of nature to explain and predict a wide variety of phenomena had popularized the notion that the universe is like a giant clockwork mechanism in which scientists, given a precise account of current conditions, could predict the exact state of the universe at any point in the future. Of course, in order for a deductive argument to successfully guarantee the truth of its conclusion, the premises themselves must be true. In our example above, careful measurement can support the truth of the first premise because it is a description of a single object and event. The second premise, however, is a generalization rather than a direct observation of a single event, and normally there is no guarantee that such a generalization will continue to hold in the future. A famous example: Even the past observation of ten thousand swans, all of which are white, is no guarantee that the next swan observed will not be black. A law of nature, on the other hand, is a necessary truth about our universe rather than a mere regularity or transient pattern. Therefore, in order to ensure that both premises are true, Premise 2 must be a law of nature. ### 2. Practical Complications In practice, it turns out that there is a persistent mismatch between what is predicted by a law of nature and what is actually observed (see, e.g., Cartwright, 1983; Mitchell, 1997). In our example above, given the initial conditions, it is very unlikely that the acceleration of the object will turn out to be *exactly* 5 m/s2 because confounding factors (like air resistance or other forces) are always acting on the object, even under highly controlled conditions. In response to this problem, defenders of the Traditional View argue that if we were able to take into account every confounding factor and sum them all, we would indeed get a perfectly accurate prediction, even if this is almost never a practical possibility. Unfortunately, the problem shows up again and becomes more pronounced when we move away from physics. In fields like geology, biology and psychology, the dynamic systems under study are highly variable and ever-changing, and so any regularities we observe are almost never universal or exceptionless. If this means that such fields do not include any actual laws of nature, then their scientific status is seriously threatened because, according to the Traditional View, real scientific knowledge is always based on laws of nature. A commonly proposed solution is to say that laws in those fields are such that they hold as long as a set of standard conditions apply, with the standards being supplied by a theory from the relevant field. Such laws are often called *ceteris paribus* laws4 (Schiffer, 1991). ### 3. A Contemporary Debate Perhaps the most important contemporary debate in this area concerns whether nature really contains any laws at all. Critics of laws of nature (and of the Traditional View in general) use the persistent mismatch between prediction and reality described in the previous section as evidence that there are no exceptionless regularities in nature. Further, the critics argue that contemporary accounts of science deny that science aims to supply incontrovertible truths, thus undermining the need for laws of nature in the first place (e.g. Mitchell, 1997; Woodward and Hitchcock, 2003; Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000). Proponents of laws of nature, including some who no longer follow the Traditional View, argue that even if scientific explanations and predictions do not rely on laws of nature, nature itself may still contain such laws, and nature’s laws may yet be uncovered and clarified by continued scientific investigation (e.g. Lange, 1999; Rupert, 2006). ### Notes 1 There are various alternative ways to characterize laws of nature. For an overview, see Hooker (1998). 2 For those unfamiliar, the standard unit for acceleration (change in velocity per second) is meters per second per second, represented as (m/s)/s, or just m/s2. The unit of force is called a “Newton,” which is short for (kg ▪ m)/s2. 3 There are many distinct threads running through the history of our understanding how science works. What I’m calling the “Traditional View” is just the most dominant thread. 4 “Ceteris paribus” means *all else being equal or held constant.* ### References [Aristotle. *Posterior Analytics*. Oxford University Press, 1993.](http://www.amazon.com/By-Aristotle-Posterior-Analytics-Edition/dp/B008WD9724/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392604614&sr=8-1&keywords=Aristotle.+Posterior+Analytics.+Oxford+University+Press%2C+1993.) [Cartwright, Nancy. *How the Laws of Physics Lie*. Oxford University Press, 1983.](http://www.amazon.com/How-Laws-Physics-Nancy-Cartwright/dp/0198247044/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392604651&sr=8-1&keywords=How+the+Laws+of+Physics+Lie) [Carnap, Rudolph. “The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction,” in *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, ed. Martin Gardner. New York: Basic Books, 1966. 12-16.](http://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Foundations-Physics-Introduction-Philosophy/dp/B0000CN9NI/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1392604678&sr=8-2&keywords=Philosophical+Foundations+of+Physics) [Hempel, Carl “Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation” in *Philosophy of Science: the Central Issues*. M. Curd & J. A. Cover eds. New York: Norton, 1998 \[1962\]. 685-694.](http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Science-The-Central-Issues/dp/0393971759/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392604731&sr=8-1&keywords=Philosophy+of+Science%3A+the+Central+Issues) [Hooker, C.A. “Laws, natural.” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. ed. E. Craig. London: Routledge, 1996. Web. ](http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Q056SECT4) [Lange, Marc. “Laws, Counterfactuals, Stability, and Degrees of Lawhood” *Philosophy of Science*, 66:2. 1999. 243-267](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/188645?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103462511807) [Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. “Thinking About Mechanisms” *Philosophy of Science*, 67. 2000. 1-25.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/188611?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103462511807) [Mitchell, Sandra. “Pragmatic Laws” *Philosophy of Science*, 4. 1997. S467-S479.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/188426?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103462511807) [Rupert, Robert “*Ceteris Paribus* Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties” *Noûs*, 42(3). 2008. 349-380.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00685.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Schiffer, Stephen. “*Ceteris paribus* Laws.” *Mind*, 100:1. 1991. 1-17.](http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/C/397/1.extract) [Woodward, J. & Hitchcock, C. “Explanatory Generalizations” *Noûs*, 37:1. 2003. 1-24. ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00426/abstract) ### Related Essays [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/ "The Problem of Induction") by Kenneth Blake Vernon [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths") by Thomas Metcalf [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr ### About the Author [Michael Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella/) is a philosophy instructor at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He earned a bachelor’s degree in biology in 1993 and a master’s in biology in 1995. He then taught high school science classes for several years before going back to grad school at the University of Colorado to earn his Ph.D. in philosophy in 2011. Unsurprisingly, he specializes in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. Mike also enjoys the classic summertime Colorado activities like hiking, biking, camping, gardening, and going to bluegrass music festivals. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Science **Tags:** laws, Zerella --- ### [The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) **Published:** April 10, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Andrew Chapman Category: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/ "Epistemology") Word Count: 1000 ### 1. The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge What is knowledge?1 To get clear on the notion of *knowledge,* many philosophers have proposed that we provide an *analysis of the concept of knowledge*. To provide such an analysis would be to lay out and explain each of the components of that concept. The thought is that the individual conceptual components will be *individually necessary* (each one of them required) and *jointly sufficient* (all of them together enough) for the concept under analysis.2 Since the time of Plato’s dialogue *Theaetetus*, a near-universally accepted analysis of the concept of knowledge, what we can call the **traditional analysis of knowledge*,*** was that knowledge was (i) justified (ii) true (iii) belief. First, the thought is that a person must *believe* something to know it. It would seem contradictory to claim that Max *knows*, but that Max doesn’t *believe*, that his tennis racquet is in the closet. Second, it would seem contradictory to claim that Max *knows* that his tennis racquet is in the closet while his racquet is actually back at the court. Max might *believe* that his racquet is in the closet *and be wrong*. He might *believe that he knows* that his racquet is in the closet *and be wrong*. He might even *have good evidence* that his racquet is in the closet and *nonetheless be wrong*. In none of these cases would we say that Max *knows* where his racquet is, since what he believes is *false*. Finally, it seems as though Max needs some *justification*, *evidence*, or *good reason* to believe that his racquet is in the closet in order for him to *know* that it is.3 Suppose that Max has no good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet. If Max just *guesses* that it’s in the closet, even if he *serendipitously* gets things right, it seems as though Max, while having a true belief, has an *unjustified* true belief, and hence, does not have knowledge.4 ![Edmund Gettier.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/edmund_l_gettier_iii_ca_1960s_umass.jpg?resize=656%2C973&ssl=1)Edmund Gettier. ### 2. The Problem Edmund Gettier’s 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” presented a serious challenge to the traditional analysis. A conceptual analysis can be rebutted by providing apparent instances of the concept that do not meet the analysis (challenging the necessity of the analysis) or by providing concepts that apparently conform to the analysis that are nonetheless not examples of the concept under analysis (challenging the sufficiency of the analysis). In Gettier’s paper, he provides two structurally similar examples of the latter sort—he gives two cases of apparent instances of justified true belief that nonetheless don’t appear to be instances of knowledge. Let’s look at the more famous of the two. Smith and Jones have both applied for a job. The president of the company tells Smith that Jones, and not Smith, will get the job. Further, Smith has just counted all of the coins in Jones’s pocket—there are ten coins in Jones’s pocket. Smith seems to have excellent evidence to believe that *Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.* From this, Smith infers, and subsequently believes, that *the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket*. However, unbeknownst to Smith, *he too has ten coins in his pocket* and further, a last-minute judgment changes the decision regarding who gets the job from Jones to Smith. So it is *true* that *the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket*, since it is Smith, who has ten coins in his pocket, who will get the job. In this case, Smith has a justified true belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. However, most of us are reluctant to attribute *knowledge* to Smith in this case. It seems that even though he has a justified true belief, Smith just got lucky that his belief is true. If this is right, then Gettier has shown that justification, truth, and belief are *insufficient* for knowledge, and hence, that the traditional analysis is wrong. ### 3. A Proposed Solution The widespread response to the Gettier Problem (as it has come to be known) has been to admit that justification, truth, and belief are *individually necessary* but *jointly insufficient* for knowledge and to propose some *fourth condition* on knowledge. An initially popular proposal was to ban beliefs resulting from false premises from counting as knowledge. Notice that in Gettier’s original case, Smith *infers* his true belief (that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket) from a false belief (that Jones will get the job and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket). However, this response was quickly challenged by epistemologists like Roderick Chisholm, Alvin Goldman, and Carl Ginet. Consider this famous counter-example from Goldman to the new proposed analysis: You are driving through the country. It seems to you as though every so often, you pass a barn. Unbeknownst to you, you are in Fake Barn Country, where nearly all of what seem to be barns are actually just convincing barn façades. At one point, you turn to your travel companion, point to an apparent barn, and say, “There’s a barn.” Luckily, you have managed to point to the one actual barn in Fake Barn Country, so your claim that *there’s a barn* is true. Do you *know* that the thing you point to is a barn? You’ve got a justified true belief that hasn’t been inferred from any false beliefs, but it still doesn’t seem as though you’ve got knowledge. If this is right, then it shows that the *no false beliefs* fourth condition will not do the trick. ### 4. Conclusion Notice that, in discussions of the Gettier Problem, we’ve been mentioning *luck* a lot. Recognition of this fact has led many contemporary epistemologists to focus their efforts on an analysis of the concept of *epistemic luck*. If we can determine exactly what this sort of luck is, the thought goes, we can determine (i) what sorts of it are knowledge-destroying5 and (ii) how best to block these sorts of knowledge-destroying luck.6 ### Notes 1 There are at least three (initially apparently distinct) sorts of knowledge: propositional knowledge (knowledge-that), ability knowledge (knowledge-how), and acquaintance knowledge (knowledge-of). For example, you *know that* you are reading a 1000-word philosophy article, you *know how* to read, and you *know-of* your best friend or your partner. This essay (and much of contemporary Anglo-American epistemology) is concerned with propositional knowledge, *knowledge-that*, only. 2 Some technical terminology: The object to be analyzed is called the *analysandum* (pl. *analysanda*) and the analysis or analyzing object is called the *analysans* (pl. *analysans*). 3 For an introduction to the concept of epistemic justification, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. It is worth noting that there is vigorous debate amongst epistemologists regarding whether the terms *justification*, *evidence*, and *reasons* mean the same thing. For the purposes of this essay, we can treat the terms as relevantly synonymous. 4 Consider your most pessimistic acquaintance’s frequent apocalyptic predictions. When things do occasionally go wrong and she declares, triumphantly, “I knew it!,” you’re not inclined to claim that she *knew* anything of the sort—she’s just a petulant naysayer whose naysayings are occasionally *true*, but nonetheless *unjustified*, and certainly not *knowledge*. 5 See Engel (1992) 6 See Pritchard (2005) ### References [Engel, Mylan, Jr. “Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 30.2 (1992): 59-75.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb01715.x/abstract;jsessionid=D87548055FD7E76C08336CA2598AFC73.f01t03?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Gettier, Edmund L. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” *Analysis* 23.6 (1963): 121. ](http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1000/Gettier.pdf) [Goldman, Alvin I. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 73.20 (1976): 771-91.](http://www.accionfilosofica.com/misc/1346105741crs.pdf) [Plato, *Theaetetus.*](http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.html) [Pritchard, Duncan. *Epistemic Luck*. New York: Oxford UP, 2005.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/epistemic-luck-9780199229789?q=epistemic%20luck&lang=en&cc=us) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. ### About the Author [Andrew Chapman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Chapman/) holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder, an MA in philosophy from Northern Illinois University and a BA in philosophy and a BM in bassoon and sound recording technology from Ithaca College. He specializes in epistemology, metaethics, and the history of philosophy (especially Kant and the 20th Century Anglophone and Phenomenological traditions). When not philosophizing, Andrew is skiing, hiking, listening to great music, or playing the bassoon. ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology **Tags:** Chapman, Gettier, justification, knowledge --- ### [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/) **Published:** October 31, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** "Ecstatic experiences” are when we seem to joyfully “lose” or transcend or go beyond ourselves. This essay introduces some philosophical issues about ecstatic experiences. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/), [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word Count: 1000 Kissing someone with whom you are falling in love. Dancing and singing along at a concert. Being “in the zone” while playing sports or creating art. Meditating until thoughts and desires cease and your mind becomes still. Seeming to encounter a spiritual being or reality. These are examples of “*ecstatic experiences*.” “Ecstatic” comes from the Greek word “ekstasis”—*ecstasy*—meaning “to stand outside oneself.” When we seem to joyfully “lose” or transcend or go beyond ourselves, those are ecstatic experiences. This essay introduces some philosophical issues about ecstatic experiences.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![Eminem. "Lose Yourself." Still photo from the film "8 Mile." 2002.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/lose-yourself.jpg?resize=656%2C438&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/lose-yourself.jpg?ssl=1) Eminem. *Lose Yourself* . Directed by Eminem and Philip G. Atwell. Interscope Records, 2002. Still image from [music video](https://youtu.be/_Yhyp-_hX2s?si=kOixbM4xh293s8ZW). ### 1. Types and Structure There are many examples of ecstatic experiences, such as: - romantic ecstasy, where we seem to become “lost” in our partner during erotic activity; - bodily ecstasy, like an exhilarating rush from intense exercise or pleasure from eating delicious food;[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - aesthetic ecstasy, such as feeling absorbed in the beauty of art or nature; - religious ecstasy, such as mystical experiences where you feel “one” with a spiritual reality. No matter what form they take, ecstatic experiences all involve feeling as though you “lose yourself.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This doesn’t mean getting physically lost, but rather *mentally* losing your sense of self. So, ecstatic experiences involve a shift in perspective from normal experience. In ordinary, everyday awareness, we are typically aware of ourselves as separate from everything else.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) We are conscious of a basic difference between ourselves and objects, everything that’s *not* ourselves. Also, we feel largely *in control* of our thoughts and behavior. So, overall, we have *possession* of ourselves—“a hold on ourselves.” In ecstatic experiences, we seem to undergo a *loss* of self, what philosopher Iris Murdoch (1919-1999) calls an “*unselfing*.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This consists of losing self-awareness, or just becoming much less self-aware, and feeling as though we lose control of ourselves: e.g., involuntarily shaking and shouting; feeling “swept away” and unable to focus on anything else, etc.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) We *lose* *ourselves* because our mental attention *finds something* *else*—our romantic partner, a song—totally captivating.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) It pulls our attention away from ourselves, causing an “out-of-self” experience. Ecstasy can then seem to involve a loss of boundaries separating subject and object, where we feel like we become “one” with what captivates us—sometimes even with *everything*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) It’s important to note, however, that while ecstasy seems to involve lessening or even eliminating our sense of self, we nonetheless remain *present* in the sense that we are aware of our experience. ### 2. Ecstasy, Meaning, and the Good Life People are interested in ecstatic experiences because they often consider them some of the most profoundly meaningful and valuable experiences of their lives:[\[9\]](#_ftn9) they feel they *benefit* *significantly* from the experiences.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) While ecstatic experiences involve a *loss* of self, they also lead to a *return* to self and, many think, a return to a *better* self.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) For instance, people often feel that, upon returning to themselves, they become more content, loving, compassionate, etc., as a result of ecstasy’s unselfing.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Perhaps, then, a good life should include at least *some* ecstatic experiences, and a life without any such experiences might be significantly lacking. Some even suggest we should try to engage in an ecstatic *way of life*: regularly seeking ecstatic experiences and working to become more psychologically open to them.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 3. Ecstasy and Reality Sometimes ecstatic experiences lead people to reconsider their beliefs about the reality of who we are and our relation to the world: they influence their metaphysical views.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Ordinarily, we might think that the “real you” is self-enclosed: a separate, self-aware *individual*, different from everything else. Indeed, in ordinary awareness, reality in general seems to consist entirely of distinct, individuated beings: e.g., people, objects, etc. Ecstatic experiences can challenge this understanding, suggesting that who we really are is *not* sealed off from the rest of reality.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Ecstatic experiences can make it seem that we are interconnected with what ordinarily appears separate from us—love, beauty, nature, other people, God, or perhaps even with everything.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 4. Ecstasy and Truth Some people think ecstatic experiences reveal some *deeper* truth about reality (e.g., that we are connected to something greater than ourselves) that is inaccessible to ordinary awareness.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) For those who have experienced profound forms of ecstasy, it can feel nearly impossible to doubt what they seemed to experience—e.g., this type of belief of “oneness”—given the feeling of certainty during the experience. But just because people *feel* that ecstatic experiences tell us the truth about reality doesn’t mean they *really* do. One major reason for doubt is that it’s possible to understand ecstatic experiences as nothing more than quick “hits” of dopamine in your brain that produce an *illusory* sense of interconnectedness.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) However, *all* human experiences can be understood as brain events, and yet that doesn’t cause us to doubt sense perceptions, for instance. Furthermore, like non-ecstatic sense perceptions, ecstatic experiences seem to be forms of *perception* that reveal some important truths about reality, and so perhaps they should be trusted too.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) However, non-ecstatic sense perceptions seem to reveal a different reality than ecstatic experiences—a world of separate rather than interconnected things. This raises the question of whether we can ever figure out which experience—ecstatic or non-ecstatic experience—is telling us the truth about reality. ### 5. Conclusion: Ecstasy’s Dangers While ecstatic experiences can be profoundly significant to people, one’s life probably shouldn’t be *wholly* or *primarily* devoted to ecstatic experiences:[\[20\]](#_ftn20) constantly pursuing ecstatic experiences could easily become a form of “escapism” or avoidance of real-world responsibilities, or worse.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Ecstatic experiences *can* improve a person’s happiness and character, but they can also make people *worse*, even immoral.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) For instance, getting high on drugs while neglecting one’s child is immoral *and* self-destructive ecstasy. And it’s possible to feel ecstatic while engaging in acts of violence towards others.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) So, the moral value of ecstatic experiences is largely dependent on the type of ecstasy and context of the experience.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) While you have probably had ecstatic experiences before, you may not have thought so deeply about them. Philosophizing about these experiences raises thought-provoking questions and helps us appreciate their importance in our lives. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay summarizes ideas and arguments primarily from four relatively recent books that discuss ecstatic experiences: Jules Evans’ *The Art of Losing Control: A Philosopher’s Search for Ecstatic Experience* (2017), Christopher Hamilton’s *Rapture* (2024), Simon Critchley’s *On Mysticism: The Experience of Ecstasy* (2024), and Louis Roy’s *Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique* (2001). While philosophers have traditionally equated ecstatic experiences solely with religious (e.g., mystical) experiences, these authors view ecstatic experiences as a larger class of experiences that includes both religious *and* non-religious or secular types of ecstasy. While this essay is focused on more recent works, arguably the philosopher who devoted the most attention to ecstatic experiences was French thinker Georges Bataille (1897-1962). For an accessible entry point to Bataille’s thought, see his book *Inner Experience* (2014/1943). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For an introduction to mysticism, see [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) and [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/), both by Matthew Sanderson. For an introduction to the philosophy of romantic love, see [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira. Hamilton (2024: pp. 97-114) argues that romantic or erotic activity such as kissing is a type of ecstasy. Critchley (2024) discusses many examples of aesthetic ecstasy. A classic example of aesthetic ecstasy is the experience of the sublime, i.e., a perceptual encounter with what seems to be infinite in size or power. For an introduction to the sublime, see [Immanuel Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson. Bell (1914: pp. 17-20) says aesthetic experience (i.e., the experience of beauty and other aesthetic qualities) is a type of ecstasy. Nietzsche’s concept of Dionysian aesthetic experience is a type of ecstatic experience; for an introduction to this concept, see [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/) by Matthew Sanderson. Roy (2001: pp. 9) describes four main types of ecstatic experiences: the aesthetic (“the sense of being part of an encompassing whole”); the ontological (“feeling intellectually secure and grounded in a being that lies beyond contingency and nothingness”); the ethical (“an apprehension of a value, such as justice, solidarity, kindness”); and the interpersonal (“the sense of a special presence…consist\[ing\] in the certainty that love is validated by the very fabric of the universe, against all appearances to the contrary.”) Critchley (2024: p. 4) mentions several types or causes of ecstasy: religious practice, art, poetry, sex, and intoxication. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Evans (2017: pp. x-xii), Hamilton (2024: p. 3), Critchley (2024: p. 3), and Roy (2001: p. 3) all say the defining characteristic of ecstatic experiences is what seems like a loss of self or losing yourself. Critchley (2024: p. 3) says, “What I am calling ecstasy is a way of surpassing the self, of being held out there outside the confines of your head and the feeling of delight, pleasure or glee that accompanies that experience.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Another way to understand ordinary experience is that we feel like we are at the *center* of our experiences, that we occupy a first-person perspective that functions as the “command center” of all of our experiences. For instance, we feel like we are at the center of our experiences in the sense that the entire world seems to revolve around us. In ecstatic experiences, on the other hand, we feel “decentered,” i.e., at least partially removed from that center perspective. For instance, we feel thrown outside of ourselves, and thereby removed from our normal center of command. “Losing yourself” in ecstatic experiences means, then, losing our place at the center of our experiences—losing control of our experience, in the sense that it doesn’t feel like we have control over ecstasy or over ourselves when experiencing it. However, the paradox of ecstatic experiences is that we do still experience them from a first-person perspective; we are still the center of the experience, if only very minimally, at least enough to “witness” the experience and understand on an implicit level that it is happening to us. Evidence of this is that if someone asked you what you experienced, you could say, “*I* had an ecstatic experience.” The ability to refer to “I” arguably indicates that you were still present for, and the center of, the experience. Thus, ecstatic experiences are, paradoxically, first-person experiences of feeling thrown outside of our first-person perspective; they are feeling decentered as experienced from the center of the experience. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Iris Murdoch coined the term “unselfing” in *The Sovereignty of Good* (2013/1970: pp. 84-85). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Evans (2017: p. x) says that ecstasy’s loss of self is a loss of self-awareness, “when our consciousness expands beyond its usual self-obsessed anxiousness into a more peaceful, absorbed and transcendent state of mind.” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Hamilton (2024: p. 3) says that ecstatic experiences involve highly focused attention and perhaps even a feeling of “oneness” with what captivates the experiencer. Critchley (2024: p. 7) writes that ecstasy involves a “radical openness and concentrated presence” of mental attention. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Roy (2001: p. 3) views ecstatic experiences as ways we connect with “the infinite.” Evans (2017: p. xii) points out that experiencers can feel “one” with everything in an ecstatic experience: “In profound moments of ego-loss, people feel deeply connected to something greater than them—nature, the cosmos, humanity, God—to the extent they go beyond any sense of ‘I’ and ‘you’.” Critchley (2024: p. 4) writes that in ecstatic experiences “the self fades away into a larger and more capacious environment or space for being” and ecstatic experiences “allow us to push outside the sticky self towards something larger, something vaster, something full of vibrancy…” Critchley (2024: p. 9) writes that ecstatic experiences involve “giving ourselves up, as much as possible, giving ourselves over to that which is larger than the self, outside the self: a pliable ground of love that is prior to the will.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) If people feel that ecstatic experiences are some of the most meaningful experiences in their lives, this might suggest that philosophers should consider ecstatic experiences when reflecting on the meaning of life. For an introduction to philosophical reflections on the meaning of life, see [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) and [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/), both by Matthew Pianalto. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Evans (2017: pp. xxii-xxiii) argues that people typically find ecstatic experiences to be healing, inspiring, socially connecting, and/or meaning-bestowing. Critchley (2024: p. 5) writes, “Ecstasy is what it feels like to be alive when we push away the sadness that clings to us…\[Ecstatic experiences\] give us some relief from misery, from melancholy, from heaviness of soul, from the slough of despond, from mental leadenness.” Critchley (2024: p. 3) writes that ecstasy provides experiencers with “a sheer feeling of aliveness…\[that\] can shift, elevate, and deepen the sense of our lives.” Critchley (2024: p. 15) writes that in ecstatic experiences “we are freed from the prison of melancholy and doubt. We are at peace and at rest.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Critchley (2024: p. 3) notes that ecstasy is “about trying to get outside oneself, to lose oneself, while knowing that the self is not something that can ever be fully lost \[i.e., there is *always* a return to the self following ecstasy, and even *during* ecstasy a self remains present.\]” Hamilton (2024: p. 3) views ecstatic experiences as consisting of both the loss *and* return to the self: “a loss of the self, a being taken out of oneself, and at the same time an intense return to the self—an awakening to the self that is also the self’s freedom or liberation.” This liberation, Hamilton says (2024: p. 3), is “a kind of freedom from the burdens of individuality.” Roy (2001: p. 5) also considers the return to the self part of an ecstatic experience; he calls it “the fruit” of the experience in the sense that it is the positive benefit of the experience on the self. Evans (2017: p. xi) argues that ecstatic experiences relieve the suffering that comes from being a self: “Our egos have evolved to help us survive and compete…But the self we construct is an exhausting place to be stuck all the time. It’s isolated, cut off by walls of fear and shame, besieged by worries and ambitions, and conscious of its own smallness and impending mortality. That’s why we need to let go, every now and then, or we get bored, exhausted, or depressed.” [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Some ecstatic experiences might count as what philosophers call “transformative experiences” in cases where they drastically change (i.e., transform) experiencers. For an introduction to the philosophy of transformative experiences, see [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira. A contemporary example is the use of ketamine, which can cause ecstatic experiences, to treat depression, ptsd, and other mental health conditions. For a scientific explanation of the therapeutic benefits of ketamine, see Allison Wells, “Ketamine: A Rising Star in Mental Health Treatment,” *Anxiety & Depression Association of America*, April 25, 2024. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Hamilton (2024: pp. 4-5) suggests we should perhaps seek to live an ecstatic or rapturous *life*, not just occasionally undergo ecstatic experiences. Hamilton (2024: pp. 4-5) writes: “…I think that there are certain lives that are, so to speak, lived under the sign of rapture or in the spirit of rapture. I think of these as emblematic lives, visions of the possibility of life by which we might be nourished and, perhaps, enabled to make space for, be better able to welcome into our own life, moments of being, moments of rapture.” Critchley (2024: p. 5) says he is most interested ultimately in “the possibility of ecstatic life” rather than episodic, momentary experiences of ecstasy. Critchley (2024: p. 4) says he is interested in “what it might mean to lead a released \[i.e., ecstatic\] existence.” Critchley (2024: p. 15) writes that ecstatic experiences “can and must be continually repeated, renewed, and re-enacted on the stage of our lives.” [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Critchley (2024: p. 11) writes that ecstatic experiences seem to involve a “transfiguration of self and world.” [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Roy (2001) argues that, given that we can experience ecstasy and a feeling of interconnection with something larger than ourselves, ecstatic experiences at least show that our consciousness is open to something greater than the self. Critchley (2024: p. 3) writes that ecstatic experiences “allow you to free yourself of your standard habits, your usual fancies and imaginings and see what is there \[i.e., see reality clearly\] and stand with what is there *ecstatically*.” [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Evans (2017: p. xxiv) says that in ecstatic experiences, “We feel connected to nature, to the cosmos, and perhaps to God in some form or other, and this can give us a sense of identity beyond the ‘I’, and the hope that perhaps something in us survives beyond death.” Ecstatic experiences might have other metaphysical implications as well. For instance, because ecstatic experiences can seem to involve transcending space and time—because they feel like they occur in a timeless moment (i.e., time seems to stop or slow way down during the experience), and because they appear to erase the spatial boundaries separating subject and object—they might have implications for how we understand the metaphysics or true nature of space and time. For an introduction to metaphysical issues related to space and time, see [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr, as well as [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/), [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/), and [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/), all by Dan Peterson. To take another example, because ecstatic experiences involve a loss of self-control, this might suggest that we have less control over ourselves than we often think, which might have implications for how we think about human free will. For an introduction to the philosophy of free will, see [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima and [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) It would seem to be a defining or essential trait of ecstatic experiences that they tend to come with a sense of conviction and even certainty on the part of experiencers that they are “real,” that what people seem to experience is indeed what they *really* experience. Thus, William James (1902/2004) argued that ecstatic experiences typically have a “noetic quality,” meaning that they feel to experiencers like genuine states of *knowledge*. To express the same idea, Jones (2016) says that ecstatic experiences feel as though they are “cognitive.” [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Evans (2017: p. xv) highlights that ecstatic experiences can be understood as nothing more than brain events that are all in the experiencer’s head, so to speak: “In a materialist world-view, there are no spirits or gods out there. Ecstasy is a mental delusion. The universe is a giant lava-lamp of matter, beautiful but inanimate, ruled by mechanical laws. The human body is likewise a machine, which somehow produces consciousness in the brain. Spiritual explanations of physical or psychic phenomena are ignorant and childish.” Evans (2017: p. xx) also discusses how “we can explain ecstasy as alterations in our neural chemistry, in our brain functioning and our autonomic nervous system. We know that giving people chemicals can trigger ecstatic experiences…We know some ecstatic experiences are connected to brain disorders, like migraines and temporal lobe epilepsy…However, just because ecstatic experiences affect the brain and body, that doesn’t mean they are nothing but neurochemical processes.” [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) James (1902/2004) and Wainwright (1981) both argue that if we consider sense perception to be veridical, and if ecstatic experiences are also types of perceptions or fundamentally perceptual in nature, then we have good reason to believe ecstatic experiences are veridical as well. In philosophy, experiences that seem to be true are called “seemings.” The view that what seems to be the case should be accepted as such unless there are good reasons for doubt is called “phenomenal conservatism.” For an introduction to phenomenal conservatism, see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller and [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) To be clear, Hamilton’s suggestion (2024: pp. 4-5) that it’s good to live a rapturous or ecstatic way of life is not saying we should be wholly or primarily devoted to ecstasy. In fact, Hamilton (2024: p. 5, Hamilton’s emphases) denies this is even possible: “\[ecstatic\] lives, for sure, no doubt have their fair share of the ‘cotton wool’ \[ordinary, non-ecstatic experiences\] that characterizes the life of the rest of us. This is why I speak of them as lived in the *spirit* of rapture: the idea here is not that of the experiences of a life that could be characterized as permanently marked by rapture \[i.e., ecstasy\], as if the person in question lived always in such a state, but of a life as, so to speak, *colored* by, lived in *the light of*, the notion of rapture.” [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Evans (2017: p. xiii and xxiv-xxv) points out that ecstatic experiences can be a form of escapism: “…the most common risk in our culture is that we become unhealthily obsessed with the ecstatic. Modern spirituality can become all about the peaks, the rapture, the ‘God-like hours’.” Evans (2017: p. xxvi) writes, “I’m not suggesting Western civilisation should become a permanent festival of ecstasy. That would be dangerous escapism, not to say impractical.” [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Hamilton (2024: pp. 5-6) points out that living an ecstatic life does not necessarily mean you are a “morally admirable person.” Evans (2017: pp. xii-xiii) argues that there are healthy and unhealthy (including immoral) types of ecstatic experiences. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Evans (2017: p. xiii) points out that people can feel ecstatic while committing acts of violence. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Evans (2017: pp. xii-xiii) argues that we should think of ecstatic experiences as generally or inherently amoral or morally neutral given that people can undergo them during immoral activities (e.g., acts of violence) and the danger that they can lead to fanatical and other problematic beliefs and states of mind (e.g., dogmatism). Evans (2017: pp. xxv) writes, “Context has a decisive effect on the outcome of ecstatic experiences, and on whether they’re healthy or toxic \[e.g., moral or immoral\].” ### References [Bataille, Georges. (2014/1943). Inner Experience. SUNY Press.](https://sunypress.edu/Books/I/Inner-Experience2) [Bell, Clive. (1914). Art. Oxford University Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Art-Clive-Bell/dp/0192820494) [Critchley, Simon. (2024). On Mysticism: The Experience of Ecstasy. New York Review Books.](https://www.nyrb.com/products/mysticism) [Evans, Jules. (2017). The Art of Losing Control: A Philosopher’s Search for Ecstatic Experience. Canongate Books. ](https://canongate.co.uk/books/2364-the-art-of-losing-control-a-philosopher-039-s-search-for-ecstatic-experience/) [Hamilton, Christopher. (2024). Rapture. Columbia University Press. ](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/rapture/9780231201551/) [James, William. (1902/2004). The Varieties of Religious Experience. Barnes & Noble Books. ](https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-varieties-of-religious-experience-william-james/1116756373) [Jones, Richard H. (2016). Philosophy of Mysticism: Raids on the Ineffable. SUNY Press. ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/P/Philosophy-of-Mysticism) [Murdoch, Iris. (2013/1970). The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Sovereignty-of-Good/Murdoch/p/book/9780415854733) [Roy, Louis. (2001). Transcendent Experiences. Toronto University Press. ](https://canongate.co.uk/books/2364-the-art-of-losing-control-a-philosopher-039-s-search-for-ecstatic-experience/) [Wainwright, William J. (1981). Mysticism: A Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value, and Moral Implications. University of Wisconsin Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Study-Nature-Cognitive-Implications/dp/029908910X) [Wells, Allison Wells. (4/25/2024). “Ketamine: A Rising Star in Mental Health Treatment.” Anxiety & Depression Association of America. ](https://adaa.org/learn-from-us/from-the-experts/blog-posts/consumer-professional/ketamine-rising-star-mental-health) ### Related Essays [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/) by Matthew Sanderson [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [Immanuel Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/) by Dan Peterson [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Ecstatic-Experiences.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)[*.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics, Epistemology, Ethics, Mind & Language, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** ecstasy, Ecstatic Experiences, Sanderson --- ### [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) **Published:** February 4, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An examination of what free speech is, its limits and its justification. **Content:** Author: [Mark Satta](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Satta) Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-law/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 989 Want to criticize your government? Burn a flag? Wear a t-shirt that says f\*\*k the draft? Thanks to *freedom of speech*, in many places you can.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But what exactly is freedom of speech? And what does it permit us to say? This essay will review some influential answers to these questions. [![Image of a microphone.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/free-speech.jpg?resize=656%2C436&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/free-speech.jpg?ssl=1) Image of a microphone. ### 1. Protection from Government, Not Private Actors Freedom of speech, sometimes called *freedom of expression*, is a legal right to express many beliefs and ideas without government interference or punishment. This freedom does not typically prevent private entities (e.g., ordinary citizens or private organizations) from limiting speech.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) If freedom of speech prevented private entities from limiting speech, freedom of speech could not be applied consistently because the freedom of speech includes the ability *not* to speak.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) So, e.g., if a newspaper was forced to publish every piece of writing submitted to it, then that newspaper would lose some ability to not speak. Freedom of speech also includes the right not to listen to or receive other people’s messages.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The fact that freedom of speech only prevents government interference doesn’t entail that freedom of speech is irrelevant to action by private entities. Some argue that certain private entities ought to voluntarily conform to legal standards for speech protection: e.g., that private universities should conform to the free speech standards legally required by public universities.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Freedom of speech is also sometimes understood more broadly as a social value. ### 2. Limits on Free Speech Freedom of speech is not an unlimited right. All governments impose some limits on what kinds of speech they will protect. This is because freedom of speech, like all rights, must be balanced against other rights and values. Common types of speech not protected by freedom of speech include threats of violence, false advertising, and defamation (i.e., false statements that unjustly harm someone’s reputation).[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Many democratic nations do not protect hate speech (i.e., speech intended to threaten, degrade, or incite hatred against a group or group member based on group prejudice). But some other nations, including the United States, treat hate speech as protected speech. Whether hate speech should receive free speech protection has been much debated in recent years.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) But even protected speech can be limited to an extent by the government: e.g., freedom of speech does not permit just anyone to enter a military base or a class at a public university and start talking. This is true because, even though military bases and public universities are government-run, these spaces seek to achieve other important goals that justify limiting free speech. Freedom of speech gives you much greater latitude in a public park, a public sidewalk, or in your own home. But even in public places like parks and sidewalks, freedom of speech allows for *content-neutral* restrictions on speech: e.g., a town can have a noise ordinance banning playing loud music in parks near residential neighborhoods after midnight. But it is important that these restrictions be *content-* and *viewpoint-neutral*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Thus, a town could *not* pass an ordinance limiting speech only about certain topics or from certain perspectives in the park. Such a rule would discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of the speech. An important part of freedom of speech is that the government cannot restrict speech just because it doesn’t like the topics or agree with the speaker. Freedom of speech also doesn’t allow for the suppression of ideas simply because those ideas are unpopular. ### 3. Expressive Conduct Freedom of speech protects more than just spoken and written expression. It also protects many other activities through which ideas can be expressed:[\[9\]](#_ftn9) e.g., in the United States, abstract art, non-lyrical music, and marching in a parade are all activities protected under the freedom of speech.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) There are controversies concerning which activities ought to be considered expressive conduct: e.g., there is substantial disagreement about whether political spending by corporations ought to be protected as free speech.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) There are also disagreements about if and when the creation of products like wedding cakes and photographs ought to be considered protected speech.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 4. Prior Restraint versus Subsequent Punishment Freedom of speech protects people against two different types of government interference: *prior restraint* and *subsequent punishment*. A prior restraint prevents you from speaking: it *restrains* your speech *prior* to it being made. At one point, many legal scholars thought that freedom of speech meant only freedom from prior restraint.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) That is no longer true. Today, most everyone believes that freedom of speech protects people not only from prior restraint, but also from subsequent punishment (i.e., from being legally sanctioned for protected speech). This makes freedom of speech more robust because it protects people not only from having their protected speech restrained, but also from having their protected speech punished by the government. ### 5. Why is Free Speech Important? Philosophers and legal scholars have given many different explanations for why free speech is important. Many scholars think there are multiple good reasons why we protect free speech.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Three common rationales for free speech protections are that they help us (1) discover truth, (2) respect human autonomy, and (3) preserve democracy by allowing criticism of government. Influential advocates of the idea that free speech helps us discover truth include writer John Milton, philosopher John Stuart Mill, and U.S. Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) One common form of the truth discovery argument is that the best way to overcome false speech is with more speech.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Given what we know about how viral misinformation works, such a claim can appear implausible.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) But even if this version of the truth discovery argument is mistaken, there may be weaker forms of a truth-preservation principle that provide us with good reason to safeguard free speech: e.g., someone might argue that the fallibility of political leaders requires them to avoid suppressing others’ ideas. ### 6. Conclusion Freedom of speech is valuable. Protecting it first requires understanding it. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See, e.g., [*Brandenburg v. Ohio*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep395/usrep395444/usrep395444.pdf), [*Texas v. Johnson*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep491/usrep491397/usrep491397.pdf), and [*Cohen v. California*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep403/usrep403015/usrep403015.pdf). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See, e.g., [U.S. Const. Amend I](https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [Gaebler 1982](https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1711&context=bclr). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) [Corbin 2009](http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/volume89n3/documents/CORBIN.pdf). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [Chemerinsky and Gillman 2017](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300240016/free-speech-campus). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) [Maras 2015](https://franklinhslibrary.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/101640061/Unprotected%20Speech%20Social%20Media.pdf), [Redish and Voils 2017](https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1808&context=wmborj), and [Post 1986](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=fss_papers). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See, e.g., [Waldron 2012](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864#:~:text=For%20constitutionalists%2C%20regulation%20of%20hate,for%20members%20of%20vulnerable%20minorities.) and [Strossen 2018](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) [Jacobs 2003](https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=facultyarticles). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) [Tushnet, Chen, and Blocher 2017](https://nyupress.org/9781479880287/free-speech-beyond-words/). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See, e.g., [Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep515/usrep515557/usrep515557.pdf). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) [Hasen 2011](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1166&context=mlr). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) [Liptak 2017](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/us/politics/gay-wedding-cake-free-speech-first-amendment-supreme-court.html). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) [Rabban 1981](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6642&context=ylj), [Healy 2013](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250058690). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) [Greenawalt 1989](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/84/). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) [Milton 1644 (reprinted 1918)](http://files.libertyfund.org/files/103/1224_Bk.pdf), [Mill 1859](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm), [Abrams v. United States (Holmes, J. dissenting](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep250/usrep250616/usrep250616.pdf)), [Whitney v. California (Brandeis, J. concurring)](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep274/usrep274357/usrep274357.pdf). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See, e.g., [Milton 1644 (reprinted 1918)](http://files.libertyfund.org/files/103/1224_Bk.pdf), [Whitney v. California (Brandeis, J. concurring)](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep274/usrep274357/usrep274357.pdf). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) [Wu 2018](https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol117/iss3/4/). ### References [*Abrams v. the United States*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep250/usrep250616/usrep250616.pdf)[, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep250/usrep250616/usrep250616.pdf) [*Brandenburg v. Ohio*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep395/usrep395444/usrep395444.pdf)[, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep395/usrep395444/usrep395444.pdf) [*Cohen v. California*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep403/usrep403015/usrep403015.pdf)[, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep403/usrep403015/usrep403015.pdf) [*Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep515/usrep515557/usrep515557.pdf)[, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep515/usrep515557/usrep515557.pdf) [*Texas v. Johnson*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep491/usrep491397/usrep491397.pdf)[, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep491/usrep491397/usrep491397.pdf) [*Whitney v. California*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep274/usrep274357/usrep274357.pdf)[, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep274/usrep274357/usrep274357.pdf) [Corbin, Caroline Mala. 2009. “The First Amendment right against compelled listening.” ](http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/volume89n3/documents/CORBIN.pdf)[*Boston University Law Review*](http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/volume89n3/documents/CORBIN.pdf)[, 89 (3): 939-1016.](http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/volume89n3/documents/CORBIN.pdf) [Chemerinsky, Erwin and Howard Gillman. 2017. ](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300240016/free-speech-campus)[*Free Speech on Campus*](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300240016/free-speech-campus)[. Yale University Press.](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300240016/free-speech-campus) [Gaebler, David. 1982. “First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association.” ](https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1711&context=bclr)[*Boston College Law Review*](https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1711&context=bclr)[, 23 (4): 995-1023.](https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1711&context=bclr) [Greenawalt, Kent. 1989. “Free Speech Justifications.” ](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/84/)[*Columbia Law Review* ](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/84/)[89 (1): 119-155.](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/84/) [Hasen, Richard L. 2011. “Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence.” ](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1166&context=mlr)[*Michigan Law Review*](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1166&context=mlr)[, 109 (4): 581-623.](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1166&context=mlr) [Healy, Thomas. 2013. ](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250058690)[*The Great Dissent:*](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250058690) [*How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His Mind—and Changed the History of Free Speech in America*](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250058690)[. Metropolitan Books.](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250058690) [Jacobs, Leslie Gielow. 2003. “Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations.” ](https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=facultyarticles)[*McGeorge Law Review*](https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=facultyarticles)[, 34 (3): 595-635](https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=facultyarticles). [Liptak, Adam. 2017. “Where to Draw Line on Free Speech? Wedding Cake Case Vexes Lawyers.” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/us/politics/gay-wedding-cake-free-speech-first-amendment-supreme-court.html)[*New York Times*](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/us/politics/gay-wedding-cake-free-speech-first-amendment-supreme-court.html). [Maras, Marie-Helen. 2015. “Unprotected Speech Communicated via Social Media: What Amounts to a True Threat?” ](https://franklinhslibrary.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/101640061/Unprotected%20Speech%20Social%20Media.pdf)[*Journal of Internet Law*](https://franklinhslibrary.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/101640061/Unprotected%20Speech%20Social%20Media.pdf)[, 19 (3): 3-9.](https://franklinhslibrary.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/101640061/Unprotected%20Speech%20Social%20Media.pdf) [Mill, John Stuart. 1859. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm)[*On Liberty*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm)[. John W. Parker & Son.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm) [Milton, John. 1918. ](http://files.libertyfund.org/files/103/1224_Bk.pdf)[*Areopagitica*](http://files.libertyfund.org/files/103/1224_Bk.pdf)[. Cambridge University Press.](http://files.libertyfund.org/files/103/1224_Bk.pdf) [Post, Robert C. 1986. “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution” ](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=fss_papers)[*California Law Review*](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=fss_papers)[, 74: 691-742.](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=fss_papers) [Rabban, David M. 1981. “The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years.” ](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6642&context=ylj)[*Yale Law Journal*](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6642&context=ylj)[, 90 (3):](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6642&context=ylj) [514-595.](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6642&context=ylj) [Redish, Martin H. and Kyle Voils. 2017. “False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Understanding the Implications of the Equivalency Principle.” ](https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1808&context=wmborj)[*William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal*](https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1808&context=wmborj)[, 25: 765-799.](https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1808&context=wmborj) [Strossen, Nadine. 2018. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Hate: Why We Should Resist it With Free Speech, Not Censorship*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hate-9780190859121?cc=us&lang=en&) [Tushnet, Mark V., Alan K. Chen, and Joseph Blocher. 2017. ](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep515/usrep515557/usrep515557.pdf)[*Free Speech Beyond Words: The Surprising Reach of the First Amendment*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep515/usrep515557/usrep515557.pdf)[. New York University Press.](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep515/usrep515557/usrep515557.pdf) [Waldron, Jeremy. 2012. ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864#:~:text=For%20constitutionalists%2C%20regulation%20of%20hate,for%20members%20of%20vulnerable%20minorities.)[*The Harm in Hate Speech*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864#:~:text=For%20constitutionalists%2C%20regulation%20of%20hate,for%20members%20of%20vulnerable%20minorities.)[. Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674416864#:~:text=For%20constitutionalists%2C%20regulation%20of%20hate,for%20members%20of%20vulnerable%20minorities.) [Wu, Tim. 2018. “Is the First Amendment Obsolete?” ](https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol117/iss3/4/)[*Michigan Law Review*](https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol117/iss3/4/)[, 117 (3): 547-581.](https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol117/iss3/4/) ### For Further Reading [“Freedom of Expression – Speech and Press.” Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute.](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/freedom-of-expression-speech-and-press) [van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/freedom-speech/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/freedom-speech/)[ (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/freedom-speech/) ### Related Essays [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/free-speech/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/free-speech.pdf). ### About the Author [Mark Satta](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Satta) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He received his PhD in Philosophy from Purdue University and his JD from Harvard Law School. Some of his philosophical research interests include philosophy of law, epistemology, bioethics, and philosophy of language. [MarkSatta.com](http://marksatta.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Social & Political **Tags:** free speech, satta --- ### [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) **Published:** December 30, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the ethical theory cultural relativism or ethical relativism or relativism: do cultural norms make actions right and wrong? **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 Consider these cultural practices: arranged marriages; female genital cutting; male circumcision; requiring women to wear veils or burkas; canings as punishments; whaling and dolphin hunting; eating cats and dogs; eating meat; human sacrifice; harsh punishments throughout history.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Many readers will judge at least some practices like these to be morally wrong. If they announce this, however, they might get a response like this: “Don’t judge these cultures’ practices! It’s their culture, their traditions, so what they do should be tolerated!” People who say things like this *may* be expressing sympathy for an ethical theory called *cultural relativism*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay introduces this theory.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) [![A child scanning a globe.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/cultural-relativism.jpg?resize=656%2C489&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/cultural-relativism.jpg?ssl=1)A child scanning a globe. ### 1. Understanding Cultural Relativism Cultural relativism proposes that what is ethical is *relative to*, or *depends on*, cultural attitudes: - if a culture *disapproves* of people doing an action, then it is wrong for people in that culture to do that action; - if a culture *approves* of people doing an action, then it is not wrong for people in that culture to do that action.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Cultural relativism is *not* the empirical observation, *accepted as true by everyone*, that different cultures sometimes have different ethical views, or that what people *believe*, *think*, or *feel* about the morality of an action is sometimes “relative” to the culture they are in. Cultural relativism is a theory of what *makes* actions right and wrong. The “don’t judge!” and “be tolerant!” reactions above might be based on it and reasoning like this: “People in other cultures aren’t doing anything wrong because ethics is determined by cultural attitudes: so they shouldn’t be judged; they should be tolerated.” ### 2. Cultural Relativism’s Implications We can better understand cultural relativism by thinking about what follows from it:[\[5\]](#_ftn5) *if cultural relativism were true or correct*, then: 1\. the majority view on any moral issue is *always* correct; relativism identifies the majority view with what’s ethically correct in that culture, so the majority view is always correct, no matter what; 2\. people who criticize majority views and advocate for change are *always* wrong: since according to relativism, majority views are always correct, anyone who critiques them *must* be mistaken; 3\. what’s ethical is identified by opinion polls; according to relativism, to find out whether an action is ethical or not, we survey the population to find the majority view: research, reflection, and wise guidance aren’t needed; 4\. there is only cultural change, never progress or improvement: according to relativism, if, e.g., a culture approved of slavery then slavery was *not wrong* in that culture at that time; if that culture came to reject slavery, then slavery would *become wrong* in that culture; this, however, was not moral *improvement* or *progress* since slavery earlier was *not wrong* according to relativism: there was merely a *change* of views. Many people think these implications show that relativism is a false theory since the majority isn’t always right, cultural critics are sometimes correct, opinion polls don’t tell us what is really ethical, and cultural views really can improve and, unfortunately, decline. ### 3. Arguments For Cultural Relativism What can be said for cultural relativism? What’s appealing about it? #### 3.1. Tolerance Some people argue for cultural relativism on the grounds that *we should be tolerant and accepting of cultural differences*. One problem with this reasoning is that (almost?) no culture holds that we should tolerate and accept *everything*, no matter what. So, a principle of *universal* tolerance and acceptance contradicts relativism, which maintains that ethical standards are culture-bound and *not* universal. To think that we should be tolerant and accepting of everything is to reject relativism. According to relativism we should accept and tolerate only what our culture accepts. Since many cultures condemn many of the actions above, relativism implies that people who reject these judgments – like those above who urge toleration – are usually mistaken. So, if our cultures should be even just *more* accepting and tolerant, we should reject relativism. #### 3.2. Disagreements Everyone observes that there are some profound ethical disagreements between cultures. From this fact, relativists conclude we should accept relativism. This reasoning, however, is doubtful. In general, when there are disagreements on an issue, *at most* one general “side” can be correct:[\[6\]](#_ftn6) e.g., if one person believes the Earth is spherical and another believes the Earth is flat, they can’t both be correct. Relativists urge that everyone can be right when they should think that, at most, one “side” is correct.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) But how can we tell which side is correct? *Evaluate the arguments on each side*: e.g., do cultures that support female genital cutting give good reasons for the practice? Or is the case against it stronger?[\[8\]](#_ftn8) About many issues, understanding and evaluating the arguments in genuinely fair and balanced ways is difficult. Whatever the challenges though, they don’t support accepting cultural relativism, which makes answering hard ethical questions very easy: do an opinion poll![\[9\]](#_ftn9) Finally, some people might appeal to relativism to try to avoid challenging issues: if relativism is correct, it’s a simple “the majority rules” and there’s no need to investigate and discuss.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. Conclusion Cultural relativists *are* correct that sometimes we should be more tolerant and accepting of cultural differences.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Some things done in other cultures are unfamiliar and may seem strange. But “different” is not the same as “wrong,” and learning about relativism can remind us of that. But *just because* some culture approves of something does not mean it’s OK. Cultures, like individuals, sometimes approve of practices that are very wrong: they aren’t perfect and neither are we. Rejecting cultural relativism usually involves accepting *ethical realism*, that what’s ethical is determined by factors that are “objective” and *not* relative to cultural attitudes: e.g., whether actions are harmful or beneficial to whoever is affected by them, or whether actions are done with the consent of all involved, and other objective considerations. What’s of primary philosophical interest is not *that* some culture approves or disapproves of an action, but *why*, their reasons. Do they have good arguments for what they support? Do we? That’s the question that ethics is all about. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For information on these cultural practices, see Wikipedia, “Arranged marriage”; Brian Earp, “Boys and girls alike: An un-consenting child, an unnecessary, invasive surgery: is there any moral difference between male and female circumcision?” *Aeon*, 1/13/2015, and Brian Earp, “Does Female Genital Mutilation Have Health Benefits? The Problem with Medicalizing Morality.” University of Oxford *Practical Ethics blog*, 8/15/2017; James Vyver, “Why do Muslim women wear a burka, niqab or hijab?” *ABC News*, 8/17/2017; Wikipedia, “Caning in Singapore”; Natasha Daly, “Japan’s controversial annual dolphin hunt begins,” *National Geographic*, 09/09/2021; Justin McCurry, “Japan resumes commercial whaling for first time in 30 years. *The Guardian*, 06/30/2019; George Petras. 2/25/2019. “South Koreans eat more than 1 million dogs each year — but that’s slowly changing. Here’s why. Young Koreans lead efforts to end a centuries-old practice.” *USA Today*; Melanie Joy, *Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism*, Red Wheel, 2020; Wikipedia, “Human sacrifice”; Greta Christina, “How Religious Fundamentalism, Ironically, Leads to a Screwed-Up Moral Relativism,” *The Orbit*, 4/17/2014. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Cultural relativism is an *ethical theory*, or a *normative* ethical theory. Such theories attempt to explain, in general, *why* actions are wrong (or right, or permissible) or what *makes* them so. “Cultural relativism” is also sometimes called “ethical relativism,” “moral relativism” and sometimes even just “relativism.” These are names for the same view, which proposes that what’s *really* right and wrong – not just *believed* to be right and wrong – is *relative to*, or *dependent on*, cultural approval. Another form of relativism is “individual relativism,” which is also *sometimes* (but sometimes not) called “ethical subjectivism,” which holds that what is right and wrong for a person to do is relative to, or dependent on, *that person’s own* approval or attitudes towards what they are doing. Individual relativism is very implausible since it seems to suggest, e.g., that if a person approves of their being, say, an ax-murderer, it is not wrong for them to be an ax-murderer: *any* action can be morally permissible provided the person doing the action approves of what they are doing. Another view called just “relativism,” is “relativism about truth,” which claims that if someone, or a group, believes some claim, that claim is true. This view, however, is *not true* because belief and truth are distinct, and so what anyone *believes* to be true, or *thinks* is true, need not be actually true: e.g., sincerely, confidently believing you are a billionaire doesn’t mean or make you a billionaire and someone merely believing you are dead or imprisoned doesn’t make you that. Usually, if someone says something is “true to them” or “their truth,” they are best understood as stating what they believe or think, which may or may not be true. For more discussion, see Huemer, Michael. “Relativism: What is this Nonsense?” *Fake Noûs*, December 25, 2021. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The understanding of relativism discussed in this essay is the version developed and discussed by James and Stuart Rachels in their *Elements of Moral Philosophy* textbook, as well as James Rachels’ “Some Basic Points About Arguments” chapter from their anthology *The Right Thing to Do.* [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Cultural relativism is sometimes presented as “if a culture *believes an action is wrong*, then that action is wrong in that culture” and “if a culture *believes an action is permissible*, then that action is permissible in that culture.” This statement of the view, however, doesn’t make sense and is incorrect, since what would it be to “believe an action is wrong” on this proposal of what relativism is? What would a culture be believing or thinking here, if they believed an action is wrong? What thought would they be thinking about what “wrong” means? What would the content of the thoughts or judgments “is wrong” and “is permissible” be? [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) There are deeper concerns about cultural relativism in terms of simply understanding what the view actually is. Cultural relativism claims that ethics depends on cultures’ attitudes, but exactly what is a cultures’ attitudes? What percent of the population or how pervasive must some attitude be to be considered representative of the culture? And what is a culture anyway? What is it to be part of a culture? (Is a visitor in a new culture “part of that culture”?). However cultures are defined (can an individual person and their views be considered a culture?), each individual person is a member of different cultures, which often have different attitudes on the same actions. E.g., suppose some college students are also part of a “conservative,” “traditional” religion. Their college student culture may approve of what their religious cultures disapprove of, and vice-versa, and so it is unclear what action cultural relativism would require of them in these cases of intra-personal cultural conflicts. Which culture should an individual “follow” in cases of conflicts? These interesting, theoretical questions about defining cultural relativism will not be addressed here. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) A potential exception to the rule that, in cases of disagreement, at most one general position is correct are *aesthetic* disagreements, disagreements about what’s most beautiful or attractive or pleasing. For example, one person might think that the first song on an album is the best song, but their friend thinks that song is the worst. They *seem* to disagree, but it also might seem that neither of them is correct: no song is “objectively” best if “beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” as is sometimes said: it just depends on what someone likes, and we often like different things. One theory of aesthetic judgments is that they are about what someone finds pleasing or attractive. So, on this view, one person here is saying, “I enjoy this song the most,” whereas the other says, “I don’t enjoy this song the most.” On this view, they don’t really disagree, since they are both just talking about what pleases them most: they are both accurately reporting what they like; they are both telling the truth. A difficulty for this view, however, is that it sometimes seems that people can be mistaken in their aesthetic judgments: e.g., if a beginning songwriter claims his songs are as good as Dolly Parton’s, or a tone-deaf singer thinks she’s as good a singer as Whitney Houston, or a local church choir thinks they are as good as the Mormon Tabernacle choir, it seems to many like all those judgments are false. If that’s correct, that means that beauty isn’t quite “in the eye of the beholder,” since some judgments about what’s beautiful, or more or most beautiful, can be mistaken. What might *make* them mistaken, however, is a challenging philosophical issue. Nevertheless, judgments about what’s, say, the most flavorful ice cream or who the best guitar player is or whether someone is more beautiful or attractive than someone else are importantly different from whether killing someone was wrong or not, whether a law is just and other weighty ethical concerns. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Another response to ethical disagreements is concluding that *nothing is wrong or not wrong at all*: there is no such thing as “wrongness.” *Ethical irrealists* or *anti-realists* called “error theorists” develop this position. See [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully. For a critique of moral error theory, see “Bah Fortiori: On the peculiarly specific character of our moral outrage” by Oliver Traldia. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) In “What’s Culture Got to Do with It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision” it is observed that female genital cutting is sometimes argued, by its advocates in cultures where it is practiced, to be morally permissible because *it is a tradition*, *it reduces promiscuity*, *it increases fertility and eases childbirth*, *it is required by their religion(s)*, and *it makes women more attactive to the men in these cultures*. Whether any of these arguments is sound might depend on any of those claims being true *and* that claim’s corresponding, unstated premise being true also: *all traditions are morally permissible* (a premise similar to cultural relativism); *all actions that decrease promiscuity are morally permissible*; *all actions that increase fertility and/or ease childbirth are morally permissible*; *all actions required by someone’s religion are morally permissible*; and *all actions that make someone more attractive to someone else are morally permissible*. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Another potential motivation for relativism is people simply not knowing much about better methods to ethical reasoning. Few people take ethics classes where they learn to systematically engage issues using ethical theories that are arguably better than relativism. In such classes, students are usually exposed to ethical theories that deny cultural relativism, see [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman, [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz, and [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies. For an approach that seeks to combine positive insights of many of these theories, see [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Some people seem to assume that the only options for what could make wrong actions wrong is either individual or cultural approval (so relativism) or God’s approval and commands: this explanation is known as the “Divine Command Theory” of ethics. There are, however, as noted there are many other plausible explanations for what makes wrong actions wrong and, interesting, the Divine Command Theory is subject to some objections that are similar to objections to relativism since both claim that its *“just because*” some authority disapproves or approves of an action that *makes* that action wrong or not. See [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case and [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For this interpretation of common appeals to relativism, which sees these appeals as attempts to avoid careful and rigorous discussion, see Satris’s (1986) very insightful discussion of what he calls “Student Relativism.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Cultural “conservatives” sometimes claim that “liberals” accept relativism since liberals sometimes say things along the lines of “people should be able to do what they want,” “if people like doing that, they should be able to do that,” and so on. But what they don’t notice is that liberals say this *only about actions they argue are not wrong*, since, for actions that are not wrong, it makes sense to say that people should be able to do them, if they want. It’s not like “liberals” claim that if someone wants to be a school shooter or dump toxic waste in the river, they should do it. So “conservatives” sometimes do not think about the contexts and subjects that relativistic-*sounding*, but not genuinely relativistic, claims are made. ### References [Christina, Greta. 4/17/2014, “How Religious Fundamentalism, Ironically, Leads to a Screwed-Up Moral Relativism,” ](https://the-orbit.net/greta/2014/04/17/religious-fundamentalism-leads-to-screwed-up-moral-relativism/)[*The Orbit*](https://the-orbit.net/greta/2014/04/17/religious-fundamentalism-leads-to-screwed-up-moral-relativism/)[. ](https://the-orbit.net/greta/2014/04/17/religious-fundamentalism-leads-to-screwed-up-moral-relativism/) [Daly, Natasha. 9/09/2021. “Japan’s controversial annual dolphin hunt begins.” ](https://api.nationalgeographic.com/distribution/public/amp/animals/article/japans-controversial-annual-dolphin-hunt-begins?fbclid=IwAR0xrnBPiQrjUOVmY52tS3881eCTFTJI-n9FwnAAfKtE7pnI9Bj-M5ysXpM)[*National Geographic*](https://api.nationalgeographic.com/distribution/public/amp/animals/article/japans-controversial-annual-dolphin-hunt-begins?fbclid=IwAR0xrnBPiQrjUOVmY52tS3881eCTFTJI-n9FwnAAfKtE7pnI9Bj-M5ysXpM)[.](https://api.nationalgeographic.com/distribution/public/amp/animals/article/japans-controversial-annual-dolphin-hunt-begins?fbclid=IwAR0xrnBPiQrjUOVmY52tS3881eCTFTJI-n9FwnAAfKtE7pnI9Bj-M5ysXpM) [Earp, Brian. 1/13/2015. “Boys and girls alike: An un-consenting child, an unnecessary, invasive surgery: is there any moral difference between male and female circumcision?” ](https://aeon.co/essays/are-male-and-female-circumcision-morally-equivalent)[*Aeon*](https://aeon.co/essays/are-male-and-female-circumcision-morally-equivalent)[.](https://aeon.co/essays/are-male-and-female-circumcision-morally-equivalent) [Earp, Brian. 8/15/2017. “Does Female Genital Mutilation Have Health Benefits? The Problem with Medicalizing Morality.” University of Oxford ](http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2017/08/does-female-genital-mutilation-have-health-benefits-the-problem-with-medicalizing-morality/)[*Practical Ethics* ](http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2017/08/does-female-genital-mutilation-have-health-benefits-the-problem-with-medicalizing-morality/)[blog.](http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2017/08/does-female-genital-mutilation-have-health-benefits-the-problem-with-medicalizing-morality/) [Huemer, Michael. December 25, 2021. “Relativism: What is this Nonsense?” ](https://fakenous.net/?p=2725)[*Fake Noûs*](https://fakenous.net/?p=2725). [Joy, Melanie. 2020. ](https://carnism.org/book/why-we-love-dogs-eat-pigs-and-wear-cows/)[*Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism*](https://carnism.org/book/why-we-love-dogs-eat-pigs-and-wear-cows/)[. Red Wheel.](https://carnism.org/book/why-we-love-dogs-eat-pigs-and-wear-cows/) [McCurry, Justin. 6/30/2019. “Japan resumes commercial whaling for first time in 30 years.” ](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/01/japan-resumes-commercial-whaling-for-first-time-in-30-years)[*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/01/japan-resumes-commercial-whaling-for-first-time-in-30-years)[.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/01/japan-resumes-commercial-whaling-for-first-time-in-30-years) [Petras, George. 2/25/2019. “South Koreans eat more than 1 million dogs each year — but that’s slowly changing. Here’s why. Young Koreans lead efforts to end a centuries-old practice.” ](https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2019/02/25/south-koreans-eat-more-than-2-million-dogs-every-year-but-thats-changing/2930025002/)[*USA Today*](https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2019/02/25/south-koreans-eat-more-than-2-million-dogs-every-year-but-thats-changing/2930025002/)[.](https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2019/02/25/south-koreans-eat-more-than-2-million-dogs-every-year-but-thats-changing/2930025002/) [Rachels, James and Stuart. 2019. ](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/elements-moral-philosophy-rachels-rachels/M9781259914256.toc.html)[*The* ](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/elements-moral-philosophy-rachels-rachels/M9781259914256.toc.html)[*Elements of Moral Philosophy*](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/elements-moral-philosophy-rachels-rachels/M9781259914256.toc.html)[, 9th Edition](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/elements-moral-philosophy-rachels-rachels/M9781259914256.toc.html)[*.*](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/elements-moral-philosophy-rachels-rachels/M9781259914256.toc.html)[ McGraw Hill. ](https://www.mheducation.com/highered/product/elements-moral-philosophy-rachels-rachels/M9781259914256.toc.html) [Rachels, James. 2019. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538129487/The-Right-Thing-to-Do-Readings-in-Moral-Philosophy-Eighth-Edition)[“Some Basic Points About Arguments.” In James and Stuart Rachels’ ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538129487/The-Right-Thing-to-Do-Readings-in-Moral-Philosophy-Eighth-Edition)[*The Right Thing to Do*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538129487/The-Right-Thing-to-Do-Readings-in-Moral-Philosophy-Eighth-Edition)[, 8th Edition, Rowman & Littlefield](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538129487/The-Right-Thing-to-Do-Readings-in-Moral-Philosophy-Eighth-Edition)[*.* ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538129487/The-Right-Thing-to-Do-Readings-in-Moral-Philosophy-Eighth-Edition) [Satris, Stephen. 1986. “Student Relativism.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/scholarpdf/show?id=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205&pdfname=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205.pdf&file_type=pdf)[*Teaching Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/scholarpdf/show?id=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205&pdfname=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205.pdf&file_type=pdf)[. 9(3). ](https://www.pdcnet.org/scholarpdf/show?id=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205&pdfname=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205.pdf&file_type=pdf)[193-205.](https://www.pdcnet.org/scholarpdf/show?id=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205&pdfname=teachphil_1986_0009_0003_0193_0205.pdf&file_type=pdf) [Traldia, Oliver. January 27, 2019. “Bah Fortiori: On the peculiarly specific character of our moral outrage.” ](https://medium.com/arc-digital/bah-fortiori-f370b1b6ffb2)[*Arc Digital*](https://medium.com/arc-digital/bah-fortiori-f370b1b6ffb2). [Vyver, James. 8/17/2017. “Why do Muslim women wear a burka, niqab or hijab?” ](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-23/why-do-muslim-women-wear-a-burka-niqab-or-hijab/5761510?nw=0&r=Gallery)[*ABC News*](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-23/why-do-muslim-women-wear-a-burka-niqab-or-hijab/5761510?nw=0&r=Gallery)[.](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-23/why-do-muslim-women-wear-a-burka-niqab-or-hijab/5761510?nw=0&r=Gallery) [“What’s Culture Got to Do with It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision.” 1993. ](https://doi.org/10.2307/1341791)[*Harvard Law Review*](https://doi.org/10.2307/1341791)[. 106(](https://doi.org/10.2307/1341791)[8). 1944–1961. ](https://doi.org/10.2307/1341791) [Wikipedia, “Arranged marriage.” ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arranged_marriage) [Wikipedia, “Caning in Singapore.”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caning_in_Singapore) [Wikipedia, “Human sacrifice.”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_sacrifice) ### For Further Reading and Viewing [Boghossian, Paul. July 24, 2011. “The Maze of Moral Relativism.” *New York Times.* ](https://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/47/science-math-philosophy/maze-moral-relativism-1333052/) [*Brain in a Vat*. August 16, 2020. “Is Cultural Relativism Racist? With Justin Kalef.” Youtube. ](https://youtu.be/RLqj8yCmGxI) [Edgerton, Robert B. 1992. ](https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0029089255?tag=simonsayscom)[*Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony*](https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0029089255?tag=simonsayscom)[. Free Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0029089255?tag=simonsayscom) [Huemer, Michael. 2013. “The Progress of Liberalism”: Michael Huemer at TEDxMileHigh. Youtube.](https://youtu.be/lrZ2DJzbYYo) [King, Nathan. January 18, 2017. “Donald Trump and the Death of Freshman Relativism.” *Huffington Post.* ](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-and-the-death-of-freshman-relativism_b_587fdbd0e4b0aa1c47ac27e8) [Prinz, Jesse. January/February 2011. “Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response.” ](https://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Morality_is_a_Culturally_Conditioned_Response)[*Philosophy Now*](https://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Morality_is_a_Culturally_Conditioned_Response)[. 82. ](https://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Morality_is_a_Culturally_Conditioned_Response) ### Related Essays [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk [Ignorance and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/ "The Moral Status of Animals") by Jason Wyckoff [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/ "Speciesism") by Dan Lowe [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### Acknowledgments The author appreciates feedback and guidance on this essay from Felipe Pereira, Dan Lowe, Thomas Metcalf, Chelsea Haramia, and a set of Facebook friends who helped him develop a list of cultural practices of ethical significance. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/cultural-relativism-1.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is co-author of [*Thinking Critically About Abortion*](http://www.abortionarguments.com), author of *[Animals & Ethics 101](http://www.animalethics101.com)*, and the author and co-author of many other writings and materials in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** cultural relativism, ethical relativism, individual relativism, moral relativism, Nobis, relativism --- ### [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) **Published:** January 23, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: [Felipe Pereira](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pereira/) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) Word Count: 998 Many people hope to live on after death, in heaven, *forever*. Even those who don’t believe in heaven usually agree that an eternal life there *would* be better than any finite, mortal life.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Are they correct? Some influential philosophers have argued that *no* immortal human life would be worth living, in heaven or otherwise.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This view has been most famously defended by British philosopher Bernard Williams (1929-2003). This essay explores Williams’ argument and some important responses to it. ![Bernard Williams.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/williams.jpg?resize=513%2C370&ssl=1) Bernard Williams. ### 1. Williams’ Argument Williams’ argument hinges on the concept of *categorical desires*. Categorical desires are desires that give us reason to stay alive.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) What makes *you* look forward to being alive? The prospect of earning a degree? Of seeing your child grow up? Of going on your dream vacation?[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Whatever your answer is, that’s a categorical desire.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Williams believed, however, that categorical desires can only give us reason to stay alive for so long—i.e., that categorical desires are *exhaustible*. First, one might “exhaust” categorical desires by *satisfying* them. Imagine someone with a categorical desire to become the CEO of a particular company, i.e., someone who wants to stay alive *in order to* rise to the top of that company. By becoming that company’s CEO, she satisfies that desire, and no longer has that goal to give her reason to stay alive.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) We also “exhaust” categorical desires by *losing interest* in them. Think again of our aspiring-CEO. Suppose she fails to be promoted as CEO. In this scenario, her categorical desire to become her company’s CEO could, in principle, give her reason to stay alive until she, well, dies. What if she doesn’t die? Suppose she’s immortal and tries, without success, to become her company’s CEO for millions (or billions!) of years. It seems likely that she’d eventually feel discouraged and lose interest. By then, the prospect of becoming her company’s CEO would’ve become too unappealing to continue to give her reason to stay alive.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Williams believed that, just like that of becoming a CEO, *any* categorical desire would, given enough time, either be satisfied or lose its appeal.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) If you were immortal, he argued, you’d sooner or later get to live long enough to have either satisfied, or grown tired of, every single categorical desire you currently have. What would it be like to carry on living forever that way, with *nothing else* to look forward to? Williams thought it’d be, at best, unbearably boring.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) To avoid that fate, and stave off boredom, you could acquire entirely new categorical desires whenever your old ones were exhausted. But then your future-self eventually won’t be pursuing a single project, dream, or goal which you would care about right now.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) This insight makes it difficult to justify the claim that immortality could be desirable for us: why should we *currently* desire to live long enough (indeed, to be immortal) in order to pursue projects, dreams, and goals that we *currently* don’t even care about?[\[11\]](#_ftn11) So Williams’ argument is a dilemma: if we were immortal, we would eventually either (a) run out of categorical desires to pursue, or (b) find ourselves pursuing categorical desires that we, currently, have no interest in pursuing. Since Williams thought that neither outcome would be desirable, he believed that no immortal life is desirable for beings like us.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 2. Responses #### 2.1. Are all categorical desires exhaustible? One reply to Williams is that at least *some* categorical desires can be inexhaustible, e.g., the desire to pursue knowledge.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Imagine a scientist who has a categorical desire to discover the workings of the universe. Would she ever learn *everything* about the universe, or ever grow tired of learning?[\[14\]](#_ftn14) It’s hard to picture her ever exhausting this categorical desire. Others have argued that the desire to cultivate love and friendships,[\[15\]](#_ftn15) or the desire for personal improvement[\[16\]](#_ftn16) are similarly inexhaustible. If so, then at least some immortal lives are desirable, namely, immortal lives spent in pursuit of these (or other) inexhaustible categorical desires. #### 2.2. Can we “recycle” categorical desires? Another reply is that immortality could be desirable if we can manage to “recycle” our categorical desires. One suggestion is that, after enough time, we might *forget* having satisfied our categorical desires. Provided our memories remain imperfect, we would eventually find ourselves wishing to satisfy the same categorical desires time and again, indefinitely into the future.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) And perhaps some desires would tend to resurface. Even if you remember having satisfied that very same desire in the past, you may desire to, e.g., listen to your favorite song one more time, and feel motivated by that to stay alive.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) #### 2.3. What’s so bad about boredom? Others have responded that a life of complete boredom could still be meaningful and worthwhile in other ways,[\[19\]](#_ftn19) e.g., if we were to discover that a director of an especially effective malaria-eradication program found life utterly tedious, we would still think that she had very good reasons to stay alive. #### 2.4. What’s so bad about developing new desires? A different reply notes that these gradual changes of categorical desires we would undergo if we were immortal aren’t any different from those we already undergo in (presumably worthwhile) mortal lives.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Surely, toddlers have good reasons to live well into adulthood even if their adult-selves will eventually pursue categorical desires they, as toddlers, would never consider pursuing. If that’s so, the same should apply for our future immortal selves.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 3. Conclusion Bernard Williams was something of an “immortality curmudgeon.”[\[22\]](#_ftn22) He argued for the view that no immortal human life would be worth living. Others have also argued for the same conclusion, although in different ways.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Some philosophers argue that, if we were immortal, we wouldn’t value our achievements,[\[24\]](#_ftn24) our loved ones,[\[25\]](#_ftn25) or our health and safety.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Others argue that, without death to give us a deadline to finish our projects, we wouldn’t feel motivated to do anything, and lead lives full of apathy and indifference.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) Others still maintain that an immortal human life would be plotless or meaningless, like a novel without an ending.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Whether Williams, or any one of his followers, makes a compelling case or not, this issue raises interesting and important questions about what makes a life—immortal or otherwise—worth living. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) People do not, of course, tend to find *any* immortal human life desirable. Most people believe that eternal existence in hell would be terrible. For an introductory discussion on such versions of immortality, see [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A. G. Holdier. And see Holdier (2017) for further discussion. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) It is important to note that Williams aimed to argue that *any* immortal life, not just an immortal *after*life, would be bad for creatures like us. One might imagine achieving immortality on earth by, e.g., becoming a vampire, uploading one’s consciousness into a computer, or living in some utopia where futuristic medicine keeps everyone healthy and young forever. Williams believed that both earthly and heavenly versions of immortality would be bad for us, and for the same reasons, namely those outlined in Section 1 of this essay. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Williams (1973): 86. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Note that categorical desires needn’t involve major life projects or long-term aspirations. One might answer the question “What makes you look forward to being alive?” by referring to smaller, short-term goals. For instance, imagine someone who is genuinely excited to watch an upcoming episode of her favorite TV series, which comes out next week. She may very well find that her desire to get to watch that episode gives her good reason to stay alive (at least until next week). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Could the desire “to attain pleasure or happiness” be a categorical desire? Williams did not think so. He argued that categorical desires are supposed to be able to motivate a person to stay alive *despite* the prospect of unpleasant times (1973, pp. 99-100). Someone who leads a life full of suffering would not be motivated to stay alive by a desire for pleasure or happiness if she only sees unending suffering for her future. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Williams concedes that a person can have *many* categorical desires at the same time. This means that, even after one satisfies (or loses interest in) a particular categorical desire, the categorical desires that remain will continue to give her reason to stay alive. In a realistic scenario, a person who gets to satisfy her categorical desire to become the CEO of a particular company would probably also have another categorical desire to be *successful* as a CEO, however she understands “success.” She could also have other categorical desires to give her reason to carry on living, even if they are unrelated to her CEO career. Williams’ main concern has to do with the possibility of a person running out of *all* categorical desires, thus lacking any reason to avoid death. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Williams’ claim is only that categorical desires cannot remain “categorical” forever. One needn’t lose that desire altogether. After many unsuccessful attempts, one might still maintain a desire to become the CEO of a particular company, despite feeling too discouraged to pursue that goal, by believing that it would be great if one *were* to become a CEO there. That is consistent with the belief that one will never *actually* get to become a CEO there. It is important to note, however, that such a desire would not be a *categorical* desire. A desire is a categorical desire only if the desirer wants to avoid death in order to either ensure that, or at least witness, that desire be satisfied. In other words, a categorical desire gives a person reason to stay alive in the sense that it gives her something to *look forward to*. A person who maintains a desire to become the CEO of a particular company only as a far-fetched dream does not really look forward to becoming a CEO there. She does not have hopes of witnessing that desire satisfied, because she does not really entertain that as an outcome that has a non-negligible chance of actually happening. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Williams (1973): 95. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Williams (1973): 93. For sustained discussions about the role of boredom in Williams’ argument, see Bortolotti and Nagasawa (2009) and Gorman (2017). See also Erik Van Aken’s [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) for a related discussion about living in a world that doesn’t meet one’s expectations. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) An important, related question is whether we would *survive* these radical psychological changes. According to some accounts of personal identity through time, we would not be one and the same person as our psychologically alien future selves. For a general introduction to the debates about personal identity through time, see [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance. See Whiting (2016, ch. 1) for further discussion about personal identity through time, and whether we should care about our psychologically alien future selves. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Williams (1973): 92. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Something worth thinking about is what (typical) human features Williams must hold fixed in order for his argument to succeed. Perhaps some version of immortality would be desirable for beings *slightly* different than us, e.g., beings just like us, except less susceptible to getting bored. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Levy (2005): 185. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) It may be worthwhile to think about whether learning new things would inevitably lose its appeal. After gaining a significant amount of knowledge, would one continue to feel *excited* to learn something new? Shelly Kagan (2012, p. 243) raises a worry along these lines. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Fischer & Mitchell-Yellin (2014): 360. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Buben (2016): 213. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Belshaw (2015): 338-339. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Fischer (2009): 85-86. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Metz (2013): 135. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Chappell (2009): 35; Fischer (2009): 90. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Benatar (2017): 157. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) The term “immortality curmudgeon” was first used by Fischer (2009) in reference to Williams, and Williams’ followers, who argue that no immortal human life would be desirable. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Interesting arguments have also been made for the related conclusion that, given our *uncertainty* about whether immortality would be good (or very bad!) for us, we have strong reasons to choose not to be immortal, were we given the option. See, for instance, Beglin (2017) and Gorman (2017). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Smuts (2011). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Todd May (2015) gestures towards this view. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Scheffler (2013): 97. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Nussbaum (1994, ch. 6); May (2009, ch. 2); Smuts (2011); Scheffler (2013). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Malpas (1998); May (2009, ch. 2). See Behrendt (2016) for a critical discussion of arguments of this sort. ### References [Beglin, D. (2017). Should I choose to never die? Williams, boredom, and the significance of mortality. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-016-0785-1)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-016-0785-1)[, 174(8), 2009–2028.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-016-0785-1) [Belshaw, C. (2015). Immortality, memory and imagination. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10892-015-9203-8)[*The Journal of Ethics*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10892-015-9203-8)[, 19(3–4), 323–348.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10892-015-9203-8) [Benatar, D. (2017). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?q=the%20human%20predicament&lang=en&cc=us)[*The human predicament: A candid guide to life’s biggest questions*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?q=the%20human%20predicament&lang=en&cc=us)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?q=the%20human%20predicament&lang=en&cc=us) [Behrendt, Kathy (2016). Learning to be dead. In M. Cholbi (ed.), ](https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/immortality_and_the_philosophy_of_death/3-156-39aec12f-4272-4e3b-9ce1-bf7c4c9b9460)[*Immortality and the philosophy of death*](https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/immortality_and_the_philosophy_of_death/3-156-39aec12f-4272-4e3b-9ce1-bf7c4c9b9460)[. (pp. 157–172). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.](https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/immortality_and_the_philosophy_of_death/3-156-39aec12f-4272-4e3b-9ce1-bf7c4c9b9460) [Bortolotti, L., & Nagasawa, Y. (2009). Immortality without boredom. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00431.x)[*Ratio*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00431.x)[, 22(3), 261–277.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00431.x) [Buben, A. (2016). Resources for overcoming the boredom of immortality in Fischer and Kierkegaard. In M. Cholbi (ed.), ](https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/immortality_and_the_philosophy_of_death/3-156-39aec12f-4272-4e3b-9ce1-bf7c4c9b9460)[*Immortality and the philosophy of death*](https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/immortality_and_the_philosophy_of_death/3-156-39aec12f-4272-4e3b-9ce1-bf7c4c9b9460)[. (pp. 205–219). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.](https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/immortality_and_the_philosophy_of_death/3-156-39aec12f-4272-4e3b-9ce1-bf7c4c9b9460) [Chappell, \[S. G.\]. (2009). Infinity goes up on trial: Must immortality be meaningless? ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00281.x)[*European Journal of Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00281.x)[, 17(1), 30–44.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00281.x) [Fischer, J. M. (2009). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/our-stories-9780195374957?q=Our%20stories:%20Essays%20on%20life,%20death,%20and%20free%20will&cc=us&lang=en)[*Our stories: Essays on life, death, and free will*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/our-stories-9780195374957?q=Our%20stories:%20Essays%20on%20life,%20death,%20and%20free%20will&cc=us&lang=en)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/our-stories-9780195374957?q=Our%20stories:%20Essays%20on%20life,%20death,%20and%20free%20will&cc=us&lang=en) [Fischer, J. M., & Mitchell-Yellin, B. (2014). Immortality and boredom. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10892-014-9172-3)[*The Journal of Ethics*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10892-014-9172-3)[, 18(4), 353–372.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10892-014-9172-3) [Gorman, A. G. (2017). Williams and the desirability of body-bound immortality revisited. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ejop.12184)[*European Journal of Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ejop.12184)[, 25(4), 1062–1083.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ejop.12184) [Holdier, A. G. (2017). The agony of the infinite: heaven as phenomenological hell. In Simon Cushing (ed.), ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498555661/Heaven-and-Philosophy)[*Heaven and philosophy*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498555661/Heaven-and-Philosophy)[. (pp. 119-136). Lanham, MD: Lexington Press.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498555661/Heaven-and-Philosophy) [Kagan, S. (2012). Death. New York: Yale University Press.](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300180848/death) [Levy, N. (2005). Downshifting and meaning in life. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00282.x)[*Ratio*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00282.x)[, 18(2), 176–189.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00282.x) [Malpas, J. (1998). Death and the unity of a life. In Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon (eds.), ](https://www.amazon.com/Death-Philosophy-J-Malpas/dp/0415191440)[*Death and philosophy.* ](https://www.amazon.com/Death-Philosophy-J-Malpas/dp/0415191440)[London: Routledge.](https://www.amazon.com/Death-Philosophy-J-Malpas/dp/0415191440) [May, T. (2009). ](https://www.routledge.com/Death/May/p/book/9781844651641)[*Death: The art of living*](https://www.routledge.com/Death/May/p/book/9781844651641)[. New York: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Death/May/p/book/9781844651641) [May, T. (2015). Love and death. In Enns, D. & A. Calcagno, A. (eds.), ](http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-07096-4.html)[*Thinking about love: essays in contemporary continental philosophy*](http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-07096-4.html)[. (pp. 17-30). Penn State University Press.](http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/978-0-271-07096-4.html) [Metz, T. (2013). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780199599318?q=Meaning%20in%20life&lang=en&cc=us)[*Meaning in life: an analytic study*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780199599318?q=Meaning%20in%20life&lang=en&cc=us)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780199599318?q=Meaning%20in%20life&lang=en&cc=us) [Nussbaum, M. (1994). ](https://www.amazon.com/Therapy-Desire-Martha-C-Nussbaum/dp/0691000522)[*The therapy of desire*](https://www.amazon.com/Therapy-Desire-Martha-C-Nussbaum/dp/0691000522)[. Princeton: Princeton University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Therapy-Desire-Martha-C-Nussbaum/dp/0691000522) [S](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/death-and-the-afterlife-9780190469177?cc=us&lang=en&)[cheffler, Samuel (2013). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/death-and-the-afterlife-9780190469177?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Death and the afterlife*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/death-and-the-afterlife-9780190469177?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/death-and-the-afterlife-9780190469177?cc=us&lang=en&) [Smuts, A. (2011). Immortality and significance. ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/430405)[*Philosophy and Literature*](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/430405)[, 35(1), 134–149.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/430405) [Whiting, J. (2016). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/first-second-and-other-selves-9780199967919?q=First%2C%20second%2C%20and%20other%20selves&lang=en&cc=us)[*First, second, and other selves: essays on friendship and personal identity*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/first-second-and-other-selves-9780199967919?q=First%2C%20second%2C%20and%20other%20selves&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press USA.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/first-second-and-other-selves-9780199967919?q=First%2C%20second%2C%20and%20other%20selves&lang=en&cc=us) [Williams, B. (1973). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problems-of-the-self/440C25B26D0E943C22DE8C2B6186F4D9)[*Problems of the self*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problems-of-the-self/440C25B26D0E943C22DE8C2B6186F4D9)[. New York: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problems-of-the-self/440C25B26D0E943C22DE8C2B6186F4D9) ### Related Essays [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A. G. Holdier [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/immortality-3.pdf). ### About the Author [Felipe Pereira](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pereira/) is a PhD student at the University of Pittsburgh. His current research interests are in ethics and moral psychology. He is co-author of “[The (Un)desirability of Immortality](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12652)” in *Philosophy Compass* and “[Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0006.025?view=text;rgn=main)” in *Ergo*, both written with Travis Timmerman. [felipe-pereira.weebly.com](https://felipe-pereira.weebly.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Bernard Williams, immortality, Pereira, philosophy of death --- ### [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) **Published:** September 15, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the traditional monotheistic concept of God and the divine attributes. **Content:** Categories: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Author: Bailie Peterson Word Count: 1000 Theists believe God exists, atheists believe that God does *not* exist, and agnostics suspend judgment on the issue. But what do each of these *mean* by ‘God’? What is the concept of God that underlies the debate?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay explains three important features of a widely-accepted idea of God and discusses some puzzles and paradoxes related to their application. ![John Comenius, likely the first picture book dedicated to the education of young children, Orbis Sensualium Pictus – or The World of Things Obvious to the Senses drawn in Pictures, mid 17th-century.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/god.jpg?resize=656%2C473&ssl=1) ### 1. The “Omni-God” Conception In the Abrahamic religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the typical idea of God is that of a perfect[\[2\]](#_ftn2) being who has, at a minimum, three properties or characteristics: - omnipotence (being all-powerful), - omni-benevolence (being wholly morally good), and - omniscience (being all-knowing). Other commonly attributed properties include: - necessary existence (God exists, and could not fail to exist), - aseity (God’s existence does not depend on anything else; God is uncaused), - immutability (God does not change), and - eternal *or* everlasting existence (God exists at all times *or* outside of time). This essay focuses on the first three attributes, as these are often taken to be *essential*, meaning that a being would not be God unless it has all three of these properties. The latter attributes are more controversial; e.g., if God exists *necessarily*, then God *exists*, which is not accepted by everyone who is interested in the question of whether God exists.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 2. Omnipotence Most people accept that the idea of God is that of an all-powerful, or omnipotent, being. What does this mean? St. Augustine suggested that omnipotence means that *God can do anything that God wills to do*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But what could God will? Could God will what’s logically impossible, e.g., that 2 and 3 added together make 4, or create an object that is both round and square at the same time? Most philosophers argue that omnipotence only includes the ability to bring about logically consistent, not contradictory, states of affairs.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Even if omnipotence is restricted to what is logically possible, there are puzzles. A classic paradox, discussed by Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes, asks whether God’s omnipotence would allow God to create a stone so heavy God could not lift it. The paradox is this: - If God *can* create such a stone, then God lacks the power to lift it, and so is not omnipotent. - But if God *cannot* create this stone, then God is not omnipotent since this is something God cannot do. Responses often involve arguing that careful analysis of the case shows that there is no actual paradox, e.g., that creating the stone is not in fact logically consistent, as the stone is described as something that both can and cannot be lifted, a contradiction, and so an impossibility.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 3. Omnibenevolence What is it to be omni-benevolent, or wholly morally good? Presumably, this means that such a being is perfectly virtuous: e.g., kind, generous and loving; never malicious or cruel; never causes or allows unnecessary harm; always does right and never does wrong. Does being wholly morally good mean that one is *unable* to do anything morally wrong? Or could an omnibenevolent God choose to do wrong *if* God wished to, even if God never chooses to? The first option might be problematic: if God’s nature or essence would prevent God from doing wrong, is this still goodness in any meaningful sense? Compare this to human goodness, and imagine two people, Alex and Blair. Alex is kind and generous because she thinks it is the right thing to do and actively seeks to be this way even when tempted to do otherwise. Blair, however, is kind and generous because he *literally cannot* be any other way: Blair couldn’t do wrong even if he wanted to. Who is the better person here? Those who find Alex better might object to understanding God’s goodness as *impeccability* or the literal inability to do wrong. Others might deny that the freedom to do otherwise is required for genuine goodness and decide that God could be like Blair without any deficiency in goodness.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) This is closely related to a problem known as the Euthyphro dilemma: does God do what is good *because it is good,* or is what God does good *because God does it?* The first option seems to make God subject to an independent notion of goodness that even God must conform to. The second option, however, suggests that whatever God wills is automatically good. So, if God could will something horrific, that would make it good.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 4. Omniscience Omniscience is often defined as knowing everything there is to be known. Things get complicated, however, when we consider whether God knows facts about the future, and if so, how this bears on our free will.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) For example, if God *knows* that you will submit your term paper 4 minutes before the deadline, that seems to rule out the possibility that you are free to turn it in earlier. Philosophers differ in their reaction to this problem, often on the basis of what they believe it means to have free will and whether God, or anyone, can indeed *know* the future (and whether there are truths about the future *now*). ### 5. Conclusion: Combining the Attributes These attributes raise questions and puzzles considered on their own, but other concerns arise from how these attributes relate to each other. For example, omnipotence and omniscience combined with complete benevolence seem to entail the absence of unnecessary and undeserved suffering: God would *know* when such bad events would take place, and presumably have the *power* to prevent them. As a benevolent being, God would want to eliminate such events, so there should not be any. However, such suffering is arguably a fact of our lives, which calls the compatibility of these attributes into question.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The proposed attributes raise difficult questions, but awareness of these issues can help make debates about the nature and existence of God more productive, as well as just make it clearer what sort of God some people believe exists, others believe does not exist or still others suspend judgment about. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) It is important to note that some people use the word ‘God’ to refer to concepts other than the concept focused on here. For example, someone might think of ‘God’ as another name for ‘love’ or ‘nature.’ While people are free to use the word ‘God’ pretty much however they’d like, it is important to be clear on one’s own concept or idea, so it’s clear what is being said or thought. It is also important to clarify one’s concept of God before engaging in debate about whether God exists. Imagine two people are discussing the existence of God: the first has a concept of an all-good, powerful and knowledgeable being and claims that such a being exists. The second believes that ‘God’ is just another name for ‘nature.’ If we do not narrow things down to a single concept, it seems that the point would be lost (e.g., we wouldn’t want to say that both debaters are theists who believe that God exists), and it’s also clear that, since nature exists, “God” clearly exists *in this sense* of the word. In order to focus on a specific debate about the existence of God, we will focus on a more common notion, concept or idea of God. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Considering God to be a *perfect* being is directly tied to holding God to have these three attributes: a perfect being would seem to have as much power, knowledge and goodness as it is possible to have. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Some versions of the Ontological Argument hinge on this controversy, e.g., Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Argument. See [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See, e.g., *City of God* Chapter 10. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Many interpret Descartes, however, as having held that God can do anything, even if it is logically impossible, e.g., in his “Letter to Mersenne, 27 May 1630,” where he states that “\[God\] was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal” (1984: 25). See, e.g., Frankfurt (1977) and Geach (1973) for support of this view. See, e.g., La Croix (1984) for a rejection of this interpretation. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Some contemporary philosophers, e.g., Mavrodes (1963) and Savage (1967), have raised interesting response to this problem. Savage argues that even if God cannot create a stone God cannot lift, this is no threat to omnipotence, since this is consistent with God lifting any stone God creates, and also creating stones of any weight. (In other words, if God creates it, God can lift it, and God can create any stone. While omnipotence requires creating stones of any weight, and lifting stones of any weight, it is asking too much to then ask God to create stones that are also unliftable.) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The discussion of free will and moral responsibility is relevant to this question. See [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima, [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki and [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For further discussion, see [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case and [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Whether or not future-based propositions have present truth values is a matter of debate. Some philosophers think that future propositions do not have truth values until they are present, while others think that tensed facts are eternally true. It might seem that, e.g., it is true right now that in two minutes you will finish reading this article. Because God is often taken to be eternal, or outside of time, it seems that God should know all facts at all times, regardless of the details of time for beings like us. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For further discussion of this issue, see [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf ### References [Aquinas, Thomas. (](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm)[1259–1265) ](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm)[*Summa contra Gentiles: On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm)[*,* ](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm)[Translated by Pegis, Bourke, Anderson and O’Neil. ](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm)[Vol. I-IV. Hanover House (1955-1957). Online Resource edited by Joseph Kenny.](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm) [Averroes. (1180). *Tahafut Al-tahafut: (The Incoherence of the Incoherence). Vol. 1 & 2.* Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008.](https://www.amazon.com/Tahafut-Incoherence-Memorial-Arabic-Studies-dp-0906094569/dp/0906094569/ref=mt_paperback?_encoding=UTF8&me=&qid=) [Augustine of Hippo. (426). ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674994522)[*The City of God Against the Pagans.* ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674994522)[Translated by George E. McCracken ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674994522)[*The City of God: Books 1-3.* ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674994522)[Harvard University Press, 1957.](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674994522) [Descartes, Rene. “To Mersenne, 27 May 1630.” and “Sixth Objections.” in Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny (1984) ](http://admin.cambridge.org/at/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/philosophical-writings-descartes-volume-3)[*The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*](http://admin.cambridge.org/at/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/philosophical-writings-descartes-volume-3)[, Vol. II and III. Cambridge University Press, 1991.](http://admin.cambridge.org/at/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/philosophical-writings-descartes-volume-3) [Frankfurt, Harry. (1977). “Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal truths.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184161)[*Philosophical Review*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184161)[ 86 (1):](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184161) [36-57.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184161) [La Croix, Richard R. (1984). “Descartes on God’s Ability to Do the Logically Impossible.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231381)[*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231381)[ 14 (3):](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231381) [455-475.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231381) [Geach, P. T. (1973). “Omnipotence.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/omnipotence/30F24F3C3453EC0D00CBD1698DC8A16C)[*Philosophy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/omnipotence/30F24F3C3453EC0D00CBD1698DC8A16C)[ 48 (183):](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/omnipotence/30F24F3C3453EC0D00CBD1698DC8A16C) [7-20.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/omnipotence/30F24F3C3453EC0D00CBD1698DC8A16C) [Mavrodes, George I. (1963). “Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183106)[*Philosophical Review* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183106)[72 (2): 221-223.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183106) [Plantinga, Alvin. (1974). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-nature-of-necessity-9780198244141?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Nature of Necessity*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-nature-of-necessity-9780198244141?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Clarendon Press](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-nature-of-necessity-9780198244141?cc=us&lang=en&). [Savage, C. Wade (1967). “The Paradox of the Stone.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182966)[*Philosophical Review* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182966)[76 (1): 74-79.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182966) ### Related Essays [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/ "Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief") by Tom Metcalf [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/god-concept1.pdf). ### About the Author Bailie Peterson is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Northern Colorado. Her main philosophical interests are metaphysics, epistemology, and pre-college philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/b-bailie-peterson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/b-bailie-peterson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** divine attributes, God --- ### ["God is dead": Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) **Published:** February 13, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Nietzsche is perhaps most famous for making the striking claim that God is dead. He writes, “God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!” This essay will help us understand this claim, his arguments for it, and its potential implications for contemporary religious and ethical thought. **Content:** Author: Justin Remhof Categories: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/); [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/); [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/); [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 985 Nietzsche is perhaps most famous for making the striking claim that God is dead. He writes, “God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!” (GS 125). What does this mean? Straightforwardly, it seems nonsensical. God is supposed to be eternal, and thus cannot die. Nietzsche’s claim, however, is that “God” is a fiction created by human beings. Thus, God “dies” when there is no good reason to believe that God exists. This essay will help us understand this claim, his arguments for it, and its potential implications for contemporary religious and ethical thought. ![Nietzsche](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/nietzsche.jpg?resize=524%2C226&ssl=1)Nietzsche ### 1. Nietzsche on Why People Believe in God What is Nietzsche’s justification for claiming that God is a fiction? The answer lies in the *function* of the idea of God. According to Nietzsche, the idea of God was created to help people handle widespread and seemingly senseless suffering. The ancient Israelites, who brought forward the Judeo-Christian God, lived in horrible conditions: for many generations, they were enslaved, beaten, and killed. Under such immense duress, it’s perfectly reasonable for them to find some reason to explain suffering and hope that those responsible for suffering will be punished. The idea of God plays that role. The idea of God emerges to provide light in a dark world. From antiquity to today most people turn to God when awful tragedies happen – for example, when loved ones are gunned down by active shooters, trapped in cities bombarded by hurricanes, or diagnosed with cancer. For many, belief in God provides strength to endure such misery. Belief in God also provides hope that when our loved ones pass away we can live with them again for eternity. Belief in God ensures that no loss is inconsolable, no injustice unrequited, and that we can finally have everlasting peace, no matter the misery gone through to get there. For Nietzsche, then, there is a natural explanation for belief in God. God is a psychological fabrication created to soothe distress, ease trauma, and provide companionship in the face of suffering. ### 2. Nietzsche’s Critique of Belief in God But, Nietzsche says, we don’t *need* to believe in God to address these challenges. Rather than try to escape suffering by embracing some otherworldly entity, Nietzsche thinks we should utilize suffering to better ourselves. A truly meaningful life turns on achieving personal excellence, and such excellence requires overcoming struggle. People like Nelson Mandela, Emma Goldman, and Ludwig van Beethoven achieved greatness by facing down hardship. Nothing truly exceptional in this world comes from peace and satisfaction. Nietzsche says, “The discipline of suffering, of *great* suffering—do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far”? (BGE 225). Moreover, belief in God sustains weakness: “Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth” (Mathew 5:5). Walking with God, for Nietzsche, is walking with a crutch. If we face suffering *on our own*, we are stronger, and have greater potential for excellence. Interestingly, Nietzsche holds that many modern atheists continue to believe in God, though they don’t recognize it. “This deed \[the death of God\] is still more remote to them than the remotest stars—*and yet they have done it themselves*!” (GS 125). Atheists often fail to understand the true extent of atheism. How could this be? The answer is this: atheists continue to embrace traditional moral principles – e.g., that we should respect people or reduce suffering – and these principles imply that all people are morally equal. Nietzsche claims that belief in God is the *only* way to ensure moral equality.[\[1\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/#_ftn1) If God were to exist, then we would all be equal as God’s children. But what makes us equal if God is dead? For Nietzsche: nothing. Why think a freedom fighter in Syria, for example, is morally equal to a Ku Klux Klan member in Wisconsin? Our capacities and abilities to respect others, to feel pain, to empathize, and so on, are vastly different. Thus, we lack universally shared characteristics necessary for moral equality. Atheists continue to believe in God as long as they believe that we are equal. Nietzsche also thinks belief in God binds excellence. Equality benefits the social order, invites mediocrity, and stamps out genuine individuality. The Judeo-Christian tradition values selflessness, humility, and weakness, and demands that everyone on Earth should embrace such values or suffer eternal consequences. But certainly not all individuals flourish while embracing Judeo-Christian values. Some individuals are exceptionally self-affirmative, prideful, and strong. What would happen to someone such as Beethoven, for example, if at a young age he were to accept that he should avoid feeling pride because it runs against God’s commandments? What if potentially excellent individuals were forbidden by some eternal order to feel self-affirmative, proud, and strong? Nietzsche’s worry is that they might not become excellent. If potentially excellent individuals get duped into believing that everyone is equal, such that they never prioritize their needs and interests over the needs and interests of others, they might not become great. Belief in God hinders greatness. God is dead, Nietzsche says, and advancing humanity requires defeating the vestiges of God found in traditional morality and moral equality. ### 3. Evaluating Nietzsche’s Critique Nietzsche is not merely atheist. He is *anti*-theist. Belief in God stifles flourishing. For Nietzsche, we should junk belief in God and focus on developing our own values, setting our own goals, and achieving personal excellence. There are important questions to consider. First, which is more plausible: Nietzsche’s view about the origin of the idea of God, or other accounts, such as that it’s true that there really is a God and that’s why people believe? Second, does belief in God indeed encourage weakness and sap self-reliance? Third, does morality require equality, and does belief in equality require belief in God? Finally, does belief in God indeed limit the development of excellence? Answers to these questions are necessary for a full evaluation of Nietzsche’s provocative claims. ### Notes [\[1\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/#_ftnref1) Nietzsche writes, “You higher men, learn this from me: in the market place nobody believes in higher men. And if you want to speak there, very well! But the mob blinks: ‘We are all equal’. ‘You higher men’—thus blinks the mob—‘there are no higher men, we are all equal, man is man, before God we are all equal’. Before God! But now this god has died. And before the mob we do not want to be equal…. You higher men, this god was your greatest danger. It is only since he lies in his tomb that you have been resurrected….” (Z IV: “On the Higher Men”). Also, when discussing how “Moral judgments and condemnations constitute the favorite revenge of the spiritually limited against those less limited,” Nietzsche says those who “fight for the ‘equality of all men before God’… almost *need* faith in God just for that” (BGE 219). ### References [Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989 \[1886\]).](https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Good-Evil-Prelude-Philosophy/dp/0679724656) [Nietzsche, Friedrich*. The Gay Science* (GS), trans. Josefine Nauckoff, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 \[1882\]).](https://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Science-Appendix-Cambridge-Philosophy-ebook/dp/B00DO1HFLE) [Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Adrian del Caro, ed. Adrian del Caro, Robert Pippen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).](https://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Zarathustra-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521602610) ### Further Reading [Anderson, R. Lanier. “Friedrich Nietzsche,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/nietzsche](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/nietzsche/) [Gemes, Ken and John Richardson (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-nietzsche-9780198776734?lang=en&cc=us) [Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).](https://www.amazon.com/Genealogy-Morals-Ecce-Homo/dp/0679724621) [Reginster, Bernard. *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism*(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).](https://www.amazon.com/Affirmation-Life-Nietzsche-Overcoming-Nihilism/dp/0674030648/ref=la_B001ITXKA4_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1517935537&sr=1-1) [Schacht. Richard. *Nietzsche* (London: Routledge, 1985).](https://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Arguments-Philosophers-Richard-Schacht/dp/0415090717) [Solomon, Robert. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” has to Teach Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).](https://www.amazon.com/Living-Nietzsche-Great-Immoralist-Teach/dp/0195306775) ### Related Essays [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/ "The Problem of Evil") by Thomas Metcalf [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/ "The Problem of No Best World") by Kirk Lougheed [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/nietzsche.pdf). ### About the Author Justin Remhof is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University. He is the author of *Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects* (Routledge, 2017). His work has appeared in journals such as *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, and *Nietzsche-Studien*. [jremhof.academia.edu](https://jremhof.academia.edu/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** God, Nietzsche --- ### [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) **Published:** May 20, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe's famous 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy." **Content:** Author: [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 1000 When discussing morality, we often talk about what we ought to do: e.g., “you ought not to cheat on that test” or “you shouldn’t steal candy from a baby.” The philosopher Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (1919-2001) argues in her article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) that unless God gives us moral commands, moral claims, including claims about what we morally “ought” to do, make no sense because “ought” implies that there is some power telling us what to do. Anscombe therefore concludes that contemporary non-religious moral theories make no sense. We must either accept God as the basis of morality, or develop a new kind of ethics that gives up talk about what we ought to do. This article explains Anscombe’s arguments and shows how she used them to attack the theory of ethics known as “consequentialism” and how it inspired other philosophers to develop theories of virtue ethics. [![Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/g.e.m.-anscombe.jpg?resize=656%2C487&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/g.e.m.-anscombe.jpg?ssl=1)Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe ### 1. Morality, Oughts, and God Anscombe says there is a sense of the word “ought” that has nothing to do with morality. We might say that “plants ought to get sun.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This doesn’t mean it’s morally wrong to block a plant from getting sun. It means that for a plant to be an exemplary plant, it must get sun. Anscombe thinks that we used to be able to say the same thing about humans. We could say “a person ought not to cheat others,” and this meant that exemplary humans do not cheat others.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This is how the ancient Greeks conceived of humans, for instance. Anscombe thinks a shift happened when philosophy adopted Christianity’s view of ethics.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) According to Christianity, which was influenced by the Jewish Torah, morality is a matter of doing what God said to do.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) God gave us moral laws, and we are supposed to follow them. With God’s law comes the idea of “ought” that we now use for morality. “A person ought not to cheat others,” when adapted into the Judeo-Christian system, turned into “there is a moral rule against cheating others,” rather than “exemplary humans do not cheat others.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Thus Anscombe says we took ancient Greek descriptions of exemplary humans, which were not rules we were supposed to follow, and turned them into rules. ### 2. Contemporary Consequentialist Moral Philosophy This is all well and good for Christians and others who accept God as the source of moral law. But, as Anscombe notes, modern moral philosophy claims not to require belief in Christianity. It claims to be justified no matter what religion you believe in.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Anscombe’s chief target is consequentialism.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Consequentialism is an ethical theory that says we ought to do whatever causes the best consequences. Anscombe thinks that this is a ridiculous view if we give up the idea that God commands us to do things. What does it mean to say we “ought” to cause the best consequences? If God doesn’t give us moral laws, there’s no law that says we ought to do this. According to Anscombe, without God, there is nobody to rightfully tell us what we ought to do. We cannot use the laws of society to tell us what to do, because a society might have awful laws. We cannot make laws for ourselves, because it is absurd to think that guiding oneself is anything like making laws.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) We could follow custom or the “law of nature,” but some customs are terrible, and the law of nature might include things like “the strong should eat the weak,” which is clearly bad.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) We could say that morality is a contract we enter into, but it is ridiculous to think we are bound by a contract we don’t know about and haven’t actually signed.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. The Virtue Solution Anscombe says there is one solution if we do not want to accept God as the basis of morality and do what God commands. We can return to the earlier way of thinking about good and bad. Using philosophy and psychology, we can figure out what things are good for humans as a species, just like we can figure out what things are good for other living creatures, like plants. Good plants get sun (for instance), and good humans behave honestly (for instance).[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This method of investigation will have no place for the lawlike sense of “ought.” Instead of “ought,” we would use more detailed descriptive terms, like “just” and “unjust.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Justice is one of the virtues of a human: a good human is (among other things) just.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) These virtue terms are more detailed than talking about what is “moral” or what we “ought” to do because we can give specific, obvious examples of (for instance) just and unjust actions. It is unjust to punish innocent people, no matter what. Consequentialism, meanwhile, says that anything *could* in principle be moral if it leads to good consequences. Consequentialism says that we ought to punish one innocent person to prevent a riot that will kill many innocent people.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Anscombe thinks that the consequentialist approach causes us to debate about whether it’s morally right to (for instance) punish an innocent person. The virtue ethical approach skips this debate about moral rightness. There is no debate about whether it’s unjust to punish an innocent person. It is clearly unjust.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) The virtue ethicist focuses on what is just and unjust, courageous and cowardly, wise and unwise, and so on.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) By developing a theory of human virtue, which requires psychological and philosophical investigation into what a good human life consists of, Anscombe thinks we can return moral philosophy to a place where we can come up with concrete answers. Consequentialism, meanwhile, gives us no concrete answers: everything depends on the consequences. ### 4. Anscombe’s Legacy Although many philosophers were not convinced by Anscombe’s insistence that judgments about what we ought to do presuppose God’s existence or her arguments against some of the ethical theories that she critiques, her discussion of the possibility of a modern virtue ethics was very influential. Many philosophers were excited by Anscombe’s proposed virtue ethics and they followed her suggestion by developing virtue ethical theories.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 7. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 7. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 5. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Moral Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case and [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 5-6. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 6. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz. Anscombe also claims that her argument applies to other moral theories, like those of Kant and Butler. (See [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman). Kant tells us we must constrain ourselves to follow the moral law, which Anscombe thinks is incoherent because if you do something yourself that is not the same as being bound by a law, and Butler thinks we can derive ethics from our conscience, but conscience often tells us to do horrific things. See Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 2-4. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 13. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 14. For an introduction to an ethical theory that appeals to following customs, see [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 14. For an introduction to ethical theories that present ethics as a contract, see [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 14-5. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) These more detailed ideas are known as “thick” concepts. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 16. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 16. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 16. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Some philosophical works influenced by Anscombe include Philippa Foot’s *Natural Goodness* and Alastair MacIntyre’s *After Virtue*. ### References [Anscombe, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051)[*Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051)[ 33.124 (1958): 1-19.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051) [Foot, Philippa. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198235089.001.0001/acprof-9780198235088)[*Natural Goodness* ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198235089.001.0001/acprof-9780198235088)[(2001, Oxford University Press, 2001).](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198235089.001.0001/acprof-9780198235088) [MacIntyre, Alastair. ](https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268035044/after-virtue/)[*After Virtue* ](https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268035044/after-virtue/)[(University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).](https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268035044/after-virtue/) ### Related Essays [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Moral Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/g.-e.-m.-anscombes-modern-moral-philosophy.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Weltman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Weltman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ashoka University, India. He works primarily on topics in social and political philosophy and in ethics. [DanielWeltman.com](http://danielweltman.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Anscombe, G.E.M. Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Weltman --- ### [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) **Published:** September 23, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Categories: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/), [Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word Count: 1000 Suppose that Lemmy is playing poker, and the only card he needs in order to win is the Ace of Spades. If he’s drawing randomly from a standard deck, it’s easy to figure out how likely he is to draw the Ace of Spades: one in fifty-two.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But we might ask other questions: how probable is it that he would, on two draws, draw the Ace of Spades *and* the Two of Spades? Or, if he were rolling two dice, how probable is it that he might roll a seven *or* an eleven? How probable is it that he will at least *not* roll a snake-eyes? We can use the *probability calculus* to answer these questions. The probability calculus has a wide variety of applications in natural science,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) social science,[\[3\]](#_ftn3) and philosophy.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### [![casino](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/casino.jpg?resize=500%2C375&ssl=1)](https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x4sfyo9) ### 1. Vocabulary We generally use decimal representations, where a probability of ‘0’ is the minimum probability and a probability of ‘1’ is the maximum. A fair coin might be 0.5-probable to come up Heads, but 0-probable to transform into a square circle. Equivalently, we can use fractions.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) We use the capital letter ‘*P*’ followed by parentheses to express the probability that some sentence is true or that some event occurred or will occur. We use sentence-letters such as ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ to represent those sentences or occurrences, as in ‘*P*(*a*).’[\[6\]](#_ftn6) We’ll assume that whatever event we’re interested in only has finitely many possible outcomes, or that there are only finitely many possibly true sentences in question. And we’ll assume elementary rules of logic. We use the symbols from sentential logic[\[7\]](#_ftn7) to make more-complex formulas. Examples: - ‘*P*(¬*a*)’: the probability that *not*–*a* is true. - ‘*P*(*a* ∧ *b*)’: the probability that both *a* *and* *b* are true. - ‘*P*(*a* ∨ *b*)’: the probability that *a* *or* *b* (or both) are true.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Assumptions:[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - All probabilities are real numbers that range from 0 to 1. I.e.: For all sentences *a*, 0 ≤ *P*(*a*) ≤ 1. - A sentence that is necessarily true has a probability of 1. I.e.: For all necessarily true sentences *a*, *P*(*a*) = 1.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - If two sentences *a* and *b* can’t both be true, then the probability that *a* or *b* is true is equal to the probability that *a* is true plus the probability that *b* is true. I.e.: For any two mutually-exclusive sentences *a* and *b*, *P*(*a* ∨ *b*) = *P*(*a*) + *P*(*b*). - All logically-equivalent sentences have the same probability. I.e.: If *a* ⟛ *b* then *P*(*a*) = *P*(*b*). ### 2. Definitions ### A. Conditional Probability What is the probability of randomly drawing the Ace of Spades in one draw from a standard, shuffled deck? Well, there are fifty-two cards, and only one is the Ace of Spades, so the probability is 1/52. But suppose you knew that the card you would draw was black. Then the probability isn’t 1/52 anymore. There are only twenty-six black cards, and one is the Ace of Spades. So the *conditional probability* of drawing the Ace of Spades *given that* you’re drawing a black card is 1/26, not 1/52. We can represent or define ‘you drew the Ace of Spades’ as ‘*a*’ and ‘you drew a black card’ as ‘*b*,’ as follows: - ‘*P*(*a*\|*b*)’ represents the conditional probability of *a*, given *b*. - *P*(*a*\|*b*) = *P*(*a* ∧ *b*)/ *P*(*b*), when *P*(*b*) > 0.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### B. Statistical Independence Possibilities are statistically independent of each other when one’s being true, or false, doesn’t affect the probability that the other is true, nor that it’s false. There’s no reason that the result of one die-roll should affect the result of a distinct die-roll. But the probability of drawing the Ace of Spades from some deck of cards is *dependent* on the probability of having already drawn all the Hearts out of that deck. If you’ve already eliminated one-quarter of the cards without eliminating the Ace of Spades, then the probability is now 1/39, not 1/52. Thus the more likely it is that all the Hearts are gone (but the other cards remain), the more likely it is that your next draw will be the Ace of Spades—so the two sentences aren’t independent. - Two sentences *a* and *b* (such that *P*(*b*) > 0) are independent when and only when *P*(*a*\|*b*) = *P*(*a*). ### 3. Rules These rules follow from our assumptions and definitions.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Negation (‘Not’ Sentences):[\[13\]](#_ftn13) *P*(¬*a*) = 1 – *P*(*a*). Illustration: If 0.25 of the cards in a deck are Hearts, then the probability of drawing something *not* a Heart in one random draw is 0.75. Conjunction (‘And’ Sentences):[\[14\]](#_ftn14) General rule for two[\[15\]](#_ftn15) possibilities: *P*(*a* ∧ *b*) = *P*(*a*) × *P*(*b*\|*a*), when *P*(*a*) > 0. Illustration: Suppose there are four marbles in a jar: two blue and two red. The probability that you will randomly draw a red marble and then (if you don’t replace the marble you drew) randomly draw a blue marble is equal to 1/2 × 2/3. After you’ve drawn one red marble (itself a 0.5 chance), the probability that you’ll draw one of the two remaining blue marbles (instead of the one remaining red marble) is 2/3. Rule for two *independent* possibilities: *P*(*a* ∧ *b*) = *P*(*a*) × *P*(*b*), when *a* and *b* are independent. Disjunction (‘Or’ Sentences):[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Rule for two possibilities: *P*(*a* ∨ *b*) = *P*(*a*) + P(*b*) – *P*(*a* ∧ *b*). Illustration: In a standard, shuffled deck, the probability that you’ll draw an ace *or* a black card is equal to 4/52 + 26/52 – 2/52. Four out of fifty-two cards are aces; twenty-six out of fifty-two are black; and two out of fifty-two are both black and aces. Rule for two[\[17\]](#_ftn17) mutually exclusive possibilities: *P*(*a* ∨ *b*) = *P*(*a*) + *P*(*b*), when *a* and *b* are mutually exclusive. ### 4. Conclusion There are other useful rules and theorems in the probability calculus, but now we know the fundamental rules and definitions. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) We use the Principle of Indifference: if there are *n* possibilities, and no reason to expect any particular outcome over any other, then the chance of any particular outcome is one-in-*n*. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Fisher 1959. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Courgeau 2012. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Collins 2012. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Depending on our [interpretation of probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/), these numbers might represent something impossible (‘0’) or something necessarily true (‘1’), or something certainly false (‘0’) or certainly true (‘1’), or a result that never occurred (‘0’) or occurred in every trial (‘1’). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) I’ll refer mostly to sentences, but the sentence in question may assert that a certain *event* has occurred or will occur. That way, our probability calculus can apply to sentences and to events. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Here I’ve chosen some standard symbols, but you might learn different symbols depending on the textbook you use. Some systems use ‘&’ or ‘·’ to mean ‘and.’ Some systems use ‘\|\|’ to mean ‘or.’ Some systems use ‘~’ or ‘!’ to mean ‘not.’ [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) We might ask about the probability of a material conditional’s being true, as in ‘*P*(*a* ⊃ *b*).’ Since ‘*a* ⊃ *b*’ is logically equivalent to ‘¬(*a* ∧ ¬*b*),’ by our rules below, *P*(*a* ⊃ *b*) = *P*(¬(*a* ∧ ¬*b*)) = 1 – *P*(*a* ∧ ¬*b*) = 1 – \[*P*(*a*) × *P*(¬*b*\|*a*)\]. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) These assumptions are based on Kolmogorov’s (1956 \[1933\]: § I.1) axioms, but these (or similar) axioms are now standard in any elementary presentation of the probability calculus. See also Hacking (2001: ch. 6) and Hájek (2018: § 1). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) As before, this actually depends upon one interpretation of probability. Other interpretations will replace “necessarily true” with, for example, ‘certainly true.’ See n. 5. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) We need to make this specification because division by any *x* is undefined when *x* = 0, and conditional probability is defined in terms of division. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) We don’t need to prove that here, but you can read proofs in a probability textbook. See e.g. Hacking (*op. cit*.) for these rules and some proofs. You may also be able to figure them out yourself. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) This follows from the third assumption. See n. 9. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) These follow from the definition of conditional probability, plus basic sentential-logic axioms, for example that conjunction is associative. See n. 9. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) General rule (including for more than two possibilities): For some set of sentences { *a*, *b*, *c*, … *y*, *z* }, the probability that *a* and *b* and … *y* and *z* will be true is equal to the probability that *a* will be true, times the probability that *b* will be true given that *a* is true, times the probability that *c* will be true given that *a* and *b* are true, … times the probability that *z* will be true given that *a* and *b* and *c* and … *y* are true. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) These follow from the four assumptions. See n. 9. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) The general rule for an arbitrary number *n* of possibilities is difficult to explain in simple terms, but it follows the pattern for two disjuncts: add all the individual probabilities, then subtract the *two*-sentence conjunctions’ probabilities, then add in the *three*-sentence conjunctions’ probabilities, then subtract the *four*-sentence conjunctions’ probabilities, and so on, up to *n*. ### References [Collins, Robin. 2012. “The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Blackwell), 202-281.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Blackwell+Companion+to+Natural+Theology-p-9781444308341) [Courgeau, Daniel. 2012. Probability and Social Science: Methodological Relationships Between the Two Approaches. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, and New York: Springer.](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9789400728783) [Fisher, Ronald A. 1959. “Mathematical Probability in the Natural Sciences.” Technometrics 1 (1): 21-29.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1266307) [Hacking, Ian. 2001. An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/an-introduction-to-probability-and-inductive-logic/EA38518337057366AD690C789DD546B8) [Hájek, Alan. 2018. “Interpretations of Probability.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2018 Edition, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/probability-interpret/)[URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/probability-interpret/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/probability-interpret/) [Kolmogorov, A. N. 1956 \[1933\]. Foundations of the Theory of Probability, Second Edition. Tr. Nathan Morrison. New York, NY: Chelsea Publishing Company.](https://www.york.ac.uk/depts/maths/histstat/kolmogorov_foundations.pdf) ### Acknowledgments I thank David Builes and the editors for helpful comments on this essay. ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus.pdf). ### Related Essays [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/olasilik-hesabi-thomas-metcalf/) ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** metcalf, Probability --- ### [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) **Published:** June 12, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay is an introduction to Bayesianism. Bayesianism says that degrees of belief or justification can be represented by probabilities, and that we can assess the rationality of degrees of belief — of credences — by seeing whether they follow a certain set of rules. **Content:** Author: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Categories: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/), [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word Count: 1000 ##### *Editor’s note: for many readers, this introduction to Bayesianism would be more profitably read after first reading* [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) *by Thomas Metcalf.* Bayesianism says that degrees of belief or justification can be represented by probabilities, and that we can assess the rationality of degrees of belief—of *credences*—by seeing whether they follow a certain set of rules.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay is an introduction to Bayesianism.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ![An image of a neon-style sign of Bayes’s Theorem.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/bayes_theorem.jpg?resize=640%2C203&ssl=1)An image of a neon-style sign of Bayes’s Theorem. ### 1. An Example Suppose you draw a card randomly out of a standard, shuffled deck and lay it facedown on the table without looking at it. What’s the probability that this Facedown Card is an ace? There are four aces among the fifty-two cards in a standard deck, and each card is equally likely to have been drawn, so the probability is 4/52 or about 7.7%. This 7.7% is the *prior* probability that the Facedown Card is an ace: prior to drawing any more cards. Now, leaving the Facedown Card unviewed, you draw ten *more* cards out of the deck and look at them; *none* is an ace. So there are forty-two cards remaining unviewed, including all four aces: forty-one cards still in the deck, plus the Facedown Card. *Now* what’s the probability that the Facedown Card is an ace? There are now forty-two *unviewed* cards; ten *viewed* cards (none of which are aces); and four aces still among the forty-two *unviewed* cards. So the probability is 4/42 ≈ 9.5%.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This “9.5%” is the *posterior* probability that the Facedown Card is an ace: posterior to (i.e., *after*) gathering the evidence of ten non-aces. In this process, we began with a probability of 7.7% that the Facedown Card was an ace. Then you gathered new evidence, and the probability became 9.5%. ### 2. Probabilities and Credences Bayesians talk about *personal* probabilities: degrees of belief, credence, confidence, or justification held by a particular person.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) If I’m certain of some hypothesis *H*, then I have 100% credence in *H*. If I’m certain it’s false, then I have 0% credence. In the story about cards, arguably, it would be *rational* to begin with 7.7% credence that the Facedown Card was an ace.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Then, after drawing ten non-aces, it would be rational to *update* your credence to 9.5% that the Facedown Card was an ace.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 3. Bayes’s Rule Your credence that the Facedown Card would be an ace should start at a certain point (7.7%) and then change based on new evidence, as we saw above. How exactly should it change? The following answer is a defining tenet of Bayesianism: Bayes’s Rule: If you acquire some evidence *E*1, then your new credence PNEW(H) in hypothesis *H* (after learning *E*1) should become equal to the old credence POLD(H\|E1), i.e., the probability of *H* given that *E*1 is true.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Your credences were previously captured by probability function POLD, according to which POLD(H) = 7.7%, and POLD(H\|E1) = 9.5%. When you learned *E*1, you updated your beliefs to a new probability function PNEW according to which PNEW(H) = POLD(H\|E1) = 9.5%. Then, if we acquire further evidence (e.g., by drawing even more cards), we treat that POLD(H\|E1) = PNEW(H) as our P(H) for *further* calculations based on some even-*newer* evidence *E*2. Term POLD(H\|E2) will be the new P(H) for when we encounter *E*3, and so on. By this process, rational cognizers repeatedly update their credence in some hypothesis.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 4. Bayes’s Theorem It’s nice to have Bayes’s Rule, but employing it requires answering a big question: How do we calculate P(H\|E)? That is, how do we know what credence to put in our hypothesis after encountering our evidence? Fortunately, we have Bayes’s Theorem. There are several useful versions of the theorem,[\[9\]](#_ftn9),[\[10\]](#_ftn10) but we’ll discuss this one:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Bayes’s Theorem:[\[12\]](#_ftn12) P(H\|E) = P(E\|H) × P(H) / P(E), where P(E) ≠ 0. The theorem tells us what credence to put in hypothesis *H* after we acquire evidence *E*. The credence, as you can see, is based on the *prior* (to encountering *E*) probabilities of *H* and *E*, and based on the *likelihood*[\[13\]](#_ftn13) P(E\|H): how probable it is that *E* would be the case given that *H* is the case. The theorem is intuitive: - The more surprising the evidence is—that is, the lower the *prior* probability P(E)—the more the evidence supports the hypothesis: the higher P(H\|E). - The more probable the hypothesis already was—that is, the higher the *prior* P(H)—the more probable it should be *after* encountering *E* too: the higher P(H\|E). - And the better the hypothesis predicts the evidence—that is, the higher P(E\|H), which is the *likelihood* of *E* given *H*—the more probable *H* should be after acquiring *E*: the higher P(H\|E). ### 5. Applying Bayes’s Theorem to the Example of Cards Consider the hypothesis “*A*” that the Facedown Card is an ace, and the evidence “*T*” that you drew out ten non-ace cards from the deck. Then we want to know P(A\|T). Consider:[\[14\]](#_ftn14) - We already calculated P(A): that’s the *prior* probability that the Facedown Card was an ace, before drawing those ten cards out: about 7.7%. - If the Facedown Card *is* an ace—that is, given our hypothesis *A*—then there are 51 cards remaining in the deck before drawing more, and *three* of them are aces. The *likelihood* P(T\|A) that you would draw out *ten* non-aces (without replacement) from a 51-card set containing *three* aces can be calculated: it’s about 51.2%.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) - The prior probability P(T) that you would draw out ten non-aces from fifty-one cards is about 41.3%.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) So calculate: P(A\|T) = P(T\|A) × P(T) / P(A) ≈ 0.512 × 0.413 / 0.077 ≈ 0.095 = 9.5%. And that’s what we saw in Section 1 above. Following the rules leads you to end up at the correct final credence. In the story about cards, there was an easy calculation available for P(A\|T). Yet in real life, we often have access to priors and a likelihood, but it’s not so easy to calculate the posterior.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) In those cases, Bayes’s Theorem is extremely useful. ### 6. Conclusion Bayesianism has enormous popularity and many useful applications across a wide variety of disciplines.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) However, there are still many points of dispute among Bayesians, and challenges for the overall theory.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The main rules are the Kolmogorov axioms and Bayes’s Rule; see below. Strictly speaking, probabilism (the view that credences should obey, or do obey, the Kolmogorov axioms of probability) is a tenet of epistemic Bayesianism, but not the only tenet. See Joyce (2005, p. 153). For more on these rules and axioms, see [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf. Bayesianism also says that probabilities in science, especially in statistics, should be understood as personal or belief-like (not objective, physical) probabilities; see Weisberg (n.d., ch. 15) and [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Bayesianism is named after the philosopher and statistician the Rev. Thomas Bayes (c. 1701–1761). His presentation of the theorem appeared in 1763 (Bayes & Price, 1763). For recent introductory or overview works on Bayesianism and Bayesian epistemology, see e.g. Hacking (2001), Joyce (2005), Howson & Urbach (2006), Steinhart (2009, ch. 5), Weisberg (2011), Carr (2013), Huber (2019), Huber (n.d.), Schupbach (2022), Talbott (2022), and Weisberg (n.d.). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In case this is puzzling, think about it from a differently ordered process. Suppose I pull out ten non-aces from a deck; shuffle the remaining forty-two-card deck; and then draw out an additional card and lay it facedown. In this case, like in the original process, that facedown card is (4/42)-probable to be an ace. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For more about types of probability, see [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf. On the probability in question, see also Hacking (2001, chs. 13–15), Steinhart (2009, sect. 7.2), Huber (2019, chs. 7–8), Shupbach (2022, p. 1), Talbott (2022, sect. 2), and Weisberg (n.d., pt. III). One way to measure someone’s degree of confidence is to see which bets they consider to be fair; see, e.g., Weisberg (n.d., sect. 16.1). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This seems to follow from what Lewis (1980) calls the “Principal Principle”: If you know that the probability of some outcome is *p*, then you should be about *p*-confident that that outcome occurred (cf. Schupbach, 2022, p. 55). One popular way to argue for the rationality of following the rules is to argue that if you don’t follow the rules, you could be “tricked” into gambling away all your money. These arguments are sometimes called “Dutch book arguments.” See [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson, along with Talbott (2022, sect. 3) and Vineberg (2022). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Some Bayesians are “subjective Bayesians” and some are “objective Bayesians” (Weisberg, 2011, sect. 3). For subjective Bayesians, you merely have to have credences that obey the Kolmogorov axioms of probability (see [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf). For objective Bayesians, there are further rational constraints on one’s *prior* probabilities: how confident you should be in some hypothesis *H* before gathering further evidence (Howson & Urbach, 2006; Talbott, 2022, sect. 4.2.F). Subjective Bayesians argue that in the long run, roughly speaking (Schupbach, 2022, sect. 2.2.3), if you continue to conditionalize correctly on your evidence, your credence will get closer and closer to objectively accurate. As Joyce (2005, pp. 157–158) observes, most real-life Bayesians will admit some subjective judgments and require others to be objective; Weisberg (2011, sect. 3) concurs that subjectivity and objectivity are on a continuum. For an interesting criticism of subjectivism, namely that it leads to (or is) a form of skepticism, see Huemer (2017, sect. 3). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This rule is sometimes called “conditionalization.” See Steinhart (2009, p. 129) and Schupbach (2022, p. 37). See also Talbott (2022), who calls this a “simple principle of conditionalization” (sect. 2). One way to calculate a conditional probability is the following equation: Definition of Conditional Probability: P(A\|B) = P(A&B) / P(B). For more on conditional probability, see [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) It might be worth specifying that we’re imagining that a perfectly rational being would use this process. In real life, there are many basically-rational beings who have never heard of Bayes’s Rule, and may not set their posterior probabilities to exactly the correct number, down to the hundredth of a percentage point. Still, Bayesians believe, the closer you are to following Bayes’s Rule exactly, the more accurate your posterior credences will be. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Another useful version: Bayes’s Theorem (for two mutually-exclusive, jointly exhaustive hypotheses H1 and H2): P(H1\|E) = P(E\|H1) × P(H1) / \[P(E\|H1) × P(H1) + P(E\|H2) × P(H2)\]. Notice that we could replace “H2” with “not H1,” which makes the version especially useful. (You might notice that this version follows from the Law of Total Probability: P(E) = P(H1&E) + P(H2&E) = P(E\|H1) × P(H1) + P(E\|H2) × P(H2). See [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf.) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Another useful version: Bayes’s Theorem (“Odds Form”) (for two mutually-exclusive hypotheses): P(H1\|E) / P(H2\|E) = \[P(H1) × P(E\|H1)\] / \[P(H2) × P(E\|H2)\], where P(H2), P(H2\|E), and P(E\|H2) ≠ 0. You might notice that this follows from the standard or “probability” form of Bayes’s Theorem plus the fact that the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive (Downey, 2012, sect. 5.2). If P(H1\|E) = P(E\|H1) × P(H1) / P(E), then we can divide both sides by P(H2\|E), yielding P(H1\|E) / P(H2\|E) = \[P(E\|H1) × P(H1)\] / \[P(E) × P(H2\|E)\]. Then, by Bayes’s Theorem (standard or probability form), P(H2\|E) × P(E) = P(E\|H2) × P(H2). In turn, we can replace “P(E) × P(H2\|E)” with “P(E\|H2) × P(H2),” and we get the aforementioned Odds Form of Bayes’s Theorem. We sometimes speak of the “odds” of H1 given E in this case, which is simply P(H1\|E) / P(H2\|E), and the “odds” of H1 are P(H1) / P(H2). In turn, the odds O(H1\|E) of *H*1 versus *H*2 given *E* will be equal to the odds O(H1) of *H*1 times the ratio of the likelihoods P(E\|H1) to P(E\|H2). Thus, finally, we sometimes write, “O(H1\|E) = O(H1) × \[P(E\|H1) / P(E\|H2)\].” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) This version is most-commonly discussed, partly because it is very simple to state, and partly because it zeroes in on exactly what we often want to know: How confident should I be in my hypothesis *H* now that I’ve encountered evidence *E*? [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) You might notice that this theorem follows from the rule for the probability of a conjunction; see see [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf. Because conjunction is commutative, P(H&E) = P(E&H). By the conjunction rule, P(H&E) = P(H) × P(E\|H), and by that same rule, P(E&H) = P(E) × P(H\|E). Then we substitute those back in the original equality, yielding P(H) × P(E\|H) = P(E) × P(H\|E), and by a bit of algebra, P(H\|E) = P(E\|H) × P(H) / P(E). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) In ordinary English, we often use “likelihood” and “probability” interchangeably, but in the Bayesian paradigm, “likelihood” is a technical term, used to mean the probability P(E\|H) that the evidence *E* in question would occur given that hypothesis *H* (Talbott, 2022, sect. 4.1). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) We often find that we initially seem to be missing at least one of these terms, especially the priors. Fortunately, if we have one of the priors, plus two likelihoods, we can usually get the other prior by employing the Law of Total Probability: P(A) = P(A\|B) × P(B) + P(A\|¬B) × P(¬B). (Recall that P(¬B) = 1 – P(B), so we can get one of those unconditional probabilities if we know the other.) See Weisberg (n.d., pp. 72–73). See n. 15 below for an application. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) To calculate probability when we draw from a set without replacement, we use the Hypergeometric Distribution (Weisstein, n.d.). It is possible to run hypergeometric calculations online (Stat Trek, n.d.; Wolfram\|Alpha Widgets, 2019). In this example, there is a population of 51, with 3 successes and 48 failures, and a sample size of 10. The probability of getting zero successes in the sample is about 0.511884754 or about 51.2%. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) We can use the Hypergeometric Distribution (Weisstein, n.d.) plus some probability calculus (see [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf). The Facedown Card has a prior probability of 4/52 of being an ace and of 48/52 of not being an ace. If it is an ace, then there are three successes in the population; if it isn’t, then there are four. Given the Hypergeometric Distribution, the probability of drawing zero aces in ten draws if there are four successes in the population is about 0.405. Similarly, if there are three successes, it’s about 0.512. Now, given that *A* and ¬*A* are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, the probability P(T) then must be equal to P(T&A) + P(T&¬A). The reason is that P(A ∨ ¬A) = 1, so by the rule for conjunctions, P((A ∨ ¬A) & T) = P(T). By elementary logic, ((A v ¬A) & T) is logically equivalent to ((A & T) ∨ (¬A & T)). Then P(T) = P((A & T) v (¬A & T)) (cf. Weisberg, n.d., p. 214). Because the two disjuncts are mutually exclusive, P(T) = P(A&T) + P(¬A & T). In turn, by the rule for conjunctions, P(T&A) + P(T&¬A) = P(T\|A) × P(A) + P(T\|¬A) × P(¬A) = (4/52) × 0.405 + (48/52) × 0.512 ≈ 41.3%. (See n. 9 above for the derivation of Bayes’s Theorem for mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive hypotheses. See n. 13 above for more explanation. See also [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf.) [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) One prominent example in philosophy is the Fine-Tuning Argument. We have no way to survey the number of worlds in which the universe permits life and count the proportion in which God exists. But we may be able to estimate how confident we should have been in theism before encountering life-permission; how confident we should be given theism that the universe would permit life; and how confident we should be given atheism that the universe would permit life. Then, using a version of Bayes’s Theorem (see n. 9 above), we can estimate the probability given life-permission that God exists, as in P(G\|L) = P(L\|G)P(G) / \[P(L\|G)P(G) + P(L\|¬G)P(¬G)\]. For more on this argument, see [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) In the sciences, Bayesian reasoning is commonly used to run statistical analyses (Baig, 2020; Kelter, 2020; Tanguy, 2020; cf. Romeijn, 2022). In philosophy, it is commonly used in the philosophy of religion (Draper, 1989; Swinburne, 2004; Collins, 2009) and in decision theory (Jeffrey, 1983; Weisberg, 2022, sect. 6.1). Epistemologists and philosophers of science study Bayesianism and its applications to epistemology and philosophy of science (Joyce, 2005; Talbott, 2022; Weisberg, 2022), including to traditional problems in the philosophy of science (Rinard, 2014). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) One dispute between Bayesians is the question of the degree to which we should be subjective or objective Bayesians; see n. 6 above. For examples of puzzles or problems for Bayesianism, including the important Problems of Uncertain Evidence, Old Evidence, and the Priors, see Talbott (2022, sect. 6.2). In turn, the debate over the Principle of Indifference (Keynes, 1921, pp. 52–53) is very relevant to the aforementioned Problem of the Priors (cf. Huemer, 2009, sect. 2; Schupbach, 2022, sect. 2.4; Weisberg, n.d., ch. 18). See Weisberg (n.d., pt. III) for a general account of Bayesianism versus frequentism, and Tanguy (2020) for an argument for the superiority of Bayesianism in hypothesis testing. ### References [Baig, Sabeeh A. (2020). Bayesian inference: An introduction to hypothesis testing using Bayes factors. ](https://academic.oup.com/ntr/article/22/7/1244/5613971)[*Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 22*](https://academic.oup.com/ntr/article/22/7/1244/5613971)[(7), 1244–1246.](https://academic.oup.com/ntr/article/22/7/1244/5613971) [Bayes, Mr. and Price, Mr. (1763). 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A new Bayesian solution to the Paradox of the Ravens. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/674202)[*Philosophy of Science, 81*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/674202)[(1), 81–100.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/674202) [Romeijn, Jan-Willem. (2022). Philosophy of statistics. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/statistics/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/statistics/)[ (Spring 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/statistics/) [Steinhart, Eric. (2009). ](https://broadviewpress.com/product/more-precisely-the-math-you-need-to-do-philosophy-second-edition/)[*More Precisely: The Math You Need to Do Philosophy*](https://broadviewpress.com/product/more-precisely-the-math-you-need-to-do-philosophy-second-edition/)[. Broadview Press](https://broadviewpress.com/product/more-precisely-the-math-you-need-to-do-philosophy-second-edition/). [Schupbach, Jonah N. (2022). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/bayesianism-and-scientific-reasoning/077B5E32819BA16CFC896176D0051307)[*Bayesianism and Scientific Reasoning*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/bayesianism-and-scientific-reasoning/077B5E32819BA16CFC896176D0051307)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/bayesianism-and-scientific-reasoning/077B5E32819BA16CFC896176D0051307) [Stat Trek. (N.d.). Hypergeometric probability calculator. ](https://stattrek.com/online-calculator/hypergeometric.aspx)[*Stat Trek*](https://stattrek.com/online-calculator/hypergeometric.aspx)[. ](https://stattrek.com/online-calculator/hypergeometric.aspx) [Swinburne, Richard. (2004). ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001/acprof-9780199271672)[*The Existence of God*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001/acprof-9780199271672)[ (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.001.0001/acprof-9780199271672) [Talbott, William. (2022). Bayesian epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/epistemology-bayesian/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/epistemology-bayesian/)[ (Spring 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/epistemology-bayesian/) [Tanguy, Alain. (2020). Hypothesis testing, a simple illustration of the superiority of the Bayesian framework. ](https://towardsdatascience.com/from-frequentism-to-bayesianism-hypothesis-testing-a-simple-illustration-11213232e551)[*Towards Data Science*](https://towardsdatascience.com/from-frequentism-to-bayesianism-hypothesis-testing-a-simple-illustration-11213232e551)[. ](https://towardsdatascience.com/from-frequentism-to-bayesianism-hypothesis-testing-a-simple-illustration-11213232e551) [Weisberg, Jonathan. (N.d.). Formal epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/formal-epistemology/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/formal-epistemology/)[ (Spring 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/formal-epistemology/) [Weisberg, Jonathan. (2011). Varieties of Bayesianism. In D. M. Gabby, S. Hartmann, & J. Woods (eds.), ](https://www.elsevier.com/books/inductive-logic/hartmann/978-0-444-52936-7)[*Handbook of the History of Logic: Volume 10: Inductive Logic*](https://www.elsevier.com/books/inductive-logic/hartmann/978-0-444-52936-7)[ (pp. 477–552). North-Holland.](https://www.elsevier.com/books/inductive-logic/hartmann/978-0-444-52936-7) [Weisberg, Jonathan. (2022). Formal epistemology. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/formal-epistemology/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/formal-epistemology/)[ (Spring 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/formal-epistemology/) [Weisstein, Eric W. (N.d.) Hypergeometric distribution. ](https://mathworld.wolfram.com/HypergeometricDistribution.html)[*Wolfram MathWorld*](https://mathworld.wolfram.com/HypergeometricDistribution.html)[. ](https://mathworld.wolfram.com/HypergeometricDistribution.html) [Wolfram\|Alpha Widgets. (2019). Hypergeometric calculator. ](https://www.wolframalpha.com/widgets/view.jsp?id=ab7e3f4ceba7f23947ef49a3bbf93b56)[*WolframAlpha*](https://www.wolframalpha.com/widgets/view.jsp?id=ab7e3f4ceba7f23947ef49a3bbf93b56)[. ](https://www.wolframalpha.com/widgets/view.jsp?id=ab7e3f4ceba7f23947ef49a3bbf93b56) [Vineberg, Susan. (2022). Dutch book arguments. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dutch-book/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dutch-book/)[ (Spring 2022 ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dutch-book/) # Related Essays [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson ### Acknowledgments I am grateful to Tyler Hildebrand for helpful comments on this entry. ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** Bayesianism, metcalf --- ### [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) **Published:** October 26, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the axioms and systems for alethic modal logic. **Content:** Author: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) Category: [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word count: 992 Philosophical arguments are usually about what’s *actually* the case: whether it’s actually true that God exists or whether it’s actually true that we have free will. But commonly, we also want to talk about whether something is *possible* or *impossible*, or whether it might be *necessarily* true: could not have been false.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) We use the term “modal logic” (where “modal” refers to there being different *modes* or ways in which something can be true or false) to refer to a special extension of standard logic.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) *Alethic* modal logic deals with necessary and possible truth and falsity.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay is an introduction to alethic modal logic. [![An image of multiple instances of the planet Earth.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/modality.png?resize=512%2C288&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/modality.png?ssl=1)An image of multiple instances of the planet Earth. ### 1. Modal Concepts Modal concepts, in this context,[\[4\]](#_ftn4) are concepts such as possibility and necessity:[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - if a proposition is *necessarily* true, then it has to be true: it could not possibly have been false. Maybe the proposition that all squares have four sides is necessarily true; - if a proposition is *impossibly* true, then it could not have been true. Maybe the proposition that 3 > 5 is impossibly true; - if a proposition is *possibly* true, then it could have been true. The proposition that there are twelve planets in this solar system could have been true (although it actually isn’t). ### 2. Adding Modality to Symbolic Logic In standard (non-modal) sentential logic, we create *formulas* by sticking sentences together (abbreviated by letters such as “A” and “B”) with constants such as “not” and “if … then ….”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) To name possibility, impossibility, and necessity explicitly, we need some special constants. The most common are the box (“□”) and the diamond (“◊”). The box means “necessarily” and the diamond means “possibly.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) So if we want to symbolize the sentence “1+2=3,” we can just write “M.” But if we want to say that it’s *necessarily true* that 1+2=3, we can write, “□M.” If I want to say that a unicorn exists, I can write “U,” but if I want to write that it’s *possible* for a unicorn to exist, I can write “◊U.” ### 3. Basic Modal-Logic Axioms Even if we have some new symbols, they won’t do us any good if we don’t know how to use them. We have to choose a set of *axioms*:[\[8\]](#_ftn8) basic propositions that tell us which formulas can be derived from which. Given the meanings of “necessarily” and “possibly,” we can define one in terms of the other. If “¬” means “not” and “↔” means “if and only if,” then for any formula φ (which itself may contain boxes or diamonds):[\[9\]](#_ftn9) (Dual)[\[10\]](#_ftn10) □φ ↔ ¬◊¬φ ◊φ ↔ ¬□¬φ ¬□φ ↔ ◊¬φ ¬◊φ ↔ □¬φ For example, “not necessarily not” and “possibly” seem to entail the same claim. We can call all four of these axioms “(Dual)” because they take advantage of dualities between “◊” and “□”: how formulas with one can be translated into equivalent formulas with the other. Another axiom that seems true is that if a formula follows from *no* assumptions (i.e. no matter what), then it’s necessarily true: (N) If φ is a theorem (i.e., it’s unconditionally true, or true based on no assumptions, in the system), then □φ is a theorem. For example, it seems that no matter what else is true about the world, *if* φ *then* φ*,* for any φ. So we can conclude, □(φ → φ). This axiom also seems true:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) (K) □(φ → ψ) → (□φ → □ψ) For example, if it’s necessarily true that if 5 > 3 then 3 < 5, then: if it’s necessarily true that 5 > 3, then it’s necessarily true that 3 < 5. But if φ isn’t necessarily true, then ψ might not be necessarily true. For example, if it’s necessarily true that *all squares have four sides*, but it’s *not* necessarily true that *this building is square*, then it won’t be necessarily true that the building *has four sides*; someone could destroy one of the sides. Another plausible axiom is:[\[12\]](#_ftn12) (M) □φ → φ Intuitively, everything that *must* be true *is* true. ### 4. More Modal-Logic Axioms and Systems We could have a system of modal logic that only contained (Dual), (N), (K), and (M).[\[13\]](#_ftn13) But it might be *incomplete*: there might be true conclusions that we can’t prove within the system, even given true premises. So we might want to include other axioms in our system:[\[14\]](#_ftn14) (B) φ → □◊φ (4) □φ → □□φ (5) ◊φ → □◊φ These are more controversial. For example, the (B) axiom entails that if something *could have been* necessarily true, then it *is* true.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) But it’s not initially clear why that would be the case. Similarly, just because something is *possible*, does that entail that it *couldn’t* have been *impossible*? Axiom (5) says “yes.” ### 5. Systems and Axioms The axioms we accept will determine which system we end up using. Here’s a summary of which axioms are true according to which systems (axioms in parentheses, systems named in boldface):[\[16\]](#_ftn16) | | (Dual), (N), and (K) | (M) | (B) | (4) | (5) | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | **K** | Yes | No | No | No | No | | **M** or **T** | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | | **B** | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | | **S4** | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | | **S5** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | The more axioms your system contains, the more arguments the system will regard as valid: the more it can prove. But if you use an axiom that’s not true, then the resulting system may be *unsound*: it may lead you from true premises to false conclusions. That’s not ideal; part of the point of having a system of logic is to ensure that that doesn’t happen.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Which of these axioms (if any) are actually true depends on how possibilities affect other possibilities. This is a complicated but interesting topic.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ### 6. Conclusion There are several other useful systems of alethic modal logic,[\[19\]](#_ftn19) and many non-alethic modal-logic systems.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) However, when philosophers say “modal logic” by itself, they’re usually referring to a system of alethic modal logic that contains some or all of the axioms described herein. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For more about modality in general, see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk. For a discussion of how we might know or reasonably believe modal claims, see [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility and Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer. As for philosophical arguments, one might hold that many arguments in ethics, for example, contain a premise that purports to be a necessary truth. This would be the case if most moral claims are necessarily true if they’re true at all. One might say something similar for arguments in epistemology, if facts about whether some evidence E justified some hypothesis H given some background-knowledge K are necessary truths. And one might think that many claims in metaphysics are necessarily true if they’re true at all. For more along these lines, see [Philosophy and its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) and [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For more about standard logic, see [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing, as well as Open Logic Project (n.d.). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This essay is about *alethic* modal logic, the logic concerning the different ways things can be true or false. Instead of using that term in the title, which could put off lay readers, I’ve elected to explicitly mention possibilities and necessities in the title. There are many other modal logics, some of which aren’t about possibility and necessity; for example, there are modal logics about obligation and permission, about knowledge, and about time (Garson, 2022). Note also that modal logic is normally considered an extension of first-order logic, but one can interpret matters in reverse (van Benthem, 2010, ch. 27). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The context is alethic modality; see n. 3. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) It’s standard to talk about possible worlds, but that can be confusing to lay readers. Some might mistake possible worlds (pace David Lewis (2001)) for something like parallel universes, and there is of course debate about their nature anyway. So I’ve elected to try to avoid such talk except for in notes. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See also [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Garson (2022). Other influential authors have used “L” and “M” (Hughes and Cresswell 1996, 14-15), based on notation from Jan Łukasiewicz (cf. Simons, 2022, sect. 5). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) An axiom is a proposition that we take as given, although axioms can be argued for or justified (in the sense that one can argue that adding a certain axiom to a system is necessary to make it sufficiently strong). I’m stating these as material conditionals and biconditionals (that could be entered on a new line, in a natural-deduction system, with no assumptions), but we could also have a natural-deduction system in which the axiom tells us that if we have the antecedent on one line, then we can infer the consequent on a new line, and so on. After all, if Δ ∪ { φ } ⊢ ψ (i.e. the set of assumptions containing the assumptions in set Δ of formulas plus the formula φ) entails (in the system) the formula ψ, then in that system, φ → ψ follows from the set Δ. This fact follows from the Deduction Theorem (cf. Franks, 2021). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Note that strictly speaking, these formulas won’t be “true” because they contain unbound metavariables (with the “φ” standing in for sentence variables, they’re variables *of* variables, so we call them “metavariables”). Thus, you can imagine them all with a quantifier as in, “for all formulas φ, ….” (See [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing.) Also, these are not always noted as axioms (sometimes they’re simply stated as definitions), but I don’t think there’s any harm in explicitly describing them as axioms. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) These equivalencies are sometimes called “duals” or “dualities” (van Benthem, 2010, sect. 2.1). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The system was named after Saul Kripke, one of the most important contributors to the development of modal logic. See e.g. Kripke (1959 and 1963) and Lemmon and Scott (1977, 29) for the name. I’ve stated these as conditionals rather than sequents, because we’re talking about axioms, and so I want to suggest entering these (conditionals) as new lines (based on no assumptions) in a natural-deduction proof. However, they arguably work as sequents too if you replace the arrow with a turnstile (“⊢” symbol), which means (roughly) “entails, in our logical system, that,” and given the left-hand-side on some line, entering the right-hand-side as a new line. One might argue that sequents are about the meta-logic question of what can be proven in the system given what, while conditionals are about the object-language question of what’s true in the system. There is some dispute here (Church, 1996, 165), which we don’t need to get into; see Klement (n.d., §§ 5-6) for more. I add that we can imagine systems of modal logic that don’t even contain (K); some of these are called “non-normal” modal logics (cf. Priest, 2012, ch. 3). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This axiom will be true whenever accessibility is *reflexive*: that is, whenever every world is possible relative to itself. No matter which world turns out to be actual, that very world will also be possible. If so, then another useful, true formula will be “φ → ◊φ.” This is intuitive: surely everything that’s actually true is possibly true. As before, here and throughout, φ can contain its own boxes and diamonds, so given this axiom, “□□φ → □φ” represents true formulas, as does “□φ → ◊□φ,” and so on. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The resulting system is sometimes called “**M**” or “**T**” (Garson, 2022, § 2). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The (B) axiom will be true whenever accessibility is *symmetric*: that is, whenever if world *w*2 is possible relative to *w*1, *w*1 will be possible relative to *w*2, for any worlds *w*1 and *w*2. If so, another useful, true formula will be “◊□φ → φ.” The (4) axiom will be true whenever accessibility is *transitive*: that is, whenever if world *w*3 is possible relative to *w*2 and *w*2 is possible relative to *w*1, *w*3 will be possible relative to *w*1, for any worlds *w*1-*w*3. If so, another useful, true formula will be “◊◊φ → ◊φ.” In fact, any string of ◊s (including only one ◊) can be replaced by any string of ◊s, and any string of □s (including only one □) can be replaced by any string of □s. Recall that given **M**, any string of □s can be replaced by one □, and any ◊ can be replaced by any string of ◊s (Garson, 2022, § 2). So with **M** and (4), you can switch out a string of any length of either symbol with a string of any length of that symbol. For example, “◊φ → ◊◊◊φ” and “□◊φ → □□□□□◊φ” will be true for any formula φ. The (5) axiom will be true whenever accessibility is Euclidean: that is, whenever: if worlds *w*2 and *w*3 are possible relative to *w*1, *w*2 and *w*3 will also be possible relative to each other, for any worlds *w*1-*w*3. Note that as with the axioms (Dual), there are dual theorems for each of these: (B Dual) ◊□φ → φ; (4 Dual) ◊◊φ → ◊φ; and (5 Dual) ◊□φ → □φ. I’m calling these duals “theorems” but one might just as well introduce them as their own axioms. Indeed, some of them might be more intuitive than the “original” axioms (B), (4), and (5). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) That is, the (B) axiom plus the (Dual) axioms entails the following theorem: (B Dual) ◊□φ → φ. Given (B), if ¬φ then □◊¬φ. Given (Dual), □◊¬φ → ¬◊□φ. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Garson (2022, § 2). Here I follow Garson in using boldface to refer to the system and plain font in parentheses to refer to the axioms, although some authors (e.g. Hughes and Cresswell 1996) use the opposite convention. We get the names “S4” and “S5” from Lewis and Lankford (1932, 501). Note that I described creating **S5** by adding either (B) and (4), *or* (5), to **M**. But (B), (4), and (5) will be true in **S5**. So you could get **S5** by adding (B), (4), *and* (5). The soundness of **S5** is sufficient for the truth of (B), (4), and (5). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) A system is sound whenever everything provable in the system is true. A system is complete whenever every true statement is provable in the system. See e.g. Garson (2022, § 6) for more. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See notes 12, 14, and 16. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) These other systems might be useful for different varieties of modality, for example, because we think that those varieties of modality are governed by different metaphysical or physical laws. If so, then we might think that one of these systems is sound and complete for what’s metaphysically possible, while a different one is sound and complete for what’s physically possible. See Kment (2022) for more about the varieties of modality. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See Garson (2022) for an extensive discussion. These include logics for obligation and permission, logics for time and temporal facts, and more. ### References [Church, A. (1996). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691029061/introduction-to-mathematical-logic-pms-13-volume-13)[*Introduction to Mathematical Logic*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691029061/introduction-to-mathematical-logic-pms-13-volume-13)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691029061/introduction-to-mathematical-logic-pms-13-volume-13) [Franks, C. (2021). The deduction theorem (before and after Herbrand). ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445340.2021.1889117?journalCode=thpl20)[*History and Philosophy of Logic, 42*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445340.2021.1889117?journalCode=thpl20)[(2), 129–159.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01445340.2021.1889117?journalCode=thpl20) [Garson, J. (2022). Modal logic. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/logic-modal/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2022 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/logic-modal/) [Hughes, G. E. and Creswell, M. J. (1996). ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203028100/new-introduction-modal-logic-cresswell-hughes)[*A new introduction to modal logic*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203028100/new-introduction-modal-logic-cresswell-hughes)[. Routledge.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203028100/new-introduction-modal-logic-cresswell-hughes) [Klement, K. C. (N.d.). Propositional logic. In J. Fieser and B. Dowden (Eds.), ](https://iep.utm.edu/prop-log/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/prop-log/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/prop-log/) [Kment, B. (2022). Varieties of modality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/modality-varieties/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/modality-varieties/)[ (Summer 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/modality-varieties/) [Kripke, S. A. (1959). A completeness theorem in modal logic. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/completeness-theorem-in-modal-logic1/2656899380CA2607B27A2E90DFEF7CFE)[*Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/completeness-theorem-in-modal-logic1/2656899380CA2607B27A2E90DFEF7CFE)[(1), 1-14.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-symbolic-logic/article/abs/completeness-theorem-in-modal-logic1/2656899380CA2607B27A2E90DFEF7CFE) [Kripke, S. A. (1963). Semantical analysis of modal logic, I. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/malq.19630090502)[*Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 9*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/malq.19630090502)[(5-6), 67-96.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/malq.19630090502) [Lemmon, E. J. & Scott, D. (1977). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Lemmon_Notes.html?id=6L2_swEACAAJ)[*The “Lemmon Notes”: An Introduction to Modal Logic*](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Lemmon_Notes.html?id=6L2_swEACAAJ)[. Basil Blackwell.](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Lemmon_Notes.html?id=6L2_swEACAAJ) [Lewis, D. (2001). ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/On+the+Plurality+of+Worlds-p-9780631224266)[*On the Plurality of Worlds*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/On+the+Plurality+of+Worlds-p-9780631224266)[. Wiley.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/On+the+Plurality+of+Worlds-p-9780631224266) [Lewis, C. I. & Langford, C. H. (1932). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Symbolic_Logic.html?id=NWmuAAAAIAAJ)[*Symbolic Logic*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Symbolic_Logic.html?id=NWmuAAAAIAAJ)[. Century Company.](https://books.google.com/books/about/Symbolic_Logic.html?id=NWmuAAAAIAAJ) [Open Logic Project. (N.d.). ](https://openlogicproject.org/)[*Open Logic Project*](https://openlogicproject.org/)[. Open Logic Project.](https://openlogicproject.org/) [Priest, G. (2012). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/an-introduction-to-nonclassical-logic/61AD69C1D1B88006588B26C37F3A788E)[*An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/an-introduction-to-nonclassical-logic/61AD69C1D1B88006588B26C37F3A788E)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/an-introduction-to-nonclassical-logic/61AD69C1D1B88006588B26C37F3A788E) [Simons, P. (2022). “Jan Łukasiewicz.” In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/lukasiewicz/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/lukasiewicz/)[ (Summer 2022 ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/lukasiewicz/) [Van Benthem, J. (2010). ](http://web.stanford.edu/group/cslipublications/cslipublications/site/9781575865980.shtml)[*Modal Logic for Open Minds*](http://web.stanford.edu/group/cslipublications/cslipublications/site/9781575865980.shtml)[. CSLI Publications.](http://web.stanford.edu/group/cslipublications/cslipublications/site/9781575865980.shtml) ### Related Essays [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility and Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/06/01/godel/) by Jon Charry [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy and its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf. ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/kipli-modal-mantik-kipli-mantiga-dair-aksiyomlar-ve-sistemler-thomas-metcalf/). ### Acknowledgments The author is grateful to the editors of *1000-Word Philosophy*, to Timothy Eshing, and to Andre Leo Rusavuk for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Logic & Reasoning, Metaphysics **Tags:** metcalf, modal logic, Modality --- ### [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) **Published:** June 30, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Andrew Chapman Category: [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/ "Philosophy of Religion")Word Count: 1000 ### 1. God’s Greatness The Abrahamic conception of God is that he’s *awesome*—all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, creator of the universe, self-existent, and a host of other properties that make him not just very, very great, but the greatest that there is or could possibly be. “This is all fine and good,” say non-theists, “but this is a description of a being whose existence we don’t affirm.” However, a famous and powerful argument for God’s existence known as the *Ontological Argument* purports to be able to show that God’s being the greatest possible being entails God’s existence: the mere definition of God proves his existence. This essay introduces this argument. ![Anselm](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/anselm_of_canterbury.jpg?resize=391%2C432&ssl=1) ### 2. Anselm’s Ontological Argument There are different versions of the Ontological Argument, but we will focus on one of the earliest, set forth by St. Anselm (1033-1109).1 As we’ve already noted, God is *the being than which no greater can be conceived*. This is Anselm’s somewhat unwieldy description of God, which we can abbreviate as *BNGC*. By definition, BNGC is the greatest conceivable being. If you think you’re conceiving of God and you can possibly conceive of a greater being, then you weren’t initially conceiving of God. Simple enough. Now, certainly you can conceive of God. To conceive of something is just to think about it clearly and distinctly; you’ve been doing that since the beginning of this essay. So we know, at least, that *God can exist in conception*, i.e., can be conceived. Even atheists admit this. What the atheist is denying, and what the agnostic is refusing to affirm or deny, is that God *exists* *in reality*. So we have an intuitive distinction between a thing that *exists* *merely in conception* and a thing that *exists in reality* *as well as in conception*. Now here’s the argument: Assume that the atheist is right, that God doesn’t exist in reality, but merely in conception. But then there would be another possible being, a God who exists not merely in conception but also in reality as well, who is *greater* than BNGC.2 That is, there would be a possible being who is greater than the being than which no greater can be conceived. But no being can be greater than the being than which no greater can be conceived—that’s a flat-out contradiction! So our original assumption, that God doesn’t exist in reality, but merely in conception, must be false, since any assumption that entails a contradiction must be false. Therefore, God must exist both in conception *and* in reality. Therefore: God exists.3 The Ontological Argument is remarkable in that it reasons from premises containing only definitions and logical laws to perhaps the grandest philosophical conclusion there is. *We can know that God exists merely by reflecting on the concept of God*. Many people, however, have been uncomfortable with the purported fact that we can prove the Almighty’s existence so apparently simply. Numerous critics, theist and non- alike, have criticized different aspects of the Ontological Argument. Let’s look at just two of the most influential criticisms: those provided by Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (994-1083) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). ### 3. Gaunilo’s Criticism Gaunilo was a monk and a contemporary of Anselm’s. In his “Reply on Behalf of the Fool,”4 Gaunilo has us imagine another really awesome thing: *the island than which no greater can be conceived*—let’s call it *INGC*. This island has all the amazing-making properties you can think of: pristine white-sand beaches for lounging, warm water for swimming, and not a tourist in sight. But certainly such an island’s existing only in conception would entail a contradiction, since then there would be a possible thing greater than the INGC, namely, *the existing* INGC. Therefore, the INGC exists. And, of course, since we have picked *island* arbitrarily, we can run the same argument for any object: a building, a mousetrap, a horse, whatever you please.5 What Gaunilo has shown, then, is that, using Anselm’s *form of reasoning*, we can prove the existence of all sorts of bizarre entities, entities that clearly don’t exist. Accordingly, concludes Gaunilo, there must be something fatally wrong with Anselm’s reasoning.6 ### 4. Kant’s Criticism Which do you prefer, *coffee* or *existing coffee*? Notice that this is different from the question of whether you prefer *coffee* or *no coffee at all*. No coffee isn’t coffee while both coffee and existing coffee are coffee just the same! If it seems like we’re verging on Lewis Carroll-style nonsense here, you’re right, and this is exactly Kant’s criticism of the Ontological Argument. According to Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, what’s gone wrong with Anselm’s argument lies in the distinction between a thing that *exists* *merely in conception* and a thing that *exists in reality* *as well as in conception*. According to Anselm, there are two different *sorts of things*: those that exist merely in conception and those that exist in reality as well as in conception. But an existing thing and its non-existing counterpart aren’t *two different sorts of thing*—one merely exists and the other doesn’t. While it is certainly true that some things exist and others do not, existing does not make a thing a different *kind* of thing from its non-existing colleague. The upshot of this, says Kant, is that *existence* is a very special type of property, one not suited for the type of argument Anselm is running. Since there is no difference between the group of objects falling into the class *God* and those falling into the class *existing God*, an existing God can be no better and no worse than a mere God. *There’s simply no relevant difference in kind* between a God who exists and a God who doesn’t. ### 5. Conclusion Of course, Gaunilo and Kant have not had the last word in this debate. Powerful arguments have been mounted in response to Gaunilo’s and Kant’s criticisms of the Ontological Argument. Additionally, increasingly complex versions of the Ontological Argument have been developed and debated. One thing that’s certain is that the Ontological Argument, whether sound or unsound, is a fascinating and powerful attempt at a proof for the existence of God. ### Notes 1 Two other famous formulations of the argument are Descartes’s formulation from the conception of existence as a *perfection* (see [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro) and Alvin Plantinga’s so-called Modal Ontological Argument (see [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf). 2 Which is greater, a God who exists merely in conception or a God who exists in reality as well as in conception? Think of all the things a God who exists in reality as well as in conception can do that a God who exists merely in conception cannot do: He can create worlds. He can listen to prayers. He can be the ultimate source and ideal form of goodness. He can reward virtuousness and punish vice… Those all seem like *great* things, and a God who exists merely in conception can do none of them. 3 You may remember this type of argument or proof from your geometry courses where it was called an *indirect proof*. Philosophers and logicians call this a *reductio ad absurdum*, or a reduction to absurdity. The strategy, as you have seen, is to assume the opposite of what you are trying to prove, show how that assumption entails either a contradiction or some other form of absurdity, and then to reject the original assumption. 4 “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God.’” (Psalm 14:1) 5 It’s important to note that we’re not *merely* talking here about the greatest *actually existing* island, mousetrap, horse…, but the greatest *possible* island, mousetrap, horse… It is plausible that for any type of existing object, one of the ones that exists is the best one (in terms of whatever makes that sort of thing a good one of what it is). But it is another thing altogether to talk about the *greatest possible* or *greatest conceivable* such object. 6 Notice that Gaunilo’s argument is also a *reductio ad absurdum:* Assume that Anselm’s reasoning is valid and an absurdity results. Therefore, Anselm’s reasoning must be flawed. ### References [ Anselm, St., *Proslogion*, in *St. Anselm’s Proslogion*, M. Charlesworth (ed.), Oxford: OUP, 1965.](http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/anselm.asp) [ Descartes, R., *Discourse on Method and The Meditations*, translated with an introduction by F. Sutcliffe, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm) [ Gaunilo, “On Behalf of the Fool”, in St. Anselm’s Proslogion, M. Charlesworth (ed.), Oxford: OUP, 1965.](http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/anselm.asp) [ Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.](http://www.cambridge.org/br/academic/subjects/philosophy/eighteenth-century-philosophy/critique-pure-reason?format=PB) [ Oppy, Graham. “Ontological Arguments.” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford University, 08 Feb. 1996. Web. 27 June 2014.](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/) [Plantinga, Alvin. *The Nature of Necessity*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-nature-of-necessity-9780198244141?q=nature%20of%20necessity&lang=en&cc=us) ### Related Essays [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer ### About the Author [Andrew Chapman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Chapman/) holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder, an MA in philosophy from Northern Illinois University and a BA in philosophy and a BM in bassoon and sound recording technology from Ithaca College. He specializes in epistemology, metaethics, and the history of philosophy (especially Kant and the 20th Century Anglophone and Phenomenological traditions). When not philosophizing, Andrew is skiing, hiking, listening to great music, or playing the bassoon. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Anselm, Chapman, God, ontological --- ### [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) **Published:** March 28, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The things that upset us often aren’t in our control. Stoic philosophers argue that it isn’t wise to allow these events to upset us. Instead, we need to regulate our emotions. For Stoics, this is the key to a happy—and good—life. This essay introduces some basic Stoic ideas. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Pianalto](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pianalto) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Existentialism and Phenomenology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) Word Count: 998 Things don’t always go how we want. People disappoint or annoy us. We disappoint ourselves. We become ill or get fired from our jobs. It rains on our wedding day. Such occurrences can be upsetting: we might get angry, sad, or scared. The things that upset us often aren’t in our control. Stoic philosophers argue that it isn’t wise to allow these events to upset us. Instead, we need to regulate our emotions. Stoics advise us to calmly accept what isn’t up to us and to concentrate on what we *can* control: our beliefs, judgments, and choices. For Stoics, this is the key to a happy—and good—life. This essay introduces some basic Stoic ideas. [![Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Seneca-Epictetus-Marcus.Aurelius.jpg?resize=656%2C297&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Seneca-Epictetus-Marcus.Aurelius.jpg?ssl=1)Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius ### 1. History Stoicism originated in ancient Greece about two thousand years ago and became an influential ethical system, with many adherents even today. The Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius practiced Stoicism, as did the statesman Seneca. Stoicism’s appeal wasn’t limited to the privileged: Epictetus, who was enslaved for part of his life, was also a Stoic.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The Stoics believe that the universe is rationally ordered: everything happens for a reason.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The good life involves accepting one’s circumstances, and responding to them with *reason* and *virtue*: acting logically, with courage, patience, justice, and moderation.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Stoics promote an egalitarian view about people: all humans have equal worth that is rooted in our shared capacity for thought. Our possessions, education, and social standing do not make us inherently superior or inferior to anyone else.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) We are all equal citizens of the world, part of a single human community. ### 2. The Fundamental Distinction Epictetus’ *Handbook* begins with the most important distinction in Stoic ethics: some things are up to us (in our control), and some things are not. Our thoughts, opinions, and intentions are up to us; what we control is *internal*, in our minds. Everything *external*—our bodies, property, other people’s opinions—isn’t up to us.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Our bodies are subject to sickness and injury even if we try to be healthy. The same is true of material possessions, which can break or be stolen. Other people form their own opinions; we can try to persuade others, but we don’t control anyone’s opinions but our own. If we try to control things that aren’t up to us, we will be unhappy.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) If instead we focus on what is up to us, we can discover how to respond well to any situation. Suppose a cherished possession breaks. We can throw a fit *or* we can calmly pick up the pieces.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Stuff breaks; a tantrum won’t change that. Marcus Aurelius begins his *Meditations* by reminding himself that every day he is going to encounter people who are ignorant, incompetent, annoying, and unethical: that’s just how some people are.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Getting upset about them only makes matters worse. Plus, if they’re *trying* to get on our nerves, then we’re giving our control to them if we get upset. If a coworker says something insulting, we could let it bother us.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Or we could ignore it or try to understand why they said it: maybe they’re having a bad day, and we could help them. Dealing calmly with everyday occurrences like this is a prerequisite to acting virtuously in more difficult situations. Epictetus even notoriously claims that the person who has trained themselves to focus on what they control will not become upset when a loved one dies.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Many bristle at this remark, finding it unrealistic and callous. But Epictetus doesn’t mean Stoics won’t *feel* pangs of grief when loved ones die. Rather, Stoics will bear the loss without losing their ability to think logically. Death is part of life; accepting this fact with dignity and grace is part of focusing on what is up to us.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Epictetus says that everything has “two handles.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) One handle makes the thing bearable and the other makes it unbearable. It’s up to us to grasp a situation by the “handle” that makes it bearable. If we break our leg, we might focus on the time we’ll lose at work or our inability to do some activity we enjoy: we’ll be unhappy. Instead, we should focus on what we can do while recuperating, like catching up on some reading or talking to our friends. We can exercise virtues (e.g. patience and friendliness) even when we’re sick or injured.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 3. Criticisms Stoics are criticized as being cold, detached, and defeatist.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Some argue that Stoics are wrong to reject strong emotions; sometimes it is right to get angry or feel sad. Critics also worry that Stoicism leads to inaction and “giving up” in the face of misfortune and injustice: if people accepted their situations, then slavery would still exist in the United States, and women would not be able to vote![\[15\]](#_ftn15) But Stoics acknowledge that some feelings are good: when danger looms, it’s good to feel *caution* so that we don’t respond inappropriately. When we succeed in acting virtuously—e.g., with courage, wisdom, or justice—in a difficult situation, it’s good to feel *joy*.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The problem is that emotions like *anger* and *fear* prompt us to think and act in harmful and irrational ways.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) In urging us to accept our circumstances calmly, Stoics aren’t suggesting that we do nothing or “give up” in difficult situations. We must make a thoughtful decision on how best to respond when others act unjustly or natural disasters occur. If we let ourselves be consumed by anger or sadness, we may act just as badly or fail to act at all. In tough times, Stoics will persevere and do what they can to help.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ### 4. Conclusion Life can be hard. Stoics urge us not to make it harder by worrying about things that we can’t control. Instead, we should examine our situation and consider how we can respond to it with courage, patience, and respect toward others and ourselves. Doing this prepares us both to confront adversity gracefully and not to squander wealth, health, and friendship when we have them: we will use our time wisely.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) For Stoics, that *is* happiness.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Marcus Aurelius (121 CE-180 CE) wrote his *Meditations* in Greek; Seneca (c. 4 BCE-65 CE) wrote in Latin; The *Discourses* of Epictetus (c. 50 CE-c.135 CE) and *The Handbook* were compiled by Epictetus’ student Arrian. For further introduction to Stoicism, see Durand et al (2023), Pigliucci’s entry on stoicism in the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and Irvine (2008). Links to online English translations of some Stoic primary sources are provided in Durand et al. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Marcus Aurelius, for example, writes: “Universal nature set out to create a universe; and now it is either the case that all that comes to be does so as a necessary consequence, or else even the most important things, to which the ruling principle of the universe directs its own efforts, lie outside the rule of reason. Remember this, and you will face many a trouble with a calmer mind” (*Meditations*, Book 7, No. 75). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Stoics trace their ethical ideas back to Socrates, who claims in Plato’s *Apology* that a good person cannot be harmed by a vicious person and who faced his own death with integrity and equanimity. See, for example, several references to Socrates in Epictetus’ *Handbook* (e.g. §5, 51, and 53). The core idea is that virtue is necessary and sufficient for a good life: acting virtuously is what makes our life good. We harm *ourselves* by acting viciously, but no one can compel us to make a vicious choice. We have the power to resist, to be steadfast in our commitment to virtue (including justice). Stoic virtue ethics differs from Aristotle’s virtue ethics in that Aristotle holds that virtue is *necessary* for happiness but not sufficient; happiness also requires some external goods. On the difference, see Galuzzo (2017). For a short introduction to virtue ethics, see [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For example, Epictetus says: “These statements are not valid inferences: ‘I am richer than you; therefore I am superior to you’, or “I am more eloquent than you; therefore I am superior to you.’….you are identical neither to your property nor with your speaking” (*The Handbook*, §44). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Epictetus, *The Handbook*, §1. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Stoic conception of happiness falls under the “Virtue Theory” category in [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Epictetus, *The Handbook* §3. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, Book 2, §1. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) On dealing with difficult people, see Epictetus, *The Handbook*, §20, 28, and 33. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Epictetus, *The Handbook* §3. On coping with death, see also §5, 11, and 16. Interestingly, although disagreeing about the nature of happiness, the Epicureans agree with the Stoics that death is not to be feared or lamented. See [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad/) by Frederik Kaufman. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Consider, for example, that when a loved one passes away, it may be our responsibility to make funeral arrangements and handle their estate; we need to try to keep ourselves together well enough to fulfill these obligations appropriately. Of course, we may feel sad and miss them. But Epictetus warns us that it is foolish to live as though we expect that none of our loved ones will ever die (*The Handbook*, §14). An important corollary of this warning is that a wise Stoic will make the most of the time they have with their loved ones; they won’t take opportunities to spend quality time with them for granted. For further discussion of the Stoic attitude toward death and loss, see Earp (2018). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) To say there are “two handles” means to say that there are (at least) two different ways of looking at or judging things and situations. Epictetus, *The Handbook*, §43. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Epictetus, *Discourses*, Book 3, Chapter 10 (in *The Complete Works*). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The ordinary, colloquial meaning of “stoic” as displaying no emotion plays into this criticism, but this ordinary usage is not the whole story. See Nussbaum (1994), Chapters 10 and 11, for discussion. Notably, Nussbaum has recently revised her views about Seneca and anger, in Nussbaum (2015). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Some might especially question the ancient Stoic idea that all events occur in accordance with a rational, providential (or divine) order of nature as encouraging us to accept things as they are and even to treat all things for happening for a good reason, even when they seem unjust. Pigliucci (2017) argues that stoic ethics has value even if we do not believe that the universe is rationally ordered. It will still be the case that some things are in our control and others are not and that trying to change things we can’t will make us unhappy. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Here I’m avoiding technical details of the Stoic theory of emotions, but the basic idea is that *emotions* and *feelings* are distinct. Emotions (*pathê*) are strong feelings that are attached to false judgments . But some feelings can be attached to true judgments (e.g. such as the judgment that one acted well in a tough situation): these are called *eupatheiai* (good feeling). For further details and examples, see Section 4 of Pigliucci’s entry on “Stoicism” in the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, as well as Irvine (2008). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Seneca’s *On Anger* offers graphic examples of the horrible things people have done when gripped by the “brief madness” (i.e. insanity) of anger, in Seneca (2010). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) For details and examples, see Nancy Sherman’s (2021) discussion of Stoic grit and resilience. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Seneca warns us in *On the Shortness of Life*: “It is not that we have a short time to live, but that we waste a lot of it” (2005, p. 1). He suggests we waste our time in many ways: by working too much, partying too much, and becoming obsessed (“preoccupied”) with pastimes; he gives examples like spending all one’s time going to circuses and wrestling matches, but a modern equivalent might be binge-watching TV shows. Seneca doesn’t see any virtue in working yourself to death either; we need to make time for philosophical thought and conversation, and also to rest and relax with a *moderate* amount of wine (see “On Tranquility of Mind” in *On the Shortness of Life*). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Thanks to Mark Conard, Nathan Nobis, Tiina Rosenqvist, Daniel Peterson, Matt Sanderson, and Kristin Seemuth Whaley for suggestions that helped improve and deepen this short essay. ### References [Aurelius, Marcus (2011). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meditations-9780199573202?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Meditations*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meditations-9780199573202?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Translated by Robin Hard. Oxford University Press](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meditations-9780199573202?cc=us&lang=en&). (Originally written in Greek c. 170-180 CE) [Epictetus (2022). ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo174912060.html)[*The Complete Works*](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo174912060.html)[. Edited and translated by Robin Waterfield. University of Chicago Press.](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo174912060.html) (Originally compiled in Greek by Arrian c. 108 CE) [Epictetus (1983). ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/the-handbook-the-encheiridion)[*The Handbook (The Encheiridion)*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/the-handbook-the-encheiridion)[. Translated by Nicholas P. White. Hackett.](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/the-handbook-the-encheiridion) Originally compiled in Greek by Arrian c. 108 CE) [Durand, Marion, Simon Shogry, and Dirk Baltzly (2023). “Stoicism.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/)[(Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/) [Earp, Brian D. (2018, August 21). “Against Mourning.” ](https://aeon.co/essays/do-not-weep-for-your-dead-how-to-mourn-as-the-stoics-did)[*Aeon*](https://aeon.co/essays/do-not-weep-for-your-dead-how-to-mourn-as-the-stoics-did)[. ](https://aeon.co/essays/do-not-weep-for-your-dead-how-to-mourn-as-the-stoics-did) [Galluzzo, Gabriele (2017, June 10). “Poor but Happy? Aristotle and the Stoics on External Goods.” ](https://modernstoicism.com/poor-but-happy-aristotle-and-the-stoics-on-external-goods-by-gabriele-galluzzo/)[*Modern Stoicism.*](https://modernstoicism.com/poor-but-happy-aristotle-and-the-stoics-on-external-goods-by-gabriele-galluzzo/) [Irvine, William B. (2008). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-guide-to-the-good-life-9780195374612?cc=us&lang=en&)[*A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-guide-to-the-good-life-9780195374612?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-guide-to-the-good-life-9780195374612?cc=us&lang=en&) [Nussbaum, Martha C. (1994). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691181028/the-therapy-of-desire)[*The Therapy of Desire*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691181028/the-therapy-of-desire)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691181028/the-therapy-of-desire) [Nussbaum, Martha C. (2015). “Transitional Anger.” ](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2014.19)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2014.19)[ 1(1): 41-56.](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2014.19) [Pigliucci, Massimo (2017). ](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/massimo-pigliucci/how-to-be-a-stoic/9780465097968/?lens=basic-books)[*How to Be a Stoic: Using Ancient Philosophy to Live a Modern Life*](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/massimo-pigliucci/how-to-be-a-stoic/9780465097968/?lens=basic-books)[. Basic Books.](https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/massimo-pigliucci/how-to-be-a-stoic/9780465097968/?lens=basic-books) [Pigliucci, Massimo. “Stoicism.” ](https://iep.utm.edu/stoicism/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/stoicism/)[. Last Accessed 3/25/2025.](https://iep.utm.edu/stoicism/) [Seneca (2005). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/297632/on-the-shortness-of-life-by-seneca/)[*On the Shortness of Life*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/297632/on-the-shortness-of-life-by-seneca/)[. Translated by C. D. N. Costa. Penguin.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/297632/on-the-shortness-of-life-by-seneca/) (Originally written in Latin c. 49 CE) [Seneca, Lucius Anneus (2010). ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo5586869.html)[*Anger, Mercy, Revenge*](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo5586869.html)[. Translated by Robert A. Kaster and Martha C. Nussbaum. University of Chicago Press.](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo5586869.html) (Originally written in Latin c. 45-56 CE) [Sherman, Nancy (2021). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/stoic-wisdom-9780197673072?lang=en&cc=us)[*Stoic Wisdom: Ancient Lessons for Modern Resilience*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/stoic-wisdom-9780197673072?lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/stoic-wisdom-9780197673072?lang=en&cc=us) ### Related Essays [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [“Hell Is Other People”: Jean-Paul Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people/) by Kiki Berk [Is Death Bad? 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[eku.academia.edu/MatthewPianalto](https://eku.academia.edu/MatthewPianalto) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), and [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Pianalto, Stoic, Stoicism --- ### [Immanuel Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) **Published:** November 11, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Some of the most memorable experiences in life—like these—fill us with a profound sense of wonder and awe. Philosophers consider these experiences examples of the sublime. This essay summarizes Kant’s theory of the sublime. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 1000 Imagine watching a sunset break through dark clouds. Or listening to thunder pound the atmosphere as lightning flashes and explodes through the sky. Or viewing raging torrents of water or the vastness of the cosmos on a clear night. Or walking through a forest with trees that seem to stretch upwards forever. Some of the most memorable experiences in life—like these—fill us with a profound sense of wonder and awe. Philosophers consider these experiences examples of *the sublime*. While experiences of the sublime are often overwhelming and overpowering, overall they are deeply empowering. According to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), the sublime empowers us by revealing the greatness (i.e., the sublimity) of our rational minds. This essay summarizes Kant’s theory of the sublime. [![Vincent van Gogh's "The Starry Night" (1889).](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/van_gogh_-_starry_night.jpg?resize=656%2C520&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/van_gogh_-_starry_night.jpg?ssl=1) Vincent van Gogh’s “The Starry Night” (1889). ### 1. What is the Sublime? The sublime is an *aesthetic* experience, i.e., a perceptual experience enjoyed for its own sake.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The experience of enjoying the beauty of flowers, for instance, is also an aesthetic experience. So what makes the sublime unique? While the experience of beauty is purely pleasurable, the sublime includes a partial feeling of displeasure, such as fear, albeit an even stronger sense of pleasure.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Kant thus considers the sublime a “negative pleasure” in that, while it’s mostly pleasurable overall, it’s also partly displeasurable (i.e., negative).[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Given the sublime’s displeasurable dimension, we can wonder why we like or derive aesthetic enjoyment from it. This means it’s important to figure out why it “hurts,” but even more so why it feels good overall. [\[4\]](#_ftn4) Kant explains there are two major types of the sublime: the *mathematical*, or what appears to sense perception infinite in size; and the *dynamical*, which is what seems infinite in power.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) An example of the mathematical sublime is the starry night sky.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) An example of the dynamical sublime is an erupting volcano.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) According to Kant, the sublime is the infinite, but the natural object (e.g., the volcano) is not actually infinite, and thus it is incorrect to consider it the true sublime object.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Instead, the true sublime (i.e., infinite) object is the rational part of the human mind (i.e., reason). For Kant, we only call the natural object sublime because it reveals the sublimity (i.e., infinity) of reason.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 2. The Mathematical Sublime In the case of the mathematical sublime, the experiencer encounters something so large that visual perception cannot take it all in at once, i.e, it appears infinite in size.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Kant argues this experience provokes the rational faculty of the mind (i.e., reason) to think of infinity, and reason then wants a sense perception to match its idea.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) However, perception cannot deliver what reason desires. For instance, you cannot see the entirety of the Grand Canyon in one visual glance the way you can a chair. (And the Grand Canyon only *appears* infinite anyway.[\[12\]](#_ftn12)) As a result, perception buckles under the demands of reason, and this is why immensely large objects cause displeasure.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) But, Kant argues, this experience is nonetheless pleasurable overall because it reveals the awesome power of reason to conceive of the idea of infinity. Only an infinite mental faculty (i.e., reason) can think of infinity in size.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Thus, it is really reason, rather than the large natural object, which is truly sublime (i.e., infinite); the seemingly infinite natural phenomenon just triggers this realization.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 3. The Dynamical Sublime In an experience of the dynamical sublime, we are presented with a perceptual object that seems infinitely powerful, such as a hurricane. To enjoy the experience of the mighty storm (i.e., to regard it as sublime rather than horrific), we must view it from a safe physical position.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) However, even if we are watching the storm on television (for instance), it nonetheless reminds us of our mortality as natural creatures: simply put, the hurricane could crush us. This explains how the dynamical sublime causes displeasure: while it might not kill us today, it reminds us that we *can* die, which makes us fearful.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) At the same time, however, Kant says the storm fills us with a triumphant sense of our own incredible strength. In particular, what merely appears to be an infinitely powerful object (e.g., the hurricane) makes the rational part of the mind think of the idea of our *own* infinite power, i.e., free will.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Wind and rain may push us around as natural beings, but Kant says they cannot move us as spiritual beings endowed with free will (i.e., infinite power).[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Free will can be understood as infinite power because it is an unlimited (i.e., infinite) ability to resist natural determination. The joyful realization of the idea of free will explains why we find this experience pleasurable.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) The dynamical sublime makes us feel physically weak, but spiritually powerful overall as rational beings who can conceive of the infinity of free self-determination. Only an infinite mental faculty (i.e., reason) can conceive of infinite power (i.e., free will). Thus, once again, it is the rational mind, for Kant, which is the true sublime (i.e., infinite) object for being able to think of infinity in power (i.e., free will).[\[21\]](#_ftn21) The powerful object of nature is just the occasion for this discovery.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) In this way, both the mathematical and dynamical sublime reveal our immeasurable capacities as humans, highlighting the superiority of our rational minds over nature.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) No matter how grand or dominant nature appears to be, it is miniscule and weak compared to reason’s ideas of infinite size and power. ### 4. Conclusion For many people, the sublime is an experience of feeling a deep connection to nature or even a divine reality.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) Thus, Kant’s decision to locate sublimity in the rational human mind might seem like an inaccurate description of what the experience is really like.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) Nonetheless, Kant’s theory of sublimity is an ideal starting point for anyone who wants to philosophize about why we derive aesthetic enjoyment from the experience of overwhelmingly large and powerful phenomena.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Kant (1987: p. 97) says we like the sublime for its own sake just as we do other aesthetic experiences. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Kant (1987: pp. 98 and 115) for his discussions of the distinction between beauty and the sublime. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Due to its combination of negative feelings (e.g., fear) and positive feelings (e.g., pleasure), Kant (1987: p. 98) characterizes the experience of the sublime as a “negative pleasure,” and (1987: p. 117) “a pleasure that is possible only by means of a displeasure.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This question is similar to the issue of understanding why, for instance, we derive aesthetic enjoyment from viewing horror movies and dramatic tragedies. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See (1987: pp. 103-117) for Kant’s discussion of the mathematical sublime, and (1987: pp. 119-123) for Kant’s discussion of the dynamical sublime. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Kant (2005: 133) famously writes, “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration \[wonder\] and reverence \[awe\], the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.” The starry heavens can be understood as mathematically sublime, and the moral law, especially in its connection with free will, can be viewed as dynamically sublime. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Kant (1987: pp. 122 and 129) for his list of examples of the sublime. Kant mostly focuses on examples of the sublime from nature. Kant (1987: p. 109) writes that it is “crude” or “monstrous” nature, or (1987: p. 99) nature “in its chaos” and “wildest and most ruleless disarray and devastation” that best arouses the experience of the sublime. This is because chaotic nature appears most formless or unbounded (i.e., infinite), unlike form-bound art or objects of nature such as plants and animals. Kant (1987: p. 108) does cite two examples of human-designed sublime objects: the Egyptian pyramids and St. Peter’s Basilica. He also cites the example of war (1987: p. 122), which can be regarded as a human phenomenon. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Regarding the definition of the sublime as the infinite, Kant (1987: p. 98) says the sublime is “formless” and “unboundedness.” Kant (1987: p. 103) also writes that the sublime can be defined as what is “absolutely large,” or “large beyond all comparison.” Kant (1987: p. 112) explicitly says that “nature is sublime in those of its appearances whose intuition carries with it the idea of their infinity.” Kant (1987: p. 105) points out that objects of nature are never genuinely infinite or absolutely large, because there could arguably always be an even larger natural object, and thus infinity “must be sought solely in our \[rational\] ideas.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Kant (1987: pp. 99 and 113) points out that we usually call the natural object (a storm, for example) sublime, and yet that is incorrect, because “sublime” is a positive term, while “the sight of \[the storm\] is horrible.” Instead, Kant says the true sublime object is only “ideas of reason” which are “aroused and called to mind” by the natural object. Kant (1987: p. 100) thus writes that the sublime is found “merely within ourselves.” Kant (1987: pp. 113 and 135) says explicitly that the sublime is found in “reason’s ideas.” Kant (1987: p. 114) writes that we have an experience of the sublime when nature is revealed to be “vanishingly small in contrast to the ideas of reason.” For Kant, reason is the mental faculty that produces absolute ideas such as infinity, free will, God, and immortality. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Kant (1987: p. 107) writes that the natural object of the mathematical sublime is what we are unable to “take…in directly in one intuition.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Kant (1987: p. 106) writes that, in an experience of the mathematical sublime, “reason demands absolute totality as a real idea.” “Absolute totality” is here another way to say the infinite; “real idea” means an idea that corresponds to a sense perception. In Kant’s estimation, there are no sense perceptions of objects which match reason’s ideas of infinity, God, free will, and the immortal soul. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Grand Canyon might *seem* infinite, because you can’t perceive it all at once, but it’s not *actually* infinite because it is limited in space; it doesn’t truly stretch on in all directions forever. According to Kant, no natural object is genuinely infinite, because they all have limits and there could arguably always be an even larger object. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) In an experience of the mathematical sublime, reason essentially pushes sense perception to its breaking point. Kant (1987: p. 106) says that reason’s demand reveals the “inadequacy” of “our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense.” Kant (1987: p. 113) writes that we experience sublimity when sense perception is “inadequate to reason’s ideas.” The role of what Kant calls the imagination, or the mental faculty that produces images in the mind, is important in the inadequacy of perception: neither can you “take in” a seemingly infinite natural object all in one visual perception, nor produce a complete image of it in your mind. Reason can conceive of the idea of the infinite, but imagination cannot mentally visualize it. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Kant (1987: p. 116) writes that the sublime “uncovers in \[us\] the consciousness of an unlimited \[i.e. infinite\] ability,” which is reason’s ability to think of infinity. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Thus, Kant (1987: p. 101) writes that the true object of mathematical sublimity is our “cognitive power.” As Kant (1987: p. 106) says, “Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense.” See also Kant (1987: p. 111). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Kant (1987: p. 119) insists on the necessity of viewing the powerful object from a safe distance when he writes that nature appears dynamically sublime only when we consider it “as a might \[i.e., power\] that has no dominance over us.” It has no dominance over us because we are physically safe from it. Kant (1987: p. 200) writes that while dynamically sublime objects could easily destroy us, “the sight of them becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, provided we are in a safe place.” Kant (1987: p. 121) further specifies that “the danger is not genuine” in an experience of the dynamical sublime, and “we must find ourselves safe in order to feel this exciting liking \[pleasure\].” [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Kant (1987: p. 129) writes that while a person might feel something *like* fear in an experience of the dynamical sublime, “since he knows he is safe, this is not actual fear.” Kant (1987: pp. 119-200) writes that we are fearful without being genuinely afraid in an experience of the dynamical sublime. If we were immediately afraid for our lives (such as when caught in a hurricane, for instance), we would not find the storm sublime, that is, pleasurable. As Kant (1987: p. 200) writes, “we flee from the sight of an object that scares us, and it is impossible to like terror that we take seriously.” Kant clarifies that fearfulness is caused by merely *thinking* of how the powerful object *could* harm us, as opposed to being genuinely afraid of it. In other words, the sublime consists of *imagined* rather than genuine fear. We are also not genuinely afraid of the powerful natural object because, like with all aesthetic experiences for Kant, we contemplate the sublime in a “disinterested” manner, which means without regard for how it could impact us in a physical or material sense. However, we must find the storm fearful (that is, it must cause us mental discomfort in some way) in order for the experience to consist of the emotional ambivalence (i.e., “negative pleasure”) essential to the sublime. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Kant (1987: p. 120) specifically says that, just like in the mathematical sublime, it is “our power of reason” which is the true dynamically sublime object. Once again, for Kant, only an infinite mental faculty (i.e., reason) can conceive of the idea of infinity, which in this case is infinite power, that is, free will. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Kant (1987: p. 120) writes that the dynamical sublime “allow\[s\] us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist…nature’s seeming omnipotence.” Kant (1987: p. 121) says that the dynamical sublime reveals the idea of our power “to choose” and engage in “full deliberation.” Furthermore, Kant (1987: p. 125) writes that everyone can experience the sublime because all humans are endowed with “moral feeling” or (1987: p. 127) “practical reason,” which includes the notion of free will. Kant (1987: p. 135) says explicitly that the dynamical sublime reveals “the idea of freedom.” For reflections on the philosophical notion of free will, see [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima and [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. We can be regarded as spiritual beings in regards to our free will for Kant because free will is “supersensible” or supernatural, non-physical, and immaterial. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Clewis (2009) devotes an entire book to exploring how the sublime is an experience of the revelation of free will. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Kant (1987: p. 121) writes that the dynamical sublime allows the rational “mind to feel its own sublimity.” In greater detail (1987: p. 123), “sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature outside us (as far as it influences us.)” Also (1987: p. 120), the sublime is a positive or honorific term, and thus cannot be ascribed to negative and terribly destructive phenomena like hurricanes. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Kant (1987: p. 120) writes that the dynamic sublime reveals that the true infinite (or sublime) object is reason and its idea of free will, which by comparison shows that nature’s might is only a “seeming omnipotence” which merely *appears* infinite. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Kant (1987: p. 121) writes that the sublime “reveals in us a superiority over nature,” that it “elevates \[reason\] above even nature.” The sublime (1987: p. 123) makes us “conscious of our superiority to nature” as it allows us to think of our rational vocation “as being sublimely above nature.” The sublime (1987: p. 124) consists in reason’s “dominance…over sensibility.” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Kant (1987: p. 122) himself notes that people often interpret the sublime as an appearance of God. As a result, the sublime may harbor a mystical dimension, even if Kant didn’t acknowledge that. For more on mysticism, see [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) For examples of this criticism, see Crowther (1991) and Brady (2013). Note that Kant’s decision to base sublimity in reason is consistent with what is arguably the main project of his critical philosophy: demonstrating the sovereignty of reason, according to which, for instance, reason can critique the foundations of knowledge and provide moral duties. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) For essays on the sublime that include reflections on Kant’s theory, see Clewis (2018), Doran (2017), Shaw (2017), and Costelloe (2015). For studies dedicated to Kant’s theory, see Clewis (2009), Crowther (1991) and Merritt (2018). ### References [Brady, Emily. (2013). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime-in-modern-philosophy/9A79EC814E0DA6654D7D4119D5F9415E)[*The Sublime in Modern Philosophy: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Nature*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime-in-modern-philosophy/9A79EC814E0DA6654D7D4119D5F9415E)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime-in-modern-philosophy/9A79EC814E0DA6654D7D4119D5F9415E) [Clewis, Robert R. (2009). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-sublime-and-the-revelation-of-freedom/76E7E11759484476DAB89B96C7286221)[*The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-sublime-and-the-revelation-of-freedom/76E7E11759484476DAB89B96C7286221)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-sublime-and-the-revelation-of-freedom/76E7E11759484476DAB89B96C7286221) [Clewis, Robert R. (2018). ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/sublime-reader-9781350030169/)[*The Sublime Reader*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/sublime-reader-9781350030169/)[. Bloomsbury. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/sublime-reader-9781350030169/) [Costelloe, Timothy M. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime/4D52C6973DBD3F0293B9C9D65B345BFC)[*The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime/4D52C6973DBD3F0293B9C9D65B345BFC)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime/4D52C6973DBD3F0293B9C9D65B345BFC) [Crowther, Paul. (1991). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-kantian-sublime-9780198239314?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-kantian-sublime-9780198239314?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-kantian-sublime-9780198239314?cc=us&lang=en&) [Doran, Robert. (2017). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/theory-of-the-sublime-from-longinus-to-kant/4BB4E6DFF02689FB880AE43FF57A4E44)[*The Theory of the Sublime: from Longinus to Kant*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/theory-of-the-sublime-from-longinus-to-kant/4BB4E6DFF02689FB880AE43FF57A4E44)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/theory-of-the-sublime-from-longinus-to-kant/4BB4E6DFF02689FB880AE43FF57A4E44) [Kant, Immanuel. (1987). ](https://www.amazon.com/Critique-Judgment-Hackett-Classics-Immanuel/dp/0872200256)[*Critique of Judgment*](https://www.amazon.com/Critique-Judgment-Hackett-Classics-Immanuel/dp/0872200256)[. Hackett Publishing.](https://www.amazon.com/Critique-Judgment-Hackett-Classics-Immanuel/dp/0872200256) [Kant, Immanuel. (2005). Critique of Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kant-critique-of-practical-reason/6ABE30C4D2DD9511891141879A0A3DA9) [Merritt, Melissa McBay. (2018). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime/35110A6DFD734453C0780E8B2FE328C0)[*The Sublime*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime/35110A6DFD734453C0780E8B2FE328C0)[. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sublime/35110A6DFD734453C0780E8B2FE328C0) [Shaw, Philip. (2017). ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Sublime/Drakakis-Shaw/p/book/9781138859647?gclid=CjwKCAjww7KmBhAyEiwA5-PUSgqoV4pp9jqJPcZ3DoWZaLAvB31nSAjGJM6rk6rZ-qwCaWiB2eYlpxoCr-MQAvD_BwE)[*The Sublime*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Sublime/Drakakis-Shaw/p/book/9781138859647?gclid=CjwKCAjww7KmBhAyEiwA5-PUSgqoV4pp9jqJPcZ3DoWZaLAvB31nSAjGJM6rk6rZ-qwCaWiB2eYlpxoCr-MQAvD_BwE)[. Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Sublime/Drakakis-Shaw/p/book/9781138859647?gclid=CjwKCAjww7KmBhAyEiwA5-PUSgqoV4pp9jqJPcZ3DoWZaLAvB31nSAjGJM6rk6rZ-qwCaWiB2eYlpxoCr-MQAvD_BwE) ### Related Essays [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) by Brock Rough [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/kantin-yucelik-teorisi-matthew-sanderson/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/sublime-1.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** aesthetics, Kant, Sanderson, sublime, the sublime --- ### [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) **Published:** July 31, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Mysticism refers to religious traditions devoted to cultivating altered states of consciousness called “mystical experiences.” This essay reviews philosophical attempts to define mystical experience as well as arguments about whether mystical experiences justify religious beliefs. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word Count: 1000 *Mysticism* refers to religious traditions devoted to cultivating altered states of consciousness called “mystical experiences.” During these experiences, mystics feel “one” with a supernatural being, or they have other types of experiences in which they allegedly perceive unity through direct contact with some fundamental aspect of reality.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Mystics tend to believe that their mystical experiences justify their religious beliefs. This essay reviews philosophical attempts to define mystical experience as well as arguments about whether mystical experiences justify religious beliefs. [![Edvard Munch, "The Sun" (1911).](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/edward-munch-the-sun.jpg?resize=656%2C380&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/edward-munch-the-sun.jpg?ssl=1)Edvard Munch, “The Sun” (1911). ### 1. What are Mystical Experiences? Mystical experiences are taken by mystics to be experiences of union with a higher power or another “ultimate” reality.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Mystical experiences are often understood as “unitive” experiences, which distinguishes them from ordinary experiences in which we are aware of multiple, separate things.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Perhaps because language typically focuses on distinctions, it might be impossible to express in language an experience of mystical union where all differences seem to disappear. Thus, mystical experiences are often considered “ineffable,” or beyond description in any language.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Also, time appears to stand still during mystical experiences which seem to mystics to take place in a timeless present moment or “eternal now.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Finally, mystical experiences are usually felt by mystics to be profoundly blissful and joyful.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) #### 1.1. Extrovertive and Introvertive Mysticism There are two major types of mystical experience: *introvertive*, which lack all sensory content, and *extrovertive*, which include sensory elements.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Introvertive experiences only involve what can be described as events occurring inside one’s own mind; extrovertive experiences seem to involve awareness of the world normally regarded as outside one’s mind.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Even though extrovertive mystical experiences include sensory content, the focus of all mystical awareness is often thought to be non-sensory.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) For example, in an extrovertive experience of purportedly perceiving God in a sunset, the sun is sensory, while God is non-sensory. An entirely non-sensory introvertive mystical experience might be, for instance, a “pure consciousness” without sensations and thoughts, which some mystics report experiencing during meditation.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) #### 1.2. Perception of “Ultimate” Reality Mystics believe they make contact with “ultimate” realities during mystical experiences through a type of spiritual perception.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This means that the “ultimate” reality is directly present to consciousness (i.e., it is perceived) instead of indirectly through another object.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) For example, theistic mystics believe they experience God first-hand instead of reasoning towards believing in God’s existence from a miracle or the beauty of nature.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Mystical experiences are thus considered to be a particular type of “unitive,” direct religious experience. They are thus distinguished from other forms of religious experiences—for example, visions, voices, and prayer—that usually don’t involve “union” or direct experiential contact with an “ultimate” reality.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 2. Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs? Mystics often argue that their experiences justify their religious beliefs. They commonly argue that mystical experiences are a type of perceptual experience—like sense perception—in relevant aspects; therefore, since sense perception justifies beliefs in external reality, mystical experiences also supply rational grounds for believing in realities outside the perceiver.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) The basis of this “argument from perception” is that both sense perception and mystical perception share a relevantly similar structure: a perceiver for whom it seems that they experience an external object. And the object perceived is directly experienced rather than indirectly through something else: just as when one experiences the plane rather than solely the vapor trail, one experiences God directly.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) In response, skeptics about mystical experience argue that the analogy is flawed because there are significant differences between the two types of perception. #### 2.1. The Problem of Cross-Checkability Some skeptics observe that sense perceptions can be cross-checked by other people in ways mystical experiences cannot: someone can’t just “take a look” to see if what you’re perceiving in a mystical experience is really there. As a result, mystical experience doesn’t support beliefs with the same strength as sense perception.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) However, proponents respond that mystical experiences *can* be checked for authenticity by spiritual guides and in accordance with sacred texts.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) #### 2.2. The Problem of Partial Distribution Skeptics also argue that everyone constantly experiences sense perceptions and they require no special preparation, whereas few people have mystical experiences (i.e. they are “partially distributed”) which can take years of meditative practices to achieve.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) However, proponents respond that some sense perceptions also necessitate training, such as tasting different kinds of wine or properly perceiving art.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Also, many extrovertive mystical experiences happen spontaneously.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Lastly, people from many places and times have had mystical experiences.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Nonetheless, you seemingly cannot force a mystical experience to occur. Mystical experiences appear to happen to mystics rather than being primarily caused by them.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) This can possibly be explained by the idea that “ultimate” realities operate independent of human control: for instance, God’s appearance is believed to be a choice entirely up to God.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) #### 2.3. The Challenge from Constructivism Another skeptical challenge is the argument from “constructivism” that mystical experiences are created by the beliefs of the mystic’s religion.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) For instance, Christians near-universally report experiencing Jesus rather than Krishna or the Buddha. Maybe mystics then don’t actually experience “ultimate” realities outside their perception. One response is that mystical experiences often surprise mystics, revealing truths counter to their beliefs.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Another reply is that there might be mystical experiences of “pure consciousness” which are empty of beliefs.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) #### 2.4. The Challenge from Naturalism One last skeptical perspective is the argument from “naturalism” that mystical experiences are solely caused by the brain.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Mystical experiences are then just a physical event in the mystic’s skull with no supernatural reality involved. However, one can argue that such explanations can’t rule out that a divine agent uses the brain to cause mystical experiences.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) ### 3. Conclusion Perhaps because mystical experiences can *seem* incomprehensible and even irrational, philosophers often view mysticism with suspicion. However, mysticism raises philosophically interesting questions about religious experience, justification, and perception.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) Also, insofar as philosophy seeks to discover what makes life meaningful, it should investigate mysticism because mystical experiences are more common than assumed and experiencers often consider them the most meaningful experiences of their lives.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For thorough discussions of different types of mystical experience, see Wainwright (1981: Ch. 1) and Jones (2016: Ch. 1). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For examples of the idea that mystics believe they experience “ultimate” realities, see Elwood (1999: p. 39), Marshall (2005: pp. 2 and 74-76), Gellman (2001: p. 4), Wainwright (1981: p. 1), and Jones (2016: p. 6). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For examples of the claim that mystical experiences are allegedly “unitive” in nature, see Stace (1960: Ch. 2), Wainwright (1981: p. 1), Marshall (2005: pp. 3 and 60-64), Elwood (1999: p. 39), and Foreman (1999: Ch. 7). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) James (1958: p. 329) considers ineffability an essential feature of mystical experience. For detailed reflections on the allegedly ineffable nature of mystical experience, see Stace (1960: Ch. 6) and Jones (2016: Ch. 6). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For discussions of how time appears to mystics to stand still during mystical experiences, see Wainwright (1981: pp. 10, 14, and 34), Stace (1960: p. 110), Marshall (2005: pp. 27 and 72-73), and Jones (2016: p. 6). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Stace (1960: pp. 79 and 110), Marshall (2005: pp. 27 and 80-81), and Jones (2016: p. 6) for discussions of the positive emotions allegedly felt by mystics during their experiences. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Stace (1960: Ch. 2) was the first to define extrovertive mystical experiences as involving sensory content and introvertive experiences as purely non-sensory. Most philosophers after Stace adhere to his distinction. For example, see Jones (2016: p. 5), Marshall (2005: p. 26), and Wainwright (1981: p. 33). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Even though introvertive mystical experiences occur in one’s mind, they still can consist of the alleged perception of some “ultimate” reality. For instance, traditional Christian mystics arguably believed they had introvertive experiences of God. For discussions of such theistic introvertive mystical experiences, see Zaehner (1957) and Wainwright (1981). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Gellman (2001: p. 5) and Alston (1991: p. 5) insist on the non-sensory focus of all mystical experience. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) However, Katz (1978) argues that all consciousness is always consciousness of something, and therefore “pure consciousness” without any content is impossible. Foreman (1999) responds that even if ordinary consciousness always consists of content, that doesn’t mean altered states of consciousness (such as a “pure consciousness” mystical experience) must also. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Philosophers of mysticism typically argue that mystics believe they *know* “ultimate” realities through their experiences and that this is an essential feature of mystical experience. Philosophers call the purported knowledge-granting aspect of mystical experience its “cognitive,” “veridical,” or “noetic” dimension. For example, see Jones (2016: Ch. 1 and Ch. 3), James (1958: p. 329), Foreman (1999: Ch. 7), and Marshall (2005: pp. 2 and 65-67). Alston (1991: p. 5 and Ch. 1), Gellman (2001: Ch. 1), and Wainwright (1981: Ch. 1 and 3) argue that mystical experience is allegedly a type of spiritual or non-sensory *perception*. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Alston (1991: Ch. 1) argues for the allegedly direct nature of mystical perception. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Alston (1991: Ch. 1) draws this distinction: on reasoning towards believing in God’s existence from a miracle or the beauty of nature, see [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus, [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf, and many other essays reviewing arguments for theism in the [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) essay section. For discussions of theistic mysticism, see Pike (1992), Steinbock (2007), Stoeber (1994), and Zaehner (1957). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Gellman (2001: pp. 6-7), Wainwright (1981: pp. 1-7), and Jones (2016: p. 4) argue in favor of this distinction. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For examples of this “argument from perception,” see Gellman (2001), Wainwright (1981), and Alston (1991). See also [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner for another perspective on believing in God through a religious experience rather than based on an argument. The issue is whether mystical experiences can provide *epistemic justification* for beliefs such that, if they are true, they are likely knowledge: see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long and [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Gellman (2001), Wainwright (1981), and Alston (1991) argue for these similarities. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Wainwright (1981: Ch. 3) and Alston (1991: Ch. 5) cover the points of this debate in detail. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See Gellman (2001: pp. 30-31), Alston (1991: pp. 209-222), and Wainwright (1981: pp. 85-87) for discussions of how mystical experience can be checked by spiritual mentors and through consulting scriptures. Another example of how mystical experiences can possibly be verified is what’s sometimes called “the fruits test,” which involves considering the positive benefits or “fruits” for the mystic that might follow from the person’s experience. For instance, one can consider whether the mystic’s spirituality and/or morality is deepened as a result of a mystical experience. If it is, then that can be considered one form of evidence in support of the authenticity of the mystical experience. For discussion of “the fruits test,” see James (1958: p. 368), Wainwright (1981: p. 86), Jones (2016: pp. 104-106), and Alston (1991: p. 203). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Alston (1991: pp. 197-199) characterizes this issue as the problem of “partial distribution.” [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See Alston (1991: p. 198) for the argument that many types of sense perceptions require special training much like some types of mystical experiences. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Many philosophers highlight the often-spontaneous nature of extrovertive mystical experiences. See, for example, Marshall (2005: p. 190). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) See Wainwright (1981: p. 88) for the argument that, while mystical experiences are relatively rare compared to experiences of sense perception, they are widely distributed in the sense that many different people throughout history and across cultures have had mystical experiences. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) James (1958: p. 329) argues that such alleged “passivity” is one of the essential features of mystical experience. See also Jones (2016: p. 7). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Wainwright (1981: pp. 93-95) and Alston (1991: pp. 218-219) both make the point that the realities allegedly experienced by mystics do not seem to appear solely as a result of mystics’ efforts, and yet it still seems necessary for mystics to spiritually position themselves correctly (for example, by letting go of the ego, etc.) in order to “receive” the appearance of the “ultimate” reality. Alston (1991: pp. 198-199 and 213) calls such positioning “spiritual receptivity.” [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) This position is also known as “contextualism.” Katz (1978) presents the definitive case for this view. Proudfoot (1985) presents a similar argument. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See Jones (2016: p. 64) for the argument that what mystics allegedly experience often surprises them because it does not match their prior beliefs, and therefore constructivism is incorrect to insist that all mystical experiences are constructed by pre-experiential beliefs. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Foreman (1999) devotes an entire book to refuting constructivism based on this argument. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Jones (2016: Ch. 4) provides a thorough summary of naturalism’s attempts to explain mystical experience, as well as possible arguments in response. Also, see Wainwright (1981: Ch. 2) and Gellman (2001: pp. 88-102). [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) See Jones (2016: p. 156) for the argument that naturalism can never fully rule out that a supernatural reality uses the brains of mystics to enact mystical experiences. [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) Indeed, it is arguably mystics’ knowledge claims that primarily interest philosophers insofar as such claims bring mysticism into contact with the concerns of epistemology. See Jones (2016: p. xvii). The issue is whether mystical experiences can provide *epistemic justification* for beliefs such that, if they are true, they are likely knowledge: see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long and [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) Many philosophers point out that mystical experiences are more common than thought and typically considered the most meaningful experiences for those who undergo them. For example, see Jones (2016: pp. ix and 336), James (1958: p. 330), and Marshall (2005: Ch. 1). ### References [Alston, William P. (1991). ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801425974/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1)[*Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801425974/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1)[. Cornell University Press. ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801425974/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1) [Elwood, Robert S. (1999). ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Religion-Robert-S-Ellwood/dp/1937002292)[*Mysticism and Religion*](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Religion-Robert-S-Ellwood/dp/1937002292)[. Seven Bridges Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Religion-Robert-S-Ellwood/dp/1937002292) [Forman, Robert K.C. (1999). ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/M/Mysticism-Mind-Consciousness2)[*Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness*](https://sunypress.edu/Books/M/Mysticism-Mind-Consciousness2)[. SUNY Press. ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/M/Mysticism-Mind-Consciousness2) [Gellman, Jerome I. (2001). ](https://www.amazon.com/Mystical-Experience-God-Philosophical-Philosophy/dp/B01MS30ED8)[*Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry*](https://www.amazon.com/Mystical-Experience-God-Philosophical-Philosophy/dp/B01MS30ED8)[. Ashgate. ](https://www.amazon.com/Mystical-Experience-God-Philosophical-Philosophy/dp/B01MS30ED8) [James, William (1958). ](https://www.amazon.com/William-James-Varieties-Religious-Experience/dp/B00HTK1PYY)[*The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature*](https://www.amazon.com/William-James-Varieties-Religious-Experience/dp/B00HTK1PYY)[. New American Library. ](https://www.amazon.com/William-James-Varieties-Religious-Experience/dp/B00HTK1PYY) [Jones, Richard H. (2016). ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/P/Philosophy-of-Mysticism)[*Philosophy of Mysticism: Raids on the Ineffable*](https://sunypress.edu/Books/P/Philosophy-of-Mysticism)[. SUNY Press. ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/P/Philosophy-of-Mysticism) [Katz, Steven T. (1978). ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/mysticism-and-philosophical-analysis-9780195200119?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/mysticism-and-philosophical-analysis-9780195200119?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/mysticism-and-philosophical-analysis-9780195200119?cc=us&lang=en&) [Marshall, Paul (2005). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/mystical-encounters-with-the-natural-world-9780199279432?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Mystical Encounters with the Natural World: Experiences and Explanations*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/mystical-encounters-with-the-natural-world-9780199279432?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/mystical-encounters-with-the-natural-world-9780199279432?cc=us&lang=en&) [Pike, Nelson (1992). ](https://www.amazon.com/Mystic-Union-Phenomenology-Mysticism-Philosophy/dp/0801426847)[*Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism*](https://www.amazon.com/Mystic-Union-Phenomenology-Mysticism-Philosophy/dp/0801426847)[. Cornell University Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Mystic-Union-Phenomenology-Mysticism-Philosophy/dp/0801426847) [Proudfoot, Wayne (1985). ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520061286/religious-experience)[*Religious Experience*](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520061286/religious-experience)[. University of California Press. ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520061286/religious-experience) [Stace, Walter (1960). ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Philosophy-W-T-Stace/dp/0874774160/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=)[*Mysticism and Philosophy*](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Philosophy-W-T-Stace/dp/0874774160/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=)[. Macmillan. ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Philosophy-W-T-Stace/dp/0874774160/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=) [Steinbock, Anthony J. (2007). ](https://iupress.org/9780253221810/phenomenology-and-mysticism/)[*Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience*](https://iupress.org/9780253221810/phenomenology-and-mysticism/)[. Indiana University Press. ](https://iupress.org/9780253221810/phenomenology-and-mysticism/) [Stoeber, Michael (1994). ](https://www.amazon.com/Theo-monistic-Mysticism-Hindu-Christian-Comparison-Philosophy/dp/0333610644)[*Theo-Monistic Mysticism: A Hindu-Christian Comparison*](https://www.amazon.com/Theo-monistic-Mysticism-Hindu-Christian-Comparison-Philosophy/dp/0333610644)[. St. Martin’s Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Theo-monistic-Mysticism-Hindu-Christian-Comparison-Philosophy/dp/0333610644) [Wainwright, William J. (1981). ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Study-Nature-Cognitive-Implications/dp/029908910X)[*Mysticism: A Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value, and Moral Implications*](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Study-Nature-Cognitive-Implications/dp/029908910X)[. University of Wisconsin Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Study-Nature-Cognitive-Implications/dp/029908910X) [Zaehner, Robert C. (1957). ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Sacred-Profane-Galaxy-Books/dp/0195002296)[*Mysticism Sacred and Profane: An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praenatural Experience*](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Sacred-Profane-Galaxy-Books/dp/0195002296)[. Oxford University Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Sacred-Profane-Galaxy-Books/dp/0195002296) ### Related Essays [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/ "Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/ "William James on Mystical Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/ "Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner ### Translation [Turkish](https://veritasdergisi.com/2024/09/09/mistisizm-felsefesi-mistik-deneyimler-dini-inanclari-gerekcelendirir-mi-matthew-sanderson/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/mysticism.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew](https://www.westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew/) *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** mystical, mysticism, Sanderson --- ### [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) **Published:** June 24, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Transformative experiences are radically new experiences that significantly change who you are. Can we rationally choose to have transformative experiences in a way that’s authentic to our own values? This essay explores this question. **Content:** Author: [Felipe Pereira](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pereira/) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/ "Philosophy of Religion") Wordcount: 997 Becoming a parent for the first time. Going to war as a newly enlisted soldier. Moving to a distant country. Having a religious conversion. Starting a new career. These experiences are good candidates for what’s called *transformative experiences—*radically new experiences that significantly change who you are.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Can we *rationally* choose to have transformative experiences in a way that’s authentic to our *own* values? This essay explores that question. [![Martin Johnson Heade. Blue Morpho Butterfly painting. Circa 1864 to 1865.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Transformative-Experiences.jpg?resize=650%2C438&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Transformative-Experiences.jpg?ssl=1)Martin Johnson Heade. Blue Morpho Butterfly painting. Circa 1864 to 1865. ### 1. What Are Transformative Experiences? Transformative experiences meet two conditions:[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - they substantially change your core commitments, values, and preferences; - they’re radically unlike your previous experiences: the only way to know what it’s like to have them is to experience them *yourself*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) For example, for many people becoming a parent looks like a transformative experience. It significantly changes their priorities—e.g., some of them loved partying, but now *prefer* a quiet life. And they couldn’t anticipate what it’d be like *for them* to be parents, no matter how many parenting books they read.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Rationality and Authenticity: Two Competing Ideals? Can it be *rational* to choose to have a transformative experience? According to the *standard view* of what rational choices are, a choice is rational only if it’s the choice with the *highest expected value* of your options—i.e., on your best evidence, it’s the choice that gets the highest “score” when you multiply how much you’d value that outcome by how likely it is to result from that choice. If the standard view is correct, however, how could it *ever* be rational to choose to have (or avoid) a transformative experience? You can’t know *beforehand* what a transformative experience is like. You can’t even know whether you’ll *value* the experience, since it’ll change your values.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) So, how can you estimate the value of the experience? If you can’t, then it’s impossible to determine whether choosing to have the experience maximizes expected value. One response to these challenges is to seek help from people who both know you well and who *have* had that experience. They can give you a well-informed estimate of how much you’d value it. But then it might seem like you’re making that choice *just because* someone told you to do it or because it fits *their* values, which would be *inauthentic* of you: you wouldn’t be acting on values you have developed and endorsed for yourself.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) We face a trilemma, then. Either: (A) it’s impossible to be *both* rational *and* authentic when choosing whether to have a transformative experience, or (B) the standard view of what’s a rational choice is false, or (C) a choice can be authentic *even if* it’s based on values you don’t endorse. ### 3. Responses #### 3.1. Accepting Option A: Transformative Choices *Can’t* Be Both Rational and Authentic, And That’s OK Some argue that, if we try harder, we *can* imagine what it’s like being a parent, or an immigrant, or an astronaut. So, these aren’t really transformative experiences.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Only *extremely* unusual experiences might be transformative. But there’s little point in lamenting the impossibility of making rational and authentic choices about experiences that practically never happen anyway. Others argue that, while we can’t be both rational and authentic when taking a giant leap into a transformative experience, that’s not a problem because we *can* do it when taking *small incremental steps* that *cumulatively* result in big transformations. I can’t be both rational and authentic in choosing to become an astronaut, but I can in choosing to go to space-camp, and then to enter the spaceship simulator, and so on . . . until I’m an astronaut.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Another thought is that if making authentic choices requires never giving up control over them, authenticity is overrated. Some of the best things in life (e.g., love) are about losing control and letting other people shape your decisions.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) #### 3.2. Accepting Option B: The Standard View *Is* False An alternative to the standard view of rational choices is that for a choice to be rational, we don’t need to know whether it’s the choice that maximizes expected value. It’s enough to know whether you really want to *discover* who you’ll become because of that choice.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Another view is that a choice can be rational if you have *proleptic reasons—*i.e., reasons that you don’t fully grasp*—*to choose it.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Suppose you’ve chosen to take a music appreciation class. Your choice isn’t inauthentic: you must have cared *somewhat* about classical music beforehand, otherwise you wouldn’t register for the class. But you didn’t *fully* grasp the value of classical music: that’s precisely what you want to learn, and why it’s rational to take the class. You could rationally and authentically choose to become a parent in the same way. #### 3.3. Accepting Option C: Authenticity *Doesn’t* Require Endorsement Maybe we should distinguish between choosing to have a transformative experience because well-informed people tell you that *you will value experiencing it* and choosing to do it because *other people value experiencing it*. While it’s inauthentic to do something just because other people value it, making choices based on the values you will endorse isn’t*—*even if you don’t endorse them *yet*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) #### 3.4. Isn’t There a Fourth Option? Some argue that certain aspects of being a parent are *objectively meaningful*, and that you can understand *these* aspects of parenthood beforehand, even if you can’t predict its experiential aspects.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Maybe that’s enough to estimate the value of becoming a parent. If it is enough, then you *can* determine whether becoming one maximizes expected value, and make a rational choice accordingly—*and* do it authentically, guided by what you believe is objectively meaningful.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. Conclusion Transformative experiences raise many other difficult questions beyond whether we can rationally and authentically choose to have them: - Can someone be *held responsible* for choosing to have a transformative experience if she no longer endorses the values of her pre-transformation self?[\[15\]](#_ftn15) - Is it wrong to cause *someone else* to have a transformative experience?[\[16\]](#_ftn16) - What about trying to *prevent* them from having one?[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Be careful, though: thinking about these questions may be transformative for you. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Transformative experiences aren’t always personally transformative *for the better*. For example, while some people who experience war might come out of it significantly kinder, more generous persons, others might change into significantly harsher, more callous persons. (For others still, fighting in a war might not change them enough to count as a transformative experience. See footnote 4 for further discussion.) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This terminology was first introduced by Laurie Paul in her (2014) book *Transformative Experiences*. See also her (2015a) article, “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting.” Paul distinguishes between two qualified senses in which an experience can be transformative—namely, by being *personally* transformative and *epistemically* transformative: “epistemically” roughly means “knowledge-related.” These two qualified senses in which an experience can be transformative correspond to the two criteria listed in section 1. Paul then introduces a stronger, *unqualified* sense in which an experience can be transformative. In order to be transformative in this stronger, unqualified sense, an experience has to be *both* personally *and* epistemically transformative. This essay is concerned with transformative experiences in this stronger, unqualified sense. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) When Paul (2014) introduces the idea of epistemically transformative experiences, she is concerned with the sorts of experiences that Frank Jackson brings up in his famous argument against physicalism, like seeing the color red for the first time, which change your “subjective point of view” by giving you first-hand knowledge of *what it is like* to have a new kind of experience. For discussion of how having an experience for the first time can seem to change what and how you know, see Tufan Kıymaz’s [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) If you wouldn’t be both personally and epistemically transformed by becoming a parent, then becoming a parent wouldn’t be a transformative experience for you. Maybe other sorts of experiences would be—for example, moving to a distant country, or starting a new career, or having a religious conversion. These experiences often seem to be both epistemically and personally transformative. But it is important to note that no candidate for a transformative experience is *guaranteed* to be a transformative experience for *everyone* who experiences it. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Even if you could know beforehand whether you’ll value the experience, which values should your choice be based on—your *pre-experience* values or your *post-experience* values? A related question: should your post-experience self honor the preferences and plans of your past-experience self? For a book-length discussion of these questions, see Sullivan (2018). For discussion of the question of whether we ought to honor the past preferences of *others*, see Boonin (2019). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Paul (2014, ch. 4) for a discussion of this alleged tension between authenticity and making transformative decisions on the basis of other people’s testimony. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For arguments in support of the view that we *can* know beforehand what it’s like to become a parent or start a new career, see Harman (2015), Chang (2015), and Dougherty et al. (2015). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Ullmann-Margalit (2006) suggests that the rational way to go about life-changing decisions is to minimize the amount of discontinuity between the way you are now and the way you will become by taking several small incremental steps that will gradually change you. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For an argument against the ideal of authenticity, in light of the value of love and losing control, see Yao (2023). See also Dover (2023) for a related discussion about how other people play a role in shaping our values and identities. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This is the ultimate solution Paul (2014) proposes to the challenge transformative experiences raise to decision theory. Paul suggests that her solution is closely associated with an existentialist way of thinking about decision-making. For an introduction of existentialism, see Addison Ellis’s [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/existentialism/). A related “voluntaristic” solution to the problem of transformative experiences has been proposed by Chang in her (2015) paper. Chang draws a distinction between “event-based” transformations (such as becoming a parent) and “choice-based” transformation (such as the choice that starts the chain of events that leads to your becoming a parent). Choice-based transformations, she argues, involve transforming yourself as an agent by voluntarily taking on new reasons and obligations—reasons that make your decision to have a transformative experience rational. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) In her (2018) book, Callard appeals to proleptic reasons in her response to the puzzle of transformative experiences. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Pettigrew (2019, pp. 154-156) argues that, as long as you’re deciding on the basis of what *you* will value, and not on the basis of what other people do, your choice is authentic in every way that matters. Campbell (2015) also argues that we can make authentic choices on the basis of non-experiential considerations. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For introductions to the topic of meaning in life, see Matthew Pinalto’s [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) and [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For arguments to the effect that the expected value of outcomes is (or ought to be) mainly determined by what we take to be their objective value, see Kauppinen (2015) and Bykvist & Stefánsson (2017). For critical discussion of these arguments, see Villager (2023). In her reply to Kauppinen, Paul (2015b, p. 516) observes that it’s not so easy to disentangle the experiential dimension of these outcomes from their value: Attempting to value outcomes involving friendship, love, and self-respect without including lived experiences in these states leads to a weird sort of zombification of what we are supposed to value. \[…\] We want to value real love, and real love involves conscious experiences and emotional relationships and many other sorts of things that subjective value is designed to capture. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) For discussion of this question, see Kemp (2015). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) For discussion of this question, see Barnes (2015), Howard (2015), and Woollard (2020). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For discussion of this question, see Akhlaghi (2022). ### References [Akhlaghi, Farbod (2022). Transformative Experience and the Right to Revelatory Autonomy. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/AKHTEA)[*Analysis*](https://philpapers.org/rec/AKHTEA)[ (1):1-10.](https://philpapers.org/rec/AKHTEA) [Barnes, Elizabeth (2015). Social Identities and Transformative Experience. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BARSIA-6)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BARSIA-6)[ 92 (2):171-187.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BARSIA-6) [Boonin, David (2019). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/32381?searchresult=1)[*Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm*](https://academic.oup.com/book/32381?searchresult=1)[. Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/32381?searchresult=1) [Bykvist, Krister & Stefánsson, H. Orri (2017). Epistemic Transformation and Rational Choice. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BYKETA)[*Economics and Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BYKETA)[ 33 (1):125-138.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BYKETA) [Callard, Agnes (2018). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/4936?searchresult=1)[*Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming*](https://academic.oup.com/book/4936?searchresult=1)[. Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/4936?searchresult=1) [Campbell, John (2015). L. A. Paul’s Transformative Experience. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/CAMLAP-5)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://philpapers.org/rec/CAMLAP-5)[ 91 (3):787-793.](https://philpapers.org/rec/CAMLAP-5) [Chang, Ruth (2015). Transformative Choices. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHATC-4)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHATC-4)[ 92 (2):237-282.](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHATC-4) [Dougherty, Tom; Horowitz, Sophie & Sliwa, Paulina (2015). Expecting the Unexpected. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DOUETU)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DOUETU)[ 92 (2):301-321.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DOUETU) [Dover, Daniela (2023). Identity and Influence. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DOVIAI)[*Synthese*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DOVIAI)[ 202 (5):1-24.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DOVIAI) [Harman, Elizabeth (2015). Transformative Experiences and Reliance on Moral Testimony. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HARTEA-11)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HARTEA-11)[ 92 (2):323-339.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HARTEA-11) [Howard, Dana Sarah (2015). Transforming Others: On the Limits of ‘You’ll Be Glad I Did It’ Reasoning. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HOWTOO-5)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HOWTOO-5)[ 92 (2):341-370.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HOWTOO-5) [Kauppinen, Antti (2015). What’s So Great about Experience? ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAUWSG)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAUWSG)[ 92 (2):371-388.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAUWSG) [Kemp, Ryan (2015). The Self-Transformation Puzzle: On the Possibility of Radical Self-Transformation. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KEMTSP)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KEMTSP)[ 92 (2):389-417.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KEMTSP) [Paul, Laurie A. (2014). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/7934)[*Transformative Experience*](https://academic.oup.com/book/7934)[. Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/7934) [Paul, Laurie A. (2015a). What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/PAUWMC)[*Res Philosophica*](https://philpapers.org/rec/PAUWMC)[ 92 (2):1-23.](https://philpapers.org/rec/PAUWMC) [Paul, Laurie A. (2015b). Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies. *Res Philosophica* 92 (2):473-545.](https://philpapers.org/rec/PAUTCD) [Pettigrew, Richard (2019). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/41592?searchresult=1)[*Choosing for Changing Selves*](https://academic.oup.com/book/41592?searchresult=1)[. Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/41592?searchresult=1) [Sullivan, Meghan (2018). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/6642?searchresult=1)[*Time Biases: A Theory of Rational Planning and Personal Persistence*](https://academic.oup.com/book/6642?searchresult=1)[. Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/6642?searchresult=1) [Ullmann-Margalit, Edna (2006). Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/ULLBDO-2)[*Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*](https://philpapers.org/rec/ULLBDO-2)[ 58:157-172.](https://philpapers.org/rec/ULLBDO-2) [Villiger, Daniel (2023). Rational Transformative Decision-Making. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/VILRTD)[*Synthese*](https://philpapers.org/rec/VILRTD)[ 201 (3):1-20.](https://philpapers.org/rec/VILRTD) [Woollard, Fiona (2020). Mother Knows Best: Pregnancy, Applied Ethics, and Epistemically Transformative Experiences. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOMKB)[*Journal of Applied Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOMKB)[ 38 (1):155-171.](https://philpapers.org/rec/WOOMKB) [Yao, Vida (2023). Eros and Anxiety. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/YAOEAA-2)[*Synthese*](https://philpapers.org/rec/YAOEAA-2)[ 202 (200):1-20.](https://philpapers.org/rec/YAOEAA-2) ### Related Essays [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pinalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pinalto [Happiness: What Is It To Be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Transformative-Experiences.pdf). ### About the Author [Felipe Pereira](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pereira/) is a PhD student at the University of Pittsburgh. His current research interests are in ethics and moral psychology. He is co-author of “[The (Un)desirability of Immortality](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12652)” in *Philosophy Compass* and “[Non-Repeatable Hedonism Is False](https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0006.025?view=text;rgn=main)” in *Ergo*, both written with Travis Timmerman. [felipe-pereira.weebly.com](https://felipe-pereira.weebly.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Pereira, transformative experiences --- ### [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) **Published:** October 10, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is philosophy? The question is itself a philosophical question. This essay surveys some answers. #philosophy #whatisphilosophy #definingphilosophy **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Metaphilosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphilosophy/) Word count: 1000 If you’ve ever wondered whether God exists, whether life has purpose, whether beauty is in the eye of the beholder, what makes actions right or wrong, or whether a law is fair or just, then you’ve thought about philosophy. And these are just a few philosophical topics. But what is philosophy? The question is itself a philosophical question. This essay surveys some answers. [!['Philosophy' in a dictionary. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/philosophydicitionary.jpg?resize=656%2C317&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/philosophydicitionary.jpg?ssl=1)‘Philosophy’ in a dictionary. ### 1. Defining Philosophy The most general definition of philosophy is that it is the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and knowledge.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Indeed, the word itself means ‘love of wisdom’ in Greek. Whenever people think about deep, fundamental questions concerning the nature of the universe and ourselves, the limits of human knowledge, their values and the meaning of life, they are thinking about philosophy. Philosophical thinking is found in all parts of the world, present, and past.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) In the academic world, philosophy distinguishes a certain area of study from all other areas, such as the sciences and other humanities. Philosophers typically consider questions that are, in some sense, broader and/or more fundamental than other inquirers’ questions:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) e.g., physicists ask *what caused* some event; philosophers ask whether causation even *exists*; historians study figures who fought for justice; philosophers ask what justice *is* or whether their causes were in fact just; economists study the allocation of capital; philosophers debate the ethical merits of capital*ism*. When a topic becomes amenable to rigorous, empirical study, it tends to be “outsourced” to its own field, and not described in the present day as “philosophy” anymore: e.g., the natural sciences were once called “natural philosophy,” but we don’t now just *think* about whether matter is composed of atoms or infinitely divisible: we use scientific experiments.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) And most of the different doctoral degrees are called “Doctor of Philosophy” even when they’re in sociology or chemistry. Philosophical questions can’t be straightforwardly investigated through purely empirical means:[\[5\]](#_ftn5) e.g., try to imagine a lab experiment testing whether societies should privilege equality over freedom—not whether people *believe* we should, but whether we *actually should*. What does moral importance look like in a microscope? The main method of academic philosophy is to construct and evaluate *arguments* (i.e., reasons intended to justify some conclusion). Such conclusions might be that some theory is true or false or might be about the correct *analysis* or *definition* of some concept. These arguments generally have at least some conceptual, intellectual, or *a priori*, i.e., non-empirical, content. And philosophers often incorporate relevant scientific knowledge as premises in arguments.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 2. Branches of Philosophy Philosophy deals with fundamental questions. But which questions, specifically, is philosophy about? Here’s a standard categorization:[\[7\]](#_ftn7) *Logic*: Logicians study good and bad arguments and reasoning, and they study formal, symbolic languages intended to express propositions, sentences, or arguments.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) *Metaphysics*: Metaphysicians study what sorts of entities exist, what the world and its constituents are made of, and how objects or events might cause or explain each other.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) *Epistemology*: Epistemologists study knowledge, evidence, and justified belief. An epistemologist might study whether we can trust our senses and whether science is trustworthy.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) *Values*: In value theory, philosophers study morality, politics, and art, among other topics. For example: What makes wrong actions wrong? How do we identify good people and good lives? What makes a society just or unjust?[\[11\]](#_ftn11) There are many sub-branches within these fields. Many other fields— the sciences, art, literature, and religion—have a “philosophy of” attached to them: e.g., philosophers of science might help interpret quantum mechanics; philosophers of religion often consider arguments about the existence of God.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) There are also unique and important philosophical discussions about certain populations or communities, such as feminist philosophy and Africana philosophy.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) People from all cultures contribute to philosophy, more than are typically discussed in Western philosophy courses.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Western academic philosophy has often neglected voices from non-Western cultures, and women’s voices.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Philosophers sometimes import tools, knowledge, and language from other fields, such as using the formal tools of statistics in epistemology and the insights from special relativity in the philosophy of time.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) When your project is understanding all of existence[\[17\]](#_ftn17) in the broadest and most fundamental way, you need all the help you can get. ### 3. The Point(s) of Philosophy Academic philosophy doesn’t present a body of consensus knowledge the way chemistry and physics do.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Do philosophical questions have correct answers? Does philosophical progress exist? Does philosophy get closer to the truth over time?[\[19\]](#_ftn19) These are all matters of philosophical debate.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) And philosophical debates are rarely resolved with certainty. So what’s the point? Here are some answers:[\[21\]](#_ftn21) - To discover truth, wherever and whatever it is.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) - To learn how to better live our lives.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) - To understand our own views, including their strengths and weaknesses. - To examine our own lives and be more conscious of our choices and their implications. - To learn how to better think and reason. Recall: The main method of philosophy is to present and examine arguments.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) And arguably, all of us are already naturally interested in at least some philosophical questions. Many people find that philosophy is a lot of fun. And it’s difficult to dispute that it is very important to find the answers to philosophical questions, if the answers exist. It’s important to know, for instance, that slavery is wrong and whether scientific consensus is generally trustworthy. So as long as it’s at least *possible* to find the answers to these questions, we should try. Also, there are strong correlations between studying philosophy and high achievement in other academic areas, such as GRE scores and professional-school admission.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) ### 4. Conclusion We’ve contrasted philosophy with other fields. We’ve looked at the branches of philosophy. And we’ve looked at the purposes or benefits of philosophy. But what *is* philosophy, really? Given everything we’ve said so far, we can provide at least a partial definition of ‘philosophy’ as follows: A largely (but not exclusively) non-empirical inquiry that attempts to identify and answer fundamental questions about the world, including about what’s valuable and disvaluable. Is this a good definition? That’s a philosophical question too. ### Acknowledgments This entry has benefited enormously from the comments and suggestions of Shane Gronholz, Chelsea Haramia, Dan Lowe, and Nathan Nobis. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Berkeley 2003 \[1710\]: 5; Blackburn 1999: 1. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Some of the oldest formal philosophy writing we have is attributed to a group of ancient Greek philosophers called the ‘Pre-Socratics,’ because they wrote before Socrates and Plato did (cf. Curd 2019). The earliest Upanishads may go back even further (Olivelle 1998: 4 ff.). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This is similar to Encyclopaedia Britannica’s (n.d.) definition: “the rational, abstract, and methodical consideration of reality as a whole or of fundamental dimensions of human existence and experience.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See e.g., Berryman 2020 on ancient atomism. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Metcalf 2018. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Most philosophers believe that the sciences provide knowledge relevant to traditional philosophical issues. That is, most philosophers endorse the meta-philosophy of ‘naturalism,’ according to which philosophy should be informed by the natural sciences. The usual justification for naturalism is based on the track-record of the natural sciences, including their tending toward consensus. See Bourget and Chalmers 2014: 476; Metcalf 2018; and Papineau 2019. For examples of the relevance of science to traditional philosophical issues, see Ingram and Tallent (2019: § 8); Wilce 2019; and Knobe and Nichols 2019. In these examples, special relativity may be relevant to philosophy of time; quantum mechanics may be relevant to philosophy of logic; and social science may be relevant to ethics. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is a version of common anthologies’ categorizations. See e.g., Blackburn 1999: vii and Rosen et al. 2015. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Logicians can also study logics about obligation (McNamara 2019), about necessity and possibility (Garson 2019), and whether useful logics can contain sentences that are both true and false simultaneously (Priest et al. 2019). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Van Inwagen and Sullivan 2019. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Steup 2019; Metcalf 2020. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Value theorists also study specific topics, such as our obligations to animals (Gruen 2019) and whether governments can be legitimate (Peter 2019). See also Haramia 2018 (the entry on applied ethics in *1000-Word Philosophy*) for an overview of applied ethics. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Indeed, one area where people see many connections is with religion. So what’s the difference between philosophy and religion? This is not an easy question to answer, but most religious practice proceeds from a shared starting-point consensus body of putative knowledge, and these beliefs are almost all about God or gods, the afterlife, and how to live a pious life. In contrast, in philosophy, everything is constantly open to question, and the topics are much broader than gods and the afterlife. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See e.g., McAfee 2019 and Outlaw 2019. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Van Norden 2017. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See e.g., Van Norden (op. cit.) and Buxton and Whiting 2020. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Indeed, one popular metaphilosophical view is methodological naturalism about philosophy, according to which philosophy should use the methods of the natural sciences. Some naturalists go so far as to say that traditional philosophical methods should be replaced by scientific methods. See Metcalf 2018 and Papineau 2019 for more discussion. As for tools and knowledge from other fields, statistical and probabilistic analysis is common in many areas of philosophy (see, e.g., Weisberg 2019) and special relativity may tell us something important about the philosophy of time (Ingram and Tallant 2019). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) And maybe even the objects that don’t exist; see Reicher 2019. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Bourget and Chalmers 2014. Arguably, there is consensus about many philosophical questions, but we don’t consider those questions in academic philosophy, at least not anymore. For example, almost everyone knows that slavery is wrong and that women should be allowed to vote if anyone is. See also Gutting 2009 for a general survey of some apparent philosophical discoveries. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Cf. Chalmers 2015. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See, e.g., Miller 2019. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See Bierce 2008; de Montaigne 1987: 204; Russell 2010: 20 for some other statements about the nature or purpose of philosophy. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Bierce 2008. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) De Montaigne 1987: 204. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) See e.g., Groarke 2019 and Prinzing and Vasquez 2025. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Daily Nous n.d. However, we do not yet know what proportion of this is a ‘selection effect’—people who are *already* smart major in philosophy—and how much of this is a ‘treatment effect,’ i.e., majoring in philosophy actually *makes* you smarter. ### References [Berkeley, George. 2003 \[1710\]. ](https://store.doverpublications.com/048643253x.html)[*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*](https://store.doverpublications.com/048643253x.html)[. Mineola, NY: Dover Philosophical Classics.](https://store.doverpublications.com/048643253x.html) [Berryman, Sylvia. 2019. “Ancient Atomism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/atomism-ancient/) [Bierce, Ambrose. 2008. “The Devil’s Dictionary.” In Project Gutenberg (ed.), Project Gutenberg. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/972/972-h/972-h.htm) [Blackburn, Simon. 1999. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/think-9780192100245?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/think-9780192100245?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/think-9780192100245?cc=us&lang=en&) [Bourget, David and David J. Chalmers. 2014. “What Do Philosophers Believe?” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7)[ 170(3): 465-500.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7) [Buxton, Rebecca and Lisa Whiting. 2020. *The Philosopher Queens: The Lives and Legacies of Philosophy’s Unsung Women.* London, UK: Unbound Publishers.](https://unbound.com/books/philosopher-queens/) [Chalmers, David J. 2015. “Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy?” ](http://consc.net/papers/progress.pdf)[*Philosophy* ](http://consc.net/papers/progress.pdf)[90(1): 3-31.](http://consc.net/papers/progress.pdf) [Curd, Patricia. 2019. “Presocratic Philosophy.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/presocratics/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/presocratics/)[, Winter 2019 Edition.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/presocratics/) [Daily Nous. n.d. “Value of Philosophy.” ](http://dailynous.com/value-of-philosophy/) [De Montaigne, Michel. 1987. ](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/352/35226/the-complete-essays/9780140446043.html)[*Complete Essays*](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/352/35226/the-complete-essays/9780140446043.html)[. Tr. M. A. Screech. London, UK: Penguin Books.](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/352/35226/the-complete-essays/9780140446043.html) [The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. N.d. “Philosophy.” In The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (eds.), ](https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy)[*Encyclopaedia Britannica*](https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy)[, Online Edition. ](https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy) [Garson, James. 2019. “Modal Logic.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-modal/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-modal/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-modal/) [Groarke, Leo. 2019. “Informal Logic.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-informal/) [Gruen, Lori. 2019. “The Moral Status of Animals.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/moral-animal/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/moral-animal/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/moral-animal/) [Gutting, Gary. 2009. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/what-philosophers-know/8F1DF2B21CEB9FE76C3800289DC08CFB)[*What Philosophers Know: Case Studies in Recent Analytic Philosophy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/what-philosophers-know/8F1DF2B21CEB9FE76C3800289DC08CFB)[. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/what-philosophers-know/8F1DF2B21CEB9FE76C3800289DC08CFB) [Ingram, David and Jonathan Tallant. 2019. “Presentism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/presentism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/presentism/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/presentism/) [Knobe, Joshua and Shaun Nichols. 2019. “Experimental Philosophy.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/experimental-philosophy/) [Markosian, Ned. 2019. “Time.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/time/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/time/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/time/) [McAfee, Noëlle. 2019. “Feminist Philosophy.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/feminist-philosophy/) [McNamara, Paul. 2019. “Deontic Logic.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-deontic/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-deontic/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-deontic/) [Miller, Alexander. 2019. “Realism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/) [Olivelle, Patrick (tr. and ed.). 1998. ](https://archive.org/stream/TheEarlyUpanisads/The%20Early%20Upani%E1%B9%A3ads_djvu.txt)[*The Early Upaniṣads: Annotated Text and Translation*](https://archive.org/stream/TheEarlyUpanisads/The%20Early%20Upani%E1%B9%A3ads_djvu.txt)[. New York, NY and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.](https://archive.org/stream/TheEarlyUpanisads/The%20Early%20Upani%E1%B9%A3ads_djvu.txt) [Outlaw, Lucius T. Jr. 2019. “Africana Philosophy.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/africana/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/africana/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/africana/) [Papineau, David. 2019. “Naturalism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/naturalism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/naturalism/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/naturalism/) [Peter, Fabienne. 2019. “Political Legitimacy.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legitimacy/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legitimacy/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legitimacy/) [Priest, Graham et al. 2019. “Paraconsistent Logic.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-paraconsistent/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-paraconsistent/)[, Winter 2019 Edition.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/logic-paraconsistent/) [Prinzing, Michael and Vasquez, Michael. 2025. “Studying Philosophy: Does Make People Better Thinkers?” *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*. 2025: 1-19. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/studying-philosophy-does-make-people-better-thinkers/45A7DE8F37BE4698265BD54490109D4A) [Reicher, Maria. 2019. “Nonexistent Objects.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/nonexistent-objects/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/nonexistent-objects/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/nonexistent-objects/) [Rosen, Gideon et al. 2015. ](https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393624427)[*The Norton Introduction to Philosophy*](https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393624427)[, Second Edition. New York, NY and London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd.](https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393624427) [Russell, Bertrand. 2010. ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philosophy-of-Logical-Atomism-1st-Edition/Russell/p/book/9780415474610)[*The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philosophy-of-Logical-Atomism-1st-Edition/Russell/p/book/9780415474610)[. Oxford, UK: Routledge Classics.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Philosophy-of-Logical-Atomism-1st-Edition/Russell/p/book/9780415474610) [Sartwell, Crispin. 2019. “Beauty.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/beauty/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/beauty/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/beauty/) [Steup, Matthias. 2019. “Epistemology.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/epistemology/) [Van Inwagen, Peter and Meghan Sullivan. 2019. “Metaphysics.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/metaphysics/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/metaphysics/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/metaphysics/) [Van Norden, Bryan W. 2017. ](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/taking-back-philosophy/9780231184373)[*Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto*](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/taking-back-philosophy/9780231184373)[. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/taking-back-philosophy/9780231184373) [Weisberg, Jonathan. 2019. “Formal Epistemology.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/formal-epistemology/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/formal-epistemology/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/formal-epistemology/) [Wilce, Alexander. 2019. “Quantum Logic and Probability Theory.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/qt-quantlog/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/qt-quantlog/)[, Winter 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/qt-quantlog/) ### Related Essays [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy and its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone [All Essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/) at *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/philosophy.pdf) in PDF. ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/philosophy/), [Azerbaijani](https://anlaam.com/2-3/) ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** African Philosophy, Art & Aesthetics, Buddhism, Chinese Philosophy, Epistemology, Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy, Logic & Reasoning, Metaphilosophy, Metaphysics, Mind & Language, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science, Race, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** defining philosophy, metcalf, what is philosophy? --- ### [Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm Shifts, and Academic Rifts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/16/thomas-kuhn-paradigm-shifts-and-academic-rifts/) **Published:** June 16, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Michael Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella/) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science") Word Count: 1000 This essay will discuss the important role played by Thomas Kuhn’s characterization of the scientific method in prompting on-going tension between two prominent schools of thought in academia: *realism* and *constructivism.* ![Thomas Kuhn](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/thomas-kuhn.jpg?resize=519%2C362&ssl=1) There are many subtle variations on these two schools, but they can broadly be construed in the following way. On one side are those who are committed to the idea that there exists a physical reality independent of human perceptions, and that science is in the business of systematically uncovering that reality. We’ll call those folks “realists.” On the other side are those who feel that human activity, specifically our psychology and sociology, shapes our reality. We’ll call those folks “constructivists” because they think that, to a large degree, humans construct their reality. The realists are inheritors of a tradition that includes most of natural philosophy and the sciences. Constructivism, on the other hand, mainly arose in the 20th century and is more closely associated with realms in which it is already understood that psychological and social forces dominate. Such realms include literature, religion, politics, and folklore. Before the rise of constructivism, science was almost universally assumed to be epistemically superior1 to all other fields of human inquiry. The idea was that scientists come up with theories that are then tested against nature itself, and if there is a mismatch between nature and theory, the theory is updated or replaced. Much of the history of epistemology involved attempts explain science’s superiority by characterizing that important connection between hard evidence and scientific theories. A common approach was to start with strict logical reasoning that philosophers had already identified as reliable, and then show how scientific reasoning conforms to that strict logic. However, by the mid-20th century, it was becoming clear that the actual methods used by successful scientists could not be characterized in terms of straightforward logic (e.g. Duhem, 1954). Realizing this, Thomas Kuhn started his analysis of science by examining the actual, day-to-day practices of successful scientists rather than trying to fit the scientific method into some pre-determined logical framework. In 1962, Kuhn published his findings in what turned out to be one of the most influential books of the century, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Kuhn found that, contrary to a common assumption among philosophers, scientists almost never directly test their theories, and tests to find a theory false (as famously recommended by Karl Popper) are especially rare. Instead, scientists usually work under the assumption that their theory is (at least roughly) true. In fact, scientists take more than their theory for granted. They also work within accepted methods of investigation, accepted standards of evidence, accepted methods of statistical analysis, and an accepted conceptual understanding of their subject matter. All of that (and more) constitute what Kuhn called the “paradigm” that structures and guides everything that happens in a field of science, from the initial formulation of research questions, to constructing relevant experiments, to explanations of observable phenomena. Without a paradigm, scientists would be unable to follow a consistent overall plan for what to do or how to do it, and their field of study would not achieve the kind of success we come to expect from a real scientific discipline. Kuhn called the daily activity of scientists working under their paradigm “normal science,” which includes the working out of unanswered questions or unsolved problems within the paradigm. Kuhn also called it “puzzle solving” because we can think of the paradigm as a big jigsaw puzzle that has much of the border and main features in place, but still contains many incomplete areas that invite new research. Sometimes an experiment may produce negative or unexpected results, but since the paradigm is assumed to be true, they attributed to experimenter error rather than to any problem with the paradigm itself. When a negative result persists despite repeated efforts to eliminate it, the result is declared an anomaly and set aside, leaving the paradigm unchallenged. Eventually, the anomalies will become numerous enough or significant enough to finally prompt a direct challenge to the paradigm, perhaps even prompting a shift to a new paradigm, and it was Kuhn’s account of how scientists shift to a new paradigm that sparked major controversy and contributed to the rift between realists and constructivists. Kuhn believed that when a paradigm is finally abandoned, scientists say goodbye not only to the equations and models from the old theory, but also to the accepted methods of investigation, standards of evidence, and everything else that was used to guide their thinking under the old paradigm. As a result, Kuhn’s account does not allow for any paradigm-neutral way of comparing two rival paradigms in order to say that the newly adopted paradigm is better than the old one or that the shift represents an overall scientific advance. Any method we are tempted to use to evaluate the quality of one paradigm may not be applicable in the other paradigm, and so the paradigms are (as Kuhn called them) incommensurable. Since, according to Kuhn, paradigms are incommensurable, social forces are left to dominate the process, and the socially dominant members of the scientific community end up convincing everyone else to accept a new paradigm (or to stick with the old one). This robs science of its epistemic superiority over other fields because, if Kuhn is correct, scientific theories ultimately are shaped by social forces rather than by an objective nature. Kuhn’s work set the stage for constructivists to argue that science is not any better at uncovering facts about nature than are religion, politics, or folklore. Instead, they argue that what we accept as reality is determined, in large part, by social factors (e.g. Feyerabend, 1975; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Through the latter 20th century, realists struggled to re-establish the reliability of science in the face of constructivist arguments.2 Today, most philosophers of science believe that paradigm-neutral methods and standards of evidence are preserved despite changes in theories, though most philosophers also accept something like Kuhn’s account of normal science, including the existence of bias in favor of existing theories (e.g. Chalmers, 1990; Kitcher, 1995). ### Notes 1In this context, to be epistemically superior means is to be better at developing an accurate understanding of the world. 2There have been many public repercussions of this academic dispute. For example, public debates over things like science education and climate change often include indirect reference to Kuhn’s notion of incommensurable paradigms and the parity of scientific nonscientific ways of understanding the world. ### References [Chalmers, Alan Francis. *Science and Its Fabrication*, University of Minnesota Press, 1990.](https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/science-and-its-fabrication) [Duhem, Pierre. *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*, translated by Philip Wiener, Princeton University Press, 1954.](http://www.amazon.com/Structure-Physical-Princeton-Science-Library/dp/069102524X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1402870505&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Aim+and+Structure+of+Physical+Theory%2C) [Feyerabend, Paul. *Against Method*, London: Verso, 1975.](http://www.versobooks.com/books/442-against-method) [Kitcher, Philip. *The Advancement of Science – Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions*, Oxford University Press, 1995.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-advancement-of-science-9780195096538?q=The%20Advancement%20of%20Science&lang=en&cc=us) [Kuhn, Thomas. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, 1962.](http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo13179781.html) [Latour, Bruno and Steve Woolgar. *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.](http://www.amazon.com/Laboratory-Life-Construction-Scientific-Facts/dp/069102832X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1402870754&sr=8-1&keywords=Laboratory+Life%3A+The+Social+Construction+of+Scientific+Facts) [Popper, Karl. *Logik der Forschung*, Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag, 1935.](http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/book/978-3-7091-2021-7) ### Related Essays [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/ "Karl Popper and Falsificationism") by Michael Zerella [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/ "Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science") by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [Michael Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella/) is a philosophy instructor at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He earned a bachelor’s degree in biology in 1993 and a master’s in biology in 1995. He then taught high school science classes for several years before going back to grad school at the University of Colorado to earn his Ph.D. in philosophy in 2011. Unsurprisingly, he specializes in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. Mike also enjoys the classic summertime Colorado activities like hiking, biking, camping, gardening, and going to bluegrass music festivals. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Science **Tags:** Kuhn, Zerella --- ### [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/) **Published:** May 12, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Michael Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella/) Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science") Word Count: 1000 “A million successful experiments cannot prove a theory correct, but one failed experiment can prove a theory wrong.” Perhaps you’ve heard someone use this cliché to describe the scientific method as a tough-minded and unsentimental pursuit of an accurate understanding of nature. The sentiment has its roots in Karl Popper’s mid-20th-Century account of scientific investigation called “falsificationism,” so it is perhaps unsurprising that Popper’s views have been popular among many proponents of science. Unfortunately, if we are to take the cliché literally, and in the way Popper intended, the central dictum of falsificationism turns out to be false. While something of the attitude implied by the cliché may remain, Popper’s original point about the logical structure of scientific discovery has difficulty standing up to scrutiny. ![karl-popper](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/karl-popper.png?resize=600%2C324&ssl=1) Karl Popper In a series of famous works starting in the late 1950s, Popper criticized some (supposedly) scientific fields of study as insufficiently rigorous. It seemed to him that some researchers were focused only on finding *positive evidence* that could be used to confirm their favorite theories rather than really challenging their theories by trying to find *evidence against* those theories. For example, Freudian psychologists frequently claimed scientific success after showing that Freudian theory was able to explain a wide range of proposed human behaviors. However, as Popper pointed out, we should be suspicious of that supposed success after recognizing that the theory is so vague and malleable that it can be bent to explain any conceivable human behavior. Popper labeled such theories “unfalsifiable” and argued that a properly scientific theory should instead tell us what ought *not* happen. If repeated attempts to find the theory’s forbidden phenomena all fail, then, and only then, has the theory passed a truly *risky test* and earned some scientific praise. Freudian theory was not capable of subjecting itself to that sort of risky testing, and so was impossible to reject, thus rendering it unscientific according to Popper. Popper’s views on science were guided by his preference for formal logic. Using *particular* instances of positive evidence to support a *general* conclusion, i.e., moving from the particular to the general, requires the use of *inductive* logic. Unfortunately, it has long been understood that induction can never *conclusively* prove a general statement about nature to be true. On the other hand, however, when we use negative evidence to contradict a general statement, i.e., when we falsify, we are using *deductive* logic, and unlike induction, deduction can provide conclusive proof. Thus we arrive at the cliché quoted at the beginning of the essay. Popper understood that in order for falsificationism to be an accurate account of scientific reasoning, it must describe actual scientific practice. With that in mind, Popper picked the famous [Eddington experiment of 1919](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tests_of_general_relativity#Deflection_of_light_by_the_Sun) in which starlight was observed to follow a curved path around the sun. Newton’s long-standing theory of physics made the general claim that light never follows a curved path through a vacuum, yet that exact curving phenomenon was observed. According to Popper, that observation alone was enough to falsify Newtonian theory, allowing Einstein’s general relativity to take its place. If Popper’s description of scientific reasoning were correct, then the 1919 episode would indeed be powerful support for falsificationism. However, it turns out that Popper’s description didn’t fully capture scientific practice. Rather than reject Newtonian theory outright, the scientific community *defended* their familiar and successful older theory. It was suggested that due to their limited measuring abilities at the time, it was entirely possible that the sun’s corona extended out far enough to refract the light as it passed. It wasn’t until more careful and reliable work continued to support Einstein over Newton that the scientific community very gradually shifted to general relativity. In Popper’s defense, one could claim that the Newtonians were just being stubborn, and if they had followed *proper* scientific logic, they would have rejected their old theory and stopped trying to come up with wild ways to defend it. To see why this is a mistaken characterization, let’s look at some more examples of unquestionably good and unquestionably bad scientific practice. Suppose a student in Chem 101 is conducting a laboratory exercise in which the liquid in a test tube is supposed to turn blue. Instead, the liquid turns green and the student, following Popper’s reasoning, claims to have falsified the current theory of chemistry. That obviously is bad science because the conclusion is far too hasty. The more reasonable explanation is that the experimenter did something wrong. And that’s not just true for beginners. After bringing the Large Hadron Collider up to full power for the first time, the scientists at CERN failed to find the Higgs boson. If they followed Popper, they would have concluded that the standard model of quantum mechanics was false and stopped looking. Again, that would have been be far too hasty. Instead, they decided to keep searching until they could no longer blame the search’s failure on problems with their methods or equipment, and their efforts eventually paid off in grand fashion. Popper’s main problem is that his deductive process of falsificationism can never provide a clear refutation of a theory. There always is the possibility that the theory is correct and it was some other detail of the experiment that was responsible for the negative outcome. He may have been right to insist that scientific theories should be subjected to risky tests, but Popper went too far in insisting that the practice of science is a clear-cut deductive process of elimination. Perhaps, then, the cliché cited at the beginning of this essay should be amended to say, “A million successful experiments cannot prove a theory correct, but one failed experiment can prove that either the theory is wrong or that some mistake was made in the experimental procedure or something totally unexpected happened.” That’s a much messier and more confusing way to describe the scientific process, but nature itself is messy and confusing, so perhaps we should not expect our investigation of it to be much different. ### References [Duhem, Pierre. *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*, translated by Philip Wiener, Princeton University Press, 1954.](http://press.princeton.edu/titles/2667.html) [Kuhn, Thomas. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Structure-Scientific-Revolutions-Edition/dp/0226458083/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1399890996&sr=8-2&keywords=The+Structure+of+Scientific+Revolutions) [Hansson, Sven Ove. “Falsificationism Falsified”, *Foundations of Science*, 11: 275–286, 2006.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10699-004-5922-1) [Popper, Karl. *Logik der Forschung*, Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag, 1935.](http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/book/978-3-7091-2021-7) [Popper, Karl. *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, London: Routledge, 1963.](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415285940/) ### Related Essays [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson ### About the Author [Michael Zerella](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Zerella/) is a philosophy instructor at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He earned a bachelor’s degree in biology in 1993 and a master’s in biology in 1995. He then taught high school science classes for several years before going back to grad school at the University of Colorado to earn his Ph.D. in philosophy in 2011. Unsurprisingly, he specializes in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. Mike also enjoys the classic summertime Colorado activities like hiking, biking, camping, gardening, and going to bluegrass music festivals. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Science **Tags:** demarcation, Falsificationism, Popper, Zerella --- ### [Pascal's Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) **Published:** January 4, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Should you believe there’s a God? To answer this, we might examine arguments for theism—like first-cause and design arguments—and arguments for atheism—like arguments from evil. These arguments offer evidence for and against God’s existence. Pascal’s wager, originally proposed by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), takes a more pragmatic approach. Pascal thought that evidence cannot settle the question of whether God exists, so he proposes that you should bet, or wager, on God because of what’s at stake: you have lots to gain and not much to lose. This article explains Pascal’s wager and considers three objections. **Content:** Author: Liz Jackson Categories: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word Count: 996 Should you believe there’s a God? To answer this, we might examine arguments for theism—like first-cause and design arguments—and arguments for atheism—like arguments from evil. These arguments offer evidence for and against God’s existence.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) *Pascal’s wager*, originally proposed by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), takes a more pragmatic approach. Pascal thought that evidence cannot settle the question of whether God exists, so he proposes that you should bet, or *wager*, on God because of what’s at stake: *you have lots to gain and not much to lose*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This article explains Pascal’s wager and considers three objections.[![Pascal's wager image: person praying in front of a pile of poker chips.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/gambrelig-min.jpg?resize=599%2C398&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/gambrelig-min.jpg?ssl=1) ### 1.The Basic Argument The basic form of the wager goes like this: If God exists and I believe in God, I’ll go to heaven, which is infinitely good. If God exists and I don’t believe in God, I may go to hell, which is infinitely bad. If God does not exist, then whether I believe in God or not, whatever I’d gain or lose would be finite. So, I should believe in God. The argument depends on the *expected value* of believing in God, which we use to make a decision if we’re not certain whether God exists.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This *decision matrix* illustrates the argument: [![Basic decision matrix for Pascal's Wager.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/wager1.jpg?resize=656%2C121&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/wager1.jpg?ssl=1)Basic decision matrix for Pascal’s Wager. Even if the chance of God existing is small, as long as it is greater than zero, the expected value of believing is infinite. Combining the chart’s values with the assumption that we should pick the action with the highest expected value yields Pascal’s Wager. While the Wager has its advocates, there are many objections. Let’s review some of the most important. ### 2. The Many-Gods Objection An initial objection is that Pascal’s wager is too simplistic. There are many religions, and believing in the God of one religion might prevent gaining the infinite rewards of another religion. To see this, let’s consider just adding two religions—Christianity and Islam—to our decision matrix. Assuming the probabilities of Christianity, Islam, and atheism are greater than zero, we get confusing expected values. This is called the “many-gods” objection, illustrated by this decision matrix: [![Decision matrix for Pascal's Wager for the "Many Gods" objection.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/wager2.jpg?resize=656%2C317&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/wager2.jpg?ssl=1)Decision matrix for the “Many Gods” objection. Apparently, Pascal’s wager doesn’t give us a reason to pick one religion over another, since Christianity and Islam both have the same expected value. You might think the decision matrix tells us that believing either religion is a better bet than believing atheism. However, there’s a possibility—even if unlikely—that atheists go to heaven and theists go to hell. As long as we don’t assign this probability 0, then atheism isn’t a worse bet than believing a religion. Thus, all options seem to have the same expected value.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) A common response to the many-gods objection can be summarized in two words: *probability matters*. It matters even when dealing with infinite values. To see why, imagine you’re given the choice between a 90% chance at an infinite good or a 10% chance at the same good. You should clearly take the 90% chance. When we apply this to Pascal’s wager, the result is that *you should wager for the religion you think is most likely to be true*. Christianity and Islam actually do not have the same expected value—wagering on the more probable religion gives you a higher chance at an infinite good, and so has a higher expected value. Further, since it’s unlikely that atheists and agnostics (agnostics suspend judgment on whether God exists) go to heaven and theists go to hell, Pascal’s wager implies it’s irrational to be an atheist or agnostic*.*[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 3. The Impossibility Objection A second objection is that wagering is impossible, because we can’t form beliefs simply for their benefits: if I offer you $1,000,000 to believe that 1+1=3, you probably still can’t believe it. Most philosophers reject *doxastic voluntarism*, the view that we can directly control our beliefs.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) In response, whether God exists isn’t obviously true or false (unlike 1+1=3), so some argue that you have more control over your religious beliefs. This might be *indirect* control, like the control you could exercise over your political beliefs by changing the news sources you read. A second response—which Pascal himself favored—frames the wager in terms of *action*, rather than belief. The wager gives you a reason to *commit* to God—by going to church, praying, and immersing yourself in a religious community—rather than trying to directly believe in God.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 4. The Irrationality Objection Even if it’s *possible* to take Pascal’s wager, that doesn’t guarantee that the beliefs formed from wagering would be *rational*, at least from an evidential point of view. It seems like forming a belief on the basis of a wager would violate *evidentialism*, the view that we should proportion our beliefs to the evidence. We should believe because of evidence, not because a belief is beneficial.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) In response, if your evidence for theism is *permissive*—meaning you could be rational as a theist, atheist, or agnostic—you can take Pascal’s wager and still respect evidentialism. This is because more than one belief-attitude fits your evidence.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Also, we can again make the wager about a commitment to God, rather than about belief. Since evidentialism applies to belief and not action, you could then take the wager without violating evidentialism. ### 5. Conclusion We’ve discussed the basic version of Pascal’s wager and examined three objections. The wager is unique because it leads us to consider many kinds of reasons for belief, including evidence, arguments, risks, and rewards. More specifically, even if the arguments that God exists aren’t successful, it’s interesting to consider whether we’d have a reason to believe in God anyway.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For an introduction to some of these arguments see [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro, [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf and [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf, as well as other arguments for and against the existence of God in the [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) essay category. There are also other [potential sources of evidence for God that don’t come in the form of arguments](https://youtu.be/tZRGaZDXz6k), e.g. evidence from religious experiences. Pascal’s Wager differs from these approaches. Instead of focusing on whether it is true or false that God exists, the wager concerns whether belief in God is beneficial, or *pragmatic,* for the believer. Thus, the Wager is called a “pragmatic” argument, in contrast to what might be called an “evidential” argument. For comparison of these types of reasons to believe, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For the original version of the wager, see Pascal (1662). Pascal’s Wager generally presumes a common concept of God that is reviewed in [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Generally, we appeal to the expected value of actions when we don’t have certainty about the relevant probabilities. If we had certainty, we could calculate the *actual* value of each action; this approach tells us how to act rationally in the face of uncertainty. Therefore, Pascal’s expected value reasoning applies to anyone who is not 100% certain that God exists or 100% certain that God doesn’t exist. For an application of the concept of expected value to voting, see [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For more on this objection, see Mougin and Sober (1994). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Jackson and Rogers (2019) for development of this argument. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Alston (1988) for an argument against doxastic voluntarism. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Rota (2016) for a contemporary version of the wager that focuses on making a commitment to God. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Conee and Feldman (2004) for an explanation and defense of [evidentialism](https://youtu.be/ZgJ3hDk0-V0). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For more on permissivism, the view that one more than attitude can be rational, given a body of evidence, see Titelbaum and Kopec (2016). Permissivism doesn’t mean that more than one attitude fits your evidence in every case. Sometimes attitudes (like *believing* 1+1=2) are rationally required by our evidence; however, our evidence for some matters (like God’s existence) is harder to assess. See James (1896) for a pragmatic argument for belief in God that appeals to permissivism. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For more on Pascal’s Wager, see Hájek (2018). ### References [Alston, W. (1988). “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/ALSTDC)[*Philosophical Perspectives*](https://philpapers.org/rec/ALSTDC)[ 2: 257–299.](https://philpapers.org/rec/ALSTDC) [Conee, E. & R. Feldman. (2004). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/evidentialism-9780199253739?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Evidentialism*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/evidentialism-9780199253739?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/evidentialism-9780199253739?cc=us&lang=en&) [Hájek, Alan, “Pascal’s Wager”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/pascal-wager/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/pascal-wager/)[(Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/pascal-wager/) [Jackson, E. and A. Rogers. (2019). “Salvaging Pascal’s Wager.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/JACSPW)[*Philosophia Christi*](https://philpapers.org/rec/JACSPW) [21 (1): 59–84.](https://philpapers.org/rec/JACSPW) [James, W. (1896/1979). “The Will to Believe.” In ](https://philpapers.org/rec/JAMTWT-51)[*The Will to Believe and Other Essays*](https://philpapers.org/rec/JAMTWT-51)[ (F. Burkhardt et al., eds.), pp. 2–32. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/JAMTWT-51) [Kopec, M. and M. Titelbaum. (2016). “The Uniqueness Thesis.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KOPTUT-2)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KOPTUT-2)[ 11(4): 189–200.](https://philpapers.org/rec/KOPTUT-2) [Mougin, G., and E. Sober. (1994). “Betting Against Pascal’s Wager.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOUBAP)[*Noûs*](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOUBAP)[ 28: 382–95.](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOUBAP) [Pascal, B. (1662/1958). ](http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/pascalswager.pdf)[*Pensees,* ](http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/pascalswager.pdf)[trans. William Trotter. New York: J. M. Dent Co., fragments 233–241.](http://liz-jackson.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/pascalswager.pdf) [Rota, M. (2016). ](https://www.ivpress.com/taking-pascal-s-wager)[*Taking Pascal’s Wager*](https://www.ivpress.com/taking-pascal-s-wager)[. Intervarsity Press.](https://www.ivpress.com/taking-pascal-s-wager) ### For Further Exploration [Jordan, Jeff, “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/)[(Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/) [Jackson, Liz (video), “Answering the Most Challenging Objections to Pascal’s Wager”.](https://youtu.be/e6qHRLkFhCM) [Jackson, Liz (video), ](https://youtu.be/e6qHRLkFhCM)[“Philosophers on Pascal’s Wager”](https://youtu.be/Izlezvr0e6w). [Jackson, Liz (video), ](https://youtu.be/e6qHRLkFhCM)[“Evidentialism: What Should We Believe?”](https://youtu.be/ZgJ3hDk0-V0). [Jackson, Liz (video), ](https://youtu.be/e6qHRLkFhCM)[“Pascal’s Wager: A Very Basic Introduction”](https://youtu.be/C_PI1ApAXtw). ### Related Essays [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/pascal.pdf)[ in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/pascal.pdf). ### About the Author Liz Jackson is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Ryerson University. She completed her PhD in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Her main philosophical interests are in epistemology and philosophy of religion. [Liz-Jackson.com](http://liz-jackson.com/) and [youtube.com/user/lizjackson111](https://www.youtube.com/user/lizjackson111) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy, Logic & Reasoning, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Pascal's Wager, pragmatic arguments --- ### [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad/) **Published:** October 2, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Most people think dying would be bad for them and so they fear it. Is that fear rational? The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE) says no. He argues that death—as the permanent extinction of consciousness—is not bad, so we should not fear it. The Roman philosopher Lucretius (94- circa 55 BCE) agrees, and he defends Epicurus. If Epicurus and Lucretius are right, then fear of death is irrational. But are they right? **Content:** Author: Frederik Kaufman Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word count: 987 Most people think dying would be bad for them and so they fear it. Is that fear rational? The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE) says no. He argues that death—as the permanent extinction of consciousness—is not bad, so we should not fear it. The Roman philosopher Lucretius (94- circa 55 BCE) agrees, and he defends Epicurus. If Epicurus and Lucretius are right, then fear of death is irrational. But are they right? [![By The Death Bed, 1896 by Edvard Munch](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/by-the-death-bed-1.jpg?resize=656%2C490&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/by-the-death-bed-1.jpg?ssl=1)By The Death Bed, 1896 by Edvard Munch ### 1. Epicurus’ Argument Death, Epicurus argued, cannot touch us because “while we exist death is not present, and when death is present we no longer exist.” Since death cannot touch us it cannot be bad. Fear is rational only for something bad. So Epicurus concludes that fearing death is pointless.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) To be clear: the issue is being dead, not dying, since while dying we still exist. Dying can be awful and so rightly feared. ### 2. Reaction to Epicurus Common sense has long recoiled to Epicurus. Surely death is bad if it deprives us of the goods of life. Granted, if continued life would be terrible, then death might not deprive. But if it does deprive us of good experiences, then it is bad because it is bad to be deprived of any good.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### 3. Lucretius’ Argument This common sense reaction to Epicurus plays right into Lucretius’ hands. For if we say that death is bad because it deprives us of time alive, then when we were born also deprives us of time alive, since we could have been born earlier than we were (or whenever we began to exist). However, since no one fears missing out on time before they were born, they should not fear missing out on time after they die. Lucretius writes: Look back again to see how the past ages of everlasting time, before we were born, have been as naught to us. These then nature holds up to us as a mirror of the time that is to come, when we are dead and gone. Is there aught that looks terrible in this, aught that seems gloomy? Is it not a calmer rest than any sleep?[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 4. Responding to Lucretius If we concede that being born “late” is just as bad as dying “early,” then maybe we should lament *both* when we were born and when we will die.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) However, this is hard to believe and even harder to actually do. Alternatively, even if our non-existence before birth and after death both deprive, maybe death deprives us of something we care about, whereas we are indifferent to time we missed before we were born.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) That is, we could simply have a preference for the future.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) However, even if true, this preference merely *explains* why we care about missing future goods by dying when we will instead of the goods we missed by being born when we were. Lucretius’ claim is that our preference is irrational, since the two periods of non-existence are symmetrical, so we should have similar attitudes toward them. Lucretius can even agree that we are biased toward the future; that, he would say, is the problem! ### 5. A Different Answer to Lucretius Here is a more promising response.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) I might die later than I will, but I could not have been born earlier than I was. Anyone born earlier would not be me, because different gametes would produce a different individual.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) If so, then I can rationally lament the one but not the other. But here’s a problem: if particular gametes determine one’s identity, in vitro fertilization (IVF) shows how the same human being could exist earlier.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) If the embryo from which a person developed were implanted earlier than it was, it seems that that same person could have existed earlier than she did. The earlier IVF human being would indeed be identical to the later one, but the term “human being” is ambiguous between “human organism,” which is a biological concept, and “*person*,” which is a metaphysical concept. Permanent coma victims, for example, are obviously human organisms, but not *persons* in the sense in which you are a person, namely, as a center of rational self-awareness. Conversely, Superman, were he to exist, would be a person in that sense, though obviously not a member of our species*.* So the embryo could have been implanted earlier, which would have resulted in the same *human organism* as the later implanted embryo, but would it have given rise to the same *person*?[\[10\]](#_ftn10) We care about the details of our lives. Our concerns, memories, hopes, relationships, and all that makes our lives worth living matters to each of us. *That* is what death threatens. Call this our “thick personhood,” to distinguish it from the bare human organism shorn of one’s biographical life.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) So even if an earlier existing human organism would be identical to a later existing one, that is not what matters to each of us.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) If I die tomorrow (contrary to fact, I fervently hope!), I can nevertheless easily imagine extending my established biography past tomorrow, but I cannot imagine my biography beginning earlier than it did. How, for example, could I have met my wife before she was born? Unless we can somehow push *everything* back in time in lock-step unison, our thick personhoods cannot possibly exist earlier than they do.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) We cannot be deprived of impossible things, such as the cake we ate yesterday. Since it is impossible for thick persons to exist earlier than they do, one cannot be deprived of time before birth. But it *is* possible to die later than one will, so we can be deprived of that time.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) If so, this answers Lucretius. ### 6. Conclusion So to return to the intuitive response to Epicurus: since death typically deprives us of good life experiences, that’s what makes it bad, thus justifying some appropriate level of fear. That’s what most of us thought initially, and it looks like we were right. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” *Principal Doctrines*, Library of Liberal Arts, Russel Geer, tr., 1978. p. 54. For Epicurus, happiness (understood as pleasure) is the only thing that has *intrinsic value*, that is, pleasure is the only thing valuable for its own sake; it is the end with respect to which everything else is a means, and so it is the ultimate goal in life. Fear of death causes extreme anxiety, thus ruining our lives. This is no idle issue. How we face the prospect of our own death is perhaps the greatest quandary of the human condition. This applies to those who think death is annihilation and maybe even more so to those who deny it. Lucretius, a committed Epicurean, expresses gratitude to his mentor for freeing him from the fear of death that afflicts so many people, causing them to lead desperate lives and to do awful things; *On the Nature of Things*, Bk II, p. 65, Cecil Bailey, tr, Oxford University Press, 1950: Sweet it is, when on the great sea the winds are buffeting the waters, to gaze from the land on another’s great struggles; not because it is pleasure or joy that any one should be distressed, but because it is sweet to perceive from what misfortune you yourself are free. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For development of this argument, see Thomas Nagel’s seminal article, “Death,” reprinted in *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge University Press, 1979. pp. 1-10. Many other philosophers develop the deprivation account, including Fred Feldman, in *Confrontations with the Reaper*, Oxford University Press, 1992; Ben Bradley, in *Well-Being and Death*, Oxford University Press, 2009; and Shelly Kagan, in *Death*, Yale University Press, 2012; and many more. The deprivation account is the most popular explanation for why death is bad, when it is bad. It is popular because it is intuitively correct, but like many seemingly obvious views in philosophy it requires more intellectual effort to establish than anyone ever imagined, as these books demonstrate. Death is a perennial topic for philosophy, but since Nagel’s article there has been a great deal of interest in the metaphysical and ethical questions surrounding death. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, trans. Cyril Bailey, Oxford University Press, 1920, III. 927. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Fred Feldman, “Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death,” *Philosophical Review* 100.2, April 1991 205-27 (reprinted in David Benatar, *Life, Death, and Meaning,* Roman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 234), holds that we should try to view our births in the same way we view our deaths: There are, after all, two ways in which we can rectify the apparently irrational emotional asymmetry \[between late birth and early death\]. On the one hand, we can follow Lucretius and cease viewing early death as a bad thing for Claudette. On the other hand, we can at least try to start viewing late birth as a bad thing. My suggestion is that in the present case the latter course would be preferable. I think it must be granted that our emotional reactions toward pleasures lost by early death are quite different from our emotional reactions toward similar pleasures lost by late birth. If my proposal is right, this emotional asymmetry is irrational. That the lateness of our birth could be as tragic as our untimely death is even harder to accept than Lucretius’ recommendation that we become indifferent to death. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, “Why Death is Bad,” *Philosophical Studies* 50 (1986) pp. 213-21, p. 219. Brueckner and Fischer think that we could be born earlier than we were, but since we have a bias toward the future, we are indifferent to goods that we missed by being born when we were. See Lukas J. Meier (2019) “What Matters in the Mirror of Time: Why Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument Fails,” A*ustralasian Journal of Philosophy*, 97:4, 651-660 for an account of what matters in pre-vital and post-mortem times. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Fischer and Brueckner, “The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth,” *Philosophical Studies* 71 (1993) 327-31; p. 328. appeal to a variation on a famous thought experiment of Derek Parfit’s that purports to show our temporal bias. (A “bias” is an irrational preference, since the idea of a rational bias seems incoherent.) Here is is Brueckner and Fischer’s version of Parfit’s thought experiment: Imagine that you are in some hospital to test a drug. The drug induces intense pleasure for an hour followed by amnesia. You awaken and ask the nurse about your situation. She says that either you tried the drug yesterday (and had an hour of pleasure) or you will try the drug tomorrow (and will have an hour of pleasure). While she checks on your status, it is clear that you prefer to have the pleasure tomorrow. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Nagel, ibid. p. 7 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For discussion of this claim, see [Origin Essentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Jeff McMahan (in “The Lucretian Argument,” in *The Good, the Right, Life and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman*. McDaniel, Kris (ed). Ashgate, 2006. Pp. 213-226, p. 216) asks us to: \[C\]onsider someone who is the product of in vitro fertilization (IVF). Her parents wanted a child but not until they were older. But they worried that conceiving a child when they were older would carry a higher risk that their child would have a congenital defect. So they had IVF and had the resulting embryos frozen. They then waited 15 years before implanting the embryo that in fact developed into this person. This seems to be a case in which, if the parents had implanted this same embryo earlier, the same person would have had an earlier origin…If this is right, there are some people who could have come into existence earlier than they did. The issues of this case lead to what’s called “the non-identity problem”: for an introduction, see [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk II, ch xxvii, paragraph 9. Locke distinguished sharply between the “man” or the human organism and the “person,” which Locke said is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For discussion of thick and thin personhood see Frederik Kaufman, “Pre-Vital and Post-Mortem Non-Existence,” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 36, (1999), pp. 1-19. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons,* Oxford University Press, 1984. Ch 12, “Why Our Identity Is Not What Matters.” Parfit argues that our continuing psychological sense of ourselves is what matters, not whether from some metaphysical point of view there is just one self-identical entity. He shows this by means of highly original thought experiments whereby a person undergoes fission, resulting in two streams of consciousness; since there are two, they cannot be numerically identical. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13)Travis Timmerman, “Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem,” *Ratio* 31/1 (2018) pp. 88-102; Timmerman argues that since the Milky Way could have begun earlier than it did, someone could be deprived of the time he or she could have had had the Milky Way formed earlier. In response, I, following Nagel, argue that we must put some limits on how possible a possibility must be for its non-realization to count as a misfortune. So even if it is possible for the Milky Way to have formed earlier than it did, one is not deprived of that additional possible time simply because the Milky Way did not form earlier than it could have. To miss out on time alive by dying in a car crash tomorrow hardly compares with missing out on time alive because the Milky Way formed later rather than earlier. The former is clearly a misfortune, whereas it is hard to see the latter that way. See my “Coming Into and Going Out of Existence,” in *Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying*, Travis Timmerman and Michael Cholbi, eds, Routledge 2020. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The sense of “possible” here may be controversial. (For an overview of the many meanings of “possible” see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk). It seems possible that the pedestrian might not have stepped off the curb when he did and into the path of the car that struck and killed him. If we deny that, then we must also abandon the idea of deprivation, since deprivation implies that there could have been a different outcome of events. That is, if we cannot be deprived of impossible things and it is impossible for things to turn out different than they did, then we cannot be deprived by the way things turned out. ### References [Bradley, Ben, ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1/acprof-9780199557967)[*Well-Being and Death*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1/acprof-9780199557967)[, Oxford University Press](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1/acprof-9780199557967)[, 2009](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1/acprof-9780199557967). [Brueckner, Anthony, and Fischer, John Martin, “Why Death is Bad,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00354589)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00354589)[ 50 (1986) pp. 213-21.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00354589) [Brueckner, Anthony, and Fischer, John Martin, “The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00989732)[*Philosophical Studies* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00989732)[71 (1993) pp. 327-31.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00989732) [Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, ](http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/menoec.html)[*Principal Doctrines*](http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/menoec.html)[, Library of Liberal Arts, Russel Geer, tr., (1978). ](http://classics.mit.edu/Epicurus/menoec.html) [Feldman, Fred, “Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185300?seq=1)[*Philosophical Review* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185300?seq=1)[100.2, April (1991) pp. 205-27.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185300?seq=1) [Kagan, Shelly, ](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300180848/death)[*Death*](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300180848/death)[, Yale University Press, 2012](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300180848/death) [Kaufman, Frederik, “Coming Into and Going Out of Existence,” in](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHOETP-2)[ *Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying*](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHOETP-2)[, Travis Timmerman and Michael Cholbi, eds, Routledge 2020.](https://philpapers.org/rec/CHOETP-2) [Kaufman, Frederik, “Pre-Vital and Post-Mortem Non-Existence,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009949)[*American Philosophical Quarterly,* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009949)[vol 36,](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009949) [1999.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009949) [Locke, John, ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/327039/an-essay-concerning-human-understanding-by-john-locke/)[*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/327039/an-essay-concerning-human-understanding-by-john-locke/)[, 1690.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/327039/an-essay-concerning-human-understanding-by-john-locke/) [Lucretius, ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/carus-on-the-nature-of-things)[*On the Nature of Things*](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/carus-on-the-nature-of-things)[, trans. Cyril Bailey, Oxford University Press, 1920.](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/carus-on-the-nature-of-things) [McMahan, Jeff, “The Lucretian Argument,” in ](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Lucretian_Argument.pdf)[*The Good, the Right, Life and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman*](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Lucretian_Argument.pdf)[. McDaniel, Kris (ed). ](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Lucretian_Argument.pdf)[Ashgate, 2006](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Lucretian_Argument.pdf)[.](https://aristotle.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Lucretian_Argument.pdf) [Nagel, Thomas, “Death,” reprinted in ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/mortal-questions/F0D076D52E53EB398DFBEF8E68FF15D1)[*Mortal Questions*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/mortal-questions/F0D076D52E53EB398DFBEF8E68FF15D1)[, Cambridge University Press, (1979).](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/mortal-questions/F0D076D52E53EB398DFBEF8E68FF15D1) [P](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[arfit, Derek, ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[*Reasons and Persons,* ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[Oxford University Press, (1984).](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085) [Timmerman, Travis, “Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12159)[*Ratio*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12159)[ 31/1 ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12159)[(2018) ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12159)[pp. 88-102.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12159) ### For Further Reading [Luper, Steven, “Death”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/death/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/death/)[(Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/death/) ### Related Essays [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/ "Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control") by Matthew Pianalto [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Origin Essentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/death.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Frederik Kaufman is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Ithaca College. [faculty.ithaca.edu/kaufmanf/](https://faculty.ithaca.edu/kaufmanf/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics **Tags:** death, Epicurus, harm of death, is death bad?, Lucretius --- ### [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) **Published:** February 6, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Does life’s having meaning depend on a supernatural reality? Is death a threat to life’s meaning? Is life the sort of thing that can have a “meaning”? In what sense? Here we will consider some approaches to questions about the meaning of life. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Pianalto](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pianalto) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/)[,](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 1000 ##### *Editors’ note: this essay and its companion essay,* [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) *both explore the concept of meaning in relation to human life. This essay focuses on the meaning of life as a whole, whereas the other addresses meaning in individual human lives.* At the height of his literary fame, the novelist Leo Tolstoy was gripped by suicidal despair.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) He felt that life is meaningless because, in the long run, we’ll all be dead and forgotten. Tolstoy later rejected this pessimism in exchange for religious faith in life’s eternal, divine significance. Tolstoy’s outlook—both before and after his conversion—raises many questions: - Does life’s having meaning depend on a supernatural reality? - Is death a threat to life’s meaning? - Is life the sort of thing that can have a “meaning”? In what sense? Here we will consider some approaches to questions about the meaning of life.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/nasa-apollo8-dec24-earthrise.jpg?resize=656%2C656&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/nasa-apollo8-dec24-earthrise.jpg?ssl=1)“Earthrise,” a photograph of Earth and some of the Moon’s surface that was taken from lunar orbit by astronaut William Anders on December 24, 1968, during the Apollo 8 mission. ### 1. Questioning the Question Many philosophers begin thinking about the meaning of life by asking what the question itself means.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) *Life* could refer to all lifeforms or to human life specifically. This essay focuses on human life, but it is worth considering how other things might have or lack meaning, too.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This can help illuminate the different meanings of *meaning*. Sometimes, we use “meaning” to refer to the *origin* or *cause* of something’s existence. If I come home to a trashed house, I might wonder, “What is the meaning of this?” Similarly, we might wonder where life comes from or how it began; our origins may tell us something about other meanings, like our value or purpose. We also use “meaning” to refer to something’s *significance* or *value*. Something can be valuable in various ways, such as by being useful, pleasing, or informative. We might call something meaningless if it is trivial or unimportant. “Meaning” can also refer to something’s *point* or *purpose*.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Life could have some overarching purpose as part of a divine plan, or it might have no such purpose. Perhaps we can *give* our lives purpose that they did not previously possess. Notice that even divine purposes may not always satisfy our desire for meaning: suppose our creator made us to serve as livestock for hyper-intelligent aliens who will soon arrive and begin to farm us.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) We might protest that this is not the most meaningful use of our human potential! We may not want our life-story to end as a people-burger. Indeed, a thing’s meaning can also be its *story*. The meaning of life might be the true story of life’s origins and significance.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In this sense, life cannot be meaningless, but its meaning might be pleasing or disappointing to us. When people like Tolstoy regard life as meaningless, they seem to be thinking that the truth about life is *bad* news.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 2. Supernaturalism *Supernaturalists* hold that life has divine significance.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) For example, from the perspective of the Abrahamic religions, life is valuable because everything in God’s creation is *good*. Our purpose is to love and glorify God. We are all part of something very *important* and *enduring*: God’s plan. Much of the contemporary discussion about the meaning of life is provoked by skepticism about traditional religious answers.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The phrase “the meaning of life” came into common usage only in the last two centuries, as advances in science, especially evolutionary theory, led many to doubt that life is the product of intelligent, supernatural design.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) The meaning of life might be an especially perplexing issue for those who reject religious answers. ### 3. Nihilism *Nihilists* think that life, on balance, lacks positive meaning.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Nihilism often arises as a *pessimistic* reaction to religious skepticism: life without a divine origin or purpose has no enduring significance. Although others might counter that life can have enduring significance that doesn’t depend on a supernatural origin, such as our cultural legacy, nihilists are skeptical. From a cosmic perspective, we are tiny specks in a vast universe–and often miserable to boot! Even our most important cultural icons and achievements will likely vanish with the eventual extinction of the species and the collapse of the solar system. ### 4. Naturalism *Naturalists* suggest that the meaning of life is to be found *within* our earthly lives. Even if life possesses no supernatural meaning, life itself may have inherent significance.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Things are not as bad as nihilists claim. Some naturalists argue that life—at least human life—has *objectively valuable* features, such as our intellectual, moral, and creative abilities.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) The meaning of life may be to develop these capacities and put them to good use.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Other naturalists are *subjectivists* about life’s meaning.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) *Existentialists*, for example, argue that life has no meaning until we *give* it meaning by choosing to live for something that we find important.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Critics (including nihilists and supernaturalists) argue that the naturalists are fooling themselves. What naturalists propose as sources of meaning *in* life are at best a distraction from life’s lack of ultimate or cosmic significance (if naturalism is true). What is the *point* of personal development and good works if we’ll all be dead sooner or later? Naturalists may respond that the point is in how these activities affect our lives and relationships *now* rather than in some distant, inhuman future.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Feeling sad or distressed over our lack of cosmic importance might be a kind of vanity we should overcome.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Some also question whether living forever would necessarily add meaning to life; living forever might be boring![\[20\]](#_ftn20) Having limited time may be part of what makes some of our activities and experiences so precious.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 5. Conclusion In Douglas Adams’ novel *The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy*, the supercomputer Deep Thought is prompted to discover “the meaning of life, the universe, and everything.” After 7 ½ million years of computation, Deep Thought determines that the answer is… *forty-two*. Reflecting on this bizarre result, Deep Thought muses, “I think the problem, to be quite honest with you, is that you’ve never actually known what the question is.”[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Adams may be wise to offer some comic relief.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Furthermore, given the various meanings of “meaning,” perhaps there is no single question to ask and thus no single correct answer. Tolstoy’s crisis is a reminder that feelings of meaninglessness can be distressing and dangerous.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) However, continuing to search for meaning in times of doubt may be one of the most meaningful things we can do.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Tolstoy (2005 \[1882\]). For discussion of Tolstoy’s rediscovery of meaning that extends his ideas beyond the specific religious outlook he adopted, see Preston-Roedder (2022). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For more detailed overviews of the meaning of life, see Metz (2021) and the entries on the meaning of life by Joshua Seachris and Wendell O’Brien in the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Ayer (2008) suspects the question is incoherent. For a response, see Nielsen (2008). For helpful discussion of the meanings of meaning, see Thomas (2019). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For discussion of meaning beyond humans (and agents), see Stevenson (2022). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Notice that purpose appears to be one type of value, as discussed in the preceding paragraph. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Nozick (1981) develops this point about purpose; Nozick (2008) offers the key points, too. In a different spirit, the ancient Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi (2013) provides some perspective on the advantages of being “useless” (having no purpose) and the dangers of being “useful.” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) On this proposal of the meaning of life as narrative, see Seachris (2009). A similar approach that emphasizes the notion of interpretation rather than story or narrative is proposed in Prinzing (2021). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) A starter list of life’s features that might lead one to tell such a story about life: war, poverty, physical and mental illness, natural disasters, addiction, labor exploitation and other injustices, and pollution. For more, see Benatar (2017). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Some, like Craig (2013), argue vigorously that life can have meaning *only* if supernaturalism is true. For further discussion and examples, see discussions of supernaturalism in Seachris, “The Meaning of Life: Contemporary Analytic Perspectives” and Metz (2021). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Landau (1997) and Setiya (2022), Ch. 6, for discussion of the origin of the phrase. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Nietzsche’s discussion of the “death of God” in *The Gay Science* (2001 \[1882\]) reflects these sorts of concerns. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For recent defenses of this view, see Benatar (2017) and Weinberg (2021). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See I. Singer (2009) for a wide-ranging naturalist approach. Wolf’s (2010, 2014) approach to meaning in life is one of the most widely accepted views amongst contemporary philosophers. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For a helpful discussion of the idea that some things might be objectively valuable, see [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Metz (2013) and P. Singer (1993) defend this sort of view of meaning *in* life. Transhumanists would argue that the best uses of our abilities will be those that help us overcome the problems, like disease and mortality, that beset humans and may transform us in substantial ways: perhaps we can achieve a natural form of immortality through technology! On transhumanism, see Messerly (2022). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Representative subjectivists include Taylor (2000) and Calhoun (2015). Susan Wolf’s works (2010 and 2014) develop a “hybrid” account of meaning that combines objective and subjective elements. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For classic expressions of this existentialist view, see Sartre (2021 \[1943\]) and Beauvoir (2018 \[1947\]). For a brief overview of existentialist philosophy, see [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis. For a more detailed, contemporary overview, see Gosetti-Ferencei (2020). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) On this point, see Nagel (1971), Nagel (1989), and “The Meanings of Lives” in Wolf (2014). For further discussion see Kahane (2014). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Marquard (1991); see Hosseini (2015) for additional discussion. Albert Camus makes a similar point, invoking the notion of “moderation,” at the end of *The Rebel* (1992 \[1951\]). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Williams (1973) gives the classic expression of this idea. For a brief overview of Williams’ argument, see [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/), by Felipe Pereira. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Of course, this outlook does mean that death can sometimes rob people of potential meaning, since death can be untimely. But death would not erase the meaningfulness of whatever one had already experienced or achieved. For arguments concerning whether death harms the individual who dies, see [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Adams (2017), Chapters 27-28. Asking a computer to give us the answer might also be a problem. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) For additional comic relief, see the film *Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life* (1983). Such playfulness may seem irreverent of these “deep” philosophical questions, but Schlick (2017 \[1927\]) argued that the meaning of life is to be found in play! [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) For discussion of crises of meaning and an introduction to psychological research on meaning in life, see Smith (2017). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) William Winsdale relates that the existential psychiatrist Viktor Frankl was once asked to “express in one sentence the meaning of his own life” (in Frankl (2006), 164-5). After writing his answer, he asked his students to guess what he wrote. A student said, “The meaning of your life is to help others find the meaning of theirs.” Frankl responded, “That is it exactly. Those are the very words I had written.” ### References [Adams, Douglas (2017). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/670/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-the-galaxy-the-illustrated-edition-by-douglas-adams/)[*The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/670/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-the-galaxy-the-illustrated-edition-by-douglas-adams/)[. Del Rey. Originally published in 1979.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/670/the-hitchhikers-guide-to-the-galaxy-the-illustrated-edition-by-douglas-adams/) [Ayer, A.J. (2008). “The Claims of Philosophy.” In: E.D. Klemke and Seven M. Cahn, eds. ](https://www.amazon.com/Meaning-Life-Reader-D-Klemke/dp/0195327306)[*The Meaning of Life, Third Edition*](https://www.amazon.com/Meaning-Life-Reader-D-Klemke/dp/0195327306)[. 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(2017). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/)[*The Power of Meaning*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/)[.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/) [Crown.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/) [Stevenson, Chad Mason (2022). “Anything Can Be Meaningful.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/05568641.2022.2079552)[*Philosophical Papers* ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/05568641.2022.2079552)[(forthcoming).](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/05568641.2022.2079552) [Taylor, Richard (2000). ](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529)[*Good and Evil*](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529)[. Prometheus. Originally published in 1970.](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529) [Thomas, Joshua Lewis (2019). “Meaningfulness as Sensefulness,” ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00063-x)[*Philosophia*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00063-x)[ 47: 1555-1577.](https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00063-x) [Tolstoy, Leo (2005). ](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html)[*A Confession*](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html)[. Translated by Aylmer Maude. Dover. Originally published in Russian in 1882.](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html) [Weinberg, Rivka (2021). “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have It, We Can’t Get It, and We Should Be Very, Very Sad,” ](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004)[*Journal of Controversial Ideas*](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004)[ 1(1), 4.](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004) [Williams, Bernard (1973). “The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality.” In: ](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621253)[*Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers, 1956-1972*](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621253)[. Cambridge University Press: 82-100.](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621253) [Wolf, Susan (2010). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters)[*Meaning in Life and Why It Matters*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters) ([Wolf’s lecture is also available at the Tanner Lecture Series website](https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_resources/documents/a-to-z/w/Wolf_07.pdf)). [— (2014). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us)[*The Variety of Values*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us) [Zhuangzi (2013). ](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-complete-works-of-zhuangzi/9780231164740)[*The Complete Works of Zhuangzi*](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-complete-works-of-zhuangzi/9780231164740)[. Translated by Burton Watson. Columbia University Press.](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-complete-works-of-zhuangzi/9780231164740) ### Related Essays [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Thai](https://philososerious.wordpress.com/2024/05/16/%e0%b8%84%e0%b8%a7%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a1%e0%b8%ab%e0%b8%a1%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a2%e0%b8%8a%e0%b8%b5%e0%b8%a7%e0%b8%b4%e0%b8%95-%e0%b8%9b%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%b0%e0%b9%80%e0%b8%94%e0%b9%87%e0%b8%99%e0%b8%84%e0%b8%b7/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/meaning-of-life.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Pianalto](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pianalto/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University. He is the author of *On Patience* (2016) and several articles and book chapters on ethics. [philosophy.eku.edu/pianalto](https://philosophy.eku.edu/pianalto) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** life's meaning, meaning in life, meaning of life, meaningful life, Pianalto --- ### [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) **Published:** March 24, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Kirk Lougheed Category: [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/ "Philosophy of Religion") Word Count: 1000 In the words of St. Anselm, God is *the being than which no greater can be conceived*. Philosophers have long wondered about what sort of world God is obligated to create given his status as the very best possible being. By *best being*, philosophers typically mean that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and wholly good. Given that God is the best being, some take it as obvious that *if* God creates any world, then it would have to be the very best possible world. Consider the following quick argument: As the very best being, God must choose the best option when one is available. There must be a best world available to create since if there were no such world, then God would lack a good reason for creating any particular world. So initially there is reason to believe that if God exists then God would create the very best world. While it might be an objection from the outset that God is not under any *obligation to create*, many philosophers assume that existence itself is a good. If this assumption is right, then God’s creating a world is better than his not creating.1 Many philosophers, including some who believe that God exists, find the claim that our world is the best world highly implausible. That is, it is obvious that our world is not the best world since it contains so much evil and suffering. It is easy to imagine a much better world than our world. But then, is it possible for God to exist if our world is not the best world? That is, if the quick argument above is successful, not only must God create, but God must create the very best world. If God did not create the best world, then the best being failed to do the best. So there is a tension between the claim that ‘God exists’ and the claim that ‘our world is not the best world.’ Theists, atheists, and agnostics have all offered a variety of responses to this problem. ### 1. The Problem One prominent response suggests that God could create a less-than-best world because for any world God could create, there could always a better world God could create.2 In contemporary philosophy of religion, this is known as *the problem of no best world*. For example, imagine that our world had one less violent human act, or one less tragic natural disaster. Or imagine that our world contained one more happy human. It is easy to imagine lots of different ways that this world might be improved. This line of thinking might entail that there is an infinite list of increasingly good worlds from which God can choose to create. On this scenario, while God is the best being, there is simply no best option to select. Thus, it can plausibly be argued that God would be justified in creating a less-than-best world provided that that world meets some minimum requirement of goodness for there simply *is no best world* for God to choose. So God can select any one of the sufficiently good worlds to create. There are worlds that are better than ours which God *could have created,* but all things considered, our world is still a good overall world. This response, if successful, would demonstrate that the existence of God is compatible with God creating a less-than-best world and thus would solve the problem of no best world. ### 2. The Moral Surpassability Objection Creation of a less-than-best world is problematic, however, because if God creates a world when there is a better world, then it is possible that God’s work is *morally surpasssable*.3 And as the best being, God is supposed to be morally unsurpassable. Note that this objection is not demanding that God do the impossible by creating the best world when there is no such world to create. Rather, it is pointing out that if there really is an infinite list of increasingly better worlds, then God’s creation is *always* going to be morally surpassable. Again, this result is supposed to be impossible if God is the best being. Where does this objection leave us? It entails that either God does not exist because God’s creative work could always be surpassed. Or it entails that this scenario cannot be true, and that God did in fact create the best world. But then we are back to being stuck with the highly counter-intuitive conclusion that our world, with all of its evil and suffering, is the very best world God could have created. ### 3. The Multiverse Hypothesis The idea that God creates a multiverse containing many isolated universes offers a unique solution to the problem of no best world. Recently, multiverse theories have gained respectability in the scientific community. Interestingly, considering the problem of no best world actually provides independent philosophical reasons for positing the existence of a multiverse. To avoid the claim that God created a unique best world – and that no better world exists – some theists posit that God created a multiverse containing all of the universes that meet some minimum requirement of goodness.4 Perhaps there is an infinite list of increasingly better universes. On this scenario, God creates all of the good universes and the entire multiverse can be considered the best possible creation. Our universe is just one among many that God creates and so the intuition that God could have created something much better is preserved on the multiverse scenario. The moral surpassiblity objection to God’s creation of world a less-than-best world is compelling. If God really is all-knowing, all-powerful, and wholly good, then it cannot be true that God’s creative work could be surpassed by an inferior being. Thus, the theist should posit that God creates a unique best world, or a multiverse that contains all of the sufficiently good universes. ### 4. Conclusion While these views are not without philosophical worries, they are promising ways for the theist to avoid the problem of no best world. If either of these positions is not convincing, then we are left with a powerful argument for atheism. ### Notes 1 There are more complex problems here about whether or not God is genuinely free, but I will not worry about them here. 2 See Myron A. Penner, “Divine Creation and Perfect Goodness in a no best world scenario,” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 59, no. 1 (2006): 25-47; and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World,” *Faith and Philosophy.* vol. 11 (1994): 260-268. 3 William Rowe. *Can God Be Free?* New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. 4 See Klaas, Kraay. “Theism and Modal Collapse,” *American Philosophical Quarterly.* vol.48 (2011): 361-372. ### References [Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Must God Create the Best?” *The Philosophical Review.* Vol.81, No. 3 (1972):317-332.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184329) [Basinger, David. “In What Sense Must God Be Omnibenevolent?” *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion* vol. 14 (1983):3-15.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00136948?LI=true) [Grover, Stephen. “Mere Addition and the Best of All Possible Worlds.” In *Religious Studies,* vol. 35 (1999): 173-190.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=88BF5A95CFFBB6D036949BA96F61B50D.journals?fromPage=online&aid=26955) [———. “This World, ‘Adams Worlds’, and the Best of All Possible Worlds.” In *Religious Studies.* vol. 39 (2003): 145-163.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=150793) [———.“Rival Creator Arguments and the Best of All Possible Worlds.” *Sophia: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics*. vol. 43, no. 1 (May 2004): 101-114.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02782440?LI=true) [Hasker, William. “Must God Do His Best?” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* Vol.16 (1984): 213-223.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00162667?LI=true) [Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Frances. “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World.” In *Faith and Philosophy.* vol. 11 (1994): 260-268](http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=faithphil&id=faithphil_1994_0011_0002_0260_0268) [Kraay, Klaas J. “Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.” *Philosophical Studies.* Vol 147 (2010):355-368.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-008-9289-y) [———. “Theism and Modal Collapse.” *American Philosophical Quaterly* Vol 48 (2011): 361-372.](http://www.ryerson.ca/~kraay/Documents/2011APQ.pdf) [Megill, Jason. “Evil and the Many Universes Response.” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*. Vol.70 (2011): 127-138.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-010-9280-3) Monton, Bradley. “Against Multiverse Theodices” *Philo.* Vol. 13, No. 2 (2010): 113-135. [Penner, Myron A. “Divine Creation and Perfect Goodness in a ‘No Best World’ Scenario.” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 59, no. 1 (2006): 25-47.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11153-005-2533-x?LI=true) [Rowe, William. *Can God Be Free?* New York, Oxford University Press, 2004.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/can-god-be-free-9780198250456?q=Can%20God%20Be%20Free&lang=en&cc=us) [Weinstock, Jerome A. “Must God Create the Best World?” *Sophia* Vol.14, Iss.2 (1975):32-39.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02804260?LI=true) [Wielenberg, Erik J. “A Morally Unsurpassable God Must Create the Best.” *Religious Studies* vol.40 (2004): 43-62.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=201305) ### Related Essays [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/ "The Problem of Evil") by Thomas Metcalf [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author Kirk Lougheed is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and D[irector of the Center for Faith and Human Flourishing](https://lcc.lt/research-at-lcc/cfhf) at [LCC International University, Lithuania](https://lcc.lt/). He is also a Research Associate in the [Philosophy Department](https://www.up.ac.za/philosophy#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Philosophy%20strives,science%20and%20history%20of%20philosophy.) at the [University of Pretoria](https://www.up.ac.za/). He specializes in African philosophy and the philosophy of religion and has serious interests in ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. [KirkLougeed.com](https://www.kirklougheed.com/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Philosophy of Religion --- ### [Divine Hiddenness: Do Some People Not Find God Because God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) **Published:** May 18, 2016 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** If God exists, then why do so many people have such a difficult time interacting with him? Perhaps the reason is not because God exists and is concealed, but because God does not exist. **Content:** Author: David Bayless Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Wordcount: 1000 If God exists, wants us to know him, and has the power to reveal himself to everyone, then why do so many people claim to not experience God or find what they consider a good reason to believe there’s a God? Why does God appear to be *hidden* from so many people? Perhaps the reason is *not* because God exists and is in some way concealed, but, instead, because God does not exist: that’s why some people who seek God do not find God. This reasoning is what’s called the “Divine Hiddenness Argument.” The argument maintains that God’s hiddenness is incompatible with his divine nature, so the fact that God seems hidden from many of us is best explained by the fact that God does not exist.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Here we’ll examine this type of argument and some of the most important responses to it. [!["Penitent Magdalene" is a 16th-century oil on canvas painting by Italian Baroque painter Caravaggio, created around 1594–1595.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/divine-hiddenness-e1749404392651.jpg?resize=650%2C645&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/divine-hiddenness.jpg?ssl=1)“Penitent Magdalene” is a 16th-century oil on canvas painting by Italian Baroque painter Caravaggio, created around 1594–1595. ### 1. The Argument The Hiddenness Argument begins with the common understanding that God, if he exists, is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The argument then claims that if God is all-loving, he would care deeply that his creatures believe that he exists. As a result, it would be unacceptable to God if any reasonable individuals failed to believe in him; a truly loving creator would want to form relationships with his creatures—which can’t happen if they are ignorant of his existence.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Also, God wouldn’t want anyone—reasonable or not—to die in a state of nonbelief, lest the departed miss their chance to go to heaven.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The final step is to observe that there are and have been people who philosopher J.L. Schellenberg calls “nonresistant nonbelievers”: reasonable people who are open to belief in God, and responsibly consider the evidence for God’s existence, yet do not believe in God. These considerations suggest an argument like this: 1. If God exists and is all-loving, then God would want people to know that he exists. 2. If God would want people to know that he exists, then this knowledge would not be difficult or impossible for people to attain. 3. But this knowledge *is* difficult or impossible for some people to attain: God *is hidden* from many reasonable people. 4. So, therefore, God doesn’t exist. To simplify: if God *did* exist, he would not be hidden in a way that results in many people reasonably believing that he does *not* exist; but there are such people, so God does not exist.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Even more simply put, God is *hidden* to many people when it seems he should not be. ### 2. Three Responses Let’s review some responses to this type of argument. #### 2.1. Denying Premise 1: Belief in God Doesn’t Matter One response involves arguing that God wouldn’t care whether people believe in him or not: a loving God would want what’s best for people, whether they believe he exists or not. People believing in God just wouldn’t matter for anything important: God’s insisting they believe *or else* would be petty. #### 2.2. Denying Premise 2: Hiddenness Promotes Some Greater Good A second response proposes that by concealing himself God might achieve some greater good that he couldn’t achieve if he were widely revealed.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) God might entice some people to more fervently seek him by *not* clearly revealing himself to them. [\[7\]](#_ftn7) God might hide himself to respect our autonomy as moral agents: if everyone were vividly aware of his presence, we might avoid wrongdoing out of fear of divine punishment, not a desire to do what’s right.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) These responses are dubious: if people finding God is good, it’s unclear why it would be better for people to find him after a chase instead of finding him more immediately. And many people do not find God after carefully seeking him, hence the Hiddenness argument. And we already know that we might be punished in various ways by the law and social condemnation. But that doesn’t undermine our autonomy, so it’s unclear why knowing that God might punish us would have that result either. So it seems unlikely that God couldn’t achieve whatever goods he desires while also making himself known; if he couldn’t do this, we might wonder why he lacked this seemingly possible ability.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) #### 2.3. Denying Premise 3: There Are No Nonresistant Nonbelievers A third response is to reject the claim that there are genuine “nonresistant nonbelievers,” and argue that such people must be guilty of ignorance, self-deception, negligence, or stubbornness, and so they aren’t *really* reasonable in not believing in God.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) This response is hard to accept. There seem to be reasonable people who do not believe in God, as anyone who has spoken with thoughtful, informed, and fair nonbelievers can attest. It is also unclear how the insistence that all such nonbelievers are unreasonable could be supported with strong evidence. #### 2.4. God’s Will Is Inscrutable A final general response submits that we finite creatures are in a poor position to discern the motives of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving creator.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Can a toddler guess why her parents take her to the doctor or daycare center? No, but the parents have good reasons for their actions, even though the toddler can’t understand them. This response claims we’re like toddlers relative to God, and so shouldn’t hope to understand why he hides himself from some of us. In response, although our understanding wouldn’t compare to God’s, that doesn’t mean we’re totally incapable of predicting that he would and should reveal himself. Our predictions are not always accurate, but they arguably can’t be *that* wide of the mark. And if we are so ignorant here, it’s hard to understand how people could be confident in *any* of their expectations about God. ### 3. Conclusion If there are seemingly reasonable people who do not find good evidence for God’s existence, that might weaken the claim that it’s rational to believe in God. In other areas of inquiry, when reasonable people seek but don’t find, that’s *some* evidence the thing they are seeking doesn’t exist.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) So the Hiddenness Argument is important to those who think they have found God, and those who find they haven’t. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Two other common names of this type of argument are the ‘Argument from Reasonable Nonbelief’ and the ‘Argument from Divine Hiddenness.’ This type of argument began with the work of J.L. Schellenberg. Schellenberg (2006, which is an updated version of his 1993 book) is his earliest presentation of a Hiddenness Argument. More developed versions of the argument are found in Schellenberg (2007) and Schellenberg (2015). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson. The Hiddenness Argument aligns with the traditional monotheistic understanding of God as *the greatest conceivable being*. St. Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109) focused on the the concept of God as the greatest conceivable being: see Anselm (\[1078\] 2001), p. 7 and [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman. It may be worthwhile to ponder if considering God not as *all*-loving, *all*-knowing, and *all*-powerful*,* but as *very*-loving, *very*-knowledgeable, or *very*-powerful makes any important difference to the argument. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Schellenberg (2006), pp. 38-40 and Schellenberg (2015), pp. 41-42 for elaboration of these points. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Theodore Drange emphasizes this in his Hiddenness Argument in Drange (1996). For discussion of arguments that most or all people would go to heaven, see [Hell and Universalism: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier. If people must (at least) believe that God exists to go to heaven, that so many people, present and past, have been part of religions that do not involve believing in God’s existence would be repugnant to an all-loving God. The uneven distribution of theistic belief throughout the globe is a sociological fact on which Stephen Maitzen builds a Hiddenness Argument in Maitzen (2006). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Hiddenness Argument is thus a version of the “Argument from Evil,” since people not believing in God is proposed to be an evil or bad thing, at least from many theistic perspectives, and thus there’s the question of why, if God exists, God would allow that to happen. To raise the issue another way, if God would create the best world he can, or even choose to create a world among the best worlds, and such a world would include all reasonable people believing in God, there’s the question of why in our world there are many reasonable people who do not believe in God. For discussion see, [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence that There is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf and [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) A similar response to the argument from hiddenness is given to the problem of evil, namely that we might not be in a position to reasonably discern whether there is or could be a greater good that would justify God allowing various types of evils: this type of response is called is known as “Skeptical Theism,” since *skeptics* deny that we have a type of knowledge. This is discussed in section “4. Evil Is No Evidence?” in Tom Metcalf’s [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is an approach derivable from various suppositions found in Pascal (\[1670\] 1995), e.g., that humans are “miserable” without God. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This sort of response is developed in Moser (2008), e.g., pp. 20-21. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Schellenberg (2015), pp. 109-112. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This response is pressed in Henry (2001) and Henry (2008). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For a representative presentation of this response, see McBrayer and Swenson (2012). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) That some people have religious and mystical experiences, and other people do not, is a central concern about whether such experiences justify religious beliefs. See [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson and [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner for discussion. On the general issue of how to respond to disagreements between seemingly reasonable people, see [The Epistemology of Disagreement: ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/)[How Should We Respond When People Disagree?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson. ### References [Anselm. ](https://hackettpublishing.com/religion/christian-thought/proslogion)[*Proslogion, with the replies of Gaunilo and Anselm*](https://hackettpublishing.com/religion/christian-thought/proslogion)[. Translated by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001: 1075-78. Originally published in 1078. ](https://hackettpublishing.com/religion/christian-thought/proslogion) [Drange, Theodore. “Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief.” 1996. Published on ](https://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore-drange-aeanb/)[*The Secular Web.* ](https://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore-drange-aeanb/) [He](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss1/6/)[nry, Doug. “Does Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?” ](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss1/6/)[*Faith and Philosophy*](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss1/6/)[ 18 (1), 2001: 75-92.](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss1/6/) [–– “Reasonable Doubts about Reasonable Nonbelief.” ](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol25/iss3/3/)[*Faith and Philosophy*](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol25/iss3/3/)[ 25 (3), 2008: 276-289.](https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol25/iss3/3/) [Maitzen, Stephen. “Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/divine-hiddenness-and-the-demographics-of-theism/72B11611F451036F23BED7CDBC349C93)[*Religious Studies* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/divine-hiddenness-and-the-demographics-of-theism/72B11611F451036F23BED7CDBC349C93)[42 (2), 2006: 171-191. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/divine-hiddenness-and-the-demographics-of-theism/72B11611F451036F23BED7CDBC349C93) [McBrayer, Justin and Swenson, Philip. “Skepticism about the Argument from Divine Hiddenness.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/scepticism-about-the-argument-from-divine-hiddenness/4D6B1DC29875B7A657ED4020BDAB3677)[*Religious Studies* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/scepticism-about-the-argument-from-divine-hiddenness/4D6B1DC29875B7A657ED4020BDAB3677)[48 (2), 2012: 129-150. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/scepticism-about-the-argument-from-divine-hiddenness/4D6B1DC29875B7A657ED4020BDAB3677) [Moser, Paul. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/elusive-god/8C09572E1F084E8E8134632DE75A8980)[*The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/elusive-god/8C09572E1F084E8E8134632DE75A8980)[New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/elusive-god/8C09572E1F084E8E8134632DE75A8980) [Pascal, Blaise. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261095/pensees-by-blaise-pascal-translated-with-an-introduction-by-a-j-krailsheimer/)[*Pensees*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261095/pensees-by-blaise-pascal-translated-with-an-introduction-by-a-j-krailsheimer/)[. tr. A.J. Krailsheimer. New York: Penguin Classics, 1995. Originally published in ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261095/pensees-by-blaise-pascal-translated-with-an-introduction-by-a-j-krailsheimer/)[1670.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261095/pensees-by-blaise-pascal-translated-with-an-introduction-by-a-j-krailsheimer/) [Schellenberg, J. L. ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801427923/divine-hiddenness-and-human-reason/#bookTabs=1)[*Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801427923/divine-hiddenness-and-human-reason/#bookTabs=1)[, with a New Preface](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801427923/divine-hiddenness-and-human-reason/#bookTabs=1)[. New York: Cornell University Press, 2006. Originally published in 1993. ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801427923/divine-hiddenness-and-human-reason/#bookTabs=1) [–– ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801478512/the-wisdom-to-doubt/#bookTabs=1)[*The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801478512/the-wisdom-to-doubt/#bookTabs=1)[. New York: Cornell University Press, 2007. ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801478512/the-wisdom-to-doubt/#bookTabs=1) [–– ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-hiddenness-argument-9780198733089?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-hiddenness-argument-9780198733089?cc=us&lang=en&)[. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-hiddenness-argument-9780198733089?cc=us&lang=en&) ### For Further Reading [Howard-Snyder, Daniel, et. al. (2022). “Hiddenness of God.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-hiddenness/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-hiddenness/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-hiddenness/) [Teeninga, Luke. “Divine Hiddenness Argument against God’s Existence.” ](https://iep.utm.edu/divine-hiddenness-argument-against-gods-existence/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/divine-hiddenness-argument-against-gods-existence/)[. ](https://iep.utm.edu/divine-hiddenness-argument-against-gods-existence/) ### Related Essays [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence that There is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed [Hell and Universalism: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner [The Epistemology of Disagreement: How Should We Respond When People Disagree?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson ### Revision History This essay was originally posted on [May 5, 2016](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/divine-hiddenness-please-see-updated-version/). It was revised and updated by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* and reposted on June 8, 2025. ### About the Author David Bayless, MD, holds BAs in physics and philosophy from the Samford University Fellows Program, and is a Resident in Internal Medicine at the Mayo Clinic School of Graduate Medical Education in Rochester, MN. His non-medical academic interests include philosophy of religion, social psychology, and the philosophy of dreaming. He believing that the study of philosophy and other humanities can enhance the quality of medical research and patient care. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [LinkedIn, ](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** evil, God, hiddenness --- ### [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) **Published:** April 7, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** Many people believe in God and understand God to be an omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and morally perfect being. But the world contains quite a lot of evil or badness: intense suffering, premature death, and moral wickedness. This inspires some questions: Why would God permit such evil? Is there a good reason why? Or does it occur in part because there is no God to prevent it? Asking these questions involves engaging with the Problem of Evil. The concern is whether evil provides a reason to disbelieve in God. There are four things one might say about evil, ranging from that it proves that God does not exist to that it provides no evidence at all against God’s existence. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 1000 Many people believe in God and understand God to be an omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and morally perfect being.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But the world contains quite a lot of *evil* or badness: intense suffering, premature death, and moral wickedness. This inspires some questions: Why would God permit such evil? Is there a good reason why? Or does it occur in part because there is no God to prevent it? Asking these questions involves engaging with *the Problem of Evil*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The concern is whether evil provides a reason to disbelieve in God. There are four things one might say about evil, ranging from that it *proves* that God does not exist to that it provides *no evidence at all* against God’s existence. This essay introduces these responses. [!["The problem of evil" by Natalie Ellen. Acrylics and collage on A3 paper. 2025.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/problem-of-evil-natalie-ellen-768x1024.jpg?resize=656%2C875&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/problem-of-evil-natalie-ellen.jpg?ssl=1)“The problem of evil” by Natalie Ellen. Acrylics and collage on A3 paper. 2025. ### 1. The Incompatibility Problem of Evil The ‘Incompatibility’ or ‘Logical’ versions of the Problem of Evil claim that evil’s existence is *logically incompatible* with God’s existence: believing in God and evil is like believing in a five-sided square, a contradiction.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Most philosophers today reject this argument.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) They think that God could have some sufficient reason to permit *some* evil: e.g., personal growth requires confronting challenges that inherently involve *some* evil or bad things. These defenses[\[5\]](#_ftn5) seem to show that it is not *contradictory* to believe in God and the existence of evil. ### 2. The Evidential Problem of Evil Other philosophers argue that the mere existence of evil does not *prove* that God does not exist, but that the facts about evil provide good *evidence* against God’s existence.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) There are probably billions of evils such that we do not know why God, if there is a God, would permit them. Many argue that if *even one* of these instances is *gratuitous*—i.e., God could have prevented it without thereby sacrificing an equal or greater good and without thereby permitting an equal or worse evil—then God does not exist.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Theists have reason to find an explanation or set of explanations that could plausibly justify all evils. This involves trying to find plausible *theodicies* or explanations of why God would permit that evil or why that evil is not as evidentially weighty as it might seem. Here’s a summary of two of the best theodicies. #### 2.1. Free Will Many theists hold that humans’ having *significant* free will is a very great good, one that is worth the evil that sometimes arises from it.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This being a plausible explanation of evil depends on justifying these claims: (a) we have *libertarian* free will[\[9\]](#_ftn9) (a belief that is mostly rejected by philosophers[\[10\]](#_ftn10)); (b) (e.g.) Stalin’s free will was more valuable than the lives of the millions he killed (against, presumably, their freely-willed choices to remain alive); (c) God must let us have not only our *decisions* but also the effects that *result* from them[\[11\]](#_ftn11); and (d) even apparently natural disasters and disease, including those that harm nonhuman animals[\[12\]](#_ftn12), are *all* the result (e.g.) of free-willed evil-spirits’ choices.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) #### 2.2. “Soul-Making” Perhaps encountering evil and freely responding to it develops various virtues, such as compassion, generosity, and courage.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) For this to explain evil, the theist may need to argue that: (a) God could not have developed those virtues in us any other equally valuable but less harmful ways (e.g,. by creating humans who are more morally sensitive in the first place and reducing evil accordingly); (b) all evil can reasonably be expected to contribute to soul-making; and (c) the compassion Smith develops when she sees Jones suffering justifies God using Jones (or allowing Jones to be used) as a *means to the end* of producing that compassion.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Given these and other theodicies, we must ask *how much* evidence evil provides, and weigh that against any evidence for God’s existence. This will obviously be very complicated. ### 3. Outweighing Evidence? Theists might argue that there is so much evidence *for* God’s existence that we are justified in being confident that God has a purpose for all evil.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) We cannot consider those arguments here, but we should recall how many billions of instances of severe, inscrutable evils there are in the world. Therefore, for this defense to work, perhaps there must be very strong evidence for God’s existence. Also, a substantial majority of philosophers reject theism,[\[17\]](#_ftn17) and so seem to believe that there is little good evidence for God’s existence. Therefore, this strategy may depend on appealing to a set of generally-rejected arguments to try to explain evil. ### 4. Evil Is No Evidence? Some defenses amount to the response that evil is *no* evidence against God’s existence at all. Some argue that we should not expect to understand why God would permit evil, and so we should not be confident in our ability to assess whether some evil is gratuitous.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) If there is a God, God might have a purpose for all the evil in the world, a purpose that we do not or cannot understand, and so we should not trust our doubt that some evil in the world is justified.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Typically, this inspires the question of whether a similar argument can be made about other beliefs we have, thereby threatening to produce a deep, *general* skepticism about science, morality, and even arguments *for* God’s existence.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) If God works in mysterious ways, how do I assess the likelihood that God has some inscrutable reason for tricking me into (wrongly) thinking that other minds exist, that the past exists, that an external world exists, and that I ought to save a child drowning in a shallow pond? This is perhaps the primary focus of the debate about the Problem of Evil in recent years. Finally, some philosophers argue that God’s existence is actually *compatible* with gratuitous evil after all,[\[21\]](#_ftn21) although most philosophers disagree.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ### 5. Conclusion If each particular evil is even a little bit of evidence against God’s existence, the billions and billions of them in history might really pile up. For many people, the problem of evil is not merely an abstract puzzle, for it challenges their most profound beliefs about what God is like and whether God even exists. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Anselm 1965 \[1077-78\]: ch. 2. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Problem of Evil involves engaging arguments *from* the existence of evil, or types of evils, *to* the conclusion that God does not exist. So the Problem of Evil is also called The Argument from Evil. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Mackie 1955. “Evidential” versions of the argument, discussed in the next section, typically focus on the totality of evil and can be seen as “Incompatibility” arguments also: the claim is that God’s existence entails that there are no *gratuitous* or *pointless* evils—evils God could have prevented it without thereby sacrificing an equal or greater good and without thereby permitting an equal or worse evil—but that there are such gratuitous or pointless evils, which is a logical contradiction. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Rowe 1979: 335. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) A “defense” is an attempt to explain why God and evil are not incompatible. Defenses are closely related to theodicies (two of which are presented below) which attempt to explain why God permits evil. Defenses and theodicies are different: defenses hold that there is some *possible* explanation, even if we’re not sure what it is, while theodicies attempt to supply that *actual* explanation. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Rowe 1979; Draper 1989; Tooley 2014: § 3.2.1. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder 1999. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Plantinga 1977: 29-59. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For an explanation of what *libertarian* free will is, see Jonah Nagashima’s [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/). Libertarians about free will (a view of which has no relation to the political position of the same name) believe that free choices are choices that are not causally determined by the past and the laws of nature (or anything else), and so they believe that determinism is false, yet that such choices are not ultimately random because *we* are the ultimate source of our choices. The other broad definition of free will is that of *compatibilist* free will. On this theory of free will, we can be *determined* to do what we do, yet our actions can still be done from *free will* if, e.g., we are doing what we want to do and acting on our own desires. This view of free will seems to allow that God could *cause* us to not act in horribly evil ways, and that we *freely choose* to never engage in these evils, and so the free will defense is not available to compatibilists. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Bourget and Chalmers 2014. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) So, e.g., Stalin might freely make the *choice* to kill someone, but whether the *effect* of that choice—that is, whether someone is actually killed—seems to be another matter. So, a question is whether, if there is a God, God could allow us to freely make *decisions* (which is assumed to be a great good), but prevent the very bad effects that *result* from some of them, and God be justified preventing those very bad effects. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Rowe 1979: 337. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Plantinga 1977: 58. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Hick 2007: 253-61. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) cf. Kant 1987 \[1785\]: 4:429; Trakakis 2008. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) cf. Rowe 1979: 338. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Bourget and Chalmers 2014. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder 1999: 115. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Wykstra 1998. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Draper 1998: 188; Russell 1998: 196-98. The general response to the Problem of Evil that we are not likely to know whether any evil is gratuitous or pointless is known as “Skeptical Theism,” since *skeptics* deny that we have a type of knowledge. A concern about skeptical theism is whether the motivations for it lead to or justify other types of skepticism. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) van Inwagen 2000; Kraay 2010. van Inwagen’s argument is complex and depends on the (controversial) claim that it can be permissible to allow *some* unjustified evils, e.g., that it could be permissible to allow someone to remain imprisoned for at least slightly longer than any just imprisonment because sometimes arbitrary lines must be drawn. From there, he appeals to something like a “little by little” argument (based on concerns about vagueness: see Darren Hibb’s [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/)). that if a little unjustified evil can be permissibly allowed, then a tiny bit more can be permissibly allowed, so then a little more can be allowed, leading to the conclusion that any unjustified evils can be allowed. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder 1999; Trakakis 2003. ### References [Anselm. (1965 \[1077-78\]). ](http://undpress.nd.edu/book/P00415)[*St. Anselm’s Proslogion*](http://undpress.nd.edu/book/P00415)[. Tr. M. J. Charlesworth. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.](http://undpress.nd.edu/book/P00415) [Bourget, David and David J. Chalmers. (2014). “What Do Philosophers Believe?” ](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7)[*Philosophical Studies*](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7)[, forthcoming.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7) [Draper, Paul. (1989). “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists.” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2215486?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[*Noûs*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2215486?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[ 23: 331-50.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2215486?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337) [———. (1998). “The Skeptical Theist.” In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), ](http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=20771)[*The Evidential Argument from Evil*](http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=20771)[. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 175-92.](http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=20771) [Hick, John. (2007). ](http://us.macmillan.com/evilandthegodoflove/JohnHick)[*Evil and the God of Love*](http://us.macmillan.com/evilandthegodoflove/JohnHick)[. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.](http://us.macmillan.com/evilandthegodoflove/JohnHick) [Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder. (1999). “Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[*American Philosophical Quarterly*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[ 36 (2): 115-30.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337) [Kant, Immanuel. ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB)[*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB)[. In Kant, Immanuel. ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB)[*Practical Philosophy*](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB)[. Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1999.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/practical-philosophy?format=PB) [Kraay, Klaas J. “Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.” ](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-008-9289-y)[*Philosophical Studies*](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-008-9289-y)[ 147 (2010), pp. 255-68.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-008-9289-y) [Mackie, J. L. (1955). “Evil and Omnipotence.” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2251467?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[*Mind*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2251467?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[ 64 (254): 200-12.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2251467?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337) [Plantinga, Alvin. (1977). ](http://www.eerdmans.com/Products/1731/god-freedom-and-evil.aspx)[*God, Freedom, and Evil*](http://www.eerdmans.com/Products/1731/god-freedom-and-evil.aspx)[. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.](http://www.eerdmans.com/Products/1731/god-freedom-and-evil.aspx) [Rowe, William. (1979). “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.” ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009775?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[*American Philosophical Quarterly*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009775?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[ 16(4): 335-41.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009775?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337) [Russell, Bruce. (1998). “Defenseless.” In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[*The Evidential Argument from Evil*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 193-205.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337) [Tooley, Michael. (2014). “The Problem of Evil.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/evil/)[*.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/evil/)[ (Spring 2014 edition).](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/evil/) [Trakakis, Nick. (2008). “Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?” ](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-008-0063-6)[*Sophia*](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-008-0063-6)[ 47: 161-91.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-008-0063-6) [———. (2003). “God, Gratuitous Evil, and van Inwagen’s Attempt to Reconcile the Two.” ](https://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30022097)[*Ars Disputandi*](https://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30022097)[ 3 (1): 1-10.](https://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30022097) [van Inwagen, Peter. (2000). “The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils.” ](http://www.andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Particular_Horrendous_Evils.pdf)[*Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*](http://www.andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Particular_Horrendous_Evils.pdf)[ 74: 65–80.](http://www.andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Particular_Horrendous_Evils.pdf) [Wykstra, Stephen John. (1998). “Rowe’s Noseeum Argument from Evil.” In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), ](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[*The Evidential Argument from Evil*](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337)[. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 126-50.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20009958?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103814702337) ### Related Essays [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibb ### Revision History This essay, posted 8/16/2020, is a revised version of an essay originally posted 4/7/2014. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/problem-of-evil.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** evil, God, metcalf --- ### [Ludwig Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/14/wittgensteins-private-language-argument/) **Published:** July 14, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Ian Tully](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Tully) Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/ "Philosophy of Mind and Language") Word Count: 1000 From roughly §243 to §315 in his *Philosophical Investigations,* the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) lays out what later commentators have dubbed “the private language argument.”1 Wittgenstein imagines a case roughly like the following: Suppose a person is stranded on a deserted island and has managed to bring along a diary. One day he decides (maybe in order to keep himself sane) to begin recording a mark – ‘S’ for example – in his diary whenever he experiences a certain sensation. Whenever the sensation occurs, he focuses his attention upon it (in effect, he tries to mentally ‘point’ to it) and marks ‘S’. Wittgenstein’s conclusion is that it is not possible to meaningfully use a term to refer to a private mental state in this way. Thus, there can be no *private language*. This essay briefly explains this argument. ![Wittgenstein](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/wittgenstein.jpg?resize=577%2C406&ssl=1) ### 1. Criteria for Correctness In brief, Wittgenstein’s complaint is that “in the present case \[the speaker has\] *no criterion of correctness.*..whatever is going to seem right to \[him\] is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.”2 In other words, in our desert island case there would be no criteria for determining when ‘S’ is used correctly, and when it is not. Two questions now present themselves. First, why must there be some ‘criterion for correctness’ in order for a sign to be meaningful? Second, why think that there are no such criteria in our desert island scenario? The first claim (that for a word to be meaningful one must be able to apply it correctly or incorrectly) seems very plausible. If it were the case that, no matter how I used a word, I could never use it incorrectly, then it would seem that the word had no meaning. For suppose you asked me what my word meant. Any answer that I gave you would be arbitrary; I could just as easily (and correctly) have chosen some other answer. So it would seem that there must be criteria of correctness for a word to be meaningful. What then could determine the content of our words, and so determine their correctness conditions? There are several possibilities. A natural place to start—and one which Wittgenstein spends a great deal of time investigating—is with the concept of a *rule.* Suppose that learning a word involves learning a rule which governs the use of that word. The rule might say, in effect, ‘use ‘S’ in these and only these situations’ or ‘use ‘S’ to apply to these and only these objects’. So, perhaps what provides the correctness conditions for our words are the rules that we learn when we learn the various expressions in our language. The trouble with this approach is that it only pushes the question back a step. As Scott Soames notes, “the problem . . is that such rules are themselves made up of words or symbols which must be understood if the rules are to be any use. Obviously this sort of explanation cannot go on forever.”3 In order to know how to follow a rule, we need to know what the rule *means*. A rule doesn’t carry its meaning on its face; it needs to be interpreted. But in order to do this we need to invoke yet more rules. It would seem, then, that internalized rules cannot play the role of criteria of correctness, on pain of infinite regress. So much for rules. But why not say that the man with the diary can appeal to his *belief* that he is now having the same sensation that he had when he originally marked ‘S’ in his diary in order to determine that he is using ‘S’ correctly? Why can’t the beliefs (or intentions) of a speaker determine when she is using an expression correctly and when she is not? The trouble is that beliefs, intentions, and other contentful mental states must—just like rules— get their content from somewhere, and so we run into the same regress problem that bedeviled appealing to internalized rules.4 ### 2. Wittgenstein’s Externalism The upshot seems to be that explanations of intentional phenomena need to bottom out in something non-intentional. We can’t use rules, or beliefs, or intentions, in order to explain meaning (content/correctness conditions) unless we are willing to explain the meaning of our rules, beliefs, or intentions in terms of still further rules, etc. Recognizing this fact, Wittgenstein turns to things outside the speaker’s head in order to ground content. More specifically, he thinks that we need to appeal to the practice and “customs” of our linguistic community.5 In other words, the meaning of a given word for a speaker of a language is determined by the pattern of its use in that speaker’s linguistic community, and a speaker uses a word incorrectly when her use is at variance with this pattern. Given this, Wittgenstein thinks there can be no (meaningful) private language. The reason should by now be clear. If I wanted to use a term to refer to some private mental state, what would be the criteria governing whether I used the term correctly or not? There would be no public criteria (since the state is private) yet all internal criteria have been ruled out. So, there would be nothing to determine when I used the term correctly and when I did not. So, the term would be meaningless.6 ### 3. A Worry Thus, Wittgenstein’s “community” view, which locates the determinants of content in the patterns of agreement in one’s linguistic community, is incompatible with private language. But here’s a worry for this view: suppose that everyone agrees that a certain shiny yellow metal is *gold.* Yet they’re wrong: it’s actually fool’s gold. Thus, when they use ‘gold’ to refer to this metal, they’re making a mistake; their term doesn’t apply in this case, even though everyone thinks it does. That would seem to show there’s something wrong with the community view, and perhaps open the door to private language after all.7 ### Notes 1 The sections in which later commentators have located Wittgenstein’s private language argument “\[do\] not contain a singular critique of just one idea, namely a private language,” but are instead organized as a somewhat loose collection of observations and remarks concerning a variety of issues (Candlish and Wrisley 2012: sec. 4.1). Thus, Wittgenstein’s argument requires a certain amount of reconstruction and interpretation. Whether the result is something Wittgenstein would recognize or endorse is up for debate. 2 Wittgenstein 1953: §258, my emphasis. 3 Soames 2003: 33 4 Soames 2003: 34. It is important to see that the problem with appealing to beliefs is *not* that our man with the diary might simply have a faulty memory and so not remember what his initial sensation, S, was like (and thus never be sure if his later sensations are the same as S or something new). Rather, the problem is that the content of his belief (namely, ‘this is the same sensation as S’) is itself made up of words (so to speak) which themselves would, if this picture is correct, require beliefs or intentions in order to determine their contents, and so on ad infinitum. 5 Wittgenstein 1953: §199. There is some controversy over whether this is really Wittgenstein’s considered view. See Candlish and Wrisley (2012), esp. sec. 4.1. 6 It is worth nothing that it is possible to draw a more skeptical conclusion from Wittgenstein’s remarks, as Saul Kripke does in his *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.* Kripke argues that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following provide grounds for a wide-ranging skepticism about meaning. The worry, very roughly, is that nothing about us determines that we mean *x* by a word rather than some other thing, *y*, for any rule which we might appeal to is subject to indefinitely many interpretations consistent with our past use of the term (Kripke 1982). For example, suppose I have never calculated the sum of two numbers greater than 57. Now I am asked: ‘what is 68 + 57?’ Applying the rule of addition, I answer ‘125.’ However, Kripke argues that everything about my psychological states and my past use of the term ‘+’ is consistent with my meaning *quaddition,* rather than *addition,* where the rule of quaddition states that if *x* and *y* are less than 57, they are added together in the normal way, but if *x* and *y* are greater than 57, their sum is 5. A full discussion of Kripke’s meaning-skepticism is beyond the scope of this article. 7 See Soames 2003: 39 ### References [Candlish, Stewart and Wrisley, George, “Private Language”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/private-language/>.](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/private-language/) [Kripke, Saul A. 1982. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Wittgenstein-Rules-Private-Language-Elementary/dp/0674954017/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1405341189&sr=8-1&keywords=Wittgenstein+on+Rules+and+Private+Language) [Soames 2003. *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 2: The Age of Meaning.* Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Analysis-Twentieth-Century-Volume/dp/0691123128/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1405341138&sr=8-2&keywords=Philosophical+Analysis+in+the+Twentieth+Century+Soames) [Wittgenstein 1953. *The Philosophical Investigations.* Tr. By G.E.M. Anscombe. N.J: Prentice Hall.](http://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Investigations-Ludwig-Wittgenstein/dp/1405159286/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1405341028&sr=8-1&keywords=philosophical+investigations) ### About the Author [Ian Tully](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Tully) is an Assistant Professor in the School of Nursing and Center for Global Health Ethics at Duquesne University. Prior to that he was a Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy and Mental Disorder at Johns Hopkins University’s Berman Institute of Bioethics. He completed his PhD in philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He is interested in ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of mind. [ianmtully.wixsite.com/iantullyphilosophy](https://ianmtully.wixsite.com/iantullyphilosophy) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Mind & Language **Tags:** Tully, Wittgenstein --- ### [Karl Marx's Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) **Published:** May 13, 2015 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** This essay focuses specifically on Marx’s theory of alienation, which rests on Marx’s specific claims about both economics and human nature. **Content:** Author: [Dan Lowe](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/lowe/) Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/ "Social and Political Philosophy"), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 1000 Karl Marx’s thought is wide-ranging and has had a massive influence, especially in philosophy and sociology. Marx is best known for his unsparing criticism of capitalism. His first major critique maintains that capitalism is essentially *alienating*. The second major critique maintains that capitalism is essentially *exploitative*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay focuses specifically on Marx’s theory of alienation, which rests on Marx’s specific claims about both economics and human nature. ![factories-at-asnieres-seen-from-the-quai-de-clichy-1887(1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/factories-at-asnieres-seen-from-the-quai-de-clichy-18871.jpg?resize=656%2C490&ssl=1) ### 1. Marx’s Analysis of Capitalism For Marx, the idea of the *means of production* is a crucial economic category. The means of production include nearly everything needed to produce commodities, including natural resources, factories, and machinery. In a capitalist economy, as opposed to a communist or socialist economy, the means of production are privately owned, as when a businessperson owns a factory. The key element *not* included as part of the means of production is labor.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) As a result, members of the capitalist economy find themselves divided into two distinct classes: those who own the means of production (the capitalist class[\[3\]](#_ftn3) or *bourgeoisie*) and those workers who do not (the *proletariat*). ### 2. Marx’s Concept of Species-Being For Marx, whether capitalism and its class-division is a suitable arrangement for human beings depends on human nature. Because humans are biological beings, and not merely free-floating immaterial minds, we must interact with and transform the natural world in order to survive.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But what distinguishes us from all other animals, like bees, spiders, or beavers, which all transform the world based on instinct, is that we transform the world consciously and freely.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Thus, the essence of a human being – what Marx calls our *species-being* – is to consciously and freely transform the world in order to meet our needs. Like many other philosophers, Marx believes that excellently doing what makes us distinctively human is the true source of fulfillment. ### 3. Alienation in Capitalist Society We can now make clear Marx’s claim that capitalism is alienating. The general idea of alienation is simple: something is *alienating* when what is (or should be) familiar and connected comes to seem foreign or disconnected. Because our species-being is our essence as human beings, it should be something that is familiar. To the extent that we are unable to act in accordance with our species-being, we become disconnected from our own nature. So if work in a capitalist society inhibits the realization of our species-being, then work is to that extent alienating.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) And since we are being alienated from our own nature, alienation is not merely a subjective feeling, but is about an objective reality. So how are workers alienated from their species-being under capitalism? Marx distinguishes three specific ways.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) A. Workers *are alienated from other human beings.* In a capitalist economy, workers must compete with each other for jobs and raises. But just as competition between businesses brings down the price of commodities, competition between workers brings down wages. And so it is not the proletariat who benefits from this competition, but capitalists. This is not only materially damaging to workers, it estranges them from each other. Humans are free beings and can cooperate in order to transform the world in more sophisticated and helpful ways. As such, they should see each other as allies, especially in the face of a capitalist class that seeks to undermine worker solidarity for its own benefit. But under capitalism workers see each other as opposing competition. B. *Workers are alienated from the products of their labor.* Capitalists need not do any labor themselves – simply by owning the means of production, they control the profit of the firm they own, and are enriched by it. But they can only make profit by selling commodities, which are entirely produced by workers.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Thus, the products of the worker’s labor strengthen the capitalists, whose interests are opposed to that of the proletariat. Workers do this as laborers, but also as consumers: Whenever laborers buy commodities from capitalists, that also strengthens the position of the capitalists. This again stands in opposition to the workers’ species-being. Humans produce in response to our needs; but for the proletariat at least, strengthening the capitalist class is surely not one of those needs. C. *Workers are alienated from the act of labor.* Because capitalists own the firms that employ workers, it is they, not the workers, who decide what commodities are made, how they are made, and in what working conditions they are made. As a result, work is often dreary, repetitive, and even dangerous. Such work may be suitable for machines, or beings without the ability to consciously and freely decide how they want to work, but it is not suitable for human beings. Enduring this for an extended period of time means that one can only look for fulfillment *outside of* one’s work; while “the activity of working, which is potentially the source of human self-definition and human freedom, is … degraded to a necessity for staying alive.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) As Marx puts it in a famous passage: \[I\]n his work, therefore, he \[the laborer[\[10\]](#_ftn10)\] does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside of work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) If Marx is right about all of this, then contemporary complaints about the degrading nature of work are not hyperbole. Insofar as capitalism prevents us from realizing our own species-being, it is, quite literally, dehumanizing. ### 4. Conclusion One may find great inspiration in the idea that true fulfillment can come from creative and meaningful work. Yet most people’s actual experience of work in capitalist economies is characterized by tedium, apathy, and exhaustion. Marx’s theory of alienation provides a conceptual framework for understanding the nature and cause of these experiences, and assures us that these subjective experiences are about an objective reality – and, crucially, a reality we can change. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) In general, Marx’s theory of alienation belongs to his earlier philosophy (the chapter “Estranged Labor” in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, an unfinished work that was unpublished at the time of his death), and his theory of exploitation belongs to his later philosophy (in *Capital*). It is a matter of scholarly debate to what extent this progression in his thinking represented a substantive change in his position, or merely a shift in emphasis. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) To keep things simple, I follow Marx in speaking of business being directed primarily at producing commodities. Of course, Marx was writing long before the development of an extensive service sector characteristic of late capitalism. Nevertheless, by tweaking some of the language, his general analysis can also be applied to service industries in capitalist economies. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In classical political economy, a “capitalist” is someone who owns the means of production–not merely someone who is in favor of capitalism. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This emphasis on biological embodiment distinguishes the Marxist conception of human nature from those which count rationality as the distinguishing feature of human beings — a feature which would equally apply to immaterial minds. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Or as Marx puts it, in quasi-Hegelian language, “Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just because of this that he is a species being.” Karl Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader* (ed. Tucker), p. 76. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Here we are focusing on whether workers – the proletariat – are alienated under capitalism. But Marx believes that the bourgeoisie experiences its own form of alienation: see Marx’s “Alienation and Social Classes” in *The Marx-Engels Reade*r (ed. Tucker). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Marx is usually interpreted as presenting *four* distinct ways in which workers are alienated under capitalism (see, e.g., Jonathan Wolff’s “Karl Marx,” section 2.3.), and there’s strong support for that within Marx’s own writing. When looked at in that way, the fourth form of alienation just is alienation from one’s species-being. But it is more perspicuous to think of the three ways as *constituting* workers’ alienation from their species-being, rather than being kinds of alienation *in addition to* alienation from species-being. I’m grateful to Jason Wyckoff for pointing out the heterodoxy of my interpretation. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Here we see the seeds of the second critique of capitalism that Marx would develop later: that it is exploitative. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Richard Schmitt, *Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction*, p. 154. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Marx almost always uses the masculine pronoun to refer to workers. For a discussion of applying Marx’s conceptual framework to women’s labor, both paid and unpaid, see Alison M. Jaggar’s *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*, especially chapters 4, 6, 8, and 10. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Karl Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader* (ed. Tucker), p. 74. ### References [Jaggar, Alison M. *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983.](http://www.amazon.com/Feminist-Politics-Nature-Philosophy-Society/dp/0847672549/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408323279&sr=8-1&keywords=jaggar+politics) [Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. *The Marx-Engels Reader* (ed. Robert C. Tucker). Second Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Marx-Engels-Reader-Second-Edition/dp/039309040X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408323247&sr=8-1&keywords=the+marx+engels+reader) [Schmitt, Richard. *Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. ](http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Marx-And-Engels-Reconstruction/dp/0813332834/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408323266&sr=8-1&keywords=schmitt+marx) [Wolff, Jonathan. “Karl Marx.” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. 2010.](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marx/) ### Related Essays [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/marx.pdf). ### About the Author [Dan Lowe](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/lowe/) is a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He earned a PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder and has a graduate certificate in Women and Gender Studies. He works on ethics broadly construed, political philosophy, and feminist philosophy. His current research is in naturalized moral epistemology and philosophical methodology in general. [sites.google.com/site/danlowe161](https://sites.google.com/site/danlowe161/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** alienation, Lowe, Marx --- ### [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) **Published:** August 4, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Jonathan Spelman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Spelman) Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/ "Social and Political Philosophy"), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 Is it better for there to be *many* people, all of whom have a relatively low quality of life, or for there to be only a *few* people, all of whom have a relatively high quality of life? Imagine that you are a government official who must choose between two policies that will bring about drastically different population outcomes. *Policy 1* will bring about a population, *A*, in which there is some number of people, each of whom lives a very high quality of life. *Policy 2* will bring about another population, *Z*, in which there are many more people, each of whom lives a very low but positive quality of life. A and Z are depicted in Figure 1: [![Fig 1](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-1.png?resize=500%2C159&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-1.png?ssl=1) Figure 11 Which policy, 1 or 2, should you choose if you want to bring about the better outcome? Most people think you should choose policy 1 because they think the existence of A is better than the existence of Z. Derek Parfit, however, presents several compelling arguments for the opposite conclusion, that you should choose policy 2 because the existence of Z is better than the existence of A.2 This essay outlines one of those arguments. ### 1. The Argument The argument for the conclusion that you should choose policy 2 begins by having us compare two populations, *A* and *A+*. As indicated above, A is made up of some number of people, each of whom lives a very high quality of life. A+ is made up of two groups of people, each of which is the same size as A. Everyone in the first of those groups, like everyone in A, lives a very high quality of life. Everyone in the second of those groups, however, lives a lower quality of life, though a quality of life that’s worth living. A and A+ are depicted in Figure 2: [![Fig 2](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-2.png?resize=233%2C250&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-2.png?ssl=1) Figure 23 Which population’s existence would be better, A’s or A+’s? Intuitively, A+’s existence would be better than A’s, for it has additional people whose lives are worth living. Therefore, we should accept: (P1) A+ is better than A. Next, we are to compare A+ to a third population, *Divided B*. Like A+, Divided B is made up of two groups of people, each of which is made up of the same number of people as A. Unlike A+, however, everyone in Divided B lives an equally good life, the quality of which is slightly better than the average quality of life in A+. A+ and Divided B are depicted in Figure 3. [![Fig 3](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-3.png?resize=300%2C242)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-3.png?ssl=1) Figure 34 Which population’s existence would be better, A+’s or Divided B’s? Intuitively, Divided B’s is better than A+’s, for although it doesn’t have anyone who is as well off as those in the first group of A+, it has a higher average quality of life than A+, a greater quantity of what makes life worth living than A+, and less inequality than A+. Therefore, we should accept: (P2) Divided B is better than A+. Finally, we are to compare Divided B to a fourth population, *B*. B is identical to Divided B except that it is undivided. Divided B and B are depicted in Figure 4. [![Fig 4](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-4.png?resize=250%2C243)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-4.png?ssl=1) Figure 45 Which population’s existence would be better, Divided B’s or B’s? Intuitively, B’s is as good as Divided B’s. Therefore, we should accept: (P3) B is as good as Divided B. If B is as good as Divided B, which is better than A+, which is better than A, then B is better than A. Thus, we should conclude: (C1) B is better than A. By the same line of reasoning, a fifth population, *C*, which is made up of twice as many people as B and in which everyone’s quality of life is more than half as good as everyone’s quality of life in B, is better than B (and therefore A). A, B, and C are depicted in Figure 5: [![Fig 5](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-5.png?resize=293%2C300)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/fig-5.png?ssl=1) Figure 56 As we move through the alphabet, we arrive at the conclusion that Z is better than Y (and therefore A). Thus, the same line of reasoning that leads us to (C1), that B is better than A, also leads us to the conclusion that Z is better than A and therefore that you should choose policy 2 over policy 1. ### 2. The Repugnant Conclusion One might think the lesson of the above argument is that a larger population whose members’ lives are worth living will always be better than a smaller one, but that’s not quite right. Instead, the lesson of the above argument is that a larger population whose members’ lives are worth living will be better than a smaller one provided that the degree to which it is larger is greater than the degree to which the quality of its members’ lives is worse. We can put the lesson of the above argument more concretely. Parfit, for example, concludes, “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living.”7 He calls this the *repugnant conclusion*. The repugnant conclusion gets its name from the fact that it’s hard to accept. Why is it hard to accept? Because although we can imagine a population of ten billion people, each of whom lives a very high quality of life, we cannot imagine another population, made up of people whose lives are barely worth living, being better than the former, no matter how many people there are in the latter. ### 3. Conclusion Given that the repugnant conclusion is hard to accept, many philosophers, including Parfit himself, attempt to resist it by arguing either that the above argument is unsound or that the same line of reasoning cannot get us all the way to the repugnant conclusion.8 Others, however, contend that such arguments are destined to fail.9 If they are correct, then we are forced to accept the repugnant conclusion, however repugnant it may be. ### Notes 1Arrhenius, Ryberg, and Tännsjö 2014. 2Parfit 1984: 419-441. 3Parfit 1984: 419. 4*Ibid*. 5*Ibid*. 6Parfit 1984: 388. 7*Ibid*. 8Feldman 1995, Hurka 1983, Locke 1987, Narveson 1967, Parfit 1986, Rachels 2001, and Temkin 1987. 9Huemer 2008 and Tännsjö 2002. ### References [Arrhenius, Gustaf, Jesper Ryberg and Torbjörn Tännsjö. “The Repugnant Conclusion.” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/repugnant-conclusion/>.](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/repugnant-conclusion/) [Feldman, Fred. “Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion.” *Utilitas* 7, no. 2 (1995): 189–206.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3365512&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S095382080000203X) [Huemer, Michael. “In Defense of Repugnance.” *Mind* 117, no. 468 (2008): 899-933.](http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/117/468/899.abstract) [Hurka, Thomas. “Value and Population Size.” *Ethics* 93, no. 3 (April 1983): 496-507.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2380627?uid=3739568&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104437658007) [Locke, Don. “The Parfit Population Problem.” *Philosophy* 62, no. 240 (April 1987): 131-157.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3528040&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0031819100063993) [Narveson, Jan. “Utilitarianism and New Generations.” *Mind* 76, no. 301 (January 1967): 62–72.](http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/LXXVI/301/62.full.pdf+html) [Parfit, Derek. *Reasons and Persons.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/reasons-and-persons-9780198249085?q=reasons%20and%20persons&lang=en&cc=us) [Parfit, Derek. “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.” *Applied Ethics.* Ed. Peter Singer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, 145-164.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/applied-ethics-9780198750673?q=applied%20ethics&lang=en&cc=us) [Rachels, Stuart “A Set of Solutions to Parfit’s Problems.” *Noûs* 35, no. 2 (2001): 214–238.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.00294/abstract) [Tännsjö, Torbjörn. “Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion.” *Utilitas* 14, no. 3 (November 2002): 339-359.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3372856&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0953820800003642) [Temkin, Larry. “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox.” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 16, no. 2 (1987): 138–187.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265425) ### Related Essays [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer ### About the Author [Jonathan Spelman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Spelman) is an assistant professor of philosophy at Ohio Northern University. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder, and he specializes in normative ethics and metaethics. When he’s not doing philosophy, he enjoys playing golf, taking photos, and spending time with his family. [JonathanSpelman.com](http://jonathanspelman.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** Parfit, repugnant conclusion, Spelman --- ### [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) **Published:** May 8, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to the concept of moral luck. **Content:** Author: [Jonathan Spelman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Spelman) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 1000 ### 1. Resultant Moral Luck While my brother and I were growing up, our father would tell us stories from his time as a police officer. One of those stories was about a teenager who fell asleep at the wheel, crossed over the center line, and hit an oncoming vehicle containing two passengers, an elderly couple, both of whom were killed in the crash. Years later, a friend of mine told me a similar story. Driving home one night, he fell asleep at the wheel, crossed over the center line, and hit an oncoming vehicle containing one passenger, a middle-aged woman. Though seriously injured, she survived. Given these details, you might be tempted to think that the teenager is *morally worse* than my friend because the results of his actions were *worse* than the results of my friend’s actions. If this is what you think, then you believe in the existence of *moral luck*, for you believe that how good a person is can depend on factors beyond one’s control (e.g., the safety features of the vehicle one hits, the physical condition of that vehicle’s passengers, whether those passengers are wearing seatbelts, etc.). In particular, you believe in the existence of *resultant moral luck* because you believe that how good one is can depend on the results of one’s actions, even when those results are beyond one’s control. ![Dice.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/dice..jpg?resize=656%2C343&ssl=1)Dice. ### 2. The Control Principle While you may initially have been tempted to regard the teenager as morally worse than my friend, after carefully considering that the results of my friend’s actions were better due to purely lucky factors, you might be willing to reevaluate the moral situation. You might then conclude that the teenager and my friend are moral equals, neither any relevantly worse than the other. Why are they moral equals? Because the only difference between them is attributable to factors *beyond their control*. If this is what you think, then you do not, in fact, believe in the existence of resultant moral luck. In “Moral Luck,” Thomas Nagel describes the motivation for denying the existence of moral luck. He writes, “Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control.”1 We’ll call this principle, that how good one is cannot depend on factors beyond one’s control, the *control principle*. As Nagel admits, the control principle is quite plausible. We do not think that how good one is depends on factors beyond one’s control. There is a worry, however, that everything about a person depends on factors beyond her control, in which case moral assessment turns out to be impossible. To see how one might arrive at that conclusion, we’ll look at three other potential species of moral luck, namely circumstantial, constitutive, and causal moral luck. ### 3. Circumstantial Moral Luck Whereas resultant moral luck exists if how good one is can depend on the results of one’s actions, even when those results are due to factors beyond one’s control, *circumstantial moral luck* exists if how good one is can depend on how one acts, even when how one acts is due to factors beyond one’s control. For example, imagine that two married women are drinking at a bar. Both find the bartender attractive, and each is willing to cheat on her husband with the bartender. The bartender, however, is only interested in one of them. Thus, only one of the two women cheats. Intuitively, those who cheat are worse than those who don’t, but in cases like this one, whether an individual cheats depends on factors beyond his or her control. Thus, if those who cheat are worse than those who don’t, circumstantial moral luck exists. ### 4. Constitutive Moral Luck *Constitutive moral luck* exists if how good one is can depend on one’s character traits, even when one’s character traits are due to factors beyond one’s control. For example, although violent criminals seem worse than upstanding citizens, it’s plausible to think that whether one is a violent criminal or an upstanding citizen depends on one’s genes and the environment in which one is raised. Moreover, if that’s correct, then whether someone is a violent criminal or an upstanding citizen is due to factors beyond his or her control. Thus, if violent criminals are, in fact, worse than upstanding citizens, then constitutive moral luck exists. ### 5. Causal Moral Luck *Causal moral luck* exists if how good an individual is can depend on anything about that individual despite the fact that everything about him or her is ultimately attributable to the laws of nature and antecedent circumstances. The position that everything about us is attributable to the laws of nature and antecedent circumstances is known as *determinism*. There is philosophical controversy regarding the compatibility (or incompatibility) of determinism and *free will.* Regardless of this philosophical controversy, it does seem as though if determinism is true, everything about us is ultimately beyond our control. ### 6. The Problem of Moral Luck and Potential Solutions By this point, it should be clear that the control principle is incompatible with the way we practice moral assessment. This is the problem of moral luck. There are two popular responses to this problem. First, there are those who would have us reject the control principle in order to preserve the way we practice moral assessment.2 Second, there are those who would have us alter the way we practice moral assessment in order to preserve the control principle.3 If neither of those options seems plausible, one could give up on the possibility of moral assessment altogether or embrace a revisionist solution. Bernard Williams, for example, recommends that we draw a distinction between two kinds of assessment, moral and ethical. While affirming the truth of the control principle on which people cannot be *morally* assessed for what is due to factors beyond their control, Williams argues that people can yet be *ethically* assessed for what is due to factors beyond their control. Furthermore, he contends that ethical assessment is the more important of the two kinds of assessment.4 Although none of these solutions seems entirely satisfactory, one of them must be correct. ### Notes 1 Nagel 1976, 138. 2 For examples of this response, see Adams 1985, Walker 1991, Wolf 1993, and Fischer and Ravizza 2000. 3 For examples of this response, see Richards 1986, Sverdlik 1988, Zimmerman 2002, and Enoch and Marmor 2007. 4 Williams 1993. ### References [Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Involuntary Sins.” *The Philosophical Review* 94, no. 1 (1985): 3-31.](http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198501)94:1%3C3:IS%3E2.0.CO;2-L) [Enoch, David and Andrei Marmor. “The Case against Moral Luck.” *Law and Philosophy* 26, no. 4 (July 2007): 405-436.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/27652623?uid=3739568&uid=2134&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103707376351) [Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza. *Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.](http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/philosophy/political-philosophy/responsibility-and-control-theory-moral-responsibility) [Nagel, Thomas. “Moral Luck.” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 50 (1976): 137-151.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4106826?uid=3739568&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103707376351) [Richards, Norvin. “Luck and Desert.” *Mind* 95, no. 378 (April 1986): 198-209.](http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/XCV/378/198.extract) [Sverdlik, Steven. “Crime and Moral Luck.” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (January 1988): 79-86.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20014225?uid=3739568&uid=2134&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103707376351) [Walker, Margaret Urban. “Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency.” *Metaphilosophy* 22, nos. 1-2 (January 1991): 14-27.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1991.tb00808.x/abstract) [Williams, Bernard. “Postscript.” *Moral Luck*. Ed. Daniel Statman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. 251-258.](http://www.sunypress.edu/p-1656-moral-luck.aspx) [Wolf, Susan. *Freedom Within Reason*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/freedom-within-reason-9780195085655?q=freedom%20within%20reason&lang=en&cc=us) [Zimmerman, Michael J. “Taking Luck Seriously.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 99, no. 11 (November 2002): 553-576.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3655750?uid=3739568&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103707376351) ### Related Essays [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost [Ignorance and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller ### About the Author [Jonathan Spelman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Spelman) is an associate professor of philosophy at Ohio Northern University. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado Boulder, and he specializes in normative ethics and metaethics. When he’s not doing philosophy, he enjoys playing golf, taking photos, and spending time with his family. [JonathanSpelman.com](http://jonathanspelman.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** luck, Spelman --- ### [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) **Published:** March 7, 2016 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** Abortion involves the intentional killing of a being that is biologically human. Killing "human beings" is often deeply wrong, so is abortion wrong? If so, when? And why? **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 Abortion involves the killing of a fetus to end a pregnancy. These fetuses are *human*, biologically.[1](#_ftn1) It seems that fetuses are *beings*, although completely dependent beings: what else would they be? So, abortion involves the killing of *a being that is biologically human*. Killing *human beings* is often deeply wrong, so is abortion wrong? If so, when? And w*hy*? Here we will review some influential philosophical answers to these questions. ![morning-sun](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/morning-sun.jpg?resize=656%2C459&ssl=1) ### 1. Human Organisms? Fetuses are not just biologically alive. And they aren’t just biologically human either, like skin cells or organs. They are *biologically human organisms*. Some thinkers argue that *our* being human organisms physically continuous with fetuses that were human organisms makes abortion wrong.[2](#_ftn2) They seem to argue that since it is wrong to kill us *now*, i.e., we have properties that make it wrong to kill us *now* (*prima facie* wrong to kill: wrong unless extreme circumstances justify the killing), it was wrong to kill us at *any* stage of our development, since we’ve been the same organism, the same being, throughout our existence. While this argument is influential in some circles, it is nevertheless dubious. You are likely over three feet tall now, but weren’t always. You can reason morally, but couldn’t always. You have the right to make autonomous decisions about your own life, but didn’t always. Many examples show that *just because* we have some characteristic, including a moral right *now,* that doesn’t entail that we (or our bodies?) have always had that characteristic or right. This argument’s advocates need to plausibly explain why that’d be different with, say, the right to life.[3](#_ftn3) ### 2. (Human) Persons? We, readers of this essay, are human organisms (unless there are any divine or extraterrestrial readers!), and it is *prima facie* wrong to kill us. Is the reason why it wrong to kill us *because* we are human organisms? Perhaps not. It is wrong to kill us, arguably, because killing us prevents us from experiencing the goods of our future: accomplishments, relationships, enjoying our lives and so on, which is distinct from being a human organism. Many philosophers describe these capacities needed for experiencing our lives, present and future, in terms of us being *persons*.[4](#_ftn4) A theory present from at least the time of John Locke can be expressed roughly as: *persons are beings with personalities*: persons are conscious beings with thoughts, feelings, memories, anticipations and other psychological states. (When some people insist that fetuses aren’t *human beings*, they might be claiming that they are not human *persons*). If we die or even become permanently comatose, we cease to be persons, since we permanently lose consciousness. This theory of personhood has explanatory power: it helps us understand *why* we are persons and *how* we (or our bodies) can cease to be persons. It justifies a growing belief that some non-human animals are (non-human) persons. It explains why rational space aliens, if there are any, would be (non-human) persons. It explains why divine or spiritual beings are or would be (non-human) persons. On this theory of personhood, beginning fetuses are not persons. This is because their brains and nervous systems aren’t sufficiently developed and complexly interconnected enough for consciousness and personhood. The medical and scientific research reports that this developmental stage isn’t reached until after the first trimester, or, more likely, until mid-pregnancy.[5](#_ftn5) Nearly all abortions occur very early in pregnancy, killing fetuses that are not yet conscious, and so are not yet persons on this theory of personhood. Any later abortions, affecting conscious and feeling fetuses who are persons or close to it, however, would likely be wrong on this theory unless done for a justifying medical reason. ### 3. Potential Personhood? But just because something (or someone) is *not* a person, that doesn’t obviously mean that it is *not* wrong to kill it. If fetuses aren’t persons, they are still *potential* persons. (And *merely potential persons* are never *actual persons*). Does that potential give fetuses, say, the right to life or otherwise make it wrong to kill them? If *potential things* have the rights of *actual things*, then potential adults, spouses, criminals, doctors, and judges would have the rights of actual ones. Since they don’t, it is plausible that *potential personhood* doesn’t yield the rights of *actual personhood*. At least, we are due an explanation of why it would, since potentiality never does that for anything else. ### 4. Valuable Futures? Abortion might seem to prevent a fetus from experiencing its valuable future, *just like* killing us does, even if it is not yet a person.[6](#_ftn6) But our futures might be valuable, in part, because we can, presently, look forward to them. Fetuses have no awareness of their futures whatsoever, and this is one important difference between their futures and our futures. Further, an *egg-and-a-sperm-that-would-fertilize-it* arguably has a future akin to that of a fetus. Contraception (even by abstinence!) keeps this future from materializing.[7](#_ftn7) But contraception and abstinence aren’t wrong. Thus, it is not wrong to perform some action that prevents such a future from materializing. ### 5. The Right to Life? Finally, suppose all fetuses are indeed persons with the right to life. Does that make abortion wrong? Not necessarily, Judith Thomson famously argued in her 1971 “A Defense of Abortion.”[8](#_ftn8) If I must use your kidney to stay alive, do I have a *right* to your kidney? No, and you don’t violate my rights if you don’t let me use it and I die. This shows that the right to life is not a *right to the bodies of others, even if those bodies are necessary for our lives to continue*. Fetuses, then, might not have a right to the pregnant woman’s body and so she doesn’t violate their rights by not allowing a fetus to use it. If so, abortion wouldn’t violate any rights of fetuses and so it might be permissible. ### 6. Conclusion The philosophical issue of the moral status of abortion is complex: these are just a few philosophical arguments on the issue. Each argument, and many others, are worthy of further discussion and reasoned debate.[9](#_ftn9) ### Notes [1](#_ftnref1) Unless we are doing veterinary ethics and are thinking about aborting feline or canine or other non-human fetuses. [2](#_ftnref2) This argument is developed in Beckwith (2007), and in George and Tollefsen (2008). This presentation here is based on Beckwith’s emphasis that fetuses and the adults they often later become are the “same being.” These arguments, however, can be interpreted in a more complex way, in which we understand them as arguing that having rights, or the properties that result in having rights, is *essential* to living human organisms, and that *we are, in essence, living human organisms* (and not, in essence, say, either minds or souls), and so we have rights whenever living human organisms exist (and so since a fetus and the later adult are the “same being” they have rights whenever they exist). This more sophisticated argument is not discussed here. [3](#_ftnref3) This response is developed in Boonin (2003) and in Nobis (2011) [4](#_ftnref4) This influential theory of personhood is developed in Warren (1973). [5](#_ftnref5) Lee, Susan J., et al. (2005) and Benatar and Benatar (2001) [6](#_ftnref6) This argument is developed in Marquis (1989). [7](#_ftnref7) For development of these arguments, see Norcross (1990). [8](#_ftnref8) Thomson (1971) [9](#_ftnref9) While abortion is, of course, a controversial issue, it is worth noting that 82% of professional philosophers surveyed “accept or lean towards” believing that first-trimester abortions are generally permissible, whereas 13% “accept or lean towards” believing they are impermissible. For philosophers who specialize in applied ethics, those numbers shift to 86% and 11%. See the 2020 PhilPapers Survey. A question is what explains these results: do philosophers tend to have these views about abortion because they better understand the issues and have trained abilities to rigorously evaluate ethical arguments? Or are these results better explained by something else? ### References [Beckwith, Francis J. *Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice*. Cambridge University Press, 2007](http://www.cambridge.org/US/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/american-government-politics-and-policy/defending-life-moral-and-legal-case-against-abortion-choice) [Benatar, David, and Michael Benatar. “A Pain in the Fetus: Toward Ending Confusion about Fetal Pain.” *Bioethics* 15 (2001): 57-76](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8519.00212/abstract) [Boonin, David. *A Defense of Abortion*. Cambridge University Press, 2003](http://www.amazon.com/Defense-Abortion-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521520355) [George, Robert P. and Christopher Tollefsen. *Embryo: A Defense of Human Life.* Doubleday, 2008](http://www.amazon.com/Embryo-A-Defense-Human-Life/dp/0385522827) [Lee, Susan J., et al. “Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence.” *Jama* 294.8 (2005): 947-954](http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=201429&resultclick=1) [Marquis, Don. “Why Abortion is Immoral.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 86.4 (1989): 183-202](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026961?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Nobis, Nathan. “Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith’s Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice.” *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 36.3 (2011): 261-273](http://jmp.oxfordjournals.org/content/36/3/261.long) [Norcross, Alastair. “Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis.” *The Journal of Philosophy* (1990): 268-277](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026835?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Philpapers. (N.d.). Survey results: Philosophical questions ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4974) [Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A Defense of Abortion.” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (1971): 47-66](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265091?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Warren, Mary Anne. “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” *The Monist* (1973): 43-61](http://monist.oxfordjournals.org/content/57/1/43) ### Related Essays [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/ "Personal Identity") by Chad Vance [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Animalism and Personal Identity: ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/)[Are We Animals?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/ "The Badness of Death") by Duncan Purves [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/ "The Non-Identity Problem") by Duncan Purves [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/ "Applied Ethics") by Chelsea Haramia [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/abortion-ethics.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is the author of *[Animals & Ethics 101](http://www.animalethics101.com/)*, co-author of *[Thinking Critically About Abortion](http://www.abortionarguments.com/)*, a co-author of *[Chimpanzee Rights](https://www.routledge.com/Chimpanzee-Rights-The-Philosophers-Brief-1st-Edition/Andrews-Comstock-GKD-Donaldson-Fenton-John-Johnson-Jones-Kymlicka-Meynell-Nobis-Pena-Guzman-Sebo-Gruen-Wise/p/book/9781138618664),* and author or co-author of many other articles, chapters, and reviews in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** abortion, bioethics, medical ethics, Nobis --- ### [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science: Comparing Philosophical and Scientific Understanding](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) **Published:** February 13, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Philosophy and science are both ways of learning about ourselves and the world. Here we’ll review the two main perspectives on the question of whether and to what degree science and philosophy overlap in their methods and their sources of knowledge. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/thomas-metcalf/ "Thomas Metcalf")Category: [Metaphilosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphilosophy/ "Metaphilosophy"), [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/)[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/thomas-metcalf/ "Thomas Metcalf")Word Count: 994 Philosophy and science are both ways of learning about ourselves and the world. Here we’ll review the two main perspectives on the question of whether and to what degree science and philosophy overlap in their methods and their sources of knowledge. We’ll start with what has historically been the most dominant view of the nature of philosophy:[\[1\]](#_ftn1) let’s call this view ‘*rationalism.*’[\[2\]](#_ftn2) After looking at this traditional perspective, we’ll review a more recent view of what philosophy is or should be: ‘*naturalism*.’ ![philosophy-science-009](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/philosophy-science-009.jpg?resize=460%2C276&ssl=1) ### 1. The Traditional View: Rationalism According to *rationalism* about philosophy itself, most or all of our characteristically philosophical beliefs are formed and justified independently of sensory observation, i.e., *a priori*, or just by *thinking* about the issues. If you know some fact *a priori,* then you know it independently of, or prior to, any kind of *empirical*, or sensory-based, or perceptual observation of that fact:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) e.g., we know *a priori* that all even numbers are exactly divisible by two; we don’t need to perform scientific experiments to learn that fact. In contrast, to know whether the number of planets in the solar system is even, *a priori* investigation wouldn’t be enough: we need *empirical* or sensory- or experience-based information.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) If we think that characteristically philosophical beliefs may be justified or known *a priori* (if and when they are justified or known), then this will tell us a lot about the differences between science and philosophy. Here’s a summary of a way we could draw the contrasts: - Science is about empirical knowledge; philosophy is often about that but is also about *a priori* knowledge (if it exists). - Science is about *contingent* facts or truths; philosophy is often about that but is also about *necessary* truths (if they exist).[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - Science is about *descriptive* facts; philosophy is often about that but is also about *normative* and *evaluative* truths (if such truths exist). - Science is about physical objects; philosophy is often about that but is also about *abstract* objects (if they exist). To explain these contrasts, *contingent* facts are facts that are actually the case, but they didn’t have to be: they could have been otherwise: *necessary* truths are true claims that *must* be true. *Descriptive* facts are about how things actually *are*; *normative* and *evaluative* truths are about how things *should* or *shouldn’t* be and their goodness and badness. Physical objects are—well, that’s not easy to describe, but perhaps they’re objects that are made of matter and have locations in space and time; *abstract* objects, if they exist, are somehow not in the physical universe.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Notice the recurrence of the word “also” above. Philosophy often *is* about empirical knowledge of contingent, descriptive, and physical facts; it’s just that those are chiefly the focus of science. And notice the recurrence of the parenthetical “if they exist”; some philosophers have denied the existence of *a priori* knowledge;[\[7\]](#_ftn7) of necessary truths;[\[8\]](#_ftn8) of normative truths;[\[9\]](#_ftn9) and of abstract objects.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) This approach to contrasting philosophy with science is supported by examining the traditional definition of the scope of philosophy. Philosophy is often thought to have three main sub-areas: *metaphysics* (the nature, structure, and contents of reality), *epistemology* (the nature and scope of knowledge and evidence), and *ethics* (good, bad, right, and wrong), generally speaking.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) If that’s accurate, then that fits very well with the description of rationalism above. Metaphysics is largely about necessary truths and abstract objects.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Epistemology is about the arguably normative and evaluative questions of what we should believe: what are we justified in believing, what do we know, and is knowledge better than true beliefs?[\[13\]](#_ftn13) And ethics is clearly normative: it’s about evaluative questions of good and bad and right and wrong.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) And if there is any knowledge or justified belief about these issues, this is *a priori*; there’s no need to run scientific experiments in laboratories, and it’s not clear what such experiments could be. ### 2. A Newer Perspective: Naturalism The word ‘naturalism’ is used in many ways in philosophy: here we are addressing what can be called ‘metaphilosophical’ naturalism.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) This means that this theory is a naturalism about *philosophy itself*, not merely about some philosophical issue or topic: it’s a philosophical view of philosophy itself. The word “naturalism” also gives us a clue about what the theory says: it says that there’s some strong connection between philosophy and the natural and social sciences. This could mean, e.g., that scientific observations, such as from neuroscience or cosmology, are relevant to traditional philosophical concerns. Most philosophers agree that science can have important things to say about philosophical issues, and some even argue that philosophy should largely be *replaced* by empirical science: e.g., perhaps we should simply believe all and only what our best scientific theories tell us about reality, and if they don’t say anything about some traditional philosophical concern, then we won’t say anything about that, either.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) This kind of view can also be called ‘naturalism.’ If we accept something like naturalism as defined in either of these ways, then it will be more difficult to define philosophy simply by contrasting it with science. But, in the bulleted list above, if we simply replace each occurrence of philosophy “is also about” with ‘traditionally, “philosophy” has been *more about*,’ we’ll end up with something that nearly all philosophers would agree with, including naturalists. Naturalists believe that we should use science to investigate traditionally philosophical questions, but most would admit that their position is relatively new on the scene.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) They acknowledge that philosophers have traditionally understood their subject matter as pursued primarily through the use of intellect, conceptual investigation, logic, and intuition. ### 3. Conclusion The sorts of topics studied in philosophy classes are definable, in general, by contrasting them with the topics and methods of the natural and social sciences. Are philosophical issues ultimately suited to *a priori* inquiry, or are they instead more appropriately considered the objects of scientific observation? Understanding how rationalists and naturalists answer this question, and comparing their insights and methods in justifying their answers, can help us understand and develop our own philosophy of philosophy. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For more on how to define and characterize philosophy itself, see [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The word “rationalism” is used in many different ways, not only in philosophy. But this label strikes me as best; “intuitionism” would commit to a stronger claim; “nonnaturalism” also suggests stronger claims and isn’t inherently very informative; and “apriorism” would be confusing. Beyond this, some rationalists have argued influentially that non-rationalistic philosophy is self-defeating (BonJour 1998: ch. 1; Bealer 1996; Huemer 2017). If there is even a minimally convincing case to be made for this conclusion, then this is further reason to suggest that philosophy itself is fundamentally a priori in an important way. We may affirm this conclusion without going so far as to say that one must assume the truth of rationalism in order to acquire philosophical knowledge. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) That doesn’t mean that we can know something *a priori* without making any kind of observation at all; we might have to use our eyes to discover what various colors look like. But some philosophers say that once we have the concepts of red and green, for example, we can know *just by thinking* that nothing can be all red and all green at the same time (cf. BonJour 1998: 2). You know it just by *thinking* about it; or just because when you consider the idea of something all red and all green, it just *seems* impossible; or just because you can’t even begin to *imagine* such an object. Note that strictly speaking, *a priori* learning may not require “thinking.” For example, if I see “1=1” written somewhere, I instantly realize that the equation is true, and I don’t really have to *think* much about it. But the “just by thinking about it” explanation is typically accurate of *a priori* knowledge. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For more on this distinction, see the entry [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For an explanation of the distinction between contingent and necessary truths, see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Cf. Plato 1997, bks. V-VII. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Quine 1961: 43. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Quine 1969: §§ 1-4. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Cf. Ridge 2013. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Cf. Loux 2006: ch. 2; Armstrong 2002. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For more on this taxonomy and more examples, see [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Loux 2006. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) BonJour 2002: ch. 10; Huemer 2002; but contrast Kornblith 2002 and Goldman 1986. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Cf. Huemer 2005: ch. 4; Ridge 2013. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Quine 1969; Goldman 1986; Kornblith 2002; cf. Papineau 2013. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See e.g. Papineau 2013. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Papineau 2013. ### References [Armstrong, D. M. 2002. *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*. London and New York: Routledge.](http://www.amazon.com/Materialist-Theory-International-Library-Philosophy/dp/0415100313/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390082985&sr=8-1&keywords=A+Materialist+Theory+of+the+Mind) [Bealer, George. 1996. “On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 10: 1-34.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2216234) [BonJour, Laurence. 1998. *In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification*. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Defense-Pure-Reason-Rationalist-Justification/dp/0521597455/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083102&sr=8-1&keywords=In+Defense+of+Pure+Reason%3A+A+Rationalist+Account+of+A+Priori+Justification) [BonJour, Laurence. 2002. *Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses*. Lanham, MD: Rowmany & Littlefield.](http://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Problems-Contemporary-Responses-Philosophy/dp/0742564193/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083132&sr=8-1&keywords=Epistemology%3A+Classic+Problems+and+Contemporary+Responses) [Goldman, Alvin. 1986. *Epistemology and Cognition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Cognition-Alvin-I-Goldman/dp/0674258967/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083176&sr=8-1&keywords=Epistemology+and+Cognition) [Huemer, Michael (ed.). 2002. *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings*. London and New York: Routledge.](http://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Contemporary-Readings-Routledge-Philosophy/dp/0415259215/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083203&sr=8-1&keywords=Epistemology%3A+Contemporary+Readings) [Huemer, Michael. 2005. *Ethical Intuitionism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.](http://www.amazon.com/Ethical-Intuitionism-Michael-Huemer/dp/0230573746/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083235&sr=8-1&keywords=Ethical+Intuitionism) [Huemer, Michael. 2017. “There is No Pure Empirical Reasoning,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 95 (3): 592-613.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phpr.12445) [Kornlibth, Hilary. 2002. *Knowledge and its Place in Nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/Knowledge-Place-Nature-Hilary-Kornblith/dp/0199246327/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083270&sr=8-1&keywords=Knowledge+and+its+Place+in+Nature) [Loux, Michael. 2006. *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, 3rd ed. New York and London: Routledge.](http://www.amazon.com/Metaphysics-Contemporary-Introduction-Introductions-Philosophy/dp/0415401348/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083296&sr=8-1&keywords=Metaphysics%3A+A+Contemporary+Introduction) [Papineau, David. 2013. “Naturalism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2013 edition. ](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/naturalism/) [Plato. 1997. “Republic.” Tr. G. M. A. Grube, Rev. Tr. C. D. C. Reeve. In John M. Cooper (ed.), *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis and Cambridge, UK: Hackett, pp. 971-1223.](http://www.amazon.com/Plato-Complete-Works/dp/0872203492/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083377&sr=8-1&keywords=Plato%3A+Complete+Works+Cooper) [Quine, W. V. O. 1961. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In W. V. O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 20-46.](http://www.amazon.com/From-Logical-Point-View-Logico-Philosophical/dp/0674323513/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083410&sr=8-1&keywords=From+a+Logical+Point+of+View) [Quine, W. V. O. 1969. “Epistemology Naturalized.” In W. V. O. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 69-90.](http://www.amazon.com/Ontological-Relativity-Other-Essays-Quine/dp/0231083572/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1390083442&sr=8-1&keywords=Ontological+Relativity+and+Other+Essays) [Ridge, Michael. 2013. “Moral Non-Naturalism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2013 edition.](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/moral-non-naturalism/) ### Related Essays [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translations [Azerbaijani](https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/tomas-metkalf-felsefe-ve-onun-elmden-ferqi-felsefi-derk-ile-elmi-derkin-muqayisesi/), [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) ### Article History This essay was originally posted on 2/23/2018. A significantly updated version was posted on 10/8/2021. ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy, Logic & Reasoning, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** metcalf --- ### [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) **Published:** February 25, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** A variety of extra credit opportunities are often given as a way to raise grades on assignments and tests and overall course grades. But there are reasons why instructors should not offer extra credit, that doing so is unjustified and unfair. Extra credit is common but is surprisingly controversial. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Philosophy of Education](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/) Word count: 995 Grades on assignments and tests are reliable, yet imperfect, indicators of students’ knowledge and understanding of a subject matter. Overall course grades are also often influenced by students’ complying with class procedures: e.g., if attendance and participation are required, then students who rarely attend class may get poor grades, even if they understand the course content and have done well on the assignments and tests. A variety of extra credit opportunities are often given as a way to raise grades on assignments and tests and overall course grades. But there are reasons why instructors should not offer extra credit, that doing so is unjustified and unfair. Extra credit is common but is surprisingly controversial.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) ![report card](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/report-card.jpg?resize=564%2C376&ssl=1) ### 1. Arguments For Extra Credit Extra credit opportunities are often said to be justified on the grounds that they: 1. motivate students to participate in research, e.g., being subjects in psychological experiments, and students learn from that participation; 2. get students involved in “the life of the mind” and encourage academic virtues, such as curiosity, creativity, and application; 3. encourage students to attend special events outside of class, e.g., guest lectures and special forums; 4. just help students get the grades that they want or “need.” These justifications are doubtful. About (1), if the, e.g., psychological studies that students participate in as subjects are *irrelevant* to the course, then participation should not influence their grades: that grade should only reflect their understanding of course content. If the research is importantly *relevant*, then participation should be required, not extra credit. Imagine a class on *all* aspects of psychology research but where *any* participation in psychological research was extra credit, not required: that is a poorly-designed course. About (2), educational research suggests that extra credit opportunities rarely contribute to ordinary students becoming “super-students.” And if the cultivation of academic virtues is a legitimate goal, this can and should be sought with regular assignments. And academic virtues can be promoted by encouraging students to participate in campus intellectual activities *even if extra credit is not given*: participation without a grade-enhancing reward displays virtue in itself. About (3), if the content of the special event – lecture, forum – isn’t relevant to the course then, again, participation shouldn’t influence grades. If it is relevant, then any students who attend should benefit from the experience, even without extra credit. But not all students can attend such events since they have other (school, work, family) responsibilities and obligations at that time. So, those who can attend get a special boost to their grade that those who cannot attend cannot get. That is not fair. Finally, about (4), students don’t *need* passing grades, if they haven’t earned those grades. Students *can* fail classes; sometimes that’s for the best. To help students pass, extra support, guidance, and tutoring can be provided; instructors can also try new teaching and course design strategies to address student difficulties. Extra credit isn’t needed to promote *genuine* student success. While there may be better arguments for extra credit not discussed here, the case in its favor so far appears weak. ### 2. Arguments Against Extra Credit Extra credit opportunities are argued against in a variety of ways. *A. Equal Opportunity Arguments:* Christopher Pynes observes that “every student in a class should have an *equal opportunity* to earn the same grade as every other student.” Many extra credit opportunities, especially those outside of scheduled class time, e.g., evening forums, hearing speakers at nearby schools and so on, are not equally available opportunities. As observed above, not all students can participate since they have legitimate conflicting responsibilities. These forms of extra credit are unfair since some students’ grades shouldn’t increase because of points that not all students have an equal opportunity to receive. *B. “Easy or Hard” Dilemmas and Grade Inflation Arguments*: Extra credit options are typically either easy or hard. If they are *hard* then only the best students will complete them, and they already have high grades, but students who “need” extra credit, because they are not learning the regular material and thus have poor grades, will not receive those points. *Easy* extra credit contributes to “grade inflation,” i.e., grades higher than warranted by the students’ understanding: a B-earning student in a *very hard* class might receive an A because of fluff extra credit. And a student with a D-level of understanding shouldn’t get a B or A by doing *a lot* of easy extra credit. Extra credit can contribute to grades not accurately reflecting students’ understanding of the course material. *C. Inequality Arguments:* Studies suggest that it’s more often the best students who do extra credit assignments: they already have high grades. Students with poor grades tend to not take advantage of extra credit options. And if students are not doing well with the regular assignments, it is unwise to burden them with even more assignment opportunities. So extra credit tends to make grade-rich students richer and grade-poor students potentially poorer, insofar as it can dilute their focus on the regular work. *D. ‘Risky Proposition’ Arguments:* Extra credit opportunities may give students the sense that they can put less effort into regular assignments because they can “make it up” with extra credit. This strategy is risky. Having no extra credit temptations avoids this risk since students’ attention to the regular work is not divided (at least not by extra credit). *E. Extra Work Arguments*: In classes where a sufficient and responsible amount of work is assigned, extra credit is more work for students and more grading for instructors. If the assignment is important, it should be a required assignment. If not, it can be eliminated without significant loss. If the assignment is fluff and the grading easy, points from it should not contribute to grades that indicate knowledge of non-fluff material. These arguments seem compelling, but *perhaps* strong rebuttals could be developed. ### 3. Conclusion In conclusion, we might ask, “Are any forms of extra credit *not* subject to an objection from above?” But would this be an acceptable extra credit question, given the arguments above? ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This paper presents many of the arguments from Christopher Pynes’ “Seven Arguments Against Extra Credit.” Pynes’ discussion references Daryl Close’s “Fair Grades.” Some further arguments for extra credit, and replies are the following: “Grading is sometimes imperfect, so students should get extra credit to offset any potentially unfair or erroneous grading.” Reply: Grading *is* imperfect: that means grades can be (mistakenly) too high or too low. If grading is imperfect, that means grades are potentially somewhat unfair for any students. But this unfairness shouldn’t be addressed only for *some* students who do extra assignments – it should be addressed for *all* students – so extra credit is not a good response to this problem. A better way might be to add some overall points to *everyone’s* grades at the end. This, however, does have the consequence that some students receive grades that suggest they know more than they really know. But it prevent some students from receiving grades that don’t reflect what they really know, which is likely more important. “Students should be encouraged to get out and see and do unique things, and extra credit encourages that.” Reply: If students should get out and see and hear new things, that can be done without extra credit, and in a manner that the above objections don’t rule out as unfair or unjustified. One way is to require that students attend *some* outside event (or some appropriate number) of outside events over the term, and provide an adequate number and variety of opportunities, so everyone can reasonably make at least one event. That addresses the concern above about unfairness. “Students sometimes ‘blow’ the first assignment, and extra credit can help students improve their grades.” Reply: *If* that is a problem (and perhaps it is not: perhaps that failure will encourage students to take things more seriously or study better), then the first assignment can be made ‘low stakes.’ Or an additional required assignment can be given to reflect on the first assignment and how to do better on next ones. (For students who did well on the assignment, they can reflect on why they did well. Thinking about thinking is usually useful for all). Something can be done to address *all* students, not just some of them, and so not contribute to unfairness or grade inflation. ### References [Close, Daryl. “Fair Grades.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2009_0032_0004_0361_0398)[*Teaching Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2009_0032_0004_0361_0398)[ 32, no. 4 (2009): 361-398. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2009_0032_0004_0361_0398) [Pynes, Christopher A. “Seven Arguments Against Extra Credit.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2014_0037_0002_0191_0214)[*Teaching Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2014_0037_0002_0191_0214)[ 37, no. 2 (2014): 191-214.](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=teachphil&id=teachphil_2014_0037_0002_0191_0214) ### Related Essays [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/ "Applied Ethics") by Chelsea Haramia ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ethics-and-_extra-credit-2-page.pdf). ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA USA. He is the author of *[Animal Ethics 101](http://www.animalethics101.com),* co-author of [*Thinking Critically About Abortion*](http://www.abortionarguments.com), and author or co-author of many articles and chapters on topics in ethics and philosophy. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Philosophy of Education **Tags:** extra credit, grades, Nobis --- ### [René Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) **Published:** August 4, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** A concise version of Rene Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy." **Content:** Author: [Marc Bobro](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bobro) Categories: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 998 *Editor’s note: this essay is the first in a two-part series on Descartes’ Meditations. The second essay is [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/).* In an era of great debate over the fundamental facts of nature—e.g., about the Earth’s place in the cosmos, the amount of energy in the universe, the circulation of blood in the human body—René Descartes’ (1596-1650) central goal was to establish a body of scientific knowledge that held the same degree of certainty as mathematical truths.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) *The Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641) is a classic work that lays the philosophical foundations of this enterprise.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) It raises timeless and fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge, the self, the mind and its relation to the body, substance, causality, perception, ideas, the existence of God, and more. This two-part essay reviews Descartes’ process of reasoning and some of his arguments on these issues. ![descartes](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/descartes.jpg?resize=656%2C430&ssl=1) ### 1. Meditation 1: Skepticism and the Method of Doubt Descartes begins by reflecting on the unfortunate fact that he has had many false beliefs.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) He sets out to devise a strategy to not just prevent having false beliefs but, more dramatically, to ensure that *scientific research* reveals truth, not error. To avoid any false beliefs, his strategy is to doubt any belief he has that could be false or that he could be mistaken about. His senses have deceived him before, so they could be deceiving him now, so he rejects all sensory-based beliefs. He reasons that if an alleged source of knowledge is *sometimes* deceptive, then it could *always* be deceptive, and so it should be rejected to find beliefs that cannot be false. ![L0012003 Descartes: Diagram of ocular refraction.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/descartes_diagram_of_ocular_refraction-_wellcome_l0012003.jpg?resize=361%2C824&ssl=1) He realizes that if he were asleep and dreaming, many of his beliefs would be false: e.g., if he were dreaming about walking somewhere, his belief that “he is walking,” would be false. Since he cannot ever tell if he is dreaming or not, this is further reason to doubt any beliefs from his senses: dreams appear the same as genuine experiences: they cannot be distinguished.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) He also realizes that he could be mistaken even about beliefs that seem clearly true to him, whether awake or dreaming, e.g., that “bachelors are unmarried.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) He could be mistaken, even about such beliefs, because he could be being deceived by some evil genius[\[6\]](#_ftn6) or even God: this is possible and he cannot show that it is not his actual situation. Since Descartes wishes to reject any belief that could be false, that he could be mistaken about, he rejects even these beliefs. The sciences, however, rely on beliefs not only about the physical world but also about mathematics, and by the end of Meditation 1, Descartes is tempted to rid himself of the desire to acquire knowledge altogether.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. Meditation 2: The Essence of the Human Mind In an epistemological epiphany, Descartes notices that one of his beliefs cannot be doubted and is therefore certain: “I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.” Descartes simply recognizes that he exists as long as he is thinking. This is true even when he’s dreaming and even if he were deceived by an evil demon or even God. Whenever there are thoughts, those thoughts (and their thinker) exist, even if those thoughts are within a deception. This is the *Cogito* as it is given in the *Meditations*.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) So, Descartes knows that he exists, but what *kind* of a thing is he? He can conceive of himself existing without a body, but cannot conceive of himself existing without thought. So, he must be a *thinking thing*: something doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, imagining and feeling. Descartes takes this to mean that he is *essentially* a mind and not a body.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) How does the *Cogito* escape the net of doubt cast in Meditation 1? Descartes says that judgments about his own thoughts are entirely unproblematic; the contents of his mental states are clear to him, meaning that he can clearly tell what his own beliefs are. However, even granted this “transparency” of mental states, how does he know that there is a *single entity* that is the subject of all of his thoughts? Descartes asks rhetorically, “Am I not the same who now doubts nearly everything, who still understands something; who affirms that this one thing is true?” His unstated answer is that he is a single entity that endures over time.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. Meditation 3: The Existence of God Being a thinking thing, Descartes knows that he has ideas. He notices that one of these ideas is the idea of God, i.e., something eternal, infinite, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good, and the creator of all things. But where did he get this idea of God, a *perfect* being? Did he invent it? Did it come from other people? No. His idea of God could *only* have come from God. According to Descartes, a cause must be at least as real or perfect as its effect. The *idea* of God however represents much more reality and perfection than the idea of himself, or of anything else.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) There’s only then one possible cause: God. So, God exists. This is Descartes’ *causal* argument for God’s existence. However, God *might* be a deceiver: God *could* have made Descartes have many false beliefs. That’s possible. How then can Descartes be sure that he can trust any of his other beliefs besides the belief of his own existence? In the case of the *Cogito,* Descartes saw very “clearly and distinctly” that to think, one must exist. But how does he know that clear and distinct perception is always reliable?[\[12\]](#_ftn12) E.g., how does he know that “triangles have three sides” if there’s an evil demon deceiving him? He now realizes that there is no way that an all-good being[\[13\]](#_ftn13) would make it so that when he “clearly and distinctly” thinks something to be true that it wouldn’t be true: an all-good being would not deceive him or allow an evil demon such license. Plus, he’s just proven that God exists. So now he can trust that whenever he “clearly and distinctly” thinks something to be true, it is.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) *This essay is the first in a two-part series on Descartes’ Meditations. The second essay, Meditations 4-6, is [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/).* ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For Descartes, knowledge of the sort that can serve as a foundation for science requires certainty, which in turn requires indubitability, namely, that it can’t be rationally doubted. This is a very high standard for knowledge, and important to understand because it’s directly relevant to responses to Cartesian skepticism that deny the indubitability requirement. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Many of Descartes’ other works, such as *The World*, *Treatise on Man*, *Description of the Human Body*, and *Optics*, focused on providing the scientific content itself. See *Descartes: The World and Other Writings*, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge, 1998). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) “Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them. And thus I realized that once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences” (Med. 1). Descartes was in his mid-30s by this point. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) “I see so plainly that there are no definitive signs by which to distinguish being awake from being asleep” (Med. 1). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) “Whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides” (Med. 1). Such beliefs are typically called *analytic a priori*, since they are not based in sense-experience, and can be known purely by definition or reason. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Sometimes translated as “malicious demon.” The Latin is *genium malignum*. I prefer “genius” to “demon,” since the latter has a religious connotation, but at this point in the *Meditations* religious belief of any kind is still in doubt. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) “I am not unlike a prisoner who enjoyed an imaginary freedom during his sleep, but, when he later begins to suspect that he is dreaming, fears being awakened and nonchalantly conspires with these pleasant illusions” (Med. 1). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Interestingly, the famous inference *cogito ergo sum* (“I think therefore I am”) occurs in Descartes’ *Discourse on the Method* (Part IV) and the *Principles of Philosophy* (I.7), but not so in the *Meditations*. It’s not clear why Descartes doesn’t do so in the *Meditations.* Some commentators argue that given his method of doubt in the *Meditations*, even simple inferences are put in question. That is, at this stage of the work, Descartes is not even sure that logic is reliable, and so cannot legitimately *argue* from *premises* to a *conclusion* that he exists. Another way to explain the absence of the *ergo* is to point out that Descartes is seeking a *foundational* belief upon which to justify all of his other beliefs and therefore ground knowledge, and that for a belief to be properly foundational it must not stand in need of justification itself. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) To say that he is *essentially* a mind and not a body is to say that his mind is part of his essence: if his mind ceased to exist, he would cease to exist, but he could exist without his body, so it is not part of his essence. Descartes also argues in Med. 2 that his knowledge of his mind through non-sensory means is also the best way to know his body. To show this, he uses the example of a piece of wax. Even when its sensory properties change (through melting, hardening, changing color, etc.) it remains the same piece of wax. So, the wax itself cannot be known through the senses. Also, the true essence of the wax is known through the senses, for the wax can take on a great, perhaps infinite, variety of shapes. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) As for his reasoning, Descartes is probably appealing to the fact that he *experiences* himself as a single entity through time. Immanuel Kant will famously challenge this line of reasoning in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) According to Descartes, each thing is “assigned” a degree of reality (which corresponds to its perfection, that is, its capacity to exist independently). In other words, everything has a place on the hierarchy of reality. God, of course, is at the “top,” since he is the most perfect, most independent being possible, and so has the greatest degree of reality. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) He asks: “What is required for knowledge is my simply having a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting. Surely it’s not possible that I could have a clear and distinct perception of the truth of some judgment (proposition) which turned out to be false?” (Med. 3). For this reason, Descartes is often called a “rationalist,” since clear and distinct perception, upon which all knowledge ultimately rests on, is *not* a form of sense-experience. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Descartes defines God as all-good. But in Meditation 1, he mentions that being “all-good” doesn’t automatically rule out some deception on God’s part. Even the Bible seems to depict God as a father who lets his children (us) be deceived sometimes. If God allows us to be deceived sometimes, why couldn’t he allow us to be deceived all of the time? But at this point in Meditation 3, he realizes that such a worry was overblown, for he now clearly and distinctly perceives that God would not allow us to be deceived in such a sweeping manner. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) We can now see the so-called “Cartesian Circle.” Descartes wants to remove the possibility that there can be a deceiving God or an evil demon deceiving him. To do this, he first argues that God exists and second claims that God couldn’t be a deceiver. Now to show that God exists he says that he clearly and distinctly perceives a causal principle (that there is as much actual reality in a cause as there is representative reality in its effect). And to show that God is not a deceiver he says that he clearly and distinctly perceives that deception is incompatible with perfection. But remember *why* Descartes is trying to prove that God couldn’t be a deceiver: in order to validate his provisional general rule that he can trust clear and distinct perception! See the circle? ### References [Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Eds. and trans. ](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Descartes-2/dp/0521288088/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=BYRB5K8D4RQN2CG1NKRR)[*The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* ](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Descartes-2/dp/0521288088/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=BYRB5K8D4RQN2CG1NKRR)[(Cambridge University Press, 1984), vol. 2.](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Descartes-2/dp/0521288088/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=BYRB5K8D4RQN2CG1NKRR) [Francks, Richard. ](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Meditations-Readers-Guide-Guides/dp/0826492835)[*Descartes’ Meditations: A Reader’s Guide* ](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Meditations-Readers-Guide-Guides/dp/0826492835)[(New York: Continuum, 2008).](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Meditations-Readers-Guide-Guides/dp/0826492835) [Gaukroger, Stephen. Ed. and trans. ](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580)[*Descartes: The World and Other Writings*](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580)[ (Cambridge University Press, 1998). ](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580) [Wilson, Margaret. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILD-2)[*Descartes* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILD-2)[(London: Routledge, 1978).](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILD-2) ### Audio Recording Also in [mp3 audio download](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/descartes-meditations.mp3). ### Related Entries [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download [*Meditations* 1-3 in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/1000word-descartes1-3.pdf); [*Meditations* ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/1000word-descartes1-6.pdf)[1-6 in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/1000word-descartes1-6.pdf). ### About the Author [Marc Bobro](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bobro) is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Santa Barbara City College in California. He holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Washington, Seattle, an MA in philosophy from King’s College London, and a BA in philosophy from the University of Arizona, Tucson. He specializes in the history of modern philosophy, especially Leibniz. Bobro is also the bassist and tubist for the mythopoetic punk band Crying 4 Kafka and collaborates on art with Elizabeth Folk. [marcbobro.academia.edu](https://marcbobro.academia.edu/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Bobro, Descartes, Descartes' meditations --- ### [René Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) **Published:** August 5, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** A concise version of Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy." **Content:** Author: [Marc Bobro](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bobro) Categories: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 999 *Editors’ note: this essay is the second in a two-part series on Descartes’ Meditations. The first essay is* *[here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/)**.* ![descartes](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/descartes.jpg?resize=656%2C430&ssl=1) ### 4. Meditation 4: The Source of Human Error Descartes argued in Meditation 3 that since God exists, most of his beliefs are true, even those that aren’t *clearly and distinctly* (hereafter C&D) perceived, since God wouldn’t allow him to be routinely deceived. But of course he sometimes is in error.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The problem is to account for his errors of judgment without assuming that his ability to judge is hopelessly defective. Descartes solves this problem by arguing that whenever he makes an error in judgment it’s not God’s fault, but his own: he has the ability to believe something even where there isn’t sufficient evidence. Judging involves both the intellect (the ability to know) and the will (the ability to choose). However, the will can easily be abused. For while his intellect *is* limited (it lacks C&D perceptions of many things),[\[2\]](#_ftn2) his will is *not* limited (it can affirm and deny even on the basis of insufficient evidence). The best course of action in such cases is to simply abstain from judging. God is hardly to blame for such error; rather, it’s the misuse of our wills. ![L0012002 Descartes: Optics- dicourse on methods...Inverted image](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/descartes_optics-_dicourse_on_methods-inverted_image_wellcome_l0012002.jpg?resize=656%2C337&ssl=1) ### 5. Meditation 5: The Essence of Physical Things Descartes then defends a theory of “essences” that is intended to provide a foundation for scientific research. He has many ideas of things (that may or may not exist outside his mind); however, they are not his invention but have their own *true and unchangeable essences.* E.g., he imagines a triangle (which may or may not exist) but does not the triangle of his “mind’s eye” have an essence that is true and unchangeable? Importantly, it is *not* invented by him. Every triangle he imagines will necessarily share certain properties; e.g., its 3 angles will equal 2 right angles.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ![Regular_polygon_19_annotated.svg](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/regular_polygon_19_annotated-svg.png?resize=300%2C300&ssl=1) This provides Descartes with a second proof for God’s existence. For his discovery about essences applies not only to the objects of mathematics and geometry, but also to *anything*—even God. As long as he C&D perceives a property of God, that property must actually belong to God. One of those properties is existence; therefore, God exists.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This is Descartes’ ontological argument for God’s existence. ### 6. Meditation 6: The Existence of Physical Things and Substance Dualism All that remains, for Descartes, is to demonstrate that the external world of physical things exists and that the mind[\[5\]](#_ftn5) and body are independent substances, capable of existing without the other. Descartes argues that it is *possible* that physical things exist. Since he C&D perceives the true and unchangeable essence of physical things (extension, divisibility, etc.), he infers that there is *some* reason to believe that there are things that actually possess this essence. The existence of physical things is also suggested by his imagination, for its contents depend on something distinct from himself, most likely physical things. That is, the best explanation of how imagination is possible includes the existence of physical things. But what is Descartes’ *proof* of the existence of physical things? He speaks of the ideas that seem to come from his senses. For instance, he has a head, hand, and all the things that make up his body, and perceives pain and pleasure in his body. He perceives heat, texture, light, sound. All of these things help him to distinguish the sky, the earth, and all bodies from one another. Now, it makes sense that his sensory ideas were caused by things distinct from his own thought, since his experience is that these ideas were not controlled by him and were very “lively and vivid.” That is, his ideas were produced by bodies existing outside of him. How can Descartes *really know* that his sensory ideas were produced by physical things? He says that there are three possible answers: himself, God or some other higher being, or physical things themselves. Descartes rejects the first, since the ideas in question are produced without his cooperation and often against his will.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Also, he has such a strong conviction that his ideas of physical things are produced by physical things themselves, that if God were in fact the cause of these ideas, then God would have to be a deceiver. If not the first two, the answer must be third: physical things themselves. Descartes next argues that mind and body are *really distinct* things: 1. He has a C&D understanding of his mind as a thinking, non-extended substance. 2. He has a C&D understanding of his body as an extended, non-thinking substance. 3. C&D perception can be trusted. 4. So, the fact that he can C&D understand one substance apart from another is enough to make it certain that the two substances are really distinct, since they are capable of being separated, at least by God. 5. *Therefore*, it is certain that his mind is really distinct from his body (*any* body) and can exist without it. This provides the foundation for his unique brand of substance dualism, sometimes called “Cartesian Dualism.” Descartes claims that his mind is not in control of his body the way that a sailor is in control of a ship. The mind/body union is deeper. But how can the mind and body causally interact or be unified in a “deep” way if minds are really distinct from bodies?[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Descartes replies to this objection in a couple of ways.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) First, the brain is the interface between mind and body, and perhaps within the brain it is the pineal gland.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Second is an argument by analogy. We know that magnetism actually occurs: oppositely charged particles attract. But what is it exactly about oppositely charged particles that causes this attraction? We know *that* magnetism occurs, but we really can’t explain *how* it does—just as we know that the mind and body interact, but cannot fully explain how.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 7. Conclusion Descartes’ time was punctuated not only by debate over the most fundamental facts of nature, but also about the correct methodology for answering such questions. While the *Meditations on First Philosophy* does not offer answers to such scientific questions,[\[11\]](#_ftn11) it does defend the correct methodology for answering them. *This essay is the second in a two-part series on Descartes’ Meditations. The first essay, Meditations 1-3, is* *[here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/)**.* ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Descartes says that his errors—making false judgments—are the only evidence of imperfection in himself. What about hate, rage, and the like? It turns out, however, that for Descartes, much like the Stoics, such emotions stem from errors in reasoning. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Descartes tells us not to blame God for our finiteness: there is no reason why God should “place in a single one of his creatures all the perfections which he can place in others”—spread out the perfections, so to speak. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This is true not just of triangles, he continues, but any other shape, for example, a chiliagon (a 1000-sided figure). He has probably never encountered a chiliagon through his senses, but he can demonstrate certain properties of a rhombus. And he knows that these properties are certainly true, since he clearly and distinctly perceives them. Pictured is an enneadecagon (19-sided figure). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Echoing St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), Descartes insists that he has a clear and distinct perception that existence is part of God’s true and unchangeable essence. Spelled out, his argument looks like this: 1. God is (by definition) the supremely perfect being. 2. If something lacks existence, it lacks a perfection. *Therefore* 3. God doesn’t lack existence. On the basis of this argument, Descartes says he is just as certain of God’s existence as he is that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is 180 degrees or that a mountain must have a valley. See “[The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/)” by Andrew Chapman. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Descartes makes no distinction between the mind (*l’esprit* or *mens*) and the soul (*l’âme* or *anima*) in his discussion of the mind-body relation. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Descartes thinks unconscious perception and willing are absurd notions. Leibniz will challenge Descartes with regard to unconscious perception at least. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is the principal objection to Cartesian Dualism then and now. In an extended correspondence with Descartes, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680) challenged him on the relation between mind and body, particularly the kind of union they’re supposed to have and the possibility of their causal interaction. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Neither reply occurs in the *Meditations* themselves. The pineal gland is discussed in the *Treatise on Man* (before 1637), *The Passions of the Soul* (1649), and in various correspondence. The magnetism analogy occurs in the *Principles of Philosophy* (1644) and in correspondence. See [*Descartes: The World and Other Writings*, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge, 1998).](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Only in the 1960s did scientists discover what purpose the pineal gland serves. Or at least *one* of its purposes: to produce melatonin. Interestingly, in the latest Gray’s Anatomy it says that it’s still unclear as to the extent of the pineal gland’s function. See Lokhorst, Gert-Jan, “Descartes and the Pineal Gland”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/pineal-gland> >. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Neither reply has proven to have much traction. The pineal gland, although located in the right place and not fully understood, is still a body. The problem with the magnetism analogy is that though we have a legitimate alternative explanation of mental activity without reference to an immaterial substance, we don’t have competing explanations when it comes to magnetism. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Such scientific questions are addressed in his *Treatise on Man, The World, Description of the Human Body, Optics, Principles of Philosophy,* and *The Passions of the Soul.* See [*Descartes: The World and Other Writings*, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge, 1998).](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580) ### References [Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. eds. and trans. ](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Descartes-2/dp/0521288088/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=BYRB5K8D4RQN2CG1NKRR)[*The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* ](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Descartes-2/dp/0521288088/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=BYRB5K8D4RQN2CG1NKRR)[(Cambridge University Press, 1984), vol. 2.](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Writings-Descartes-2/dp/0521288088/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=BYRB5K8D4RQN2CG1NKRR) [Shapiro, Lisa. Ed. and trans. ](https://www.amazon.com/Correspondence-between-Princess-Elisabeth-Descartes/dp/0226204421/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1530217801&sr=1-1&keywords=lisa+shapiro+descartes)[*The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes* ](https://www.amazon.com/Correspondence-between-Princess-Elisabeth-Descartes/dp/0226204421/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1530217801&sr=1-1&keywords=lisa+shapiro+descartes)[(University of Chicago Press, 2007).](https://www.amazon.com/Correspondence-between-Princess-Elisabeth-Descartes/dp/0226204421/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1530217801&sr=1-1&keywords=lisa+shapiro+descartes) [Gaukroger, Stephen. Ed. and Trans. ](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580)[*Descartes: The World and Other Writings*](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580)[ (Cambridge University Press, 1998).](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Writings-Cambridge-History-Philosophy/dp/0521631580) [Francks, Richard. ](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Meditations-Readers-Guide-Guides/dp/0826492835)[*Descartes’ Meditations: A Reader’s Guide* ](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Meditations-Readers-Guide-Guides/dp/0826492835)[(New York: Continuum, 2008).](https://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Meditations-Readers-Guide-Guides/dp/0826492835) [Wilson, Margaret. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILD-2)[*Descartes* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILD-2)[(London: Routledge, 1978).](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILD-2) [Williams, Thomas. Trans. ](https://www.amazon.com/Three-Philosophical-Dialogues-Freedom-Classics/dp/0872206114/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1530219147&sr=1-5&keywords=thomas+williams+anselm)[*Anselm: Three Philosophical Dialogues*](https://www.amazon.com/Three-Philosophical-Dialogues-Freedom-Classics/dp/0872206114/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1530219147&sr=1-5&keywords=thomas+williams+anselm)[ (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002).](https://www.amazon.com/Three-Philosophical-Dialogues-Freedom-Classics/dp/0872206114/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1530219147&sr=1-5&keywords=thomas+williams+anselm) ### Audio Recording Also in [mp3 audio download](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/descartes-meditations.mp3). ### Related Essays [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer ### PDF Download Download [Meditations 4-6 in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/1000word-descartes4-6.pdf); [*Meditations* ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/1000word-descartes1-6.pdf)[1-6 in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/1000word-descartes1-6.pdf). ### About the Author [Marc Bobro](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bobro) is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Santa Barbara City College in California. He holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Washington, Seattle, an MA in philosophy from King’s College London, and a BA in philosophy from the University of Arizona, Tucson. He specializes in the history of modern philosophy, especially Leibniz. Bobro is also the bassist and tubist for the mythopoetic punk band Crying 4 Kafka and collaborates on art with Elizabeth Folk. [marcbobro.academia.edu](https://marcbobro.academia.edu/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Bobro, Descartes --- ### [“I think, therefore I am”: René Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) **Published:** November 26, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Charles Miceli Category: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/) Word Count: 994 If you are reading this, then you are probably looking at a screen or a piece of paper. Think to yourself: “I have some paper in my hand,” “I am in front of a computer” or whatever fits. Is your belief here *certain*? Is there *any* way that you could believe this, yet your belief be false? Is there any possibility that you are mistaken about this belief? René Descartes (1596-1650) argues you could: this belief, and almost all other beliefs, are *not* certain. Descartes argues that there is one clear exception, however: “I think, therefore I am.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) He claims to have discovered a belief that is *certain* and *irrefutable*. Perhaps there is no saying more famous in philosophy than this phrase, often known as the “Cogito” after its Latin phrasing, *cogito ergo sum*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This essay explores the meaning of the Cogito, its importance to Descartes, and its legacy for philosophy up to the present day. ![matrix_reboot_1000-630x400-1](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/matrix_reboot_1000-630x400-1.jpg?resize=630%2C400&ssl=1) ### 1. Doubt and Skepticism The phrase “I think, therefore I am” first appears in *Discourse on the Method* (1637)*.*[\[3\]](#_ftn3) But Descartes changes the wording to “I am, I exist”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) in his most famous (1641) work, *Meditations on First Philosophy*[\[5\]](#_ftn5) (called the *Meditations* for short). In the *Meditations*, Descartes reflects on the fact that he has had many false beliefs, and he sets out to address that problem, with the hope of finding a way to ensure he only has true beliefs and even that scientific research yields only truths as well. His strategy is to doubt, or not believe, any claim that is false or *could* be false. He recognizes that his senses might be deceiving him now, since they have deceived him before; he might also be reasoning erroneously now, since he has reasoned badly before. He thereby doubts all beliefs from his senses and from his faculty of reasoning, since those beliefs *could* be false. Descartes then considers the most extreme reason for doubt: there *may* exist an evil demon (sometimes translated ‘genius,’ ‘genie,’ or ‘spirit’) who has the power to control all of his thoughts, tricking him into believing anything.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Descartes cannot *prove* that this demon does not exist. So he acknowledges that it’s *possible* that all his beliefs about the world external to his own mind are illusions *caused* by the demon, corresponding to nothing at all, and so all his beliefs about the external world are false. Descartes is usually thought of as considering *skepticism*, the view that we lack knowledge or justified belief.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Here skepticism is considered because we lack *certainty*: what we believe might be false, so our beliefs aren’t knowledge. As we will see, Descartes argues that the Cogito enables him to defeat skepticism and show that we have knowledge, with certainty. ### 2. The Cogito and Certainty After considering the evil demon, Descartes soon discovers the Cogito. He realizes that thinking “I am, I exist,” *withstands* the evil-demon test! *Even if* all the beliefs and types of beliefs that Descartes reviews are false, or could be false, at the least, *he* *must exist* to be deceived. Even if one doubts one’s own existence, one *must* exist at that moment, since there must be something, or someone, doing the doubting. Doubting is a way of thinking, and one’s existence is required to doubt or think in the first place: it is impossible to doubt and yet not exist. So, the “I think” element in the Cogito implies the direct, immediate, certain knowledge of one’s own existence. Thought requires a thinker and this is known *with certainty*, since not even the demon could deceive someone who doesn’t exist. Descartes thereby found what he was looking for: *some* certain, indubitable, irrefutable knowledge.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 3. Defeating Skepticism Once the Cogito is discovered, Descartes argues it can serve as a foundation for how to find other truths that are certain. Descartes proposes that the Cogito is undeniably true because it is *clear* and *distinct*. About clarity, Descartes explains, “Some perceptions are so transparent and at the same time so simple we can never think without believing them to be true…”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) When something is *distinct*, the mind has an unclouded vision of what is most essential about that object. These qualities become the standard against which all other beliefs can be evaluated. Descartes argues that the clarity and distinctness rule, derived from the Cogito, can justify our beliefs about the external world. But what verifies the clarity-and-distinctness rule? God’s existence, Descartes argues. By reflecting on his idea of God, he argues that God exists.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Descartes then argues that a truthful, good God would not allow us to be deceived when we understand objects clearly and distinctly, and so God would not allow us to routinely have false beliefs. The Cogito then serves as the foundation for a series of claims that build upon each other. According to Descartes, his reasoning establishes that, what he originally doubted, he actually knows, with certainty.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) He thereby defeats the skeptical concerns that he considered earlier. ### 4. Conclusion: Knowledge without Certainty Descartes was impressed by the Cogito because he had found a belief that is certain and so, *when believed*, cannot be false. He thought that certainty was necessary for a belief to be known. While he argued that, fortunately, we *can* ultimately be certain of much of what we think we know,[\[12\]](#_ftn12) most philosophers following him have denied that. Contemporary theorists of knowledge tend to *deny* that knowledge requires certainty: they tend to be “falliblists,” arguing that we can *know* some claim, yet not be certain that it is true.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) The problem with Descartes’ standard for knowledge is that almost no beliefs meet it. Descartes thought he could show how our ordinary knowledge claims are ultimately based on the Cogito, but most philosophers have not been convinced by his case. The epistemic lesson of the Cogito is that *if* certainty is a necessary requirement for knowledge, we are left with very little knowledge indeed. The challenge, however, is that if certainty is not required for knowledge, what is?[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For a discussion of the whole of Descartes’ *Meditations*, see Marc Bobro’s [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) It should be noted that although the idea expressed in *cogito ergo sum* is usually attributed to and associated with Descartes, it was not an entirely new idea. For instance, over a 1000 years earlier, St. Augustine, in *The City of God* (Book XI, 26), wrote “ergo sum si fallor,” which is often paraphrased as *fallor ergo sum*: “I make mistakes, therefore I am.” [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1*. Cambridge University Press (2012) (AT VI 32: CSM I 127). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) It’s instructive to consider why Descartes changes the wording from the *Discourse on the Method* to the *Meditations*. Unlike in the *Discourse*, Descartes employs strict tests of doubt in the *Meditations*, where even simple inferences are put in question. In other words, in setting the stage for the Cogito, the meditator is unsure that logic is reliable, and so cannot legitimately *argue* from premises to a conclusion that she exists. Another way to account for the missing *ergo* in the Cogito of the *Meditations* is to point out that Descartes seeks a *foundational* belief upon which to provide justification for other beliefs and therefore ground knowledge, and that for a belief to be properly foundational it is in no need of justification itself. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2.* Cambridge University Press (2012) (AT VII 25: CSM II 17). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The 1999 science-fiction film *[The Matrix](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0133093/)* is an update on this idea: one’s beliefs may be caused by the Matrix, not the physical world, and so they are false: e.g., someone “plugged into” the Matrix *believing* she is riding a bicycle is not *actually* riding a bicycle, so that belief is false. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) There are different kinds of skeptics. Some skeptics are “global” skeptics, who deny that we have any knowledge at all, about anything: Descartes seems close to a global skeptic, at least before he reaches the Cogito. Other types of skepticism are more limited: e.g., someone might be a skeptic about knowledge claims about the future (“Nobody really *knows* what will happen in the future”), or a skeptic about claims to religious knowledge, or moral knowledge, or skeptics about knowledge claims based on testimony, and more. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) What follows from the certainty of the Cogito is the nature of Descartes himself: he must be a thing that thinks. The Cogito does not prove that Descartes has a body or a brain, or even that other minds exist: these can all be doubted. Only thought is certain: Descartes says, “*I am, I exist*, that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I think. It might perhaps even happen that if I stopped thinking, I should at once altogether stop being.” Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2.* Cambridge University Press (2012) (AT VII 27: CSM II 18). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2.* Cambridge University Press (2012) (AT 7, 145-6, CMS 2, 104). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Descartes argues that his idea of God is such that it could only have been caused by God: Descartes couldn’t have created that idea on his own or from any of his own experiences. Descartes also offers a distinct ontological argument for God’s existence: see [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Thus, Descartes is clearly a foundationalist. See e.g. [Hasan, Ali, “Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification,” in E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-foundational/)*[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-foundational/)*[, Fall 2018 edition.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-foundational/) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Something unclear is whether each individual would have to go through the thought processes that Descartes engaged in to have knowledge, or else they lack knowledge, or whether Descartes (or anyone’s, or enough people’s) engaging in these meditations would contribute to everyone’s having knowledge. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See e.g. [Unger, Peter. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/ignorance-9780198244172?cc=us&lang=en&)*[Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/ignorance-9780198244172?cc=us&lang=en&)*[ (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press), Chapter III.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/ignorance-9780198244172?cc=us&lang=en&) [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For discussion of some challenges facing theories of knowledge that deny that certainty is necessary for knowledge, see [The Gettier Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman and [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. ### References [St. Augustine, ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm)*[The City of God ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm)*[(412) ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45304/45304-h/45304-h.htm) [Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. ](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/052128807X/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i1)*[The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/052128807X/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i1)*[. Cambridge University Press (2012)](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/052128807X/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i1) [Cottingham, John, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. ](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0521288088/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i2)*[The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2.](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0521288088/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i2)*[ Cambridge University Press (2012) ](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0521288088/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i2) [Hasan, Ali, “Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification,” in E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-foundational/)*[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-foundational/)*[, Fall 2018 edition.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/justep-foundational/) [Unger, Peter. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/ignorance-9780198244172?cc=us&lang=en&)*[Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/ignorance-9780198244172?cc=us&lang=en&)*[ (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press), Chapter III.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/ignorance-9780198244172?cc=us&lang=en&) ### Related Essays [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/cogito.pdf). ### Acknowledgments The editors are grateful to Marc Bobro for his review of this essay. ### About the Author Charles Miceli teaches philosophy in New Jersey and in Asia. He received an MA from Fordham University and reads novels in his spare time. micelicharles @ yahoo.com ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** cogito, Descartes, I think therefore I am --- ### [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) **Published:** March 5, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** There are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. Can it be morally permissible to let them die? Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments. **Content:** Author: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word count: 1000 Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore. When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to *let them die*? Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to *actively kill* some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay reviews these arguments. ![Ferdinand Hodler, ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/800px-hodler_-_valentine_godc3a9-darel_im_krankenbett_-_1914.jpeg?resize=656%2C484&ssl=1)Ferdinand Hodler, “Valentine Godé-Darel on Her Sickbed,” 1914 ### 1. Passive Euthanasia Denying that passive euthanasia is ever morally permissible suggests that we must *always* do everything we can to try to keep someone alive, even if they are miserable, want to die, and say so. To many, that’s just cruel.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Passive euthanasia can be directly supported by both consequentialist (or utilitarian) and Kantian ethics.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) For the consequentialist, the patient being out of their misery is a better consequence *for them*, and overall, than their staying alive: this decreases the total amount of pain and unhappiness in the world, and no other choice would produce more good, for them or overall. For a Kantian, letting them die respects their *autonomy* or decisions about matters that profoundly affect their own lives: this respects them as “ends in themselves,” whereas forcing them to live treats them as a “mere means” toward *our* ends, not their own. Passive euthanasia can also be supported by stating conditions when it can be OK to let someone die. We begin with an ‘if’ and develop a principle: *If* . . (a) someone is dying, *and* (b) is in horrible pain and suffering, *and* (c) that pain and suffering cannot be relieved, *and* (d) that person wants to die and says so, *and* (e) informed, thoughtful and caring people agree that the person would be better off no longer living . . , *then* it can be permissible to let that person die.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Passive euthanasia, then, can be justified in a variety of ways. ### 2. Active Euthanasia To see why *active* euthanasia might be permissible, we begin by reflecting on why passive euthanasia might be OK: it gets people out of their misery and respects what they want for their own lives. We then observe that these goals can often be pursued more *directly* and *immediately* by, say, giving them an overdose of pain-killing medications. Letting people die can take a long time, and that time might be full of unwanted suffering. Killing people, when they want to be killed, achieves their goals, more quickly. So, it seems that if passive euthanasia can be permissible, so can active. ### 3. Objections There are many objections to this reasoning. Some concern euthanasia in general. 3.1. Some claim that pain can *always* be controlled and so there is never a need to euthanize anyone. However, this insistence that pain can *always* be made bearable is, sadly, not true. 3.2. Some argue that “miracles” are possible – there’s *always* a chance that someone recovers – and so euthanasia is wrong. But making important decisions on very unlikely chances is often unwise. Most interestingly though, euthanasia would never *prevent* a miracle, especially one of divine origins. Further objections claim there are important differences between active and passive euthanasia, making passive permissible but active wrong. 3.3. Some argue that it’s always wrong to intentionally kill someone, so active euthanasia is wrong. In reply, while it’s, at least, *nearly always* wrong to kill people, this is arguably because people *usually* want to live and do not have lives full of pain. Perhaps killing can be justified when this is not the case.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) 3.4. Some argue that allowing active euthanasia *might* put us on a “slippery slope” to murdering people who want to live. But this hasn’t happened where active euthanasia is allowed, since we do and would have safeguards to lessen this possibility, as we do with other things that *might* lead to bad results if misused. 3.5. Some argue that there are important moral differences between *allowing* something to happen and *doing* something or because *killing someone* and *letting them die* are profoundly different, and so passive and active euthanasia should be judged differently. But consider this case: An aunt will inherit lots of money if her five-year-old nephew dies. She plans to drown him in the bathtub and make it look like an accident. He just started his bath; she’s on her way to the bathroom to drown him. She opens the bathroom door and is *delighted* to see that he has slipped in the bathtub and is drowning. She watches, ready to push him under if he steadies himself and saves his own life. But, as her luck would have it, he drowns; she never touches him throughout the ordeal. She inherits the money.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) If she claimed that she didn’t “do anything,” *she did*: she stood there, and *doing nothing is doing something*. And letting someone die can be *as bad*, or *nearly as bad*, and perhaps sometimes *even worse than* killing someone[\[7\]](#_ftn7): indeed, *a way* to kill someone is to let them die. So these distinctions are, at least, not clear. 3.6. A final concern is that especially if active euthanasia were allowed, some people *could* be wrongfully killed. This *is* possible: some people might wrongfully break (potentially good) rules. But we cannot ignore that if euthanasia is *not* allowed, it might be that some people *could* be *wrongly* kept alive. Which wrong is more likely? Which wrong is worse? ### 4. Conclusion While death is, arguably, usually bad for the person who dies, the goal of euthanasia is to make this less bad: the word *euthanasia* means a “good death.” These issues are important, and not just for people currently facing hard choices about death. None of us knows what will happen to us: at any time, an accident or illness might force these issues upon us, and so we should engage them more deeply, now.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The discussion and arguments here are largely based on [James Rachels](http://www.jamesrachels.org/)’ (1941-2003) famous and widely-reprinted article “[Active and Passive Euthanasia,” ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Rachels.pdf)*[New England Journal of Medicine](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Rachels.pdf)*[ 1975; 292: 78-80](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Rachels.pdf). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The discussion here concerns what’s called ***voluntary*** euthanasia, where a person wants to die and says so. There are other types of euthanasia though. ***Non-voluntary*** euthanasia involves an individual who *neither* wants to die *nor* wants to live, e.g., someone who has been unconscious for a long time, say in a coma, and we have good reason to believe that consciousness will never return: they currently don’t literally *want* anything and we usually don’t know what they *would have wanted*, since people usually don’t discuss this. What is sometimes called ***involuntary*** “euthanasia” involves someone *who wants to live and says so*. If such a person is let die or killed, this is *not* euthanasia: in all or nearly all cases, this is *murder* or *wrongful killing*, and so won’t be discussed further here. These definitions cover most actual cases of euthanasia, but they aren’t perfect. First, it *could* happen that someone said that, if they were to fall into a permanent coma, they *would very much want* their body to be kept alive for as long as possible, but nobody knows this is what they wanted: if they are euthanized, is that *in*voluntary or *non*-voluntary? It could also happen that someone *wants* to die, but has no way of communicating that (suppose they have an extreme form of “[locked-in syndrome](https://www.google.com/search?q=locked+in+syndrome&rlz=1C1CHFX_enUS743US743&oq=locked+in+syndrome&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.679j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8),” with eye paralysis too, so they cannot even blink out messages): if they are euthanized, is that voluntary or non-voluntary? These cases are unclear, given the characterizations above, as are further possibilities of *someone who wants to die but nobody knows that* and *someone who wants to live but nobody can tell*. Non-human animals who are judged to have a poor quality of life due to serious health problems are often (actively) euthanized: is this best considered a form of non-voluntary euthanasia, or potentially a different type of voluntary euthanasia? These animals have *some* current wants or desires, unlike a coma patient, but probably don’t have a specific want or desire to die, unlike in typical voluntary euthanasia cases. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Consequentialism and Kantianism can be used to support euthanasia (although Kant himself might have opposed it: Kant’s own judgments on many moral issues and the positions on moral issues that his theories arguably support sometimes diverge). But these theories do urge us to be very cautious about bringing about someone’s death, including our own. Consequentialists would, and should, urge especially anyone who doesn’t have a challenging medical condition but wishes to die to seek counseling and assistance to help find happiness and fulfillment: in *most* cases, this would be better than death for that person and for promoting overall happiness. “*It gets better*,” the saying goes: it’s possible for someone to be euthanized (passively or actively), or commit suicide (if someone euthanizes themselves, this is a type of suicide; if they need assistance to do this, this is *assisted suicide*), whose death is not in their own best interest or contributes to the greatest overall good. Indeed, some people have wished to die, have been prevented from ending their own life, come to appreciate their own life later, and then have been glad that they had not ended their life when they wanted to do so earlier. (However, it’s also sometimes true that people want to die, they live, and are eventually able to live what they report to be fulfilling lives, yet they still they wish they had died: [Dax Cowart](https://www.google.com/search?q=dax+cowart&rlz=1C1CHFX_enUS743US743&oq=Dax+Cowart&aqs=chrome.0.0l6.535j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8) is a well-known case perhaps like this). And Kantians don’t think that autonomy is unrestricted or limitless: *just because* we want something for ourselves doesn’t mean we should get it. Kantians firmly reject an attitude of “It’s your life, so do *whatever* you want with it,” since we have obligations to respect ourselves (and our *future* selves), given our value as persons, and this respect for ourselves could rule out *some* cases of euthanasia and suicide. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The details of a principle like this, however, take us to harder questions about euthanasia, harder than those that arise in most circumstances: for examples, what if someone wants to die *now* but isn’t currently in horrible pain and suffering, or is expecting to die, but many years later after a very slow decline? Should *anyone else* have “say” over your own life or judge whether some pain and suffering is “horrible enough” *for you* to reasonably wish to die? If so, who? What if someone *isn’t* dying and doesn’t even have a bad medical condition but just finds their life not worth living and so wants to die (and so, say, plans to starve themselves to death or do other things that will result in their death)? These harder questions, and others, would need to be addressed for a complete defense of this or similar principles and any arguments based on them. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Some might claim that their *intention* in any euthanasia is *not* to kill anyone: killing is an *unintended* consequence of their real intention, which might be to make the patient comfortable. If this makes sense, they might claim that they are not engaged in any *intentional* killing, so they aren’t violating any moral principle against intentional killing. This type of reasoning is related to what’s called the “Doctrine of Double Effect.” [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) This case is from James Rachels. Here is another example that addresses the distinction between *doing something* versus *allowing something to happen*: In a deep forest, hiking alone, Adam finds someone who has fallen into a deep pit. They ask him to throw them a rope so they can climb out. Adam doesn’t and they eventually starve to death. Adam learns of this on the news but feels fine since, he tells himself, “I didn’t *do anything* there. I did nothing wrong.” To most, Adam clearly *did* something – he didn’t just allow something to happen – and he *did* something wrong: what he *did*, standing there *not* throwing the rope, was wrong. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For tragic reflections that letting someone die can be worse than killing them, see [Gary Comstock, “You Should Not Have Let Your Baby Die,” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/opinion/you-should-not-have-let-your-baby-die.html)*[The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/opinion/you-should-not-have-let-your-baby-die.html)*[, July 12, 2017](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/opinion/you-should-not-have-let-your-baby-die.html). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Thanks to Zach Blaesi, Taylor Cyr, Chelsea Haramia, Dan Lowe, Travis Rodgers and Dan Peterson for comments on and discussion of this essay. ### References [Gary Comstock, “You Should Not Have Let Your Baby Die,” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/opinion/you-should-not-have-let-your-baby-die.html)*[The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/opinion/you-should-not-have-let-your-baby-die.html)*[, July 12, 2017](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/opinion/you-should-not-have-let-your-baby-die.html). [James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Rachels.pdf)*[New England Journal of Medicine](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Rachels.pdf)*[ 1975; 292: 78-80. ](https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Rachels.pdf) ### For Further Reading [Young, Robert, “Voluntary Euthanasia”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/euthanasia-voluntary/). [Cholbi, Michael, “Suicide”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suicide/). [Woollard, Fiona and Howard-Snyder, Frances, “Doing vs. Allowing Harm”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doing-allowing/). [McIntyre, Alison, “Doctrine of Double Effect”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/). ### Related Essays [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/euthanasia.pdf). ### Acknowledgments This essay is an abbreviated version of a longer chapter of the same title published in [Noah Levin, ed., ](https://www.ngefarpress.com/2019/05/introduction-to-ethics-open-educational.html)*[Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource ](https://www.ngefarpress.com/2019/05/introduction-to-ethics-open-educational.html)*[(NGE Press, 2019)](https://www.ngefarpress.com/2019/05/introduction-to-ethics-open-educational.html)*.* Nathan is grateful to Noah Levin for the occasion and inspiration to write these essays. ### About the Author [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is the author of *[Animals & Ethics 101](http://www.animalethics101.com/)*, co-author of *[Thinking Critically About Abortion](http://www.abortionarguments.com/)*, a co-author of *[Chimpanzee Rights](https://www.routledge.com/Chimpanzee-Rights-The-Philosophers-Brief-1st-Edition/Andrews-Comstock-GKD-Donaldson-Fenton-John-Johnson-Jones-Kymlicka-Meynell-Nobis-Pena-Guzman-Sebo-Gruen-Wise/p/book/9781138618664)*, and author or co-author of many other articles, chapters, and reviews in philosophy and ethics. [NathanNobis.com](http://www.nathannobis.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** bioethics, biomedical ethics, death, euthanasia, hospice, killing, medical ethics, mercy killing, Nobis --- ### [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) **Published:** September 8, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The word “ubuntu” is from some southern African languages and it literally means “humanness.” To have ubuntu is to be a person who is living a genuinely human way of life, whereas to lack ubuntu is to be missing human excellence. This essay reviews this concept and how it informs both the good life and how to act morally. **Content:** Author: Thaddeus Metz Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [African Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/african-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 998 The word “ubuntu” is from some southern African languages and it literally means “humanness.” To have ubuntu is to be a person who is living a genuinely human way of life, whereas to lack ubuntu is to be missing human excellence. Black people indigenous to Africa commonly believe that one’s basic aim in life should be to exhibit ubuntu, which is done by prizing communal relationships with other people. This essay reviews this concept and how it informs both the good life and how to act morally. ### 1. Ubuntu as Cultivating One’s Humanity Desmond Tutu, South Africa’s renowned Nobel Peace Prize winner, remarks, “When we want to give high praise to someone, we say *Yu u nobuntu*; Hey, so-and-so has *ubuntu*.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) For many black African cultures, the more one displays ubuntu, that is, develops human excellence, the better one’s life. This conception of the good life distinguishes two possible ways of living, an *animal* life and a *human* one, and claims that one ought to live a genuinely human way of life and avoid living in the manner of a beast or subhuman. Mogobe Ramose, who has developed a philosophy on ubuntu, says, “One is enjoined, yes, commanded as it were, to actually become a human being.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) If someone fails to do so, then many Africans would say of him, “He is not a person” or even “He is an animal.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) They would be claiming that, although we are biologically human beings, someone who does not live well has failed to develop the valuable aspects of their human nature.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) A self-realization ethic of this sort differs from other conceptions of the good life, particularly those popular among contemporary Western psychologists and philosophers. Most strikingly, this ethic does *not* focus on hedonic considerations, such as an individual’s pleasure or satisfaction, features that humans share with animals. ### 2. Ubuntu and Communal Relationship Many black African societies sum up one’s proper basic aim in life with phrases such as “A person is a person through other persons” or “I am because we are.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) These maxims include prescriptive or normative meanings: they instruct one to become a real person or to realize one’s true self, and to do so by relating to other people in certain ways. More specifically, sub-Saharan conceptions of the good life characteristically understand self-realization in terms of communal or harmonious relationships. Augustine Shutte, one of the first moral philosophers to seriously engage with ubuntu, says: Our deepest moral obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) So an ubuntu ethic focuses on self-realization, but is also communitarian in nature. This community (or harmony) is an ideal form of interaction between people, a type of relating that people ought to strive to create and to maintain. Community, or communal relationship, is usefully analyzed as the combination of two interactions: *identifying* with others and *exhibiting solidarity* with them.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) To *identify* with others is for people to treat themselves as members of the same group: to conceive of themselves as a “we,” to take pride or feel shame in others’ activities, and to engage in joint projects, coordinating to achieve shared or at least compatible ends. *Solidarity*, in part, involves engaging in helpful behavior, acting in ways that are reasonably expected to benefit others. Solidarity involves attitudes, emotions and motives being positively oriented toward others’ good, say, by sympathizing and helping them for their sake. To see some of the appeal of grounding self-realization on prizing such a communal conception of interaction with others, consider that the union of identifying with others and exhibiting solidarity with them is basically what English speakers mean by a broad sense of “friendship” (or even “love”). Speaking of an African perspective on ethics, Tutu remarks, “Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) There are similarities between a conception of the good life grounded on ideals of ubuntu and Western notions of eudaimonia and virtue. For Aristotle, there is a significant self-regarding element to self-realization, such as theoretical contemplation or self-control, that does not essentially involve other persons (although it often might in practice). In contrast, according to many salient sub-Saharan worldviews, one is to realize oneself solely through others. Realizing oneself is exhausted by exhibiting other-regard, an approach that is attractive at least insofar as we are considering the moral virtues.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 3. Ubuntu and Action Concretely, what is involved in realizing oneself through communal or harmonious relationships with others? The sub-Saharan tradition characteristically answers this question by appealing to a variety of virtues.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) One exhibits excellence insofar as one displays character traits such as politeness, kindness, sympathy, compassion, benevolence, altruism, sacrifice, forgiveness, mercy, and tolerance. It might be thought that realizing oneself by prizing friendliness in these ways demands pacifism, but that is probably not true. By acting in unfriendly or conflicting ways when necessary (and likely) to prevent crime, which involves disrespect and harm, one arguably prizes friendliness and community. This conception of the good life is meant to guide individuals in the choices they make, and it has also influenced societal decision-making in African societies. Contemporary African intellectuals and policy makers often appeal to ubuntu when thinking about how to organize public and other large-scale institutions.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) These organizations ought to improve people’s lives, and so they should be structured in ways that foster ubuntu, a plausible view of how best to live.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ### 4. Conclusion Ubuntu as an ethical perspective and way of life has been in existence for several hundred years among sub-Saharan peoples, even if written scholarship on the topic is new. Ideals associated with ubuntu are one major source of such inspiration, and not merely to those living below the Sahara desert, since its values should be of interest to global readers. Is the quality of human life enhanced merely by people feeling good, as per a typical contemporary Western approach, or is it better promoted by people exhibiting virtues that are ways of being a friendly person?[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Tutu, 1999, 31 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Ramose, 1999, 52. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Bhengu, 1996, 27. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005, 224–226, 236. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) E.g., Mandela, 2013, 227; Mkhize, 2008, 40; Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005, 218; Tutu, 1999, 35. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Shutte, 2001, 30; see also Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005, 221–228; Tutu, 1999, 35. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) These definitional remarks borrow from Metz, 2011, 537–540. Communal or harmonious relationship with others that confer ubuntu on a person is understood as the combination of identity and solidarity. As one South African intellectual, Nkondo, 2007, 91, remarks, “If you asked ubuntu advocates: *What principles inform and organise your life?….*the answers would express commitment to the good of the community in which their identities were formed, and a need to experience their lives as part of their community.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Tutu, 1999, 35. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Metz & Gaie, 2010, 275; Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005, 222–228. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See, e.g., Gyekye, 2010; Mnyaka & Motlhabi, 2005; Paris, 1995, 129–156. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See, e.g., Eze, 2010; Murove, 2009; Nkondo, 2007. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Consider two examples from a South African context. First, an ubuntu ethic was largely responsible for the formation of the [Truth and Reconciliation Commission](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/) that famously dealt with apartheid-era crimes in a non-retributive manner (Tutu, 1999). Second, South Africa’s Constitutional Court appealed to the value of ubuntu in order to judge the death penalty to be inconsistent with the right to life and value of human dignity represented in its Bill of Rights (Cornell & Muvangua, 2011, 65–94). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) This essay has been adapted and reprinted with permission from Springer Nature: [Metz T. (2014) Ubuntu: The Good Life. In: Michalos A.C. (ed.) ](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_4029)[*Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_4029)[. Springer, Dordrecht.](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_4029) The Editors thank Professor Metz for making this edited and abridged version of his essay available for readers of *1000-Word Philosophy*. ### References [Bhengu, M. J. (1996). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Ubuntu.html?id=2uAQAQAAIAAJ)[*Ubuntu: The essence of democracy*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Ubuntu.html?id=2uAQAQAAIAAJ)[. Cape Town, South Africa: Novalis Press.](https://books.google.com/books/about/Ubuntu.html?id=2uAQAQAAIAAJ) [Cornell, D., & Muvangua, N. (Eds.). (2011). ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823233823/ubuntu-and-the-law/)[*Ubuntu and the law: African ideals and postapartheid jurisprudence*](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823233823/ubuntu-and-the-law/)[. New York: Fordham University Press. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823233823/ubuntu-and-the-law/) [Eze, M. O. (2010). ](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230622999)[*Intellectual history in contemporary South Africa*](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230622999)[. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230622999) [Gyekye, K. (2010). “African ethics.” In E. Zalta (Ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/)[*Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/african-ethics/) [Mandela, N. (2013). *Nelson Mandela by himself: The authorised book of quotations*, S. Hatang and S. Venter, (Eds). Johannesburg, South Africa: Pan Macmillan.](https://www.panmacmillan.com/authors/nelson-mandela/nelson-mandela-by-himself/9780230759930) [Metz, T. (2011). Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa. ](http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1996-20962011000200011)[*African Human Rights Law Journal*](http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1996-20962011000200011)[, 11, 532–559.](http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1996-20962011000200011) [Metz, T., & Gaie, J. (2010). The African ethic of ubuntu/ botho: Implications for research on morality. ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057240.2010.497609)[*Journal of Moral Education*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057240.2010.497609)[, 39, 273–290.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057240.2010.497609) [Mkhize, N. (2008). Ubuntu and harmony: An African approach to morality and ethics. In R. Nicolson (Ed.), ](http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=210)[*Persons in community: African ethics in a global culture* ](http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=210)[(pp. 35–44). Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.](http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=210) [Mnyaka, M., & Motlhabi, M. (2005). The African concept of ubuntu/botho and its socio-moral significance. ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1558/blth.3.2.215.65725)[*Black Theology*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1558/blth.3.2.215.65725)[, 3, 215–237.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1558/blth.3.2.215.65725) [Murove, M. F. (Ed.). (2009). ](http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=335)[*African ethics: An anthology of comparative and applied ethics.*](http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=335)[ Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.](http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=335) [Nkondo, G. M. (2007). Ubuntu as a public policy in South Africa: A conceptual framework.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18186870701384202)[ *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18186870701384202)[, 2, 88–100.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18186870701384202) [Paris, P. (1995). ](https://fortresspress.com/product/spirituality-african-peoples-search-common-moral-discourse)[*The spirituality of African peoples.* ](https://fortresspress.com/product/spirituality-african-peoples-search-common-moral-discourse)[Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.](https://fortresspress.com/product/spirituality-african-peoples-search-common-moral-discourse) [Ramose, M. (1999). ](https://books.google.com/books?id=fT17AAAAMAAJ&q=inauthor:%22Mogobe+B.+Ramose%22&dq=inauthor:%22Mogobe+B.+Ramose%22&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjipMD77r_kAhUGlKwKHerbAEoQ6AEwAHoECAAQAg)[*African philosophy through ubuntu*](https://books.google.com/books?id=fT17AAAAMAAJ&q=inauthor:%22Mogobe+B.+Ramose%22&dq=inauthor:%22Mogobe+B.+Ramose%22&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjipMD77r_kAhUGlKwKHerbAEoQ6AEwAHoECAAQAg)[. Harare, Zimbabwe: Mond Books.](https://books.google.com/books?id=fT17AAAAMAAJ&q=inauthor:%22Mogobe+B.+Ramose%22&dq=inauthor:%22Mogobe+B.+Ramose%22&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjipMD77r_kAhUGlKwKHerbAEoQ6AEwAHoECAAQAg) [Shutte, A. (2001). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Ubuntu.html?id=zV7XAAAAMAAJ)[*Ubuntu: An ethic for the new South Africa*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Ubuntu.html?id=zV7XAAAAMAAJ)[. Cape Town, South Africa: Cluster Publications.](https://books.google.com/books/about/Ubuntu.html?id=zV7XAAAAMAAJ) [Tutu, D. (1999). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/181253/no-future-without-forgiveness-by-desmond-tutu/9780385496902/)[*No future without forgiveness*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/181253/no-future-without-forgiveness-by-desmond-tutu/9780385496902/)[. New York: Random House.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/181253/no-future-without-forgiveness-by-desmond-tutu/9780385496902/) ### For Further Reading [Gaie, J. (2007). The Setswana concept of *botho*: Unpacking the metaphysical and moral aspects. In J. Gaie and S. Mmolai (Eds), *The concept of botho and HIV/AIDS in Botswana*. Eldoret, Kenya: Zapf Chancery, pp. 29-43.](http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/the-concept-of-botho-and-hiv-aids-in-botswana) [Khoza, R. (1994). *Ubuntu, botho, vumunhu, vhuthu, African humanism*. Sandton: Ekhaya Promotions.](http://www.reuelkhoza.co.za/ubuntu-botho/) [Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African moral theory. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00280.x)[*Journal of Political Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00280.x)[, 15, 321-341.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00280.x) [Mokgoro, Y. (1998). *Ubuntu* and the law in South Africa. *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal*, 1, 15-26.](https://www.ajol.info/index.php/pelj/article/view/43567) [Murove, M. F. (2016). *African moral consciousness*. London: Austin Macauley Publishers Ltd.](https://www.amazon.com/African-Moral-Consciousness-Munyaradzi-Murove/dp/1785541536) ### Related Essays [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/afrikali-ubuntu-etigi-thaddeus-metz/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ubuntu.pdf). ### About the Author Thaddeus Metz is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. Professor Metz has published about 250 scholarly papers in value theory and in moral, political and legal philosophy, about half of which address African philosophy. [www.up.ac.za/philosophy/article/2923571/preview?module=cms&slug=content-item&id=2923571](https://www.up.ac.za/philosophy/article/2923571/preview?module=cms&slug=content-item&id=2923571) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** African Philosophy, Ethics, Global Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** African ethics, African Philosophy, Thad Metz, Thaddeus Metz, Ubuntu --- ### [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) **Published:** September 17, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay is the second in a two-part series on the topic of capitalism and socialism. The first essay is on defining capitalism and socialism; this essay is on arguments for capitalism and socialism. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Wordcount: 993 *Editor’s note: this essay is the second in a two-part series authored by Tom on the topic of capitalism and socialism. The first essay, on defining capitalism and socialism, is available* [*here*](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/)*.* Suppose I had a magic wand that allowed one to produce 500 donuts per hour. I say to you, “Let’s make a deal. You use this wand to produce donuts, and then sell those donuts for $500 and give me the proceeds. I’ll give you $10 for every hour you spend doing this. I’ll spend that time playing video games.” My activity—playing video games—seems pretty easy. Your job requires much more effort. And *I* might end up with a lot *more* money than $10 for every hour *you* work. How is *that* fair? In the story, the magic wand is analogous to ***capital goods***: assets (typically machinery and buildings, such as robots, sewing machines, computers, and factories) that make labor, or providing goods and services, more productive. Standard definitions of ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ indicate that, in general, capitalist systems permit people to privately own and control capital goods, whereas socialist systems do not. And capitalist systems tend to contain widespread wage labor, absentee ownership, and property income; socialist systems generally don’t.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Capital goods are morally interesting. As in the case of the magic wand, ownership of capital goods can allow one to make lots of money without working. In contrast, other people have to work for a living. This might be unfair or harmful. This essay surveys and explains the main arguments in this debate.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ![Commercial donut manufacturing.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/donuts.jpg?resize=656%2C401&ssl=1)Commercial donut manufacturing. ### 1. Capitalism Arguments for capitalism tend to hold that it’s beneficial to society for there to be incentives to produce, own, and use capital goods like the magic wand, or that it’s wrong to forcibly prevent people from doing so. Here are four arguments for capitalism, stated briefly: (1) Competition: ‘When individuals compete with each other for profits, this benefits the consumer.’[\[3\]](#_ftn3) *Critique*: Competition also may encourage selfish and predatory behavior. Competition can also occur in some socialist systems.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) (2) Freedom: ‘Preventing people from owning capital restricts their freedom. Seizing their income in the form of taxes may constitute theft.’[\[5\]](#_ftn5) *Critiques*: Maybe owning property, itself, restricts freedom, by excluding others from using it.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) If I announce that I own something, I may be thereby announcing that I will force you not to use it. And maybe “freedom” requires the ability to pursue one’s own goals, which in turn requires some amount of wealth.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Further, if people must choose between work and starvation, then their choice to work may not be really “free” anyway.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) And the general distribution of wealth is arguably the result of a morally arbitrary “natural lottery,”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) which may not actually confer strict property-rights over one’s holdings.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) I didn’t choose where I was born, nor my parents’ wealth, nor my natural talents, which allow me to acquire wealth. So perhaps it’s not a violation of my rights to take some of that property from me. (3) Public Goods:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ‘When objects, including capital, must be shared with others, then no one is strongly motivated to produce them. In turn, society is poorer and labor is more difficult because production is inefficient.’[\[12\]](#_ftn12) *Critique*: People might be motivated to produce capital for altruistic reasons,[\[13\]](#_ftn13) or may be coerced in some socialist systems to do so. Some putatively socialist systems allow for profitable production of capital goods.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) (4) Tragedy of the Commons: ‘When capital, natural resources, or the environment are publicly controlled, no one is strongly motivated to protect them.’[\[15\]](#_ftn15) *Critique*: As before, people might be motivated by altruism.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Some systems with partially-private control of capital may nevertheless qualify as socialist.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### 2. Socialism Arguments for socialism tend to hold that it’s unfair or harmful to have a system like in the story of the magic wand, a system with widespread wage labor and property income. Here are four arguments for socialism, stated briefly: (1) Fairness: ‘It’s unfair to make money just by owning capital, as is possible only in a capitalist system.’[\[18\]](#_ftn18) *Critique*: Perhaps fairness isn’t as morally important as consent, freedom, property rights, or beneficial consequences. And perhaps wage laborers consent to work, and capital owners have property rights over their capital.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) (2) Inequality: ‘When people can privately own capital, they can use it to get even richer relative to the poor, and the wage laborers are left poorer and poorer relative to the rich, thereby worsening the inequality that already exists between capital-owners and wage-laborers.’[\[20\]](#_ftn20) *Critiques*: This is a disputable empirical claim.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) And perhaps the ability to privately own capital encourages people to invest in *building* capital goods, thereby making goods and services cheaper. Further, perhaps monopolies commonly granted by *social* control over capital are “captured” by wealthy special-interests,[\[22\]](#_ftn22) which *harm* the poor by enacting regressive laws.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) (3) Labor: ‘Wage laborers are alienated from their labor, exploited, and unfree because they must obey their bosses’ orders.’[\[24\]](#_ftn24) *Critiques*: If this alienation and exploitation are net-harmful to workers, then why do workers consent to work? If the answer is ‘because they’ll suffer severe hardship otherwise,’ then strictly speaking, this is a critique of allowing poverty, not a critique of allowing wage labor. (4) Selfishness: ‘When people can privately own capital, they selfishly pursue profit above all else, which leads to further inequality, environmental degradation, non-productive industries, economic instability, colonialism, mass murder, and slavery.’ *Critique*: These are also disputable empirical claims. Maybe when people are given control over *socially*-owned capital, they selfishly extract personal wealth from it.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) Maybe when the environment is socially controlled, everyone is individually motivated to over-harvest and pollute.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) State intervention in the economy may be a major cause of the existence of non-productive industry, pollution, and economic instability.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) Last, some of the worst perpetrators of historical evils are governments, not private corporations.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) ### 3. Conclusion It is difficult to justifiably draw general conclusions about what a pure capitalism or socialism would be like in practice.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) But an examination of the merits and demerits of each system gives us some guidance about whether we should move a society in either direction. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See my [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) for an explanation of how to define these systems. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For much-more-extensive surveys, see Gilabert and O’Neill n.d. and Arnold n.d. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) By analogy, different people might try to construct even better magic wands, or use them for better purposes. Typically the benefits are thought to include lower prices, increased equality, innovation, and more options. See Smith 2003 \[1776\]: bk. 1, ch. 2 and Friedman and Friedman 1979: ch. 1. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Schweickart 2011 presents an outline of a market socialism comprising much competition. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) By analogy, if I legitimately own the magic wand, then what gives you the right to threaten violence against me if I don’t give it to you? Nozick 1974: ch. 7 presents a general discussion of how socialism might restrict freedom and how taxation may be akin to theft or forced labor. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Spencer 1995 \[1871\]: 103-4 and Zwolinski 2015 discuss how property might require coercion. See also Scott 2011: 32-33. Indeed, property in general may essentially be theft (Proudhon 1994 \[1840\]). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Rawls (1999: 176-7) for this sort of argument. See [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies for an introduction. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See e.g. Burawoy 1979 for a discussion of whether workers consent to work. See also Marx 2004 (1867): vol. IV, ch. VII. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Rawls 1999: 62 ff. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Relatedly, while one may currently *hold* capital, one may greatly owe the *existence* of that product to many other people or to society in general. See e.g. Kropotkin 2015 \[1913\]: chs. 1-3 and Murphy and Nagel 2002. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) A public good is a good that is non-excludable (roughly, it is expensive to prevent people from using it) and non-rivalrously consumed (roughly, preventing people from using it causes harm without benefiting anyone) (Cowen 2008). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) By analogy, why bother building magic wands at all if someone else is immediately going to take it from me and start using it? Standard economic theory holds that public goods (non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods) will, on the free market, be underproduced. This is normally taken to be an argument for government to produce public goods. See e.g. Gaus 2008: 84 ff. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For example, according to Marxist communism, the ideal socialist society would comprise production for use, not for profit. See e.g. Marx 2004 \[1867\]: vol. 1 ch. 7. See also Kropotkin 1902, which is a defense of the general claim that humans will tend to be altruistic, at least in anarcho-communist systems. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) In a market-socialist system (cf. Schweickart 2011), it is possible to make capital goods and sell them at a profit that gets distributed to the laborers. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) By analogy, if I know that anyone in the neighborhood can use the magic wand, I might not invest my own time and money to maintain it. But if it’s mine alone, I care a lot more about maintaining it. This is the basis of the well-known ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ alleged problem. See, e.g., Hardin 1968. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Kropotkin 1902. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) As before, in Schweickart’s (2011) system, firms will be motivated to protect capital if they must pay for capital’s deprecation, even though the capital is owned by society. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) By analogy, as noted, the wand-owner might make lots of money for basically doing no work. Sherman 1995: 130; Schweickart 2011: § 3.2. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See e.g. Friedman 2002 for a collection of consequentialist arguments for capitalism, and Nozick 1974: chs. 3 and 7 for some arguments concerning freedom and capitalist systems. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) By analogy, the wand-owner might accumulate so much money as to start buying other magic wands and renting those out as well. See e.g. Piketty 2014. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Taking the world as a whole, wealth in absolute terms has been increasing greatly, and global poverty has been decreasing steeply, including in countries that have moved in mostly capitalist directions. See e.g. World Bank Group 2016: 3. Friedman 1989: ch. 5 argues that capitalism is responsible for the improved position of the poor today compared to the past. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) See e.g. Friedman 1989: ch. 7 for a discussion of regulatory capture. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Friedman 2002: chs. IV and IX; Friedman 1989: ch. 4. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) By analogy, the person I’ve hired to use the wand might need to obey my orders, because they don’t have a wand of their own to rent out, and they might starve without the job I’ve offered them. Marx 2009 \[1932\] introduces and develops this concept of alienation. See Dan Lowe’s 2015 [Karl ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/)[Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) for an overview. See also Anderson 2015 for an argument that private corporations coercively violate their workers’ freedom. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) See n. 21 above. This result is most-obvious in countries in which dictators enrich themselves, but there is nothing in principle preventing rulers of ostensibly democratic countries from doing so as well. Presumably this worry explains the presence of the Emoluments Clause in the U. S. Constitution. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See n. 14. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) See e.g. Friedman 2002: chs. III and V and the example of compliance costs for regulations. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) See Huemer 2013: ch. 6 ff. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) All or nearly all large-scale economies have been mixed economies. In contrast, a pure capitalism would be an anarcho-capitalism (see e.g. Gaus 2010: 75 ff. and Huemer 2013), and a pure socialism wouldn’t permit people to privately own scissors. See also the entry “Defining Capitalism and Socialism.” ### References [Anderson, Elizabeth. 2015. ](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10938.html)*[Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It)](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10938.html)*[. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10938.html) Arnold, Samuel. N. d. “Socialism.” In *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed.), [The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://www.iep.utm.edu/socialis/). [Burawoy, Michael. 1979. ](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo23899991.html)*[Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo23899991.html)*[*.* Chicago, IL and London, UK: The University of Chicago Press.](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/M/bo23899991.html) [Cohen, G. A. 2009. *Why Not Socialism?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9009.html) [Cowen, Tyler. 2008. “Public Goods.” In David R. Henderson (ed.), *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.](https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html) [Dagger, Richard and Terence Ball. 2019. “Socialism.” In Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (ed.), ](https://www.britannica.com/topic/socialism)[E*ncyclopædia Britannica*](https://www.britannica.com/topic/socialism)[.](https://www.britannica.com/topic/socialism) [Dahl, Robert A. 1993. “Why All Democratic Countries have Mixed Economies.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219491?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)*[Nomos](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219491?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)*[ 35: 259-82.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219491?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Dictionary.com. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/capitalism) [Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2019. “Henri de Saint-Simon.” In *Encyclopædia Britannica*](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henri-de-Saint-Simon). [Friedman, David D. 1989. ](http://daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf)*[The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism](http://daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf)*[, Second Edition. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company.](http://daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf) [Friedman, Milton. 2002. ](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo18146821.html)[*Capitalism and Freedom*](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo18146821.html)[. 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New York, NY: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-business-ethics-9780199916221?cc=us&lang=en&) [Gaus, Gerald. 2008. ](https://www.cengage.com/c/on-philosophy-politics-and-economics-1e-gaus)*[On Philosophy, Politics, and Economics](https://www.cengage.com/c/on-philosophy-politics-and-economics-1e-gaus)*[. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.](https://www.cengage.com/c/on-philosophy-politics-and-economics-1e-gaus) [Gilabert, Pablo and Martin O’Neill. 2019. “Socialism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socialism/)*[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socialism/)*[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socialism/) [Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” ](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243)*[Science](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243)*[ 162(3859): 1243-48.](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243) [Herzog, Lisa. 2019. “Markets.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/markets/)*[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/markets/)*[, Spring 2019 Edition. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/markets/) [Huemer, Michael. 2013. ](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137281647)*[The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137281647)*[. Houndmills, UK and New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137281647) [Investopedia. 2019. “Mixed Economic System.” ](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mixed-economic-system.asp) [Kropotkin, P. 1902. ](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/petr-kropotkin-mutual-aid-a-factor-of-evolution)[Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/petr-kropotkin-mutual-aid-a-factor-of-evolution)[. New York, NY: McClure Phillips & Co.](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/petr-kropotkin-mutual-aid-a-factor-of-evolution) [Kropotkin, Peter. 2015 \[1913\]. The Conquest of Bread. London, UK: Penguin Classics.](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/272/272099/the-conquest-of-bread/9780141396118.html) [Marx, Karl. 2009 \[1932\]. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf)[Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf)[, tr. Martin Milligan (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books), pp. 13-202.](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf) [Marx, Karl. 2004 \[1867\]. ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf)[Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf)[. New York, NY: Penguin Classics.](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf) [Merriam-Webster. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/capitalism) [Mill, John Stuart. 1965 \[1848\]. ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-principles-of-political-economy-ashley-ed)[Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Volume I: The Principles of Political Economy I](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-principles-of-political-economy-ashley-ed)[, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-principles-of-political-economy-ashley-ed) [Murphy, Liam and Thomas Nagel. 2002. The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195150163.001.0001/acprof-9780195150162) [Nozick, Robert. 1974. ](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/)[Anarchy, State, and Utopia](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/)[. New York, NY: Basic Books.](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-nozick/anarchy-state-and-utopia/9780465051007/) [Oxford English Dictionary, N.d. a. “Capital.” ](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27450) [Oxford English Dictionary. N.d. b. “Capitalism.” ](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27454) [Oxford English Dictionary. N.d. c. “Mixed Economy.” ](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/120348) [Oxford English Dictionary. N.d. d. “Socialism.”](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183741) [Piketty, Thomas. 2014. ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674430006)[Capital in the Twenty-First Century](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674430006)[, tr. Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674430006) [Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1994 \[1840\]. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/proudhon-what-is-property/7A109B76BC2C9E40DCF30455384D2BF3)[What is Property?](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/proudhon-what-is-property/7A109B76BC2C9E40DCF30455384D2BF3)[ Ed. Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/proudhon-what-is-property/7A109B76BC2C9E40DCF30455384D2BF3) [Rawls, John. 1999. ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674000780)[A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674000780)[. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674000780) [Schweickart, David. 2011. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742564985/After-Capitalism-2nd-Edition)[After Capitalism](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742564985/After-Capitalism-2nd-Edition)[, Second Edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742564985/After-Capitalism-2nd-Edition) [Scott, Bruce R. 2011. ](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461418788)[Capitalism: Its Origins and Evolution as a System of Governance](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461418788)[. New York, NY: Springer Science+Business Media.](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461418788) [Sherman, Howard J. 1995. ](https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/reinventing-marxism)[Reinventing Marxism](https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/reinventing-marxism)[. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.](https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/reinventing-marxism) [Smith, Adam. 2003 \[1776\]. ](https://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html)[The Wealth of Nations](https://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html)[. New York, NY: Bantam Dell.](https://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html) [Wikipedia. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism) [Wiktionary. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/capitalism) [World Bank Group. 2016. Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change. Washington, DC: World Bank Group and The International Monetary Fund.](http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-monitoring-report) [Zwolinski, Matt. 2015. “Property Rights, Coercion, and the Welfare State: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income for All.” ](http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_19_04_04_zwolinskif.pdf)[The Independent Review](http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_19_04_04_zwolinskif.pdf)[ 19(4): 515-29](http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_19_04_04_zwolinskif.pdf) ### Related Essays [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Tom Metcalf [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** capitalism, capitalist, metcalf, socialism, socialist --- ### [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) **Published:** September 17, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay is the first in a two-part series on the topic of capitalism and socialism. This essay is on defining capitalism and socialism; the second essay is on arguments for capitalism and socialism. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Wordcount: 999 *Editor’s note: this essay is the first in a two-part series authored by Tom on the topic of capitalism and socialism. The second essay, on evaluating capitalism and socialism, is available [here](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/).* Should our society be capitalist, socialist, or something in between? To adjudicate this debate, we must understand the definitions of ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism.’ ![Image of a finger pointing at an entry in a dictionary.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/dictionary_1633840c.jpg?resize=460%2C288&ssl=1)Image of a finger pointing at an entry in a dictionary. ### 1. Academic definitions The most fundamental difference between capitalism and socialism is about the ownership and control of ***capital goods***, that is, assets (typically, machinery and buildings, e.g. lawnmowers, computers, and factories) that make labor, or providing goods and services, more productive.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In turn, the academic definitions of ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ as economic systems are as follows:[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - **capitalism**: a system in which most or all capital goods are *privately owned and controlled*: owned and controlled by particular individuals, not by society nor the government.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **socialism**: a system in which most or all capital goods are *socially owned and controlled*: shared in a society and controlled by that society, possibly by a government.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Note that these definitions are about *capital goods*, or “private property”; *consumer goods* or *personal property*, such as top hats and burritos, can be privately owned in most versions of socialism.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) In contrast, in some versions of communism and anarchism, no one privately “owns” *any* goods; one merely uses or possesses them.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Note also that both of these definitions are compatible in principle with a society’s having or lacking a government. Real-life capitalist systems almost always have other features:[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - widespread **wage labor**: most people work for a set wage or salary (rather than a share of the firm’s profits); - widespread **absentee ownership**: most of the owners of most capital goods don’t work using those capital goods (e.g. most owners of shares of Toyota do not work at designing or assembling Toyota cars); and - **private-property income**: it’s possible to make money just by privately *owning* property, not by working. (Some people might do “work” in managing their own investment portfolio, but even someone who inherited such a portfolio and never thought about it twice would still be able to collect income from it.) In contrast, socialist systems contain little-or-no wage labor, absentee ownership, or private-property income.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Instead of wage labor and private-property income, people might work for a share of their firm’s profits, or might simply collect a share of dividends from society’s wealth, or there might be no money at all and people simply take what they need.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 2. Free Markets and Regulations It is common to describe free-market economies as more capitalistic and more-regulated economies as more socialistic.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) However, it is possible to have a highly-regulated system in which all capital is nevertheless privately owned: there is wage labor, absentee ownership, and private-property income, but there are also many laws governing labor, and high taxes. Similarly, it is possible to have a mostly-unregulated socialist system. Similarly, socialism is not synonymous with ‘the welfare state,’ because the latter term refers to a system of laws intended to benefit the poor and middle class, and says nothing in particular about who owns most of the capital. A system in which all capital was privately owned but there was a high income tax, one used to buy services for the poor, could still count as “capitalist.” Indeed, an anarchist socialism arguably contains no “regulations,” nor welfare state, at all. Therefore, although it is not generally misleading to regard regulations and welfare programs as socialistic, this is not part of the academic definitions of ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism.’ ### 3. Mistaken definitions So far, we’ve looked at the academic definitions of ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism.’ But these words are also used in other ways. So let’s consider two *mistaken* definitions: - **capitalism**: an evil system that only works to the benefit of the rich; there is extreme, widespread poverty and inequality; almost everyone is consumerist and greedy, and only want to accumulate more wealth; working people are enslaved by their bosses; and no one protects the environment from degradation. - **socialism**: an evil system in which society is a totalitarian dictatorship; everyone is lazy because they know they’ll get free stuff; the economy is in shambles, with waste and corruption everywhere; everyone has to share their toothbrushes; and traditional religion and families are replaced by worship of the State and life in hippie communes. These definitions are “mistaken” because they are insufficiently neutral; almost no one would explicitly endorse either of the systems described, so it’s usually a waste of time to use these definitions. It’s possible that capitalism (the academic definition) inevitably *leads to* capitalism (the mistaken definition), or vice-versa for socialism. But that’s an open, *empirical* question—it doesn’t mean that one should *define* ‘capitalism’ or ‘socialism’ that way. ### 4. Real-life examples? All large-scale societies have had *mixed economies*: some capitalistic and some socialistic elements.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Consequently, it’s difficult to look at real-life societies and argue that something about them is good or bad *because of* capitalism or socialism. We don’t always know which feature to credit or blame. For example, some have argued that the primary cause of the Great Recession in the United States was insufficient regulation;[\[12\]](#_ftn12) others have said it was too much government intervention in the housing market.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Similarly, people might blame capitalism or socialism for some harm, when the system in question was *generally* capitalistic but the harm was caused by a socialistic *feature*, or vice-versa. For example, if a socialist argues that capitalism is bad because the criminal-justice system is unfair or inefficient, the supporter of capitalism can reply that the criminal-justice system is *socially* controlled. On the other side, if a supporter of capitalism argues that socialism is bad because many officials in socialist systems used their private property to enrich themselves, the socialist can reply that that only occurred because the system was insufficiently socialistic. ### 5. Conclusion When important terms are subject to disputed definitions, it’s best to specify explicitly which definitions we are referring to. Since the defining feature of this debate is the question of whether or not people should be able to privately own capital, we should start with the academic definitions. It’s fair to both sides to employ maximally neutral and widely-used definitions, and then try to answer the ethical and social-justice question of which arrangement is better.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Oxford English Dictionary n.d. a. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Virtually all major lay and academic sources define these essentially in the manner above or very similarly. Lay examples include popular dictionaries and encyclopedias: Dagger and Ball 2019; Dictionary.com n.d.; Oxford English Dictionary n.d. b and d.; Merriam-Webster n.d.; Wiktionary n.d.; and Wikipedia n.d. Academic sources include the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Arnold n.d.: § 1), the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Gilabert and O’Neill n.d.: § 1 and Herzog 2019: § 1), philosophy textbooks (e.g. Gaus 2010: 75 ff., which draws the distinction between capitalism and socialism in part based on whether capital goods can be owned), academic histories of capitalism (e.g. Scott 2011: 27, 31, ff.), the foundational documents of this debate, such as Marx 2009 \[1932\] and Mill 1965 \[1848\]: bk. 2, ch. 1, and recent, semi-popular works (Bhaskara 2016). The historical origins of the words also match these definitions: The term ‘capitalist’ appeared before ‘capitalism,’ but it referred to owners of capital, so capitalism is best-defined as a system in which there are such owners. See e.g. Oxford English Dictionary n.d. a. Similarly, ‘socialism’ originally referred to sharing or centrally controlling society’s assets and resources, rather than privately owning them; see e.g. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica 2019 and Dagger and Ball 2019. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) It’s not always easy to define what “private” ownership is. In rough terms, in capitalist systems, for most capital goods, someone or some group can say to most other people in the society, ‘This is *mine* and it isn’t *yours*, and you have no claim on it at all, nor any claim on profits derived from using it.’ In contrast, in socialist systems, for most capital goods, everyone in society can say ‘This is *mine*, and *everyone else’s* as well, although I may not have been appointed to *manage* it. I still have a claim on the profits generated from using it.’ [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Although some individuals may be democratically appointed as managers of those goods. However, these managers are normally not considered “owners” of those goods; those goods are still owned by society. For example, the managers aren’t permitted to sell off the capital goods and pocket the proceeds. See Schweickart 2011: Chapter 3 for further description of how this might work. Bruenig’s (n.d.) social-wealth fund system would also mean that society owns the social wealth, but some proper subset of society manages it. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Sunkara 2016. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See e.g. Berkman 2003 \[1937\]: 217 and Maggs 1961. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See e.g. Scott 2011: 166 and Arnold n.d. It is a complex question why capitalist systems tend to have these features. A brief answer would be that people generally like leisure time and so if they can be absentee owners who make private-property income, they will be. (Both of these are rare or impossible in standard socialist systems.) As for wage labor, this is a question for labor economics, but my suspicion is that it has to do with the considerations in Coase 1937. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Oxford English Dictionary n.d. c. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See n. 3 above and Berkman 2003 \[1937\]. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Gilabert and O’Neill (n.d.: § 3.2.4) hold that the presence of regulations can be understood as introducing a more socialistic element to a capitalistic society. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See Oxford English Dictionary n.d. c.; Dahl 1992; and Investopedia 2019. For example, in the United States, several corporations (e.g. the police forces, the military, regulatory agencies, and the postal service) are socially controlled. And even in the USSR, citizens could collect property income (Maggs 1961). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See e.g. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011 for an overview of some of these arguments. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *Ibid*. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) To try to answer this question, see e.g. my [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/). ### References [Arnold, Samuel. N. d. “Socialism.” In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed.), ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/socialis/)[*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.iep.utm.edu/socialis/)[. ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/socialis/) [Berkman, Alexander. 2003 \[1937\]. ](https://libcom.org/files/Berkman%20-%20What%20Is%20Anarchism.pdf)[*What is Anarchism?*](https://libcom.org/files/Berkman%20-%20What%20Is%20Anarchism.pdf)[ Edinburgh, Scotland and Oakland, CA: AK Press.](https://libcom.org/files/Berkman%20-%20What%20Is%20Anarchism.pdf) [Bruenig, Matt. 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(ed.), ](https://www.britannica.com/topic/socialism)[*Encyclopædia Britannica*](https://www.britannica.com/topic/socialism)[. ](https://www.britannica.com/topic/socialism) [Dahl, Robert A. 1993. “Why All Democratic Countries have Mixed Economies.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219491?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Nomos*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219491?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[ 35: 259-82.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24219491?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Dictionary.com. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/capitalism) [Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. 2019. “Henri de Saint-Simon.” In Encyclopædia Britannica (ed.), ](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henri-de-Saint-Simon)[*Encyclopædia Britannica*](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henri-de-Saint-Simon)[. ](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henri-de-Saint-Simon) [Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2011. ](http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf)[*The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Official Government Edition*](http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf)[. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.](http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf) [Gaus, Gerald. 2010. “The Idea and Ideal of Capitalism.” In George G. Brenkert and Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.), ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-business-ethics-9780199916221?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-business-ethics-9780199916221?cc=us&lang=en&)[. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-business-ethics-9780199916221?cc=us&lang=en&) [Gilabert, Pablo and Martin O’Neill. N.d. “Socialism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socialism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socialism/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socialism/) [Herzog, Lisa. 2019. “Markets.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/markets/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/markets/)[, Spring 2019 Edition.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/markets/) [Investopedia. 2019. “Mixed Economic System.” ](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mixed-economic-system.asp) [Maggs, Peter B. 1961. “The Security of Individually-Owned Property Under Soviet Law.” ](https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol10/iss4/2/)[*Duke Law Journal*](https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol10/iss4/2/)[ 10(4): 525-37.](https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol10/iss4/2/) [Marx, Karl. 2009 \[1932\]. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.” In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf)[*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf)[, tr. Martin Milligan (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books), pp. 13-202.](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf) [Merriam-Webster. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/capitalism) [Mill, John Stuart. 1965 \[1848\]. ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-principles-of-political-economy-ashley-ed)[*Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Volume I: The Principles of Political Economy I*](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-principles-of-political-economy-ashley-ed)[, ed. J. M. Robson. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-principles-of-political-economy-ashley-ed) [Oxford English Dictionary, N.d. a. “Capital.” ](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27450) [Oxford English Dictionary. N.d. b. “Capitalism.” ](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27454) [Oxford English Dictionary. N.d. c. “Mixed Economy.” ](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/120348) [Oxford English Dictionary. N.d. d. “Socialism.” ](http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183741) [Schweickart, David. 2011. ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742564985/After-Capitalism-2nd-Edition)[*After Capitalism*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742564985/After-Capitalism-2nd-Edition)[, Second Edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780742564985/After-Capitalism-2nd-Edition) [Scott, Bruce R. 2011. ](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461418788)[*Capitalism: Its Origins and Evolution as a System of Governance*](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461418788)[. New York, NY: Springer Science+Business Media.](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781461418788) [Sunkara, Bhaskar. 2016. “End Private Property, Not Kenny Loggins.” ](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/socialism-marxism-private-property-person-lennon-imagine-kenny-loggins/)[*Jacobin*](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/socialism-marxism-private-property-person-lennon-imagine-kenny-loggins/)[. ](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/socialism-marxism-private-property-person-lennon-imagine-kenny-loggins/) [Wikipedia. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism) [Wiktionary. N.d. “Capitalism.” ](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/capitalism) ### Related Essays [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/defining-capitalism-and-socialism.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** capitalism, capitalist, metcalf, socialism, socialist --- ### [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) **Published:** May 8, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to philosophical theories of happiness: what is it to be happy? **Content:** Author: [Kiki Berk](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Berk/) Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) Words: 992 Do you want to be happy? If you’re like most people, then yes, you do. But what is happiness? What does it mean to be “happy”?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay discusses four major philosophical theories of happiness.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [!["Mr. Happy" on the beach. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/happiness.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/happiness.jpg?ssl=1)“Mr. Happy” on the beach. ### 1. Hedonism According to hedonism, happiness is simply the experience of pleasure.[\[3](#_ftn3)\] A happy person has a lot more pleasure than displeasure (pain) in her life. To be happy, then, is just to feel good. In other words, there’s no difference between *being* happy and *feeling* happy. Famous hedonists include the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus and the modern English philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) These philosophers all took happiness to include intellectual pleasures (such as reading a book) in addition to physical pleasures (such as having sex). Although we associate being happy with feeling good, many philosophers think that hedonism is mistaken. First, it’s possible to be happy without feeling good (such as when a happy person has a toothache), and it’s also possible to feel good without being happy (such as when an unhappy person gets a massage). Since happiness and pleasure can come apart, they can’t be the same thing. Second, happiness and pleasure seem to have different properties. Pleasures are often fleeting, simple, and superficial (think of the pleasure involved in eating ice cream), whereas happiness is supposed to be lasting, complex, and profound. Things with different properties can’t be identical, so happiness can’t be the same thing as pleasure. These arguments suggest that happiness and pleasure aren’t identical. That being said, it’s hard to imagine a happy person who never feels good. So, perhaps happiness involves pleasure without being identical to it. ### 2. Virtue Theory According to virtue theory, happiness is the result of cultivating the virtues—both moral and intellectual—such as wisdom, courage, temperance, and patience. A happy person must be sufficiently virtuous. To be happy, then, is to cultivate excellence and to flourish as a result. This view is famously held by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Linking happiness to virtue has the advantage of treating happiness as a lasting, complex, and profound phenomenon. It also explains how happiness and pleasure can come apart, since a person can be virtuous without feeling good, and a person can feel good without being virtuous. In spite of these advantages, however, virtue theory is questionable. An important part of being virtuous is being morally good. But are immoral people *always* unhappy? Arguably not. Many bad people seem happy in spite of—or even because of—their unsavory actions. And a similar point can be made about intellectual virtue: unwise or irrational people aren’t always unhappy, either. In fact, some of these people seem happy as a direct result of their intellectual deficiencies. “Ignorance is bliss,” the saying goes! But virtue theorists have a response here. Maybe some immoral people *seem* happy, on the surface; but that doesn’t mean that they are *truly* happy, at some deeper level. And the same thing can be said about people who lack the intellectual virtues: ignorance may lead to bliss, but that bliss isn’t true happiness. So, there seems to be some room for debate on these issues. ### 3. Desire Satisfaction Theory According to the desire satisfaction theory, happiness consists in getting what you want—whatever that happens to be. A happy person has many of her desires satisfied; and the more her desires are satisfied, the happier she is. Even though getting what you want can be a source of happiness, identifying happiness with desire satisfaction is problematic. To start, this implies that the only way to become happier is by satisfying a desire. This seems wrong. Sometimes our happiness is increased by getting something we didn’t previously want—such as a surprise birthday party or getting stuck taking care of a neighbor’s cat. This implies that desire satisfaction is not *necessary* for happiness. Desire satisfaction is not always *sufficient* for happiness, either. Unfortunately, it is common for people to feel disappointed when they get what they want. Many accomplishments, such as earning a degree or winning a tournament, simply don’t bring the long-lasting happiness that we expect.[\[6](#_ftn6)\] So, even if getting what we want sometimes makes us happy, these counterexamples suggest that happiness does not consist in desire satisfaction.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 4. Life Satisfaction Theory According to the life satisfaction theory, happiness consists in being satisfied with your life. A happy person has a positive impression of her life in general, even though she might not be happy about every single aspect of it. To be happy, then, means to be content with your life as a whole. It’s controversial whether life satisfaction is affective (a feeling) or cognitive (a belief). On the one hand, life satisfaction certainly comes with positive feelings. On the other hand, it’s possible to step back, reflect on your life, and realize that it’s good, even when you’re feeling down.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) One problem for this theory is that it’s difficult for people to distinguish how they feel in the moment from how they feel about their lives overall. Studies have shown that people report feeling more satisfied with their lives when the weather is good, even though this shouldn’t make that much of a difference. But measuring life satisfaction is complicated, so perhaps such studies should be taken with a grain of salt.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 5. Conclusion Understanding what happiness is should enable you to become happier. First, decide which theory of happiness you think is true, based on the arguments. Second, pursue whatever happiness is according to that theory: seek pleasure and try to avoid pain (hedonism), cultivate moral and intellectual virtue (virtue theory), decide what you really want and do your best to get it (desire satisfaction theory), or change your life (or your attitude about it) so you feel (or believe) that it’s going well (life satisfaction theory). And if you’re not sure which theory of happiness is true, then you could always try pursuing all of these things. 😊 ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This might seem like an empirical (scientific) question rather than a philosophical one. However, this essay asks the conceptual question of what happiness is, and conceptual questions belong to philosophy, not to science. [\[2](#_ftnref2)\] Happiness is commonly distinguished from “well-being,” i.e., the state of a life that is worth living. Whether or not happiness is the same thing as well-being is an open question, but most philosophers think it isn’t. See, for example, Haybron (2020). [\[3](#_ftnref3)\] The word “hedonism” has different uses in philosophy. In this paper, it means that happiness is the same thing as pleasure (hedonism about happiness). But sometimes it is used to mean that happiness is the only thing that has intrinsic value (hedonism about value) or that humans are always and only motivated by pleasure (psychological hedonism). It’s important not to confuse these different uses of the word. [\[4](#_ftnref4)\] For more on Epicurus and happiness, see Konstan (2018). For more on Bentham and Mill on happiness, see Driver (2014), as well as [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller and [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [\[5](#_ftnref5)\] For more on Plato and happiness, see Frede (2017); for more on Aristotle and happiness, see Kraut (2018), and on the Stoics and happiness, see Baltzly (2019). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For a discussion of the phenomenon of disappointment in this context see, for example, Ben Shahar (2007). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For more objections to the desire satisfaction theory, see Shafer-Landau (2018) and Vitrano (2013). [\[8](#_ftnref8)\] If happiness is life satisfaction, then happiness seems to be “subjective” in the sense that a person cannot be mistaken about whether or not she is happy. Whether happiness is subjective in this sense is controversial, and a person who thinks that a person *can* be mistaken about whether or not she is happy will probably favor a different theory of happiness. \[[9](#_ftnref9)\] See Weimann, Knabe and Schob (2015) and Berk (2018). ### References [Baltzly, Dirk, “Stoicism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/) [Berk, Kiki (2018). “Does Money Make Us Happy? The Prospects and Problems of Happiness Research in Economics,” in *Journal of Happiness Studies,* 19, 1241-1245.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-017-9857-y) [Ben-Shahar, Tal (2007). *Happier*. New York: McGraw-Hill.](https://www.mhprofessional.com/9780071492393-usa-happier-group) [Driver, Julia, “The History of Utilitarianism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history) [Frede, Dorothea, “Plato’s Ethics: An Overview”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/plato-ethics) [Haybron, Dan, “Happiness”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/happiness)[Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/happiness) [Konstan, David, “Epicurus”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/) [Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/) [Shafer-Landau, Russ (2018). *The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-ethical-life-9780190058265?cc=us&lang=en&) [Vitrano, Christine (2013). *The Nature and Value of Happiness.* Boulder: Westview Press.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Nature-and-Value-of-Happiness/Vitrano/p/book/9780813347271) [Weimann, Joachim, Andreas Knabe, and Ronnie Schob (2015). *Measuring Happiness*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/measuring-happiness) ### Related Essays [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/ "Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control") by Matthew Pianalto [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/happiness.pdf). ### About the Author [Dr. Kiki Berk](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Berk/) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Southern New Hampshire University. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy from the VU University Amsterdam in 2010. Her research focuses on Beauvoir’s and Sartre’s philosophies of death and meaning in life. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** berk, happiness, well-being --- ### [Animalism and Personal Identity: Are We Animals?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/animalism/) **Published:** March 11, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the philosophical theory on the topic of personal identity known as animalism. **Content:** Author: [Kristin Seemuth Whaley](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Seemuth-Whaley) Category: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 995 What are we? Philosophers often look for answers that capture what we are fundamentally—what makes us who we are. Maybe we’re non-physical souls or minds.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Maybe we’re our thoughts and our memories. Or, perhaps we’re physical things like bodies or brains. According to a view called *animalism*, we’re human animals.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This view is the focus of our discussion here. [![Woman and a dog in a car.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/animalism.jpg?resize=656%2C433&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/animalism.jpg?ssl=1)Woman and a dog in a car. ### 1. Animalism Animalism is the view that each of us is a human animal: a biological organism of the species *Homo sapiens*. Animalists acknowledge that human animals typically exhibit rationality and levels of intelligence that other animals don’t, but hold that we are animals nonetheless. Animalism has implications for our identity over time, how we’re still *us* through the past, present, and future, despite the many ways we change. If we’re human animals, then we can’t exist independently of those animals; what’s often called *personal identity* depends on our being the same *animal* over time—it’s a matter of biology.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 2. Animalism vs. Psychological Theories Animalism departs from views according to which our identity over time is a matter of our psychology, on being psychologically connected to our past and future selves through our thoughts, memories, and self-conceptions:[\[4\]](#_ftn4) e.g., if you remember not liking broccoli as a kid but like broccoli now, you’re still the same person because you *remember being* that kid. To see how animalism and psychological theories diverge, imagine this: You are diagnosed with an untreatable illness. Your doctor proposes a cutting-edge procedure to transplant your brain into another body, and your body will be kept alive long enough to salvage any remaining healthy organs for other patients awaiting transplants. After the procedure, the patient with your brain wakes up and thinks, “Amazing! I have a new body and no illness!” Where are *you*: with your brain or with your body?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) According to psychological theories, the patient with your brain, who is psychologically connected to your earlier self, who remembers being you, *is* you*.* According to animalism, this patient is *not* you: identity is a matter of *biology*, not *psychology*. You are the animal with the illness but no brain, since this biological organism continues to live the same biological life that you were living before. Your brain is joined up with a different animal living a *different* biological life. Animalism entails that even a human animal on life support with no possibility of conscious activity is still *one of us*. And we can’t outlive these animals in an afterlife or—if technology ever enables this—by uploading our consciousnesses to a virtual reality,[\[6\]](#_ftn6) or getting new bodies through brain transplants.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) So animalism denies some common views about our identity through time. ### 3. The Case for Animalism Why do some people accept animalism? The best case for it is the *Thinking Animal Argument*, directed at a seated reader: Premise 1: There is a human animal sitting in your chair. Premise 2: The human animal sitting in your chair is thinking. Premise 3: You are the only thinking being sitting in your chair. Conclusion: Therefore, you are the human animal sitting in your chair.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The being in your chair is a biological organism, a human animal; this living human organism with (right now) a functional brain, is thinking;[\[9\]](#_ftn9) *you* are the only thinker there, no other thinking being is also in your chair.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) If successful, the argument establishes that you *are* that human animal. It’s not that you and the animal occupy the same space, thinking the same thoughts. There’s just one thinker there, you, which establishes *identity* between you and the animal. Therefore, you are a human animal. And, if so, your identity depends on being the same human animal over time. ### 4. Resisting Animalism Rejecting the argument requires denying a premise. Denying premise 1—that there is a human animal sitting in your chair—is hard to defend.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Denying premise 2—that the human animal sitting in your chair is thinking—requires claiming that the human animal *isn’t* thinking: the organism is not what literally thinks, but it is intimately related to a *mind* or a *soul* that does think. But if human animals don’t think, then either other intelligent organisms like dolphins or chimpanzees are not actually intelligent, or they, too, are intimately related to minds that think.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) If we are thinking *minds*, not thinking *animals,* this might challenge some of our everyday judgments about ourselves and our relationship to physical things: e.g., you never actually see yourself in the mirror (you see the organism); if you take a road trip with your dog, Spot, where we normally judge there to be *two* things are actually *four* (the human animal, the canine animal, you, and Spot);[\[13\]](#_ftn13) and you and Spot never snuggle (only the organisms do). Denying premise 3—that you are the only thinking being sitting in your chair—instead requires claiming that you are not the *only* thinker: you’re a thinker, and so is the human animal, with thoughts exactly like yours. But if there *are* two thinkers in your chair, you won’t know that you’re not the animal. Even if you think, “I’m not the animal; I’m the thinker that’s *not* the animal,” the animal will think the exact same thing. So, denying premise 3 doesn’t provide any assurance that you’re *not* an animal.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Another way to resist is with a parallel Thinking *Brain* Argument about the *brain* located where you are.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) The argument has analogous support, but its conclusion contradicts animalism: you are a *brain* not an *animal.* So we might have equally good evidence for a competing conclusion. At the least, it warrants more discussion of what it takes to be a thinker. ### 5. Conclusion So, what are we, fundamentally? Animals? Brains? Minds? Souls? Some combination? Any answer has consequences for our self-understanding and raises further philosophical questions: When do we come into, and go out of, existence? Who counts as *one of us*, and what moral obligations do we have toward them? There’s a lot at stake when considering “What are we?” ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Descartes (1641) argues that each of us is an immaterial thing, a soul or a mind, rather than a physical thing, like a body. For an overview of his argument, see Meditation 6: The Existence of Physical Things and Substance Dualism in [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Olson (1999) is a major proponent of animalism. For additional presentations of animalism and its various forms, see Bailey (2015), Thornton (2016), and Blatti (2019). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For an explanation of biological identity, continuing to live the same biological life, see Blatti (2019, §1.2); for an opposing view, see Madden (2016). The relationship between animalism and our identity over time is a matter of current debate; see Duncan (forthcoming) and Bailey, Thornton, and van Elswyk (forthcoming). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Locke (1690, II.xxvii) argues that personal identity is a matter of psychology. For an introduction to psychological theories of personal identity, see section 3 of [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Another option is that *neither* patient is you, even if the procedure is successful. But, at most, you either follow your brain or stay with your body. Perhaps both patients survive as individuals very closely related, but not identical to, you. For discussions of *survival* as opposed to *identity*, see Parfit (1984). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For fictional representations of what this might be like, see Amazon’s [*Upload*](https://www.amazon.com/Upload-Official-Trailer/dp/B08BYYSF6M/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=upload&qid=1615378857&sr=8-1) series or *Black Mirror’s* “[San Junipero](https://www.netflix.com/watch/80104625?trackId=200257859).” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The general challenge of the afterlife is that if you gain a new body or exist unembodied after physical death, you don’t appear to be *the same animal.* Some animalists, such as van Inwagen, try to preserve the possibility of an afterlife by arguing that God transports the human organism into a physical afterlife and puts a corpse in its place on earth; see discussion in Hasker and Taliferro (2019). Other animalists suggest different strategies for preserving the possibility of an afterlife, see, for example, Thornton (2019). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This is a reconstruction of Olson’s argument (2003). For other arguments for animalism, see Blatti (2012) and Bailey (2016). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) If, later, this human animal has its brain removed for a brain transplant, then this human animal would no longer be thinking. But premise 2 is about what’s happening right now. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Philosophers of personal identity will go to great lengths to preserve the idea behind this premise; theories of personal identity should not lead to the conclusion that there are multiple thinkers where you are. For discussion, see Hershenov (2013). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Some philosophers would deny premise 1 and endorse *mereological nihilism*, according to which there are *no* composite physical objects, such as animals (or chairs, for that matter). For discussion of this view, see Wasserman (2017, §4). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Chimpanzees and dolphins, like humans, communicate, develop social relationships, use tools, work together cooperatively, and recognize themselves in the mirror, all of which provide evidence of thought and intelligence (Bearzi and Stanford 2010). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) If we were to give an inventory of everything in the car, we’d typically mention things like luggage, Spot’s toys, road trip snacks, water bottle, etc., you, and Spot. But, once we’ve accounted for you and Spot, we would likely fail to account for two things that are very obviously in the car: the human animal and the canine animal. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Denying premise 3 also requires denying some everyday judgments: there would be twice as many *thinkers* as we normally recognize; the person and the animal are both thinking. If you do something nice for a friend, you’ve brought happiness to both your friend and the animal located where your friend is. If you say something that hurts their feelings, you’ve actually done it twice over: once to the person and once to the animal. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) The Thinking Brain Argument proceeds as follows: Premise 1′: There is a human brain located where you are. Premise 2′: The human brain located where you are is thinking. Premise 3′: You are the only thinking being located where you are. Conclusion’: Therefore, you are a human brain. ### References [Blatti, Stephan (2012). “A New Argument for Animalism,” ](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans102)[*Analysis* ](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans102)[(72)4, 685-690.](https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans102) [Blatti, Stephan (2019), “Animalism,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/animalism/#OurPers)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/animalism/#OurPers) [Bailey, Andrew (2015). “Animalism,” ](https://andrewmbailey.com/Animalism.pdf)[*Philosophy Compass* ](https://andrewmbailey.com/Animalism.pdf)[10(12), 867-883.](https://andrewmbailey.com/Animalism.pdf) [Bailey, Andrew (2016). “You are an Animal,” ](https://andrewmbailey.com/YouAreAnAnimal.pdf)[*Res Philosophica*](https://andrewmbailey.com/YouAreAnAnimal.pdf)[ (93)1, 205-218.](https://andrewmbailey.com/YouAreAnAnimal.pdf) [Bailey, Andrew, Allison Krile Thornton, and Peter van Elswyk (forthcoming), “Why Animalism Matters,” ](https://andrewmbailey.com/WAM.pdf)[*Philosophical Studies.*](https://andrewmbailey.com/WAM.pdf) [Bearzi, Maddalena and Craig Stanford (2010). “A Bigger, Better Brain: Observations of Chimpanzees and Dolphins Strengthen the Notion that Humanlike Intelligence may not be Uniquely Human,” ](https://www.americanscientist.org/article/a-bigger-better-brain)[*American Scientist.*](https://www.americanscientist.org/article/a-bigger-better-brain) [Descartes, René (1641). ](http://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1641.pdf)[*Meditations on First Philosophy.*](http://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1641.pdf) [Duncan, Matt (forthcoming), “Animalism is Either False or Uninteresting (Perhaps Both),” ](https://www.academia.edu/41650697/Animalism_is_Either_False_or_Uninteresting_Perhaps_Both_)[*American Philosophical Quarterly.*](https://www.academia.edu/41650697/Animalism_is_Either_False_or_Uninteresting_Perhaps_Both_) [Hasker, William and Charles Taliferro, (2019). “Afterlife,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/afterlife/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/afterlife/) [Hershenov, David B. (2013). “Who Doesn’t Have a Problem of Too Many Thinkers?,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23460792)[*American Philosophical Quarterly* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23460792)[50(2), 203-208.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23460792) [Locke, John (1690). “On Identity and Diversity” (II.xxvii), An ](http://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf)[*Essay Concerning Human Understanding.*](http://earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf) [Madden, Rory (2016). “Human Persistence,” ](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10040838/1/human-persistence.pdf)[*Philosophers’ Imprint* ](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10040838/1/human-persistence.pdf)[(16)17.](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10040838/1/human-persistence.pdf) [Olson, Eric (1999). ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195134230.001.0001/acprof-9780195134230)[*The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195134230.001.0001/acprof-9780195134230)[. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195134230.001.0001/acprof-9780195134230) [Olson, Eric (2003). “An Argument for Animalism,” in ](https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101685!/file/animalism.pdf)[*Personal Identity,* ](https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101685!/file/animalism.pdf)[eds. R. Martin and J. Barresi, Blackwell, 318-334.](https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101685!/file/animalism.pdf) [Parfit, Derek (1984). ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[*Reasons and Persons.* ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085) [Thornton, Allison Krile (2016). “Varieties of Animalism,” *Philosophy Compass* 11(9)](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12340)[, 515-526.](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12340) [Thornton, Allison Krile (2019). “Disembodied Animals,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 56(2), 203-217.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/48570838?seq=1) [Wasserman, Ryan (2017). “Material Constitution,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/#Eli)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/#Eli) ### Related Essays [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/animalizm-ve-kisisel-ozdeslik-biz-hayvan-miyiz-kristin-seemuth-whaley/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity.pdf). ### About the Author [Kristin Seemuth Whaley](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Seemuth-Whaley) teaches philosophy at Carroll University in Wisconsin. She specializes in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, and she is a recipient of the AAPT Grant for Innovations in Teaching. [KristinSeemuthWhaley.com](http://kristinseemuthwhaley.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* *[1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)**.* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** animalism, personal identity, Seemuth-Whaley --- ### [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) **Published:** February 6, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the ethical theory known as "virtue ethics," which focusses on having good character and acting on it. **Content:** Author: David Merry Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 1000 Think of the (morally) best person you know. It could be a friend, parent, teacher, religious leader, thinker, or activist. The person you thought of is probably kind, brave, and wise. They are probably not greedy, cruel, or foolish. The first list of ‘character traits’ (*kind, brave, etc.)* are *virtues,* and the second list (*arrogant, greedy, etc.)* are *vices*. Virtues are ways in which people are good; vices are ways in which people are bad. This essay presents *virtue ethics,* a theory that sees virtues and vices as central to understanding who we should be, and what we should do. [![The main characters from The Wizard of Oz. Each has a vice, but they are seeking to become more virtuous.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/the-wizard-of-oz-tin-man-dorothy-lion-scarecrow.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/the-wizard-of-oz-tin-man-dorothy-lion-scarecrow.jpg?ssl=1)The main characters from The Wizard of Oz. Each has a vice, but together they are seeking to become more virtuous. ### 1. Virtue and Happiness Virtues are excellent traits of character.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) They shape how we act, think, and feel. They make us who we are. Virtues are acquired through good habits, over a long period of time. #### 1.1. Eudaimonia According to Aristotle (384-322 BCE) virtues are those, and only those, character traits we need to be happy.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Many virtue ethicists today agree.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) These virtue ethicists are called *eudaimonists,* after the Greek word *eudaimonia,* usually translated as “happiness,” “flourishing,” or “well-being*.*”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) For eudaimonists, happiness is more than a feeling: it involves living well with others and pursuing worthwhile goals. This includes cultivating strong relationships, and succeeding at such projects as raising a family, fighting for justice, and (moderate yet enthusiastic) enjoyment of pleasure.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Eudaimonists believe our happiness is not easily separated from that of other people. Many would consider the happiness of their friends and family as part of their own. Eudaimonists may extend this to complete strangers, and non-human animals. Similarly for causes or ideals: eudaimonists believe complicity in injustice and deceit reduces a person’s happiness.,[\[6\]](#_ftn6) If eudaimonists are right about happiness, then it is plausible that we need virtues such as honesty, kindness, gratitude and justice to be happy. This is not to say that the virtues will guarantee happiness. But eudaimonists believe we cannot be truly happy without them. One concern is that vicious people often seem happy. For example, dictators live in palaces, apparently rather pleasantly. Eudaimonists may not think this amounts to happiness, but many would disagree. And if dictators can be happy, then we certainly can be happy without the virtues. Answering this objection is an ongoing project for eudaimonists.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) #### 1.2. Emotion, Intelligence, and Developing Virtue Eudaimonists believe emotions are essential to happiness, and that our emotions are shaped by our habits. Good emotional habits are a question of balance. For example, eudaimonists argue that honest people habitually *want to* and *enjoy* telling the truth, but not so much that they will ignore all other considerations–a habit of enjoying pointing out other people’s shortcomings will leave us friendless, and so is not part of honesty.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Because virtue requires balancing competing considerations, such as telling the truth and considering other people’s feelings, virtue also requires experience in making moral decisions. Virtue ethicists call this intellectual ability *practical intelligence,* or *wisdom.*[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 2. Virtue and Right Action Virtue ethicists believe we can use virtue to understand how we should act, or what makes actions right. According to some virtue ethicists, an action is right if, and only if, it is what a virtuous person would characteristically do under the circumstances.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) On rare occasions, virtuous people do the wrong thing. But this is not acting *characteristically.* #### 2.1. Being Specific “Do what virtuous people would do” is not very specific, and we may be left wondering what the theory is actually saying we should do. One way to make it more specific is to generate rules for each of the virtues and vices, called “v-rules.” Two examples of v-rules are: be kind, don’t be cruel. The v-rules give specific guidance in many cases: writing an email just to hurt someone’s feelings is cruel, so don’t do it.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Unfortunately, the virtues can conflict: if a friend asks whether we like their new partner, it may be more honest to say we do *not*, but kinder to say we do. In this case it is hard to say what the virtuous person would do. Virtue ethicists might respond that other ethical theories will also struggle to give clear guidance in hard cases.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Second, they might try to understand how a virtuous person would think about the situation. Remember that virtuous people have practical intelligence, and habitually care about other people’s happiness and telling the truth. So they may consider a lot of particular details, including how close the friendship is, how bad the partner is, how gently the friend may be told.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) This may not provide a specific answer, but virtue ethicists hope they can at least provide a helpful model for thinking about hard cases.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) #### 2.2. Explaining Why We have seen how virtue ethics tells us *what* to do. But we also want to know *why* we should do it. Virtue ethicists point out that if we ask virtuous people, they will explain why they did what they did.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Their reasoning results from their excellent emotional habits and practical intelligence–that is, from their virtue. And if we want to be happy, we need to cultivate virtue. So these should be our reasons too. But in explaining their decision, the virtuous person won’t necessarily mention virtue. They might, for example, say, “I wanted to avoid hurting their feelings, so I told the truth gently.”[\[16\]](#_ftn16) It might then seem that *something other than* virtue–in our example, the importance of other people’s feelings–explains why the action is right*.* But then *this other thing* should be central to ethical theory, instead of virtue. Virtue ethicists may respond that the moral weight of *this other thing* depends on which character traits are virtues. Accordingly, if kindness were not a virtue, there may be no moral reason to care about others’ feelings.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### 3. Conclusion Virtue ethicists recommend reflecting on the character traits we need to be happy. They hope this will help us make better moral decisions. Virtue ethics may not always yield clear answers, but perhaps acknowledging moral uncertainty is not a vice. ### Notes \[1\] Others may define virtue as admirable or merely good traits of character. For additional definitions of virtue and understandings of virtue ethics, see Hursthouse and Pettigrove’s “Virtue Ethics.” \[2\] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book One, Chapter 9, Lines 1099b25-29. For this interpretation, see Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness,* p. 6. \[3\] Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, pp. 165-169, “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, p. 226, Foot, *Natural Goodness*, pp. 99-116. There are many other accounts of virtue worth considering. One major alternative is sentimentalist accounts, such as that of Hume and Zagbzebski, who define virtues as those character traits that attract love or admiration. Some scholars argue that Confucian ethics is a virtue ethic, though this is debated: see Wong, “Chinese Ethics.” Also see John Ramsey’s [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/). For an African understanding of virtue, see Thaddeus Metz’s [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/). \[4\] Hursthouse has a detailed and accessible discussion of the merits of different translations of *eudaimonia* in *On Virtue Ethics,* pp. 9-10. \[5\] Some people find this account of virtue surprising because they think virtue must involve sacrificing one’s own happiness for the sake of other people, and living like a saint, a monk, or just being a really boring and miserable person. In this case it may be more helpful to think in terms of ‘good character’ than ‘virtue’. David Hume amusingly argued that some alleged virtues, such as humility, celibacy, silence, and solitude, were vices. See his *Enquiry* 9.1. \[6\] The idea that injustice erodes everybody’s happiness is *not* to deny that it especially harms people who are treated unjustly. However, eudaimonists consider *being* unjust, or *deceiving* others to be bad for us. \[7\] For a compelling discussion of this objection to eudaimonism, see Blackburn, *Being Good,* pp. 112-118*.* Eudaimonists have been trying to answer this objection for a long time. Indeed, arguing that it is more beneficial to be just than unjust is one of the major themes of Plato’s *Republic.* For more recent attempts to make the case, see Hursthouse’s *On Virtue Ethics,* Chapter 8, or Foot, *Natural Goodness,* especially Chapter 7. See also Kiki Berk’s [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/). \[8\] The idea that the virtues involve finding a balance is called ‘the doctrine of the mean.’ See *Nicomachean Ethics,* Book II, Chapter 6, lines 1106b30-1107a5. For one contemporary account of the emotional aspects of virtue, see Hursthouse’s *On Virtue Ethics,* pp.108-121. \[9\] Aristotle discusses practical intelligence in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 6. For a contemporary account see Hursthouse’s *On Virtue Ethics,* pp. 59-62. \[10\] Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics,* pp. 28-29. This is sometimes called a qualified-agent account. For some alternatives, see van Zyl’s “Virtue Ethics and Right Action”. \[11\] Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics,* pp. 28-29. \[12\] For other moral theories, see [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman and [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz. When reading, you might consider whether these theories would give you clearer guidance about your friend’s partner. \[13\] See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* Book 2, chapter 9, lines 1109a25-30. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* pp. 128-129. \[14\] For two examples of how virtue ethics may be helpfully applied to tough moral decisions, see Hursthouse’s “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, and Foot’s “Euthanasia”. \[15\] Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics and Abortion”, especially p. 227, pp. 234-237. “Do what a virtuous person would do” is only supposed to tell us what we should *do,* not how we should think*.* \[16\] This objection is discussed in Shafer-Landau’s *The Fundamentals of Ethics,* pp. 272-274. \[17\] On this connection between facts about morality on facts about virtue and human happiness, see Hursthouse “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, pp. 236-238. ### References [Aristotle. ](https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/960833F3F69116D70510F59BBA7EFDED#overview)[*Nicomachean Ethics*](https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/960833F3F69116D70510F59BBA7EFDED#overview)[*.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/960833F3F69116D70510F59BBA7EFDED#overview)[C. 355-322 BCE.](https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/960833F3F69116D70510F59BBA7EFDED#overview)[ Trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge UP. 2014.](https://www.cambridge.org/highereducation/books/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics/960833F3F69116D70510F59BBA7EFDED#overview) [Blackburn, S. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/being-good-9780192853776?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Being Good.* ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/being-good-9780192853776?cc=us&lang=en&)[Oxford UP. 2001.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/being-good-9780192853776?cc=us&lang=en&) [Boxill, B. “How Injustice Pays.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265004)[*Philosophy and Public Affairs,* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265004)[9(4): 359-371. 1980.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265004) [Foot, P. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198235089.001.0001/acprof-9780198235088)[*Natural Goodness.*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198235089.001.0001/acprof-9780198235088)[ Oxford UP. 2001.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198235089.001.0001/acprof-9780198235088) [Foot, P. “Euthanasia”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(2): 85–112. 1977.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264937) [Foot, P. “Moral Beliefs.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544606)[*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544606)[59: 83-104. 1958.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544606) [Hume, ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm)[*An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm)[ 1777.](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4320/4320-h/4320-h.htm) [Hursthouse, R. “Virtue Theory and Abortion.”](https://philpapers.org/rec/HURVTA)[ *Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HURVTA)[. 20(3): 223-246. 1991.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HURVTA) [Hursthouse, R. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199247994.001.0001/acprof-9780199247998)[*On Virtue Ethics.*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199247994.001.0001/acprof-9780199247998)[ Oxford UP. 1999.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199247994.001.0001/acprof-9780199247998) [Hursthouse, Rosalind and Glen Pettigrove, “Virtue Ethics”. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/)[(Winter 2018 Edition), Zalta, E.N (ed.). 2018,](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/ethics-virtue/) [Nussbaum, M. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fragility-of-goodness/B212012979833A828690B9CA907A87BF)[*The Fragility of Goodness.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fragility-of-goodness/B212012979833A828690B9CA907A87BF)[Cambridge UP. 2nd Edition, 2001.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fragility-of-goodness/B212012979833A828690B9CA907A87BF) [van Zyl, L. “Virtue Ethics and Right Action”. In Russell, D. C (ed.) ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-virtue-ethics/D53CC45020E7D790701CD4136FB005ED)[*The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-virtue-ethics/D53CC45020E7D790701CD4136FB005ED)[Cambridge UP. 2013.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-virtue-ethics/D53CC45020E7D790701CD4136FB005ED) [Plato. ](https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0168)[*Republic.*](https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0168) [C. 375 BCE. Trans. Paul Shorey. Harvard UP. 1969.](https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0168) [Shafer-Landau, R. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-fundamentals-of-ethics-9780190058333?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Fundamentals of Ethics*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-fundamentals-of-ethics-9780190058333?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Fourth Edition. Oxford UP. 2017.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-fundamentals-of-ethics-9780190058333?cc=us&lang=en&) [Wong, D. “Chinese Ethics”. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/ethics-chinese/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition)*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/ethics-chinese/)[. Zalta, E.N (ed). 2021.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/ethics-chinese/) [Zagzebski, L.T. ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190655846.001.0001/acprof-9780190655846)[*Exemplarist Moral Theory.* ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190655846.001.0001/acprof-9780190655846)[Oxford UP. 2017.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190655846.001.0001/acprof-9780190655846) ### Related Essays [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/) by Ian Tully [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/virtue-ethics-.pdf). ### About the Author David Merry’s research is mostly about ethics and dialectic in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, although he also occasionally works on contemporary ethics and philosophy of medicine. He received a Ph.D. from the Humboldt University of Berlin, and an M.A in philosophy from the University of Auckland. He is co-editor of [*Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity*](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-70817-7). He offers interactive, discussion-based online philosophy classes and maintains a blog at [Kayepos.com](https://www.kayepos.com/). He teaches at the National University of Singapore. [philpeople.org/profiles/david-merry/](https://philpeople.org/profiles/david-merry/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), and [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** Aristotle, eudaimonia, happiness, hursthouse, Nicomachean Ethics, virtue, virtue ethics --- ### [The Prisoner's Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/) **Published:** April 24, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: [Jason Wyckoff](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Wyckoff) Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/ "Social and Political Philosophy")Word Count: 1000 What is the relationship between being rational and producing good results? One might think that rational people, acting rationally on good information, will always produce good outcomes for themselves, and maybe for others too. But consider William Poundstone’s description of a widely discussed case: “Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don’t have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a Faustian bargain. If he testifies against his partner, he will go free while the partner will get three years in prison on the main charge. Oh, yes, there is a catch…If *both* prisoners testify against each other, both will be sentenced to two years in jail.”1 We’ll call our prisoners Orange and Black. This matrix illustrates the possible outcomes, with Orange’s sentence listed first and Black’s listed second: [![Prisoner's Dilemma Matrix](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/screen-shot-2014-04-23-at-11-58-08-am.png?resize=492%2C218)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/screen-shot-2014-04-23-at-11-58-08-am.png) If we assume the only thing each prisoner cares about is minimizing her own sentence and that the two prisoners can’t communicate with each other, it’s rational for each prisoner to testify—even though this produces the second-worst outcome for each prisoner. No matter what Black does, Orange gets a lighter sentence by testifying, and vice-versa. “Testify” is therefore the *dominant strategy* for both players and Testify/Testify is a *dominant strategy equilibrium* (the outcome produced by everyone’s adoption of their dominant strategy). ### 1. Significance We’ll use the language of game theory—a field in the study of decision-making—and call this scenario a game, with players. Let’s introduce some generic terms, and call choices like remaining silent “cooperation” (with the other player) and choices like testifying “defection.” In a PD, mutual cooperation produces a pretty good outcome (second-best from the perspective of each player, best overall in terms of total preference-satisfaction), but mutual cooperation is rationally precluded because each player can see that defection is the better option *for her*, no matter what the other player does. So a game has a PD structure when mutual cooperation is second-best for everyone, but the players’ attempts to get the best results for themselves end up producing the outcome they all regard as second-worst. The bottom line is that rational people, behaving rationally, can produce very bad outcomes. ### 2. Iterations So far, we’ve seen what happens when the PD is played once. But what if it’s played multiple times by the same players? For somewhat technical reasons, mutual cooperation may be unstable if the players know how many times the game will be played.2 Things are different, however, if it’s unknown when the last round will be (an indefinitely iterated game). Interestingly, under such conditions *cooperative strategies work well*. A particularly effective (and simple) strategy is *tit-for-tat*, in which the player cooperates in the first round, and from then on the player does what the other player did in the previous round. This punishes defection with immediate but short-lived consequences—“you just defected, so now I’m denying you the benefits of my cooperation. But I’ll cooperate if you cooperate.” In *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Robert Axelrod says of tit-for-tat, “\[w\]hat accounts for \[its\] robust success is its combination of being nice, retaliatory, forgiving, and clear.”3 It’s nice because it’s initially cooperative, avoiding trouble. Though it punishes defection, it forgives by rewarding a return to cooperative behavior. And it’s easy to recognize and understand. It’s worth noting that tit-for-tat is just one among many possible “nice strategies.” In iterated PDs, nice strategies tend overwhelmingly to deliver better results than strategies that are not nice.4 The lesson: be cooperative until the other player defects, and then react but forgive. Think long-term and gain trust. ### 3. Applications So then, where’s the philosophy? Consider one domain in which the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been influential: ethics. Some philosophers have argued (controversially) that we might develop moral principles from the self-interested reasoning of participants in a PD. They hold that by accepting ethical constraints on behavior, we all achieve better results in the long term.5 Rather than simply try to maximize our welfare, we should be “constrained maximizers.” Here, we might interrogate the use of the PD model. Can it supply moral reasons to constrain behavior toward the disadvantaged and those with less power, with whom the powerful don’t interact on the equal footing of players in a PD? If so, how? The PD has also influenced political philosophy. Thomas Hobbes famously argued that in the state of nature, without a government, people’s attempts to maximize their own gains lead to violence, constant fear, and lives that are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”6 Some contemporary social contract theorists have suggested that Hobbes was thinking of the state of nature as a PD—a situation in which universal cooperation can’t be secured because each person has decisive reasons to be non-cooperative, so the result is universal serial defection—a state of war. By establishing a state, we change the payoff structure by *making defection more costly*, thereby avoiding the PD. But anarchists can also help themselves to the lessons we’ve learned here. They might argue that a condition of statelessness is more like an *iterated* PD since people are looking to do well in the long run, not just immediately. Under such conditions, perhaps cooperation evolves without the establishment of a state. This may be a fruitful way to frame the debate between those who think a stateless world would be best and those who think government is necessary. Or perhaps it simply invites more questions: Is the state of nature *really* a PD? Is there such a thing as a “state of nature” at all? Is government—particularly democracy—about adjudicating competing interests, or rather about solving shared problems collectively? These are difficult questions, but there is little doubt that the Prisoner’s Dilemma has played a significant role in shaping recent debates on important problems in philosophy. ### Notes 1 Poundstone, 1993, 118. 2 Sorenson (2004) explains the matter quite well. 3 Axelrod, 1984, 54. 4 See Davis, 1997, 147. Jean Hampton (1997, 46) claims that cooperation in an iterated PD is rational only if one has assurance that one’s opponent will cooperate as well, but this is not true, as the tournament of computer programs discussed in Axelrod (1984) demonstrates. 5 See, e.g., Gauthier, 1986. 6 See Hobbes 1994 \[1668\], ch. 13. ### References [Axelrod, Robert (1984). *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books.](http://www.basicbooks.com/full-details?isbn=9780465005642) [Davis, Morton D. (1997). *Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction*. Dover Publications, Inc.](http://store.doverpublications.com/0486296725.html) [Gauthier, David (1986). *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/morals-by-agreement-9780198249924?q=Morals%20by%20Agreement&lang=en&cc=us) [Hampton, Jean (1997). *Political Philosophy*. Westview Press.](http://www.westviewpress.com/book.php?isbn=9780813308586) [Hobbes, Thomas (1994 \[1668\]). *Leviathan*. Hackett Publishing Company.](http://www.hackettpublishing.com/leviathan) [Poundstone, William (1993). *Prisoner’s Dilemma*. Anchor.](http://knopfdoubleday.com/book/133168/prisoners-dilemma/) [Sorenson, Roy (2004). “Paradoxes of Rationality,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Rationality* (Alfred Mele and Piers Rawling, eds). Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-rationality-9780195145397?q=The%20Oxford%20Handbook%20of%20Rationality&lang=en&cc=us) ### About the Author [Jason Wyckoff](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Wyckoff) earned a PhD in philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder, a JD at Georgetown University Law Center, and a BA from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Over the past several years he has published in the areas of ethics, social and political philosophy, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of religion. He has a taste for Scotch and a budget for Canadian whisky. [utah.academia.edu/JasonWyckoff](http://utah.academia.edu/JasonWyckoff) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** prisoner's dilemma, Wyckoff --- ### [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) **Published:** January 16, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the concept of indoctrination or what it is to indoctrinate someone, and whether that's problematic or bad or not. **Content:** Author: Chris Ranalli Categories: [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/), [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word Count: 998 words Schools are supposed to educate students by teaching them important facts and skills. However, schools are sometimes accused of *indoctrinating* students: e.g., coercing them into believing religious views, failing to present widely-accepted scientific facts, or promoting controversial moral or political views.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) But what is indoctrination anyway? Is it always bad? If so, why? Might some indoctrination be necessary, unavoidable, or even good? This essay overviews notable answers to these questions. [![An empty classroom.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/classroom.jpg?resize=656%2C438&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/classroom.jpg?ssl=1)An empty classroom. ### 1. What is Indoctrination? Theories of indoctrination are divided between “content” (*what* is taught), “method” (*how* it is taught), and “outcome” theories (the *results* of teaching).[\[2\]](#_ftn2) #### 1.1. Content: Ideology The *Ideology Theory of Indoctrination* is a popular *content*-based theory that claims that indoctrination differs from education when what’s being taught is an *ideology*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) An *ideology* is a worldview, a set of interconnected values and rigid beliefs about what the world is or should be like—which guide people’s thinking and action.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Ideologies include Marxism, Christianity, Humanism, Islam, Nazism, and Liberal Democracy, among other political and religious worldviews. The Ideology Theory of Indoctrination proposes if students are taught to believe, e.g., that Marxism is correct, that’s indoctrination because Marxism is an ideology. But why think that teaching ideology is always indoctrination? One reason is that teaching students to believe ideologies might seem at odds with the educational aim of fostering *intellectual virtues*, such as open-mindedness, curiosity, and sensitivity to evidence.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Intellectual virtues lead students to inquire, think critically, and support their beliefs with evidence.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Ideological thinking, in contrast, leads students to believe that controversial beliefs—e.g., the core doctrines—are indisputably true, established facts without evaluating the evidence. But the claim that indoctrination always involves teaching ideology has some counterintuitive implications. For one, it’s hard to see how teaching *without* ideology is possible.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Teaching students why, e.g., democracy is just, is ideological in the sense that it promotes democratic ideology. If ideological instruction is indoctrination, so is mainstream civic education, since it too promotes ideologies. But civic education and indoctrination *are* different. Proponents might reply by distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ ideology: bad ideologies are *false* or *unjustified* beliefs; good ideologies are true or justified beliefs, and teaching bad ideology is indoctrination, whereas teaching good ideology is not. The trouble is that it’s not always clear which ideologies are false or unjustified. Reasonable people disagree about many religious and political ideologies. This makes the Ideology Theory unhelpful for distinguishing indoctrination from education. #### 1.2. Method: Bypassing Rationality A promising *method* theory is the *Rationality-Bypassing Theory*. It says that indoctrination occurs when teachers get students to believe things without enabling them to rationally evaluate the beliefs. Consider students who are forced to attend classes where the instructors teach them that God exists in such a way that they’re not allowed to inquire or challenge it without penalty. Some would consider this to be indoctrination because the instruction seems to coerce the students into belief as opposed to allowing them to rationally evaluate the reasons for and against it for themselves.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This theory, however, faces challenges. First, while students’ knowledge may be merely memorized, indoctrination can equip them with knowledge of how to defend their beliefs. This can happen when, e.g., students are taught that God exists along with arguments for it and rebuttals to challenges. In this case, students *are able to* rationally engage with certain criticisms of their beliefs, but we’re still inclined to say that they were indoctrinated.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) The second is that it might be *good* to sometimes bypass students’ rationality: e.g., to help students acquire critical thinking skills, teachers must first get them to accept certain principles of reasoning *without challenging them*: debate can sometimes impede education.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) #### 1.3. Outcome: Dogmatism A major *outcome* theory says that indoctrination occurs when the teaching produces dogmatism about what one believes. Dogmatism is ignoring or dismissing relevant challenges to one’s beliefs.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This is the *Dogmatism Theory of Indoctrination*.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Consider ISIS instructors who teach their recruits that it’s wrong to disbelieve (fundamentalist) Islam. Their instruction results in *dogmatism* among their students because they have good reason to consider other possibilities, but are taught to ignore them. This seems like a bad case of dogmatism. But some cases of dogmatism seem to be good: e.g., are people who dogmatically refuse to consider climate change denialism seriously doing something wrong? If not, this opens the door to potentially unproblematic indoctrination as well. If some students are indoctrinated to believe what’s *true*, and thereby to dismiss the alternatives, they’re simply dismissing false positions. This seems good.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 2. Ethics and Indoctrination This takes us to ethics. Charging someone with indoctrination suggests that they did something wrong. But is indoctrination wrong? It depends on what indoctrination is. If indoctrination is a matter of teaching ideology, it’s wrong when it *misleads* students. Ideologies often give fixed answers to questions for which reasonable people can disagree: e.g., being taught that God *definitely* exists (or *definitely* does not exist) misleads students because it suggests that reasonable people don’t deny it when they do.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) If, however, indoctrination is a matter of getting students to believe something in a way that bypasses their rationality, this seems *disrespectful*. It seems wrong to bypass students’ rationality when they *can* rationally evaluate the belief. The Dogmatist Theory allows for *good* indoctrination: e.g., suppose students are taught that the Earth is round *and* they dogmatically believe it, as a result. They were never taught the challenges that, say, flat-earth conspiracy theorists raise against it. Still, maybe that’s innocuous indoctrination because doing otherwise gives them the false impression that it’s part of a serious debate when it isn’t. Misleading people seems wrong, after all. Some beliefs are rightly accepted without considering the alternatives that some erroneously take seriously.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 3. Conclusion Having a clearer understanding of indoctrination helps us to evaluate charges made against educators. It also helps us to evaluate why indoctrination is wrong, when it is. As we’ve seen, the answers aren’t straightforward. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Thiessen (1984) for an overview. See Merry (2005) for an overview and vindication in certain cases. For example, private religious schools have been accused of indoctrinating students into believing religious views, or for failing to impartially present scientific facts, like the age of the Earth. Private secular schools have also met charges of indoctrination. In the UK, the American School of London has recently been accused of so-called ‘racial indoctrination’. See Wolcock (2021). And public schools have been criticized for indoctrinating students for teaching evolution and for promoting moral or political views that some find problematic. For example, several public U.S. schools have been charged with ‘Marxist indoctrination’. In April 2021, Lt. Governor of Idaho, Janice McGeachin, formed the *Task Force to Examine Indoctrination in Idaho Education*. North Carolina has also taken formal measures to curb what it takes to be ‘indoctrination’ in public schools. See Greene (2021). German schools under the Nazi regime have been cited as indoctrinating students. See the Holocaust Encyclopedia (2021). Universities, the media, and social networks have also been accused of indoctrination. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Callan and Arena (2009). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See White (1967). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For this definition of ideology, see Fine & Sandstrom (1993). There are other definitions of ideology which define ideology as *beliefs or ways of thinking which prevent the believer from accurately interpreting reality*. According to this definition, ideologies are always *epistemically bad*, that is, bad with respect to getting knowledge and avoiding ignorance. See Mills (2017). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Many philosophers argue that a major aim of education is to foster intellectual virtues, like curiosity and open-mindedness. Critical thinking also seems to be an intellectual virtue. See Siegel (1988) See Pritchard (2013) and Baehr (2013) for the idea that education should aim at cultivating intellectual virtue. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Of course, having intellectual virtues does not guarantee true or justified beliefs. Intellectual virtues can help prevent one from forming false or unjustified beliefs, but having intellectual virtues does not guarantee that one will acquire true and justified beliefs. A student in a hostile environment, say, one where it’s extremely difficult to tell what’s true and what’s false, might make lots of mistakes despite their open-mindedness, curiosity, and sensitivity to evidence. For an introduction to the concept of epistemic justification, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is an example of the ‘paradox of indoctrination’. Education aims to produce students who hold beliefs rationally and open-mindedly, but that requires that students accept principles of reasoning methods that they either can’t or shouldn’t rationally evaluate. See Macmillan (1983). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Kleinig (1982) and Merry (2005) for this position. The Rationality-Bypassing Theory is connected to the idea that indoctrination is essentially a kind of *belief manipulation*. See also Yaffe (2003). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Callan and Arena (2019) for this objection. They write: “…the most flagrant indoctrinators will frequently appeal to chains of reasoning when teaching their beliefs. Religious or po­litical indoctrination, for example, will commonly involve instruction in standard argu­ments that purport to disclose the erroneous reasoning on which heresies are based. And some (though certainly not all) instances of indoctrination occur in venues entered into voluntarily by those who become victims of indoctrination” (Callan and Arena 2019, 108). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This can happen when there is a debate, but at least one ‘side’ of the debate approaches the topic from a highly misinformed position and so debating the issue can make that side appear more reasonable or evidence-based than it really is. In educational contexts, discussing and debating as though both sides are equally controversial can mislead students and thereby disrupt education. For example, if students are learning about the Holocaust, it would mislead students to have a serious discussion of Holocaust denialism (under the guise of ‘revisionism’) as an informed position about the history of the Holocaust. Sometimes people say that ‘both sides’ of a debate—for example, about climate change, or the effectiveness of vaccines—are equally worthy of serious consideration. This is incorrect when one ‘side’ is not a reasonable, informed position: there’s the presentation of different viewpoints as being equally reasonable (or equally problematic), which is motivated by wanting to appear fair to all sides, but this is misleading when at least one of the viewpoints is misinformed and unreasonable and so should not be presented as a view for serious consideration. This is referred to as ‘bothsidesing’. See Boyd (2017). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See Battaly (2018) for this way of thinking about dogmatism. What counts as a *relevant alternative* to one’s belief is philosophically controversial. Some philosophers say that a challenge or alternative belief is relevant when it is objectively likely to be true. Other philosophers say that an alternative is relevant when the believer has good reason to think that it’s likely to be true (even if it’s not objectively likely). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) I develop and defend a dogmatist or closed-mindedness theory in Ranalli (forthcoming). See also DiPaolo & Simpson (2016) for a dogmatism theory. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Some philosophers make this same type of claim about echo chambers. For example, see Lackey (2021). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Some philosophers make this kind of argument for no-platforming: that platforming people with false or repugnant positions essentially misleads students about which positions are really part of serious debate. See Levy (2019). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) There can be different ways in which dogmatism, that is, the tendency to hold a belief without considering seriously the alternatives to it, can be judged to be good or bad. One way is by focusing on whether it is *epistemically* good or bad, where this means roughly ‘good or bad with respect to keeping true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs’. See Fantl (2018) and Battaly (2018) for why open-mindedness is sometimes epistemically bad. This is different from *moral* and *prudential* evaluations of whether dogmatism is good or bad. Dogmatism might be judged to be epistemically good even if it is morally bad; or morally good even if it is epistemically bad; or morally and epistemically bad, but prudentially good, that is, good for the person who is dogmatic. An example of morally good but epistemically bad dogmatism would be a case in which the person holds a belief they acquired irrationally but owing to their irrationally held belief, they fail to consider seriously false morally-repugnant challenges to it. ### References [Baehr, J. (2013). 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(2008) Indoctrination and the Space of Reasons. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2008.00284.x)[*Educational Theory*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2008.00284.x)[, 11(2):193-212.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2008.00284.x) [Hess, D. E., & McAvoy, P. (2014). ](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315738871)[*The Political Classroom: Evidence and Ethics in Democratic Education*](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315738871)[. Routledge.](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315738871) [Kleinig, J. (1982). ](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophical-Issues-in-Education/Kleinig/p/book/9781138692947)[*Philosophical Issues in Education*](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophical-Issues-in-Education/Kleinig/p/book/9781138692947)[. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophical-Issues-in-Education/Kleinig/p/book/9781138692947) [Lackey, J. (2021). Echo Chambers, Fake News, and Social Epistemology. In ](https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0010)[*The Epistemology of Fake News*](https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0010)[. Oxford University Press.](https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0010) [Levy, N. (2019). No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming. ](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.29)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.29)[, ](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.29)[*5*](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.29)[(4), 487–502](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.29). [Macmillan, C. J. B. (1983). On Certainty and indoctrination. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485472)[*Synthese*](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485472)[, ](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485472)[*56*](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485472)[(3), 363–372.](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485472) [Merry, M. S. (2005). Indoctrination, Moral Instruction, and Nonrational Beliefs: A Place for Autonomy? ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2005.00002.x-i1)[*Educational Theory*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2005.00002.x-i1)[, ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2005.00002.x-i1)[*55*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2005.00002.x-i1)[(4), 399–420. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2005.00002.x-i1) [Mills, C. W. (2017). Ideology. In I. J. Kidd, J. Medina, & G. Pohlhaus (Eds.), ](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043.ch9)[*The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043.ch9)[. Routledge Handbooks Online.](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043.ch9) [*Press Release: Idaho Lt. Governor’s Task Force to Examine Indoctrination in Idaho Education Moves Forward, Begins Soliciting Public Feedback and Experiences*](https://idahodispatch.com/press-release-idaho-lt-governors-task-force-to-examine-indoctrination-in-idaho-education-moves-forward-begins-soliciting-public-feedback-and-experiences/)[. (2021, April 22). Idaho Dispatch](https://idahodispatch.com/press-release-idaho-lt-governors-task-force-to-examine-indoctrination-in-idaho-education-moves-forward-begins-soliciting-public-feedback-and-experiences/). [Pritchard, D. (2013). Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12022)[*Journal of Philosophy of Education*](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12022)[, ](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12022)[*47*](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12022)[(2), 236–247.](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12022) [Ranalli, C. (2022). Closed-minded belief and Indoctrination. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *59*(1), 61-80.](https://scholarlypublishingcollective.org/uip/apq/article/59/1/61/293913/Closed-minded-Belief-and-Indoctrination?fbclid=IwAR1Uj-WeowcYd5qRn8n5ckJAcs3Cj4-eU9XraEiJetr0ykG0KLvWqKzAYV8) [Siegel, H. (1988). ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23767283)[*Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23767283)[, New York: Routledge.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23767283) [United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. “Indoctrinating Youth.” Holocaust Encyclopedia](https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/indoctrinating-youth). Accessed \[November 2021\]. [White, J. P. (1967). Indoctrination. In R. S. Peters (Ed.) ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203861073-17/indoctrination-white)[*The Concept of Education*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203861073-17/indoctrination-white)[. Routledge](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203861073-17/indoctrination-white). [Woolcock, N. (2021). American School in London Accused of ‘Racial Indoctrination’. ](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/american-school-in-london-accused-of-racial-indoctrination-q73xg7bbj)[*The Times*](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/american-school-in-london-accused-of-racial-indoctrination-q73xg7bbj)*.* [Yaffe, G. (2003). Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00293.x)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00293.x)[, ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00293.x)[*67*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00293.x)[(2), 335–356.](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00293.x) ### Related Essays [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. 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Work on this essay was made possible by the project EXTREME (Extreme Beliefs: The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism), which received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. ### About the Author [Chris Ranalli](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ranalli) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at VU University Amsterdam. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. He specializes in epistemology, with interests in philosophy of mind and the intersection of epistemology and ethics. He is currently exploring topics in social and political epistemology. [chris-ranalli.weebly.com](https://chris-ranalli.weebly.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Logic & Reasoning, Philosophy of Education, Social & Political **Tags:** indoctrinate, indoctrination, Ranalli --- ### [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) **Published:** August 25, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Chelsea Haramia Category: [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the third in a three-part series on the topic of philosophical feminism. The first two parts, on the Sameness Approach to feminism and the Difference Approach to feminism, are by Annaleigh Curtis. The first essay can be viewed [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) and the second [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/).* Here is a common stereotype about women: “Women are less rational and more emotional.” Two questions immediately arise: Less rational than *what*? And more emotional than *what*? The straightforward answer is *men*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) A related answer is that women are less rational and more emotional *than they should be*. Putting these answers together, we discover certain assumptions in the original statement—that men are superior, and that men are the standard against which women are measured.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) These assumptions of masculine superiority and feminine inferiority may be reinforced through stereotypes, even when these stereotypes don’t explicitly assert a hierarchy between men and women.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Proponents of the *dominance* approach to feminism argue that injustice consists in unjust social relations of domination and subordination. Unjust power relations have been fundamental to the way that our discourse, our relations, and our institutions have been created and maintained. They have allowed the dominant group—men—to structure society and the very discussions we use to critique it in ways that maintain and reinforce the power they hold over subordinated groups and individuals. In sum, the dominance approach targets unequal power relations as the source of gender injustice. ![A feminine-looking crash test dummy head.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/crash-test.jpg?resize=646%2C768&ssl=1)A feminine-looking crash test dummy head. Not all unequal power relations are unjust. Parents commonly stand in an unequal yet just power relation to their children, for example. However, instances of gendered oppression also involve unequal power relations, and they involve not only the abuse of power but also the devaluation—and often dehumanization—of those who deviate from the dominant standard. As we saw in Part 2 of this series, the *difference* approach to feminism takes the existing conditions and tries to achieve justice *within* them.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) So, one might respond to the above stereotype by arguing that emotions and emotional thinking are actually quite valuable, and that women’s purported emotional maturity is an asset. The dominance theorist would reply that women should not be trying to prove to men that they are valuable.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This tacitly reinforces a system that assumes that dominant men should be the ones to decide who’s valuable in the first place, thereby reinforcing the power that the dominant have to make such determinations. The dominance approach instead criticizes the structures and conditions themselves, arguing that they are created and maintained by the powerful, namely, dominant men. Tacit and explicit assumptions about superiority and inferiority must be rejected in order to attain gender justice. Highlighting the value of stereotypically feminine traits fails to expose the fact that merely being-a-woman connotes inferiority. So, for the dominance theorist, it’s not a question of how *valuable* stereotypically feminine characteristics are; it’s a question of how power and domination are already *built into our assumptions* about sex and gender differences. If these assumptions form the basis for our everyday discussions, then, as Marilyn Frye observes, “the powerful normally determine what is said and sayable.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This kind of dominance arguably exists not only in discourse but also in the systems and institutions that structure our lives. If socially constructed sex and gender differences enforce the perceived inferiority of women, then this could require a “shift in perspective from gender as difference to gender as dominance.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) For example, Catherine MacKinnon criticizes the legal system as constructed from the point of view of the dominant, noting, for example, the fact that female rape victims do not have a say in what is considered rape because “rape is defined according to what men think violates women.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8)The the legal system’s past stance on marital rape supports this idea. It wasn’t until 1993 that it became legally possible in all 50 states for a man to rape his wife. Before that, a man could rape his wife, and the legal system would deem it neither rape nor a crime. Or, consider something as seemingly benign and generic as automobile safety and design. Crash test dummies are typically made based on the average male body, and this body falsely represents the average American person. The result is a disproportionate number of women suffering injury or death in automobile accidents simply because they are women.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) The crash test dummy is a material manifestation of what Audre Lorde calls the “mythical norm.”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) However, Lorde extends dominance concerns beyond simple sex hierarchies and brings these considerations to bear on power relations based on age, race, class, sexuality, and other defining characteristics. She says “\[i\]n america, this \[mythical\] norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, \[and\] Christian.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Her goal is not to identify differences per se; it is to identify when difference is presented as inferiority, and then to notice that this purported inferiority is used to devalue and dehumanize subordinated human beings. When this power results in the dehumanization of the subordinated, it is powerful enough to dictate who lives and who dies. It determines whose lives are prioritized and whose lives are considered discardable by the very institutions that structure and design society. This explains why many women face an undue risk of death from automobile accidents. And it explains why domination often entails physical violation for members of subordinated groups—as can be seen from the high risk of violence that trans women of color face, which is arguably compounded by their membership in multiple subordinated groups.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) If the domination of women and other subordinated groups renders them powerless in an important sense, then one might worry that the dominance approach implies that the subordinated are hopelessly oppressed.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) To teach others that their oppression is the result of powerful, systemic forces that are beyond their control can itself be disempowering. Empowering the oppressed is an important part of fighting oppression, but this also raises questions of whether and when the oppressed themselves should expend the time and energy required to fight to have their humanity respected, and of what role privileged and powerful individuals should play in the fight against oppression.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) In sum, the *sameness* approach prioritizes gender equality, the *difference* approach aims to elevate feminine attributes, and the *dominance* approach targets the structures and systems that maintain the subordination of women and others. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) In step with Annaleigh Curtis’s caveat in Parts 1 & 2 of this series, I pause here to note the following: I write about men and women in this essay as if those categories were real and exhausted the gendered possibility space. I do this mostly because the thinkers I discuss tended to do so. However, most feminists today accept that there is no hard and fast biological or social binary with men on one hand and women on the other. For an overview of ways in which sex, gender identity and expression, and sexual orientation come apart, see [here](https://www.chp.edu/-/media/chp/departments-and-services/adolescent-and-young-adult-medicine/documents/gender-and-sexual-development/basic-definitions-sogie.pdf?la=en). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) De Beauvoir, Simone. *The Second Sex (Introduction)* in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Haslanger, Sally. “Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground” in Haslanger, Sally. *Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) And as we also saw in Part 2, this same critique can be leveled at the sameness approach outlined in Part 1. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) MacKinnon, Catharine. “Difference and Domination: On Sex Discrimination” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Frye, Marilyn. *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory*. California: The Crossing Press, 1983, p. 105. This means that the dominant create and impose definitions and thereby determine our discourse according to their standards. In this same work, Frye gives an example of the dominant controlling the discourse, noting that “when the Secretary of Defense calls something a peace negotiation…then whatever it is that he called a peace negotiation is an instance of negotiating peace” (p. 105). These issues are now known as instances of *epistemic injustice*: for an introduction, see [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) MacKinnon, Catharine. “Difference and Domination: On Sex Discrimination” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 251. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) MacKinnon, Catharine. “Desire and Power” and “Sex and Violence: A Perspective” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 267. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in 2019, a female wearing a seat belt had a 73% greater chance of being seriously injured in a frontal crash than a male involved in the same kind and severity of crash. See also: Criado-Perez, Caroline. *Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World Designed for Men*. New York: Abrams Press, 2019 or overview of the issues in: [Criado-Perez, Caroline. “The deadly truth about a world built for men – from stab vests to car crashes.” ](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/23/truth-world-built-for-men-car-crashes)[*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/23/truth-world-built-for-men-car-crashes)[. February 23, 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/23/truth-world-built-for-men-car-crashes). Arguably, the dominant group’s interests are routinely prioritized, often at the cost of the bodily integrity of the subordinated, because the dominant group holds a vast amount of decision-making power in society. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Lorde, Audre. “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 293. By “mythical” Lorde does not mean that this norm is not real. While it is a myth that this idealized person accurately represents the human norm, the norm and its oppressive effects are nonetheless very real. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Ibid. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Barrouquere, Brett. “Under Attack” in *Intelligence Report* published by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Spring Issue, Feb. 20, 2019. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Judith Butler levels this kind of criticism against Catherine MacKinnon in Butler, Judith. *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Lorde, Audre. “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. ### References [Barrouquere, Brett. “Under Attack” in ](https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2019/under-attack)[*Intelligence Report,*](https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2019/under-attack)[ published by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Spring Issue, Feb. 20, 2019.](https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2019/under-attack) [Butler, Judith. ](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=819)[*The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection.*](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=819)[ Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=819) [Criado-Perez, Caroline. ](https://www.abramsbooks.com/product/invisible-women_9781419729072/)[*Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World Designed for Men*](https://www.abramsbooks.com/product/invisible-women_9781419729072/)[. New York: Abrams Press, 2019.](https://www.abramsbooks.com/product/invisible-women_9781419729072/) [Criado-Perez, Caroline. “The deadly truth about a world built for men – from stab vests to car crashes.” ](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/23/truth-world-built-for-men-car-crashes)[*The Guardian*](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/23/truth-world-built-for-men-car-crashes)[. February 23, 2019.](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/feb/23/truth-world-built-for-men-car-crashes) [de Beauvior, Simone. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Second Sex (Introduction)* ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&) [Frye, Marilyn. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/197801/politics-of-reality-by-marilyn-frye/)[*The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/197801/politics-of-reality-by-marilyn-frye/)[. California: The Crossing Press, 1983.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/197801/politics-of-reality-by-marilyn-frye/) [Lorde, Audre. “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[ New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&) [MacKinnon, Catharine. “Desire and Power” and “Sex and Violence: A Perspective” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[ New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&) [MacKinnon, Catharine. “Difference and Domination: On Sex Discrimination” in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&)[ New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?cc=us&lang=en&) ### Related Essays [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/feminism3.pdf "feminism3") in PDF. ### About the Author [Chelsea Haramia](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Haramia/) is an associate professor of philosophy at Spring Hill College, Alabama, and guardian of two qualitatively identical, probably numerically distinct, cats named Hesperus and Phosphorus. [ChelseaHaramia.com](http://chelseaharamia.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** dominance, Feminism, feminist philosophy, Haramia --- ### [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) **Published:** July 6, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** "Misogyny" refers to systems that uphold gender-based oppression against women and girls. What those systems are, and how they operate, is a subject of philosophical debate. Here we explain two prominent accounts of these systems and discuss whether misogyny can be understood independently of broader systems of oppression. **Content:** Authors: Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey Categories: [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/) Word count: 998 The term *misogyny*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) refers to systems that uphold gender-based oppression against women and girls. What those systems are, and how they operate, is a subject of philosophical debate. Here we explain two prominent accounts of these systems and discuss whether misogyny can be understood independently of broader systems of oppression. [![Shepard Fairey's 2017 Triptych: "We the People: Greater Than Fear, Defend Dignity, & Protect Each Other"](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/shepard-fairey.png?resize=656%2C331&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/shepard-fairey.png?ssl=1)Shepard Fairey’s 2017 Triptych: “We the People: Greater Than Fear, Defend Dignity, & Protect Each Other” ### 1. Misogyny as Dehumanization According to the *dehumanization* theory of misogyny, misogynistic actions, behaviors, institutions, and practices are those that treat women as less than full persons.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The root of misogyny is the *objectification* of women: instead of being treated as persons, women are treated as mere objects,[\[3\]](#_ftn3) in many cases, *as* bodies—or worth no more than their bodies—and their bodies as mere instruments for ends other than their own.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The *Handmaid’s Tale*, e.g., depicts a world in which women’s social value is wholly tied to their reproductive utility.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. Misogyny as Enforcement According to an alternative theory from contemporary philosopher Kate Manne, misogyny is the systemic social *enforcement* of patriarchy[\[6\]](#_ftn6)—the attitudes (i.e., anxieties, commitments) and actions that maintain or reproduce a social order of women’s subordination to men.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Specifically, misogyny enforces social expectations about entitlement, or lack thereof, to certain moral goods and services. Manne calls this the “moral economy of gender,” which includes: - what *women* owe *men*: - respect, love, nurturing, safety, acceptance, security; - kindness, compassion, moral attention, care, sympathy; and: - what *women* cannot take from *men*: - positions of leadership, authority, influence, money (forms of power, status, prestige); - pride, reputation, social standing (freedom from shame or public embarrassment). Misogyny primarily involves punishing “bad women”—women who fail to provide what the moral economy of gender dictates they owe or cannot take. Think of the hostility women face when they refuse to smile when catcalled on the street,[\[8\]](#_ftn8) or the guilt felt by women who are primary wage-earners and the related shame felt by their male partners.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) According to the dehumanization theory, misogyny involves treating women as less than fully human. The enforcement theory, however, understands misogyny as treating women as fully human, and *as such* appropriately subject to anger, hostility, and resentment when they “act badly.” ### 3. Naming Misogyny Naming something ‘misogynist’ identifies it as behavior that perpetuates women’s subordination or as influenced by attitudes that do. On both the dehumanization and enforcement theories, “misogynistic” is used to describe particular actions (e.g., slut-shaming) and attitudes (e.g., hostility to women with authority), as well as broader social practices and institutions (e.g., Title IX processes[\[10\]](#_ftn10)). On both theories, people who hold misogynist attitudes often love and care about individual women. In fact, someone who acts misogynistically, enforcing women’s subordination, is likely to love “good women” who act in accordance with the moral economy of gender or do not resist such subordination. You can love women—or even *be* a woman—and be a misogynist. ### 4. An Objection to Accounts of Misogyny The dehumanization and enforcement theories both acknowledge that different people experience misogyny differently. But, both aim to articulate a singular conception of misogyny and assume that it can be understood apart from other forms of oppression. Some object to attempts to define misogyny in this way on the grounds that it cannot be isolated from other systems of oppression:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) e.g., Linda Martín Alcoff writes: “Abolishing the patriarchy can’t solve gender-based discrimination or subordination because the patriarchy isn’t the root of the problem.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Patriarchy—the order enforced by misogyny—always functions alongside other forms of oppression (i.e., white supremacy, ableism, heterosexism, colonialism).[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Focusing on any one system independently of the others will not adequately describe the phenomenon in question. Moreover, one may think that attempts to define misogyny lead to wrongly treating the experiences of relatively privileged women (i.e., straight, white, cis, wealthy) as paradigmatic: e.g., Manne’s moral economy of gender focuses on *moral* rather than *physical* labor. She excludes women’s physical bodies and sex, childcare, housework, childbearing, and child-raising from the list of relevant goods and services.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) This makes central and definitional the experience of white, wealthy cis women, as much of this domestic labor is demanded of women of color. Similarly, enforcing norms about the physical body is imperative to understanding trans women’s experiences; trans people are over four times more likely to be victims of violent crime than cisgender people.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) This concern is reflected in language used to describe gender-based oppression. The widespread use of terms like misogynoir[\[16\]](#_ftn16), and transmisogyny[\[17\]](#_ftn17), indicate that “misogyny” is viewed by many as an inappropriate label for their experiences. Rather than attempt to analyze each dimension of oppression individually, an intersectional analysis insists that all systems of oppression operate concurrently and interrelatedly. Each person is subject to intersecting forces that lead to distinctive experiences based on their multiple social identities. So, e.g., Black women’s experiences are not complications of or mere aggregations of the “primary” oppressions faced by (white) women and Black people (men). Instead, an intersectional analysis insists that our many social identities all together shape how we operate within broader social contexts.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Intersectional analysis starts from the context of one’s identity. As such, it also takes into account historical and broader social contexts, recognizing that ending oppression will require different things in different times and places.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Some Latina feminists argue that pursuing justice requires tackling the accumulation of all systems of oppression taken together as a whole.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) They argue that rather than focusing on misogyny, the primary object of analysis and political resistance should be *oppression*. This approach envisions feminism*s*[\[21\]](#_ftn21)—not a single universal feminism—as localized practices that are sensitive to particular social and historical conditions.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ### 5. Conclusion Naming when, where, and how misogyny occurs can help us make sense of our experiences and to see how those experiences are related to those of others. This serves broader political organizing and social movements to end gender-based oppression. Whether this can or should be done by identifying a general conception of misogyny, or is better done by embracing localized analyses of oppressive conditions that include gender-based oppression, remains a matter of philosophical debate. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The term comes from the Greek words meaning “hatred of women” (Greek: misein = to hate; gynē = women). “Misogyny,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d.). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Yap, Audrey. “Misogyny and Dehumanization,” *APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy* 18, no. 2 (2019); David Livingstone Smith’s work develops the notion of dehumanization as central to oppression. Smith, David Livingstone. *Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others* (New York: St. Martins Press, 2011). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Nussbaum, Martha C. “Objectification.” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 24, no. 4 (1995): 249–91; Langton, Rae. “Autonomy Denial in Objectification.” *Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Martha Nussbaum identifies seven ways “to treat a person as a thing”: (1) instrumentality, (2) denial of autonomy, (3) inertness, (4) fungibility, (5) violability, (6) ownership, and (7) denial of subjectivity. Langton adds to the list: (8) ‘reduction to body’, (9) ‘reduction to appearance’, and (10) ‘silencing.’What each of these have in common is understanding, treatment, or representation of women as not-persons, as mere things rather than subjects. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Kelland, Lindsay. “Conceptually Situating the Harm of Rape: An Analysis of Objectification.” *South African Journal of Philosophy* 30, no 2 (2011):168-183; Papadaki, Lina.“What is Wrong About Objectification?” *Current Controversies in Political Philosophy*, Thom Brooks (ed.), London: Routledge (2015): 87–99. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Atwood, Margaret. *The Handmaid’s Tale* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Manne, Kate. *Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 33. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Misogyny has a partner in this enforcement: *himpathy –* the positive, seemingly sympathetic reaction to men in situations in which they have been denied the goods to which patriarchy determines they are entitled. Manne (2019): 196-205. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Bosman, Julie. “A College Student Was Killed by a Man Whose Catcalls She Tried to Ignore, Prosecutors Say.” *The New York Times.* November 27, 2019. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Syrda, Joanna. “Spousal Relative Income and Male Psychological Distress.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 46, no. 6 (June 2020): 976–92. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) MacKinnon, Catharine A. In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education. *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 125, No. 7 (MAY 2016), pp. 2038-2105. Hänel, Hilkje C. “#MeToo and Testimonial Injustice: An Investigation of Moral and Conceptual Knowledge.” *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 48, no. 6 (July 2022): 833–59. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Yap, Audrey. “Misogyny and Dehumanization,” *APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy* 18, no. 2 (2019). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Alcoff suggests that we embrace an anti-imperial approach. This “requires a genuine reorientation of feminist theory toward the quotidian or the everyday, toward a democratic epistemology that takes the activist oppressed as the ultimate makers of their own liberation. Intersectional approaches will necessarily lead to pluralist feminist conclusions; since forms of oppressions and identities are varied, their solutions must be as well.” (p. 12) Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Decolonizing Feminist Theory: Latina Contributions to the Debate,” *Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and Resistance.* Oxford University Press (2020). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) E.g., Sally Haslanger writes both: “society’s oppressive social system is patriarchal,” and, there is “no such thing as patriarchy.” We do not live in a patriarchal system, full stop. We live in a racialized-capitalist-heteropatriarchy. Haslanger, Sally. “Why I Don’t Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne’s *Down Girl*.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 101, no. 1 (2020): 220-229. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Although Manne mentions reproductive and domestic labor (p. 110-111), she does not include them in her account of the moral economy of gender on the grounds that they are now not as expected from women or are “more evenly divided in some heterosexual relationships.” Her aim in doing so is to expand our understanding of labor; but one may contend that this exclusion privileges as paradigmatic or central to the analysis of the experiences of a very small subsection of women. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Flores, Andrew R, Lynn Langton, Ilan H Meyer, and Adam P Romero. “Victimization Rates and Traits of Sexual and Gender Minorities in the United States: Results from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 2017.” *Science*, October 2, 2020. Alam, Adnan. “Transgender Sex Workers Vulnerable to Violence, but When Is It a Hate Crime?: Cronkite News.” Cronkite News – Arizona PBS, November 5, 2019. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Moya Bailey and Trudy contributed to coining (2008) and proliferating (since 2010) the term misogynoir, which refers to the ways anti-Black racism and misogynistic attitudes and cultural representations shape ideas about Black women. Bailey, Moya and Trudy. “On Misogynoir: Citation, Erasure, and Plagiarism.” *Feminist Media Studies* 18, no. 4 (2018): 762-768. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Matsuzaka, Sara, and David E. Koch. “Trans Feminine Sexual Violence Experiences: The Intersection of Transphobia and Misogyny.” *Affilia* 34, no. 1 (February 2019): 28–47. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Crenshaw, Kimberle. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies.” *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 1989, no. 1 (1989): 139-167. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Notice that this does not require abandoning, philosophically or otherwise, all talk of race, gender, class, sexual identity, etc. Instead, as Haslanger (2020) explains, we can “see the social order as “cooking together” a set of ingredients, resulting in a *capitalist white supremacist nationalist ableist ageist heteronormative …etc…. patriarchal order*, and to treat the mentioned elements as analytical categories that can be used to explain certain features of the system. We can explain why the dough rises because of the yeast, even if the yeast cannot be separated out in the bread. Different elements have explanatory priority in response to different questions.” (p. 229) [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Decolonizing Feminist Theory: Latina Contributions to the Debate”; Lugones, María “Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach”; Méndez, Xhercis. “Decolonial Feminist *Movidas* A Caribeña (Re)thinks “Privilege,” the Wages of Gender, and Building Complex Coalitions” *Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and Resistance.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Feminism, then, is not aimed narrowly at realizing the social or political equality of women to men. Feminism, as a framework and practice, attempts to eliminate oppression, full stop. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) An example of local feminisms involves the relative importance of eliminating “the gender binary.” In the Global North, the gender binary, itself, is often taken to be the root of patriarchal oppression, and thus, eliminating the binary is often taken as a central political goal. Whereas, in the Global South, the gender binary is understood by many to have been part of colonial domination, replacing Indigenous gender systems that did not operate in the same ways and may not have been, inherently, oppressive. Alcoff references Nkiri Nzegwu’s work (2006) who, “argues that, in the case of Igbo families, the subordination of daughters and wives was a historically specific practice that developed only after the colonial takeovers.” Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Decolonizing Feminist Theory: Latina Contributions to the Debate,” *Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and Resistance.* Oxford University Press (2020): 14. ### References [Alam, Adnan. “Transgender Sex Workers Vulnerable to Violence, but When Is It a Hate Crime?: Cronkite News.” Cronkite News – Arizona PBS, November 5, 2019. ](https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2018/08/08/transgender-sex-workers-vulnerable-to-violence-but-when-is-it-a-hate-crime/) [Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Decolonizing Feminist Theory: Latina Contributions to the Debate,” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[*Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and Resistance.* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[Oxford University Press (2020): 11-28.](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT) [Atwood, Margaret. ](https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Handmaids-Tale-by-Atwood)[*The Handmaid’s Tale*](https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Handmaids-Tale-by-Atwood)[ (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985)](https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Handmaids-Tale-by-Atwood) [Bailey, Moya and Trudy. “On Misogynoir: Citation, Erasure, and Plagiarism.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14680777.2018.1447395)[*Feminist Media Studies* ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14680777.2018.1447395)[18, no. 4 (2018): 762-768.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14680777.2018.1447395) [Bosman, Julie. “A College Student Was Killed by a Man Whose Catcalls She Tried to Ignore, Prosecutors Say.” The New York Times. The New York Times, November 27, 2019.](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/us/chicago-college-student-killed-catcall.html.) [Crenshaw, Kimberle. “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies.” University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, no. 1 (1989): 139-167.](https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=uclf) [Frye, Marilyn. “Oppression.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRYO)[*Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories*](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRYO)[. London & New York: Routledge (2000). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/FRYO) [Flores, Andrew R, Lynn Langton, Ilan H Meyer, and Adam P Romero. “Victimization Rates and Traits of Sexual and Gender Minorities in the United States: Results from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 2017.” ](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33008905/)[*Science*](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33008905/)[, October 2, 2020.](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33008905/) [Hänel, Hilkje C. “#MeToo and Testimonial Injustice: An Investigation of Moral and Conceptual Knowledge.” ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/01914537211017578)[*Philosophy & Social Criticism*](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/01914537211017578)[ 48, no. 6 (July 2022): 833–59.](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/01914537211017578) [Haslanger, Sally. “Why I Don’t Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne’s Down Girl.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HASWID)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HASWID)[ 101, no. 1 (2020): 220-229.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HASWID) [Kelland, Lindsay. “Conceptually situating the harm of rape: An analysis of objectification.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KELCST)[*South African Journal of Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/KELCST)[ 30, no 2 (2011):168-183. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/KELCST) [Langton, Rae. “Autonomy Denial in Objectification.” ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.001.0001/acprof-9780199247066)[*Sexual Solipsism Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.001.0001/acprof-9780199247066)[. Oxford Univ. Press, 2013.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247066.001.0001/acprof-9780199247066) [Lugones, María “Revisiting Gender: A Decolonial Approach.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[*Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and Resistance.* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[Oxford University Press (2020).](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT) [MacKinnon, Catharine A. In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 125, No. 7 (May 2016), pp. 2038-2105.](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/feature/in-their-hands-restoring-institutional-liability-for-sexual-harassment-in-education) [Manne, Kate. ](http://www.katemanne.net/down-girl.html)[*Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny*](http://www.katemanne.net/down-girl.html)[ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).](http://www.katemanne.net/down-girl.html) [Matsuzaka, Sara, and David E. Koch. “Trans Feminine Sexual Violence Experiences: The Intersection of Transphobia and Misogyny.” ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0886109918790929)[*Affilia*](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0886109918790929)[ 34, no. 1 (February 2019): 28–47.](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0886109918790929) [Méndez, Xhercis. “Decolonial Feminist ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[*Movidas*](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[ A Caribeña (Re)thinks “Privilege,” the Wages of Gender, and Building Complex Coalitions” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[*Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and Resistance.* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT)[Oxford University Press (2020).](https://philpapers.org/rec/RUZTOT) [Merriam-Webster Dictionary. “Misogyny.” (n.d.). ](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misogyny.) [Nussbaum, Martha C. “Objectification.” ](https://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/nussbaumO.pdf)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/nussbaumO.pdf)[ 24, no. 4 (1995): 249–91.](https://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/mprg/nussbaumO.pdf) [Papadaki, Lina.“What is Wrong About Objectification?” ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203123805-5/wrong-objectification-lina-papadaki)[*Current Controversies in Political Philosophy*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203123805-5/wrong-objectification-lina-papadaki)[, Thom Brooks (ed.), London: Routledge (2015): 87–99.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203123805-5/wrong-objectification-lina-papadaki) [Smith, David ](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250003836/lessthanhuman)[Livingstone](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250003836/lessthanhuman). [*Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others*](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250003836/lessthanhuman)[. New York: St. Martins Press (2011).](https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250003836/lessthanhuman) [Syrda, Joanna. “Spousal Relative Income and Male Psychological Distress.” ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167219883611)[*Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167219883611)[ 46, no. 6 (June 2020): 976–92.](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167219883611) [Yap, Audrey. “Misogyny and Dehumanization,” ](https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.apaonline.org/resource/collection/D03EBDAB-82D7-4B28-B897-C050FDC1ACB4/FeminismV18n2.pdf)[*APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy*](https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.apaonline.org/resource/collection/D03EBDAB-82D7-4B28-B897-C050FDC1ACB4/FeminismV18n2.pdf)[ 18, no. 2 (2019).](https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.apaonline.org/resource/collection/D03EBDAB-82D7-4B28-B897-C050FDC1ACB4/FeminismV18n2.pdf) [Young, Iris Marion. “Five Faces of Oppression.” ](https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcm4g4q.7)[*Justice and the Politics of Difference*](https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcm4g4q.7)[, 2011, 39–65. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcm4g4q.7. ](https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcm4g4q.7) ### Related Essays [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/kadin-dusmanligi-mizojini-nedir-odelia-zuckerman-clair-morrissey/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/misogyny-1.pdf). ### About the Authors Odelia Zuckerman graduated from Occidental College in 2022 with a B.A. in Philosophy and Politics. Clair Morrissey is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Undergraduate Research Center at Occidental College. She specializes in practical ethics and political philosophy, and has both research and teaching interests in public philosophy. [oxy.edu/academics/faculty/clair-morrissey](https://www.oxy.edu/academics/faculty/clair-morrissey) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** Feminism, feminist philosophy, gender, girls, intersectionality, Misogyny, sex, women --- ### [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) **Published:** April 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Annaleigh Curtis Categories: [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 990 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the first in a three-part series on the topic of philosophical feminism. The first two parts, on the Sameness Approach to feminism and the Difference Approach to feminism, are by Annaleigh Curtis; the third part, on the Dominance Approach, is by Chelsea Haramia. The second essay is [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) and the third is [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/).* In both academic and non-academic discussions of feminism, there is sometimes a lack of appreciation for the diversity among feminist positions. Two people may be called feminists while disagreeing about a range of theoretical and practical issues, like the nature of oppression, sex work, or abortion. In this and the next essay, I lay out two general feminist approaches to sexist oppression: the *sameness* approach and the *difference* approach.1 This first essay focuses on the sameness approach. ![Women = men graphic.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/genderequality.jpg?resize=656%2C453&ssl=1)Women = men graphic. There are many ways of dividing up strands of thought, particularly when they have arisen organically out of a political movement. What is called the sameness approach here shares similarities with what elsewhere is called humanist or liberal feminism. The basic idea is that people ought to be treated equally, regardless of their physical or social characteristics. The general argumentative strategy is this: Premise 1: If A and B are the same in the relevant respects, then A and B should be treated the same. Premise 2: Women and men2 are the same in the relevant respects. Conclusion: Women and men should be treated the same. This argument seems persuasive at first glance. If two things are the same in whatever ways really matter, it would be irrational to treat them differently. For example, if two job candidates are equally qualified for a job, it would be unfair to hire one just because he is a man. This sort of intuition guides the sameness approach. Notice that this approach does not have to say that men and women are exactly the same. The defender of this approach can admit that there are natural or socialized differences, just not in terms of what really matters. People may disagree, though, about what really matters: human dignity, intellect, a soul, certain capacities, whatever it might be. One well-known philosopher who can be called a defender of the sameness approach is John Stuart Mill, best known for his writings on topics in ethics and political philosophy. Mill wrote that one thing that seems to distinguish the past and present is a casting away of various sorts of discrimination: “\[H\]uman beings are no longer born to their place in life, and chained down by an inexorable bond to the place they are born to, but are free to employ their faculties, and such favourable chances as offer, to achieve the lot which may appear to them most desirable.”3 For Mill, meaningful distinctions among individuals could not be made based on irrelevancies like race, sex, or class. Though the sameness approach has a lot of initial intuitive pull, there may be problems with it. Just take the example of the job candidates from before. We supposed that two candidates who were equally qualified should not be distinguished on the basis of sex. Consider two objections to the sameness approach relating to this example. First, does the sameness approach entail that affirmative action is impermissible? After all, if it is wrong to distinguish between people merely on the basis of sex, then neither men nor women should receive jobs based on sex. Yet many feminists, including those who support the sameness approach, probably approve of some affirmative action in hiring. This same sort of objection has been made against race-based affirmative action, and it is sometimes even called “reverse racism.” A standard response to these objections holds that affirmative action is justified because men and women, like white people and people of color, start off on very uneven playing fields in our society. Men, especially white men, have received undue advantages for many years, so it is not really unfair to preferentially hire women and candidates of color because this merely counters a long-standing bias against them. It is not so clear whether or how this response can work with the sameness approach. Perhaps the defender of the approach must take the long view about what constitutes equal treatment, holding that some preference now makes up for opposite preference in days past. If so, then the defender of the sameness approach must spell this out in her theory. Second, but related, there may be a difficulty with our original supposition that two candidates were equally qualified. After all, how often are candidates equally qualified? More to the point, should we address the possibility that women are likely to be systematically underqualified as a result of sexism prior to even being considered for a job? People do not receive the same education, opportunities, and encouragement as they develop. The sameness approach would demand change on these fronts, no doubt, but the defender of the approach may be hard-pressed to say what ought to be done between now and the just future they imagine. Treating everyone just the same if they have been treated differently for a very long time may just perpetuate the difference by assuring that those with a head start remain ahead. The reader will find listed below several resources for reading about the sameness approach to sexist oppression, though it would also be instructive to observe debates in the news and among friends to see whether one can identify uses of this approach as well as the difference and dominance approaches to be discussed in Parts [2](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/ "Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach") and [3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/). ### Notes 1 A third approach, the *dominance* approach, is discussed [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/). These divisions are taken directly from *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader*, edited by Sally Haslanger and Elizabeth Hackett. They, in turn, find some basis in an essay reprinted in that volume by Catharine MacKinnon called “Difference and Domination: On Sex Discrimination.” 2 I talk about men and women in this essay as if those categories were real and exhausted the gendered possibility space. I do this mostly because the thinkers I discuss tended to do so. However, most feminists today accept that there is no hard and fast biological or social binary with men on one hand and women on the other. For an overview of ways in which sex, gender identity and expression, and sexual orientation come apart, see [here](https://www.chp.edu/-/media/chp/departments-and-services/adolescent-and-young-adult-medicine/documents/gender-and-sexual-development/basic-definitions-sogie.pdf?la=en). 3 J.S. Mill, “The Subjection of Women” <http://www.constitution.org/jsm/women.htm> ### References [de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. 1949.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Second-Sex-Simone-Beauvoir/dp/0679724516/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1397739342&sr=8-2&keywords=the+second+sex) [Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?q=theorizing%20feminisms&lang=en&cc=us) [Jaggar, Alison (1983). *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/978-0-7425-7994-1) [Mill, J.S. “The Subjection of Women.” 1869. ](http://www.constitution.org/jsm/women.htm) [Nussbaum, Martha (2000). “The Future of Feminist Liberalism.” *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 74: 47–79.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3219683?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103881076497) [Okin, Susan Moller (1989). *Justice, Gender and the Family*. Basic Books: New York.](http://www.basicbooks.com/full-details?isbn=9780465037032) ### Related Essays [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/feminism1.pdf "feminism1") in PDF. ### About the Author [Annaleigh Curtis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Curtis) has a JD from Harvard Law School, a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder, a Graduate Certificate in Women and Gender Studies from CU Boulder, and a B.A. in Philosophy from Washburn University. She is a practicing attorney in Boston; her focus is intellectual property litigation. Her academic interests include social epistemology, moral epistemology and methodology, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of law. [papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=2361641](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=2361641) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** Curtis, Feminism --- ### [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) **Published:** July 18, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What are the proper moral education, and how should those goals be pursued? Theories of moral education try to answer that question: they provide ideas about how we can, and should, try to teach morality and shape students into morally better people. This essay introduces some of the most influential theories. **Content:** Author: Dominik Balg Categories: [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 Moral guidance is an integral part of primary and secondary schooling. For instance, students are praised for being helpful and kind, and told that this is right and good. They are also told not to cheat, bully, and steal, as these actions are wrong and bad. So schools are engaged in some forms of *moral education.*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) What are the proper goals of this moral education, and how should those goals be pursued? Theories of moral education try to answer that question: they provide ideas about how we can, and should, try to teach morality and shape students into morally better people. This essay introduces some of the most influential theories. [![An elementary school classroom.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/moral-education.jpg?resize=656%2C443&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/moral-education.jpg?ssl=1)An elementary school classroom. ### 1. Directive vs. Non-directive Theories of Moral Education Theories of moral education can be divided into *directive* and *non-directive* theories.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) According to directive theories, schools should directly teach students that some actions are wrong, that some actions are right, and tell them which is which and *why*. They should also teach students some about what’s fair and just, and some about what makes a person morally better and worse: what character traits are virtues and which are vices. In contrast, non-directive theories do not aim to teach any specific moral views: they focus on developing students’ abilities to discover *for themselves* what’s moral. These theories do, however, usually propose that moral education involves giving students some knowledge, e.g., about moral concepts and arguments. ### 2. Directive Theories There are several influential directive theories, each with a different proposal for which specific moral views should be taught in educational settings: - ***knowledge-transmission* theories** recommend that schools should teach moral views that their proponents reasonably believe are known to be true[\[3\]](#_ftn3); - ***transcendental* theories** urge the teaching of values that are presupposed by a wide variety of moral outlooks, the moral foundations that people with different moral views on broader social and political issues agree on; - ***pragmatic theories*** propose that schools should teach those moral views that are useful for well-functioning societies.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) These theories share a common idea: to become functioning members of society, to make responsible decisions, and to lead good lives, students need to know something about what’s right and wrong, and good and bad. They need to understand and accept some basic rules of conduct: e.g., they need to accept that one should not be violent or treat other people unfairly. Since moral rules can conflict with students’ immediate desires and preferences, we can’t expect students to make good moral decisions without explicit instruction: directive theories attempt to provide this guidance.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) While this all may seem plausible, there are, however, concerns about directive approaches. Beyond many of the basic rules of conduct for functioning classrooms and societies, moral issues are often controversial. Concerning ethical questions where there are reasonable disagreements, teaching specific answers *as knowledge* might amount to wrongful *indoctrination*, not moral education.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Furthermore, people often disagree on the details of which moral views everyone must accept or agree on—what might be “transcendent”—and which exact moral views people need to accept for a functioning society—what’s “pragmatic.” Finally, even advocates of directive theories should agree students should also learn how to make responsible moral decisions independently: teaching some specific moral views won’t help them develop the skills they need to make well-reasoned moral judgments on their own.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Non-Directive Theories The common aim of non-directive theories of moral education is to enable students to reasonably and responsibly answer moral questions independently. Different theories propose different ways to achieve that aim. #### 3.1. Skill-based Theories *Skill-based theories* aim at the development of critical reasoning skills.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) These include the ability to give reasons for one’s views, to assess the quality of different arguments, and to reconsider one’s views in light of new evidence.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) By developing such skills, students can better make their own reasoned moral judgments. #### 3.2. Emotion-based Theories According to *emotion-based theories*, moral education should help students develop emotional skills that should guide their moral judgment: e.g., by engaging in role-plays or reading literary narratives and watching films, students can develop *empathy* and *sympathy*.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) They can also learn how to use techniques like meditation or breathing exercises to cultivate *attentiveness* or feelings of *compassion*, *hopefulness,* or *gratitude*.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Such emotional skills might contribute to students’ own well-being *and* help them make better moral choices. #### 3.3. Character-based Theories According to *character-based theories*, moral education should build moral character. This view is usually spelled out in terms of cultivating moral virtues such as *honesty*, *courage*, *humility,* and *compassion*[\[12\]](#_ftn12): by promoting the development of such virtues, teachers can help students to become better people.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) For example, teachers can read and discuss texts of virtuous exemplars like Nelson Mandela or Martin Luther King with their students to motivate them to emulate these persons’ attitudes or characters.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. Conclusion Any particular choice between these theories of moral education must respect students’ autonomy and acknowledge that moral questions are often controversial: this will constrain the use of directive approaches, which recommend teaching specific moral views. But the fact that moral questions are often *not* controversial will constrain non-directive approaches also: if a student concludes from some attempt at non-directive moral education that there’s nothing ever wrong with cheating, bullying, and stealing, or that arrogance and cruelty are virtues, then that “moral education” has failed. A general challenge is that successful moral education should ideally not just have an impact on how students *think* and feel, but also on how they *act*. People often *believe* they should act a certain way, but can’t bring themselves to *do* so. So students not only need to be brought to have appropriate moral beliefs—which often isn’t easy—they also need to learn to put their moral beliefs into practice: that’s often even harder, for anyone, at any age, and at any level of education.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) While many open questions remain, the above considerations should also give rise to some optimism: there are many theories that schools and teachers can experiment with as they try to help students become better, and hopefully genuinely good, people. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay is about moral or ethical education, but what is *morality* or *ethics* anyway? (Philosophers often consider ethics and morality to be the same thing: what’s ethical is moral, what’s immoral is unethical, and so on.). This is a challenging philosophical question, and one way to answer it—among many other ways—is that *ethics or morality concerns behavior that ethical or moral theories would condemn as wrong, or support as right*. Two influential ethical theories include *consequentialism*, which focusses on promoting overall good consequences, and *Kant’s ethics*, or *Kantian deontology*, which focuses on respecting persons and following rules that we’d accept that everyone follow. For introductions to these theories, see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz and [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. To better understand what morality and ethics are, readers are encouraged to review these and other morally theories, and reflect on how they might be relevant to personal ethical choices and ethical questions about law and social policy: many essays in the [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) section of *1000-Word Philosophy* can provide guidance in reflecting on particular ethical issues. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For a more detailed explanation of the distinction between directive and non-directive theories of moral education, see, e.g., Hand 2014, 526; 2020, 14. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Advocates of knowledge-transmission theories, of course, presume that there is some *moral knowledge*, or that some moral claims are *known*. While the idea of moral knowledge is sometimes controversial, many people would think and say that they *know* it’s usually good to be a helpful and kind person and that it’s always wrong to bully innocent people, and that stealing is usually, if not always, wrong: so most people seem to think there is *some* knowledge. For introductions to *moral epistemology*—the application of epistemology, or theory of knowledge, to moral claims—see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) On knowledge-transmission theories see, e.g., Balg 2023. On transcendental theories, see, e.g., Hirst 1974 and Tiedemann 2019. On pragmatic theories, see, e.g., Hand 2014, 2018. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For a more detailed discussion of the indispensability of moral education, see, e.g., Hand 2018, 7-10. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) On what indoctrination is and why it’s often problematic, see [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli. For an introductory discussion of how we might respond when reasonable people disagree in their views on an issue, see [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis for a discussion of how gaining *knowledge* from others might not result in *understanding* that topic. Applied to moral education, the concern is that someone might *know* that some action is wrong, yet not *understand* why the action is wrong in a manner that will allow them to apply that understanding to other moral issues. A concern about directive theories of moral education is that they won’t provide this type of understanding. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For a defense of skill-based theories, see, e.g., Meyer 2023, Musschenga 2009. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores and [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf. These essays review critical thinking and argument analysis concepts and skills in general, and these concepts and skills can be applied to ethics and moral education. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) People often think of empathy as a moral virtue: it’s good to be a person who would respond with empathy. But many philosophers and psychologists define empathy as a specific *emotional capability*, i.e., the ability to imagine other people’s feelings (see, e.g., Eisenberg and Strayer 1987; Goldman 2006; Hoffman 2000). Against the background of such an understanding, empathy shouldn’t be conceived of as a virtue because virtues and capabilities are two different things: while the former indicate what a person *would (not) do* under certain circumstances, the latter indicate what a person *is able to do* (Battaly 2011). Given this, a person could use her empathetic capabilities for purposes that are morally problematic: e.g., to manipulate or exploit other people. So, empathy is not, *in itself*, a moral virtue: it is a virtue only when it is used to promote right and good ends, so to speak. For a defense of emotion-based theories that specifically appeal to the emotion of empathy, see, e.g., Nussbaum 2003, Slote 2009. For a defense of an emotion-based theory that specifically appeals to the emotion of sympathy, see, e.g., Noddings 2002. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For an emotion-based approach that specifically recommends the use of such techniques, see e.g., Ash et al. 2019. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry for a discussion of what *virtues*, or good character traits are [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a defense of this view, see, e.g., Arthur et al. 2017, Kristjánsson 2015 or Miller 2022. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For a discussion of this strategy, see, e.g., Vos 2017. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Indeed, it has been observed that too many philosophers and ethicists (and other thinkers), even ones who develop moral theories and theories of moral education, sometimes have false, unjustified, or bad ethical views and/or behave badly. For discussion about how to respond to this, see [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis. ### References [Arthur, J., Kristjánsson, K., Harrison, T., Sanderse, W., and Wright, D. (2017). ](https://www.routledge.com/Teaching-Character-and-Virtue-in-Schools/Arthur-Kristjnsson-Harrison-Sanderse-Wright/p/book/9780815360919?gclid=Cj0KCQjw1_SkBhDwARIsANbGpFtrKzDKInwEPv0gNUv8uVOg2_F5g67CSlSBnp_wbtc1JDYcaXeYZr0aAkHYEALw_wcB)[*Teaching Character and Virtue in Schools.*](https://www.routledge.com/Teaching-Character-and-Virtue-in-Schools/Arthur-Kristjnsson-Harrison-Sanderse-Wright/p/book/9780815360919?gclid=Cj0KCQjw1_SkBhDwARIsANbGpFtrKzDKInwEPv0gNUv8uVOg2_F5g67CSlSBnp_wbtc1JDYcaXeYZr0aAkHYEALw_wcB)[ Routledge: London.](https://www.routledge.com/Teaching-Character-and-Virtue-in-Schools/Arthur-Kristjnsson-Harrison-Sanderse-Wright/p/book/9780815360919?gclid=Cj0KCQjw1_SkBhDwARIsANbGpFtrKzDKInwEPv0gNUv8uVOg2_F5g67CSlSBnp_wbtc1JDYcaXeYZr0aAkHYEALw_wcB) [Ash, M., Harrison, T., Pinto, M., DiClemente, R., and Negi, L. T. (2019). A model for cognitively‑based compassion training: theoretical underpinnings and proposed mechanisms. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41285-019-00124-x)[*Social Theory & Health*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41285-019-00124-x)[ 19: 43–67.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41285-019-00124-x) [Balg, D. (2023). Moral Disagreement and Moral Education: What’s the Problem? ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-023-10399-9)[*Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-023-10399-9)[ Online first.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-023-10399-9) [Battaly, H. (2011). Is empathy a Virtue? In: Amy Coplan, and Peter Goldies (ed): ](https://academic.oup.com/book/7216/chapter/151873191)[*Empathy – Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives.*](https://academic.oup.com/book/7216/chapter/151873191)[ Oxford: Oxford University Press. 277-301.](https://academic.oup.com/book/7216/chapter/151873191) [Eisenberg, N., and Strayer, J. (1987). ](https://www.scirp.org/(S(351jmbntvnsjt1aadkozje))/reference/referencespapers.aspx?referenceid=213484)[*Empathy and its development.*](https://www.scirp.org/(S(351jmbntvnsjt1aadkozje))/reference/referencespapers.aspx?referenceid=213484)[ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.scirp.org/(S(351jmbntvnsjt1aadkozje))/reference/referencespapers.aspx?referenceid=213484) [Goldman, A. (2006). ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-04835-000)[*Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading.* ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-04835-000)[Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-04835-000) [Hand, M. (2014). Towards a Theory of Moral Education. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-9752.12116)[*Journal of Philosophy of Education*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-9752.12116)[ 48(4): 519-532.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-9752.12116) [Hand M. (2018). ](https://www.routledge.com/A-Theory-of-Moral-Education/Hand/p/book/9781138898547)[*A Theory of Moral Education.*](https://www.routledge.com/A-Theory-of-Moral-Education/Hand/p/book/9781138898547)[ London: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/A-Theory-of-Moral-Education/Hand/p/book/9781138898547) [Hand, M. (2020): Moral Education in the Community of Inquiry. ](https://jps.bham.ac.uk/articles/10.46707/jps.v7ii.118)[*Journal of Philosophy in Schools*](https://jps.bham.ac.uk/articles/10.46707/jps.v7ii.118)[ 7(2): 4-20.](https://jps.bham.ac.uk/articles/10.46707/jps.v7ii.118) [Hirst, P. (1974): ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HIRMEI-2)[*Moral Education in a Secular Society*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HIRMEI-2)[. London: University of London Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HIRMEI-2) [Hoffman, M. L. (2000). ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2000-03781-000)[*Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice.*](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2000-03781-000)[ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2000-03781-000) [Kristjánsson, K. (2015): ](https://www.routledge.com/Aristotelian-Character-Education/Kristjansson/p/book/9781138737945)[*Aristotelian Character Education.*](https://www.routledge.com/Aristotelian-Character-Education/Kristjansson/p/book/9781138737945)[ Routledge, New York.](https://www.routledge.com/Aristotelian-Character-Education/Kristjansson/p/book/9781138737945) [Meyer, K. (2023): Moral Education Through the Fostering of Reasoning Skills. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-023-10367-3)[*Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-023-10367-3)[ Online first.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-023-10367-3) [Miller, C. (2022): How Situationism Impacts the Goals of Character Education. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-022-10345-1)[*Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-022-10345-1)[Online first.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-022-10345-1) [Musschenga, A. W. (2009). Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2009.00707.x)[*Journal of Philosophy of Education*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2009.00707.x)[ 43(4): 597-613.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2009.00707.x) [Noddings, Nel (2002): ](https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED468125)[*Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education.* ](https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED468125)[New York: Teachers College Press.](https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED468125) [Nussbaum, M. (2003): ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674179493)[*Cultivating humanity. A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education.*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674179493)[ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674179493) [Slote, M. (2009): Caring, Empathy and Moral Education. In Harvey Siegel (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education, 211-226. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28239) [Tiedemann, M. (2019): Philosophical Education and Transcendental Tolerance. ](https://journal.viterbo.edu/index.php/atpp/article/view/1169)[*Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis*](https://journal.viterbo.edu/index.php/atpp/article/view/1169)[ 39(2), 32-40.](https://journal.viterbo.edu/index.php/atpp/article/view/1169) [Vos, P. H. (2017): Learning from exemplars: emulation, character formation and the complexities of ordinary life. Journal of Beliefs & Values 29(1): 17-28.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13617672.2017.1393295) ### Related Essays [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) By Chris Ranalli [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/ahlak-egitimi-ogrencilere-daha-iyi-insanlar-olmayi-ogretmek-dominik-balg/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/moral-education.pdf). ### About the Author Dominik Balg is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Mainz. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Cologne. He specializes in philosophy of education and philosophical issues in teaching philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/dominik-balg](https://philpeople.org/profiles/dominik-balg) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Philosophy of Education, Social & Political **Tags:** ethics education, moral education --- ### [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) **Published:** August 17, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: David Antonini Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) Word Count: 1000 Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), born in Hanover, Germany, was a public intellectual, refugee, and observer of European and American politics. She is especially known for her interpretation of the events that led to the rise of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Arendt studied under German philosophers Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers and set out to pursue a path as an academic, writing a dissertation on St. Augustine. However, Hitler, the Nazi regime’s rise to power, and the bloody Holocaust forever changed her life. Being Jewish, Arendt was forced to flee the country, seeking refuge in France and eventually the United States. After living through the outbreak of WWII, Arendt devoted the rest of her life to writing about politics, although less in a traditional philosophical sense and more in the vein of a political observer, interpreting events of the twentieth century. This essay explains some central insights of her political thought and how she developed these concepts to overcome the loss of politics as public debate in Nazi Germany.![Arendt](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/arendt.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1) ### 1. Totalitarianism and the Loss of Public Debate Arendt understands “politics” as *public debate by a community about meaningful aspects of their shared life together*. She witnessed the collapse of politics, in this sense, under Nazi totalitarianism. This form of rule seeks to diminish public debate by making it a criminal act to criticize the regime. Arendt sought to understand the rise of this unprecedented form of government, and to defend public debate against threats to its existence. Throughout her writings Arendt defended the importance of public debate. She had witnessed with German citizens in the 1930’s and 40’s what could happen in its absence: the substitution of a fabricated reality based on a leader’s vision, accepted by seemingly well-intentioned citizens. Without public debate, the ruling regime is free to construct a false narrative about “reality,” perpetuate that narrative, and maintain power because there is nothing to compete with it. ### 2. “The Human Condition” and Plurality Arendt’s well-known 1958 text *The Human Condition* contains some of her central insights about politics, especially her concept of *human plurality*. For Arendt, *plurality* is an existential condition of human life: we are *equal* insofar as we are human beings but *distinct* because no human being is like any other. Our distinctness provides us with a perspective that cannot be fully understood by anyone else, yet our equality means that, as a presupposition of communication, we assume the capacity for speech and reason in each other. Based on plurality, politics then is the place and activity of shared communication based on the distinct perspectives of equal human beings. When we engage in political life, we seek to communicate how things look from our distinct perspectives, while others do the same. For Arendt, the activity of publicly addressing one another about how things appear from our distinct perspectives is the lifeblood of politics. Sharing our perspectives with to others is done in the public space, which must be preserved if democratic politics is to remain a viable possibility. This public space was destroyed under totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century. ### 3. Power through Civil Disobedience How does Arendt argue we preserve the public space? The answer lies in how Arendt rethinks the concept of *power*. As a political concept, we often associate power with rulers, governments, and politicians. Rulers or politicians have or hold power, as if power is something to be possessed. We often hear the phrase that politicians are not concerned about their constituents but about “staying in power.” Arendt, however, considers *legitimate* power as something that exists *between* citizens as they engage in political action together, whereas power wielded by rulers through the use of terror and violence is *illegitimate*. She argues that “power *springs up* between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) So, when a group of human beings decides to act for a specific political purpose, power exists between them as they collaborate together to achieve a political aim: we might say that it is power that “holds them together” *as a group* and not just a collection of disparate individuals.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) For Arendt, an exemplary moment of power preserving the public space is the act of civil disobedience, especially the various movements during the turbulent decades of the mid twentieth-century in the United States, on which Arendt wrote.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) When citizens gather together to protest an unjust law, power exists between them. The public action to protest unjust laws is a manifestation of the public space discussed above. To think of power as Arendt does means that those engaged in civil disobedience are attempting to reclaim the public space of debate. Through enacting unjust laws, government has abused the legitimacy it has been entrusted with: through civil disobedience, citizens try to reclaim that legitimacy. Reclaiming the public space of debate is an effective mechanism for citizens when they believe a government has lost its legitimacy. Robust public debate in many forms ensures that it is not merely the ruling regime that defines the parameters of public debate, especially if they attempt to drown out dissent as, for example, in the delegitimization of the media or press. Public debate competes with political leaders’ attempts to substitute fabricated truths in order to maintain power. In sum, the public space is preserved through power that “springs up” among citizens when they gather together. *Public space* refers to the activity of shared debate among plural human beings; this space and activity are maintained as long as opportunities exist for the gathering of citizens.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 4. Conclusion Arendt’s political thought is unique among political thinkers because it does not lay out a theoretical program like a social contract or theory of justice. Instead, Arendt’s political thought is *existential* in attempting to understand how a meaningful space for politics and public debate can be lost and how that space might be re-enlivened through political action. Current political circumstances, especially the rise of nationalist and populist movements across the globe, speak to the importance of robust public debate among citizens. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 200. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Arendt’s insight, that power holds a group together, is fairly intuitive. Any group of people that decide to achieve some common goal must work together and not be at cross purposes. Being in agreement and working together means the group has power between them, but if they quarrel and pursue separate projects, there is no longer power present. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Hannah Arendt, “Civil Disobedience” in *Crises of the Republic* (New York: HBJ Publishing, 1970) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Twentieth-century German thinker Jurgen Habermas is close to Arendt in his thinking on the public space or public sphere, especially in his insistence upon undistorted forms of speech and communication. His thought is that public debate can proceed through what he calls “the force of the better argument.” Habermas, as well as Rawls, is generally associated with a school of political thought known as *deliberative democracy*, where the emphasis upon public debate is essential. Aspects of Arendt’s thought can be considered to belong to this school of thought. However, their accounts of the public sphere (in the case of Habermas) or public reason (in the case of Rawls) belong to more idealist strains of political theory whereas Arendt’s political thinking has a different starting point. ### References [Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*. Edited by Johanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).](https://books.google.com/books/about/Love_and_Saint_Augustine.html?id=Ue57eLTxMVsC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false) [Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).](https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Human_Condition.html?id=gW9M6ZktZQUC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false) [Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. (New York: Meridian Books, 1958).](https://books.google.com/books?id=zLrKGGxBKjAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+origins+of+totalitarianism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi7qPuhr-jcAhWW8oMKHUOiDaEQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=the%20origins%20of%20totalitarianism&f=false) [Hannah Arendt, “Civil Disobedience” in *Crises of the Republic* (New York: HBJ Publishing, 1970).](https://books.google.com/books?id=s_5qwrH1EaIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=crises+of+the+republic&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwikpou6r-jcAhUs0YMKHQAzDucQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=crises%20of%20the%20republic&f=false) [Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society.* Translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985).](https://www.amazon.com/Theory-Communicative-Action-Rationalization-Society/dp/0807015075#reader_0807015075) ### Related Essays [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Introduction to Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/hannah-arendtin-siyasi-dusunceleri-david-antonini/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/arendt-handout.pdf) ### About the Author [David Antonini](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Antonini) received his PhD from Southern Illinois University Carbondale in 2018. He is the author of [*Public Space and Political Experience: An Arendtian Interpretation*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793626011/Public-Space-and-Political-Experience-An-Arendtian-Interpretation?fbclid=IwAR2mkj12oWJ3ABOsv02oSoMymrlD-0Le8BlEYbwo9XRWshc8DaYwbvFWz8A) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021). He is an instructor at Great Basin College in Pahrump, Nevada. [davidantonini.wordpress.com](https://davidantonini.wordpress.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Social & Political **Tags:** Antonini, Arendt, Hannah Arendt, Nazi, Nazis --- ### [Theories of Punishment: What Justifies Punishment?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) **Published:** February 5, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Philosophical theories of punishment ask what justifies punishment, both in general and what justifies particular punishments. Most theories appeal to punishment’s effects on the future or facts about the past. This essay reviews these theories. **Content:** Author: Travis Joseph Rodgers Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 995 Criminals are punished with fines, public scorn, imprisonment, death and more. Philosophical theories of punishment ask what justifies punishment, both in general and what justifies particular punishments.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Most theories appeal to punishment’s effects on the *future* or facts about the *past*. This essay reviews these theories. ![Sisyphus rolling a boulder, as punishment.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/punishment.jpg?resize=656%2C328&ssl=1) ### 1. Forward-Looking Theories According to *forward-looking* theories of punishment, punishments are justified to the extent that they bring about future good results. Theories differ in terms of what those results are. ### 1.1. Deterrence Theories One goal of punishment is to bring about less crime. One way of doing this is by discouraging would-be criminals. *Deterrence* theories propose that punishments are justified to the degree to which they reduce, or *deter*, crime by preventing people from committing crimes or discouraging repeat offenses. To understand how effective a punishment is as a deterrent, we consider the negative consequences for the criminal. If thieves are asked only to return stolen goods, that “punishment” is a very light consequence. Stealing might then be a good gamble: if a thief succeeds, she gets the items; if she is caught, she simply returns them. Fines or imprisonment provides a more effective deterrent and a stronger incentive to not steal. A punishment’s deterrent force results from the severity of the penalty and the likelihood of punishment. More severe punishments and more effective means of catching and prosecuting criminals increase a punishment’s deterrent effect. ### 1.2. Rehabilitation Theories Rather than focusing on reducing crime, *rehabilitation* theories of punishment focus on making criminals into people who are less likely to commit crimes.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Consider two purse thieves. One steals for excitement. Another steals because of a lack of legitimate job opportunities and a lack of food: this thief feels bad about snatching purses but, nonetheless, he steals. In the first case, rehabilitation theorists urge trying to improve the person’s character and values. In the second, mandatory job training or education could be part of the punishment. Rehabilitation is often attempted using education, training, medication, and therapy. ### 1.3. Concerns about Forward-Looking Theories All forward-looking theories must specify what resources can be used to bring about the desired results. Costly punishments like the death penalty and life imprisonment might be justified if they effectively realize whatever goods the theory aims at: e.g., killing *some* criminals could most improve the world on some views, and since some wrongdoers might be incapable of rehabilitation, permanently removing them from society might be best.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) A problem for forward-looking theories is that the punishments recommended might not seem “proportional” to the crime. Serious crimes might call for light punishments if recidivism – repeat criminal offenses – is unlikely; light crimes might call for brutal punishments if that effectively reduces them.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Subjecting criminals, or even innocent people, to extreme punishments to “send a message” or deter others from committing crimes is another potential problem for forward-looking theories.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. Backward-Looking Theories *Backward-looking* theories identify the justification for punishment in some fact about how the to-be punished crime was committed. Most theories seek a punishment “proportional to” or “fitting” the crime. *Retributivist* theories see punishment as a “paying back” for the crime committed. *Restorative* theories seek to return the victim’s status to what it was prior to the crime. Both theories look “backward” to the crime itself to determine an appropriate punishment: retributivists focus on doing harm to the wrongdoer; *restorative* theories focus on doing good to the crime victim. ### 2.1. Retributivist Theories An influential example of retributivism is the *lex talionis* (the law of retaliation), the view that the crime is to be revisited upon the perpetrator of the crime: we should “reap what we sow.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) So, thieves should be deprived of their property, murders should forfeit their own life, and so on. On this view, punishment is not intended to make the world a better place, to reduce criminality, or to improve the perpetrator.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) These may sometimes happen, and these may be further goods, but the justification for the punishment is simply that it is what the criminal *deserves*. That such theories do not aim at making the world an overall better place is sometimes a point of criticism of the theory. Why punish, some ask, if it serves no broader good? One reply is that people, especially criminals, getting what they deserve is its own good. Some potential problems for retributivism include that some crimes are incapable of being paid back in full: e.g., a mass murderer can be killed only once; a criminal might destroy a unique artifact that no punishment can restore. In other cases, paying the person back with a similar punishment seems morally abhorrent, as in the case of sexual assault. ### 2.2. Restorative Theories A second backward-looking theory suggests that the justification for punishment is not to inflict suffering on someone or to create an overall better world but to *restore* those who were harmed by the crime. This *restorative* theory of punishment is backward-looking in that it targets the victim’s situation prior to the crime, by forcing the wrongdoer to help the victim.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) A punishment, which the wrongdoer is forced to do, is justified to the extent that it *restores* victims to their standing prior to the crime, e.g., their mental and/or physical state, property restoration, and so on. This may seem more compassionate than retributivism since the goal of these punishments is to make the victim better off, comparatively, and thus the world a better place.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Restorative justice faces a similar retributivist problem of fully “restoring” someone. Some losses cannot be restored (e.g., the losses to murder victims loved ones), and sometimes restoring the harmed individual would require seemingly unjustified offenses (e.g., enslaving a criminal to the victim until a theft is paid back).[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. Conclusion Some of the elements of these theories of punishment can be combined. We might recommend rehabilitation when possible and deterrence when not possible. We might also recommend restoration in addition to retribution. And forward-looking and backward-looking elements might be balanced against one another, to decrease crime while giving no more punishment than deserved.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay does offer a definition of punishment. We can at least say that *punishment involves treating someone in some way they don’t want to be treated* or *harming them in some way* or *doing something to them that’s against their interests*: this is why a “punishment” of taking someone on their dream vacation or giving them some item they have long wanted would not be a punishment. But a full definition of punishment will be guided by a *theory* of punishment, or a view of what justifies this type of ill-treatment and its its intended purpose(s), which are reviewed here. So, we might think that punishment is *harming someone to seek some forward-looking goods*, or to seek some *backwards-looking goods*, or perhaps both: the details here on the goods will depend on the theory of punishment. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) An important question about whether a punishment is justified is whether the proposed punishment would be *just* or *unjust*. Thus, questions about the justification for punishment lead to fundamental questions about justice in general. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Mill (1868) argues in favor of the death penalty only in cases where rehabilitation is not possible, for instance. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Murray Rothbard (1998) defends a backward-looking, retributivist theory of punishment and challenges forward-looking theories on these and other grounds. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Punishing innocents to decrease criminality in others is often called *telishment* rather than punishment. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Douglas Husak (1992), Immanuel Kant (1887), and Christopher Heath Wellman (2012) discuss slightly different versions of this kind of theory. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Indeed, Kant (1887) notoriously argues that those who murder must die, and that a society has a duty to execute those who have committed murder, regardless of the consequences for the society. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Murray Rothbard’s (1998) writing in economics explains the “victim’s situation” as their rights. In other words, you must compensate (or restore) a victim for any right you violate. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Some proponents consider restorative justice an alternative to punishment, but note that like other views of punishment, restorative justice involves some “hard treatment” of the wrongdoer and serves to protect rights of individuals and order in society. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Roderick Long, a proponent of restorative justice, raises and attempts to address some of these concerns. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) This article focuses on theories of criminal punishment, but these same theory types can be applied to non-criminal cases of punishment as well. For instance, we might view “making a good person” as a desirable future state and then justify punishing a child to the extent that that punishment does the best job of making the child a good or better person. And we might think that boycotting a business owned by a bigot is giving it exactly what it deserves. ### References [Husak, Douglas. 1992. “Why Punish the Deserving.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HUSWPT)*[Nous](https://philpapers.org/rec/HUSWPT)*[ 26 (4): 447-464.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HUSWPT) [Kant, Immanuel. 1887. ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/359)*[The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/359)*[trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh).](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/359) [Long, Roderick. 1993-94. “Punishment vs. Restitution: A Formulation.” ](http://freenation.org/a/f12l2.html)*[Formulations](http://freenation.org/a/f12l2.html)*[. ](http://freenation.org/a/f12l2.html) [Mill, John Stuart. 1988. “Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment 1868.” ](http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-xxviii-public-and-parliamentary-speeches-part-i)*[The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XXVIII.: Public and Parliamentary Speeches.](http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-xxviii-public-and-parliamentary-speeches-part-i)*[ Eds. John M. Robson and Bruce Kinzer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. pp. 266-273. ](http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-xxviii-public-and-parliamentary-speeches-part-i) [Rothbard, Murray. 1998. “Punishment and Proportionality](https://mises.org/library/punishment-and-proportionality-0)[.](https://mises.org/library/punishment-and-proportionality-0)[” New York University Press, (2](https://mises.org/library/punishment-and-proportionality-0)[nd](https://mises.org/library/punishment-and-proportionality-0)[ edition with an introduction by Hans-Hermann Hoppe); originally published Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982.](https://mises.org/library/punishment-and-proportionality-0) [Wellman, Christopher Heath. 2012](https://philpapers.org/rec/WELTRF)[. “The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment”, ](https://philpapers.org/rec/WELTRF)*[Ethics](https://philpapers.org/rec/WELTRF)*[, 122: 371–393.](https://philpapers.org/rec/WELTRF) ### For Further Reading [Boonin, David. 2008. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problem-of-punishment/5DBC9B354BB574F589902D95FA49A2AE)*[The Problem of Punishment](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problem-of-punishment/5DBC9B354BB574F589902D95FA49A2AE)*[. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/problem-of-punishment/5DBC9B354BB574F589902D95FA49A2AE) [Hart, H.L.A. 1968. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HARPAR-4)*[Punishment and Responsibility. ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HARPAR-4)*[Oxford University Press.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HARPAR-4) ### Related Essays [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/theories-of-punishment.pdf). ### About the Author Travis Joseph Rodgers is Professor of Humanities at Valencia College in Orlando, Florida. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Florida State University. His specialties are ethics and ancient philosophy. His research focuses on the question of political legitimacy – that is, under what conditions governments might be justified in forcing someone to do something, applied ethics, and ethical theory. [valenciacollege.academia.edu/TravisRodgers](https://valenciacollege.academia.edu/TravisRodgers) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** crime, punishment --- ### [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/) **Published:** July 12, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The philosophical method called phenomenology tries to understand experiences from the inside, i.e., what it’s like to live through different types of experiences from the individual experiencer’s own point of view. This essay introduces phenomenology’s attempt to achieve this understanding of our experiences. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) Wordcount: 999 It’s common today to attempt to understand human experiences from the outside looking in, based on objective, measurable causes. For instance, the pleasure in cuddling is often understood as the release of the brain’s “cuddle chemical” oxytocin; vision is explained as light hitting the retina; goosebumps from music are seen as a nervous system response; stress is a surge in cortisol; a “runner’s high” is an endorphins rush.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The philosophical method called *phenomenology* takes a different approach. It focuses on trying to understand experiences *from the inside*, i.e., what it’s like to live through different types of experiences from the individual experiencer’s own point of view. This essay introduces phenomenology’s attempt to achieve this understanding of our experiences.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [!["Mont Sainte-Victoire" by Paul Cézanne. Watercolor and pencil on paper. 1902–06.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/phenomenology.jpg?resize=656%2C517&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/phenomenology.jpg?ssl=1)“Mont Sainte-Victoire” by Paul Cézanne. Watercolor and pencil on paper. 1902–06. ### 1. Describing Experiences Phenomenology is the study of *phenomena*, i.e., things—objects, memories, people, emotions, ideas, sensations, spiritual realities, etc.—as we subjectively experience them from our first-person perspectives.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) It studies how phenomena seem to be “given” or *appear* to our minds—not just visually, but also in hearing, feeling, remembering, desiring, touching, perceiving, thinking, choosing, imagining, etc.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) To examine how phenomena show up to consciousness, phenomenologists attempt to describe what “*lived experiences*” are like—i.e., experiences of phenomena as we live or undergo them.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) They do this instead of explaining the possible causes of experiences (e.g., brain chemicals). For instance, instead of asking, “What *causes* people to be motivated?” phenomenologists would ask, “What’s it like to *feel* motivated?” The goal of phenomenology, then, is not to explain why things happen or what they are (e.g., their chemical composition), but to describe, in detail, how phenomena become present to consciousness from the perspective of people living through the experience.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 2. Purpose Phenomenological descriptions of lived experiences are attempts to understand the *general* features of experiences, i.e., the defining characteristics of experiences that make them what they are. Thus, phenomenological descriptions are not just of what *the phenomenologist* experiences, but of what that type of experience is like *in general*, for everyone. Another goal of phenomenology is to provide a foundation for objective studies of experience: e.g., science.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) For instance, phenomenologists would observe that we can’t effectively search for a physiological cause of a runner’s high if we don’t first know what it is we are trying to explain, i.e., what the experience of such a high is like.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Phenomenologists also argue that their descriptions allow them to appreciate the personal meaning of experiences as we live them and so resist attempts to reduce experiences to nothing more than objective measurements.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) For instance, phenomenologists would insist that the emotional significance of lived happiness isn’t fully captured by identifying dopamine or serotonin as its physical cause. ### 3. Method To try to discover the defining traits of experiences, phenomenologists use a careful methodical process.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Let’s say we want to know what it’s like to experience *nostalgia—*wishing you could return to a past experience, e.g., a happy experience you had when you were a child. Phenomenologists would start by mentally “bracketing” or setting aside causal explanations (e.g., “experiences are caused by brain events”) in order to focus intensely only on how the phenomenon appears to our minds—what it’s like to *feel* nostalgic.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Phenomenologists also set aside biases and any particular aspects of the experience that are specific only to an individual’s unique personal perspective and are not universally experienced by all who have the experience. So, phenomenologists won’t say nostalgia always involves longing for a *past vacation* because that specific element isn’t essential or necessary for making the experience what it is. Finally, phenomenologists would mentally experiment with imagining the experience of nostalgia with and without certain elements (e.g., grief, desire, hope, yearning, etc.) to see which are essential and which are not essential.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) So, phenomenologists might insist that nostalgia includes sadness about the inability to return to a past situation, because without that, the experience is just a simple pleasant memory. ### 4. Examples To see some results of this methodology in practice, let’s consider a few well-known phenomenologists’ descriptions of various experiences: - Michel Henry (1922-2002) provides a phenomenology of *subjectivity—*what it’s like to be a self—which says that my experience of my inner self—e.g., my experience of my emotions—appears different from my experience of objects outside myself. Whereas objects (e.g., tables) appear separate and different from me, I feel “one” with my emotions: e.g., I perceive the table over there, but I *am*[\[13\]](#_ftn13) - Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) offers a phenomenology of “the lived body” which observes that I subjectively inhabit my body—i.e., I *live* my body from the inside out—whereas I perceive other peoples’ bodies as *objects* in the world.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) - Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) gives a phenomenology of other people which argues that the *faces* of others appear differently than my experience of things in the world. In particular, faces seem to demand an *ethical* response from me in a way objects do not. For instance, tables ask nothing of me, whereas the face of a homeless child at my door compels me to feel concern and want to help her.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) - Jean-Paul Sartre provides a phenomenology of freedom which argues that I experience the past as fixed and unchangeable, whereas the future appears like an open array of possibilities I get to shape and create using my ability to choose (including deciding how I think and act *in response* to my past).[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### 5. Conclusion Critics of phenomenology insist that it’s not possible to identify *general* defining characteristics of experiences independent of individual bias or social conditioning, i.e., there’s no way to bracket out all non-essential features.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) For instance, perhaps experiencing human faces as demanding a response could be due simply to personal upbringing or cultural norms, rather than some essential feature of the experience. Nonetheless, phenomenology is valuable because the first-person perspective it studies is where we *live* and experience meaning.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Phenomenology can deepen our appreciation for life: we often overlook our experiences, and phenomenology helps us slow down and pay attention to their richness.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For a scientific explanation of the pleasure experienced in cuddling, including an explanation of the term “cuddle chemical,” see Joe Schwarcz, “Want to cuddle? Personality is likely to get you further than oxytocin,” *McGill Office for Science and Society*, 12/10/2021. For a scientific explanation of vision, see “How the Eyes Work,” by *National Eye Institute*, 4/20/22. For a scientific explanation of experiencing goosebumps from music, also known as “frisson,” see “Frisson” on *Wikipedia*. For a scientific explanation of stress, see “Chronic stress puts your health at risk,” *Mayo Clinic*, August 1, 2023. For a scientific explanation of runner’s high, see David J. Linden, “The Truth Behind ‘Runner’s High’ and Other Mental Benefits of Running,” *Johns Hopkins Medicine*. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Note that while this essay presents some of the major ideas of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who is considered the founder of phenomenology, it aims to summarize phenomenology in a general and broad manner that can apply to a wide variety of phenomenologists. For other helpful introductions to phenomenology, see Zahavi (2025), Moran (2000), and Sokolowski (1999). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) While not an explicit concept in phenomenology, some philosophers call what seems to be the case in experiences “seemings.” For an introduction to the concept of seemings, see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For this reason, Husserl (2001/1900: p. 168) said that the “motto” of phenomenology is “back to the things themselves!” In other words, phenomenology is an attempt to return to examining how things (i.e., “the things themselves”) give themselves or appear to our minds. Thus, Marion (2002) stresses that phenomenology is the study of “givenness.” Heidegger (2008/1927: p. 58) defines phenomenology in a similar manner as follows: “Phenomenology means to let that which shows itself \[i.e., gives itself\] be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” For an introduction to Marion’s philosophy, see [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/) by Matthew Sanderson. For an introduction to Heidegger’s philosophy, see [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) and [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/), both by Matthew Sanderson. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The relationship between consciousness and phenomena—i.e., that consciousness is always consciousness *of* something, that is, always directed towards or *about* something–is what phenomenologists call “intentionality.” For an introduction to the concept of intentionality, see [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/) by Addison Ellis. However, some phenomenologists (see, e.g., Henry 2002 and Marion 2001) argue that intentionality is only one way in which phenomena appear to consciousness, i.e., only one type of “phenomenality.” This is because they view intentionality as always consciousness of separate, distinct *objects* or individual beings, but they insist that humans experience some phenomena that can’t be understood as objects. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For instance, Husserl (2014) insisted that, to study how phenomena appear to us, it’s necessary to “bracket” (i.e., to remove from mental consideration) what causes the phenomenon or what it is. For instance, phenomenologists study how trees present to our minds rather than trying to figure out what chemical compounds they are made out of. Husserl called this method of studying phenomena “the phenomenological reduction,” referring to how one “reduces” one’s attention to just focus on what the experience is like from a first-person perspective. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Arguably every phenomenologist sees phenomenology as laying the foundation for a different type of study: Husserl (1970) for science; Heidegger (2008/1927) for ontology (i.e., the study of the Being of beings); Merleau-Ponty (2010/1945) for psychology; Levinas (1969/1961) for ethics; and so on. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For example, we’d need to know what the experience of a runner’s high is like to be able to identify *who* is experiencing it so that we know whose brains to study (and when) to discover the physiological causes of a runner’s high. A brain researcher who has never heard of runner’s high before would have no idea what she is trying to explain or when events in the brain might correlate with the experience. She could, of course, scan a person’s brain while he is running and observe changes in the brain, but she couldn’t know which of those changes corresponds to the experience of a runner’s high as opposed to other types of experiences a person might undergo while running. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Arguably every phenomenologist fights against a different form of what they understand as reductive approaches to human experience: Husserl (1970) against science reducing experience to natural causes; Heidegger (2008/1927) against metaphysics reducing Being to beings; Merleau-Ponty (2019/1945) against psychology reducing the lived body (i.e., the body as we subjectively experience it) to another object in the world; Henry (2002) against modern culture (what he calls “barbarism”) reducing subjectivity (i.e., the experience of the self) to behavior in the world; and so on. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Note that the process described here is largely the method used most fully by Husserl. Each phenomenologist arguably revises Husserl’s method based on their own individual conception of phenomenology and what they think works best for the phenomena they are attempting to describe. But arguably every phenomenologist could endorse this summary as encapsulating the gist of the phenomenological method. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) This method of “bracketing” is what Husserl called “the phenomenological reduction.” Arguably every phenomenologist after Husserl uses their own version of the reduction, even if they don’t explicitly call it that. They also critique Husserl’s version for different reasons. For examples of this type of criticism and revision, see Heidegger (2008/1927) and Marion (2002). It’s important to note that phenomenologists bracket, e.g., scientific explanations not because they are seen as incorrect, but only for the purpose of paying full attention to how phenomena appear to our minds. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Husserl (2014) called the method or process of thinking through what elements are necessary or essential in an experience “imaginative variation” or “free variation in imagination.” This is because it involves imagining variations of an experience—for instance, mentally adding or removing characteristics of an experience—in order to discover what features or traits are essential for making the experience what it is. This process is part of the phenomenological reduction. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Henry (2002) for this description of one’s inner self. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Merleau-Ponty (2010/1945) for this description of the lived body. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Levinas (1969/1961) for his description of experiencing the face of another person. Levinas believes the face compels an *ethical* response, and thus the face-to-face relation is the origin of moral responsibility. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Sartre (2021/1943) for his description of the experience of freedom or what philosophers typically call “free will.” Technically speaking, Sartre didn’t view our ability to choose as a type of will, but rather as the very nature of consciousness. For an introduction to the philosophy of free will, see [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima and [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. For an introduction to Sartre’s philosophy, see [“Hell is Other People”: Jean-Paul Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people/) by Kiki Beck and [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/existentialism/) by Addison Ellis. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Sellars (1997), Rorty (2017), Derrida (1989), and Foucault (1994), among many others, can be understood as criticizing phenomenology in this manner. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Arguably every phenomenologist makes this point in their own way. For a good example, see Husserl (1970). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) For an introduction to philosophical reflections on the meaning of life, see [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) and [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/), both by Matthew Pianalto. ### References [Derrida, Jacques. (1989). Edmund Husserl’s “Origins of Geometry:” An Introduction. University of Nebraska Press. ](https://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/nebraska-paperback/9780803265806/edmund-husserls-origin-of-geometry/) [Foucault, Michel. (1994). The Origin of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. Vintage. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/55037/the-order-of-things-by-michel-foucault/) [Heidegger, Martin. (2008/1927). Being and Time. Harper. ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/being-and-time-martin-heidegger?variant=32154071597090) [Henry, Michel. (2002). I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity. Stanford University Press.](https://www.sup.org/books/religious-studies/i-am-truth) [Husserl, Edmund. (2014). Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. Hackett Publishing.](https://hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/20th-century/ideas-for-a-pure-phenomenology-and-phenomenological-philosophy) [Husserl, Edmund. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Northwestern University Press. ](https://nupress.northwestern.edu/9780810167988/crisis-of-european-sciences-and-transcendental-phenomenology/) [Husserl, Edmund. (2001/1900). Logical Investigations. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Logical-Investigations-Volume-1/Moran-Husserl/p/book/9780415241892?srsltid=AfmBOopeggDVTHifTF9N3E7NIYuDFOQRnf3ddiTdx_uoFNfohSN9M9vJ) [Levinas, Emmanuel. (1969/1961). Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Duquesne University Press. ](https://www.dupress.duq.edu/products/philosophy5-paper) [Linden, David J. (2025). “The Truth Behind ‘Runner’s High’ and Other Mental Benefits of Running.” ](https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/wellness-and-prevention/the-truth-behind-runners-high-and-other-mental-benefits-of-running)[*Johns Hopkins Medicine*](https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/wellness-and-prevention/the-truth-behind-runners-high-and-other-mental-benefits-of-running)[. Last accessed July 9, 2025. ](https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/wellness-and-prevention/the-truth-behind-runners-high-and-other-mental-benefits-of-running) [Marion, Jean-Luc. (2002). Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Stanford University Press. ](https://www.sup.org/books/theory-and-philosophy/being-given) [Marion, Jean-Luc. (2001). In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena. Fordham University Press. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823222162/in-excess/) [Mayo Clinic. (August 1, 2023). “Chronic stress puts your health at risk.” Last accessed July 12, 2025.](https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/stress-management/in-depth/stress/art-20046037) [Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. (2010/1945). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Phenomenology-of-Perception/Merleau-Ponty/p/book/9780415834339?srsltid=AfmBOopm91dgFKghkxRA9Xe4SUovNgOIVHVAtFPGlyp7NMPfm-MKfQCe) [Moran, Dermont. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Introduction-to-Phenomenology/Moran/p/book/9780415183734?srsltid=AfmBOooj5pq1NqzTI3-01VlFuBIWXThofEo6GodTRlIOGUiRA-cSDWnP) [National Eye Institute. (April 20, 2022). “How the Eyes Work.” Last accessed July 9, 2025. ](https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/healthy-vision/how-eyes-work) [Rorty, Richard. (2017/1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691178158/philosophy-and-the-mirror-of-nature?srsltid=AfmBOoqVE1R1YPvQNA7kN8Xg72gVUXkKsqoMp4k-5rLJsdBW848Y6tdA) [Sartre, Jean-Paul. (2021/1943). Being and Nothingness. Simon and Schuster. ](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Being-and-Nothingness/Jean-Paul-Sartre/9781982105457) [Schwarcz, Joe. (12/10/2021). “Want to cuddle? Personality is likely to get you further than oxytocin.” ](https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/history-general-science/want-cuddle-personality-likely-get-you-further-oxytocin)[*McGill Office for Science and Society*](https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/history-general-science/want-cuddle-personality-likely-get-you-further-oxytocin)[. Last accessed July 9, 2025. ](https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/history-general-science/want-cuddle-personality-likely-get-you-further-oxytocin) [Sellars, Wilfrid. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674251557) [Sokolowski, Robert. (1999). Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/introduction-to-phenomenology/E674F6D1A67EB5EA0BAD016711487D9D) [Zahavi, Dan. (2025). Phenomenology: The Basics. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Phenomenology-The-Basics/Zahavi/p/book/9781032396378) [Wikipedia. (2025). “Frisson.” Last accessed July 9, 2025. ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frisson) ### Related Essays [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/) by Addison Ellis [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [“Hell is Other People”: Jean-Paul Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people/) by Kiki Beck [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) by Matthew Sanderson [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/) by Matthew Sanderson [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) By Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Phenomenology.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)[*.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Mind & Language, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** phenomenology, Sanderson --- ### [G. E. Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) **Published:** February 23, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to G.E. Moore’s Proof of an External World and his response to External World Skepticism. **Content:** Author: Chris Ranalli Categories: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Historical Philosophy ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word count: 1000 *External* *world skepticism* is the view that we cannot know anything about the external world: we can’t know that we have hands, that there are other people, or, in general, know that anything external to our minds exists. Such skeptics commonly argue that we can’t refute *skeptical hypotheses*—such as that everything is a projection of our own minds—and that since we can’t do that, we can’t know that we have hands or much else.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) British philosopher G. E. Moore (in)famously purported to refute external world skepticism with what’s known as *Moore’s Proof*: he held out his hands during a lecture and said “Here is one hand” and “here is another”, claiming to prove that there is an external world on that basis.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) While philosophers tend not to think that Moore’s Proof refutes skepticism, it is hard to explain why.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay reviews some of the most important attempts. [![G.E. Moore's "Proof of an External World."](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/moore.jpg?resize=656%2C463&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/moore.jpg?ssl=1)G.E. Moore’s “Proof of an External World.” ### 1. Transmission Failure To begin evaluating Moore’s Proof, let’s consider a potentially analogous “proof”: Imagine Sally and Susie are at an art exhibition viewing a wall that appears red. Sally asks, “What color is the wall?” Susie replies, “Well, the wall looks red.” Sally counters with, “But couldn’t the wall be white with hidden red lights shining on it?” Susie answers: “The wall *looks* red, and so it *is* red. Therefore, it’s not white with hidden red lights shining on it.” Did Susie *prove* that there are no hidden red lights shining on the wall? Intuitively not. But why? Some philosophers have argued that the reason why responses like Susie’s fail is because it’s a case of what’s known as “transmission failure.” This occurs when someone’s belief A entails belief B (B is a logical consequence of A), but their support for A is not support for B, because prior support for B is necessary for getting support for A. On this view, the reason why Susie didn’t prove that there are no hidden red lights is that, by relying on her perceptions to believe that the wall is red, she is presupposing that there are no such lights. Some philosophers think that Moore’s “proof” is also a case of transmission failure.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Moore believes that he has hands, and this entails that there’s an external world. But, intuitively, his perceptions could support his belief that he has hands only if he *already has* support for thinking there is an external world. For aren’t hands *external* objects?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. Liberalism and Conservatism However, some philosophers argue that Moore’s Proof is not a case of transmission failure. On their view, we don’t need *evidence* *for* his conclusion in order to have perceptual evidence for his premise. Instead, we only need to *lack* *evidence* *against* the conclusion in order for our perception as of our hands to support the premise that we have hands.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This is called *liberalism* about perceptual justification: **Liberalism**: For your perception to provide evidence for your external world beliefs, you must *lack* evidence for skeptical hypotheses. In contrast, proponents of transmission failure seem committed to: **Conservatism**: For your perception to provide evidence for your external world beliefs, you must already *have* evidence to reject skeptical hypotheses.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The trouble is that conservatism seems to imply skepticism.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) How *could* you get evidence against skeptical hypotheses if not by relying on your perception? This supports taking a closer look at liberalism. ### 3. Dogmatism One way of developing liberalism is *dogmatism*. According to dogmatism, if your perception as of something’s being the case (call it “P”) makes it seem to you that P, then provided that you lack sufficient evidence to doubt that P, you are justified in believing that P.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) For example, right now your perceptions make it seem to you that you are reading an essay. Now consider whether you have evidence to believe that you are *not* reading an essay. (Do you?). Provided you lack such evidence, dogmatism implies that you are justified in believing that you are reading an essay. The dogmatist extends this idea to Moore’s Proof as follows: It seems to you that you have hands. You also lack evidence to believe that there is no external world. So, your perception justifies you in believing that you have hands. So, you are justified in believing in an external world. Dogmatism by itself, however, doesn’t resolve our puzzle about why Moore’s ‘proof’ is unsatisfying. If I’m a skeptic and you rehearsed Moore’s Proof for me, I probably wouldn’t be persuaded. But why not? After all, according to dogmatism, I apparently have justification to believe the conclusion! That’s what we’ll explore next. ### 4. Why is Moore’s Proof Unpersuasive? Dogmatists argue that Moore’s Proof might not persuade the external world skeptic but that this doesn’t make it a bad argument. This is because there is a difference between arguments that give us justification to believe their conclusions—**justifying arguments**—and arguments which persuade people who doubt the conclusion—**persuasive arguments**. An argument with unjustified premises might persuade someone to overcome their doubts about the conclusion. Likewise, an argument with justified premises might fail to persuade someone to believe a conclusion they have justification to believe.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The skeptic doubts that there is an external world, which undermines her confidence in her perceptions. Moore’s Proof won’t help her overcome her doubts. This is because her doubts prevent her from accepting the premise of Moore’s Proof (“I have hands”), even though her perceptions *do* give her justification to believe that premise. Moore’s Proof starts from the assumption that one needn’t doubt their perceptions unless there is concrete evidence of unreliability, like bad weather or intoxication. The skeptical hypothesis that everything is a projection of one’s mind, however, is a *mere* logical possibility; there’s no concrete evidence that it might actually be the case. For this reason, it shouldn’t undermine one’s trust in their perceptions. ### 5. Conclusion Most people who first encounter Moore’s Proof typically think that it’s a total failure. As we’ve seen, it’s not clear why or even whether it is a failure. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Skeptical hypotheses* are hypothetical scenarios in which your beliefs could systematically be false, but they would nevertheless appear true; everything would seem the same to you. Descartes famously discusses two skeptical hypotheses: if we were dreaming or if were deceived by an evil demon, our beliefs about the external world would be false yet everything would appear “normal” to us. See [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro. Zhuangzi raises the possibility of dreaming with a metaphysical twist; that we could be butterflies dreaming that we are human beings. See Zhuangzi (2013: 18) in Watson (ed.) (2013). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Moore’s Proof is typically standardized as follows: Premise: Here are two hands. Therefore, conclusion: There is an external world. See Wright (2002) for this way of standardizing the proof. Here’s how Moore put his proof: “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples” (Moore 1993: 166). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Compare with Barry Stroud (1984), who said that “we immediately feel that Moore’s Proof is inadequate” (1984: 86). Annalisa Coliva (2008) calls the proof “an obviously annoying failure” (Coliva 2008: 235). J. Adam Carter, in his (2012) survey of recent work on Moore’s Proof, says that the proof is “intellectual unsatisfying” (Carter 2012: 115). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Wright (2002) defends this position. Wright (2004) further develops this into an anti-skeptical strategy. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Some philosophers argue that we could have hands even if we were brains in vats living inside a simulated world. For them, ‘hands’ and other ordinary objects are defined in terms of what they *do* rather than what they are made of, whether it be organic matter or 0’s and 1’s. For this reason, some skeptical hypotheses are compatible with our ordinary beliefs. See Chalmers (2018), Walker (2020), and Ranalli and Walker (2025). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Liberals also tend to be *Neo-Mooreans*, who hold that Moore’s Proof is sound, and thereby that it really does prove that there’s an external world. Unlike Moore, however, they try to explain *how* we can know or get evidence to believe the premise ‘here are two hands’. See Pritchard (2007) for an introduction. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Pryor (2004), section 3, for this way of thinking about the relationship between perceptual evidence and skeptical hypotheses. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Pryor (2000) argues for this claim. Conservatives typically reply by arguing that there is a species of justification for beliefs that doesn’t rely on having evidence, so-called *entitlement*, and argue that we can be entitled to believe that there’s an external world without having evidence for it. See Wright (2004). Some philosophers, like Coliva (2015), argue that it is constitutive of *being a rational agent* that you accept that there’s an external world. For an introduction to the related concept of epistemic justification, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For a defense of dogmatism, see Pryor (2000). Dogmatism is an example of a more general thesis in epistemology called *phenomenal conservativism*, the idea that if it seems to you that P when you lack defeaters—reasons to think that P is false, or that you are making mistake—you thereby get some degree justification to believe P. See Huemer (2001) and Tucker (ed.) (2013). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This is a simplified form of Pryor’s (2011), section 7, discussion of why some proofs with good justificatory structure, like Moore’s Proof, do not persuade skeptics. As Pryor puts it, if you believe without evidence that you are in a skeptical scenario, this belief would not undermine the evidence that your perceptions give you to believe that you have hands, but it will “rationally obstruct” you from believing that you have hands (Pryor 2011: 368). ### References [Carter, J. Adam (2012). “Recent Work on Moore’s Proof.” ](https://brill.com/view/journals/skep/2/2/article-p115_3.xml?language=en)[*International Journal for the Study of Skepticism*](https://brill.com/view/journals/skep/2/2/article-p115_3.xml?language=en)[ 2 (2):115-144.](https://brill.com/view/journals/skep/2/2/article-p115_3.xml?language=en) [Chalmers, David J. (2018). “Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism.” *Journal of Philosophy* 115 (12):625-660.](https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_2018_0115_0012_0625_0660) [Coliva, Annalisa (2008). “The Paradox of Moore’s Proof of an External World.” ](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/58/231/234/1443016)[*Philosophical Quarterly*](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/58/231/234/1443016)[ 58 (231):234–243.](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/58/231/234/1443016) [Coliva, Annalisa (2015). *Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology*. Palgrave-Macmillan.](https://philpapers.org/rec/COLERA-3) [Cottingham, John (ed.) (1996). *Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections From the Objections and Replies*. Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in Latin in 1647)](https://philpapers.org/rec/COTDMO-2) [Huemer, Michael (2001). *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield](https://philpapers.org/rec/HUESAT). [Moore, G.E. (1993) “Proof of an External World.” In *G. E. Moore: Selected Writings*, 147–170. New York: Routledge.](https://philpapers.org/rec/MOOGMS) [Pritchard, Duncan (2007). “How to be a Neo-Moorean.” In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), *Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology*. Oxford University Press. pp. 68-99.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/internalism-and-externalism-in-semantics-and-epistemology-9780199275755) [Pryor, James (2000). “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”. *Noûs* 34 (4):517–549.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00277) [Pryor, James (2004). “What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”. *Philosophical Issues* 14 (1):349–378.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x) [Ranalli, Chris, and Walker, Mark (2025). “Metaphysical ecumenicalism and Moore’s Poof.” *Episteme.* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/metaphysical-ecumenicalism-and-moores-proof/6396F7B6BD6FC4C50EB2C75535D3FEA7) [Stroud, Barry (1984). *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*. Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198247613.001.0001/acprof-9780198247616) [Tucker, Chris (ed.) (2013). *Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*. Oxford University Press USA.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001/acprof-9780199899494) [Walker, Mark (2020). “Moore’s Proof, Theory-ladenness of perception, and Many proofs.” *Philosophical Studies* 177 (8):2163-2183.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-019-01304-1) [Watson, Burton (ed.) (2013). *The Complete Works of Zhuangzi.* Columbia University Press.](http://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-complete-works-of-zhuangzi/9780231164740) [Wright, Crispin (2002). “(Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: Moore and McDowell” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 65, 330–48.](https://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00205.x) [Wright, Crispin. (2004). “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” *Aristotelian Society Supplement*.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00121.x) ### Related Essays [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/mooreun-dis-dunyanin-gercekligi-kaniti-dis-dunya-supheciligine-cevap-vermek-chris-ranalli/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Moore.pdf). ### About the Author [Chris Ranalli](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ranalli) is a lecturer in epistemology at the VU University Amsterdam and post-doctoral fellow for the Extreme Beliefs ERC project. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Edinburgh. He specializes mainly in epistemology, but he has interests in philosophy of mind and the intersection of epistemology and moral philosophy. He is currently exploring topics in social epistemology and the ethics of belief. [chris-ranalli.weebly.com](https://chris-ranalli.weebly.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics **Tags:** external world skepticism, G.E. Moore, George Edward Moore, Ranalli, skepticism --- ### [Albert Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) **Published:** May 1, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Erik Van Aken Category: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 ##### “There is only one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.”– Albert Camus It might seem flippant to remark that *the* essential question in philosophy is “Should I kill myself?” But the question of suicide rests on what Camus considered the essential human problem: the sense in which our lives are entirely *absurd*. This essay will outline the origin and consequences of Camus’s notion of the absurd from his 1942 *The Myth of Sisyphus*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) ![Albert Camus and The Myth of Sisyphus](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/camus.jpg?resize=559%2C392&ssl=1) Albert Camus and The Myth of Sisyphus ### 1. The Absurd and its Origin There are many things we might naturally call absurd: a rude joke, an outrageous statement, or the price of a pair of designer jeans. This though is not what Camus means by “absurd.” For Camus, the absurd originates from a combination of two things: *the way we want the world to be* and *the way the world actually is*. About how we *want* the world to be, it just seems to be a part of human nature that we have a sense of justice and fairness, and so we want the world to be just and fair: we want evil punished and virtue rewarded. We also want to understand why bad things happen to good people, why good things happen to bad people, why we’re here, where we’re going, and what it all means. Concerning how things *actually* are, however, evil goes unpunished, good deeds often are not rewarded, good things happen to bad people, bad things happen to good people, and we don’t understand any of it. We just do not, and according to Camus, we *cannot* understand what we want to understand. Camus’s doctrine of the absurd then has both metaphysical and epistemological aspects. As a *metaphysical* thesis, the absurd is a confrontation between the human mind and an indifferent universe: what exists is a “mind that desires and the world that disappoints” (50). As an *epistemological* thesis, the absurd highlights our desire to understand and the fundamental limits of our knowledge. ### 2. The Inescapability of the Absurd Having diagnosed the essential human problem, Camus shifts his interest to *prognosis*, determining *whether* and *how* to live in the face of the absurd. *The Myth of Sisyphus* is primarily a critique of existentialism, specifically the attempts by thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Heidegger to overcome the absurd by appealing to God or the transcendent. These thinkers, Camus claims, contradict themselves by presupposing that life is absurd in some way, but proposing a solution to the absurd (so that life isn’t *really* absurd after all). For example, Kierkegaard sees life as profoundly absurd, due to its central lack of meaning. He thereby proposes that we take “a leap of faith,” essentially arguing that belief in God will ultimately provide one’s life with meaning. Camus opposes this form of *escapism*, claiming that existentialists “deify what crushes them and find reason to hope in what impoverishes them” (24). Camus rejects appeals to the transcendent; for him, the absurd – the “divorce” between us and the world – represents the *inescapable* human condition. As we’ll see, in place of the false hope of religiosity, Camus advises a vivid awareness of the absurd and a form of *revolt*. ### 3. Absurdity and Happiness: The Myth of Sisyphus In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to the pointless task of rolling a large rock up a mountain, only to watch the rock roll back down, and to repeat the task for eternity. As a life filled entirely of mundane and trivial labor, Sisyphus’s existence is meant to illustrate the futility (and absurdity) we confront in our own lives. Camus observes that a person’s life can become, essentially, a mundane routine: “Rising, streetcar, four hours in the office or the factory, meal, streetcar, four hours of work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday and Sunday according to the same rhythm…” (12-13). Yet, for Camus, Sisyphus is not to be pitied. Sisyphus represents the “absurd hero” because *he chooses to live in the face of absurdity*. This “choosing to live” is a matter of consciousness, for through his attitude and outlook, Sisyphus can free himself from his punishment and triumph over his situation *without being able to change it*. Sisyphus is aware of the full extent of his punishment: he is fully conscious of the fate imposed on him by the gods and the utter futility of his existence. His *passion*, *freedom*, and *revolt*, however, make him stronger than the punishment intended to crush him. Though it may seem odd, Camus indicates that Sisyphus is happy. By making his rock “his thing” (123), Sisyphus finds joy in *being.* Perhaps the climb up becomes more comfortable over time: maybe the muscles that once strained under the weight of the rock now effortlessly control it; conceivably, the rock moves so gracefully upwards that the act of moving it becomes a work of art. Through his freedom, Sisyphus *revolts* against the gods and refuses the futility of their punishment by consciously living with passion. The rock, the mountain, the sky, and the dirt belong to him and are his world. Sisyphus has no hope to change his situation but, nevertheless, he uses all that’s given to and available for him. ### 4. Conclusion Camus’s answer to the question of suicide is *no*. Camus insists that we must persist in the face of absurdity and not give ourselves over to false hope; he ultimately suggests that life will be lived all the better *if it has no meaning*. It is up to us to live our lives with *passion*, *freedom*, and *revolt* – three consequences of the absurd – or else we give in to false hope or even choose not to live at all. By embracing our passions and absurd freedom, we can thus throw ourselves into the world with a desire to use all that’s given. Though we can never reconcile the metaphysical and epistemological tensions that give rise to the absurd, we can remember that the “point,” after all, is “to live” (65). ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Further quotations will be from *The Myth of Sisyphus* and given in the main text. The first quote is from page 3. ### Reference [Camus, Albert (1942), The Myth of Sisyphus, J.O’Brien (trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2018.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/23470/the-myth-of-sisyphus-by-albert-camus/9780525564454/) ### For Further Reading Aronson, Ronald, “Albert Camus”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ### Related Essays [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk ### Acknowledgments The editors thank Matthew Howery and Melissa Shew for their feedback on this essay. ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) ### PDF Download ### Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/camus.pdf). ### About the Author Erik received an MSc in philosophy from the University of Edinburgh and a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Kent. He has taught philosophy at the University of Kent as an Assistant and Associate Lecturer. His main interests lie at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of agency. [kent.academia.edu/Erikvanaken](https://kent.academia.edu/Erikvanaken) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** Albert Camus, Camus, Sisyphus, The Absurd, The Myth of Sisyphus --- ### [Jean-Luc Marion on 'Saturated Phenomena': What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/) **Published:** June 21, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay introduces French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion's concept of "saturated phenomena"—things people seem to experience (e.g., artworks, romantic partners, spiritual realities, etc.) that “blow your mind”—an important idea in the school of philosophy known as “phenomenology.” **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/), [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 999 Imagine seeing new beauty and meaning in your favorite painting every time you view it. Or feeling taken aback—surprised even—by how attractive your romantic partner is, not just physically, but as a person. Or having what you believe was an experience of a spiritual reality that completely caught you off guard and left you struggling to describe what you seemed to encounter. These are examples of what French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1946) calls “*saturated phenomena*”: things people *seem* to experience (e.g., artworks, romantic partners, spiritual realities, etc.) that “blow your mind,” i.e. that exceed a person’s ability to make sense of them. This essay introduces Marion’s concept of saturated phenomena, an important idea in the school of philosophy known as “*phenomenology*.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![Composition VII by Wassily Kandinsky. An abstract oil painting. 1913.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Kandinsky-Composition-VII.jpg?resize=656%2C439&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Kandinsky-Composition-VII.jpg?ssl=1)Composition VII by Wassily Kandinsky. An abstract oil painting. 1913. ### 1. The Phenomenology of Givenness Marion is a *phenomenologist*. As the name implies, *phenomenology* is the study of *phenomena*, i.e., things as they seem to appear to our minds in experience: other people; moods and emotions; sensations such as sights and sounds; perhaps even spiritual, non-sensory realities such as God.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Phenomenology seeks to describe phenomena as we seem to subjectively experience them. For instance, to study romantic love, phenomenologists try to describe what the experience of falling in love seems to be like in “*lived* experience,” i.e., experience from a first-person perspective.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Phenomenologists believe that accurate descriptions of lived experiences capture the essence or defining characteristics of how phenomena appear to us. According to Marion, *saturated* phenomena are a unique and important type of phenomena we experience. Marion aims to describe the “*givenness*” of such phenomena: how they give or present themselves, on their own terms, *to* our minds.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This is because he thinks our minds only *receive* saturated phenomena rather than causing them somehow.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. The Active Mind Marion agrees with previous phenomenologists (e.g., Husserl and Heidegger) that our minds typically shape experiences.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Our minds do this by anticipating, filtering, categorizing, and imposing meaning onto many of the phenomena we experience. This mental activity enables us to understand and maintain a sense of control over what we experience. As a result, our experiences partially consist of what our minds contribute to them. For instance, your mind uses the concept of “essay” to identify what you’re currently experiencing. Expectations in your mind help you prepare for what might happen in the future, such as anticipating an example after reading “such as.” Mental pictures allow you to imagine possibilities and also “fill in” what’s missing from an experience, such as the backside of objects when looking at their front. Marion believes that experiences of saturated phenomena overwhelm the mind’s ability to help structure and construct experiences in these ways.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) To see why, it helps to contrast saturated phenomena with what Marion calls *poor* phenomena.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 3. Poor Phenomena Some phenomena perfectly “match” what’s in our minds.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) For instance, your smartphone is probably exactly what you have in mind—what you expect and visualize—each time you reach for it. However, *poor* phenomena are those where our mental concepts and expectations are much greater, fuller, or richer than the given phenomenon. For example, a musician might feel like she can never get her instrument to sound as good as what she “hears” in her head. Another example is any circular object you experience in the world compared to your idea of a *perfect* circle. In these examples, the phenomena experienced (i.e., the music and circular objects) are “poor” compared to the richness of ideas the mind actively contributes to the experiences. ### 4. Saturated Phenomena S*aturated* phenomena, on the other hand, are things given or presented to our minds which are more than we can “take in,” overflowing (i.e., *saturating*) our comprehension ability.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Whereas poor phenomena give too little in comparison to our mental ideas, saturated phenomena give too much, overwhelming our capacity to grasp or make sense of them. In short, poor phenomena fail to meet our expectations, while saturated phenomena far exceed them.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Marion thinks we often experience saturated phenomena.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) For instance, historical events (e.g., 9/11) can saturate our minds with their complexity and abundance of information; artworks can saturate us with everything they make visible and all their possible meanings; our bodies can saturate us with their inescapable closeness; other people can saturate us with their uniqueness and mysteriousness.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) For Marion, if God exists, God would be the ultimate example of a saturated phenomenon because he is considered eternal, infinite, all-powerful, etc.: you can’t envision or wrap your mind around God.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) As a result, if God were to appear before you, he would explode the framed boundaries of your mind, like a blinding light does to vision.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Thus, saturated phenomena flood (i.e., saturate) your mind with size, depth, and intensity, overpowering its ability to impose meaning and order onto reality. Your mind *witnesses* saturated phenomena, but it can’t adequately process or anticipate them.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) For this reason, unlike experiences of poor phenomena that are *directed* by our minds, experiences of saturated phenomena seem out of your control—like they happen entirely *to* you rather than you making them happen.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Thus, saturated phenomena interrupt the mind’s usual attempts to manage reality, rendering it a passive recipient.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ### 5. Conclusion Marion is sometimes criticized for suggesting that saturated phenomena overwhelm our minds to the point where active mental operations like interpretation can play no role in our experience of them.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Critics say interpretation is necessary even just to identify a phenomenon *as* saturated. Marion might respond that such identification comes only *after* the experience is over, but during the experience our minds can only passively receive the phenomenon.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Nevertheless, Marion’s concept of saturated phenomena gives us an interesting way to think about some of life’s most meaningful experiences, e.g., experiences of beauty, love, the divine, etc.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Furthermore, according to Marion, these awe-inspiring experiences challenge our sense of power and control as individuals. Thus, saturated phenomena teach us to be humble and receptive, allowing ourselves to be “blown away” and transformed by what escapes understanding. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For an introduction to phenomenology, see [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson. Marion discusses saturated phenomena across much of his work, but in most detail in his books *Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness* (2002) and *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena* (2001), as well as in the essays “The Saturated Phenomenon” and “The Banality of Saturation” collected in his book *The Visible and the Revealed* (2008). For helpful discussions of Marion’s concept of saturated phenomena, see Gschwandtner (2014), Gschwandtner (2007), Horner (2005), Mackinlay (2009), and Hart (2007). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Things that seem to be the case in experience are what philosophers call “seemings.” For an introduction to this concept, see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller. Note, however, that “seemings” is not an explicit topic of discussion in phenomenology specifically. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Marion discusses romantic love in his book *The Erotic Phenomenon* (2006). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Marion (2002) for his discussion of “givenness.” Marion (2001: p. 25) writes that a saturated phenomenon “. . . gives itself starting from itself alone (and not from a foreseeing and constituting subject) . . .” [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Marion (2001: pp. 24-25) writes that a saturated phenomenon is one to which “I must respond precisely because I have neither chosen it nor foreseen it nor straightaway constituted it. Now, this datum \[i.e., the saturated phenomenon\] gives itself to me, because it imposes itself on me, calls me, and determines me—in short, because I am not the author of it. The datum . . happens to me, and in which it is distinguished from all foreseen, synthesized, and constituted objects, since it happens to me as an event. This unforeseen happening marks it as given and attests in it to givenness.” It’s important to note that receiving—e.g., witnessing—saturated phenomena is still something your mind does, for Marion. It’s just that your mind isn’t actively helping to construct or “co-constitute” an experience of saturated phenomena. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For an introduction to phenomenology, including Husserl and Heidegger, see Smith (2013) and Smith (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy; no date provided). See Marion (1998 and 2002) for his most extensive discussions of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy. For more about Heidegger’s philosophy, see [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) and [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/), both by Matthew Sanderson. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Marion often argues that phenomenologists such as Husserl and Heidegger believed that our minds *always* help actively construct experiences by imposing meaning and order onto phenomena. Marion is thus critical of such phenomenologists for overlooking how experiences of saturated phenomena are, in Marion’s view, an exception to that rule. For his discussion of this criticism, see Marion (1998 and 2002). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Marion (2002 and 2008) for discussions of poor phenomena. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Marion (2001: p. 112) sometimes calls phenomena that match our mental concepts and expectations “common phenomena.” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Thus, experiences of saturated phenomena can sound quite close to experiences of what philosophers call “the sublime” where you encounter something that seems infinite in size or power. For an introduction to the sublime, see [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Marion (2001 and 2002) distinguishes between intention, which is what our minds bring and contribute to experiences (e.g., concepts), and intuition, which is the phenomena given or presented to our minds. In experiences of poor phenomena, intention is much greater than intuition, whereas in experiences of saturated phenomena intuition is significantly greater than intention. Marion (2002: p. 225) writes that with saturated phenomena “intuition sets forth a surplus that the concept cannot organize, therefore that the intention cannot foresee. As a result, intuition is not bound to and by the intention…Far from coming after the concept and therefore following the thread of the intention (aim, foresight, repetition), intuition subverts, therefore precedes, every intention, which it exceeds and decenters.” Marion (2001: p. 112) writes that he is “proposing…to consider phenomena where the duality between intention (signification) and intuition (fulfillment) certainly remains…but where, to the contrary of poor and common phenomena, intuition gives (itself) in exceeding what the concept (signification, intentionality, aim, and so on) can foresee of it and show.” [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Marion (2001) discusses four major types of saturated phenomena and argues that each type exceeds (i.e., saturates) one of Immanuel Kant’s four mental categories of understanding (i.e., the categories in our minds that structure and organize experience): “the event” (e.g., historical events like 9/11, personal events like falling in love, etc.) saturates (i.e., surpasses) the category of “relation”; “the flesh” (i.e., one’s subjective experience of embodiment) saturates the category of “modality”; “the icon” (e.g., other people, religious symbols, etc.) saturates the category of “quality”; and “the idol” (e.g., works of art) saturates the category of “quantity.” Marion sometimes discusses a fifth type of saturated phenomena – “the Revelation” (i.e., God) – which he says is the ultimate saturated phenomenon because it saturates all four of Kant’s categories. This essay gives examples of each of these types. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Marion (2001) for his discussion of these and other examples of saturated phenomena. Regarding works of art, for instance, Marion (2001: p. 70) writes, “…we cannot see a painting once and for all…\[T\]he painting cannot be seen in a single instance, it must be reseen in order to appear, because it appears according to the phenomenality of the saturated phenomenon.” In Marion’s essay “The Banality of Saturation” (2006) he stresses that many experiences of saturated phenomena are ordinary (i.e., “banal”), everyday occurrences. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) In general, Marion thinks it’s the nature of saturated phenomena that you can’t envision them or picture them in your mind (which also means you can’t adequately expect or anticipate them), at least not as a whole, the way you can easily form a mental picture of your entire smartphone, for instance. Marion (2001: p. 113) writes, “I cannot have vision of these phenomena \[i.e., saturated phenomena\], because I cannot constitute them \[i.e., conceptualize them\] starting from a univocal meaning, and even less produce them as objects. What I see of them, if I see anything of them that *is*, does not result from the constitution I would assign to them in the visible, but from the effect they produce on me. And, in fact, this happens in reverse so that my look is submerged, in a counter-intentional manner. Then I am no longer the transcendental *I* \[i.e., a mind actively constructing reality\] but rather the witness, constituted by what happens to him or her.” [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Marion (2001 and 2002) for his discussions of God as the ultimate saturated phenomenon. For a helpful introduction to Marion’s thinking about God, see Horner (2001 and 2005). For an introduction to the attributes or characteristics of God (e.g., all-powerful, etc.), see [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson. For more about the philosophy of religious experience (including mystical experience, often considered a type of religious experience), see [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/), [Rudolf Otto on ‘Numinous’ Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/), [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/), and [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/), all by Matthew Sanderson. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Marion (2001: p. 113) uses the word “witness” to describe how our minds experience saturated phenomena. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Marion (2001: p. 113) writes that saturated phenomena “happen to us.” See Marion (2002) for a discussion of how saturated phenomena challenge the self’s mastery of reality. The idea that saturated phenomena happen to us and overwhelm our mental power to control our experiences might suggest that such phenomena hinder our agency and free will. For an introduction to free will, see [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima and [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) However, it’s important to remember that while your mind can only passively receive saturated phenomena, that doesn’t mean it does nothing during the experience. It still witnesses saturated phenomena, for instance. But it passively receives such phenomena in the sense that it doesn’t and can’t help actively construct or “constitute” the experience. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See Gschwandtner (2014) and Mackinlay (2009) for examples of this criticism. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Gschwandtner (2014) argues that this appears to be Marion’s response to the criticism, but she finds it problematic for implying that there can be a “pure” experience free from interpretation. Remember that your mind passively receiving saturated phenomena is still something your mind does—e.g., witnessing the phenomena—but it’s just that your mind isn’t constructing any part of the experience. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) For an introduction to the philosophy of what makes life meaningful, see [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) and [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/), both by Matthew Pianalto. ### References [Gschwandtner, Christina M. (2014). Degrees of Givenness: On Saturation in Jean-Luc Marion. Indiana University Press. ](https://iupress.org/9780253014191/degrees-of-givenness/) [Gschwandtner, Christina M. (2013). Postmodern Apologetics? Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy. Fordham University Press. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823242757/postmodern-apologetics/) [Gschwandtner, Christina M. (2007). Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics. Indiana University Press.](https://iupress.org/9780253219459/reading-jean-luc-marion/) [Hart, Kevin (editor). (2007). Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion. University of Notre Dame Press. ](https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268030780/counter-experiences/) [Horner, Robyn. (2005). Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction. Ashgate Publishing Company. ](https://www.routledge.com/Jean-Luc-Marion-A-Theo-logical-Introduction/Horner/p/book/9780754636618?srsltid=AfmBOoojkquT5EQ75ra8raIsdpTbz0sZ8OG4EBHeNkszAmpN95nV5b6E) [Horner, Robyn. (2001). Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology. Fordham University Press. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823221226/rethinking-god-as-gift/) [Mackinlay, Shane. (2009). Interpreting Excess: Jean-Luc Marion, Saturated Phenomena, and Hermeneutics. Fordham University Press. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823231089/interpreting-excess/) [Marion, Jean-Luc. (2002). Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Stanford University Press. ](https://www.sup.org/books/theory-and-philosophy/being-given) [Marion, Jean-Luc. (2006). The Erotic Phenomenon. University of Chicago Press.](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/E/bo4134284.html) [Marion, Jean-Luc. (2001). In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena. Fordham University Press. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823222162/in-excess/) [Marion, Jean-Luc. (1998). Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology. Northwestern University Press. ](https://nupress.northwestern.edu/9780810112353/reduction-and-givenness/) [Marion, Jean-Luc. (2008). The Visible and the Revealed. Fordham University Press. ](https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823228843/the-visible-and-the-revealed/) [Smith, David Woodruff. (2013). Phenomenology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Last accessed on June 20, 2025. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/)[ ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/) [Smith, Joel. (No publication date provided.) Phenomenology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Last accessed on June 20, 2025. ](https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/) ### Related Essays [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) by Matthew Sanderson [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [Rudolf Otto on ‘Numinous’ Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/) by Matthew Sanderson [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) By Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Jean-Luc-Marion-.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)[*.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics, Phenomenology & Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Jean-Luc Marion, marion, Sanderson, saturated phenomena --- ### [Martin Heidegger on Technology ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) **Published:** April 23, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) argues that the main problem with technology’s dominance is how it limits our thinking and what we experience as human beings. Heidegger presents this view in a philosophy of technology that seeks to identify the defining characteristic or essence of modern technology. This essay summarizes Heidegger’s theory. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Categories: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 In today’s world it often seems like we can’t do anything without technology. Friends and family gather only to spend the whole time on their phones. Presentations are canceled if the slide deck software isn’t working. Posting photos of real-life events on social media can feel more important than the events themselves. The main problem with technology’s dominance, says philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), is how it limits our thinking and what we experience as human beings. Heidegger presents this view in a *philosophy of technology* that seeks to identify the defining characteristic or essence of modern technology. This essay summarizes Heidegger’s theory.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![A hydroelectric dam.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Heidegger-technology.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Heidegger-technology.jpg?ssl=1)A hydroelectric dam. ### 1. “Enframing” Heidegger says that the essence of modern technology is a certain worldview that’s the driving force *behind* the technology.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Heidegger names this technological worldview “*enframing*.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) As a worldview, enframing is not a subjective mindset, but the way our world usually “looks” today. The modern world often appears to us “enframed” as a collection of problems that need to be resolved through the most efficient and effective solutions possible—*technological* solutions.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Enframing doesn’t just motivate our creation and use of technological devices: it defines and dominates our entire modern way of life, determining how we see and do nearly everything.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. “Challenging-forth” Due to enframing, almost all human activity becomes what Heidegger calls “*challenging-forth*:” forcing or “challenging” people and things to provide what is needed to satisfy our demands as quickly as possible.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) So, we use technology to “challenge” nature by forcefully extracting “natural resources” for accomplishing our goals: mining for coal, clear-cutting forests, drilling for oil, splitting atoms, damming water, etc.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Whereas pre-modern technology—e.g., windmills, woodworking, traditional farming, etc.—worked in harmony *with* nature, modern technology basically assaults it.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) We not only use technology *to* challenge-forth; we also challenge technology itself, e.g., AI to write real estate descriptions, 3d printers to make prosthetic limbs, etc. People are challenged too: to be productive employees, to adapt to technological advancements (ironically!), etc. We even challenge activities that might seem like *breaks* from challenging. For instance, we challenge vacations to “recharge our batteries”—so we can challenge better (i.e., be more productive) when we return! ### 3. “Standing-reserve” Because of enframing, nearly everything becomes what Heidegger calls “standing-reserve,” stockpiles of resources valued only for how useful they are for meeting our needs.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) People are considered “human resources;” natural things are “natural resources;” libraries contain “information resources;” education consists of “learning resources;” lives are allocations of “time resources,” etc.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Technology is also itself standing-reserve, i.e., a “capital resource.” Think of all the devices and machines stockpiled in your residence, or apps on your phone, “on call” awaiting your command to help with seemingly all tasks.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) We now *expect* everything to be standing-reserve: on *stand*by, ready and available at our fingertips to serve our desires at a moment’s notice.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) We want to be able to stream all media (e.g., movies, music, etc.) anytime and from anywhere. Some even expect dating apps to help stock a “hookup homie roster,” i.e., a standing-reserve of romantic partners available for whenever the mood strikes.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) According to Heidegger, we challenge-forth—i.e., we force everything to be useful for achieving our objectives—to obtain, organize, store, and efficiently use standing-reserve. Managing standing-reserve is then the ultimate focus and goal of challenging-forth.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. The Danger Heidegger shows no indication that he would be worried about the typical dangers associated with technology in the 21st century, e.g., fossil fuels destroying the environment; nuclear weapons annihilating humanity; automation and AI replacing jobs; smartphones ruining attention spans, etc.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Instead, Heidegger’s main concern is that technology will forever degrade what it means to be human.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) In particular, the danger is that humanity, defined by Heidegger as our ability to see the world in different ways, will become unable to see outside the seemingly all-pervasive technological worldview.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Heidegger is most worried about how enframing can restrict human thinking and experience only to what is enframed, i.e., only to challenging-forth and standing-reserve. Especially troubling for Heidegger is the threat of losing our capacity to appreciate what he considers the most meaningful type of value, i.e., *non*-technological value (e.g., seeing a forest as sacred rather than as simply a resource for wood).[\[18\]](#_ftn18) For instance, Heidegger says a hydroelectric plant “enframes” the water as valuable only for supplying energy. This contrasts with a pre-modern wooden bridge that invites us to contemplate the water’s non-technological value, e.g., its beauty.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) ### 5. Conclusion: Heidegger’s Recommendation To combat the dangers of modern technology, Heidegger doesn’t want us to destroy it to return to a simpler age.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Instead, he believes we need to learn how to become *free* in our *use* of technology.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) That doesn’t mean to completely free ourselves *from* technology.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) That would be detrimental and futile, and, e.g., everyone “going off grid” is just more *challenging-forth* (i.e., challenging nature to free us from challenging)![\[23\]](#_ftn23) Instead, developing a free *relationship* with technology means becoming as free to put it down as to use it, e.g., as free to ignore your notifications as to check them, etc.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) We achieve this, Heidegger says, not only through practice, but most of all by remaining mindful that enframing is but one of *many* possible worldviews.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) By learning to put technology away when appropriate (e.g., on a first date, etc.), we develop a better “technology/life balance,” becoming free to engage in life and with people in *non*-technological ways. For example, we are able to spend quality time with loved ones without being on our phones.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Thus, Heidegger thinks that freedom isn’t found in rejecting technology, but rather through developing the capacity to set it aside. Whether enframing still allows for such a free engagement with technology is open to debate.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This essay mostly concentrates on summarizing key concepts from Heidegger’s major and most focused statement on technology, the essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” originally published in 1954, in Heidegger (1993). For helpful discussions of Heidegger’s views on technology, see Braver (2009), Braver (2014), Cerbone (2008), Polt (1999), Richardson (2012), Wrathall (2005), and Young (2002). The philosophy of technology is a subfield of philosophy that focuses on how best to define technology as well as ethical issues related to technology. For more about the philosophy of technology, see Franssen, et. al. (2023). It is important to note that Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party in Germany. While he was not a vocal supporter of the Holocaust, and some argue that he vehemently disagreed with Hitler, he never publicly criticized Hitler, renounced his membership in the party, or apologized for his involvement. For more on Heidegger’s relationship with Nazism, see Polt (1999). For reflections on how we should regard philosophers who displayed morally flawed characters, see [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/flawed-philosophers/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Heidegger (1993: p. 311) famously says, “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological.” In other words, the essence of technology is not the technological devices, software, etc.. He argues that the essence of something is never that thing itself, e.g., the essence of tree or “tree-ness” is not a tree, and thus the essence of technology is not a piece of technology or even the collection of all examples of technology. Rather, the essence of something, including technology, is what is *behind* or *at the basis of* that thing, i.e., what causes, brings about, defines, motivates the use of, etc. the thing. Heidegger (1993: p. 337) writes, “So long as we represent technology \[i.e., the essence of technology\] as an instrument \[i.e., as the technology itself\]…\[w\]e press on past the essence of technology \[i.e., we fail to understand its essence\].” Arguably, the central philosophical concept of Heidegger’s thought is what he calls “*Being*,” i.e., not a being or beings, but existence in general, that is, what makes beings be or exist. For more on Heidegger’s concept of Being, see [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) by Matthew Sanderson. Heidegger believes there is a unique way in which Being appears (or “presences,” as in “comes into presence” or “becomes present”) during each historical period. In other words, existence (i.e., Being) “looks” different in each time period. Said differently, in Heidegger’s view, each historical age is a different and unique “world,” in the sense that we use when we refer to “our *world* today.” In his essay on technology summarized here, he refers to this idea (i.e., how Being appears in history) simply as a “revealing” or “unconcealment.” This means technology, for Heidegger, is ultimately in its essence the way Being appears or is revealed in today’s world. This essay expresses the idea that technology is a certain revealing of Being by calling technology a “worldview.” Heidegger does not give an exact date or general timeframe when he believes modern technology began. His only comment in the essay (1993: p. 327) summarized here regarding the beginning of modern technology seems to be this: “. . machine-power technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which for chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, historically earlier.” [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) “Enframing” is the standard English translation of Heidegger’s German term “das Gestell.” In ordinary German, the term means frame, rack, shelf, or stand, but Heidegger seeks to give the word an expanded meaning in his philosophy of technology. The root verb of “Gestell” is “stellen,” which means to supply, posit, place, put forth, and the like. Heidegger says that he intends the prefix “Ge” to refer to the gathering or unification of “stell,” i.e., of what is supplied. Thus, “Gestell” refers to how the world appears, in the age of modern technology, as a unified whole of supplies or stock ordered for maximum use. In other words, it refers to how the technological worldview “frames” the entire world as an interconnected system of organized, usable resources. A more colloquial translation of the term would be something like “framework.” In Heidegger’s *Contributions to Philosophy*, written much earlier (1936-1937) than his essay summarized here (1954), he (1999: p. 88) calls enframing “machination,” which he says is “a manner of the essential swaying of being,” i.e., the way in which existence (i.e., “Being”) appears in the modern world. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Heidegger would likely point out that the common use today of the expression “technological solutions,” and even just referring to forms of technology solely as “solutions,” is indicative of our modern worldview where we see everything as problems to be solved through the creation and use of technology. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The essence of technology is a type of worldview or what Heidegger (1993: p. 318) calls a “revealing” (i.e., it reveals or shows beings as “standing-reserve” or stockpiles of resources) which is unique in that, because it is so dominant and pervasive (more so, Heidegger believes, than other revealings), it drives out all other possible worldviews, i.e., other possibilities for revealing (e.g., beings revealed as non-resources, etc.) and also blinds us to the fact that it does that. Heidegger (1993: p. 333) writes, “Thus, the challenging-enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing (bringing-forth) but also conceals revealing itself \[conceals that the essence of technology is a type of revealing, and thereby conceals the fact that we always live within a type of revealing of some kind\] and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, propriates.” Heidegger (1993: p. 339) writes, “The essential unfolding of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering \[i.e., a type of challenging-forth or technological activity\] and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealment of standing-reserve \[i.e., everything appears as resources stockpiled for maximum use\].” It should be noted that, while it’s the nature of enframing to be all-pervasive and dominant (more so, in Heidegger’s opinion, than other types of revealing or worldviews), like any worldview, enframing does not completely dominate, i.e., it does not completely determine us, render us powerless, and entirely block out all other worldviews. Instead, there is still space, according to Heidegger, for viewing the world and behaving differently, i.e., in a *non*-technological manner. Heidegger (1993: pp. 330-331) writes that enframing “in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology.” In other words, enframing does not wholly determine us or force us to remain in enframing forever. For Heidegger, humans are only partly responsible for enframing. We are responsible, at least in the sense that we help perpetuate enframing, simply because we are the users of technology, i.e., we are the challengers who perpetuate challenging-forth. However, we are certainly not entirely responsible, in Heidegger’s view, for the creation and start of enframing as a worldview (i.e., a “revealing”). Heidegger (1993: p. 323) writes, “Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call the actual is revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously, man. To what extent is man capable of such a revealing? Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself \[i.e., how beings appear or show up during different historical periods\], in which at any given time the actual shows itself or withdraws.” Also (1993: p. 324), “Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering \[i.e., a type of challenging-forth\] as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself \[i.e., enframing, in this case\], within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork…” In summary, then, humans are the users of technology and the performers of challenging-forth, and in doing so we are partly responsible for the perpetuation of the technological worldview. However, no one person or group is responsible for the start of the worldview, or will be responsible for its end. In short, we create and use technology, but we didn’t create the technological worldview *behind* the creation and use of technology. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Heidegger (1993: p. 320) writes, “The revealing \[i.e., worldview\] that rules in modern technology is a challenging.” He (1993: p. 321) says, “The revealing \[i.e., worldview\] that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth.” Heidegger (e.g., 1993: p. 321) calls challenging-forth “setting-upon” to express how challenging-forth *sets* things to work, e.g., extracts things to put them to use. Or in the sense of challenging-forth *setting* (i.e., placing) a burden or demand upon things so that they are useful to us in certain ways. Heidegger’s main example of “challenging-forth” when he first introduces the concept is extracting various forms of energy from nature, i.e., extracting what we today call “natural resources.” However, it’s clear that challenging-forth for Heidegger is overall a much broader concept and not limited solely to extraction. For example, Heidegger (e.g., 1993: p. 325) often defines challenging-forth in part as what he calls “ordering,” i.e., organizing resources such that they can be put to maximum use. Like extracting, ordering is a way of forcing the world to give us what we want in the form of order and organization. Examples of ordering in modern society are abundant. Think, for example, of how you organize devices in your home (e.g., each might have their own charger and location), apps on your phone, or documents in virtual “folders” within online storage systems. Businesses “order” their “human resources” by placing every employee somewhere on an “org \[i.e., organization or order-ization\] chart.” Indeed, the ideal in our society is arguably for *everything* to be “ordered” in Heidegger’s sense of the word. Notice that, after extracting resources, ordering them always involves *storing* them in some way, and we order and store resources in order to put them to maximum use in the most efficient manner possible. Thus, we can say there are at least four major types of challenging-forth: extracting, ordering, storing, and using. For this reason, it can be helpful to think of challenging-forth as any goal-oriented activity where we do something solely as a means to some end (rather than engaging in an activity for its own sake.) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Heidegger (1993: p. 320) writes that challenging-forth “puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.” Note, however, that challenging-forth doesn’t solely involve extracting resources; it also consists, for instance, of what Heidegger (e.g., 1993: p. 325) calls “ordering” the resources we extract. “Ordering” resources means organizing them, but it also refers to how, for instance, we seek to *transform* or *design* resources to force them to adapt to our needs, i.e., to bend them to the will of humanity so that they best “serve” us. A prime example of this is genetically engineering crops: we don’t just harvest (i.e., extract) fruits and vegetables, for instance; we also seek to “order” (e.g., genetically engineer, etc.) them so that they better meet our needs. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Humans have arguably always used technology, at least in the form of rudimentary tools. However, Heidegger (1993: p. 312) says that modern technology is, “in contrast to the older handicraft technology, something completely different and therefore new.” What sets modern technology apart from pre-modern technology, according to Heidegger, is not the sophistication of our technological devices, but rather challenging-forth. Whereas pre-modern technology operated in accordance *with* nature, and sought to bring out the best in it, modern technology challenges nature, forcing it to meet our demands. For example, Heidegger (1993: p. 320) argues that the pre-modern windmill works with nature in the sense that it “lets” the wind blow it rather than forcing the wind to do something, as opposed to the modern hydroelectric plant that forcefully extracts and impounds water. Even arguments against using nature as a resource often end up still based in the technological worldview. For instance, an argument against cutting down trees in a state park might be that it will deprive humans of a resource for enjoyment, recreation, hiking, etc. In other words, the argument says, “Don’t challenge the trees for wood. Instead, challenge them for human leisure.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Heidegger (1993: p. 322) writes, “What kind of unconcealment \[i.e., revealing or worldview, in the sense of how everything in the world appears or shows up\] is it, then, that is peculiar to that which results from this setting-upon that challenges? Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve…It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences \[i.e., presents or shows itself to us\] that is wrought upon by the revealing that challenges.” Humans have arguably always collected, stored, and used resources. However, according to Heidegger, the modern technological worldview (i.e., enframing) is unique because it consists of nearly *everything* appearing as resources (i.e., standing-reserve). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Thus, as Heidegger (1966: p. 50) himself puts it, enframing causes nature, if not also our entire modern world, to appear like it is just one big giant gas station: “The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought \[i.e., technological thinking\], attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.” Indeed, there’s hardly anything in our world today that isn’t at least sometimes referred to, or could be referred to, as a “resource.” In many ways, the word “resource” is now synonymous with “stuff,” “thing,” “item,” and other generic words that designate something (i.e., literally *anything*). Heidegger (1993: p. 322) writes that, within enframing, we no longer relate to things as “objects,” and (1993: p. 324) “…the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.” We no longer see things as objects in the sense that we don’t see them for what *they* *are* (e.g., we don’t appreciate their intrinsic value or their identity separate from how humans view them); we only see them for what they can *do* for *us*, i.e., only as standing-reserve. Heidegger argues that within enframing humans become standing-reserve as well. An example of this is how businesses now often say that “people are our most valuable resource.” Heidegger, in fact, already in 1954 noticed the use of the term “human resources” and cites it as an example of how humans have become standing-reserve. He (1993: 323) writes, “…\[M\]an for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature…If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about human resources…gives evidence of this.” [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Indeed, there are seemingly technological “resources”—devices, machines, programs, apps, etc.—to solve every modern problem and need: microwaves for cooking; televisions and smartphones for entertainment; dating apps for relationships, etc. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Heidegger (1993: p. 322) writes, “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering \[i.e., the type of challenging-forth that involves organizing resources for maximum use\].” [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) As another example, consider how surprised and disappointed we often are to discover that something is “out of stock” (i.e., not available as standing-reserve.) We seem to expect an endless stock (i.e., standing-reserve) of every product sold, in case we should ever want or need to buy it some day. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For instance, this essay began by challenging a cloud-based document system (i.e., a type of standing-reserve) on a computer (standing-reserve again) to write and store words (also standing-reserve). Then email (more standing-reserve) was challenged to send the essay (standing reserve yet again) to editors (i.e., *human* standing-reserve). Next the internet (you guessed it: standing-reserve!) was challenged to display the essay. Social media (another type of standing-reserve, of course) was then challenged to promote the essay. In this way, challenging-forth leads to standing-reserve, which then leads to more challenging-forth, which results in more standing-reserve, and so on. That never-ending system dominates almost all of our waking hours in our modern enframed world, according to Heidegger. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Heidegger (1993: p. 333) writes, “The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology.” [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Heidegger (1993: p. 333) writes that the danger of technology threatens “man in his essence. The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.” Also (1993: p. 337), enframing “thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free essence…” [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) “Ability to see the world in different ways” is here intended to summarize Heidegger’s idea that humanity stands in the “clearing” of Being. Being is the basic fact of existence, which Heidegger defines as revealing or presence-ing, which he sometimes calls a clearing, like a clearing in the forest in which different things can appear or come to presence. Hence, our standing in the clearing of Being means that many different things can appear before our awareness, i.e., we can see the world in an innumerable amount of different ways. In other words, it’s our human essence to be capable of being aware of many different ways the world can reveal or presence itself to us, i.e., in the language of this summary, we can inhabit an endless amount of “worldviews.” Heidegger (1993: p. 331) writes that, in enframing, humanity “is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and promulgating nothing but what is revealed in ordering \[i.e., being unable to see outside of enframing\], and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is blocked – that man might rather be admitted sooner and ever more primally to the essence of what is unconcealed and to its unconcealment \[i.e., might become aware that enframing is a type of revealing or worldview, i.e., an unconcealment\], in order that he might experience as his essence the requisite belonging to revealing \[i.e., an essence which is here summarized as ‘the ability to see the world in different ways.’\]” Heidegger (1993: p. 332) writes that enframing “drives out every other possibility of revealing \[e.g., non-technological value\]. Above all, enframing conceals that revealing which…lets what presences come forth into appearance \[e.g., non-technological value, etc.\]. As compared with that other revealing, the setting-upon that challenges forth thrusts man into a relation to whatever is that is at once antithetical and rigorously ordered. Where enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing \[i.e., in enframing, everything appears as standing-reserve\]. They no longer even let their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such \[i.e., enframing is a unique type of revealing in that it is so pervasive and dominant that it blocks awareness precisely of the fact that it is a revealing or worldview\].” Heidegger’s worry is not so much that we are too dependent on technology, but rather that its worldview (i.e., enframing) dominates, to the exclusion of all else, how we see and do almost everything, thereby degrading our humanity and how we see the world. Thus, Heidegger is not saying we need to become independent of technology, or detached from it (for these would require forceful effort and thus still be types of challenging-forth), but rather we need to develop the capacity for *using* technology when needed and appropriate, but also regularly *letting it be*, i.e., putting it down and setting it aside, especially at times that do not require it or where another *non*-technological mode of living is called for, e.g., silencing and storing your phone during an in-person social event, etc. Part of the danger for Heidegger is that we will become (or already are) indifferent to, or even wholly ignorant of, the loss of our essence as humans (i.e., our ability to see the world in different ways, or our awareness of various types of revealing), thereby also confining us to that loss indefinitely, i.e., making it impossible to ever regain our human essence. Heidegger (1993: p. 332) writes, “Man stands so decisively in subservience to the challenging-forth of enframing that he does not grasp enframing as a claim, that he fails in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists \[i.e., in what respect he can become aware of different types of revealing or worldviews\], in terms of his essence, in a realm where he is addressed, so that he can *never* encounter only himself.” In his *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger (1999: p. 8) refers to our indifference toward what we have lost in the technological worldview as “the hidden distress of *no-distress at all*.” Heidegger says it’s “no-distress at all” in the sense that we are ignorant of and indifferent to the distress, and thus we act as though there is no distress. Heidegger nonetheless calls it a form of “distress” because he believes we experience it as a loss of meaning and value, insofar as he considers what this essay summarizes as “non-technological value” to be the most meaningful type of value. Heidegger (1999: p. 91) believes we attempt to compensate for this distress through “exaggeration and uproar” (e.g., consuming entertainment such as TikTok, etc.) [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Many examples could be given of where Heidegger seems to say that what this essay calls “non-technological value” is the most meaningful type of value for humans. For instance, Heidegger (1993: p. 333) writes that the danger of enframing is that it “threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.” What Heidegger calls a “more original revealing” (i.e., more original or “true” worldview) and a “more primal truth” is what is summarized here as “the most meaningful type of value,” i.e., non-technological value, since he believes the more original revealing and primal truth are more metaphysically fundamental, so to speak, than enframing (i.e., the technological worldview), and thus *outside of* or *prior to* enframing, i.e., where *non*-technological value resides. Heidegger believed this danger was the root cause of all the other dangers people associate with technology (e.g., environmental disaster, etc.) insofar as our loss of the capacity to appreciate non-technological value causes, for instance, a loss of respect for the natural world (because we view it as just a resource for our needs, and view ourselves as “master” over it, or what Heidegger (1993: p. 332) calls “lord of the earth”), whereby we treat it solely as standing-reserve, and thus fail to care for and safeguard it, thereby leading to things like climate change, etc. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See Heidegger (1993: p. 321) for this example. Note that this doesn’t mean Heidegger thinks we should remove all hydroelectric plants and replace them with wooden bridges. One reason why is because such a move would likely be an action of just more challenging-forth and thereby only ensnare us further in enframing. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Heidegger is not a Luddite and doesn’t hate technology. Heidegger (1993: p. 333) writes, “What is dangerous is not technology. Technology is not demonic; but its essence is mysterious. The essence of technology…is the danger.” Regarding Heidegger’s own personal use of technology, Polt (1999: p. 174) reports that Heidegger never owned a television but he did enjoy watching sports on other people’s televisions. Also, Heidegger despised the thought of composing his texts on a typewriter, so he wrote everything by hand, but then had his brother type up all of his writings for him. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Heidegger (1993: p. 311) writes that he is trying to prepare us to develop a “free relationship” to technology. Heidegger (1993: pp. 330-331) writes that enframing “in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology…Quite to the contrary, when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology \[i.e., once we begin to reflect upon the fact that enframing is a worldview or type of revealing whereby we realize that other worldviews are possible\] we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim \[i.e., realizing that other non-technological worldviews are possible enables us to engage with technology in a free manner\].” For more about the concept of freedom in philosophy, see [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima and [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Heidegger (1993: p. 330) writes that our response to enframing should not be “to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of the devil.” It should be noted that while Heidegger doesn’t recommend attempting to completely free ourselves *from* technological devices, he is advocating that we should work to free ourselves from our technological *worldview* (i.e., enframing), and that developing a free relationship with technology would help accomplish that. But it should also be noted that, for Heidegger, humans are not solely responsible for freeing ourselves from enframing; instead, we must ultimately “wait,” so to speak, for Being to show or reveal itself differently, as worldviews or types of revealing do not arise, according to Heidegger, primarily as the result of human choice and effort. Nonetheless, Heidegger does think we need to “prepare” for the next worldview by at least not perpetuating the constant, pervasive use of technological devices that has become typical within enframing. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) In counseling us not “to rebel helplessly against \[technology\],” Heidegger (1993: p. 330) regards attempts at forcefully rejecting technology as challenging-forth efforts typical of precisely the technological worldview, i.e., enframing. In other words, attempting to completely escape enframing, in Heidegger’s view, only further ensnares us in enframing. Thus, Heidegger says rebelling against technology is helpless or futile, in the sense that fighting technology is just another example of technological activity (i.e., challenging-forth). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Heidegger (1966: p. 54) writes, “We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them at any time. We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.” It should be noted that, just as Heidegger doesn’t think humans are wholly responsible for the start of enframing, he also doesn’t think it’s possible for us to “escape” it solely through our own efforts and choices, i.e., he doesn’t believe we are wholly responsible for ending enframing either. Heidegger (1993: p. 339) writes, “Human activity can never directly counter this danger \[i.e., the danger posed by enframing\]. Human achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it.” Thus, becoming free in relation to technology does not mean being able to freely choose our way out of it. Instead, while we must work to cultivate an appreciation for non-technological value and maintain an awareness that enframing is but one possible worldview (i.e., type of revealing), we must also (and perhaps ultimately) essentially “wait” for enframing to change or give way to another worldview, as Heidegger does not think humans alone can create and instantiate new worldviews. However, this leaves Heidegger’s philosophy of technology open to the criticism that his view makes us too passive and perhaps renders us essentially powerless in the face of enframing. See Polt (1999) for more on this criticism. The danger of the technological worldview – i.e., that it will permanently block out all other possible worldviews or types of revealing – also contains “the saving power,” according to Heidegger (1993: p. 333), in precisely this sense: if we reflect on and maintain an awareness of the essence of technology, whereby we see that it is *a* worldview (i.e., a revealing), but one which blocks out all other possible worldviews, we then see that *other* worldviews are in fact *possible*, which thus suggests possible paths out of enframing (i.e., the technological worldview), and thus the danger has also given us the salvation *from* the danger. Heidegger (1993: p. 337) writes that “the saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence. This dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment – and with it, from the first, the concealment – of all essential unfolding on this earth. It is precisely in enframing, which threatens to sweep man away into ordering \[i.e., challenging-forth, because it orders or organizes standing-reserve\] as the ostensibly sole way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free essence – it is precisely in this extreme danger that the innermost indestructible belongingness of man within granting \[i.e., the way in which humans are always aware of different worldviews or types of revealing, and thus always ‘belong’ in the clearing of Being whereby things appear or are ‘granted’\] may come to light, provided that we, for our part, begin to pay heed to the essence of technology.” [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Heidegger’s basic logic here is that *thinking* about technology frees us in relation to it. More specifically, according to Heidegger, if we get beyond thinking that the essence of modern technology is the technology itself (i.e., the devices, etc.)—i.e., if we see and continually reflect upon the fact that the essence of technology is a *worldview* (i.e., a revealing or unconcealment) – then we also simultaneously maintain an awareness that it is only one of many possible worldviews, whereby we realize there are other possible *non*-technological worldviews we can also inhabit. Thus, reflecting on the essence of technology—i.e., doing exactly what Heidegger is attempting to model for us in his essay on technology—is also itself developing a free relationship with technology. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) This would not be a trivial or futile example for Heidegger, as he (1993: p. 338) writes that we can help cultivate our salvation (i.e., “foster the saving power in its increase”) from enframing “\[h\]ere and now and in *little* things \[emphasis added\].” Another example is viewing nature as a poet might: as wondrous, awe-inspiring, etc., rather than as just a useful resource. Heidegger (1993: p. 340) writes that poetry and art are examples of engaging in the world in a non-technological manner, and thus may serve as models for how we might “overcome” enframing. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Arguably there are contemporary examples of people attempting to develop the type of free relationship with technology that Heidegger recommends. Consider, for instance, what’s called “rawdogging,” i.e., engaging in an activity without the aid of consuming media (e.g., music, etc.) via some form of technology. For instance, “rawdogging” a walk, also known as “silent walking” or engaging in an “awe walk,” is taking a walk without earbuds or other headphones for listening to music, podcasts, etc. in order to savor the sights and sounds of the walking path and perhaps feel a sense of awe in response. A person who “rawdogs” a walk likely uses technology on a regular basis but, as Heidegger recommends, is able to set technology down for the walk. ### References [Braver, Lee. (2009). Heidegger’s Later Writings: A Reader’s Guide. Continuum. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/heideggers-later-writings-9780826422118/) [Braver, Lee. (2014). Heidegger: Thinking of Being. Polity Press.](https://www.wiley.com/en-be/Heidegger%3A+Thinking+of+Being-p-9780745664910) [Cerbone, David R. (2008). Heidegger: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum. ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/heidegger-a-guide-for-the-perplexed-9781441112286/) [Franssen, Maarten, et al. (2023). Philosophy of Technology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Last accessed on April 18, 2025.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/technology/) [Heidegger, Martin. (1993). “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings. HarperCollins Publishers. ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/basic-writings-martin-heidegger?variant=40974771486754) [Heidegger, Martin. (1999). Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). Indiana University Press. ](https://iupress.org/9780253336064/contributions-to-philosophy-from-enowning/) [Heidegger, Martin. (1966). Discourse on Thinking. Harper and Row. ](https://www.amazon.com/Discourse-Thinking-Translation-Gelassenheit-Heidegger/dp/B001B3Q40A) [Polt, Richard. (1999). Heidegger: An Introduction. Cornell University Press. ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801435843/heidegger/#bookTabs=1) [Richardson, John. (2012). Heidegger. Routledge. ](https://www.routledge.com/Heidegger/Richardson/p/book/9780415350716) [Wrathall, Mark. (2005). How to Read Heidegger. W. W. Norton & Company. ](https://www.amazon.com/How-Read-Heidegger/dp/0393328805) [Young, Julian. (2002). Heidegger’s Later Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/twentieth-century-philosophy/heideggers-later-philosophy?format=PB&isbn=9780521006095) ### Related Essays [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/ "Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment") by Thomas Metcalf [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) by Matthew Sanderson [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/flawed-philosophers/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Heidegger-on-Technology-.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [ ](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)[*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** Heidegger, Sanderson, tech, technology --- ### [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) **Published:** December 9, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to Martin Heidegger's notion of Being. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 997 While witnessing the birth of a child, or a flower newly in bloom in early spring, you might begin to reflect on existence in general and feel amazed by the simple mind-blowing fact that *anything* exists—that there is something (not anything in particular, but anything at all) rather than nothing. In doing so, you are experiencing wonder at what Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) calls *Being*. This essay summarizes Heidegger’s notion of Being.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![Richard Pousette-Dart, "Sky Presence, Morning," 1963.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Richard-Pousette-Dart.jpg?resize=656%2C397&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Richard-Pousette-Dart.jpg?ssl=1)Richard Pousette-Dart, “Sky Presence, Morning,” 1963. ### 1. Being and Beings Consider the device on which you’re (perhaps) reading this essay. Being refers not to *what* the device is—e.g., a computer or smartphone—but rather to the simple fact *that* it is, that it exists.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Being is the basic fact or “that-ness” of existence overall.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Whereas beings (e.g., devices) are particular entities that exist, Being is existence in general. As such, Being is what makes beings *be* or exist: Being is what makes there be something (i.e., some being or beings) rather than nothing.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) However, Being is not *a* being (i.e., an entity or thing).[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Thus, we should not think of Being as a God who causes something to exist.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Even thinking of Being as what encompasses all beings still reduces it to a being: a being that includes all beings.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Being is “larger” or more general than any one being or even all beings: Being is existence as a whole.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Being is the existence or “that-ness” which all beings have in common. Nonetheless, while Being is not the same as beings, Being is also not a blank space or void filled by beings. There is no free-floating Being independent of beings. Instead, Being is always the Being *of* beings: Being always comes “attached” to beings, so to speak.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Being and beings then always co-exist.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) While Being is shared by all beings, Being is not therefore a trait (e.g., greenness, etc.) of beings.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Instead, Being is what gives existence to beings so that *they* can possess traits. Likewise, for Heidegger, material and immaterial are properties only of beings, and so Being possesses neither. Thus, Being is not a spiritual reality or limited to physical existence observable through sense perception.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) However, while not a physically existing thing, Being is also not just an idea or concept inside the human mind. Thus, Being is not the “umbrella” concept encompassing all beings that we arrive at by generalizing the concept of existence from particular entities that exist.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Instead, Being is mind-independently real.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Indeed, Being is arguably the most fundamental dimension of reality, insofar as it is what enables *everything* to exist.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 2. Being and Presence For Heidegger, to be or to exist (i.e., to be a being with Being) means to be present. For instance, your device’s existence (i.e., its Being) is found in that it is present before you. Thus, overall, Being (i.e., the simple fact or “that-ness” of existence in general) is *presence*.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) More specifically, because Heidegger thinks of Being as a continual event that happens in time, Being is a dynamic movement: Being is the presence-*ing* of beings.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Notice your device again: as a being, it is now presence-ing to your awareness.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Not that your device is moving or doing anything to *make itself* present. Rather, your device is presence-ing in the simple sense that its existence—i.e., its Being—is appearing or becoming revealed to you over time. Being is that event of presence-ing.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Because Being is not a being, it is not a cause (like a God) *behind* presence-ing: rather, Being is itself the movement of presence-ing.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) In this way, Being is a verb (as indicated by the “ing” at the end of the word) more than a noun, a happening rather than a thing (i.e., a being): Being is Be-*ing*,[\[21\]](#_ftn21) i.e., the perpetual activity of beings coming into presence before an awareness.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Something (i.e., some being) is always presence-ing to you: this essay, the device you’re maybe reading it on, the snack you’re enjoying while reading—something is constantly becoming present to your awareness.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) This ongoing presence-ing (i.e., Being) is why there is something rather than nothing: presence is the “that-ness” of existence.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) ### 3. Being and Concealing As an event, Being unfolds across time. Being is then always temporal; presence-ing always occurs in time.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) For instance, the presence-ing (i.e., the Be*ing*) of your device takes time: the whole device doesn’t appear instantaneously.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Thus, because Being only appears over time, it never completely appears all at once. Instead, Being is always simultaneously both revealing (i.e., showing) and concealing (i.e., hiding) itself.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) It’s the nature of presence-ing that, if something becomes present, then something else—some other being, perspective, etc.—is concurrently concealed or hidden (i.e., is *not* present).[\[28\]](#_ftn28) For instance, something presence-ing means other beings are hidden from view: your device appearing before you means other things around you are concealed. Or, to use another example, something presence-ing from one angle prevents us from seeing it from other perspectives: the appearing of the front of your device means the back of the device remains hidden.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) That Being always partially “hides” means we can never experience all of Being, and therefore it is mysterious.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) ### 4. Conclusion Heidegger thought it is important to contemplate Being because doing so makes us human.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) However, Heidegger’s notion of Being can seem so abstract and vague that you might have trouble wrapping your mind around it. But this is likely because we are usually too focused on beings—e.g., people, devices, laundry, etc.—to attend to or even notice Being in general.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) Furthermore, if Heidegger’s notion of Being is difficult to comprehend, it’s perhaps not because Being is so unusual, but rather because it’s so ordinary, common, familiar, and close to us.[\[33\]](#_ftn33) Indeed, Being *is* us: it is the basic fact or “that-ness” of all of existence, ourselves included.[\[34\]](#_ftn34) Nothing could be nearer to us than Being, and that is perhaps why it can be so easy to overlook.[\[35\]](#_ftn35), [\[36\]](#_ftn36) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) It would be an understatement to say that Being was the major preoccupation—some would argue obsession—of Heidegger’s philosophy. In fact, there is perhaps no other philosopher who more thoroughly identified himself with a single theme than Heidegger did with the topic of Being. Heidegger (1968: p. 50) writes that “Every thinker thinks only one thought.” Being was definitely Heidegger’s one main thought. Heidegger’s philosophy is often divided into early and later periods based on the view (which Heidegger himself sometimes seemed to suggest) that his thinking underwent a significant shift between the two periods. (When exactly to draw the line between the periods is a matter of much scholarly debate, though Heidegger’s magnum opus, *Being and Time* (1962), is most often viewed as an early work. There is almost a lot of debate about what specifically are the major differences in Heidegger’s thought between the two periods.) However, this essay attempts to summarize Heidegger’s concept of Being as it is arguably defined throughout all of his writings, focusing on ideas that can be considered common to both the early and later periods. Nonetheless, the first half of the essay does draw more from the early period and the second half more from the later Heidegger. For more on the issue of early vs. later periods in Heidegger’s philosophy, see Polt (1999.) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Heidegger (1962: p. 25) writes that all humans have a “vague average understanding of Being.” For instance, you already have a basic understanding of Being just in thinking about your device: you understand that “my device exists” or “my device is a smartphone.” Your use of the words “exists” and “is” implies an understanding of existence and is-ness, i.e., Being. And yet what is Being itself? While you have an implicit understanding of Being, it can be difficult to formulate that understanding in an explicit theory. Doing so was arguably Heidegger’s main task as a philosopher. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Heidegger (1962: p. 26) writes, “Being lies in the fact that something is.” Heidegger (1998: p. 234) says that “the wonder of all wonders” is “*that* beings *are*” and writes (1994: p. 169) that “the miracle of beings” is “that they are.” Heidegger does also think of Being as the way in which beings exist, including humanity. For instance, the Being of humanity, or the way in which we exist, is that we are being-towards-death: we live with an awareness of our mortality. Heidegger thus challenges the traditional distinction between what he calls “what-Being” (i.e., what something is) and “that-Being” (i.e., the fact that something is.) For example, see Heidegger (1982: pp. 7-121). However, for those first learning about Heidegger’s philosophy, focusing on Being as “that-Being” is arguably the most accessible entry point. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Polt (1999: p. 2) points out that Heidegger ended his essay “What is Metaphysics?” and began his lecture course *Introduction to Metaphysics* with the traditional philosophical question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Heidegger’s notion of Being is intended as an answer to that question, insofar as Being is that which determines beings as beings and thus makes there be something (i.e., some being or beings) rather than nothing. However, because Being is not a being, Being should not be thought of as a God or separate being that causes something (rather than nothing) to exist. Instead, Being is itself existence or existing-ness (i.e., being-ness) rather than a distinct cause *behind* existence. For another, theistic perspective on why there is something rather than nothing, see [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Heidegger (1962: p. 26) writes that “the Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity \[i.e., a being\].” Thus, Being is not a God, person, agent, ground, cause, etc. Heidegger sometimes refers to the difference between Being and beings (i.e., entities) as “the ontological difference.” For example, see Heidegger (1982: pp. 17 and 319). According to Heidegger, the mistake of traditional metaphysics was thinking of Being as *a* being—for instance, as God, substance, the thing-in-itself, spirit, will to power, and so on. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Heidegger (1993: p. 234) writes, “‘Being’ – that is not God and not a cosmic ground.” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) While Being is the shared existence of all beings, Being is not the biggest being (because it is not a being at all) in which all particular beings participate. Heidegger (1993: p. 242) insists that Being is not “something that encompasses being, or…a creation of the infinite being, or…the product of a finite subject.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Heidegger (1993: p. 240) writes that “Being \[is\] essentially broader than all beings.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Heidegger (1962: p. 29) writes that “Being is always the Being of an entity \[i.e., a being or beings\].” There is no Being without beings that have Being. Because Being is shared by all beings, and therefore it also always co-exists with beings, we can say that Being is both one (i.e., the one Being-ness of all beings) and many (i.e., the many beings possessing Being.) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Being is not a separate reality independent of beings. Thus, Being should not be understood as the first cause of all beings. Being is not the cause of beings because causes are beings (e.g., God, etc.) and Being is not a being. Also, Being does not technically exist before beings. Instead, in the beginning, so to speak, there was both Being and beings. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Heidegger (1993: p. 260) writes that “Being \[is not\] any existing quality that allows itself to be fixed among beings.” [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) While it is perhaps not clear whether Heidegger recognizes the existence of supernatural entities (Heidegger occasionally speaks of “the gods,” but their metaphysical status is arguably left ambiguous), Heidegger does think Being is metaphysically prior to the material vs. immaterial distinction, in the sense that he thinks applying this distinction to Being reduces Being to a being, since only beings can have properties such as mental, physical, etc. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Heidegger (1962: p. 22) writes that the “‘universality’ of ’Being’ is not that of a *class* or *genus*. The term ‘Being’ does not define that realm of entities…conceptually according to genus and species.” [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) While Being is mind-independent, in the sense, for instance, that it’s not just an idea inside the human mind or dependent on human perception for its existence, Heidegger (1998: p. 310) does think Being needs human awareness in order to appear. Nonetheless, Heidegger (1993: p. 240) clarifies that his view is not that “Being is the product of man.” [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Heidegger (1993: p. 238) even says that only Being truly exists, and therefore we should only use the word “is” when referring to Being; beings, on the other hand, can’t be said to exist except by virtue of Being giving them existence, and therefore we perhaps shouldn’t say a being “is” or exists, at least not when considered on its own, i.e., independent of Being. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) For examples of Heidegger identifying Being as presence, see Heidegger (1968: p. 235) and (1972: p. 2). Heidegger (1969: pp. 31-2) writes, “Let us think of Being according to its original meaning, as presence.” Saying Heidegger defines Being as presence is not at all to suggest that he identifies Being with the present-at-hand rather than the ready-to-hand (referring here to the important distinction he draws in *Being and Time* (1962)). Instead, the present-at-hand and ready-to-hand should be understood as two types of presence, as Heidegger considered them both to be aspects or modalities of Being, so to speak. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For an example of Heidegger identifying Being as presence-ing or presencing, see Heidegger (1998: p. 308). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) For Heidegger, humans are the only beings who are aware of Being. Thus, Heidegger says humans are a “clearing” for Being: just as a clearing in a forest is an open space that allows light to appear, human awareness is an open space that allows Being to come into presence. (Note that if Being becomes present in the clearing, then really what comes to presence is presence-ing itself.) In other words, we are the beings to whom Being becomes present; we are the presented-to of Being. In this way, Being needs and relies on humans in order to show itself: without humans, Being (although metaphysically mind-independent) does not come into presence, because it would then have no one to whom to present itself, so to speak (remembering that Being is not a being and therefore it lacks the agency to literally choose to present itself). For Heidegger’s notion of humanity as the clearing for Being, see Heidegger (1962: p. 265 and 1993: p. 228). For Heidegger’s view that only humans are aware of Being, and that Being only appears to humans, see Heidegger (1993: pp. 228-229 and 231; 1962: p. 228). Heidegger (1998: p. 310) writes that Being does not stand “somewhere on its own” independent of humanity but instead needs the human being in order to become present. Heidegger (1969: pp. 31-2) writes, “Being is present to man neither incidentally nor only on rare occasions. Being is present and abides only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him. For it is man, open towards Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence.” [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Heidegger (1998: p. 302) refers to Being as the “ereignis” or event of presencing. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Heidegger (1962: pp. 4-5) writes that Being is “that which determines beings as beings.” As the event of presence-ing, Being is what gives beings (i.e., presences) their Being or makes them become present. However, because Being is not *a* being, it is not separable from the presence-ing of presences (i.e., beings), like a distinct being (such as a God) that causes presence-ing. Instead, Being is itself the presence-ing of beings (i.e., presences). Just as when we say “*it* is raining,” only the rain is raining (i.e., there is no separate being doing the raining), because Being is not a being, there is no being doing the presence-ing of beings. Instead, Being is Be-*ing*, that is, making beings be or present themselves; Being is itself the action of presence-ing. But Being is an action that is its own actor; there is no doer behind the doing of Being. Being is self-giving of presence-ing: presence-ing is Being itself with no further cause behind it. Thus, Heidegger (1993: p. 238) writes, “The self-giving into the open, along with the open region itself, is Being itself.” Being is self-giving in the sense that Being itself gives the event of presence-ing (i.e., “the open”) rather than something behind it causing presence-ing. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Braver (2014: p. 13) points out that Heidegger encouraged one of his English translators to write Being as Be-ing in order to highlight its dynamism. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) When something becomes present in front of you, the entire happening (i.e., the presence becoming present to your awareness) is a presence-ing, and that movement of presence-ing is Being. In the space and relationship between a presence (i.e., a being) and a human awareness (i.e., a presented-to), there is the event of presence-ing. Being is that event. Ordinarily, we only notice the presence (i.e., the being or beings), but it’s also possible to attend to the movement of presence-ing between the presence and the presented-to. Heidegger’s insistence that Being needs human awareness in order to appear or come to presence might suggest there is an element of idealism in his philosophy. See Richardson (2012) for a discussion of this topic. For more about idealism in general, see [Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis and [Idealism Pt. 2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) The reader might object that beings don’t present themselves, but rather *we* make them present through our human choices and actions: by picking them up, looking them over, paying attention to them, and so on. However, Heidegger insisted across all his philosophy that humans are not the masters of presence-ing. Instead, presence-ing happens with humans in cooperation with presences (i.e., beings): Being is the event or relationship of presence-ing between 1) the beings that come into presence and 2) human awareness or the presented-to. As Heidegger (1969: pp. 31-2) writes, “becoming present needs the openness of a clearing, and by this need remains appropriated to human being. This does not at all mean that Being is posited first and only by man…Man and Being are appropriated to each other. They belong to each other.” Heidegger (1993: p. 234) writes that “Man does not decide whether and how beings appear,…come forward into the clearing of Being, come to presence and depart.” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Heidegger sometimes uses the word “ereignis,” translated as “event of appropriation,” to characterize the dynamic movement of Being. Being is an event of appropriation in the sense of appropriating—i.e., seizing hold of or presence-ing before—human awareness. For a helpful discussion of Heidegger’s notion of ereignis, see Polt (1999: pp. 143-148). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Heidegger (1962: pp. 39-40) writes that Being is essentially temporal. Indeed, his masterpiece is called *Being **and** Time*, and Heidegger always stressed that the key word in the title is “and” (i.e., because Being and time always go together.) Notice that while Being is in a sense the absolute (since it gives existence to everything), and therefore can perhaps be understood as permanent, infinite, eternal, and so on, Being is also finite and impermanent in the sense that it reveals itself temporally. Said differently, Being might be considered changeless, and yet as temporal it is also constantly changing. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) As temporal, Being is historical, which means it shows up in different ways in different time periods. For a helpful discussion of how Being is historical for Heidegger, see Braver (2014: pp. 140-156). For instance, Heidegger thinks in our current world Being reveals itself as what he calls technology, which for Heidegger refers to the way Being appears today rather than certain types of equipment: namely, nearly everything (e.g., your device, etc.) appears as a resource, forcefully extracted from nature, standing in reserve to be used towards achieving our goals in the most efficient ways possible. Heidegger says that, in our age of technology, nearly everything is “enframed” as “standing-reserve,” i.e., as resources or tools to be exploited for efficiency. Consider, for example, that even employees (i.e., people) are now “enframed” as “human resources,” and organizations now commonly say that “people are our most valuable resource.” Thus, Heidegger says that the age of technology turns everything, including humans, into a giant gas station (note that gasoline is a perfect example of a resource that is kept on “standing-reserve” for use in vehicles.) For Heidegger’s views on technology, see Heidegger (1993: pp. 307-342). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Heidegger (1993: p. 249) talks about Being as revealing-concealing. Heidegger (1994: p. 178) writes that Being “withdraws and conceals itself…It shows itself and withdraws at the same time.” There are arguably few texts of Heidegger’s writing where he does not stress the revealing-concealing nature and structure of Being. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Notice that, for Heidegger, presence implies absence: for something to be present means something else is absent. Thus, if Being is presence, it is also at the same time absence or non-presence. [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) Another example is that, as Being currently reveals itself in our historical era as technology, it simultaneously conceals other, non-technological ways of presence-ing: for instance, where Being reveals itself as things which are superior in value precisely for *not* being technological or useful, for being instead intrinsically or inherently valuable, such as perhaps works of art, sacred places and objects, etc. [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) Heidegger (1993: p. 236) writes that Being always “remains mysterious.” That we can never experience the totality of Being means that it is always partly unknown and unknowable, and hence mysterious. [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) See Heidegger’s essay “Letter on Humanism” (1993: pp. 213-266) for a prime example of his insistence that contemplating Being is what makes us human. [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) Heidegger (1993: p. 235) says we often end up forgetting about Being “in favor of the pressing throng of beings.” Heidegger (1993: p. 234) writes that “Man at first clings always and only to beings.” Heidegger (1994: p. 183) writes, “What, in an exceptional and unique sense, conceals itself in the domain of open beings is Being. We experience this in the most prosaic and yet most enigmatic event, namely that beings most immediately press upon us and impose themselves and that only beings seem to be.” Further connecting the unnoticed nature of Being to its revealing/concealing nature, Heidegger (2002: p. 197) writes, “It would lie then in the essence of Being itself that Being remains unthought because it removes \[i.e., conceals\] itself.” [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) Heidegger (1993: p. 263) writes, “What is strange in the thinking of Being is its simplicity. Precisely this keeps us from it.” Heidegger (1994: p. 159) writes that “on account of its obviousness, Being is something forgotten.” Heidegger (1962: p. 36) writes that what is most familiar is, for that very reason, the most difficult to grasp. Heidegger (1993: p. 234) writes that “Being is farther than all beings and is yet nearer to man than every being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God. Being is the nearest. Yet the near remains farthest from man.” Also (1993: p. 235), “But nearer than the nearest and at the same time for ordinary thinking farther than the farthest is nearness itself: the truth of Being.” [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) Heidegger (1968: p. 98) writes, “Prior to all else it \[i.e., Being\] stands before us, only we do not see it because we stand within it.” Being is like a painting you can’t see well because you are standing too close to it; only, in the case of Being, it’s because you *are* the painting or you exist within it. Like how the eye can’t see itself, sometimes the most difficult things to see are those which are closest to us. [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) Another reason it is so easy to overlook Being is that, as the event of presence-ing, it is like the visual field which makes seeing possible and yet which we overlook by focusing on the seen object, where our focus on the illuminated object blinds us (ironically) to the light (i.e., presence-ing) itself. As Heidegger (1994: pp. 127-8) writes, “In order to bring into view what resides in a visual field, the visual field itself must precisely light up first, so that it might illuminate what resides within it; however, it cannot and may not be seen explicitly. The field of view…must in a certain sense be over-looked.” [\[36\]](#_ftnref36) In addition to the difficulty involved in comprehending Heidegger’s ideas, his philosophy is controversial primarily due to his early involvement in the Nazi party of Germany which he never publicly denounced and for which he never apologized. This involvement raises difficult questions about the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and Nazi politics which scholars continue to debate to this day: for instance, whether Heidegger’s philosophy, intentionally or unintentionally, provides theoretical support for the Nazi agenda; whether Heidegger’s philosophy is representative of the Nazi worldview; whether Heidegger’s philosophy can be interpreted and valued independent of his personal involvement with the Nazi party; and so forth. For a helpful summary of this controversy, see Polt (1999). How to regard Heidegger’s Nazi sympathies is an example of a larger question regarding how we should view and respond to morally flawed philosophers and philosophies in the history of philosophy. For discussion of this, see [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/flawed-philosophers/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis. ### References [Braver, Lee. (2014). Heidegger: Thinking of Being. Polity Press. ](https://www.wiley.com/en-ie/Heidegger:+Thinking+of+Being-p-9780745664910) [Heidegger, Martin. (1982). The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Indiana University Press. ](https://iupress.org/9780253204783/the-basic-problems-of-phenomenology-revised-edition/) [Heidegger, Martin. (1994). Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic.” Indiana University Press.](https://iupress.org/9780253326850/basic-questions-of-philosophy/) [Heidegger, Martin. (1993). Basic Writings. HarperCollins Publishers. ](https://www.harpercollins.com/products/basic-writings-martin-heidegger?variant=40974771486754) [Heidegger, Martin. (1962). Being and Time. Harper and Row. ](https://www.amazon.com/Being-Martin-Heidegger-August-Hardcover/dp/B014S3460E) [Heidegger, Martin, (1969). Identity and Difference. Harper Torchbooks.](https://www.amazon.com/Identity-Difference-Martin-Heidegger/dp/B00179N88E/ref=sr_1_3?crid=X1VEZS7F3R8H&keywords=heidegger+identity+and+difference&qid=1701881400&s=books&sprefix=heidegger+identity%2Cstripbooks%2C83&sr=1-3) [Heidegger, Martin. (2002). Off the Beaten Track. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/heidegger-beaten-track?format=PB&isbn=9780521805070) [Heidegger, Martin. (1972). On Time and Being. Harper and Row.](https://www.amazon.com/time-being-Martin-Heidegger/dp/0060638559) [Heidegger, Martin. (1998). Pathmarks. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/pathmarks/F43C838E358AD5081DA410CFBDDE3C86) [Heidegger, Martin. (1968). What is Called Thinking? Harper and Row.](https://www.amazon.com/Called-Thinking-Harper-Perennial-Thought/dp/006090528X/ref=pd_sbs_sccl_1_1/139-0813427-9858603?pd_rd_w=zyuaz&content-id=amzn1.sym.368860b3-210c-423c-90a6-0753fc75e40d&pf_rd_p=368860b3-210c-423c-90a6-0753fc75e40d&pf_rd_r=Q7P0YNSPGK03RB134J0Y&pd_rd_wg=EGRuM&pd_rd_r=023f3dd4-ee08-4693-b2c1-f7d207db1e59&pd_rd_i=006090528X&psc=1) [Polt, Richard. (1999). Heidegger: An Introduction. Cornell University Press. ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801435843/heidegger/#bookTabs=1) [Richardson, John. (2012). Heidegger. Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Heidegger/Richardson/p/book/9780415350716) ### Related Essays [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/ "Martin Heidegger on Technology") by Matthew Sanderson [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis [Idealism Pt. 2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/flawed-philosophers/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Heidegger-on-Being.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew/](https://www.westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** Being, Heidegger, Sanderson --- ### [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) **Published:** January 16, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** We often have something like a sense or feeling that something is true. Many philosophers believe that there’s a type of mental attitude that is connected to such feelings, called a seeming. This essay reviews some important philosophical issues about seemings. **Content:** Author: Kaj André Zeller Category: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word count: 1000 It appears to me that there’s a cup of coffee in front of me and that I’ve had two coffees already. It’s obvious that 5 + 7 = 12, common sense that one shouldn’t torture puppies, and the string of words “The ran this” feels ungrammatical. We sometimes have the intuition that something’s wrong with an argument or are under the impression that the time is right to take up an opportunity. These examples illustrate that we often have something like a sense or feeling that something is true. Many philosophers believe that there’s a type of mental attitude that is connected to such feelings, called a *seeming*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay reviews some important philosophical issues about seemings.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [![The broken pencil illusion.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/bent-pencil.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/bent-pencil.jpg?ssl=1)The broken pencil illusion. ### 1. Seemings and Justification Beliefs can be justified or reasonable. Often, this is so because they are based on other beliefs. But plausibly, some of our beliefs can be justified or reasonable without being based on other beliefs.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Seemings are of philosophical interest because they might explain how this can be the case: perhaps beliefs can be justified by how things seem to us. And seemings might explain how we could be entitled to many of our everyday beliefs. For instance, while I cannot exclude the possibility that the cup of coffee in front of me is an illusion, I don’t have a good reason to take this possibility seriously.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Some philosophers argue that my seeming that there’s a cup of coffee in front of me is enough to justify my belief that there’s, indeed, a cup of coffee in front of me. Many philosophers think that there are various kinds of seemings: the seeming that there’s a cup of coffee in front of me is *visual*, the seeming that I already had two coffees is *memorial*, the seeming that 5 + 7 = 12 is *intellectual*, the seeming that one shouldn’t torture puppies is *ethical*, and the seeming that “The ran this” is ungrammatical is *linguistic*. It’s up to debate, however, whether and to which degree all of those types of seemings can justify beliefs. Memorial seemings might be, for instance, generally more often mistaken than linguistic seemings. Most philosophers think that visual appearances can provide evidence for beliefs or justify beliefs.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Some philosophers argue that other sorts of seemings, such as common sense and intuition, can also justify beliefs. Suppose it clearly seems to me that torturing puppies is wrong. Since I have no reason to doubt that torturing puppies is wrong, these philosophers would say that I’m justified in believing that it’s, in fact, wrong to torture puppies.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Of course, just because something seems to be true doesn’t always mean one should believe it. Suppose there’s a pencil in a glass of water in front of me. The pencil seems bent to me, but I know this to be an illusion: I know water can make straight objects appear bent. Certainly, I shouldn’t believe that the pencil is bent. Some philosophers would say that I’m still slightly justified in believing the pencil is bent but that I’m more justified in believing that it’s not. Others would say that in such a case, my seeming doesn’t provide any justification.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. What are Seemings? As we have seen, seemings are clearly related to beliefs. One might then wonder whether they simply *are* beliefs, perhaps just beliefs that we did not infer from other beliefs.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Indeed, I believe there’s a cup of coffee in front of me right now, and I didn’t infer this belief from some other belief I had. Note that if seemings just were a kind of belief, they could *not* explain how some of our beliefs can be justified without being based on other beliefs. But consider the pencil in the water glass again. When I look at the pencil, it *merely* seems to me that it’s bent, but I don’t believe it is. Many philosophers hold that therefore we shouldn’t say that seemings are just a kind of belief.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Another suggestion is that seemings are *inclinations* to believe.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Inclinations to believe can result in beliefs. But we can also reject an inclination. When I see the pencil in the water, I feel drawn towards the belief that it’s bent. But I don’t have to accept this inclination. However, one can be inclined to believe something without having a seeming that it’s true. For instance, you might lean towards believing that your favorite candidate won the elections because you wish this to be true.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) At the same time, it can seem to you that she lost. So seemings aren’t clearly inclinations to believe either.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) For such reasons, many philosophers claim that seemings are neither beliefs nor inclinations to believe but a different, special type of mental attitude or mental state.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 3. Doubts about Seemings Other philosophers doubt that seemings are a unique type of attitude. Why? Well, perhaps the alleged examples of seemings only share the name “seeming.”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) As already noted, the examples given above are quite diverse. Yet, every mental state we call “seeming” has a common feature: it typically *produces*—but is not identical to—an inclination to believe. That’s, however, not enough to convince someone of the existence of a unique mental state called “seeming.” After all, wishful thinking and other mental states also typically lead to inclinations to believe. Another reason to doubt that there are seemings is this: you’re probably aware of many mental states, including beliefs and inclinations to believe. But can you find seemings in your mind? If not, you aren’t alone: famous philosophers haven’t found them either.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) On the other hand, throughout history, many philosophers have written about attitudes that are at least very similar to seemings, using names such as *phantasia* or *clear and distinct perception*.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) This longstanding interest in such mental states gives some confidence that seemings exist even though they’re hard to grasp. ### 4. Conclusion If there are seemings, they might explain why we appear to have a whole host of reasonable beliefs that aren’t justified by other beliefs. But are there seemings? To many, it seems so. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The topic of “seemings” is a subtopic in the area of *epistemology* or theory of knowledge and is closely related to the concept of *epistemic justification*. For introductions to these, see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Tom Metcalf and [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd Long. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Seemings are sometimes also described in terms of *appearances* and *intuitions.* Some philosophers, however, use “intuition” only for intellectual seemings, and “appearance” only for *perceptual seemings*. Moreover, it is important to note that we do not always aim to report a mental state when we say, “It seems to me…”. For example, when I politely want to tell you that I disagree with your opinion, I might say, “It seems to me you’re wrong.” [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Such beliefs are sometimes called *basic beliefs*, which are justified beliefs, but beliefs that are not justified by other beliefs. See [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie Turner. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Therefore, seemings are of philosophical interest regarding *skepticism*, roughly the view that we do not, or cannot have, have knowledge of a particular type, or of any kind. For an introduction to a type of skepticism, see [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/)[ by Andrew Chapman.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) So, what is thought is that seemings provide *epistemic justification* for beliefs. To better understand the concept of epistemic justification, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd Long. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Philosophers who think that it’s only (or mostly) sensual appearances that can provide evidence or justify beliefs are often called *empiricists*. Philosophers who argue that a priori seemings such as common sense or intuition can justify beliefs are often called *rationalists*. See [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. The view that I am at least to some degree justified to believe something when it seems true to me and I don’t have good reasons to doubt that it’s true is known as *phenomenal conservatism*. This view is most prominently advocated by Michael Huemer (e.g., 2007). Some philosophers argue that appeals to seemings are important, and perhaps even indispensable, to giving reasons for one’s ethical views: see [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Matthias Steup (2023) and other philosophers call the view that seemings always provide at least some justification *dogmatism*. If my seeming doesn’t provide any justification because I know that I’m facing an illusion, philosophers would say that my seeming is *defeated* (i.e., undercut or overridden) by my knowledge that I face an illusion: basically, contrary (and stronger) evidence undermines the initial (and weaker) evidence. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) William Lycan (1988) argues that seemings are beliefs we do not derive from other beliefs. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) One response here would be to claim that I both believe that the stick is bent and believe that it’s not. This reply, however, would have the implausible consequence that I’m irrational when experiencing such a simple visual illusion. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Ernest Sosa (2007) argues that seemings are inclinations to believe. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Believing on the basis of a *wish* or *desire* that some claim is true—perhaps because believing that will satisfy some desire or goal of the person *that does not relate to the belief being true or justified*—is often described in terms of “prudential” or “pragmatic” justification, in contrast with epistemic justification. For an example of this distinction applied to belief that there is a God, see [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson. A potentially related attitude is *hope*—hoping that some claim is true or that something will happen. See [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale for an analysis of hope. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) A similar response to the one given in footnote 5 is given by Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux (2009): you might be inclined to believe that your candidate will win, and have a competing inclination to believe that she will lose. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Chris Tucker (2013) mentions another option: instead of a belief or an inclination to believe, a seeming might be a belief or an inclination to believe that a mental state is evidence for something. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Michael DePaul (2009) expresses the suspicion that there’s no unique type of mental state that the name “seeming” refers to. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Earl Conee (1988) and Timothy Williamson (2007) report that they are not aware of having seemings. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Aristotle uses the word *phantasia* (e.g., in *De Anima*, \[350 BC\] 1986), and Descartes uses the phrase *clear and distinct perception* (e.g., in *Meditations on First Philosophy*, \[1641\] 1993). See [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli and [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro. Blake McAllister (2023) provides more historical examples. ### References [Aristotle. (](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/260882/de-anima-on-the-soul-by-aristotle/)[\[350 BC\] ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/260882/de-anima-on-the-soul-by-aristotle/)[1986). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/260882/de-anima-on-the-soul-by-aristotle/)[De Anim](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/260882/de-anima-on-the-soul-by-aristotle/)[a (On the Soul). Translated by H. Lawson-Tancred. Penguin Books.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/260882/de-anima-on-the-soul-by-aristotle/) [Conee, Earl. (1998). “Seeing the Truth.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653725)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653725)[, Vol.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653725) [58, No. 4: pp. 847–857.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2653725) [Descartes, R. (\[](https://hackettpublishing.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy)[1641\] ](https://hackettpublishing.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy)[1993](https://hackettpublishing.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy)[).](https://hackettpublishing.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy) [*Meditations on First Philosophy: In which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body are Demonstrated.* ](https://hackettpublishing.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy)[Translated by D. A. Cress](https://hackettpublishing.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy)[. Hackett Pub. Co.](https://hackettpublishing.com/meditations-on-first-philosophy) [DePaul, Michael. (2009). “Phenomenal Conservatism and Self‐Defeat.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40380420)[*Philosophy and* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40380420)[*Phenomenological Research*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40380420)[. Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 205–212.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40380420) [Earlenbaugh, Joshua & Molyneux, Bernard. (2009). “Intuitions are Inclinations to Believe.”](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9388-4) [*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9388-4)[, Vol. 145, No. 1, pp. 89–109.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9388-4) [Huemer, Michael. (2007). “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041026)[*Philosophy and*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041026)[ *Phenomenological Research*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041026)[, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 30–55.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041026) [Lycan, William G. (1988). ](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-general-interest/judgement-and-justification?site_view=mobile)[*Judgement and Justification.*](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-general-interest/judgement-and-justification?site_view=mobile)[ Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-general-interest/judgement-and-justification?site_view=mobile) [McAllister, B. (2023). ](https://www.routledge.com/Seemings-and-the-Foundations-of-Justification-A-Defense-of-Phenomenal-Conservatism/McAllister/p/book/9781032247953)[*Seemings and the Foundations of Justification: A Defense of* ](https://www.routledge.com/Seemings-and-the-Foundations-of-Justification-A-Defense-of-Phenomenal-Conservatism/McAllister/p/book/9781032247953)[*Phenomenal Conservatism*](https://www.routledge.com/Seemings-and-the-Foundations-of-Justification-A-Defense-of-Phenomenal-Conservatism/McAllister/p/book/9781032247953)[. Routledge](https://www.routledge.com/Seemings-and-the-Foundations-of-Justification-A-Defense-of-Phenomenal-Conservatism/McAllister/p/book/9781032247953). [Sosa, Ernest. (2007). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-virtue-epistemology-9780199297023?cc=us&lang=en&)[*A Virtue Epistemology.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-virtue-epistemology-9780199297023?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-virtue-epistemology-9780199297023?cc=us&lang=en&) [Steup, Matthias. (2023). “The Chemistry of Epistemic Justification.” In K. McCain, S. Stapleford, & M. Steup (eds.), ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003299349/seemings-kevin-mccain-scott-stapleford-matthias-steup)[*Seemings*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003299349/seemings-kevin-mccain-scott-stapleford-matthias-steup)[, pp. 7–22. Routledge. ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9781003299349/seemings-kevin-mccain-scott-stapleford-matthias-steup) [Tucker, Chris. (2013). “Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.” In C. Tucker (ed.), ](https://academic.oup.com/book/4517)[*Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*](https://academic.oup.com/book/4517)[, pp.](https://academic.oup.com/book/4517) [1–29. Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/4517) [Williamson, Timothy. (2007). ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470696675)[*The Philosophy of Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470696675)[. Wiley-Blackwell.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470696675) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd Long [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie Turner [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/ "Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Meceli [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/seemings-1.pdf). ### About the Author Kaj André Zeller is a Graduate Student of Philosophy at Koç University in Istanbul, Turkey. His research interests are in the fields of contemporary ethics, the philosophy of emotions and phenomenology. He is currently working on the topic of moral vagueness. [KajAndreZeller.wordpress.com](https://kajandrezeller.wordpress.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics **Tags:** seeming, seemings --- ### [Intentionality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/) **Published:** March 3, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to intentionality. **Content:** Author: Addison Ellis Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/ "Philosophy of Mind and Language") Word Count: 1000 Imagine: You direct your web browser to Google Translate. You select *English* as the input language and *Chinese* as the output language. You type ‘Horses are really cool!’ into the input field. In the blink of an eye, the output field reads ‘马是真的很酷!’ We know that the program running in the background takes input words and phrases in English, matches them with identical English words and phrases in its memory that are paired with Chinese, and outputs the proper Chinese words and phrases in the appropriate order. Now does this mean that Google Translate *understands* both English and Chinese well enough to perform the translation for you? That is, does it *understand* like a human translator understands these languages? Most people would say no, that while a *translation* has occurred, the program itself doesn’t *understand* anything at all.1 It seems as though whatever function or ability is carried out by the mind in language translation is also ultimately carried out by the process described in the Google Translate case. That is, we can say that the two processes are *functionally equivalent*. But we want to say that Google Translate lacks *mentality* in a very important way.2 What does this tell us about our minds? According to some philosophers, it tells us that while *our* minds have a special ability to understand the world, certain functional analogs of our minds do not. Franz Brentano claimed that what distinguishes systems possessing mentality from the systems lacking mentality is a property called *intentionality*.3 Intentionality is the ability of the mind to be *about* things or to *represent* things to be thus-and-so. When I say “I see a horse about 200 meters from here,” I possess a mental state that represents my environment as containing a horse 200 meters from me. In this way, my mental state is also *about* that particular horse. So it seems that when I utter meaningful statements or think or understand meaningful thoughts, my mind is also exhibiting the property of intentionality. In a sense, however, it does seem that certain of the Chinese characters in Google Translate are *about* horses. So if we want to use intentionality to draw a dividing line between the mental and the non-mental, we’ll need to introduce a further distinction. This is the distinction, suggested by John Searle, between two sorts of intentionality—*original* and *derived*.4 ### 1. A Defense of the Original/Derived Distinction Intentionality is *original* when it is *intrinsic to* a mind—i.e., when it is the result of the natural activities of that mind. While computers, languages, or individual symbols may stand for or represent the world, some philosophers believe that they do so only derivatively. That is, creatures *like us* program computers, lend meanings to words, and give meaning to symbols. Without us imbuing artifacts with intentionality, these things could not be said to possess it. In this sense, we can think of the intentionality of computers, languages, and symbols as a *derived* intentionality—i.e., it is an intentionality that is *lent* to artifacts. If artifacts have intentionality only insofar as it is derived from some other thing’s original intentionality, then artificial intentionality can be *reduced* to, or properly described *in terms of* the original intentionality of its creator. Here’s an example to make the point clear: Imagine that I happen upon a slab of rock on which there are some peculiar (although perfectly natural) markings, and I discover that the structure of these markings happens to map onto the actual structure of the town of Twin Peaks, WA.5 It would be a stretch to claim that the slab therefore *really represents* the town of Twin Peaks. After all, it was an enormous coincidence that the slab came to have those markings at all. However, let’s say that I make a stencil of the accidental “map” and give it to a friend of mine who is planning to visit Twin Peaks. Now it seems proper to claim that the markings *really represent* Twin Peaks. If this is so, then whatever power the markings have for representing Twin Peaks is dependent upon my *intending* them to be such a representation. Since maps do not intrinsically (i.e., on their own) represent anything, they only have derived, not original, intentionality. They can only be *about* the world only when we make them so. ### 2. Intentional Egalitarianism In contrast to the above view, we should consider a popular alternative view that holds that there is no real distinction to be drawn between original and derived intentionality. Some who hold this view6 argue that because we are wholly physical creatures, products of evolution, there is no reason to think that our intentionality is any more special or primitive than that of artifacts. After all, if we are fully natural and physical creatures who are designed by nature to possess minds that can represent the world, then the design processes leading to our ability to understand and make meanings are analogous to the design processes we use when we create meaning-mongering artifacts. Therefore, according to this view, there is no distinction to be made between the intentionality possessed by minds like ours and that possessed by artifacts. There is only one kind of intentionality, and it is possessed by minds and computer programs like Google Translate alike. ### 3. Conclusion The Google Translate thought experiment purportedly showed that understanding and meaning cannot be the product of purely mechanical activity. If this is true, then computers *on their own* cannot be intentional systems, and meaning and understanding are unique to creatures like us who have original intentionality. If, on the other hand, Intentional Egalitarianism is correct, then we ought to believe that all kinds of artifacts possess intentionality. It is extremely difficult to be confident about which side we should take in this debate. However, it should be clear that we need a robust theory of intentionality in our philosophical toolbox before we can even begin to answer fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind and language concerning meaning, content, and representation. ### Notes 1 This is an updated and simplified version of a famous thought experiment from John Searle known as the “Chinese Room” thought experiment. See Searle (1980). 2 ‘Mentality’ here is standing in for a cluster of concepts that also includes meaning, mindedness, and mental content, among others. 3 See Brentano (1995). 4 See Searle (*op. cit*) and Haugeland (2002). 5 Philosophers would call the relation between the map and and the town that it is a representation of a relation of *isomorphism.* This term means that there is a one-to-one correspondence between each of the parts of the map and each of the parts of the town. 6 See Dennett (1996). ### References [Brentano, Franz. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Trans. Oskar Kraus. London: Routledge, 1995. ](http://www.amazon.com/Psychology-Empirical-Standpoint-International-Philosophy/dp/0415106613/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1393858702&sr=8-1&keywords=Psychology+from+an+Empirical+Standpoint+Oskar+Kraus) [Dennett, Daniel C. *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.](http://www.amazon.com/DARWINS-DANGEROUS-IDEA-EVOLUTION-MEANINGS/dp/068482471X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1393858759&sr=1-1&keywords=darwin%27s+dangerous+idea) [Haugeland, John. “Authentic Intentionality.” *Computationalism: New Directions*. Ed. Matthias Scheutz. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2002. 159-74.](http://www.amazon.com/Computationalism-New-Directions-Matthias-Scheutz/dp/0262194783/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1393858802&sr=1-1&keywords=Computationalism%3A+New+Directions) [Jacob, Pierre. “Intentionality.” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford University, 07 Aug. 2003. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. ](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/) [Searle, John R. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3.03 (1980): 417-24.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6573580) ### Related Essays [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson ### About the Author [Addison Ellis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ellis) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The American University in Cairo. His interests include Kant and Post-Kantian European Philosophy, with special attention to the topics of self-consciousness, ontology, and cognitive capacities and attitudes. [philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis](https://philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Mind & Language **Tags:** Ellis, intentinonality --- ### [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/existentialism/) **Published:** April 21, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** What do existentialists have to say about human nature and living a meaningful life? This essay provides introductory answers. **Content:** Author: [Addison Ellis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ellis) Category: [Phenomenology and Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/ "Phenomenology and Existentialism"), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 *Video below* ### 1. Mr. Green Mr. Green is many things: a teacher, a husband, a father, a college graduate, and a medical patient, to name a few. Some of his features may be counted as accomplishments, others failures, and yet others unlucky accidents thrust upon him by the world. But is this all there is to Mr. Green? According to the philosophical tradition of *Existentialism*, something is missing in this characterization. For the existentialist, we are not merely a collection of facts; we are also *self-conscious, living,* *caring beings*. While trees, seagulls, and fish are all similarly *alive*, they do not live the same sorts of lives that we do. Existentialism is the philosophical science of our peculiar sorts of lives.1 Our lives are *ongoing activities*. Mr. Green’s existence, just like the existence of every similarly self-conscious, caring being, is more than a series of events or a set of facts. In providing such an understanding, Existentialism breathes new life into old ideas about the nature of value, freedom, and even more broadly into questions about the nature of reality and knowledge. In this essay, we will restrict our focus to what existentialists have to say about human nature and living a meaningful life.2 ![Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/sartre-and-heidegger.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre ### 2. Existence Precedes Essence Many philosophers, both historical and contemporary, believe that the way something is is determined by its *essence*. That is, essences are *fixed determinants* of the way things are. Those who follow this line of thought may take essences to be the non-physical and eternal *standards* to which things conform.3 Thus, the essence of a table is what determines table-like behavior. Likewise, the essence of a human being is what determines what a human being is like. These fixed determinants can range from principles given by God to those we attribute to society. Martin Heidegger helpfully points out that we often speak of the way “one” does things, referring to no one in particular. We say things like “this is the way *one* does *x*,” because doing *x* correctly means doing it in accordance with some pre-established standard.4 But Heidegger believes that this way of thinking should not extend to *our ways* of living. That is, *we* should not understand ourselves as living correctly only when we live “as one lives.” Existentialism reverses this picture by suggesting that it is our *living* which determines our essence, and not the other way around. Let’s go back to Mr. Green. In order to understand what sort of being he is, we must understand that *who* he is is not a fact he was born with, nor is it a fact that was established merely after some important events in his life unfolded. He is who he is because of what he *chooses*, and one can never stop choosing. For even by trying to decide that I will no longer make choices, I am *making the choice* not to choose. Jean-Paul Sartre, the most famous of the historical existentialists, expresses the idea that we are who we make ourselves, and not who we are pre-determined to be, with a concise slogan: “existence precedes essence.”5 ### 3. Freedom & Authenticity If Sartre is right and our lives are essentially up to us, then existentialists must also be committed to a robust kind of *freedom*, since we are not determined by what happens to us. But if Mr. Green’s essence is up to him, and he’s free to craft his essence as he pleases, then on what standards does he draw to guide himself in his crafting? It would seem that existentialists cannot simply draw from a set of independently existing standards. If this were so, then *who we are* is again simply a matter of conforming to some pre-established standards. If the standards are up to us, then why should we choose any one set of standards over any other? That is, how can we make sense of the idea that there is a *right* way to live and a *wrong* way to live if there is no external standard for judging whether we have made the *right choice*?6 This is a difficult issue in Existentialism, one that is grappled with by all the major figures in the tradition. The answer we will entertain here is that it is possible to find a standard *within* our own activities that determines whether they are being performed well or poorly. This is what existentialists refer to as *authenticity*.7 Mr. Green, knowing that he has terminal lung cancer, can arrange the final years of his life in a variety of ways; it is up to him how he will structure his remaining time. But there are two ways in which he can choose: (i) he can see his choices as simply thrust upon him by the world—i.e., he can believe that he really doesn’t have a choice at all, or (ii) he can see his choices *as* *his own* while taking full responsibility for them. Only by acting in this way is Mr. Green acting *authentically*, since it is only under these conditions that he is true to himself. Acting *inauthentically*, then, involves excusing oneself from responsibility by ignoring one’s freedom. The existentialist hopes to have shown that despite the lack of external guidance, we are perfectly capable of telling from within our own activities whether we are acting authentically or inauthentically.8 ### 4. Conclusions Existentialism gives us some tools for understanding (i) our *essence,* and (ii) how it is possible to live a meaningful life. The ideas defended by existentialists have been thought to have both positive and negative implications for us. On the one hand, our lives are not determined by God, society, or contingent circumstances; on the other hand, absolute freedom can be a burden. As Sartre puts it, “man is condemned to be free.”9 That is, it was never up to us to be free, and we cannot cease to be free. Since we *must* be free, and because freedom entails responsibility, we can never opt out of being responsible. Thus we are simultaneously unencumbered and encumbered by our freedom to choose who we will be. ### Notes 1 This is not to denigrate the lives of things radically different from us, but merely to point out that paradigm human creatures live peculiar sorts of lives. The demarcating line here between *lives like ours* and *lives unlike ours* needn’t be drawn along purely biological lines. There are potentially things—certain non-human animals, futuristic artificially intelligent systems—that have lives like ours, and whose lives are properly studied by Existentialism. Similarly, there are some biological humans—the very young, the severely mentally handicapped—whose lives are *not like ours*, and hence, whose lives are not properly studied by Existentialism. 2 Existential themes can be traced as far back as St. Augustine in his *Confessions*. Most philosophers today agree, however, that 19th-Century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and 19th-Century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche did much to provide the framework for what Existentialism would become in its more definitive era. The major figures of Existentialism include not only Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, but also (perhaps more importantly) Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger, in the 20th century. 3 What Plato calls “forms.” 4 This is an expression of what Heidegger calls the They-self, *Being and Time S*ection 129 5 Sartre, *Existentialism Is a Humanism* (20) 6 There is some debate about whether Existentialism is actually a moral theory. One reason for the doubt is precisely this one – that there is nothing action-guiding about Existentialism. 7 Steven Crowell makes this point in his SEP article when discussing Nietzsche’s idea of a ‘ruling instinct.’ 8 There is a serious worry here that must be addressed by the existentialist, and I will leave it as an exercise for the reader. While it seems better to act authentically than to act inauthentically, don’t we need to meet even more standards in order to count as living a truly good life? In other words, we might worry about whether authenticity is the only guiding principle that we really need. Perhaps it is possible to be an authentic genocidal dictator. If so, then perhaps Existentialism does not, on its own, suffice as a moral theory. 9 Sartre, *op. cit*. (29) ### References [Crowell, Steven. “Existentialism.” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford University, 23 Aug. 2004. Web. 18 Apr. 2014.](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/) [Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie. Ed. Edward Robinson. New York: HarperPerennial/Modern Thought, 2008.](http://www.amazon.com/Being-Time-Martin-Heidegger/dp/0061575593/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1398086429&sr=8-1&keywords=being+and+time) [Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Existentialism Is a Humanism*. Ed. John Kulka and Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre. New Haven: Yale UP, 2007.](http://www.amazon.com/Existentialism-Humanism-Jean-Paul-Sartre/dp/0300115466/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1398086462&sr=1-1&keywords=existentialism+is+a+humanism) ### Related Essays [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia ### Video ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/existentialism.pdf). ### About the Author [Addison Ellis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ellis) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The American University in Cairo. His interests include Kant and Post-Kantian European Philosophy, with special attention to the topics of self-consciousness, ontology, and cognitive capacities and attitudes. [philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis](https://philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** Ellis, Sartre --- ### [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) **Published:** November 21, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** William James is considered the first philosopher of mysticism. This essay introduces James’ views on mystical experience. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 1000 Some Christians claim to sense Jesus’ presence; some Hindus feel “one” with what they view as the permanent core of reality (i.e., Brahman); some “spiritual but not religious” people experience ecstatically losing themselves in the vast expanse of the universe.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) These are all examples of *mystical experiences*. But what defines a mystical experience? In his landmark study *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) William James (1842-1910) attempts to define the common features shared by all mystical experiences, and address whether such experiences justify beliefs based on them.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) James is considered the first philosopher of mysticism. This essay introduces James’ views on mystical experience. [![Altarpiece, Group X, No. 1 by Hilma af Klint (1862 – 1944). ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Hilma-af-Klint.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Hilma-af-Klint.jpg?ssl=1)Altarpiece, Group X, No. 1 by Hilma af Klint (1862 – 1944). ### 1. Defining Mystical Experience For James, mystical experience is one type of religious experience.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) He argues that it is important to define mystical experience because, in his view, elements of it—such as the awareness of an unseen reality—form the core of all religious experiences.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) James highlights four major defining traits of mystical experience, in addition to mentioning other common characteristics.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) #### 1.1. Ineffable First, mystical experiences are partly *ineffable* or inexpressible in language.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) People who have mystical experiences find it challenging, after returning to ordinary awareness, to adequately convey what happened to them during a mystical experience. James’ view is that no *adequate* report can be given of a mystical experience, unlike how relatively easy it is to describe physical objects, for instance.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) This doesn’t mean mystical experiences can’t be described at all: metaphors and poetic language can sometimes be used to express what a mystical experience is like.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) In this way, mystical experiences are like emotions: people must directly undergo the experience first-hand for themselves to fully understand them.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) #### 1.2. Noetic Quality While mystical experience is perhaps ineffable like emotion, it nonetheless *seems* to experiencers to be a state of knowledge, understood as a perception of objective reality, whether it really is or not.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) James refers to this characteristic as the “noetic quality” of mystical experience, i.e., it seems to provide genuine knowledge (i.e., noesis) of “ultimate” realities (e.g., God, Brahman, etc.) which are perhaps unavailable to ordinary consciousness.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) According to James, these first two characteristics alone make for a mystical experience.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) However, James highlights two other important traits which, while less universally present than the first two characteristics, are nonetheless commonly found in mystical experiences.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) #### 1.3. Transiency The third trait James considers is transiency.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) This describes the fact that mystical experiences typically last only a few hours, minutes, or even seconds.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) James notes, however, that mystical experiences tend to deepen and become richer, including persisting for greater lengths of time, with each subsequent experience a person undergoes.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) #### 1.4. Passivity A fourth characteristic James discusses is passivity.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) This refers to the idea that mystical experiences seem to happen to people rather than people making them happen. Experiencers may undertake forms of spiritual preparation (e.g., meditation, etc.) to become more open and receptive to mystical experiences.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) But people usually can’t force a mystical experience to occur simply by willing it.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Instead, mystical experiences seem initiated and caused by whatever “ultimate” reality people think they encounter during the experience.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) #### 1.5. Additional Characteristics In addition to the four traits James highlights, he also briefly mentions additional characteristics. These include that the boundaries separating oneself and the “ultimate” reality seem to dissolve in a profound sense of “oneness” or unity.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) As a result, mystical experiences are typically “monistic” (i.e., all appears to be interconnected from within the experience) and “pantheistic” (i.e., everything appears to be one with the divine).[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Also, mystical experiences are arguably most compatible with a supernatural worldview insofar as experiencers seem to encounter a non-sensory, non-physical “ultimate” reality.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Finally, mystical experiences are usually “optimistic” in the sense that they are emotionally positive and uplifting, characterized by a sense of bliss.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) ### 2. Are Mystical Experiences Authoritative? Now that we understand how James defines mystical experience, let’s consider his views on whether mystical experiences are “authoritative,” that is, whether they justify the beliefs that result from them.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) For instance, if a mystical experience leads you to believe that everything is one with God, are you justified in holding that belief based solely on the authority of your experience?[\[26\]](#_ftn26) James argues that mystical experiences are authoritative for the person who had the experience; they are not authoritative for people who didn’t have the experience and only learned about it from someone who did.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) Mystical experiences are authoritative for the experiencer because they seem to be perceptions of objective reality just as much as sense perceptions; thus, since we consider sense perceptions authoritative for beliefs based on them, then mystical experiences should be considered authoritative as well.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) However, mystical experiences are not authoritative for others because experiencers greatly disagree about what “ultimate” reality (e.g., Jesus, Nirvana, the Dao, etc.) they allegedly encountered in their experiences. As a result, others can never figure out whose testimony to trust without having the experiences for themselves.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) A common objection to James’ position here is that mystical experience is not a perception of objective reality comparable to sense perception. If it were, critics argue, then other people would be able to check mystical experiences for accuracy like they can with sense perceptions. For instance, others could “take a look” and see if they perceive the same thing you did during your mystical experience. But that is not possible, critics say, and so James is mistaken to think mystical experience is just as authoritative as sense perception.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) ### 3. Conclusion Most philosophers of mysticism after James argue that his list of defining characteristics for mystical experience is incomplete or inaccurate in some way.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) However, despite its alleged flaws and limitations, James’ theory of mystical experience was the first of its kind and continues to influence the philosophy of mysticism to this day. His theory is thus an excellent starting point for anyone seeking to understand how to define mystical experience and its relationship to beliefs based on it. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Jones (2024) for more about these and many other examples of mystical experiences. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For insightful discussions of James’ philosophy of mysticism, see Proudfoot (1985), Putnam (2006), and Roy (2001). Barnard (1997) argues that mysticism is a central concern of all of James’ philosophy. Schleiermacher’s theories of religious experience in *On Religion* (1799) and *The Christian Faith* (1821) can be considered precursors to James’ views, but Schleiermacher did not seek to define mystical experience specifically. For more about the philosophy of mysticism and mystical experience in general, see [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This essay focuses on summarizing the essay entitled “Lectures XVI and XVII: Mysticism” in James’ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) James (1902/2004: p. 328) writes that “personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness.” Many philosophers after James disagree with this assessment; they argue that mystical experience is simply one specific kind of religious experience, instead of the basis of all religious experiences, and that there are many types of religious experience which are not mystical in nature. See Franks Davis (1989) for an example of this argument. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See James (1902/2004: pp. 329-330) for his discussion of these four traits. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See James (1902/2004: p. 329) for his discussion of the ineffability of mystical experience. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) James (1902/2004: p. 329) writes, “The subject of it \[i.e., mystical experience\] immediately says it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For instance, it’s common for people to describe the experiential union with an “ultimate” reality as feeling like a drop of water merging with the ocean or air pervaded by the warmth of sunlight. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) James (1902/2004: p. 329) writes that it follows from the ineffability of mystical experience “that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect. No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of it consists. One must have musical ears to know the value of a symphony; one must have been in love one’s self to understand a lover’s state of mind. Lacking the heart or ear, we cannot interpret the musician or the lover justly, and are even likely to consider him weak-minded or absurd. The mystic finds that most of us accord to his experiences an equally incompetent treatment.” James (1902/2004: p. 351) also writes, “This incommunicableness of the transport is the keynote of all mysticism. Mystical truth exists for the individual who has the transport, but for no one else. In this, as I have said, it resembles the knowledge given to us in sensations more than that given by conceptual thought….It is a commonplace of metaphysics that God’s knowledge cannot be discursive but must be intuitive, that is, must be constructed more after the pattern of what in ourselves is called immediate feeling, than after that of proposition and judgment.” Franks Davis (1989) disagrees with James that ineffability is unique to mystical experience. She argues that most, if not all, religious experiences are ineffable to some degree. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For more about what philosophers call “seemings,” including whether seemings can justify beliefs based on them, see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See James (1902/2004: p. 329) for his discussion of the noetic quality of mystical experiences. James (1902/2004: p. 329) writes, “Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-time.” Experiencers come away from mystical experiences feeling like they have acquired revelations into the true nature of “ultimate” reality. In fact, says James, mystical experiences seem so real and genuinely knowledge-granting that they make ordinary awareness feel like just one type of consciousness, and perhaps not the most revelatory kind. James (1902/2004: p. 335) writes that mystical states of consciousness cause the experiencer to realize “that our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question, for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality.” James (1902/2004: p. 366) writes that mystical experiences “break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding of the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith.” James (1902/2004: p. 369) writes that “the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe…\[T\]here never can be a state of facts to which new meaning may not truthfully be added, provided the mind ascend to a more enveloping point of view. It must always remain an open question whether mystical states may not possibly be such superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world.” [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) James (1902/2004: p. 329) writes, “These two characters \[i.e., ineffability and noetic quality\] will entitle any state to be called mystical, in the sense in which I use the word.” Netland (2022: p. 193) points out that these first two characteristics are in tension with one another in the sense that, if mystical experiences are ineffable, it’s hard to understand how they can also be knowledge-granting (i.e., noetic) since knowledge arguably always involves the ability to express what is known: if you can’t express it, then you must not really know it. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) James (1902/2004: p. 329) writes, “Two other qualities \[i.e., transiency and passivity\] are less sharply marked \[i.e., less than ineffability and noetic quality\], but are usually found.” James (1902/2004: p. 330) summarizes his analysis of the four characteristics as follows: “These four characteristics are sufficient to mark out a group of states of consciousness peculiar enough to deserve a special name and to call for careful study. Let it then be called the mystical group.” [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See James (1902/2004: p. 329) for his discussion of the transiency characteristic of mystical experiences. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) James (1902/2004: p. 329) writes, “Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. Except in rare instances, half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they fade into the light of common day.” [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) James (1902/2004: p. 329) writes of mystical experiences, “Often, when faded, their quality can but imperfectly be reproduced in memory; but when they recur it is recognized; and from one recurrence to another it is susceptible of continuous development in what is felt as inner richness and importance.” [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See James (1902/2004: pp. 329-330) for his discussion of the passivity characteristic of mystical experiences. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) James (1902/2004: pp. 329-330) writes, “Although the oncoming of mystical states may be facilitated by preliminary voluntary operations \[i.e., spiritual preparations\], as by fixing the attention, or going through certain bodily performances, or in other ways which manuals of mysticism prescribe; yet when the characteristic sort of consciousness once has set in, the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power.” [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) James (1902/2004: p. 330) comments that, far from being caused by an assertion of will, once a mystical experience begins, the experiencer feels “as if his own will were in abeyance.” [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) James (1902/2004: p. 330) writes that, in a mystical experience, the experiencer feels “as if he were grasped and held by a superior power.” [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) James (1902/2004: p. 335) writes, “Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity.” James (1902/2004: p. 360) writes, “We pass into mystical states from out of ordinary consciousness as from a less into a more, as from a smallness into a vastness, and at the same time as from an unrest to a rest. We feel them as reconciling, unifying states…In them the unlimited absorbs the limits and peacefully closes the account.” James (1902/2004: p. 362) writes that the “overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness.” James (1902/2004: p. 371) writes that mystical experiences involve a feeling of “inner union with the divine.” [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) James (1902/2004: p. 336) writes that mystical experience “is a monistic insight, in which the other in its various forms appears absorbed into the One.” James (1902/2004: p. 360) writes that mystical experiences point in the philosophical direction of monism. James (1902/2004: p. 365) writes that the mystic state of consciousness is “on the whole pantheistic.” [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) James (1902/2004: p. 351) writes that “mystics may emphatically deny that the senses play any part in the very highest type of knowledge which their transports yield.” James (1902/2004: p. 358) writes that “other-worldliness” is “encouraged by the mystical consciousness.” James (1902/2004: p. 365) writes that the mystical state of consciousness is “anti-naturalistic, and harmonizes best with…so-called other-worldly states of mind.” James (1902/2004: p. 365) writes that mystical experiences seem to speak of the truth of “supernaturality” and (p. 370) “supernaturalism.” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) James (1902/2004: p. 360) writes that mystical experiences point in the philosophical direction of “optimism…They appeal to the yes-function more than to the no-function in us.” James (1902/2004: p. 365) writes that the mystic state of consciousness is “on the whole…optimistic, or at least the opposite of pessimistic.” See Corrigan (2008) for a helpful discussion of feelings and emotions in James’ analysis of mystical experience. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) James (1902/2004: p. 365) says his “task is to inquire whether we can invoke it \[i.e., mystical experience\] as authoritative. Does it furnish any warrant for the truth of the…supernaturality and pantheism which it favors?” [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) For what is meant by “justified” here—*epistemically* justified—see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. An epistemically justified belief is, in some sense, likely to be true; this type of justification contrast with, among other types, “pragmatic” justification which concerns what is useful or helpful to believe. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) James (1902/2004: p. 366) writes, “Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.” However, “No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically.” [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) James (1902/2004: pp. 366-367) writes, “As a matter of psychological fact, mystical states of a well-pronounced and emphatic sort are usually authoritative over those who have them. They have been ‘there,’ and know…Our own more ‘rational’ beliefs are based on evidence exactly similar in nature to that which mystics quote for theirs. Our senses, namely, have assured us of certain states of fact; but mystical experiences are as direct perceptions of fact for those who have them as any sensations ever were for us. The records show that even though the five senses be in abeyance in them, they are absolutely sensational in their epistemological quality, if I may be pardoned the barbarous expression – that is, they are face to face presentations of what seems immediately to exist…The mystic is, in short, invulnerable, and must be left, whether we relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoyment of his creed.” [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) See James (1902/2004: pp. 367-369) for his discussion of why mystical experiences are not authoritative for those who haven’t had them. James (1902/2004: p. 367) writes that “mystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept the deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves outsiders and feel no private call thereto. The utmost they can ever ask of us in this life is to admit that they establish a presumption.” For more about how to respond to disagreements, in terms of deciding what—if anything—to believe about matters of profound disagreement, see [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson. One reason James says mystical experiences are not authoritative over “outsiders” is because the appearance of authenticity present in each mystical experience is weakened by the fact of religious diversity: different mystics hold varying beliefs based on their experiences, and mystical experience is compatible with a variety of metaphysical positions and religious beliefs. For instance, James (1902/2004: p. 368) writes that mystical experience is “dualistic in Sankhya, and monistic in Vedanta philosophy. I called it pantheistic, but the great Spanish mystics are anything but panetheists…The fact is that the mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual content whatever of its own. It is capable of forming matrimonial alliances with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies, provided only they can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional mood. We have no right, therefore, to invoke its prestige as distinctively in favor of any special belief, such as that in absolute goodness, of the world. It is only relatively in favor of all these things – it passes out of common human consciousness in the direction in which they lie.” Even though mystical experiences are not authoritative over “outsiders,” James writes (p. 368) that they “tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest. They offer us hypotheses, hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset. The supernaturalism and optimism to which they would persuade us may, interpreted in one way or another, be after all the truest of insights into the meaning of life.” [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) See Alston (1991) for a thorough summary of the ways in which mystical experience and sense perception are not alike according to critics (including the example cited here), as well as possible responses to this criticism. Also see [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner for similar discussion. One response, for instance, is to point out that there are many ordinary, non-mystical experiences – e.g., experiences of emotion, imagination, rational intuition, etc. – which cannot be independently checked and verified by other people, and yet that doesn’t lead us to conclude that such experiences are all illusory; therefore, we shouldn’t draw that conclusion about mystical experiences either. Another response is to argue that mystical experience *can* be checked and verified, just in a manner that is appropriate for this unique type of experience (because it’s not appropriate to judge non-sensory mystical experiences by the same standards as sensory experiences) – for instance, by examining the “fruits” or positive benefits of the experience on the experiencer’s moral and spiritual development; by checking the mystical experience against religious doctrines and texts as well as the past mystical experiences of others in the tradition; and so on. [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) For example, Franks Davis (1989: p. 34) introduces her own list of four defining traits of mystical experience which differs significantly from James’ list. She (p. 34) argues, for instance, that a sense of freedom from space and time should be considered an essential characteristic of mystical experience, which is a trait that James doesn’t seem to mention at all in his analysis. ### References [Alston, William. (1991). Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cornell University Press.](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801425974/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1) [Barnard, G. William. (1997). Exploring Unseen Worlds: William James and the Philosophy of Mysticism. SUNY Press.](https://sunypress.edu/Books/E/Exploring-Unseen-Worlds2) [Corrigan, John (editor). (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-religion-and-emotion-9780190608583?cc=us&lang=en&) [Franks Davis, Caroline. (1989). The Evidential Force of Religious Experience. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-evidential-force-of-religious-experience-9780198250012?cc=us&lang=en&) [James, William. (1902/2004). The Varieties of Religious Experience. Barnes & Noble Books. ](https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-varieties-of-religious-experience-william-james/1116756373) [Jantzen, Grace. (1996). Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/religion/theology/power-gender-and-christian-mysticism?format=PB&isbn=9780521479264) [Jones, Richard H. (2024). A History of Mysticism. SUNY Press. ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/A/A-History-of-Mysticism2) [Netland, Harold A. (2022). Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God: The Evidential Force of Divine Encounters. Baker Academic. ](https://bakeracademic.com/p/Religious-Experience-and-the-Knowledge-of-God-Harold-A-Netland/382668) [Proudfoot, Wayne. (1985). Religious Experience. University of California Press.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520061286/religious-experience) [Putnam, Ruth Anna (editor). (2006). The Cambridge Companion to William James. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-william-james/9638642470D21E28CADBF6763D111B40) [Roy, Louis. (2001). Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique. University of Toronto Press.](https://utorontopress.com/9781442682733/transcendent-experiences/) [Schleiermacher, Friedrich. (2011). The Christian Faith. Apocryphile Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Christian-Faith-Friedrich-Schleiermacher/dp/1937002039) [Schleiermacher, Friedrich. (1996). On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/schleiermacher-religion-speeches-its-cultured-despisers?format=PB&isbn=9780521479752) ### Related Essays [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/ "Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/ "Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/James-on-Mysticism.pdf). ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew/](https://www.westshore.edu/staff/sanderson-dr-matthew/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), and [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. 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Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** James, mystical, mysticism, Sanderson, William James --- ### [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/) **Published:** May 24, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** German philosopher and theologian Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) coined the term “numinous” and described numinous religious experience in his influential 1917 book "The Idea of the Holy." This essay introduces Otto’s theory. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#religion) Word Count: 998 Philosophers of religion sometimes distinguish two types of religious experience: *mystical* experience and *numinous* experience.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Mystical experience is where someone feels like they become united or “one” with a spiritual being or reality (e.g., God, Nirvana, etc.). Numinous experience, on the other hand, is where they also seem to encounter a spiritual being or reality, but as totally different and separate from themselves.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) German philosopher and theologian Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) coined the term “numinous” and described numinous religious experience in his influential 1917 book *The Idea of the Holy*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay introduces Otto’s theory. [![Untitled, oil on canvas, by Mark Rothko, 1952-1953. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Untitled-by-Mark-Rothko.jpg?resize=656%2C447&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Untitled-by-Mark-Rothko.jpg?ssl=1)Untitled by Mark Rothko. Oil on canvas. 1952-1953. ### 1. “Mysterium Tremendum” For Otto, a numinous experience is a type of religious experience, i.e., what seems to be an encounter with what Otto calls “the holy” or “numen” (i.e., a spiritual being or reality).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Numinous experience consists of a single bittersweet “mixed emotion” (what Otto calls “numinous emotion”) made up of a combination of shock, fear, and joy.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Otto believes that the mixed numinous emotion allows for what seems like an accurate perception of the holy, similar to how someone loving you might enable them to see “the real you.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Otto thinks that numinous emotion reveals the holy to be what he calls the “*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*,” i.e., the tremendous and fascinating mystery. Otto provides a detailed analysis of each concept in this description. #### 1.1. “Mysterium” Otto thinks the holy seems to be a “mysterium” or mystery when experienced through the lens of numinous emotion. Otto says this means the numen appears as “the wholly other,” i.e., as entirely different from or “other” than the experiencer and all of creation.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In other words, the holy seems to be a completely otherworldly, transcendent presence, totally separate from the ordinary, and thus a mystery beyond rational comprehension.This aspect causes us to feel the sense of shock or astonishment that is a major part of the numinous emotion.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The appearance of the holy as “wholly other” or totally *different* from you is one aspect of numinous experience that contrasts it with mystical experiences of oneness in which the holy seems to be the *same* as you. #### 1.2. “Tremendum” As an astonishing mystery, the holy also seems to be “tremendum” or tremendous. The tremendous nature of the holy causes us to feel the sense of fear that is central to numinous emotion. Otto says the holy’s tremendousness consists of “awefulness,” “overpoweringness,” and “energy.” As tremendous, the holy seems to possess what Otto names “awefulness.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) This means it appears eerie, weird, and uncanny. Thus, this aspect of the numen causes us to feel a sense of fear like what we feel upon encountering what are believed to be ghosts and haunted places.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Also due to its tremendous nature, the holy seems overpowering, referring to the might and majesty—the “bigness”—of the numen.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This element causes us to experience what Otto calls “creature-feeling.” This is the sense of your relative smallness—that as a creature you are but a tiny mortal—in contrast to what appears to be the overwhelming power of the holy.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Creature-feeling adds a sense of fear to the numinous experience by making us intensely aware that we are finite in both space and time, and thus we can be crushed and die. Because it involves feeling that there is a profound *difference* between yourself and the holy, creature-feeling is another element of numinous experience that contrasts with mystical experiences where you feel *one* with the holy. Lastly, as tremendous, the holy seems to possess the trait Otto calls “energy,” i.e., the numen’s purported vitality, activity, and passion.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Otto says a good example of seeming to perceive the energy of the holy is encountering what appears to some to be the wrath of God.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) In this instance, the holy’s energy inspires fear in its perceived ability to express strong emotions and act upon us with great force. #### 1.3. “Fascinans” Viewed as a tremendous mystery, the holy causes shock and fear, and thus mostly seems scary and repulsive. However, according to Otto, we are also profoundly *attracted* to the numen.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) We desire and long to encounter the holy; we feel blissful rapture and ecstasy upon seeming to experience it.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Otto says this is because the holy appears in a numinous experience as supremely valuable and capable of providing humanity with ultimate salvation.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) This means that, in addition to appearing scary, the numen also seems to possess an alluring and intoxicating dimension, which Otto names its “fascinans” (i.e., fascinating) aspect.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) This fascinating element of the holy is what causes us to feel the joy that is a defining part of the numinous mixed emotion.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Thus, overall, the numen, as disclosed to numinous emotion, seems both repulsive and attractive, humbling and uplifting, terrifying and exalting, i.e., both a tremendous *and* fascinating mystery.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) As a result, Otto claims we experience a combination of shock, fear *and* joy upon purportedly encountering it. Numinous experience is then a bittersweet religious experience. ### 2. Conclusion Philosophers debate whether religious experiences justify religious beliefs. The question is whether you are rationally justified to believe in God, for instance, simply because you seemed to experience God. Otto’s answer is that the existence of the holy is self-evident to anyone who has ever felt numinous emotion.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) And he provides no further rational argumentation for the existence of the holy.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) Instead, he directs readers to engage in introspection to discover their own inner numinous emotion.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Once people access that emotion, Otto believes they will immediately seem to perceive the holy, and thus need no further argument to convince them of its existence. However, critics say that personal, subjective emotions are not good evidence for the existence of *anything*, much less an objective divine reality.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) After all, *feeling* that a threat exists (e.g., experiencing fear and anxiety), for instance, doesn’t mean one really does. Nonetheless, Otto’s theory is an important starting point for anyone who wishes to explore the emotional dimension of religious experience. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For more about the philosophy of religious and mystical experience, see [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/), [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/), and [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/), all by Matthew Sanderson. Wainwright (1981), Davis (1989), Yandell (1994), and Netland (2022) are examples of philosophers who consider numinous experience to be a unique and major type of religious experience that is sharply different from mystical experience. It should be noted that philosophical discussions about religious experiences concern how things *seem* to the person; they decidedly do not *not* assume or presume that what the person seems to experience actually exists or is real—indeed a core question in philosophy of religious experience is to what extent these experiences—how things *seem* to the person—are evidence of a reality that’s being experienced. For more on this concept of how things seem— called “seemings”—see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller; for further discussion on how things seem can justify beliefs, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This means that numinous experiences are often considered “dualistic” in the sense that the experiencer and God (for instance) seem to remain two distinct beings during the experience, whereas mystical experiences are considered “monistic” because they involve the experiencer feeling “one” with the spiritual being or reality. See e.g., Davis (1989) for a discussion of how numinous religious experiences are dualistic compared to monistic mystical experiences. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Otto’s theory of the holy is arguably one of the most important theories of religious experience of the 20th century. Most theories of religious experience published after it reference and wrestle with it. For a helpful introduction to Otto’s philosophy of religious experience, see Almond (1984). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Otto coins the term “numinous” from the Latin word for divinity or the holy, “numen.” See Otto (1958: pp. 5-7) for his discussion of the term. Otto often uses the term “the numinous” to seemingly refer to both the holy or “numen” and the experience of the numen (i.e., numinous experience). However, to maintain a clear distinction between the holy and one’s experience of the holy, this essay will treat “numinous” solely as qualifying a type of experience, i.e., a purported experience of the numen. Thus, the essay will speak either of “numinous experience” or “the numen,” but never use “the numinous” to refer to both, as Otto often seems to do. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Otto (1958: p. 16) calls numinous experience “numinous emotion.” Otto (1958: pp. 12-13) writes that numinous emotion “may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the mind with a tranquil mood of deepest worship. It may pass over into a more set and lasting attitude of the soul, continuing, at it were, thrillingly vibrant and resonant, until at last it dies away and the soul resumes its ‘profane,’ non-religious mood of everyday experience. It may burst in sudden eruption up from the depths of the soul with spasms and convulsions, or lead to the strangest excitements, to intoxicated frenzy, to transport, and to ecstasy.” Otto (1958: p. 5) holds that numinous experience consists purely of non-rational (i.e., non-conceptual) emotion. It is non-rational in that he considers the experience to be entirely emotional – i.e., it is only felt and involves no conceptual (i.e., rational) thinking. Thus, the full title of Otto’s book is *The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational*. Otto is often criticized for downplaying or overlooking the role of rational (or conceptual) elements – such as thinking, judging, interpreting, etc. – in religious experience. For examples of this criticism, see Proudfoot (1985), Wynn (2005), Roy (2001), and Almond (1982). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Otto (1958: p. 12) writes that the nature of the holy “can only be suggested by means of the special way it is reflected in the mind in terms of feeling.” Otto (1958: p. 33) writes that the holy is something which we “may know only by a direct and living experience.” Otto (1958: p. 34) writes that the holy “can be firmly grasped, thoroughly understood, and profoundly appreciated, purely in, with, and from the \[numinous emotion\] itself.” Otto (1958: p. 143) writes, “It is one thing merely to believe in a reality beyond the senses and another to have experience of it also; it is one thing to have ideas of ‘the holy’ and another to become consciously aware of it as an operative reality, intervening actively in the phenomenal world.” Otto (1958: p. 143) writes that “by feeling” (i.e., numinous emotion) the holy is “directly encountered in particular occurrences and events.” Otto (1958: p. 11) writes that, from the perspective of numinous emotion, the holy is “experienced as present” and “felt as objective and outside the self.” According to Otto, we have a “gut feeling,” so to speak, of the holy. Otto (1958: p. 2) writes that the holy “requires comprehension of a quite different kind \[i.e., non-rational, emotional comprehension\]. Yet, though it eludes the conceptual way of understanding, it must be in some way or other within our grasp, else absolutely nothing could be asserted of it.” Otto (1958: p. 33) writes that, regarding the real nature of the holy, “he can neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in thought, but may know only by a direct and living experience.” Otto (1958: p. 147) writes that numinous experiences (consisting of numinous emotion) “must certainly be termed cognitions, modes of knowing, though, of course, not the product of reflection, but the intuitive outcome of feeling.” Otto is saying that numinous emotion “knows” the holy, but intuitively rather than cognitively or intellectually. In other words, we “know” the holy through feeling it, so to speak. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Otto (1958: pp. 25-30) analyzes the “mysterium” and “wholly other” aspects of the numen. Otto (1958: p. 26) writes, “Taken in the religious sense, that which is ‘mysterious’ is – to give it perhaps the most striking expression – the ‘wholly other,’ that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the ‘canny,’ and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment.” Otto (1958: p. 28) writes, “The truly ‘mysterious’ object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently ‘wholly other,’ whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Otto (1958: p. 26) for his analysis of the types of feelings evoked by the mysterium and the wholly other aspects of the numen. Otto most often calls the emotional response to the mysterium or ‘wholly other’ aspect of the numen “wonder” and “astonishment,” but it’s clear from his description (1958: p. 28)—“recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb”—that “shock” is arguably the most common contemporary colloquial term used to express what he has in mind. “Amazement” would also work, though “shock” conveys more of the “negative” reaction suggested by Otto’s use of the word “recoil,” for instance. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Otto (1958: pp. 13-19) for his analysis of the awefulness dimension of the numen. Otto (1958: p. 19) describes awefulness as a sense of absolute unapproachability. “Spooky” is the modern colloquial term that perhaps comes closest to expressing what Otto calls “awefulness” here. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Otto (1958: p. 13) writes that awefulness involves “a quite specific kind of emotional response, wholly distinct from that of being afraid, though it so far resembles it that the analogy of fear may be used to throw light upon its nature.” This is an example of Otto’s claim that numinous emotion is entirely unique and different in kind from ordinary emotions and yet the latter may be used as analogies to help us understand numinous emotion. Otto (1958: p. 14) says, in regards to the feeling of awefulness, “Here we have a terror fraught with an inward shuddering such as not even the most menacing and overpowering created thing can instill. It has something spectral in it.” Otto (1958: pp. 14, 16-17, 28-29) compares the fear of awefulness to the fear of ghosts and other phenomena which appear uncanny, eerie, and weird. Otto (1958: p. 16) says that numinous fear is the kind of fear that makes one’s blood run icy cold, flesh creep, and hair stand on end. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Otto (1958: pp. 19-23) analyzes the overpoweringness aspect of the numen. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Otto (1958: pp. 8-11) describes his notion of creature-feeling which he (1958: p. 10) defines as “the emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures”; (1958: p. 17) “the feeling of personal nothingness and submergence before the awe-inspiring object directly experienced”; (1958: p. 20) “in contrast to ‘the overpowering’ of which we are conscious as an object over against the self, there is the feeling of one’s own submergence, of being but ‘dust and ashes’ and nothingness”; (1958: p. 21) “impotence and general nothingness as against overpowering might, dust and ashes as against ‘majesty.’” [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Otto (1958: pp. 23-24) for his discussion of the energy aspect of the numen. Otto (1958: p. 23) describes energy “in symbolical expressions” as “vitality, passion, emotional temper, will, force, movement, excitement, activity, impetus” and says it is particularly evident in the feeling of God’s wrath. Otto (1958: p. 24) defines energy as “a force that knows not stint nor stay, which is urgent, active, compelling, and alive.” Otto does not specify a unique emotion through which the energy of the holy is given. But since he thinks such energy is present in the feeling of God’s wrath, it’s likely that energy is perceived as much by a kind of numinous fear as the element of awefulness for which Otto also cites God’s wrath as an example. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Otto (1958: pp. 18 and 23) for his discussion of the feeling of the wrath of God. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Otto (1958: p. 31) writes that the numen “may appear to the mind an object of horror and dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures with a potent charm, and the creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his own. The ‘mystery’ is for him not merely something to be wondered at but something that entrances him; and beside that in it which bewilders and confounds, he feels a something that captivates and transports him with a strange ravishment, rising often enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxication; it is the Dionysiac-element in the numen.” [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Otto (1958: p. 32) writes that the numinous “is the object of search and desire and yearning.” Otto (1958: p. 34) writes that the experience of the numinous “gives the peace that passes understanding.” Otto (1958: pp. 54-55) writes of “when the close presence of the numen, intercourse with it, and enduring possession of it, becomes an object of craving, is even desired as the summum bonum.” [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Otto (1958: p. 32) writes that we desire the numen “for its own sake and not only for the sake of the aid and backing that men expect from it in the natural sphere.” Otto (1958: p. 33) writes of the development of religious history, “Possession of and by the numen becomes an end in itself; it begins to be sought for its own sake; and the wildest and most artificial methods of asceticism are put into practice to attain it. In a word, the vita religiosa begins; and to remain in these strange and bizarre states of numinous possession becomes a good in itself, even a way of salvation, wholly different from the profane goods pursued by means of magic.” Otto (1958: p. 33) writes that the numen is experienced “as something that bestows upon man a beatitude beyond compare.” See also Otto (1958: pp. 50-59) for his discussion of the value of the numen and numinous experience. Otto (1958: p. 51) writes that the numen has an “objective and ultimate” value. Otto (1958: p. 52) suggests the term *augustus* (i.e., august) for the “supreme worth and value” of the numen and numinous experience. Otto (1958: p. 52) writes that the numen is “‘august’ (augustum) in so far as it is recognized as possessing in itself objective value that claims our homage.” Thus, the numen can be characterized as the “mysterium tremendum fascinans et augustum,” i.e., the tremendous, fascinating, and august mystery. For more about the connection between the holy and value, see [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Otto (1958: pp. 31-40) analyzes the fascinans dimension of the numen. Otto (1958: p. 31) writes that the numen “is in one of its aspects the element of daunting ‘awefulness’ and ‘majesty’…but it is clear that it has at the same time another aspect, in which it shows itself as something uniquely attractive and fascinating.” Otto (1958: p. 31) writes that numinous emotion experiences the fascinans dimension of the numen—for instance, experiences God—as absolute and complete “love, mercy, pity, comfort.” [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) “Joy” is arguably the best colloquial term to summarize the range of “happy” emotions Otto believes are provoked by the fascinating aspect of the holy. Examples of these emotions mentioned by Otto are love, comfort, peace, and the like. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Otto (1958: p. 31) writes, “These two qualities, the daunting and the fascinating, now combine in a strange harmony of contrasts” which results in a “dual character of the numinous consciousness.” Thus, the numinous has a similar emotionally ambivalent (i.e., attractive and repulsive) structure as the experience of the sublime. Otto (1958: pp. 41-49) considers the sublime a this-worldly analogy or symbol for the other-worldly numen. For more about the sublime, see [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Otto thinks that religious feeling is itself proof of the holy as an objective reality, just as the subjective experience of romantic love is perhaps evidence of the beloved’s worth and value. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) For more on the idea of believing in God without a rational argument, see [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Otto (1958: p. 6) writes that he is going “to suggest this unnamed Something to the reader as far as we may, so that he may himself feel it.” Otto (1958: p. 7) writes that the reader “must be guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through the ways of his own mind, until he reach the point at which ‘the numinous’ \[the holy\] in him perforce begins to stir, to start into life and into consciousness….In other words our X cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes ‘of the spirit’ must be awakened.” Otto (1958: p. 8) writes, “The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, or, say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious feelings.” Otto (1958: p. 10) writes that religious feeling “must be directly experienced in oneself to be understood.” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) See Netland (2022) for an example of this criticism. ### References [Almond, Philip C. (1982). Mystical Experience and Religious Doctrine: An Investigation of the Study of Mysticism in World Religions. Mouton Publishers.](https://www.amazon.com/Mystical-Experience-Religious-Doctrine-Religion/dp/9027931607/ref=sr_1_1?crid=RQMYQMBS010Z&keywords=philip+almond+mystical+experience&qid=1704299101&s=books&sprefix=philip+almond+mystical+experience%2Cstripbooks%2C85&sr=1-1) [Almond, Philip C. (1984). Rudolf Otto: An Introduction to his Philosophical Theology. The University of North Carolina Press.](https://uncpress.org/book/9780807896044/rudolf-otto/) [Davis, Caroline Franks. (1989). The Evidential Force of Religious Experience. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-evidential-force-of-religious-experience-9780198250012?cc=us&lang=en&) [Netland, Harold A. (2022). Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God: The Evidential Force of Divine Encounters. Baker Academic. ](https://bakeracademic.com/p/Religious-Experience-and-the-Knowledge-of-God-Harold-A-Netland/382668) [Otto, Rudolf. (1917/1958). The Idea of the Holy. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-idea-of-the-holy-9780195002102?cc=us&lang=en&) [Otto, Rudolf. (1932/2016). Mysticism East and West. Wipf and Stock.](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-East-West-Comparative-Analysis/dp/1532608659) [Proudfoot, Wayne. (1985). Religious Experience. University of California Press.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520061286/religious-experience) [Roy, Louis. (2001). Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique. University of Toronto Press.](https://utorontopress.com/9781442682733/transcendent-experiences/) [Stace, W. T. (1960). Mysticism and Philosophy. Macmillan. ](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Philosophy-W-T-Stace/dp/0874774160) [Yandell, Keith. (1994). The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Religious-Experience-Keith-Yandell/dp/0521477417) [Wainwright, William J. (1981). Mysticism: A Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications. The University of Wisconsin Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Mysticism-Study-Nature-Cognitive-Implications/dp/029908910X/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2I7SY8PCKWVFA&keywords=william+wainwright+mysticism&qid=1704299144&s=books&sprefix=william+wainwright+mysticism%2Cstripbooks%2C77&sr=1-1) [Wynn, Mark R. (2005). Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling. Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/emotional-experience-and-religious-understanding/6F933E8DCAEE26905ECE5F08902B4099) ### Related Essays [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson ### About the Author [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson) is Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Shore Community College in Scottville, Michigan. He specializes in philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and 19th and 20th-century continental philosophy. [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** mystical, mysticism, otto, Rudolph Otto, Sanderson --- ### [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without An Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) **Published:** July 20, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** It’s often thought that religious beliefs—such as belief in God—require supporting arguments to be reasonable. Some philosophers have argued, however, that arguments are not needed for belief in God to be reasonable. This essay examines their case. **Content:** Author: Jamie B. Turner Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology) Word Count: 1000 Suppose that one evening, you look to see whether your neighbors are home, notice that their car isn’t in the driveway and the lights are off, and so conclude that they’re out. It’s just because of such reasoning or argument that your belief is reasonable.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) While we believe many things on the basis of arguments, we also believe many more things *without* argument or reasoning, e.g., believing there’s a cup on our desk, that we ate cereal for breakfast, that we’re in pain, and that we hear a bird chirping. These are beliefs we form immediately, without any explicit reasoning, when we see, remember, feel, or hear these things. And these sorts of beliefs are reasonable for us to hold. It’s often thought that religious beliefs—such as belief in God—require supporting arguments to be reasonable.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Some philosophers have argued, however, that arguments are not needed for belief in God to be reasonable.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay examines their case. [![A night sky.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/proper-basicality.jpg?resize=656%2C363&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/proper-basicality.jpg?ssl=1)A night sky. ### 1. Evidence and Rationality It’s commonly thought that being reasonable or rational is a matter of evidence: a belief is rational for someone *only* *if* they have sufficient evidence that supports their belief. Evidence, however, takes different forms. One form is arguments; another form is experiences and how things appear or seem to a person, such as our sensory perceptions. Evidence isn’t limited to arguments: if we had to offer an argument for *everything* we believe, including the premises of *that* argument, and the premises of *those* arguments, and so on forever, then we arguably wouldn’t be rational in holding any beliefs since we don’t and *can’t* do that.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But we *are* rational in accepting many of our beliefs, so we don’t need an argument for everything we believe.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 2. Rationality and Belief in God Many *theists*, people who believe there’s a God, believe because of an argument: they consider the origins of the cosmos, ponder its orderliness, and infer that God best explains its existence.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Arguing for God’s existence from these features of the natural world might make belief in God rational. A different type of reason for belief, however, is based upon, e.g., encountering the beauty of the starry night sky or the joy of holding a newborn child: the person is simply overwhelmed by what they take to be God’s presence. This believer doesn’t *argue* or *reason* towards believing God exists: they simply find themselves believing because of these or similar experiences. Some contemporary philosophers have defended the view that belief in God can be rational for theists who believe because of their immediate experiences, not arguments.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The most notable defender of this view is philosopher Alvin Plantinga (1932–).[\[8\]](#_ftn8) He argues that belief in God can be “properly basic,” by which he means it is “basic”—it isn’t inferred from any other belief, and held “properly”—it’s rational.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In Plantinga’s view, belief in God can have the same sort of intellectual status as our other more ordinary beliefs about the world such as what we perceive or remember.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Since evidence includes experiences—it’s not just arguments—then since beliefs in cups or chirping birds can be rational by way of such evidence, the same could extend to belief in God.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Thus, if someone has an experience that they take to be of God, then this experience counts as evidence and in favor of one’s belief in God being rational, in the same way as it does for our more ordinary beliefs. So, arguably, belief in God *can* be “properly basic.” ### 3. Objections There are many objections raised against the case that belief in God can be properly basic.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) One of the most common is that it seems to imply that almost any belief could be properly basic. Imagine someone who takes themselves to have experiences of tooth fairies, goblins, or the Great Pumpkin at Halloween. If experiences can render belief in God properly basic, it seems that the experience of these bizarre entities could make belief in them properly basic also. But, the objector claims, belief in these bizarre entities is irrational and so can’t be properly basic; they conclude that experiences alone cannot make a belief properly basic, including belief in God. In response, one might agree that belief in, say, the Great Pumpkin could *potentially* be rational without arguments, but argue that most people have good reasons to doubt that such a being exists: e.g., if there really were a Great Pumpkin, we’d expect many others to spot it or for science to reveal to us that such an entity exists; that hasn’t happened, so probably there’s no Great Pumpkin. So, those who think that belief in God can be properly basic might argue that there are good reasons to doubt the existence of bizarre entities like the Great Pumpkin, but these doubts are not present for belief in God. This response involves proposing it’s not experiences alone that make beliefs properly basic but experiences *combined with there being no adequate reason to doubt beliefs formed on their basis*. Critics respond that there are at least some reasons to doubt that there’s a God: e.g., that the presence of so much evil in the world renders God unlikely, or that if God really exists, then we’d expect evidence of God to be more obvious—perhaps we’d even expect more people to have what they take to be experiences of God!—among other objections.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Perhaps some theists haven’t seriously considered these reasons, though, and so they won’t give such theists good reason to doubt. For those theists who have considered them well enough, if they have a good response to them, then they won’t be good reasons for these theists to doubt either; but if they lack good responses, then these doubts might prevent their belief in God from being rational.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. Conclusion In sum, perhaps belief in God *could* be “properly basic.” However, whether belief in God is *in fact* properly basic for a person depends on whether they have strong reasons to doubt, and how well they respond to those reasons. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) An argument is a set of reasons or propositions (i.e., premises) which provides reason or support to accept another proposition (i.e., a conclusion). For more on the notion of “argument” and ordinary case examples see [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Although this essay focuses on how specifically belief in God may or may not require arguments for such a belief to be reasonable, this is not the only kind of religious belief that might be appropriate for this form of consideration. For instance, some have considered whether specifically belief in aspects of God’s nature might be reasonably believed without argument (i.e., whether God is triune or wholly one) or whether a purported special revelation from God (e.g., the Bible, Qur’an, or Bhagavad Gita) may be reasonably believed without argument. See Plantinga (2000), Baldwin and McNabb (2018), Turner (2021), and Gupta (2022) regarding these latter kinds of religious belief and whether arguments are necessary in these cases for reasonable religious belief. Defenders of the view that religious beliefs can be reasonable without arguments have primarily focused on three kinds of religious belief: belief in God’s existence, belief in His specific nature, and belief in His special revelation. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Consider the following argument against belief in God: - If belief in God is reasonable, then there are good arguments for such a belief. - There are no good arguments for belief in God. - Therefore, belief in God is unreasonable. Those who think that belief in God is reasonable have often responded to the sort of argument outlined above, by rejecting premise (2). They agree that arguments are needed for belief in God to be reasonable but attempt to show such a belief is reasonable by offering arguments in support of it. But those who uphold the sort of view we’re considering in this essay reject premise (1), and so, for them, whether premise (2) is true or not is less important. For if premise (1) is false, it implies that belief in God can be reasonable without arguments. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Few contemporary philosophers defend the idea that inferences may in fact go back infinitely far. Indeed, according to a PhilPeople survey of academic philosophers only around 1% of philosophers today accept something like this view: see PhilPapers (n.d.). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the view is not quite the same as the idea that *arguments* need to go back infinitely far. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The idea that we do not need an argument for everything we believe—principally because this implies an infinite regress of offering arguments to support our belief—is the basis of perhaps the central argument for “foundationalism.” This is, roughly, the view that there are at least some beliefs we hold that are reasonable without argument: these are beliefs that provide the “foundation” for our other reasonable beliefs. See [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli, and Poston (2014) for an introduction to this view. It is important to note, however, that some philosophers deny that there are foundational or what’s later described in this essay as “basic” beliefs: they propose that our beliefs are part of a web or system of beliefs and that the extent to which they’re reasonable depends on how well they cohere together and provide mutual support. This view is known as “coherentism.” See [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf for an introduction to this view. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For instance, some believers base their religious beliefs on versions of the cosmological or design arguments: see [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) and [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf. There are many other arguments for theism: many are introduced in the [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) category of essays. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) As mentioned above in note 2, some philosophers think that arguments are needed for belief in God to be reasonable and others who think that such arguments are not needed for belief in God to be reasonable. In the philosophical literature, those who uphold the former view are often referred to as upholding “theistic evidentialism.” Whereas those who uphold the latter view are often referred to as upholding “reformed epistemology.” This latter view was coined by Alvin Plantinga due to the influence of Reformed theologians, particularly John Calvin (1509-1564), on this approach to religious epistemology. See Dougherty and Tweedt (2015) on the difference and overlap between these perspectives. For the paradigmatic cases of reformed epistemology see Alston (1991) and Plantinga (2000); for theistic evidentialism see Swinburne (2004). A different type of potential justification for religious beliefs appeals to *mystical experiences*, which are understood to be a different type of experience than the experiences that advocates of the “proper basicality” of religious beliefs typically appeal to; see [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Alvin Plantinga famously began articulating this idea in his book *God and Other Minds* (1967). Plantinga later developed the view in his article “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?” (1981) and then further still in his chapter “Reason and Belief in God” (1983). This set of works is often referred to as the “earlier Plantinga” with respect to reformed epistemology. The work on reformed epistemology of the “later Plantinga” is fleshed out in his *Warranted Christian Belief* (2000). This book comprises the final element of his “warrant trilogy”, with the two previous works in the trilogy *Warrant: The Current Debate* (1993) and *Warrant and Proper Function* (1993) being on epistemology or the theory of knowledge, but not applied to religious beliefs. Plantinga applied the insights of these two books on epistemology to religious epistemology in *Warranted Christian Belief* (2000). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) More specifically, Plantinga argues that belief in God can be “warranted” to a degree sufficient for one to *know* that God exists. His argument is grounded in the idea that “warrant” (i.e., that property enough of which turns a true belief into knowledge: “warrant” is a proposed improvement on the idea that “epistemic justification” is necessary for knowledge: see [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman and [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long) just so long as one’s belief is the product of truth-aimed properly functioning faculties in congenial environments for those faculties. Plantinga proposes that *if* God exists then God would have probably made knowledge of Himself available to us by giving us an ability of faculty to know Him which, in following John Calvin, he calls a *sensus divinitatis* (i.e., “sense of divinity”). If that faculty works properly in the right circumstances, he argues belief in God can be warranted without argument to a degree sufficient for knowledge. Plantinga goes on to extend his argument for specifically Christian theistic belief, which includes belief in God as triune and the Bible as God’s revelation: see Plantinga (2000). More recently, Turner (2021) has argued the same for Islamic theism, primarily based on the concept of *fiṭra* as developed by the Muslim medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), which partially resembles the idea of a *sensus divinitatis*. Baldwin and McNabb (2018) have also considered the extent to which this might be possible across a variety of religious traditions. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This discussion here differs from Plantinga’s original way of making his point. He originally claimed that belief in God could be rational “without evidence.” But by “without evidence” he meant “without argument.” Since experiences and how things seem to be a person can be evidence, it was misleading for him to put his view this way: e.g., when someone believes there’s a God based on an experience of the night sky, that experience *is* their evidence. In his later work, however, Plantinga acknowledges that experiences and seemings are evidence: see Plantinga (1993), especially chapter 10. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The theory of rationality appealed to in this essay is closer to what’s called a “phenomenal conservative” approach to reformed epistemology than the traditional Plantingian approach developed in his (2000). According to phenomenal conservatism, a person is justified in believing that *p*, if it *seems* to them that *p* and they have no sufficient *defeater* for (or reason to doubt) the belief that *p*, see Huemer (2007). It is important to understand here what is meant by a “seeming” and what we mean by a “defeater.” A “seeming” is a mental state or experience in which a certain proposition “appears” to a subject to be true e.g., it appears (*seems*) to me <that there is a tree> before me. A “defeater” for a given belief is a form of “counterevidence.” It can either be “rebutting,” i.e., something that gives us reason for thinking that a belief is false, or “undercutting,” i.e., something that undermines or takes away our reason for taking the belief to be true. The point being developed here is roughly the thought that belief in God could be justified or rational along the lines of phenomenal conservatism’s theory of justification, absent any sufficient defeater. See Sudduth (2008) on the notion of “defeaters.” For more on the phenomenal conservative approach to reformed epistemology see Tucker (2011), and Gage Paul and McAllister (2020). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Some of the most important objections to the idea that belief in God can be properly basic are: (1) the Great Pumpkin objection, (2) the religious diversity objection, and (3) the disanalogy objection. (1) is the sort of objection under consideration in this essay. For more detail on this objection see Scott (2014). Regarding (2), this is the objection that theists of different types each claim to experience God but they differ in their beliefs about the God being experienced. For instance, Christian theists claim to have had an experience of Christ as God, Hindu theists an experience of Brahman, and Muslim theists an experience of Allah. The objection is that theists who claim to have had an experience of God as Christ, Brahman, or Allah, and are aware of such disagreement cannot reasonably trust their tradition-specific experiences of God without recourse to an argument. This means that their beliefs in God cannot be properly basic because they must be based on an argument that gives the relevant theist good reason for taking their own experience as trustworthy. Concerning (3), this objection contends that there are important disanalogies between ordinary perceptual beliefs and belief in God, such that the former can be properly basic but not the latter. See Bolos and Scott (2015) for a discussion of these three objections. Also see Moon (2016) for an overview of recent work on these and other objections. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For introductions to these arguments given to believe there is not, or probably is not, a God, see [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless. A case against trusting religious beliefs formed and held on the basis of religious experiences can be developed from observations about the diversity of religious experiences: many people do not have religious experiences and, when people have religious experiences, their experiences vary widely and so there are good reasons to doubt beliefs formed from religious experiences: see [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson for the basis of this type of argument. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) As such, it may well be the case that arguments are needed for some believers in God to dispel objections raised against their belief in God. However, this needn’t be the case for every kind of believer. For instance, the average believer in God among ordinary folk might not be very well aware of the objections to belief in God or may lack the proper tools needed to respond to them. For these believers, it’s plausible to think that they’re acting reasonably in trusting others in their community who can and perhaps have responded to these objections. See Sennett (1993) and Ruloff (2003) concerning this distinction between ordinary and reflective believers, and the epistemic duties that may apply to one but not the other. ### References [Alston, W. (1991). ](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801481550/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1)[*Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience*](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801481550/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1)[. New York: Cornell University Press.](https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801481550/perceiving-god/#bookTabs=1) [Baldwin, E. and McNabb, T. (2018). ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498552943/Plantingian-Religious-Epistemology-and-World-Religions-Prospects-and-Problems)[*Plantingian Religious Epistemology and World Religions: Problems and Perspectives*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498552943/Plantingian-Religious-Epistemology-and-World-Religions-Prospects-and-Problems)[. London: Lexington Books.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498552943/Plantingian-Religious-Epistemology-and-World-Religions-Prospects-and-Problems) [Bolos, A. and Scott, K. (2015). Reformed Epistemology. In ](https://iep.utm.edu/ref-epis/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/ref-epis/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/ref-epis/) [Dougherty, T. and Tweedt, C. (2015). “Religious Epistemology,” ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12185)[*Philosophy Compass* ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12185)[10(8):547-559.](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12185) [Gage Paul, L. and McAllister, B. (2020). “Phenomenal Conservatism.” In J. DePoe and T. McNabb (eds.), ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/debating-christian-religious-epistemology-9781350062740/)[*Debating Christian Religious Epistemology*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/debating-christian-religious-epistemology-9781350062740/)[ (London: Bloomsbury), pp. 61-81.](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/debating-christian-religious-epistemology-9781350062740/) [Gupta, A. “Are There ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/are-there-de-jure-objections-to-madhvic-belief/A9EF938E2EC5E702EA58B8BDA8497B1E)[*De Jure* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/are-there-de-jure-objections-to-madhvic-belief/A9EF938E2EC5E702EA58B8BDA8497B1E)[Objections to Mādhvic belief?,” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/are-there-de-jure-objections-to-madhvic-belief/A9EF938E2EC5E702EA58B8BDA8497B1E)[*Religious Studies* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/are-there-de-jure-objections-to-madhvic-belief/A9EF938E2EC5E702EA58B8BDA8497B1E)[58(4):732-744.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/are-there-de-jure-objections-to-madhvic-belief/A9EF938E2EC5E702EA58B8BDA8497B1E) [Huemer, M. (2007). “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x)[74(1):30-55.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x) [Moon, A. (2016). “Recent Work in Reformed Epistemology,” ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12361)[*Philosophy Compass* ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12361)[11(12):879-891.](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phc3.12361) [PhilPapers. (N.d.). Survey Results: Justification: Reliabilism, Nonreliabilist Foundationalism, Infinitism, or Coherentism? ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org./survey/results/5062)[*Philpeople.org*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org./survey/results/5062)[.](https://survey2020.philpeople.org./survey/results/5062) [Plantinga, A. (1993). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/warrant-and-proper-function-9780195078640?cc=tr&lang=en&)[*Warrant and Proper Function*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/warrant-and-proper-function-9780195078640?cc=tr&lang=en&)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/warrant-and-proper-function-9780195078640?cc=tr&lang=en&) [Plantinga, A. (2000). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/12530?searchresult=1)[*Warranted Christian Belief*](https://academic.oup.com/book/12530?searchresult=1)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/12530?searchresult=1) [Poston, T. (2014). Foundationalism. In ](https://iep.utm.edu/foundationalism-in-epistemology/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/foundationalism-in-epistemology/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/foundationalism-in-epistemology/) [Ruloff, C.P. (2003). “Evidentialism, Warrant, and The Division of Epistemic Labor,” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02380933)[*Philosophia* ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02380933)[31(1-2):185-203.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02380933) [Scott, K. (2014). “Return of The Great Pumpkin,” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/return-of-the-great-pumpkin/86D1FCD9D2662751A84168985BA4669A)[*Religious Studies* ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/return-of-the-great-pumpkin/86D1FCD9D2662751A84168985BA4669A)[50(3):297-308.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/return-of-the-great-pumpkin/86D1FCD9D2662751A84168985BA4669A) [Sennet, James. (1993). “Reformed Epistemology and Epistemic Duty.” In E.S. Radcliffe and C.J. White (eds.), ](https://www.amazon.com/Faith-Theory-Practice-Justifying-Religious/dp/0812692470)[*Faith and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief* ](https://www.amazon.com/Faith-Theory-Practice-Justifying-Religious/dp/0812692470)[(Chicago, Open Court Publishing), pp. 196-207.](https://www.amazon.com/Faith-Theory-Practice-Justifying-Religious/dp/0812692470) [Sudduth, M. (2008). Defeaters in Epistemology. In ](https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/)[.](https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/) [Swinburne, R. (2004). ](https://academic.oup.com/book/1828?searchresult=1)[*The Existence of God*](https://academic.oup.com/book/1828?searchresult=1)[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/1828?searchresult=1) [Tucker, C. (2011). “Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology.” In K.J. Clark and R. VanArragon (eds.), ](https://academic.oup.com/book/1432/chapter-abstract/140796304?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*Evidence and Religious Belief* ](https://academic.oup.com/book/1432/chapter-abstract/140796304?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[(New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 52-74.](https://academic.oup.com/book/1432/chapter-abstract/140796304?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Turner, J.B. (2021). “An Islamic Account of Reformed Epistemology,” ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/797586)[*Philosophy East and West* ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/797586)[71(3):767-792.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/797586) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/ "Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/ "Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson [[“The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/uygun-temelde-tanri-inanci-arguman-olmaksizin-tanriya-inanmak-jamie-b-turner/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/properly-basic.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Jamie B. Turner is a doctoral researcher at the Centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Birmingham. His main philosophical interests are in religious epistemology and Islamic analytic philosophy of religion. [bham.academia.edu/JamieBTurner](https://bham.academia.edu/JamieBTurner) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** Alvin Plantinga, belief in God without an argument, proper basicality, reformed epistemology, theism, theistic belief --- ### [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) **Published:** June 15, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) Categories: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/), [Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word count: 998 ![Sleeping Beauty](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/sleeping-beauty.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1) Sleeping Beauty Imagine that Beauty takes part in an experiment: on Sunday night, she is put to sleep. Then, the experimenters flip a fair coin. If the coin lands *heads*, Beauty is awakened on Monday, then is put back to sleep until the experiment ends on Wednesday. If the coin lands *tails*, Beauty is awakened on both Monday and Tuesday; however, after her Monday waking, Beauty is given a memory drug that makes her forget her Monday waking when she wakes up on Tuesday. This chart sums up the story: | | Sunday | Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | |---|---|---|---|---| | Heads | Experiment begins; Beauty goes to sleep | Beauty is awakened, then a few minutes later, put back to sleep | Beauty is **not** awakened. | Experiment ends; Beauty wakes up | | Tails | Experiment begins; Beauty goes to sleep | Beauty is awakened, then a few minutes later, put back to sleep (after receiving memory drug) | Beauty is awakened, then a few minutes later, put back to sleep | Experiment ends; Beauty wakes up | This case sets up what’s called the “Sleeping Beauty Problem.” Its question is: What degree of belief, or *credence*, should Beauty assign to the claim “The coin landed heads” (call this H) when she awakens? Credences are numbers from 0 to 1 that represent how strongly we believe a claim to be true. A credence of 1 represents complete certainty that a claim is true, a credence of 0 represents complete certainty that a claim is false, and a credence of 0.5 represents complete neutrality. Answers to the question of what Beauty’s credence in “The coin landed heads” (H) ought to be are typically divided into two camps: - “halfers” say Beauty should assign H a credence of 1/2. - “thirders” say Beauty should assign H a credence of 1/3. The “problem” in the Sleeping Beauty problem is that it’s not clear which of these two solutions is correct or why. Debates over this problem are relevant to epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of probability, and more. ### 1. The Halfer Argument Before Beauty goes to sleep, *halfers* say, Beauty knows that the probability of the coin landing heads is 1/2, and she gains (and loses) no information between going to sleep on Sunday and waking up. Halfers conclude that she should assign a credence of 1/2 to H.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This typical halfer argument jointly employs two principles of rationality: the *Reflection Principle*[\[2\]](#_ftn2) and the *Principal Principle*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The *Reflection Principle* states that, if I know that I will have credence *c* in a certain claim tomorrow (without learning any new information in the meantime), then I should have credence *c* in that claim today. The *Principal Principle* states that our degrees of belief ought to line up with real-world probabilities.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) When used together, these principles tell us that Beauty should have credence 1/2 in H on Sunday night (per the Principal Principle), and, since she learns no *new* information when she wakes, she should have that same credence (1/2) whenever she wakes. ### 2. Thirder Argument: the Principle of Indifference The *Principle of Indifference* states that, when we have *n* different possibilities and no reason to expect any one of these possibilities over any other, we should assign a credence of 1/n to the claim that any one possibility will occur. Think about a fair die: we have no evidence that any one of the six identical die faces is more likely to result from a die roll. Thus, we should assign a credence of 1/6 to the claim “the die will land six on the next roll.” The Principle of Indifference at first seems to favor the halfer since we have no reason to believe that the coin is any more likely to land heads than tails or vice-versa. But, *thirders* argue, what we should *really* be indifferent over is Beauty’s three indistinguishable possible waking events (waking Monday when the coin landed heads, waking Monday when the coin landed tails, and waking Tuesday when the coin landed tails), and so we should assign a credence of 1/3 to H.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The thirder’s way of dividing up the world into indistinguishable states is more detailed and fine-grained than the halfer’s and so, they argue, represents a better application of the Principle of Indifference.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 3. Thirder Argument: New Information For those unconvinced by the previous argument, here’s another one: imagine that, instead of waking up twice if the coin lands tails, Beauty instead wakes up a hundred times (and receives the memory drug after each waking). In this variant,[\[7\]](#_ftn7) it’s easier to believe that Beauty gains some new, relevant information when she wakes: “I’m awake now,” information she seems a lot more likely to receive if the coin landed tails instead of heads.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Even if Beauty doesn’t learn new information about the coin or the world outside of herself when she wakes, she does learn new information about her place in the world (that is, *self-locating* information) that justifies her change in credence. If this justification is correct, it applies in our original case too since, once again, Beauty should expect herself to wake up more frequently if the coin lands tails and so should take the new information that she is awake as evidence that the coin landed tails.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 4. Conclusion The Sleeping Beauty problem is a seemingly simple puzzle whose solutions have required philosophers to refine their concepts and principles of rationality in an attempt to better understand how and when our credences ought to change. Though most philosophers agree that the thirder’s position is correct, there is currently no consensus on what the best argument for that position is. While interesting in its own right, the problem challenges us to answer some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology: Under what conditions are we rationally permitted (or required) to change our credences? And what counts as “new evidence” that should lead us to change our credences? Answers to these questions matter not just to the Sleeping Beauty problem but for a whole host of philosophical puzzles in philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, and rational choice theory.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) [\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Lewis (2001) for a more detailed presentation of this argument. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The *Reflection Principle* was originally proposed in van Fraassen (1984) and van Fraassen (1995). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The *Principal Principle was* originally proposed in Lewis (1980). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) An example of the Principal Principle in action: imagine that you about to roll a fair die and assign a credence to the claim “The next die roll will land on 6”. The principal principle says that, since the real-world, objective probability of this claim being true is 1/6, that’s the credence you should assign to this claim. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Elga (2000) for a more detailed presentation of this argument. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) To see why we should prefer utilizing more “fine-grained” approaches, consider “rolling above a 4” and “rolling a 4 or lower” on a fair die. I may have no knowledge of what the die’s result will be and so be indifferent between these options, which would lead me to improperly assign a credence of 1/2 to my rolling a 5 or a 6 on a fair die. But the problem with applying the principle of indifference this way is that I have more information about dice than I’m letting on, and I know that I can divide “rolling above a 4” on the die into two options (rolling a 5 or a 6) which are each indistinguishable from each other and from the other four options available (rolling a 1, a 2, a 3, or a 4). Since “rolling above a 4” corresponds to 2 of these 6 indistinguishable fine-grained options, I should assign this result a credence of 1/3 instead of 1/2. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Another variant case worth considering comes from Dorr (2002). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Halfers respond that waking up shouldn’t count as “new information” since Beauty knows before she goes to sleep that she will receive that information in the future since she wakes up at least once no matter what side the coin lands on. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) There are other prominent thirder arguments in the literature worth mentioning which have been omitted here in the interest of space. Some of the most important (and technical) use Dutch Book arguments, which reveal sets of irrational credences by showing that an agent with these credences would be led to accept a series of bets which, jointly, would be guaranteed to lose her money. Hitchcock (2004) and Briggs (2010) present important examples of this style of argument applied to the Sleeping Beauty problem. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) These include fine-tuning arguments for the existence of an intelligent designer or a multiverse (see Thomas Metcalf’s [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/)) and the doomsday argument, which purports to show that our being alive at this particular point in human history serves as good evidence that the human species is unlikely to survive much longer. See Huemer (2018) for more on the connections between these puzzles and the Sleeping Beauty problem. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Many thanks to Chelsea Haramia, Dan Lowe, Thomas Metcalf, and Nathan Nobis for their helpful comments on this article. ### References [Arntzenius, Frank. 2002. “Reflections on Sleeping Beauty.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329069?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Analysis*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329069?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[. 62(1). 53-62.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329069?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Briggs, Rachael. 2010. “Putting a value on Beauty.” ](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yCR-BwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=Briggs,+Rachael.+2010.+%E2%80%9CPutting+a+value+on+Beauty.%E2%80%9D+Oxford+Studies+in+Epistemology.+3.+3-34.&ots=zOo9sw3pjs&sig=TsoT3yuUQnSlM21cUlwlag0f12s#v=onepage&q&f=false)[*Oxford Studies in Epistemology*](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yCR-BwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=Briggs,+Rachael.+2010.+%E2%80%9CPutting+a+value+on+Beauty.%E2%80%9D+Oxford+Studies+in+Epistemology.+3.+3-34.&ots=zOo9sw3pjs&sig=TsoT3yuUQnSlM21cUlwlag0f12s#v=onepage&q&f=false)[. 3. 3-34.](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yCR-BwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=Briggs,+Rachael.+2010.+%E2%80%9CPutting+a+value+on+Beauty.%E2%80%9D+Oxford+Studies+in+Epistemology.+3.+3-34.&ots=zOo9sw3pjs&sig=TsoT3yuUQnSlM21cUlwlag0f12s#v=onepage&q&f=false) [Dorr, Cian. 2002. “Sleeping Beauty: in defence of Elga.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328920?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Analysis*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328920?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[. 62(4). 292-296. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328920?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Draper, Kai and Joel Pust. 2008. “Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-007-9226-1)[*Synthese*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-007-9226-1)[. 164(2). 281-287.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-007-9226-1) [Elga, Adam. 2000. “Self-Locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329167?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Analysis*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329167?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[. 60(2). 143-147.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329167?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Gibbard Allan and William Harper. 1981. “Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility.” in ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_8)[*Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_8)[. eds. Richard Campbell and Lanning Sowden. 133-158.](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_8) [Hitchcock, Christopher. 2004. “Beauty and the Bets.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024889.29125.c0)[*Synthese*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024889.29125.c0)[. 139. 405-420.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024889.29125.c0) [Huemer, Michael. 2018. “Self-Locating Belief.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HUESB?fbclid=IwAR2kNClm-yvC_pZ8YC67nVe2j4yIqV03ZEukUXhIuCjr_q1eiAMoVFwl-VM)[*Paradox Lost: Logical Solutions to Ten Puzzles of Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HUESB?fbclid=IwAR2kNClm-yvC_pZ8YC67nVe2j4yIqV03ZEukUXhIuCjr_q1eiAMoVFwl-VM)[. 219-243.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HUESB?fbclid=IwAR2kNClm-yvC_pZ8YC67nVe2j4yIqV03ZEukUXhIuCjr_q1eiAMoVFwl-VM) [Lewis, David. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” ](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14)[*Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability vol. 2*](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14)[. eds. Rudolph Carnap and R.C. Jeffrey. 263-293.](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14) [Lewis, David. 2001. “Sleeping Beauty: reply to Elga.”](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329230?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[ *Analysis*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329230?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[. 61(3). 171-176](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3329230?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [van Fraassen, Bas. 1981. “](https://www.jstor.org/stable/687309?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in Probability Kinematics.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/687309?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/687309?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/687309?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[ 32(4). 375–379.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/687309?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [van Fraassen, Bas. 1984. “Belief and the Will.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_1984_0081_0005_0235_0256)[*Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_1984_0081_0005_0235_0256)[.](https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_1984_0081_0005_0235_0256) [81. 235-256.](https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_1984_0081_0005_0235_0256) [van Fraassen, Bas. 1995. “Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the Sirens.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00996309?LI=true)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00996309?LI=true)[. 77. 7-37](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00996309?LI=true) ### Related Essays [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Morehouse College and South Georgia State College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 2013 and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning, Metaphysics **Tags:** Peterson --- ### [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) **Published:** June 24, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the Philosophy of Space and Time. Are the Past and Future Real? **Content:** Author: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) Categories: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/) Word Count: 996 In his *Confessions*, St. Augustine remarks about time that, “. . I know what it is if no one asks; but if anyone does, then I cannot explain it.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) It may seem easy to explain the present: it’s what’s happening, what’s real, now. But are the past and future just as “real” as the present? And what does “real” mean in this context? Here we’ll consider the three most popular positions on the reality of the past and future. Our discussion introduces *the philosophy of space and time*, of which the philosophy of time is one part.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This area of philosophy—at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of physics—helps us understand whether the past and future are real or not. [![An image of fractal clock art.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/philosophy-of-time.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/philosophy-of-time.jpg?ssl=1)An image of fractal clock art. ### 1. Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block Theory The present, as compared to the past and future, is unique in our experiences: we experience present events right when they happen. Past events can only be accessed through memory, when other people share their memories, or by reviewing photos, writings, and similar objects. We don’t currently experience future events, though we may experience them in the future; the best we can do is make predictions about what will be. So the present moment is special in that, as we eat our lunch, we experience that meal *directly.* Past breakfasts and future dinners are not directly available to us. Considering the special experience of the present can lead us to one of the following theories about the reality of the past, present, and future:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **Presentism:** *presentists* argue that only the present is real and that the past and future are, in some sense, not real. - **Eternalism**: *eternalists* hold that the past, present, and future are all equally real. - **Growing block** **theory**: *growing block theorists* treat the past and present as real but the future as unreal. These views present different pictures about the relationship between our experience and what is real. Presentists take our special access to the present to give us good reason to believe it is uniquely real. Eternalists and growing block theorists believe that our experiences of the present give us no more reason to think that the past (and future) is unreal than my experience of being in Georgia gives me reason to think that distant Madagascar doesn’t exist. ### 2. Relativity and Eternalism While eternalists are accused of not explaining our special experience of the present moment adequately,[\[4\]](#_ftn4) its alternatives struggle to accommodate modern physics, particularly the theory of relativity. Einstein’s theory of relativity unifies three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time into a single, four-dimensional spacetime. The four-dimensional “distance” between any two events, called the “spacetime interval,” is an objective fact, but observers moving at different speeds may disagree about how much time has elapsed between these events. This phenomenon, where observers traveling at different speeds may disagree with each other about which events happen at the same time, is called the “**relativity of simultaneity**.” The relativity of simultaneity poses a problem for presentists and growing block theorists in scenarios like the following:[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Bob sees a balloon outside his house pop at the same time that he sees the clock in his living room strike four. In Bob’s reference frame, these two events—the balloon popping and his clock striking four—happen at the same time. A second later, Bob sees a child crying in response to the balloon pop. But an astronaut in her spaceship flying close to the speed of light over Bob’s house looks down and sees this: Bob’s clock strikes four at the same time that she sees the child holding a popped balloon begin to cry. In her reference frame, the child crying and Bob’s clock striking four happen at the same time. [![An image illustrating relativity of simultaneity.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/simultaneity-image.png?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/simultaneity-image.png?ssl=1)An image illustrating the relativity of simultaneity. The puzzle for the presentist and growing block theorist is this: From Bob’s perspective, when his clock strikes four, the balloon popping is in the present while the child’s crying is in the future. From the astronaut’s perspective, when Bob’s clock strikes four, the balloon popping is in the past, and the child’s crying is in the present. Both the presentist and growing block theorist tell us that the future is unreal, but are they talking about Bob’s future or the astronaut’s? The theory of relativity doesn’t allow for special, privileged reference frames that tell us what’s real or what isn’t, so presentists and growing block theorists must explain how their theories accommodate relativistic phenomena.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 3. Presentism and Language We might understand the terms “real” and “unreal” in two different ways. First, if by “real event” we mean one that’s actually happening right now. Someone asking “Is it really raining outside?” uses this **tensed** definition of “real”. On the tensed reading of “real”, the presentist position seems obvious and the alternative positions nonsensical—of course only present events exist right now! That’s what “now” means! But there is also a **tenseless** definition of “real”, one that someone might use when, after seeing the musical *Hamilton*, they ask their friend, “Is Burr really Hamilton’s killer?” The questioner is not asking whether Burr is killing Hamilton right now but whether Burr’s killing Hamilton is an invention of *Hamilton’s* author or an actual, historical event. When we use a tenseless definition to understand presentism and its alternatives, the presentist owes us reason to think that our special access to the present gives us good reason to believe that the past and future are unreal like Narnia, Hogwarts, or any other fictional setting. Because presentism and its alternatives seem so different depending on whether one adopts a tensed or tenseless reading of these positions, some philosophers[\[7\]](#_ftn7) have argued that the debate over the reality of the past and future is merely semantic. ### 4. Conclusion Contemplating the reality of the past and future can leave us feeling as confused as St. Augustine about the nature of time. But by taking time to consider our experience of time, our best available physical theories, and clearer definitions of the words we use, we can better understand it. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Confessions* 11.17. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Before launching into this examination, we should address one question first: why the philosophy of space *and* time? Why not treat these concepts separately? After all, we don’t have a subfield of philosophy called philosophy of physics *and* aesthetics: we keep the two fields separate! One answer is that many of our best physical theories treat space and time in a similar (if not identical) way – both space and time are dimensions that describe our physical world and provide us with a way to situate both ourselves and the events we care about. As a result, there are some puzzles in the philosophy of space that have analogues in the philosophy of time, and vice-versa. But one of the best reasons to consider space and time together in one philosophical subfield comes from relativistic physics, which treats space and time as a single unified whole, spacetime, instead of as separate concepts. We’ll cover some considerations from relativity later in this entry, but see Sklar (1977) for more on the philosophical ramifications of relativity. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) There are, of course, other possible positions that we can take on the reality of the past, present, and future than those I list below: for instance, we could believe that only the past is real, or that only the future is real, or that only the past and future are real, or that only the present and future are real. However, to my knowledge, no philosophers have defended these theories as almost all philosophers of time seem to agree that *at least* the present moment is real and that the past is more likely to be real than the future. I say “almost all” because there are some philosophers, following in the tradition of McTaggart (1908), who argue that all of time (past, present, and future) is unreal. While interesting, this argument is sufficiently complex to warrant its own separate entry, so I will restrict my attention to presentism, eternalism, and the growing block model for this entry and refer those interested in learning more about McTaggart and his argument to section 3 of McDaniel (2020). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See, for instance, Lucas (1989), who writes that eternalism “gives a deeply inadequate view of time” because, among other things, it fails to “account for…the pre-eminence of the present…” (8). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This style of argument was first presented by Rietdijk (1966) and Putnam (1967). My co-author Michael Silberstein and I presented an updated version of the argument in 2010. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) There are, of course, other options here aside from bringing presentism and the theory of relativity into harmony: some might reject relativistic physics as an adequate physical theory, and some might be willing to say that agents traveling at different speeds just live in different realities. In some ways, this second option isn’t too different from Stein’s (1991) “point presentism,” which restricts the notion of “the present” to things happening both right now and right here. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Notably Dorato (2006) and Savitt (2006). ### References [St. Augustine. (2006). ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Confessions/ffHYAAAAMAAJ?hl=en)[*Confessions*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Confessions/ffHYAAAAMAAJ?hl=en)[. Trans. Gary Wills. London: Penguin Group.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Confessions/ffHYAAAAMAAJ?hl=en) [Dorato, Mauro. (2006). “The irrelevance of the presentist/eternalist debate for the ontology of Minkowski spacetime.” In D. Dieks (Ed.) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DORTIO-2)[*The Ontology of Spacetime I*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DORTIO-2)[. Amsterdam: Elsevier.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DORTIO-2) [Lucas, John. (1989). ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Future/-lRnQgAACAAJ?hl=en)[*The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Future/-lRnQgAACAAJ?hl=en)[. Blackwell.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Future/-lRnQgAACAAJ?hl=en) [McDaniel, Kris. (2020). “John M. McTaggart.” in E.N. Zalta (ed), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mctaggart/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mctaggart/)[ (Spring 2022 ed).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mctaggart/) [McTaggart, J.E. (1908). “The Unreality of Time.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2248314?casa_token=uEtDV2mxiI8AAAAA%3Ak5T3ZyYeXZoYwoBunKljUtLLnWlh3zfhi95SsLr4D4SEdO6m8JSZgb41yxHvgLWPDFf8AuA-BwPg4yP0ER0A4iRSjzPS8uXTGMZ_tA5RJapqFM83J_Y&seq=1)[*Mind*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2248314?casa_token=uEtDV2mxiI8AAAAA%3Ak5T3ZyYeXZoYwoBunKljUtLLnWlh3zfhi95SsLr4D4SEdO6m8JSZgb41yxHvgLWPDFf8AuA-BwPg4yP0ER0A4iRSjzPS8uXTGMZ_tA5RJapqFM83J_Y&seq=1)[ 17(68). 457-474.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2248314?casa_token=uEtDV2mxiI8AAAAA%3Ak5T3ZyYeXZoYwoBunKljUtLLnWlh3zfhi95SsLr4D4SEdO6m8JSZgb41yxHvgLWPDFf8AuA-BwPg4yP0ER0A4iRSjzPS8uXTGMZ_tA5RJapqFM83J_Y&seq=1) [Peterson, Daniel and Michael Silberstein. (2010). “Relativity of Simultaneity and Eternalism: In Defense of the Block Universe.” In V. Petkov (ed) ](https://facultysites.etown.edu/silbermd/files/2011/11/RoSandBlockworld.pdf)[*Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski’s Unification of Space and Time*](https://facultysites.etown.edu/silbermd/files/2011/11/RoSandBlockworld.pdf)[. New York, NY: Springer Press.](https://facultysites.etown.edu/silbermd/files/2011/11/RoSandBlockworld.pdf) [Putnam, Hilary. (1967). “Time and physical geometry.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024493?seq=1)[*Journal of Philosoph*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024493?seq=1)[y 64, 240-247.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024493?seq=1) [Rietdijk, C.W. (1966). “A rigorous proof of determinism derived from the special theory of relativity.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/186637?seq=1)[*Philosophy of Science* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/186637?seq=1)[33(4), 341-344.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/186637?seq=1) [Savitt, Steven. (2006). “Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective.” In D. Dieks (Ed) ](https://philpapers.org/rec/SAVPAE)[*The Ontology of Spacetime I*](https://philpapers.org/rec/SAVPAE)[. Amsterdam: Elsevier.](https://philpapers.org/rec/SAVPAE) [Sklar, Lawrence. (1977). ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime)[*Space, Time, and Spacetime*](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime)[. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime) [Stein, Howard. (1991) “On Relativity theory and Openness of the Future.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/187456?seq=1)[*Philosophy of Science* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/187456?seq=1)[58, 147-167.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/187456?seq=1) ### Related Essays [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science: Comparing Philosophical and Scientific Understanding](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Morehouse College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** Metaphysics, Peterson, philosophy of physics, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of time --- ### [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) **Published:** August 3, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the philosophy of space and time, focusing on the question, "What is space?" **Content:** Author: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) Categories: [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 Imagine that every object in the universe – you, your chair, Earth, everything else – moved one meter to your left. Would you notice a difference? Facts about relative distances, like how far my chair is from me, would remain the same before and after this shift. If such a shift causes no observable change, then we might wonder whether there is *any* meaningful difference between the universe before and after the shift. The goal of this “shift” thought experiment, first proposed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)[\[1\]](#_ftn1) in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), is to argue against the view that *space exists independently of the stuff that’s in it*. Instead, Leibniz says *space is merely a convenient way of thinking about the relationships between material objects*. Here we’ll articulate these two positions in the philosophy of space, which is a branch of the philosophy of space and time,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) and consider key arguments for and against those positions. [![Samuel Clarke and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/clark-leibniz-bw.jpg?resize=656%2C327&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/clark-leibniz-bw.jpg?ssl=1)Samuel Clarke and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. ### 1. Relationism *Relationists* about space, like Leibniz, take space to consist of relationships between material objects such as planets, humans, and coffee mugs. Because shifting the universe one meter to your left doesn’t change any distances between objects, relationists say that such shifts leave space unchanged. Relationists say that the fact that no experiment we could do would tell us whether or not everything was moved one meter to our left shows that relationalism is correct. If the shift argument is convincing, treating space as separate and independent from the material objects within it seems mysterious and unnecessary. Most of the things we believe exist (tables, electrons, tectonic plates, other people) are physical, material objects that we can observe or measure in some way. So, by making space just a way of understanding the relationships between physical objects, relationists ground their view of space in ordinary things we can sense and measure instead of some separate mysterious entity. If we believe that, all other things being equal, we should prefer theories about objects we’re familiar with from experience, like tables and planets, instead of theories that rely on arcane entities like spatial points (see below), then we have reason to believe the relationist’s theory of space.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 2. Substantivalism *Substantivalists*, however, take space to be something real, like a material object but not made of matter. Space, in their view, is made of many identical points, understood as infinitesimal, immaterial “containers” for matter.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Material objects, when they move, move from one spatial point to another. Arguments for substantivalism typically identify some observable phenomenon that substantivalists can explain but relationists can’t. #### 2.1. Argument from Acceleration Some phenomena that substantivalists think they alone can explain are the observable effects of acceleration. If a car quickly accelerates, the driver feels pushed back in their seat. But a pedestrian, standing on the sidewalk next to that car, doesn’t feel a similar sensation even though, from the driver’s perspective, the pedestrian is the one accelerating.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) [![Driving in a speeding car.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/450px-speeding_car-140mph.jpg?resize=450%2C600&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/450px-speeding_car-140mph.jpg?ssl=1)Driving in a speeding car. For a relationist, this might seem strange: if space is just distance relationships between objects, then saying “the car accelerates away from the pedestrian” and “the pedestrian accelerates away from the car” are equally correct. So why does only the driver feel pushed backwards? Substantivalists can explain this fact because only one person, the driver, is *really* accelerating through space, while relationists have a harder time explaining it.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) #### 2.2. Kant’s Incongruent Counterparts In 1768, Kant (1724-1804) provided a novel argument against relationism based on what he calls *incongruent counterparts*. First, consider your left hand and your right hand: ![Artist M. C. Escher's "Drawing Hands" lithograph.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/drawing-hands.jpglarge.jpg?resize=656%2C548&ssl=1)Artist M. C. Escher’s “Drawing Hands” lithograph. All distances between two parts of my left hand (say, my left thumb and my left pinky finger) are the same as the distances between two parts of my right hand (my right thumb and my right pinky finger). So the relationist should say that the left and right hands are identical. But have you ever tried to put a left-hand glove on your right hand? It doesn’t work: our left and right hands, while reflections of one another, are just differently shaped. Kant’s point about incongruent counterparts like our left and right hands is that they are clearly not identical to one another, but the relationist can’t explain the difference between them since all the spatial relationships within the parts of your left and right hands are the same. But the substantivalist can explain this difference by appealing to the parts of space a right hand fills that a left hand doesn’t and vice-versa. So, like acceleration, incongruent counterparts seem to be a phenomenon that substantivalists can explain but relationists can’t, grounding another reason to favor substantivalism. ### 3. Relativity The relationist/substantivalist debate changed with the advent of Einstein’s theory of relativity in the early 20th century. Instead of talking about space and time separately, Einstein united them into a single, four-dimensional *spacetime*. One feature of Einstein’s general theory of relativity is that facts about the structure of spacetime depend on the distribution of matter in spacetime and vice-versa, which is captured by the Einstein field equations. This may seem, at first, like a point in the relationist’s favor since space seems to depend on matter, and there are many relationists that have used relativistic physics to advance their position.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) However, one strange feature of the Einstein field equations that supports substantivalism is that there exist numerous distinct “vacuum solutions” to these equations: that is, according to these equations, there are multiple distinct spacetimes with different geometry compatible with a completely empty universe. If we take this multiplicity of vacuum solutions seriously, then we have a feature of our best physics that the substantivalist can explain but the relationist can’t. The relationists, however, can point out that we’ve never encountered an actual vacuum universe in nature; we’ve only encountered the one non-vacuum universe we live in. So while the theory of relativity has changed the relationist/substantivalist debate, it hasn’t settled it. ### 4. Conclusion Advances in physics have changed the conversation between relationists and substantivalists. As our best available physical theories change, we should anticipate new developments in arguments for both relationism and substantivalism, even if the physics alone cannot settle this debate. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The simplified argument briefly reconstructed here isn’t quite Leibniz’s argument, or at least not a straightforward reading of the argument he provides in his third letter (LIII.5) to Clarke. A key premise I’ve suppressed is Leibniz’s *Principle of Sufficient Reason*, which takes for granted that, for things to be one way rather than another, God must have reason to prefer them being the way they are to the way they could be. If absolute space exists and is a substance separate and apart from the matter within it, then all points within that space are assumed to be identical, and there could be no reason God could give for choosing to make a world with everything just where it is instead of making a world with everything one meter to the left. It is only once the Principle of Sufficient Reason is invoked that Leibniz draws his conclusion that space can’t be a substance, or, in his terminology, that there is no absolute space. For an introduction to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, see [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Why the philosophy of space *and* time? Why not treat these concepts separately? One answer is that many of our best physical theories treat space and time in a similar (if not identical) way – both space and time are dimensions that describe our physical world and provide us with a way to situate both ourselves and the events we care about. As a result, there are some puzzles in the philosophy of space that have analogues in the philosophy of time, and vice-versa. But one of the best reasons to consider space and time together in one philosophical subfield comes from relativistic physics, which treats space and time as a single unified whole, spacetime, instead of as separate concepts. We’ll cover some considerations from relativity later in this entry, but see Sklar (1977) for more on the philosophical ramifications of relativity. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This stage of the relationist’s argument relies on intuitions about simplicity and metaphysics, specifically the idea that we shouldn’t assume the world to have more things in it than are necessary in order to explain the stuff we see in the world around us. For more on simplicity, see Baker (2022), especially his section titled “Ontological Parsimony,” which discusses the claim that, all other things being equal, we should prefer theories that require us to believe in the existence of fewer things or types of things. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The properties of spatial points may differ from one substantivalist account to another; for instance, substantivalists who believe that space is discrete may disagree with substantivalists who believe that space is continuous about whether, given any two points of space, another point of space must exist between them. But substantivalists about space typically agree on the following facts: 1) points of space are the smallest possible units of space, 2) points of space have well-defined metric properties that tell you the distance from one point of space to another, and 3) material objects and their parts can occupy points of space. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Newton’s famous example of the observable effects of acceleration comes not from cars but from a spinning bucket hung from a long cord. When the bucket is filled with water and spins, the water sloshes up onto the sides, which is observably different from how the bucket appears when at rest. Newton’s example appears in his Scholium IV in his *Principia*. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Some relationists have responded to arguments for substantivalism that rely on observable changes in accelerating objects by pointing out that one body is accelerating relative to the motion of many more bodies; for instance, in my example above, the car accelerates relative not just to me but to trees, houses, and all sorts of other objects in its vicinity, as well as the “fixed stars” beyond the earth. The pedestrian, however, is only accelerating relative to the car and is at rest with respect to all those other objects. See Section VI.4 of “The Principles of Dynamics” in Mach (1919) for a developed relationist response to acceleration along these lines. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The most famous relationist argument that takes advantage of the general theory of relativity is the “hole argument”: see Norton (2019) for details. ### References [Baker, Alan. (2022) “Simplicity” in E.N. Zalta (Ed), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/)[(Spring 2022 ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/) [Kant, Immanuel. (1968) “Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation of Regions of Space” in G.B. Kerford and D.E. Walford (Ed), ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Selected_Pre_critical_Writings_and_Corre/fvPoAAAAIAAJ?hl=en)[*Kant: Selected Precritical Writings and Correspondence with Beck*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Selected_Pre_critical_Writings_and_Corre/fvPoAAAAIAAJ?hl=en)[. 36-43.](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Selected_Pre_critical_Writings_and_Corre/fvPoAAAAIAAJ?hl=en) [Leibniz, G.W. and Samuel Clarke. (\[1717\] 2000). ](https://hackettpublishing.com/leibniz-and-clarke-correspondence)[*Correspondence*](https://hackettpublishing.com/leibniz-and-clarke-correspondence)[. Hackett Publishing Company.](https://hackettpublishing.com/leibniz-and-clarke-correspondence) [Mach, Ernst. (1919). ](https://archive.org/details/scienceofmechani005860mbp/page/n7/mode/2up)[*The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development*](https://archive.org/details/scienceofmechani005860mbp/page/n7/mode/2up)[. Trans. T.J. McCormack. Open Court Publishing Company.](https://archive.org/details/scienceofmechani005860mbp/page/n7/mode/2up) [Maudlin, Tim. (2012). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691165714/philosophy-of-physics)[*Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691165714/philosophy-of-physics)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691165714/philosophy-of-physics) [Newton, Isaac. (\[1687\] 1995). *The Principia*](https://www.loc.gov/item/04014428).[ Trans. A. Motte. Prometheus Books.](https://www.loc.gov/item/04014428) [Norton, John. (2019). “The Hole Argument.” in E.N. Zalta (Ed), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/)[ (Spring 2022 ed).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/) [Sklar, Lawrence. (1977). ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime)[*Space, Time, and Spacetime*](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime)[. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520031746/space-time-and-spacetime) ### Related Essays [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/?fbclid=IwAR3LuoaHJas2uWkVnlhdsKVgrAQdriwt40at1vLAeLbUJXTTSUFr109-F0A) by Dan Peterson [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/) by Thomas Metcalf [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science: Comparing Philosophical and Scientific Understanding](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/uzay-ve-zamanin-felsefesi-uzay-nedir-dan-peterson/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/what-is-space.pdf). ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Morehouse College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** Peterson, philosophy of space, philosophy of space and time, Philosophy of time, Time --- ### [Marquis de Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and Democracy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/20/condorcets-jury-theorem/) **Published:** July 20, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** This essay explains Marquis de Condorcet’s "jury theorem" and how philosophers have used it as an argument for democracy. **Content:** Author: Robert Weston Siscoe Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 999 Suppose that a majority of jurors decide that a defendant is guilty (or not), and we want to know the likelihood that they reached the correct verdict. The French philosopher Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) showed that we can get a mathematically precise answer, a result known as the “Condorcet Jury Theorem.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Condorcet’s theorem isn’t just about juries, though; it’s about collective decision-making in general. As a result, some philosophers have used his theorem to argue for democratic forms of government. This essay explains Condorcet’s theorem and how philosophers have used it as an argument for democracy. [![A fresco by Cesare Maccari (1840-1919 CE) depicting Roman senator Cicero (106-43 BCE) denouncing the conspirator Catiline in the Roman senate.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/condorcet-jury-theorum.jpg?resize=656%2C409&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/condorcet-jury-theorum.jpg?ssl=1)“A fresco by Cesare Maccari (1840-1919 CE) depicting Roman senator Cicero (106-43 BCE) denouncing the conspirator Catiline in the Roman senate” (Source: *[World History Encylopedia](https://www.worldhistory.org/image/4532/cicero-denounces-catiline/)*). ### 1. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Condorcet’s theorem depends on a few assumptions. First, that jurors reach their verdicts independently: each examines the evidence and makes a decision on their own. Second, that jurors are competent: more likely than not to choose the correct verdict. We can pick any percentage over 50%, so let’s assume that all of the jurors have, say, a 60% chance of getting the right answer. These assumptions enable us to calculate the probability that the majority will choose the right verdict.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) If we have one juror, the probability of a majority selecting the right verdict is 60%. If we have three jurors, the probability of a majority selecting the right verdict rises to 64.8%. How is this calculated? There are four possible ways for the majority to get the right answer. Because these possibilities are mutually exclusive, we can find the probability that one of those four would happen by finding the probability of each possibility and adding them together:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Possibility 1: Jurors 1 and 2 are right and Juror 3 is wrong, 60%×60%×40%=14.4% Possibility 2: Jurors 1 and 3 are right and Juror 2 is wrong, 60%×40%×60%=14.4% Possibility 3: Jurors 2 and 3 are right and Juror 1 is wrong, 40%×60%×60%=14.4% Possibility 4: All the Jurors are right, 60% × 60% × 60% = 21.6% Adding up these probabilities gives us 64.8%.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Notice the probability of a correct verdict with three jurors is higher than with one juror: the more jurors we have, the more likely it becomes that a majority will choose the correct verdict. So, if we have 25 jurors, the chance that a majority selects the right verdict rises all the way to 84.6%![\[5\]](#_ftn5) In fact, so long as each juror is more than 50% likely to get the right verdict, as we add more jurors, we get closer to a 100% chance of a majority reaching the correct verdict.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 2. The Jury Theorem as an Argument for Democracy There are many similarities between Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and the voting behavior of citizens in an ideal democracy. Because of these similarities, philosophers have used the Theorem to argue that democracies are effective at choosing the best political candidates and policies. First, just as jurors each choose a verdict, democratic voters each make independent decisions in voting, in many cases by casting secret ballots. Second, in the courtroom, lawyers present the evidence to the jurors, while in democracies, public institutions take measures to help voters make good decisions, with schools teaching students about governmental processes and news sources informing citizens about political candidates and policies. So in an ideal democracy, voters are competent and informed, with a better than 50% chance of choosing the best politicians and policies. An important difference between juries and democracies, however, is that voting takes place with a very large number of citizens. Even smaller countries have far more voters than 25 jurors so, if all of Condorcet’s assumptions hold, democracies would choose the best candidate by majority vote almost 100% of the time.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Criticisms Of course, most people think that democracies often don’t choose the best. Does this mean that this argument for democracy is a complete failure? No, but it does show that we need to look more carefully at the differences between Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and actual democratic voting to see if a similar, weaker argument might still be successful. First, in the jury case, there is a correct and an incorrect verdict: either guilty or innocent. In voting, however, the choices are not just correct or incorrect. Particular candidates or policies might be less effective, but they are not ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ in the way a guilty verdict can be. This difference can potentially be fixed. We could think of voters as choosing, not just right and wrong candidates and policies, but better and worse ones. If voters are more likely than not to choose the best, then we can still apply the Condorcet Jury Theorem to democracy.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Second, political problems are usually more complex than court cases. Even if jurors can decide whether a defendant has committed a crime, it is more challenging to choose the best social, economic, or immigration policy, much less choose all of them at the same time by voting for a specific politician’s entire platform. This calls into question whether democratic voters really are able to choose the best option over 50% of the time. This difference is much more difficult to fix, as it would be very demanding for citizens to become experts in all of these areas.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Finally, even though citizens cast votes independently, they rarely reach decisions independently. In court cases, care is taken to prevent the jury from being biased by talking to family or reading outside news sources. In democracies, though, isolating individuals in these ways is not feasible. Furthermore, it is not clear this is a difference we would want to fix. Totalitarian regimes are notorious for limiting the political information that citizens receive, whereas democracies are praised for facilitating a free exchange of ideas.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. Conclusion Some philosophers have claimed that Condorcet’s Jury Theorem can provide a defense of democracy. The many differences between the setup of Condorcet’s Theorem and democracies make it clear that further arguments are needed to show that, despite these differences, democracies would still regularly choose the best. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Marquis de Condorcet (1785). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Condorcet’s Jury Theorem does not apply to all jury decisions. The United States, for example, does not allow decisions in criminal cases to be decided by majority vote, requiring that the jurors reach the final verdict unanimously. Similarly, the jurors do not judge independently; they confer with each other and presumably influence each other’s judgments. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In this case, we can simply multiply the individual probabilities in each possibility (for example, as in 60% × 60% × 40%), because we’re assuming that the jurors’ decisions are independent of each other. And we can add together each of the four possibilities to reach a final probability that at least one would be true, because the possibilities are mutually exclusive: no two can be true at the same time, because each is inconsistent in some way with all three other possibilities. For more, see [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) More generally, we can use the formula – [![Condorcet Jury Theorem formula.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/condorcet-jury-formula.jpg?resize=300%2C85&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/condorcet-jury-formula.jpg?ssl=1) – where “*N*” is the quantity of voters, “*m*” is the quantity of voters needed to count as a majority, and “*p*” is the probability that an individual voter will reach the correct decision. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) To find the probability of getting the right verdict via majority vote for any number of jurors and levels of competency, you can use [this lin](https://www.wolframalpha.com/input?i=sum+%28+%28%28%283%21%29%2F%28%283+-+i%29%21%2A%28i%21%29%29%29%29+%2A+%28%280.6%29%5Ei%29+%2A+%28%281+-+0.6%29%5E%283+-+i%29%29+%29%2C+i%3D2+to+3)[k](https://www.wolframalpha.com/input?i=sum+%28+%28%28%283%21%29%2F%28%283+-+i%29%21%2A%28i%21%29%29%29%29+%2A+%28%280.6%29%5Ei%29+%2A+%28%281+-+0.6%29%5E%283+-+i%29%29+%29%2C+i%3D2+to+3). In the associated site (Wolfram Alpha n.d.), you can see that “3” has already been entered for the total quantity of jurors, “2” has been entered for the quantity of jurors needed to achieve a majority, and “0.6” has been entered for the probability per juror of reaching the correct verdict, but you can change the numbers to run other calculations. For example, if each juror is 0.55-probable to reach the correct verdict, there are 11 jurors, and therefore 6 required for a majority, replace the “3” with “11,” the “2” with “6,” and the “0.6” with “0.55” throughout. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Think of it like this. It is difficult to tell if a coin is fair after only a couple flips. It is possible that it lands heads on the first two flips, making it look like it is unfair. However, the more times you flip a fair coin, the more and more likely it is that it will come up heads about 50% of the time. So having more flips is a good way to reveal the true odds of the coin landing heads. Likewise, if voters are 60% likely to get the right answer, it might be difficult to tell that after only a few voters, but adding more voters makes it more and more likely that they will get the right answer about 60% of the time, ensuring that a majority picks the correct verdict. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Democratic voting often includes more than two choices. With the jury, there were just two options – guilty and not guilty. At the ballot box, though, voters might have to choose between many different politicians and policies. This difference can potentially be fixed. Governments could require that all ballots only offer two choices, and some philosophers have argued that the Condorcet Jury Theorem can work with multiple options, just so long as voters are more likely to pick the correct alternative than they are each of the incorrect options. See Goodin and List (2001). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) In fact, the Theorem works with any particular property when one outcome has the property and the other lacks it. For example, if one politician will help the poor more than the other, and each voter has a 51% chance or greater to select the politician who will help the poor more, then Condorcet’s Theorem shows that, as we add more and more voters, it becomes more and more likely that voters will select the politician that will assist the poor more effectively. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Section 4, “Political Knowledge, Morality, and Blame,” of Thomas Metcalf’s [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) briefly reviews evidence to believe that at least most Americans have relatively little politically-relevant knowledge: they are far from experts on which political policies and candidates are likely to be best. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For an overview of defenses of democracy that are based on the sharing and discussing of reasons for various politicians and political policies, see Min and Wong (2018). ### References [List, Christian and Robert Goodin. (2001), “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9760.00128)[*Journal of Political Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9760.00128)[ 9(3): 277–306.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9760.00128) [Marquis de Condorcet. (1785). ](https://books.google.de/books/about/Condorcet.html?id=e7IXFcvyEMUC&redir_esc=y)[*Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions*](https://books.google.de/books/about/Condorcet.html?id=e7IXFcvyEMUC&redir_esc=y)[.](https://books.google.de/books/about/Condorcet.html?id=e7IXFcvyEMUC&redir_esc=y) [Min, John and James Wong. (2018). “Epistemic Approaches to Deliberative Democracy.” ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12497)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12497)[ 13(6).](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12497) [Wolfram Alpha. (N.d.). ](https://www.wolframalpha.com/)[*WolframAlpha*](https://www.wolframalpha.com/)[. https://www.wolframalpha.com/](https://www.wolframalpha.com/) ### Related Essays [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [John Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/condorcets-jury-theorem/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/condorcet.pdf). ### About the Author Wes Siscoe is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Notre Dame with the *Virtues and Vocations* project, helping faculty members integrate virtue education into their courses. He received his PhD from the University of Arizona, and his research revolves around several themes – rationality, language, and virtue – and their importance for accounts of human excellence and achievement. [WesSiscoe.com](https://www.wessiscoe.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Social & Political **Tags:** Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, democracy, Marquis de Condorcet --- ### [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) **Published:** December 17, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the philosophical views of Animal Farm and 1984 author George Orwell. **Content:** Author: [Mark Satta](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Satta) Categories: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) Word Count: 1000 George Orwell (1903-1950) was an early twentieth-century writer best known as the author of *Animal Farm* and *1984*. He also wrote essays, novels, and non-fiction books. While not trained as a philosopher, Orwell’s writings include many philosophical claims. His philosophical insights are relevant to both pressing social issues and recent developments in philosophy. This essay discusses some of his philosophical views in political philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of language. [![George Orwell, author of Animal Farm and 1984.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/orwell.png?resize=656%2C318&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/orwell.png?ssl=1)George Orwell, author of “Animal Farm” and “1984.” ### 1. Biography Orwell was born in colonial India, where his English father worked for the British Civil Service, and was raised in England as part of the middle class. After completing school, he worked for five years with the Imperial Police in Burma (now Myanmar). During this time, Orwell became an anti-imperialist. After resigning from the Imperial Police, Orwell returned to England to become a writer. His writing often reflected his personal experiences, which included living among the poor in Paris and London, researching working conditions in Northern England, fighting as a volunteer soldier in the Spanish Civil War, and creating World War II propaganda for the British Broadcasting Company.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Orwell published *Animal Farm* in 1945. It was a commercial success in the United States and the United Kingdom. *1984*, published in 1949, was an even bigger success. Orwell died of tuberculosis less than a year after *1984* was published.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### 2. Political Philosophy Orwell’s early writing focused on the themes of poverty and imperialism. He claimed that upper- and middle-class people typically misunderstood why people lived in poverty and what living in poverty was like.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Orwell argued that poor people were not poor because of inferior moral character, but because of dysfunctional social and political systems that created unjust inequality.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Orwell came to hate imperialism.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) He thought that both the oppressed and the oppressors were unfree under imperialism: the oppressed because foreign imperialist invaders subjected them to injustice;[\[6\]](#_ftn6) the oppressors because they were pressured into acting unjustly for the sake of keeping up appearances. Such oppressors also faced social pressure to censor themselves by not criticizing an imperial political structure that benefited their social group.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Orwell’s later writings focused on the themes of socialism and totalitarianism, among others. He rejected capitalism in favor of socialism.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) For Orwell, a socialist government was one in which major industries were nationalized, income inequality was limited, and quality education was available to all, regardless of social class.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Importantly, Orwell distinguished socialism from Marxism and Soviet Communism.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) He noticed how these things were sometimes inaccurately conflated with socialism.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Orwell often specified that he was a democratic socialist, committed to a socialist society that preserved people’s freedom and autonomy.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Orwell was staunchly opposed to totalitarianism. He viewed totalitarianism as a specific kind of dictatorship that had not existed prior to the twentieth century. For Orwell, totalitarianism was characterized by an unbounded desire for complete control and power for power’s sake.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Orwell saw this desire for power and control as incompatible with a just legal system that applies to everyone and thus limits even a ruler’s power.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) But totalitarians will not tolerate limits on their power. Orwell viewed both Nazi Germany and Soviet Communism as totalitarian states.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 3. Epistemology For Orwell, totalitarian rule had epistemic consequences. Because totalitarian rulers need total control, they cannot tolerate facts that conflict with their goals. As a result, totalitarians will say whatever is necessary to retain power and will seek to convince people to give up on the concept of objective truth.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Orwell used the primary antagonist in *1984*, O’Brien, to model how the totalitarian desire for control leads the totalitarian to try to subvert truth.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Totalitarianism was not the only political threat to truth that Orwell worried about. Orwell also viewed what he called ‘nationalism’ as a threat to truth and to the formation of justified beliefs. Orwell used ‘nationalism’ as a technical term to refer to the practice of making the advancement of a nation or other political unit one’s central concern.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Nationalists are fiercely loyal to their political team and tend to view everything “in terms of competitive prestige.”[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Orwell’s description of nationalism is similar to many contemporary descriptions of today’s political left and right in the United States and many European nations.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Nationalism, for Orwell, comes in positive and negative forms. The positive nationalist focuses on promoting one’s own political team. Negative nationalism focuses on denigrating a political team to which one is opposed. The epistemic significance of nationalism on Orwell’s account is that such political loyalty leads nationalists to distort their evidence, often unconsciously, in order to retain the belief that their political team is superior “even when the facts are overwhelmingly against” such a view.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) Orwell’s insights can be expressed in modern terms as making a case for the view that political partisanship leads to cognitive bias and vice versa.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ### 4. Language and Literature Orwell believed that the development of politics, thought, and language were all interconnected.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Because language influences our thoughts and our politics, Orwell thought it was important to write well. Orwell’s desire to avoid bad writing is not the desire to defend “standard English” or rigid rules of grammar. Rather, Orwell’s chief goal is for language users to aspire “to let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way about.”[\[24\]](#_ftn24) For example, Orwell thought that we tend to pick the metaphors that first come to mind but that these metaphors often distort our ideas in unproductive ways. This is what led Orwell to work toward developing an art of political writing.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) Orwell believed that, in some sense, all writing is political and that all art is propaganda[\[26\]](#_ftn26) because all writing conveys a political message, even if that message is just support for the status quo. As a result, Orwell viewed literature as a potential weapon against totalitarianism. ### 5. Conclusion Political epistemology and political philosophy of language have only recently begun to emerge as distinct sub-fields within academic philosophy.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) In this way, Orwell’s insights about the relationship between politics, thought, and language were ahead of their time and are worth philosophical examination. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See, for example, Orwell 1933/1961, Orwell 1937/1958, and Orwell 1938/1952. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Many biographies about Orwell have been written, including Crick 1980, Sheldon 1991, and Taylor 2003. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See, for example, Orwell 1931, Orwell 1933/1961. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Orwell 1933/1961, Orwell 1937/1958. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Orwell 1937/1958, ch. 9. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Orwell 1937/1958, ch. 9. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Orwell 1936, Orwell 1937/1958, ch. 9. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Orwell 1937/1958, Orwell 1941, Orwell 1946a. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Orwell 1941. For an introduction to socialism, see [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For an introduction to Marxism, see [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Orwell 1937/1958. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See, for example, Orwell 1946a. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a sampling of Orwell’s anti-totalitarian writings see Orwell 1943, 1946a, 1946b, 1946c, 1946d. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See, for example, Orwell 1941, where Orwell writes of the “totalitarian idea that there is no such thing as law, there is only power.” [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Orwell 1944. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Orwell 1943. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Orwell 1949. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Orwell 1945. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Orwell 1945. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See, for example, Rini 2017 and Abramowitz and Webster 2018. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Orwell 1945. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) For contemporary scholarship on political partisanship, and cognitive bias see, for example, Rini 2017, Abramowitz and Webster 2018, and Finkel et al 2020. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Orwell’s most famous writings dealing with the interconnectedness of politics, language, and thought are his essay “Politics and the English Language” (Orwell 1946c) and much of the dialogue and writings of various characters in *1984.* [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Orwell 1946c. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Orwell 1946a. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See Orwell 1946a, 1946b, 1946d, and 1940. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) For recent work in political epistemology see Bernecker, Flowerree, and Grundmann 2021, Edenberg and Hannon 2021, and Hannon and de Ridder 2021. For recent work in social and political philosophy of language see Khoo and Sterken 2021. ### References [Abramowitz, ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12479)[Alan I. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12479)[ and Webster, ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12479)[Steven W](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12479)[. (2018). “Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12479)[*Advances in Political Psychology*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12479)[ 39, 1: 119–135.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12479) [Bernecker, Sven, Amy K. Flowerree, and Thomas Grundmann (eds.). (2021). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-epistemology-of-fake-news-9780198863977?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Epistemology of Fake News*](blank)[. Oxford University Press.](blank) [Crick, Bernard. (1987). ](https://sutherlandhousebooks.com/product/george-orwell-a-life/)[*George Orwell: A Life*](https://sutherlandhousebooks.com/product/george-orwell-a-life/)[. Sutherland House.](https://sutherlandhousebooks.com/product/george-orwell-a-life/) [Edenberg, Elizabeth and Michael Hannon (eds). (2021). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/political-epistemology-9780192893338?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Political Epistemology*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/political-epistemology-9780192893338?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/political-epistemology-9780192893338?cc=us&lang=en&) [Eli J. Finkel, Christopher A. Bail, Mina Cikara, Peter H. Ditto, Shanto Iyengar, Samara Klar, Lilliana Mason, Mary C. McGrath, Brendan Nyhan, David G. Rand, Linda J. Skitka, Joshua A. Tucker, Jay J. Van Bavel, Cynthia S. Wang and James N. Druckman. “Political Sectarianism in America.” (2020). ](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abe1715)[*Science*](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abe1715)[ 370 (6516).](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abe1715) [Hannon, Michael and Jeroen de Ridder (eds.). (2021). ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Political-Epistemology/Hannon-Ridder/p/book/9780367345907)[*The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Political-Epistemology/Hannon-Ridder/p/book/9780367345907)[. Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Political-Epistemology/Hannon-Ridder/p/book/9780367345907) [Khoo, Justin and Rachel Katharine Sterken (eds.). (2021). ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Social-and-Political-Philosophy-of-Language/Khoo-Sterken/p/book/9781138602434)[*The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language.*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Social-and-Political-Philosophy-of-Language/Khoo-Sterken/p/book/9781138602434)[ Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Social-and-Political-Philosophy-of-Language/Khoo-Sterken/p/book/9781138602434) [Orwell, George. “The Spike.”](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-spike/)[ *Adelphi*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-spike/)[, 1931.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-spike/) (‘George Orwell’ is a pen name. This essay was originally published under Orwell’s real name, Eric Blair, but republication is generally credited to ‘George Orwell.’) [Orwell, George. ](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/Down-and-Out-in-Paris-and-London/9780156262248)[*Down and Out in Paris and London*](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/Down-and-Out-in-Paris-and-London/9780156262248)[. New York: Harcourt Publishing Company. (1933/1961).](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/Down-and-Out-in-Paris-and-London/9780156262248) [Orwell, George. “Shooting an Elephant.” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/shooting-an-elephant/)[*New Writing*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/shooting-an-elephant/)[, 1936.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/shooting-an-elephant/) [Orwell, George. ](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/the-road-to-wigan-pier/9780156767507)[*The Road to Wigan Pier*](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/the-road-to-wigan-pier/9780156767507)[. New York: Harcourt Publishing Company. (1937/1958).](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/the-road-to-wigan-pier/9780156767507) [Orwell, George. ](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/homage-to-catalonia/9780544382046)[*Homage to Catalonia*](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/homage-to-catalonia/9780544382046)[. Boston: Mariner Books. (1938/1952).](https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/homage-to-catalonia/9780544382046) [Orwell, George. “Charles Dickens.” Originally published in ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/charles-dickens/)[*Inside the Whale and Other Essays*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/charles-dickens/)[. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1940.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/charles-dickens/) [Orwell, George. “The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius.” Searchlight Books, 1941.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-lion-and-the-unicorn-socialism-and-the-english-genius/) [Orwell, George. “Looking Back on the Spanish War” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/looking-back-on-the-spanish-war/)[*New Road*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/looking-back-on-the-spanish-war/)[, 1943.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/looking-back-on-the-spanish-war/) [Orwell, George. “Raffles and Miss Blandish.” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/raffles-and-miss-blandish/)[*Horizon*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/raffles-and-miss-blandish/)[, 1944.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/raffles-and-miss-blandish/) [Orwell, George. “Notes on Nationalism.” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/notes-on-nationalism/)[*Polemic*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/notes-on-nationalism/)[, 1945.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/notes-on-nationalism/) [Orwell, George. “Why I Write.” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/why-i-write/)[*Gangrel*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/why-i-write/)[, 1946a.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/why-i-write/) [Orwell, George. “The Prevention of Literature.” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-prevention-of-literature/)[*Polemic*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-prevention-of-literature/)[, 1946b.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-prevention-of-literature/) [Orwell, George. “Politics and the English Language.” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-and-the-english-language/)[*Horizon*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-and-the-english-language/)[, 1946c.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-and-the-english-language/) [Orwell, George. “Politics vs. Literature: An Examination of Gulliver’s Travels.” ](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-vs-literature-an-examination-of-gullivers-travels/)[*Polemic*](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-vs-literature-an-examination-of-gullivers-travels/)[, 1946d.](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/politics-vs-literature-an-examination-of-gullivers-travels/) [Rini, Regina. (2017). “Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.” *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*.](https://kiej.georgetown.edu/fake-news-partisan-epistemology/) [Sheldon, Michael. (1991). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Orwell.html?id=tDkzAAAAMAAJ)[*George Orwell: The Authorized Biography*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Orwell.html?id=tDkzAAAAMAAJ)[. HarperCollins.](https://books.google.com/books/about/Orwell.html?id=tDkzAAAAMAAJ) [Taylor, D.J. (2003). ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Orwell.html?id=aFRIvQEACAAJ)[*Orwell: The Life*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Orwell.html?id=aFRIvQEACAAJ)[. Vintage Books.](https://books.google.com/books/about/Orwell.html?id=aFRIvQEACAAJ) ### For Further Reading [Dwan, David. (2010). “Truth and Freedom in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.” ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/395666/pdf)[*Philosophy and Literature*](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/395666/pdf)[ 34, 2: 381-393.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/395666/pdf) [Gleason, Abbott, Jack Goldsmith, and Martha Nussbaum (eds.). (2005). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691113616/on-nineteen-eighty-four)[*On Nineteen Eighty-Four: Orwell and Our Future*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691113616/on-nineteen-eighty-four)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691113616/on-nineteen-eighty-four) [Patai, Daphne. (1984). ](https://www.amazon.com/Orwell-Mystique-Study-Male-Ideology/dp/0870234463/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=)[*The Orwell Mystique: A Study in Male Ideology*](https://www.amazon.com/Orwell-Mystique-Study-Male-Ideology/dp/0870234463/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=)[. University of Massachusetts Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Orwell-Mystique-Study-Male-Ideology/dp/0870234463/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=) [Rodden, John (ed.). (2007). ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-george-orwell/1B28AF542F21D62C1D1E552CBEF917FB)[*Cambridge Companion to George Orwell.*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-george-orwell/1B28AF542F21D62C1D1E552CBEF917FB)[ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-george-orwell/1B28AF542F21D62C1D1E552CBEF917FB) [Satta, Mark. (2022). ](https://iep.utm.edu/george-orwell/)[Orwell, George. *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.](https://iep.utm.edu/george-orwell/) [Satta, Mark. (2021). “George Orwell on the Relationship Between Food and Thought.” ](https://marksatta.files.wordpress.com/2021/08/satta-2021-published-version-orwell-on-the-relationship-between-food-and-thought.pdf)[*George Orwell Studies*](https://marksatta.files.wordpress.com/2021/08/satta-2021-published-version-orwell-on-the-relationship-between-food-and-thought.pdf)[ 5, 2: 76-89.](https://marksatta.files.wordpress.com/2021/08/satta-2021-published-version-orwell-on-the-relationship-between-food-and-thought.pdf) [Scrivener, Michael and Louis Finkelman, (1994). “The Politics of Obscurity: The Plain Style and Its Detractors.” ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/417847/pdf)[*Philosophy and Literature*](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/417847/pdf)[ 18, 1: 18-37.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/417847/pdf) ### Related Essays [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dane Lowe [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies ### About the Author [Mark Satta](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Satta) is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He received his PhD in Philosophy from Purdue University and his JD from Harvard Law School. Some of his philosophical interests include epistemology, philosophy of language, social and political philosophy, and philosophy of law. [MarkSatta.com](http://www.marksatta.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Mind & Language, Social & Political **Tags:** 1984, Animal Farm, George Orwell, Orwell, satta --- ### [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) **Published:** October 14, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Annaleigh Curtis Categories: [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the second in a three-part series on the topic of philosophical feminism. The first two parts, on the Sameness Approach to feminism and the Difference Approach to feminism, are by Annaleigh Curtis; the third part, on the Dominance Approach, is by Chelsea Haramia. The first essay is [here](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/ "Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach") and the third is [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/).* As I noted in [Part 1 of this series](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/ "Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach"), strands of thought that arise out of political movements are often difficult to categorize and also often answer to many names. The *difference* approach discussed here, following Haslanger and Hackett,1 is elsewhere sometimes called *radical*, *cultural*, or *gynocentric* feminism. Recall that the basic nugget of thought underlying the sameness approach was the thought that men and women,2 in whatever way matters, are similar enough to warrant similar treatment. Insofar as they are denied similar treatment, they are wronged, and a system that denies them this treatment is wrong or unjust along the dimension of gender. I noted a problem with this approach in the first essay, which was that similar treatment is not always the best answer to the kinds of wrongs women face and which feminism seeks to alleviate. The difference approach may be seen as an attempt to offer a feminist alternative that avoids this pitfall. ![Women ≠ men graphic.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/genderequality2.jpg?resize=656%2C453&ssl=1) Women ≠ men graphic. Whereas the sameness approach responds to the sexist—who claims that men are better than women in some relevant way—by asserting the sameness of men and women, the difference approach responds by turning the sexist’s argument on its head—at least sometimes, perhaps in many domains, women are better than men. Of course, what is claimed is really closer to this: traditionally feminine attributes and qualities have been undervalued or devalued by a male-dominated society and should be revalued to reflect their true worth. Depending on the particular view, the attributes and qualities associated with femininity may be so associated as a result of either natural tendencies, social tendencies, or a mix of these. At the same time, the difference approach exposes some ways in which masculinity is taken to be normal, neutral, and natural. An example brings the view into sharper relief. Consider the women’s suffrage movement. John Stuart Mill, who we encountered as a proponent of the sameness approach, argued for women’s rights, e.g. to political participation, on the grounds that they were the same as men in the relevant ways. Jane Addams, using the difference approach several decades after Mill, argued that women had a right to political participation because they were uniquely suited to it.3 She argued that running a city required the same skills as running a home: keeping people clean, fed, fulfilled, and so on. Since women are adept at running homes, they should be adept at running cities, and should thus be afforded the right to vote. In this argument, it is women’s distinctive talents, whether these are due to natural or social factors, that give them special insight into the domain. This argumentative strategy accepts the sexist’s premise that there are differences between men and women, but rejects the claim that men are superior. Others have made a similar argumentative move in other domains. Perhaps women have a distinct and valuable moral voice, as Carol Gilligan famously argued.4 Perhaps they provide unique agricultural knowledge, as Vandana Shiva has pointed out.5 Perhaps mothering makes them more peaceful, as Sara Ruddick suggested.6 Femininity is often associated with particular characteristics—passivity, emotion, community, home—set in opposition to other, supposedly masculine characteristics—activity, reason, individuality, work. While the latter set is often valued more highly by society, it is easy to come up with contexts in which the former should be preferred. If society were set up to value some of these characteristics more, we might all be better off. One failing of the sameness approach was its difficulty dealing with cases where men and women really ought to be treated differently, like when evaluating job candidates or college applicants in a system that has not given women an equal chance to succeed. The difference approach may escape this problem at the outset since it can easily justify differential treatment. Perhaps women’s experiences or qualities would make them suited to jobs in traditionally male dominated fields, but decision makers in these fields have been blinded by society’s undue focus on masculine traits. Revaluing the relevant feminine traits would result in hiring more women and better companies. However, the difference approach may not go far enough. Staying with the hiring example, it may just turn out that characteristics coded as feminine are not helpful in a particular business context, whether because the business itself came to be in a world where masculine traits were preferred, by mere chance, or for some other reason. If this turns out to be the case, the defender of the difference approach seems to be stuck, hamstrung by her own argumentative technique of taking what has been devalued and elevating it. Instead of providing women with new opportunities across the board, it either constrains them to expanding into whatever areas in which they can convince others they add value or leaves them with the same opportunities but increased external appreciation. While these may be gains, they fail to account fully for the range of talents, experiences, and interests of both women and men. Of course, a defender of the approach may be able to meet such an objection, just as a defender of the sameness approach may be able the meet the charges against it. Yet a deeper problem plagues both. As Catharine MacKinnon puts it, “\[The sameness approach grants\] women access to what men have access to. \[…\] The differences branch \[…\] exists to value or compensate women for what we are or have become distinctively as women (by which is meant, unlike men) *under existing conditions*.”7 Despite their apparent differences, the sameness and difference approaches both take the initial system as given and fail to question adequately the construction of this sameness and difference in the context of a broader system of subordination. They fail to ask why the system was constructed this way and simply seek the best treatment for women within the system. The dominance approach, favored by MacKinnon and others, attempts to remedy this problem, and will be the subject of the third installment in this series. ### Notes 1 Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 2 I pause to note again the following: I talk about men and women in this essay as if those categories were real and exhausted the gendered possibility space. I do this mostly because the thinkers I discuss tended to do so. However, most feminists today accept that there is no hard and fast biological or social binary with men on one hand and women on the other. For an overview of ways in which sex, gender identity and expression, and sexual orientation come apart, see [here](https://www.chp.edu/-/media/chp/departments-and-services/adolescent-and-young-adult-medicine/documents/gender-and-sexual-development/basic-definitions-sogie.pdf?la=en). 3 Addams, Jane. “Women and Public Housekeeping” printed in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 4 Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. 5 Shiva, Vandana. “Women’s Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity Conservation” printed in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 6 Ruddick, Sara. “Notes Toward a Feminist Maternal Peace Politics” printed in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 7 MacKinnon, Catharine. “Difference and Domination: On Sex Discrimination” printed in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006 (emphasis added). ## References [Addams, Jane. “Women and Public Housekeeping” printed in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?q=Theorizing%20Feminisms:%20A%20Reader&lang=en&cc=us) [Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.](http://www.amazon.com/In-Different-Voice-Psychological-Development/dp/B0025J3YDY/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1413127840&sr=8-1&keywords=In+a+Different+Voice%3A+Psychological+Theory+and+Women%E2%80%99s+Development.) [MacKinnon, Catharine. “Difference and Domination: On Sex Discrimination” printed in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?q=Theorizing%20Feminisms:%20A%20Reader&lang=en&cc=us) [Ruddick, Sara. “Notes Toward a Feminist Maternal Peace Politics” printed in Hackett, Elizabeth, and Sally Haslanger. *Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/theorizing-feminisms-9780195150094?q=Theorizing%20Feminisms:%20A%20Reader&lang=en&cc=us) ### Related Essays [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/feminism2.pdf "feminism2") in PDF. ### About the Author [Annaleigh Curtis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Curtis) has a JD from Harvard Law School, a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder, a Graduate Certificate in Women and Gender Studies from CU Boulder, and a B.A. in Philosophy from Washburn University. She is a practicing attorney in Boston; her focus is intellectual property litigation. Her academic interests include social epistemology, moral epistemology and methodology, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of law. [papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf\_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per\_id=2361641](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=2361641) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com**.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ##### ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Sex & Gender, Social & Political **Tags:** Curtis, Feminism --- ### [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) **Published:** July 3, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** W.D. Ross believed that there are multiple fundamental moral principles. He called them "prima facie" duties. This essay introduces Ross’s theory, which is often called intuitionism. **Content:** Author: [Matthew Pianalto](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pianalto) Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 1000 Many ethicists believe in *monism*, the view that all moral obligations are rooted in one ultimate principle. But *pluralists*, such as the British philosopher W.D. Ross (1877-1971), reject monism. Ross held that monistic ethical theories, such as utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, oversimplify morality and are counter-intuitive. Utilitarians say that we must always maximize overall happiness. But maximizing happiness might sometimes be achieved by actions that seem quite wrong, such as torturing or killing innocent people. Kantians hold that we must always treat people with respect and never harm them to achieve good ends. But there could be situations in which we couldn’t avoid doing something that seems to disrespect at least one person, e.g., we might have to lie or harm someone in order to prevent something *more* disrespectful or harmful from occurring.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) As a pluralist, Ross believed that there are multiple fundamental moral principles. He called them *prima facie duties*. This essay introduces Ross’s theory, which is often called *intuitionism*. [![Henry Scott Tuke's painting "The Promise" (1888). ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/the-promise-walker-henry-scott-tuke-oil-painting.jpg?resize=656%2C548&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/the-promise-walker-henry-scott-tuke-oil-painting.jpg?ssl=1)Henry Scott Tuke’s painting “The Promise” (1888). ### 1. “Prima Facie” Duties Ross uses the term *prima facie duty* to refer to actions that we have *some* moral reason to perform (or avoid). Ross adapts the Latin phrase “prima facie” (“at first glance”) to capture the idea that these are duties that *always* have some moral weight, but that no *prima facie* duty always has priority over the others. Ross proposes the following list of *prima facie* duties: - fidelity: keeping promises, - reparation: making amends for wrongful actions, - gratitude: repaying the good actions of others from whom we’ve benefitted, - justice: apportioning pleasure or happiness to merit, - beneficence: promoting the good of others, - self-improvement: improving our moral character, and - non-maleficence: not harming or injuring others.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Ross contends that these *prima facie* duties are *self-evident*: that is, any mature, rational person who reflects on these ideas can recognize that each *prima facie* duty points to a feature of an action that *tends* to make it right to do: e.g., if an action involves keeping a promise, that tends toward making that action right. Most of us understand that making a promise creates a responsibility to honor it. That’s what promises *are*. But if keeping a promise somehow involved committing an injustice or injuring others, those features would tend toward making the action wrong: it is also self-evident that treating people unfairly or injuring people is generally something we shouldn’t do.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 2. Conflicts of Duty Sometimes *prima facie* duties conflict. What is our *actual duty* in such situations? Imagine you’ve promised to meet a friend for lunch. As you are leaving for the restaurant, your mother—who lives nearby—calls to say that she’s had an accident and needs you to drive her to the hospital. Although you have a *prima facie* duty of fidelity to keep promises, it seems *obviously* OK to break the promise to your friend to take your mother to the hospital: that’s an emergency! Of course, in breaking a promise, you’ll also have a duty of reparation to apologize to your friend for missing lunch. Now imagine again that you’ve promised to meet a friend for lunch. Your mother calls because her car broke down and she needs a ride to a local food bank, where she helps serve lunch to people in need. If you give your mom a ride, you won’t have time to meet your friend. Here matters seem less clear. Helping mom may do more good than meeting up with your friend, since you would help her help others, but you *promised* to meet your friend.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) What has more weight—the *prima facie* duty of fidelity or the *prima facie* duty of beneficence? In such cases, Ross says we must study the situation carefully in order to make the best judgment possible about what our actual duty is.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) In other words, we must rely on our *intuition*, or as Ross often puts it, “what we really think” the right thing to do is.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) That’s also what we did to resolve the scenario when mom needed to go to the hospital; the urgency of the emergency made the correct resolution seem more obvious to us in that case*.* However, Ross claims that we cannot be *certain* about our actual duties. Our considered opinions are not perfect; acting on our intuition means taking a risk. Nevertheless, we can’t do any better than to go with our most carefully considered judgments.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Intuition? A major criticism of Ross’s view is that his appeals to intuition and “what we really think” are not trustworthy. Our intuitions may be biased or unethical. They often conflict with others’ intuitions. Some object that the idea of using intuition to identify basic moral responsibilities and resolve moral conflicts seems mysterious and unprincipled. For Ross, *intuition* is nothing more or less than our ability to think rationally, understand ideas, and make judgments; we should not think of intuition as a special faculty or a moral “sixth sense.” It simply refers to our considered opinions. Some of these, such as our views about the moral significance of promises, justice, and beneficence, are quite deep and settled; other intuitions may be more open to revision. As noted already, Ross does not regard intuition as infallible. He recognizes that humans have refined their ideas about right and wrong and rejected ideas and practices that used to seem OK to many people. Nevertheless, our best information about what is truly right comes from the carefully considered intuitions of people who are well-informed, perceptive, sensitive, and rational.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The *prima facie* duties identify values that have stood the test of reflection, experience, and time. Thoughtful people do sometimes have conflicting intuitions about complex cases. Because of this, Ross suggests that we should have some humility about our own opinions, and be willing to consider carefully the viewpoints of others.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 4. Conclusion Contemporary moral theorists continue to appeal to “prima facie” duties. Thus, perhaps there is a *prima facie* duty of gratitude to Ross for developing this idea, even if we disagree with other elements of his theory.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For an introduction to utilitarianism, see [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz. On this type of objection to utilitarianism, see Spencer Case’s [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/). For an introduction to Kant’s ethics, including common objections, see Andrew Chapman’s [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Ross allows that this list might be amended by expansion or simplification; later in *The Right and the Good* and in *The Foundations of Ethics*, he emphasizes *prima facie* obligations of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, beneficence, and non-maleficence, and treats justice and self-improvement as part of the *prima facie* duty of beneficence to add to the general good. The point of the list is to highlight that there is a *plurality* of *prima facie* duties—not just *one* sort of duty, such as to do whatever maximizes happiness. See Skelton (2022) and Simpson for further discussion. For a different proposal of *ten* basic *prima facie* duties, see Audi (2005). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Ross suggests that some *prima facie* duties typically have priority over others: e.g., while it’s good to do things that make people happy (beneficence), we usually shouldn’t do that by injuring other people (non-maleficence, justice). We should repay debts (fidelity) before giving to charity (beneficence). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Ross argues at length in *The Right and The Good* that it is not intuitive that we should break a promise just because by breaking it, we can do something else that produces a small amount of additional happiness: promises have moral weight that is not merely about producing the most happiness. My own intuition about the case involving your mother and your friend is that you should keep your promise. However, I’m assuming the food bank will serve lunch even if she can’t make it on this particular day. If it turns out that the food bank can’t open without mom, then it begins to seem to me that beneficence overrides fidelity; in that case, I would say help mom and call your friend to apologize and to reschedule the lunch date. I encourage readers to try filling out the details of the case in various ways in order to think about how those changes affect the presence and apparent strength of the different *prima facie* duties in each variation. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) We can, and perhaps sometimes *should*, ask others we trust and respect to help us consider the situation, too. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Ross (2002), 39. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Ross points out that the lack of certainty is not a special problem for his view, since utilitarian calculations, e.g., are also based on less than certain predictions and measurements. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Ross (2002), 41. Notice that these points leave room for us to be skeptical of the intuitions of people who lack these characteristics, and to be critical of the intuitions even of apparent moral authorities who speak outside of their areas of expertise or who it turns out are relying on untrustworthy or limited information. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Of course, monists may find these responses unsatisfying. An additional theoretical objection to Ross’s view is that it offers only an “unconnected heap of duties”—i.e., an arbitrary list—that lacks a systematic or unifying basis. However, Ross would respond that our rational ability to grasp the *prima facie* rightness of each of the *prima facie* duties just *is* the unifying basis. Furthermore, in offering the list of *prima facie* duties, Ross argues that they correspond to specific roles (e.g. of promiser or wrongdoer), relationships (parent, friend, citizen), and features of the world (that pain hurts, that we can affect the world in positive or negative ways), and in that regard, are not arbitrary. For further discussion, see McNaughton (1996). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Thanks to Nathan Nobis, Kristin Seemuth Whaley, Thomas Metcalf, Dan Lowe, and David Kaspar for their helpful feedback and suggestions on this essay. ### References [Audi, Robert (2005). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123882/the-good-in-the-right)[*The Good in the Right*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123882/the-good-in-the-right)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123882/the-good-in-the-right) [McNaughton, David (1996). “An Unconnected Heap of Duties?” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956354)[*The Philosophical Quarterly*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956354)[ 46(185): 433-447.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956354) [Ross, W.D. (2002). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-right-and-the-good-9780199252657?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Right and the Good*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-right-and-the-good-9780199252657?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press. Originally published in 1931.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-right-and-the-good-9780199252657?cc=us&lang=en&) [Ross, W.D. (1939). ](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.150370/mode/2up)[*The Foundations of Ethics*](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.150370/mode/2up)[. Oxford University Press.](https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.150370/mode/2up) [Simpson, David. “William David Ross (1877-1971).” ](https://iep.utm.edu/ross-wd/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://iep.utm.edu/ross-wd/)[. Last Accessed 6/13/2023.](https://iep.utm.edu/ross-wd/) [Skelton, Anthony (2022). “William David Ross.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/william-david-ross/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/william-david-ross/)[(Spring 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/william-david-ross/) ### Related Essays [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/w-d-rossun-ilk-bakista-odevler-etigi-matthew-pianalto/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ross.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Matthew Pianalto](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pianalto/) is a Professor of Philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University. He is the author of *On Patience* (2016) and several articles and book chapters on ethics. [philosophy.eku.edu/pianalto](https://philosophy.eku.edu/pianalto) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** intuition, intuitionism, Pianalto, Ross --- ### [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) **Published:** July 25, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: John Ramsey Categories: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-religion/), [Islamic Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/islamic-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 997 Right now you probably think that you are awake, that you are not asleep and dreaming. But do you *know* you aren’t dreaming? French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650) famously asked a question like this at the beginning of his *Meditations on First Philosophy*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) His answer was that since he couldn’t be *certain* he wasn’t dreaming, he didn’t *know* that he wasn’t dreaming, and since he didn’t know that, none of the beliefs he gained from his senses amounted to knowledge.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The use of dreams to question whether we have knowledge and motivate *skepticism*—the view that we lack knowledge—has a richer history than contemporary philosophers often acknowledge. Persian-Muslim philosopher and legal scholar, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) employed dreams to raise skeptical concerns about knowledge more than 500 years before Descartes did. This essay explores the role of al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument in his autobiographical *al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, or *The Deliverance from Error*, and how he uses it to raise doubts about whether we have any knowledge at all. ![al-Ghazālī'](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/al-ghazc481lc4abs-dream-argument.jpg?resize=528%2C300&ssl=1)al-Ghazālī’ ### 1. al-Ghazālīʼ’s Intellectual Journey Through Doubt Al-Ghazālī frames *Deliverance* as a letter to an unnamed correspondent, who has asked about Al-Ghazālī’s intellectual journey from doubt to certainty (¶2).[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Al-Ghazālī begins his intellectual journey by recounting that, as a youth, he held with certainty many religious and cultural beliefs that he acquired from his Islamic upbringing. He began to doubt these beliefs when he realized that his beliefs differed from people who were raised Christian and Jewish.[\[4\] ](#_ftn4)He wishes to determine whether there was any truth to the beliefs routinely accepted in his community and, if true, to know them with certainty. So, he explains his steps towards regaining certainty. As a first step, al-Ghazālī proposes and contemplates a standard that will help him tell whether he can know with certainty what he believes from his senses and from reason: Then it became clear to me that sure and certain knowledge is that in which the thing known is made so manifest that no doubt clings to it, nor is it accompanied by the possibility of error and deception, nor can the mind even suppose such a possibility. (¶7) Al-Ghazālī finds that many of his beliefs do not survive this test. Moreover, he begins to doubt his beliefs from sensory experiences because they are prone to error or correction from rational beliefs: The strongest of the senses is the sense of sight. Now this looks at a shadow and sees it standing still and motionless and judges that motion must be denied. Then, due to experience and observation, an hour later it knows that the shadow is moving…. Sight also looks at a star and sees it as something small, the size of a dinar: then geometrical proofs demonstrate that it surpasses the earth in size. In the case of this and of similar instances of sense-data the sense-judge makes its judgments, but the reason-judge refutes it and repeatedly gives it the lie in an incontrovertible fashion. (¶10) So al-Ghazālī comes to doubt the certainty he earlier held regarding his sensory experiences. We have reasons to doubt that sensory experiences really represent reality because too often another sensory experience contradicts a prior experience—as happens when he observes the shadow an hour later. Or our use of mathematical proofs or other scientific methodology—as is the case with al-Ghazālī’s example of a star—provides a reason to doubt that our sensory experiences correspond to reality. ### 2. al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument Al-Ghazālī next considers beliefs based on reason—what he calls “primary truths”—such as the belief that 10 > 3 or the same claim cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied (¶11). These beliefs do not fare any better than do beliefs from sensory experiences. To help his reader understand why, al-Ghazālī personifies his senses so they can argue with him. The senses argue that since reason—which al-Ghazālī believes to be a “higher” ability than sensory experiences—can be used to doubt sensory experience, an even “higher” ability might be able to raise doubts about the beliefs of reason. In this imagined debate, al-Ghazālī’s sensory experiences strengthen their argument by appealing to an analogy with dreaming. When dreaming, we believe with certainty that what we’re dreaming is true. But, we wake up and realize those dream beliefs are untrue. So, by analogy, if we were to have a third type of experience—one that was neither a dreaming nor waking experience, we could doubt the beliefs we normally have while waking. Having this third type of experience would be similar to waking from a dream: we would be “waking up” to a higher reality. Much later in *Deliverance* (¶82ff), al-Ghazālī returns to a discussion of the possibility of this third type of experience. He proposes that we all do have an ability that goes beyond reason—the ability of prophecy. Although most of us do not recognize these experiences as such, Sufis—Islamic mystics[\[5\]](#_ftn5)—as well as the prophets, are “masters of \[these\] states” (¶83) through their devotional practices. Al-Ghazālī calls such experiences “fruitional experiences,” and through them we have an intimate relationship with Allah (God). Given the perfections of Allah, especially that He is all-knowing and good, one’s fruitional experiences of Allah provide certainty to many of our sensory and rational beliefs. In other words, according to al-Ghazālī, one only knows once one has fruitional experiences of Allah. Even if one doesn’t accept the existence of Allah or fruitional experience, one can still raise doubts about the certainty we associate with reason and self-evident truths because we can entertain the possibility of a higher ability through the analogy that al-Ghazālī’s personified senses offer the reader. ### 3. Conclusion At the start of *Deliverance From Error*, al-Ghazālī raises a number of skeptical concerns about the nature of knowledge to cast doubt on beliefs that, at first glance, appear to be certain. In the rest of the letter, al-Ghazālī recounts his study of various disciplines—rational theology (*kalām*) (¶s 18–24), Aristotelian philosophy (¶s 25–60), Ismāʿīlism (¶s 61–79), and Sufism (¶s 80–101). None of these disciplines, except for Sufism, enable al-Ghazālī to overcome the doubts he raised with his Dream Argument. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For an introduction version of Descartes’ *Meditations* see [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro. The *Meditations* are the source of the well-known phrase, “I think, therefore I am.” For an explanation of the significance of that insight, see [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/)[”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Descartes is thereby associated with s*kepticism,* the view that we know very little, if anything, since—on this view of knowledge—knowledge requires certainty. There are various forms of skepticism. An extreme form of skepticism, often called *global skepticism*, is the view that nobody knows anything at all. Another extreme form of skepticism is *external world skepticism*: this is the view that no beliefs about the external world, such as sensory-based beliefs about what exists in the external world beyond our own thoughts, are knowledge: see Andrew Chapman’s [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/). More limited skepticisms claim that we lack knowledge in certain areas, e.g., that there is no *scientific knowledge*, or that there is no *religious knowledge* and so no religious beliefs are known, or that there is no *moral knowledge* and so nobody ever knows whether actions are right or wrong. Many forms of skepticism, however, are common and justified: e.g., skepticism about beliefs gained from well-known sources of propaganda or astrology or mere wishful thinking: we don’t gain knowledge from any of those sources. For an explanation of a common philosophical theory of what knowledge is, see Andrew Chapman’s [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) References to this text include paragraph numbers that follow the translator’s numbering. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) “The thirst for grasping the real meaning of things was indeed my habit and wont from my early years and in the prime of my life. It was an instinctive, natural disposition placed in my makeup by God Most High, not something due to my own choosing and contriving. As a result, the fetters of servile conformism fell away from me, and inherited beliefs lost their hold on me, when I was still quite young.” (¶6) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Broadly construed, Sufism is a mystical and ascetic tradition within Islam. Although it is not a sect of Islam (e.g., Sunni or Shia), historically most Sufis have been Sunni. The general aim of the tradition seeks a purification of one’s heart to understand and form a direct relationship with Allah. Within the Sufi tradition, adherents may engage in numerous practices, including fasting, breathing and mantra meditation, recitation of the Qu’rān, and other acts of piety, for purifying one’s self of selfish desires and ego so to better experience Allah. ### References [al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid. ](https://www.amazon.com/Al-Ghazalis-Path-Sufism-Deliverance-al-Munqidh/dp/1887752307/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=deliverance+from+error&qid=1587484991&sr=8-1)[*Al-Ghazali’s Path To Sufism: His Deliverance from Error*](https://www.amazon.com/Al-Ghazalis-Path-Sufism-Deliverance-al-Munqidh/dp/1887752307/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=deliverance+from+error&qid=1587484991&sr=8-1)[, translated by Richard McCarthy, S.J.. Fons Vitae, 2000 (Originally written circa 1110 CE).](https://www.amazon.com/Al-Ghazalis-Path-Sufism-Deliverance-al-Munqidh/dp/1887752307/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=deliverance+from+error&qid=1587484991&sr=8-1) [Descartes, René. ](https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1641.pdf)[*Meditations on First Philosophy*](https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1641.pdf)[, translated by Jonathan Bennett, 2017](https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1641.pdf) (Originally published 1641 CE). ### Related Essays [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli [The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/al-ghazalis-dream-argument-for-skepticism.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [John Ramsey](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ramsey) is currently a freelance academic editor and works with multilingual and early career academics. His philosophical interests are in early Chinese philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Pragmatism. His academic work has appeared in *Philosophy East and West*, *The Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, and *Asian Philosophy.* [RamseyEditorial.com](http://ramseyeditorial.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** al-Ghazālī, Ramsey --- ### [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order/) **Published:** July 9, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Henrique Schneider Categories: [Chinese Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 998 *Way*, *Chaos*, and *Order* are central to (early) Chinese philosophy. The *Way* is not a metaphor, but a natural structure to be uncovered by thinking and action. *Chaos* happens when people do not find a *Way*. Not finding a Way is bad for everyone and everything. But if people and communities follow the right Way, *Order* arises. Order is not about just solving a political problem: it is about bringing peace, increasing welfare, and finding positive interactions. The concept of the *Way*, or *Dao,* can refer to the natural structure of the cosmos that is uncovered by thinking and action. It can also be the structure and content of the political discourse as well as the principle that creates order. (Early) Chinese philosophy is about the many interpretations of how to harmonize political order, political discourse and the natural *Dao*. The importance of the *way* in establishing *order* becomes clear against the historical background, which was marked by *chaos*. Between 771 and 221 BCE, China was torn apart. Wars between competing kingdoms, migration, and poverty. In this climate of insecurity, brutality, and social breakdown, Chinese philosophy began. Ways of thinking – later labelled as Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism, among other philosophies, whereby these labels denote at best some fuzzy family resemblance – flourished, all of them seeking to establish order.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay reviews three influential early Chinese understandings of harmonizing the social with the natural *Dao*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ![The Impressive Battle of Gaixia: Chinese Reunification Emerges from Chaos](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/impressive-battle-of-gaixia.jpg?resize=656%2C442&ssl=1) ### 1. Confucianism The teachings of Kong Zi (孔子; Kǒngzǐ, “Master Kong” – “Confucius” is the Latinization of Kǒng Fūzǐ 孔夫子, “Great Master Kong”; 551? – 479? BCE) stress the performance of roles, virtuous behavior, ritual adequacy, and education. The Confucian idea of Order was based on emulating ancient wisdom. This means that each person must perform certain roles. It is not the person who chooses the role: roles are given by the place a person has in the community. In Confucianism, the role constitutes what the person does – and is. So, it is the person that adapts to the role and not the role that adapts to the person. The most important roles are “father, son,” “older brother, younger brother,” “ruler, subject,” “older friend, younger friend,” and “husband, wife.” People’s following the roles is a necessary but not yet sufficient condition for establishing order. Only if the roles are performed with virtue will people succeed in becoming wise. It takes a lot of effort for a person to perform roles virtuously. Confucius stresses primordial virtues: benevolence, righteousness, ritual property, loyalty, knowledge, and filial piety. Here the *Dao* manifests itself as an ordering principle. People are required to make a lot of effort to become educated, virtuous, able to perform the rites and so on. This process of aligning one´s actions with the Dao is called self-cultivation. ### 2. Daoism The Daodejing (道德經; Dàodéjīng) and the Zhuangzi (莊子; Zhuāngzǐ) are the bases for Daoism. While the Daodejing is attributed to a possibly unhistorical person called the “old master,” Laozi (老子; Lǎozǐ), the Zhuangzi is attributed to Master Zhuang (369 – 290? BCE). The central concept of Daoism is *Dao*. In this discourse, *Dao* is the process of reality itself, the way things come together, while still transforming. While it cannot be expressed in language what the *Dao* is, it is not an other-worldly entity. Rather, the *Dao* is holistic. It is a pattern that shapes reality but at the same time, the structure of reality is the *Dao*. Those who experience oneness with Dao will be enabled to *wu-wei*, which might best be understood as letting the *Dao* of things flow in one’s action. Negatively, it means that human action should not interfere with the natural flow of the *Dao*. Positively, it means training oneself to understand the particular *Dao* – natural structure and social adequacy – of one’s action. Conformity with the *Dao* automatically leads to order, because the *Dao* is the natural order of things. The only way of becoming one with the *Dao* is to detach oneself from lesser preoccupations and exercise *wu-wei*, or “effortless action.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The *Dao*, as it unfolds and if left untampered, is always a force of good. Virtue – the ability to navigate reality – comes from the *Dao*, and not from the rites or self-cultivation. ### 3. Legalism The “Legalist school”, Fajia, (法家; fǎ jiā) is a label applying different philosophers who used the *Fa* – standard or law – as pivotal concept. Its main proponents are: Shen Dao ( 慎到; Shèn Dào; c. 350-c. 275 BCE), Shang Yang (商鞅; Shāng Yāng; 390-338 BCE), Li Si ( 李斯; Lì Sì c. 280-208 BCE), Shen Buhai (申不害; Shēn Bùhài; c. 400-c. 337 BCE), and Hanfei (韓非; Hán Fēi; c. 280-233 BCE). Their objective was to create order by making the state strong. They wanted to strengthen the position of the ruler by standardizing the instruments of government and governance. Standardization includes a general set of rules valid and applicable to all people, uniformity in weights, measures, and units of account, as well as predictable administrative processes. With the “two handles” of praise and punishment, rulers would be able to create a well-functioning state-machinery that would lead to order and peace. Generally, Legalists subscribed to the idea that where the state is ordered, communities are ordered, too. Order leads to strength and strength leads to order. Therefore, they decidedly objected to Confucian virtuosity and Daoist *wu-wei*. Their ideal of leadership was to govern by standards, or laws. In their discourse, it was the ruler’s task to identify the natural *Dao* and mold social standards according to it. Then, the state-machinery oversees the compliance with the standards, aligning social actions with the natural *Dao* via maintaining standards. ### 4. Conclusion Against the context of chaos, the three ways of thinking emerged. Confucianism developed a system of role- and virtue-ethics shaped by ritual. In emulating the *Dao*, the wisdom of the past, Confucians wanted to restore order. Daoists desired to establish order by challenging society’s actions. In achieving *wu-wei*, the *Dao* unfolds and creates a natural order. Legalists thought that establishing standards molded on the *Dao* would automatically lead to order. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This particular context in which all these ways of thinking emerged reveals a lot about Chinese philosophy. For example, philosophy is not interested in stand-alone issues: it is about the relationships of people, community, society, and structures of governance like state and empires. Philosophy is both practical and intellectual. Chinese Philosophy does not distinguish between what *is* and what *ought to be*: both are parts of the same. It is Order that unites what is and what ought to be. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) There were more than the three “schools” introduced here. The three chosen for this text reflect their relative importance at the time and their continuation until today. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The concept of *wu wei* (無爲), literally no-doing, philosophically usually rendered as “effortless action” is an intriguing concept in Chinese philosophy. It is especially important to Daoism, but as a philosophical term it has many nuances. It one sense, it can denote an attitude of genuine non-action, motivated by a lack of desire to participate in human affairs. However, it can also refer to an action that is particularly attuned to the Dao of a circumstance. Think of dancing – not a particular ballroom dance or other forms of formal dancing – but just following the rhythm. In this metaphor, the rhythm would be the Dao and the person dancing would effortlessly, naturally be attuned to it. In a more political use, it means identifying the best course of action in a given context. For more discussion, see Cook (1997). ### Reference [Cook, Scott (1997). “Zhuang Zi and his carving of the Confucian ox,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400301?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[*Philosophy East and West*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400301?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)[, 47 (4): 521–554.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400301?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) ### For Further Reading [Bo Mou (ed.), ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781134249381)[*History of Chinese Philosophy*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781134249381)[, Routledge, 2008. ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781134249381) [Philip Ivanhoe and Bryan Van Norden (eds.), ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/readings-in-classical-chinese-philosophy)[*Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/readings-in-classical-chinese-philosophy)[, Hackett Publishing, 2005.](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/readings-in-classical-chinese-philosophy) [Bryan Van Norden, ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/introduction-to-classical-chinese-philosophy)[*Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/introduction-to-classical-chinese-philosophy)[, Hackett Publishing, 2011.](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/introduction-to-classical-chinese-philosophy) [Cristian Violatti, *Ancient Chinese Philosophy* (online resource).](https://www.ancient.eu/Chinese_Philosophy/) [Chad Hansen, *Chad Hansen’s Chinese Philosophy Pages*, a collection of introductory and advanced essays (online resource).](http://philosophy.hku.hk/ch/) ### Related Essays [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey [*Wu-Wei*: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider ### About the Author [Henrique Schneider](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Schneider) is a professor of economics at the Nordakademie in Elmshorn and Hamburg, Germany. His research addresses economics and philosophy, as well as early Chinese philosophy, especially Legalism. His book on a Chinese legalistic philosopher, Hanfei, [*An Introduction to the Political Philosophy of Hanfei*](http://www.cambridgescholars.com/an-introduction-to-hanfeis-political-philosophy) (Cambridge Scholars Press) was published in 2018. <https://www.nordakademie.de/die-nordakademie/team/> ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Chinese Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** Schneider --- ### [Wu-Wei: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) **Published:** June 3, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Henrique Schneider Categories: [Chinese Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 997 *Wu-wei* (無爲, wúwéi) is a central concept in early Chinese philosophy. However, different schools of thought conceptualized the notion differently, so it is difficult to briefly capture its multiple senses and uses. Our focus here will be on one sense of *wu-wei* in the context of a famous story from Zhuangzi, a Daoist text. Here, *wu-wei* will be understood as “acting without desire.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The concept has applications in Chinese philosophy to ethics, social and political philosophy, and even in the creation of art. ### 1. The Dao The starting point for understanding *wu-wei* is the *Dao* (道, dào), a concept central to Chinese philosophy. The *Dao* is the natural structure of the world which applies to different realms and situations: there is a natural way of raining, there is a natural way in organizing a society, and there is a natural way of acting in a given circumstance. The *Dao* is understood as a normative standard that is objective, not the fruit of human design, and normative in a physical as well as in a metaphysical sense: it describes how things should be and what ought to happen. Everything in the world has a particular *Dao* that is aligned to the natural structure of the world. ### 2. Acting according to the natural structure of a situation W*u-wei* occurs when a person’s actions align with the *Dao*. It is a cognitive and behavioral state of serenity or passivity, or a technique for gaining control of one’s actions by aligning them to the natural way of a given situation.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) One commentator explains that *wu-wei* is “acting effortlessly and spontaneously in harmony with a normative standard, i.e., the *Dao*, and thereby acquiring an almost magical efficaciousness in moving through the world.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3)A person who is attuned to this structure just follows its way. As an example of *wu-wei*, consider this vignette from the *Zhuangzi:* Cook Ting was cutting up an ox …. As every touch of his hand, every heave of his shoulder, every move of his feet, every thrust of his knee – zip! zoop! He slithered the knife along with a zing, and all was in perfect rhythm, as though he were performing . . . music. Cook Ting . . . said, ‘When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now – now I go at it by spirit and don’t look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I go along with the natural makeup. . . A good cook changes his knife once a year — because he cuts. A mediocre cook changes his knife once a month — because he hacks. I’ve had this knife of mine for nineteen years . .’[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ![Cook Ding Cuts Up an Ox](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ding.jpg?resize=640%2C338&ssl=1)Cook Ding Cuts Up an Ox This story is meant to illustrate that Ting[\[5\]](#_ftn5) is not acting because *he wants to*, but because *it is what he ought to do*. He just lets the *Dao* unfold through his actions. The *Dao* of the cook, in this situation, is to cut up the ox. His performing the role of the cook corresponds to the natural way of the situation, as does the technique he employs. In being serene or passive, Ting allows for a harmony of his actions with the *Dao*, cutting up the ox almost in a magical flow. ### 3. Acting without desire Does Ting, however, have a *desire* to conform to the *Dao*? Does he desire to act not on desire? The point of the story is to show that Ting does not act on his personal desires. Ting’s actions follow directly from the *Dao* of that particular situation, which is aligned with the overall natural structure of the world. Ting himself is acting, but not based on his desire: he is becoming instead an instrument of the *Dao*. Pursuing subjective desires interferes with the *Dao*. The result of this interference is an imbalance between the outcome generated by the desiring agent and the outcome that would have been attuned to the *Dao*. This imbalance is detrimental to the whole structure of things.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Acting *wu-wei*, however, leads to the right results or to outcomes attuned to the *Dao*. In this vignette, Ting becomes a master cook and his knife lasts longer than expected. Because he does not let his personal desires interfere with the way of doing things that Ting is “successful.” Ting is *wu-wei* because he allows his actions to be guided solely by the *Dao* of the specific circumstance – unbridled by his subjective desires. Isn’t there, then, a desire to be *wu-wei*? It is, again, the other way around: according to the *Dao* as a normative standard, Ting ought to be *wu-wei* by allowing the natural way of the situation to unfold through his actions. ### 4. Conclusion How can anyone achieve the state of acting *wu-wei*? Acting *wu-wei* could be considered a skill, an instrument of self-control, or the result of self-cultivation. The self has to be cultivated into serenity, into accepting the natural way of things, and into following it. This again is not a desire, but a consequence from what ought to be. There are applications of *wu-wei* in many areas. In ethics, it concerns how people ought to act; for example, helping one’s parents as well as strangers, when the *Dao* of a situation requires.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In different schools of political philosophy, *wu-wei* is a principle of governance. The ideal ruler acts *wu-wei*, not trying to advance his or her own agenda, but to align the state-machinery to the *Dao*. In aesthetics, the artistic value of a painting is its capturing the *Dao* of the depicted situation. To do this, artists must act *wu-wei*, creating art through aligning their work with the *Dao* of the situation. Of course, it takes time and effort to become *wu-wei*. But Chinese philosophy does not portrait *wu-wei* as a cheap way out of difficult situations. On the contrary, acting wu-wei requires constant self-cultivation. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Wu* is a particle that negates a noun/noun phrase and often works as a negative existential (so it works like the negations in “I lack free time” or “It is not that case that I have free time”). *Wei* is often translated as “activity/action/to do” (it can also function like “in virtue of”). So, the most literal translation would be “lacking activity/action” or “non-action” or “in absence of or without doing”. There are other and widespread translations such as “effortless action,” “non-action,” or “in absence of or without doing.” This article focuses on the notion mentioned above, since it is the most accurate, but keeping in mind that any translation of this term is interpretative. The concept of *wu-wei* is deployed very differently, even in Daoist texts. The *Daodejing*– also: *Tao Te Ching, Tao Te King* – as well as the *Zhuangzi* place special emphasis on *wu-wei*. Both these texts belong to a philosophical tradition labeled Daoism. The concept of *wu-wei* is also employed in other Chinese philosophies, such as “Legalism” and “Confucianism”. The Daodejing (道德經, Dàodéjīng) is a Chinese classic text traditionally credited to Laozi (老子, Lǎozǐ), who is supposed to have lived in the 6th century BCE. The text’s authorship, date of composition and date of compilation are debated. The oldest excavated portion dates back to the late 4th century BCE, but modern scholarship dates other parts of the text as having been written—or at least compiled—later than the earliest portions of the Zhuangzi. Together with the Zhuangzi, it is often considered foundational for “Daoism”; see Creel (1970) and Hansen (2000). In the Daodejing, there is a concept-pair, *wu-yu* (without desire), meaning something like “action without desire”; and *wu-wei,* which might be used to mean “not act”. The Zhuangzi (莊子, Zhuāngzǐ) is an ancient Chinese text from the late Warring States period (476–221 BCE) which contains stories and anecdotes that exemplify the carefree nature of the ideal Daoist sage. The text is a compilation but it has been attributed to its name-giver, Master Zhuang, a person about very little is known; see Creel (1970) and Hansen (2000). Other strands in Chinese philosophy to employ *wu-wei* are Legalism and Confucianism. “Legalism” refers to a group of Chinese Philosophers advocating a strong state through standardization of the instruments of government; see Schneider (2018). “Confucianism” refers to a group and long-lasting tradition in Chinese Philosophy. As diverse as it is, Confucianism emphasizes knowledge and learning, virtues and rites as well as roles and society; see Nivison (1996). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Creel (1970). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Slingerland (2000, p. 294). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Translated by Watson (1964). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) In contemporary Romanization: Ding. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) What if the Dao tells Ting to do something he does not want to? Then, in classic Chinese philosophy, Ting would be behaving unnaturally and unethically. The Dao being the natural and metaphysical normative standard, if Ting acts contrary to it, Ting’s actions will not be successful. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) It should be noted that some strains of Chinese philosophy require children to actively seek ways to help their parents but see no ethical obligations towards people who are not family members. ### References [*Zhuangzi*](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/chuang-tzu/9780231105958)[: translated by Burton Watson (Chuang Tzu: The Basic Writings, Columbia University Press, 1964).](https://cup.columbia.edu/book/chuang-tzu/9780231105958) [Creel, Herrlee G. (1970). ](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo24606882.html)[*What is Taoism?*](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo24606882.html)[ Midway.](https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo24606882.html) [*Daodejing*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/3170/dao-de-jing-by-roger-t-ames-and-david-l-hall/9780345444196/)[: translated by Roger Ames and David Hall (Dao de jing: A philosophical translation, Ballantine Books, 2003).](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/3170/dao-de-jing-by-roger-t-ames-and-david-l-hall/9780345444196/) [Hansen, Chad. (2000). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-daoist-theory-of-chinese-thought-9780195134193?cc=us&lang=en&)[*A Daoist theory of Chinese thought: A philosophical interpretation*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-daoist-theory-of-chinese-thought-9780195134193?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-daoist-theory-of-chinese-thought-9780195134193?cc=us&lang=en&) [Nivison, David S. (1996). ](http://www.opencourtbooks.com/books_n/ways_confucianism.htm)[*The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy*](http://www.opencourtbooks.com/books_n/ways_confucianism.htm)[. Open Court Press.](http://www.opencourtbooks.com/books_n/ways_confucianism.htm) [Schneider, Henrique (2018). ](https://www.cambridgescholars.com/an-introduction-to-hanfeis-political-philosophy)[*Introducing the Political Philosophy of Hanfei*](https://www.cambridgescholars.com/an-introduction-to-hanfeis-political-philosophy)[. Cambridge Scholars.](https://www.cambridgescholars.com/an-introduction-to-hanfeis-political-philosophy) [Slingerland, Edward (2000). Effortless action: The Chinese spiritual ideal of Wu-wei. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1465924)[*Journal of the American Academy of Religion*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1465924)[ 68.2, 293-327.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1465924) ### Related Essays [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider ### About the Author [Henrique Schneider](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Schneider) is a professor of philosophy of economics at the Nordakademie in Elmshorn and Hamburg, Germany. His research addresses economics and philosophy, as well as early Chinese philosophy, especially Legalism. His book on a Chinese legalistic philosopher, Hanfei, *An Introduction to the Political Philosophy of Hanfei* was published in 2018. <https://www.nordakademie.de/die-nordakademie/team/> ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics, Chinese Philosophy, Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** Dao, Schneider, Wu-Wei, Zhuangzi --- ### [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) **Published:** April 10, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: John Ramsey Categories: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Chinese Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 959 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the second in a two-part series authored by John on the topic of Mengzi’s moral psychology. The first essay is [here](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/).* In the first part on Mengzi’s moral psychology, we explored his claim that all people have four moral senses as well as the virtues cultivated from these senses. Here, we explore the central analogy behind Mengzi’s view of ethical cultivation. ![Mencius's Well by Helen De Cruz](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/menciusswell2.jpg?resize=656%2C496&ssl=1) Philosophers sometimes ask what makes a person’s life worthwhile or what conditions make for a good life. Mengzi’s answer involves cultivating our innate moral senses into fully ripened virtues of *ren* (humaneness), *yi* (rightness), *li* (propriety), and *zhi* (wisdom).[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This cultivation neither is individualistic nor can it happen in isolation: it requires a lifetime of meaningful interactions with other people. In short, one’s ethical cultivation is interdependent with other people, one’s social environment, and whether (and how well) one reflects on the stirrings of their sprouts and extends their previous moral behavior to the current situation. ### 1. The Analogy Mengzi responds to a question about why some people are good and others bad (despite all people possessing the moral senses) by outlining a theory of ethical cultivation through an analogy with the cultivation of agricultural crops. Take barley for comparison. If you broadcast the grains and rake the soil over them, and if the soil and planting times are comparable for all, they will all shoot up and ripen by the summer solstice. If there are differences it is because of the differences in the fertility of the soil, or in the nourishment of rain and dew, or in the labor of the farmer…. why would we suspect it to be any different with people? (6A7)[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Mengzi calls our attention to the role of soil, rain and dew, and the labor of the farmer. We can further elaborate the analogy by considering the sun, good weather, and the farmer’s tools, all of which Mengzi discusses in nearby passages (6A6–6A9). One might think that the soil in which our sprouts are planted is our bodies. However, Mengzi thinks each of us is “planted” in a social environment, consisting of our families, particular cultures, and other social factors. In 6A8 Mengzi explicitly connects rain and nourishing, morning dew with nightly rest and restorative *qi* (vital energy).[\[3\]](#_ftn3) To explain why a particular king lacks *zhi* (wisdom), Mengzi says, “It is but seldom that I have an audience of the king, and when I retire, there come all those who act upon him like the cold” (6A9). Here Mengzi identifies himself as the sun, or role model, for the king’s sprouts. Mengzi also considers an example of two students learning the game *Go* from Master Qiu. Although Master Qiu provides instruction to both, one student daydreams of hunting swans while the other “gives to the subject his whole mind and bends to it all his will, doing nothing but listening to *Go* Master Qiu” (6A9). Both students are nourished by a role model but only one takes heed of the role model’s instruction and attentively practices what he learns. But who, like a farmer laboring on their crops, cultivates our sprouts? Mengzi is not explicit about this, but a plausible answer is that each person does. Moreover, each person must use the proper tools of cultivation, which for Mengzi include the various social rituals and norms endorsed by Confucianism, the Confucian literary classics, and most importantly reflection and extension—Mengzi’s version of moral deliberation. ### 2. Reflection and Extension[\[4\]](#_ftn4) In one of the longest passages in the Mengzi (1A7), Mengzi and King Xuan discuss how the later can become a sage king. Earlier, Xuan had seen an ox about to be sacrificed to consecrate a ritual bell and spared it because he could not bear its suffering, which he compares to an innocent person being lead to execution. His people chastised him for being stingy because he sacrificed a sheep instead. Mengzi disagrees with this assessment and praises the king for reflecting and extending. The process of reflection and extension has four steps, which might be generalized from Xuan’s narrative: (1) hearing the whimpering of the ox: *one witnesses a situation in which one of their sprouts are stirred*; (2) remembering his dismay at the suffering of an innocent about to be executed[\[5\]](#_ftn5): *one remembers or thinks of a similar situation in which the same sprout stirred*; (3) as king, Xuan has the power to stay the execution just as he has the authority to modify the consecration ritual[\[6\]](#_ftn6): *one reflects on what power they have to act or how they acted in the similar situation*; (4) spare the ox: *one acts in this situation similarly to how they acted in the previous situation*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Conclusion The cultivation of our sprouts involves an individual working to cultivate one’s innate moral senses through the use of reflection and extension, the social norms that govern one’s social milieu, and one’s reliance on others. We are dependent on people directly in two ways. First, rituals and social norms structure our relationships and interactions with others. Second, familial relationships are the “root” of reflection and extension (1A7 and 4A19). We are also dependent on others indirectly: others serve as role models and help create and sustain social environments in which particular persons may flourish. Mengzi’s analogy helps explain why people do and don’t cultivate their moral senses. Some of us are fortunate to grow up in socio-morally rich social environments and families, whereas others grow up in socio-morally deprived situations. Some of us may benefit from good role models; others choose poor role models. Some practice reflection and extension and others fail to listen to and reflect on their moral senses. Nonetheless, since Mengzi believes that all humans possess the moral senses and can reflect and extend—“the sage and I are of the same kind” (6A7)—we all can cultivate our moral senses, though some face more challenges than others. ### *Glossary and Pronunciation Guide* The following is a rough guide for pronouncing the Chinese terms used in this article. A “!” indicates a falling tone and “?” indicates a rising tone. Visit [here](https://chinese.yabla.com/chinese-pinyin-chart.php) for audio clips of individual syllables. In the list below the Chinese term is provided both in *pinyin* (a form of spelling) and in traditional characters followed by an English translation in square brackets and its pronunciation in parentheses. *fei* 非 \[not-this, wrong\] (“fey”) *li* 禮 \[rituals, social norms, propriety\] (“lee?”) *Mengzi* 孟子 \[Confucian thinker and text\] (“mung!” followed by “dz”) *qi* 氣 \[vital energy\] (“chee!”) *Qiu* 秋 \[a legendary *Go* master\] (“chew”) *ren* 仁 \[humaneness\] (“wren?”) *shi* 是 \[this, correct\] (“shr!” or “sher!” as in “Sherlock”) *yi* 義 \[rightness\] (a long “e!” sound as in “bee”) *zhi* 智 \[wisdom\] (“jr!”as in the first syllable of “Germany”) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See [Part 1](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) for a discussion of the four sprouts and their corresponding virtues. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Throughout I follow Eno’s (2016) translation of the text. The text is usually divided into 7 Books with two parts (A and B) and then subsequently arranged by numbered passages. Thus, “2A6” refers to Book 2A, passage 6. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In early Chinese discourse, *qi* 氣 usually refers to a vapor diffuse in the air and, in particular, human breath. Mengzi uses *qi* in a more technical sense as a vital energy that affects our emotions and moral senses. In 2A2 he claims that one’s store of *qi* can move one’s will. Thus, *qi* can help us act more resolutely when our moral sprouts stir. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Contemporary commentators disagree about how exactly reflection and extension works. For instance, see Ivanhoe 2002 and Wong 2002. The view I offer here is consistent with these interpretations but is simplified for brevity. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The range of situations one can reflect on is not limited to one’s own experiences. Instead, the range of reflection is informed by one’s cultural knowledge and background, including literature and philosophical hypotheticals as well as (for us moderns) situations we encounter in movies and TV series. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The specific power(s) we have in a particular situation is tied to our social roles and relationships. For instance, Mengzi could not spare the ox because he does not have the social standing to do so, but he does have the social power to advise the king to spare the ox. King Xuan continues to follow his social role in consecrating the bell by substituting a sheep, which he hadn’t heard bleating and so didn’t stir his sprout of compassion. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Mengzi sums up the process with an interesting formulation of the golden rule: “Treat your aged kin as the elderly should be treated, and then extend that to the treatment of the aged kinsmen of others; treat your young kin as the young should be treated, and then extend it to the young children of other” (1A7). ### References [Ivanhoe, Philip J. “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension” in Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002).](https://www.amazon.com/Essays-Moral-Philosophy-Mengzi-Xiusheng/dp/0872206238/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648637&sr=1-1&keywords=essays+of+moral+mengzi) [Wong, David. “Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi” in Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002).](https://www.amazon.com/Essays-Moral-Philosophy-Mengzi-Xiusheng/dp/0872206238/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648637&sr=1-1&keywords=essays+of+moral+mengzi) ### Further Reading [*Mencius*](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Penguin-Classics/dp/014044971X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648532&sr=1-1&keywords=lau+mencius)[, trans. D.C. Lau (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 2003).](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Penguin-Classics/dp/014044971X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648532&sr=1-1&keywords=lau+mencius) [*Mencius*](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[: ](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[*An Online Teaching Translation*](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[, trans Robert Eno, 2016.](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf) [Mengzi with Selections from Traditional Commentaries, trans. Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008).](https://www.amazon.com/Mengzi-Selections-Traditional-Commentaries-Classics/dp/087220913X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648553&sr=1-1&keywords=mengzi+with+commentary) ### Related Essays [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider ### About the Author [John Ramsey](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ramsey) is currently a freelance academic editor and works with multilingual and early career academics. His philosophical interests are in early Chinese philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Pragmatism. His academic work has appeared in *Philosophy East and West*, *The Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, and *Asian Philosophy.* [RamseyEditorial.com](http://ramseyeditorial.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Chinese Philosophy, Ethics **Tags:** mencius, Mengzi, Ramsey --- ### [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) **Published:** April 10, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: John Ramsey Categories: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Chinese Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 988 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the first in a two-part series authored by John on the topic of Mengzi’s moral psychology. The second [essay](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) is here.* Mengzi (372–289 BCE), or Mencius,[\[1\]](#_ftn1) an early Confucian whose thinking is represented in the eponymous *Mengzi*,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) argues that human nature is good and that all human beings possess four *senses*—the feelings of compassion, shame, respect, and the ability to approve and disapprove—which he variously calls “hearts” or “sprouts.” Each sprout may be cultivated into its corresponding virtue of *ren*, *li*, *yi*, or *zhi*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Here we explore why Mengzi thinks we possess these four hearts and their relation to the cultivated virtues. Next, we explore Mengzi’s theory of ethical cultivation. ### 1. Mengzi’s Thought Experiments Mengzi employs thought experiments to demonstrate the existence of these senses except for the ability to approve and disapprove: this ability was widely acknowledged among his contemporaries. #### A. Compassion Anticipating disagreement with his claim that all humans have a sense of compassion,[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Mengzi asks us to suppose someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well: anyone in such a situation would have a feeling of alarm and compassion—and not because one sought to get in good with the child’s parents, not because one wanted fame among one’s neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child’s cries. (2A6) ![Mencius's Well by Helen De Cruz](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/menciusswell2.jpg?resize=656%2C496&ssl=1) ###### Illustration by [Helen De Cruz](http://helendecruz.net/). Used with permission. Notice that Mengzi stresses that everyone would experience a spontaneous reaction to the situation and not experience the feeling as a result of ulterior motives or moral reasoning. #### B. Respect In advising a disciple debating a Mohist, from a rival school to early Confucianism that critiqued Confucians’ insistence on elaborate rituals and other wasteful uses of material resources, Mengzi invokes the sense of respect by telling a story about a society in which people did not bury their parents, abandoning them in open ditches. Later, when they passed the bodies of their deceased parents and saw “foxes were eating them, bugs were sucking on them. Sweat broke out on the survivors’ foreheads. They turned away and did not look” (3A5). Here their sprouts react to their failure to respect their parents.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) #### C. Shame And for shame: If food is “given with contempt, even a homeless person will not accept them. If they’re trampled upon, even a beggar won’t take them” (6A10). ### 2. The Sprouts and Their Virtues #### A. Ren : Humaneness (from Compassion) Translators often render *ren* as “humaneness” or “benevolence.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) A *ren* person will be benevolent and humane since *ren* is cultivated from of a sense of compassion or dismay at others’ suffering. *Ren*, however, involves more than either benevolence or humaneness as it involves doing well by other people. Mengzi tells us that fathers do not formally educate their sons because doing so would undermine the relationship (4A18). Social roles are important for early Confucians insofar as what it means to do well by other people depends on how those people are related to each other. Parents do well by their teenagers very differently than teenagers do well by their parents. A modern parent who has cultivated *ren* might do well by their teenager by ensuring that they have ample opportunity to express themselves and make their own decisions and mistakes. The teenager might cultivate their *ren* by respecting their parents, meeting curfew (so not to cause anxiety in their parents), and the like. 40 years later the teenager will be in their 50s and the parent in their 80s. Being *ren* for either individual involves different behaviors now because the adult child and their parent face different types of suffering. #### B. *Li* : Propriety (from Respect) *Li* has two related meanings. One sense refers to actual rituals, say the various rituals that make up a marriage ceremony or funeral rites, and social norms, such as wearing appropriate clothing or a man’s not touching his sister-in-law’s hands when giving her a gift (4A17). Another sense of *li* means performing the ritual or social norm well. Consider the ritual (and norm!) of shaking hands—some people shake hands well, so they have done *li* (the shaking hands ritual) and they are *li* (performed the ritual well). *Li* is cultivated from a sense of respect. That this sense is innate may seem odd from our contemporary standpoint. But for the Confucians, that *li* grows out of a sense of reverence or respect made perfect sense because many rituals involved reverence of one’s ancestors or respect to people with more social and political authority. #### C. *Yi* : Rightness (from Shame) *Yi* is the cultivated from a sense of shame or, since the feeling is cultivated and not actually felt, the sense that we *would* feel shame if we failed to act. There are many situations and social circumstances that are not governed by rituals and social norms; in those instances, when one acts well, one is *yi*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Consider, again, the well thought experiment. There are no *li* that guide our behavior when we encounter small children teetering on the edge of a well, so we can’t be *li* in that situation. Though those of us who run and try to save the child would be *yi* and those of us who don’t will likely feel shame as they watch the child fall. #### D. *Zhi* : Wisdom (from the Ability to Approve and Disapprove) Wisdom is cultivated from our ability to approve and disapprove. The *Mengzi* is not entirely clear on what this ability involves because its authors assume readers’ knowledge of *shi* and *fei*. Here’s the basic idea: we *shi* something when we think it’s true or right and *fei* something when we think it’s false or wrong. Imagine an early Chinese mother and toddler: the toddler sees an ox saunter pastand says, “*niu!”,* and their mother says, “*shi!*”. If the toddler had said “*ma!*”, she would say “*fei*” because *ma* names horses. The mother says “*shi”* or “*fei”* because she knows which word refers to which animal. Mengzi believes that this sense is innate—we’re born with it—because small children clearly have preferences and *shi* or *fei* constantly. As they grow up, they refine this ability. Wisdom, then, is having the correct view about right and wrong, true and false, and this correct view will be informed by one’s ethical cultivation and possession of the other three virtues. ### Glossary and Pronunciation Guide The following is a rough guide for pronouncing the Chinese terms used in this article. A “!” indicates a falling tone and “?” indicates a rising tone. Visit [here](https://chinese.yabla.com/chinese-pinyin-chart.php) for audio clips of individual syllables. In the list below the Chinese term is provided both in *pinyin* (a form of spelling) and in traditional characters followed by an English translation in square brackets and its pronunciation in parentheses. *ci rang* 辭讓 \[modesty and courtesy\] (“ts-ir? rung!” pronounce “ts” as in cats” and “ir” as in “bird”) *fei* 非 \[not-this, wrong\] (“fey”) *gong jiang* 恭敬 \[reverence and respect\] (“gohng jeeng!” or “go” +”ng” followed by “jee” +”ng”) *li* 禮 \[rituals, social norms, propriety\] (“lee?”) *ma* 馬 \[horse\] (“maa” pronouncing the “aa” first with a falling and then with a rising tone) *Mengzi* 孟子 \[Confucian thinker and text\] (“mung!” followed by “dz”) *niu* 牛 \[ox\] (“new?) *ren* 仁 \[humaneness\] (“wren?”) *shi* 是 \[this, correct\] (“shr!” or “sher!” as in “Sherlock”) *yi* 義 \[rightness\] (a long “e!” sound as in “bee”) *zhi* 智 \[wisdom\] (“jr!”as in the first syllable of “Germany”) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mengzi 孟子 is also known by his Latinized name, Mencius, and lived during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) in early Chinese history. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) It is likely that Mengzi did not write this text and that it was composed, in various stages, by his disciples (Brooks and Brooks 2002). There are quite a few excellent translations of *Mengzi*, particularly Eno (2016), Lau (2003) and Van Norden (2008). I recommend Eno’s translation because it contains an excellent running commentary on the text and is readily accessible online. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) These virtues may be loosely translated as “humaneness”, “propriety” (or “ritual propriety”), “rightness,” and “wisdom,” respectively. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) It’s unclear what sort of categorical claim Mengzi offers here. For clarification see Van Norden 2007, pages 214–227. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) I have chosen to translate the phrases *gong jing* and *ci rang,* which the *Mengzi* uses interchangeably in describing this moral sprout, as “respect”. *Gong jing* conveys a sense of reverence and respect, while *ci rang* suggests modesty and courtesy. All of these connotations might be captured by “deference,” but likely that word is less familiar than is “respect,” which nonetheless captures a key feature of the sprout. Readers familiar with contemporary western ethical theories, particularly Kantianism, should avoid reading “respect” in light of these theories. For one, the innate sprout of respect is prior to its cultivated virtue of *li*, which involves performing rituals well (see section 2.B). Second, for the Kantian, respect involves an attitude we take in treating each other as rational and autonomous agents, but for the Confucian respect might be seen as an attitude we take in treating others as social agents. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Chinese character 仁 appears to be a conjunction of the characters for person (人) and two (二). If this etymology is correct, *ren* suggests a cultivated form of being with other people. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Sometimes Mengzi and his Confucian contemporaries will say that a well-done ritual is also *yi*. ### References [Brooks, E. Bruce and Brooks, A. Taeko. “The Nature and Historical Context of the Mencius” in ](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Interpretations-Alan-Kam-Leung-Chan/dp/082482377X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1521648431&sr=8-1&keywords=mencius+contexts)[*Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations*](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Interpretations-Alan-Kam-Leung-Chan/dp/082482377X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1521648431&sr=8-1&keywords=mencius+contexts)[ (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002).](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Interpretations-Alan-Kam-Leung-Chan/dp/082482377X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1521648431&sr=8-1&keywords=mencius+contexts) [Van Norden, Bryan W. ](https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Ethics-Consequentialism-Chinese-Philosophy/dp/110740732X/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648476&sr=1-5&keywords=virtue+ethics+and+confucianism)[*Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*](https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Ethics-Consequentialism-Chinese-Philosophy/dp/110740732X/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648476&sr=1-5&keywords=virtue+ethics+and+confucianism)[ (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007).](https://www.amazon.com/Virtue-Ethics-Consequentialism-Chinese-Philosophy/dp/110740732X/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648476&sr=1-5&keywords=virtue+ethics+and+confucianism) ### Further Reading [*Mencius*](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Penguin-Classics/dp/014044971X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648532&sr=1-1&keywords=lau+mencius)[, trans. D.C. Lau (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 2003).](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Penguin-Classics/dp/014044971X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648532&sr=1-1&keywords=lau+mencius) [*Mencius*](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[: ](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[*An Online Teaching Translation*](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[, trans Robert Eno, 2016.](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf) [Mengzi with Selections from Traditional Commentaries, trans. Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008).](https://www.amazon.com/Mengzi-Selections-Traditional-Commentaries-Classics/dp/087220913X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648553&sr=1-1&keywords=mengzi+with+commentary) ### Related Essays [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider ### About the Author [John Ramsey](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ramsey) Author: John Ramsey Categories: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Chinese Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/) Word Count: 959 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the second in a two-part series authored by John on the topic of Mengzi’s moral psychology. The first essay is [here](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/).* In the first part on Mengzi’s moral psychology, we explored his claim that all people have four moral senses as well as the virtues cultivated from these senses. Here, we explore the central analogy behind Mengzi’s view of ethical cultivation. ![Mencius's Well by Helen De Cruz](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/menciusswell2.jpg?resize=656%2C496&ssl=1) Philosophers sometimes ask what makes a person’s life worthwhile or what conditions make for a good life. Mengzi’s answer involves cultivating our innate moral senses into fully ripened virtues of *ren* (humaneness), *yi* (rightness), *li* (propriety), and *zhi* (wisdom).[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This cultivation neither is individualistic nor can it happen in isolation: it requires a lifetime of meaningful interactions with other people. In short, one’s ethical cultivation is interdependent with other people, one’s social environment, and whether (and how well) one reflects on the stirrings of their sprouts and extends their previous moral behavior to the current situation. ### 1. The Analogy Mengzi responds to a question about why some people are good and others bad (despite all people possessing the moral senses) by outlining a theory of ethical cultivation through an analogy with the cultivation of agricultural crops. Take barley for comparison. If you broadcast the grains and rake the soil over them, and if the soil and planting times are comparable for all, they will all shoot up and ripen by the summer solstice. If there are differences it is because of the differences in the fertility of the soil, or in the nourishment of rain and dew, or in the labor of the farmer…. why would we suspect it to be any different with people? (6A7)[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Mengzi calls our attention to the role of soil, rain and dew, and the labor of the farmer. We can further elaborate the analogy by considering the sun, good weather, and the farmer’s tools, all of which Mengzi discusses in nearby passages (6A6–6A9). One might think that the soil in which our sprouts are planted is our bodies. However, Mengzi thinks each of us is “planted” in a social environment, consisting of our families, particular cultures, and other social factors. In 6A8 Mengzi explicitly connects rain and nourishing, morning dew with nightly rest and restorative *qi* (vital energy).[\[3\]](#_ftn3) To explain why a particular king lacks *zhi* (wisdom), Mengzi says, “It is but seldom that I have an audience of the king, and when I retire, there come all those who act upon him like the cold” (6A9). Here Mengzi identifies himself as the sun, or role model, for the king’s sprouts. Mengzi also considers an example of two students learning the game *Go* from Master Qiu. Although Master Qiu provides instruction to both, one student daydreams of hunting swans while the other “gives to the subject his whole mind and bends to it all his will, doing nothing but listening to *Go* Master Qiu” (6A9). Both students are nourished by a role model but only one takes heed of the role model’s instruction and attentively practices what he learns. But who, like a farmer laboring on their crops, cultivates our sprouts? Mengzi is not explicit about this, but a plausible answer is that each person does. Moreover, each person must use the proper tools of cultivation, which for Mengzi include the various social rituals and norms endorsed by Confucianism, the Confucian literary classics, and most importantly reflection and extension—Mengzi’s version of moral deliberation. ### 2. Reflection and Extension[\[4\]](#_ftn4) In one of the longest passages in the Mengzi (1A7), Mengzi and King Xuan discuss how the later can become a sage king. Earlier, Xuan had seen an ox about to be sacrificed to consecrate a ritual bell and spared it because he could not bear its suffering, which he compares to an innocent person being lead to execution. His people chastised him for being stingy because he sacrificed a sheep instead. Mengzi disagrees with this assessment and praises the king for reflecting and extending. The process of reflection and extension has four steps, which might be generalized from Xuan’s narrative: (1) hearing the whimpering of the ox: *one witnesses a situation in which one of their sprouts are stirred*; (2) remembering his dismay at the suffering of an innocent about to be executed[\[5\]](#_ftn5): *one remembers or thinks of a similar situation in which the same sprout stirred*; (3) as king, Xuan has the power to stay the execution just as he has the authority to modify the consecration ritual[\[6\]](#_ftn6): *one reflects on what power they have to act or how they acted in the similar situation*; (4) spare the ox: *one acts in this situation similarly to how they acted in the previous situation*.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. Conclusion The cultivation of our sprouts involves an individual working to cultivate one’s innate moral senses through the use of reflection and extension, the social norms that govern one’s social milieu, and one’s reliance on others. We are dependent on people directly in two ways. First, rituals and social norms structure our relationships and interactions with others. Second, familial relationships are the “root” of reflection and extension (1A7 and 4A19). We are also dependent on others indirectly: others serve as role models and help create and sustain social environments in which particular persons may flourish. Mengzi’s analogy helps explain why people do and don’t cultivate their moral senses. Some of us are fortunate to grow up in socio-morally rich social environments and families, whereas others grow up in socio-morally deprived situations. Some of us may benefit from good role models; others choose poor role models. Some practice reflection and extension and others fail to listen to and reflect on their moral senses. Nonetheless, since Mengzi believes that all humans possess the moral senses and can reflect and extend—“the sage and I are of the same kind” (6A7)—we all can cultivate our moral senses, though some face more challenges than others. ### *Glossary and Pronunciation Guide* The following is a rough guide for pronouncing the Chinese terms used in this article. A “!” indicates a falling tone and “?” indicates a rising tone. Visit [here](https://chinese.yabla.com/chinese-pinyin-chart.php) for audio clips of individual syllables. In the list below the Chinese term is provided both in *pinyin* (a form of spelling) and in traditional characters followed by an English translation in square brackets and its pronunciation in parentheses. *fei* 非 \[not-this, wrong\] (“fey”) *li* 禮 \[rituals, social norms, propriety\] (“lee?”) *Mengzi* 孟子 \[Confucian thinker and text\] (“mung!” followed by “dz”) *qi* 氣 \[vital energy\] (“chee!”) *Qiu* 秋 \[a legendary *Go* master\] (“chew”) *ren* 仁 \[humaneness\] (“wren?”) *shi* 是 \[this, correct\] (“shr!” or “sher!” as in “Sherlock”) *yi* 義 \[rightness\] (a long “e!” sound as in “bee”) *zhi* 智 \[wisdom\] (“jr!”as in the first syllable of “Germany”) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See [Part 1](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) for a discussion of the four sprouts and their corresponding virtues. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Throughout I follow Eno’s (2016) translation of the text. The text is usually divided into 7 Books with two parts (A and B) and then subsequently arranged by numbered passages. Thus, “2A6” refers to Book 2A, passage 6. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) In early Chinese discourse, *qi* 氣 usually refers to a vapor diffuse in the air and, in particular, human breath. Mengzi uses *qi* in a more technical sense as a vital energy that affects our emotions and moral senses. In 2A2 he claims that one’s store of *qi* can move one’s will. Thus, *qi* can help us act more resolutely when our moral sprouts stir. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Contemporary commentators disagree about how exactly reflection and extension works. For instance, see Ivanhoe 2002 and Wong 2002. The view I offer here is consistent with these interpretations but is simplified for brevity. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The range of situations one can reflect on is not limited to one’s own experiences. Instead, the range of reflection is informed by one’s cultural knowledge and background, including literature and philosophical hypotheticals as well as (for us moderns) situations we encounter in movies and TV series. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The specific power(s) we have in a particular situation is tied to our social roles and relationships. For instance, Mengzi could not spare the ox because he does not have the social standing to do so, but he does have the social power to advise the king to spare the ox. King Xuan continues to follow his social role in consecrating the bell by substituting a sheep, which he hadn’t heard bleating and so didn’t stir his sprout of compassion. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Mengzi sums up the process with an interesting formulation of the golden rule: “Treat your aged kin as the elderly should be treated, and then extend that to the treatment of the aged kinsmen of others; treat your young kin as the young should be treated, and then extend it to the young children of other” (1A7). ### References [Ivanhoe, Philip J. “Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi’s Notion of Extension” in Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002).](https://www.amazon.com/Essays-Moral-Philosophy-Mengzi-Xiusheng/dp/0872206238/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648637&sr=1-1&keywords=essays+of+moral+mengzi) [Wong, David. “Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi” in Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002).](https://www.amazon.com/Essays-Moral-Philosophy-Mengzi-Xiusheng/dp/0872206238/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648637&sr=1-1&keywords=essays+of+moral+mengzi) ### Further Reading [*Mencius*](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Penguin-Classics/dp/014044971X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648532&sr=1-1&keywords=lau+mencius)[, trans. D.C. Lau (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 2003).](https://www.amazon.com/Mencius-Penguin-Classics/dp/014044971X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648532&sr=1-1&keywords=lau+mencius) [*Mencius*](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[: ](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[*An Online Teaching Translation*](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf)[, trans. Robert Eno, 2016.](http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf) [Mengzi with Selections from Traditional Commentaries, trans. Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008).](https://www.amazon.com/Mengzi-Selections-Traditional-Commentaries-Classics/dp/087220913X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1521648553&sr=1-1&keywords=mengzi+with+commentary) ### Related Essays [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider ### About the Author [John Ramsey](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ramsey) is currently a freelance academic editor and works with multilingual and early career academics. His philosophical interests are in early Chinese philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, and Pragmatism. His academic work has appeared in *Philosophy East and West*, *The Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, and *Asian Philosophy.* [RamseyEditorial.com](http://ramseyeditorial.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Chinese Philosophy, Ethics **Tags:** mencius, Mengzi, Ramsey --- ### [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) **Published:** June 1, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Nicholaos Jones Category: [Buddhist Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/buddhist-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) Word Count: 991 Abhidharma is a scholastic tradition of Buddhism, arising in India during the 3rd century BCE, directed toward systematizing discourses written during the first few centuries of Buddhism. Those early discourses tend to analyze the objects of our experience – physical things and mental events – into simpler constituents. For example, the *Skandha Sutra* (*Discourse on the Aggregates*) analyzes *persons* into five aggregates (*skandhas*): physical matter (*rupa*), sensation (*vedana*), recognition (*samjna*), mental disposition (*samskara*), and discernment (*vinnana*). The early analyses are partial, each focusing on only some aspects of the objects we experience. A central project of Abhidharma Buddhism is refining these early analyses into a comprehensive taxonomy of object categories, the members of which resist further analysis into component parts. These are *dharmas*, named from the Sanskrit root *dhr*, meaning *that which sustains, supports, upholds, maintains.* This entry reviews the Abhidharma understanding of *dharmas* by examining what they are, what properties they have, and how they compare to *substances* and *properties*. ![Buddha_preaching_Abhidhamma_in_Tavatimsa](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/buddha_preaching_abhidhamma_in_tavatimsa.jpg?resize=656%2C349&ssl=1) ### 1. Examples of Dharmas Sarvastivada and Theravada are the two central branches of Abhidharma. Sarvastivadins divide *dharmas* into 75 categories; Theravadins, into anywhere between 82 and 17,280 categories. For example, Theravadins typically analyze physical matter such as mud and blood into four *great elements* (*mahabhuta*): earth (*prithivi*), with the character of solidity and the function of support; water (*apa*), with the character of humidity and the function of cohesion; fire (*usnata*), with the character of heat and the function of maturation; air (*vayu*), with the character of mobility and the function of extension. Sarvastivadins implicitly include these elements as emission sources for sensory object (*alambana*) *dharmas* such as taste (*rasa*) and texture (*sprastavya*). Sarvastivadins pair these objects with sensory faculty (*indriya*) *dharmas* such as tongue (*jihva*) and touch (*kaya*) that receive emissions of the appropriate kind. ### 2. Constraints on Dharmas These examples should render intelligible some of the central theoretical claims about *dharmas* from the Abhidharma tradition. There are two constraints for identifying *dharmas*. *Each dharma belongs to exactly one fundamental category*. Tastes are not textures and earth is not water. This constraint rules out the possibility of a solid and wet mud *dharma* belonging to the categories of earth and water. It also encourages an explanation-seeking question: By virtue of what does any particular *dharma* belong to one category rather than another? The answer provides a second constraint: *There is a characteristic* (*laksana*) *intrinsic to each dharma, by virtue of which the dharma belongs to exactly one fundamental category.* Earth’s characteristic is solidity: all and only earth *dharmas* are solid. Water’s characteristic is humidity: all and only water *dharmas* are wet. ### 3. Definitions of Dharma According to Abhidharma, *For every dharma, there is a svabhava*. *Sva-* means *intrinsic*; *bhava* refers to existing as a particular individual with a particular identity. Saying that each *dharma* is *svabhava* means that each *dharma* is a particular individual existing with a particular identity by virtue of characteristics intrinsic to itself. Whence: Definition: *Dharma is that which bears svabhava*. This is provisional. The grammar connotes that *dharma* is one thing, its *svabhava* something separate that is owned by the *dharma*—in the way that a suitcase bears luggage. But *dharma* is not distinct from *svabhava*. A suitcase can lose its luggage, but a *dharma* and its *svabhava* are inseparable. Whence: *Each dharma is* *unalterable in its identity* (*aviparita-bhava*). Unalterability means that anything with a different *svabhava* would be a different *dharma*, rather than the same *dharma* in a different state. This distinguishes *dharmas* from substances (*dharmins*) which persist through change. When Buddhists say that *dharmas* are insubstantial, they mean that *dharmas* cannot survive change, not that *dharmas* fail to exist. Abhidharma tradition balances the preceding definition against another: Definition: *Dharma is that which is borne by others*. This is also provisional because the grammar misleadingly connotes that *dharmas* are properties (*gunas*) of a substance. ### 4. Middle Way There is a tension between the definitions. Unless *svabhava* somehow depends upon others, being borne by others precludes *dharmas* from bearing anything of their own. One of Abhidharma’s fundamental insights concerns how to achieve a middle way between conceptualizing *dharmas* as substances or as properties. *Each svabhava corresponds to an intrinsic power* (*sakti*). Earth’s *svabhava*, solidity, corresponds to the power to support: solidity is supporting. Water’s *svabhava*, humidity, corresponds to the power of cohesion: humidity is sticking together into a unity. Just as no *dharma* is separate from its *svabhava*, no *svabhava* is separate from its power. So each power has a *svabhava*, and each *dharma* has a power distinctive of its kind. Because existing *dharmas* are manifest to us through observation, their powers must be as well. Powers are manifest to us only when enacted. Whence: *Each dharma is an activity.* So *dharmas* are *svabhava* *qua* substance, activities *qua* function. Being an activity means *doing something*, making something happen—being a cause. But causes are causes only by virtue of producing results. According to the Buddhist teaching of dependent arising (*pratitya-samutpada*), causes produce their effects only with the cooperation of distinct conditions. Whence: *Dharmas always arise as clustered together in dependence upon each other*. A single, solitary *dharma* would not receive assistance from others, thereby failing to enact its activity. Nor would it contribute assistance to others. So it would neither bear its *svabhava* nor be borne by others. ### 5. Conclusion: The Significance of Dharmas Abhidharma analyzes the world we experience into a multiplicity of *dharmas*, depending upon and interacting with each other to produce the dazzling array of our experiences. So, for example, a moment of conscious tactile discernment arises when a touch faculty receives texture from something touchable. Abhidharmic analysis has a twofold soteriological purpose. Insofar as our desires to acquire objects are not desires to acquire the *dharmas* constituting those objects, analysis helps to forestall craving those objects. Since those objects arise as confluences of fleeting activities, analysis also helps to reinforce the impossibility of preserving the objects that help to satisfy our desires. This forestalls attachment to those objects. ### Glossary The list below includes every Sanskrit term mentioned in this article, followed by its Pali equivalent in brackets (when available and different from the Sanskrit) and common English translations. Abhidharma \[Abhidhamma\]: the higher teaching (of Buddhism) *alambana* \[*arammana*\]: objective support, sensory object *apa* \[*ap*\]: liquid, water (a *mahabhuta*) *aviparita*: irreversible, unalterable *dharma* \[*dhamma*\]: elemental factor, phenomenon; doctrine, teaching *dharmin*: substance *guna*: property, quality *indriya*: faculty, predominant condition *jihva*: tongue (one of several *indriya*) *kaya*: touch (one of several *indriya*) *laksana* \[*lakkhana*\]: characteristic, mark *mahabhuta*: great element *prithivi* \[*pathavi*\]: earth (a *mahabhuta*) *pratitya-samutpada* \[*paticca-samuppada*\]: dependent arising, dependent origination *rasa*: flavor, taste (one of several *alambana* ) *rupa*: form, physical matter (a *skandha*) *sakti* \[*shakti*\]: energy, force, power *samjna* \[*sanna*\]: perception, recognition (a *skandha*) *samskara* \[*sankhara*\]: mental disposition, mental formation (a *skandha*) Sarvastivada \[Sabbathavada\]: a major branch of Abhidharma *skandha* \[*khandha*\]: aggregate, heap *sprastavya* \[*photthabba*\]: tangible, texture (one of several *alambana* ) *sutra* \[*sutta*\]: religious discourse *svabhava* \[*sabhava*\]: inherent nature, intrinsic nature *teja* \[*usnata*\]: fire (a *mahabhuta*) Theravada: a major branch of Abhidharma *vayu* \[*vayu*\]: air, wind (a *mahabhuta*) *vijnana* \[*vinnana*\]: consciousness, discernment (a *skandha*) *vedana*: feeling, sensation (a *skandha*) ### References Buswell, Jr., Robert E. and Donald S. Lopez, Jr., [*The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10099.html) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Buddhaghosa, [Visuddhimagga: The Path of Purification](https://archive.org/details/Visuddhimagga-ThePathOfPurification), trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 2011), especially Part III, Chapter 14. Karunadasa, Y., [*The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma*](http://www.abhidhamma.org/dhamma_theory_philosophical_corn.htm) (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1996). Ronkin, Noa, [*Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition*](https://www.routledge.com/Early-Buddhist-Metaphysics-The-Making-of-a-Philosophical-Tradition/Ronkin/p/book/9780415600019) (New York: Routledge, 2005), Chapter 2, 34-85. Siderits, Mark, [*Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/buddhism-as-philosophy) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2007), 111-123. ### About the Author Nick is a professor of philosophy at The University of Alabama in Huntsville. His research focuses on Buddhist metaphysics and (separately) philosophy of systems biology. He has published in *Philosophy East and West*, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, *British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, and *Erkenntnis*, among others. [www.uah.edu/njones/](http://www.uah.edu/njones/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Buddhism, Global Philosophy, Historical Philosophy --- ### [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) **Published:** November 4, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to Karl Marx's theory of history, known as historical materialism. **Content:** Author: Angus Taylor Categories: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 1000 Karl Marx (1818–1883) is one of history’s most influential and controversial figures. He devoted most of his time to trying to understand the inner workings of capitalist economies.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) He was also a philosopher concerned with the alienation under capitalism of individuals from their social and creative potential.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) On a broader canvas, Marx was a philosopher of history[\[3\]](#_ftn3) who outlined a theory of the development and transformation of human societies in general – a theory referred to as *historical materialism*. This essay introduces this theory. [!["Work" by Ford Madox Brown, 1865](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ford-madox-brown-1865_work.jpg?resize=656%2C463&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ford-madox-brown-1865_work.jpg?ssl=1)[*Work*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Work_(painting)) by Ford Madox Brown, 1865 ### 1. What is Historical Materialism? Various theses have been advanced to explain the course of human history: for example, that history is shaped primarily by the actions of exceptional individuals.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Or that it displays the unfolding of humanity’s consciousness of freedom.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Or that civilizations grow and decay like biological organisms.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Or that history has no pattern but “is just one damned thing after another.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) For Marx, the key factor determining the form and development of any society is the way it interacts with its material environment to sustain itself – that is, its *mode of production*. This comprises its technological powers (“forces of production”) and the economic structure (“relations of production”) used to harness those powers. The forces of production include the means of production (tools, machines, and raw materials) and the labor power of workers (strength, skill, and knowledge). The relations of production are social relations of control over forces of production, both means of production and labor power. The division of society into economic classes reflects the unequal distribution of power over the production process and the wealth created. “The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general,” says Marx.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) In particular, a society’s economic structure (“base”) determines the nature of its “superstructure” of legal and political institutions and prevailing ideology. Marx argues that in time a society’s growing technological capacities become hindered (“fettered”) by its relatively invariant economic structure. This increasing dysfunction eventually results in revolution: the economic structure is replaced to allow for further technological growth, and society’s political and legal institutions and its ideology undergo a corresponding change. For example, when the feudal, land-based economies of the European Middle Ages became hindrances to the growth of society’s productive powers, they were superseded by capitalist economies, based on market competition, private ownership of the means of production, and the employment of wage workers. These economies were entrenched by the political dominance of the capitalist class and an ideology of acquisitive individualism that came to prevail. ### 2. Technological Determinism? What ultimately drives historical change? One school of thought sees Marx’s theory as a form of technological determinism “in which history is, fundamentally, the growth of human productive power, and forms of society rise and fall according as they enable or impede that growth.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Others, though not denying that technology may lay the groundwork for historical change, are adamant that Marx assigns the key role to the struggles among different economic classes.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) In *The Communist Manifesto* Marx and his colleague Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) proclaim, “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 3. Capitalism Marx’s general theory of history encompasses societies of all types, each type having certain unique features. The capitalist mode of production is a self-expanding, unstable system, marked by a “boom-and-bust” cycle. Market competition has given unprecedented impetus to the development of technology while undermining traditional social ties and values, and concentrating capital in the hands of the relative few who control the means of production. But it has simultaneously generated a working class that is increasingly integrated and made aware of its own potential power by the evolution of the very system that exploits it. Originally Marx and Engels believed that the struggle to overthrow capitalist ruling classes would require violence; but by the 1870s they had come to believe that in certain countries with parliamentary institutions, the working class could win power by peaceful means. The transition from capitalism would allow the achievement of a truly democratic and classless society (“communism”), thus bringing an end to the history of class struggles.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Capitalism has proven far more resilient than Marx expected. Now, however, the addition of ecological crises to capitalism’s traditional challenges has the makings of a perfect storm, one that many think the system will be hard-pressed to survive in anything like its current form.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 4. Is the Theory Coherent? Some critics say Marx’s theory of history is either false or trivial. If it holds that society’s legal and political “superstructure” is merely an effect of the mode of production, then it is clearly false because politics, law, and ideology profoundly affect the latter. For example, a capitalist economy could not last a day without the laws and judicial system that protect private ownership and support markets, enable trade, guarantee security, etc. On the other hand, if Marx’s theory is interpreted to mean that every aspect of the social system affects every other aspect, then it is true but trivial. Defenders of Marx, beginning with Engels, have sought ways to reconcile the idea of the explanatory primacy of the mode of production with the fact of reciprocal influence. The works of scholars in recent decades include impressive attempts to show that the theory can be interpreted in a way that is coherent and non-trivial.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 5. Conclusion Marx’s theory of history claims to identify structural and developmental features common to all human societies, grounded in their need to employ their technological powers to wrest a living from their material environments.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) While rejecting the idea that the course of history is predetermined, it sees a long-term progression of societal forms toward increased technological capacity to control this “metabolism” with nature. Whatever the merits of Marx’s predictions about capitalism, historical materialism, as a more general theory of history, cannot peer into a future beyond capitalism with any assurance – though it may assist in understanding how, over the long course of history, we have got to where we are now. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) So-called *speculative* philosophy of history refers to theories of the course of human history, of which Marx’s theory is one. *Critical* philosophy of history examines the methods and kinds of explanations used by historians. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881). See Besner (2013). Carlyle is depicted in Ford Madox Brown’s painting *Work* at the right side, wearing a hat. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). See Pinkard (2019). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Oswald Spengler (1880–1936). See Gallant (2021). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This phrase is commonly attributed to Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975), though Toynbee’s own view is that the rise and fall of civilizations depends on whether elites can respond creatively to challenging circumstances. See Kumar (2014). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See McLellan (2000), p. 425. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Cohen (1978), p. x. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See the works of British Marxist historian E. P. Thompson, e.g., Thompson (2013). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See McLellan (2000), p. 246. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Marx wrote little about this prospective post-capitalist society. The state, an instrument of class domination, would eventually be replaced by a cooperative community in which each person would be able to engage in creative, satisfying work and develop all sides of themselves, mental and physical. Each would contribute to society according to their individual abilities and receive according to their individual needs. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Benton (2018). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Cohen (1978) argues that the economic structure determines, or selects, a particular type of superstructure precisely because of the latter’s stabilizing effect on the economic structure, just as in turn that particular economic structure is determined by its effect on the development of the productive forces. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Historical materialism is not the same as “dialectical materialism”. The latter is a philosophy of nature that views human societies as components of a larger hierarchy of systems drawing energy from their environments and subject to common basic laws of development. Whether dialectical materialism is compatible with historical materialism has been the subject of considerable debate. ### References [Benton, Ted. 2018. “What Karl Marx Has to Say about Today’s Environmental Problems”. In ](https://theconversation.com/what-karl-marx-has-to-say-about-todays-environmental-problems-97479)[*The Conversation*](https://theconversation.com/what-karl-marx-has-to-say-about-todays-environmental-problems-97479)[.](https://theconversation.com/what-karl-marx-has-to-say-about-todays-environmental-problems-97479) [Besner, Linda. 2013. “Not Made by Great Men”. In ](https://hazlitt.net/feature/not-made-great-men)[*Hazlitt*](https://hazlitt.net/feature/not-made-great-men)[.](https://hazlitt.net/feature/not-made-great-men) [Cohen, G. A. 1978. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691070681/karl-marxs-theory-of-history)[*Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691070681/karl-marxs-theory-of-history)[. Princeton: Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691070681/karl-marxs-theory-of-history) [Fulcher, James. 2015. ](https://academic.oup.com/book/672)[*Capitalism: A Very Short Introduction*](https://academic.oup.com/book/672)[, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://academic.oup.com/book/672) [Gallant, James. 2021. “The Reascent of the Decline”. In ](https://fortnightlyreview.co.uk/2021/02/gallant-spengler/)[*The Fortnightly Review*](https://fortnightlyreview.co.uk/2021/02/gallant-spengler/)[.](https://fortnightlyreview.co.uk/2021/02/gallant-spengler/) [Kumar, Krishan. 2014. “The Return of Civilization – and of Arnold Toynbee?”, ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/return-of-civilizationand-of-arnold-toynbee/FE6F858900CBB1843DD7C0D3DD5BE360)[*Comparative Studies in Society and History*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/return-of-civilizationand-of-arnold-toynbee/FE6F858900CBB1843DD7C0D3DD5BE360)[ 56: 815–843.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/return-of-civilizationand-of-arnold-toynbee/FE6F858900CBB1843DD7C0D3DD5BE360) [McLellan, David (ed.). 2000. ](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/karl-marx-selected-writings-9780198782650?cc=ca&lang=en&)[*Karl Marx: Selected Writings*](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/karl-marx-selected-writings-9780198782650?cc=ca&lang=en&)[, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/karl-marx-selected-writings-9780198782650?cc=ca&lang=en&) [Pinkard, Terry. 2019. “The Spirit of History”. In ](https://aeon.co/essays/what-is-history-nobody-gave-a-deeper-answer-than-hegel)[*Aeon*](https://aeon.co/essays/what-is-history-nobody-gave-a-deeper-answer-than-hegel)[.](https://aeon.co/essays/what-is-history-nobody-gave-a-deeper-answer-than-hegel) [Popper, Karl R. 1966. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691019727/open-society-and-its-enemies-volume-2)[*The Open Society and Its Enemies*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691019727/open-society-and-its-enemies-volume-2)[, vol. II. Princeton: Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691019727/open-society-and-its-enemies-volume-2) [Shaw, William H. 1978. ](https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/oer/5/)[*Marx’s Theory of History*](https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/oer/5/)[. Stanford: Stanford University Press.](https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/oer/5/) [Thompson, E. P. 2013 (1963). ](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/13539/the-making-of-the-english-working-class-by-thompson-e-p/9780141976952)[*The Making of the English Working Class*](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/13539/the-making-of-the-english-working-class-by-thompson-e-p/9780141976952)[. London: Penguin.](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/13539/the-making-of-the-english-working-class-by-thompson-e-p/9780141976952) ### Related Essays [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/karl-marxin-tarih-teorisi-angus-taylor/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/marx-phil-of-history.pdf). ### About the Author Angus Taylor taught philosophy for many years at the University of Victoria in British Columbia. He is the author of [*Animals and Ethics: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate*](https://broadviewpress.com/product/animals-and-ethics-third-edition/)[ (Broadview Press, 2009)](https://broadviewpress.com/product/animals-and-ethics-third-edition/). [uvic.academia.edu/AngusTaylor](https://uvic.academia.edu/AngusTaylor) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** historical materialism, Marx, Marxism --- ### [Philosophy of Archaeology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/13/philosophy-of-archaeology/) **Published:** March 13, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to philosophical issues in archeology. **Content:** Author: Indy Smith Category: [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science"), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) Word Count: 999 The work of archaeologist is worlds away from the fantasy of the globe-trotting, Nazi-fighting Jones boys, but archaeological work still has its own idiosyncratic charm. From a small and fragmentary set of hard-won clues, archaeologists construct a telescopic vision of our distant human past. They are not unlike an astronomer who processes data gathered by the Hubble telescope to create meaningful images of the cosmos. Admittedly, the image we receive back from archaeologists lacks the grandeur of something like the Carina Nebula, but it is no less important to our overall scientific understanding. Through the efforts of archaeologists, we are offered a rare glimpse of our own origins as human beings. The question for the philosopher, then, is this: how do archaeologists do what they do? What makes their work a reliable lens through which to view our human past? This essay engages these questions. [![A scene from the 1981 film "Raiders of the Lost Ark." ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/indiana-jones.jpg?resize=656%2C370&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/indiana-jones.jpg?ssl=1) A scene from the 1981 film “Raiders of the Lost Ark.” ### 1. The Fundamental Problem of Archaeology To answer that question, it helps to understand the challenges faced by the archaeologist, in particular what might be called the *fundamental problem of archaeology*. The fundamental problem is, in effect, a problem of access. The archaeologist wants to make sense of what will here be referred to as *past human ways of life*. Past human ways of life are a riotous assembly of actions and events, actions and events that are sometimes momentous, like the fall of Rome, sometimes mundane, like the manufacture of stone tools, and sometimes strange, like the purported carnal liaisons our early ancestors shared with the Neanderthals. These past human ways of life make up sets of closely related and fully realized physical phenomena. As such, past human ways of life have measurable physical consequences. Sometimes these physical consequences defy the odds, surviving through all the upheaval of the intervening years to become the sorts of evidence the archaeologist might directly observe in the present. The archaeologist refers collectively to all of these physical consequences of human life that have survived into the present as the *archaeological record*. Now, one thing the archaeologist must accept, however reluctantly, is that they are not time travelers. If they could travel back in time, their work would be simple. They could bypass the archaeological record entirely and directly observe past human ways of life. Whatever claims they would like to make about the human past, about what happened and when, they could confirm just by having a direct look – no inference from evidence needed. Unfortunately, archaeologists don’t have time machines. So, the fundamental problem for them is that they have no way of getting themselves into a position where they could just watch the past unfold. That means that they must come at past human ways of life indirectly, so to speak, by relying on evidence left in the present by those past ways of life.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) So, how do they do it? ### 2. Positivism Archaeologists have devised a number of alternative solutions to this fundamental problem.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) *Positivist archaeologists* maintain that archaeology reliably represents the human past via two methodological procedures: *direct observation* of present evidence and *knowledge of the causes* of that evidence.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) One might imagine an archaeologist bushwhacking through southern Utah where they stumble upon a slab of rock roughly the size of two textbooks laid side by side. Down the middle of the rock runs a long, shallow groove. The archaeologist knows that present-day indigenous people in the region grind corn on flat rocks bearing a striking resemblance to the one lying before her. They also know that in regions like this one, corn’s energetic profitability makes it an important staple of the diet. Knowing such things, and seeing what they see, they conclude that humans here once ground corn. It is worth noting that the positivist view is substantially more sophisticated than this simple description would suggest. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that for the positivist, the two most important features of good archaeological work are direct observation and knowledge of causes. ### 3. Extreme Relativism Let’s turn to an alternative to the positivist view known as the *extreme relativist view* of archaeology. It should first be noted that extreme relativism is more a motley than a unified field. What all the various positions share in common is a core set of objections to the positivist view in archaeology, specifically the positivist view of direct observation of evidence in the present.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Extreme relativists tend to implicate an almost endless variety of social, political, and economic forces they take to be causally responsible for the inability of archaeologists to directly observe evidence in the present. As they see it, these various factors tint the lenses of archaeology, mediating between the archaeological observer and the thing supposedly being observed. This leads to a somewhat cynical view about archaeological images of the past. Extreme relativists insist that images of the human past do not so much reflect good evidence as they do the sorts of social, political, and economic forces that influence archaeologists in the present. Accordingly, extreme relativists believe that no objective picture of the past is possible. ### 4. Moderate Relativism Moderate relativists lie somewhere between positivists and extreme relativists. They admit that social, political, and economic forces may influence present archaeological observations and therefore shape archaeological images of the past. Nevertheless, moderate relativists think that it is often possible to address these influences and to gain some objective or true understanding of the lives humans once lived.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 5. Conclusion The field of archaeology is quite contentious and foundational battles are, if not being fought outright, still simmering in a sort of unspoken cold war. Philosophers might, therefore, contribute much to the field, especially concerning the nature of archaeological observation and the scope of archaeological knowledge. It is hoped, in addition, that an explanation for archaeologists’ reliability might one day be found. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Binford, 1983 and Trigger 2003. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Trigger, 2006. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Binford, 1962; Binford, 1965; Gibbon, 1989; Salmon, 1982; Wylie, 2002; and Hempel, 1942. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See Shanks and Tilley, 1987. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Hodder and Hutson, 2003. ### References [Binford, Lewis. “Archaeology as Anthropology.” *American Antiquity* 28: 1962, pp 217-225.](http://anthro.utah.edu/PDFs/binford_1962.pdf) [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. “Archaeological Systematics and the Study of Cultural Process.” *American Antiquity* 31: 1965, pp 203-210.](http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/davidson/proseminar/Week%209%20Paradigms%20and%20Schools%20of%20Archaeology/Binford%201965%20Archaeological%20systematics.pdf) [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_](http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/davidson/proseminar/Week%209%20Paradigms%20and%20Schools%20of%20Archaeology/Binford%201965%20Archaeological%20systematics.pdf)[. “Meaning, Inference, and the Material Record.” In *Ranking, Resource and Exchange*, edited by Colin Renfrew and Stephen Shennan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp 160-163.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/archaeology/archaeology-general-interest/ranking-resource-and-exchange-aspect-archaeology-early-european-society) [Gibbon, Guy E. (1989). *Explanation in Archaeology*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.](http://www.amazon.com/Explanation-Archaeology-Social-Guy-Gibbon/dp/0631169318/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1394715329&sr=8-1&keywords=Explanation+in+Archaeology+gibbon) [Hempel, Carl. “The Function of General Laws in History.” *The Journal of Philosophy*, 39, No. 2: 1942, pp. 35-48.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2017635?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103651735097) [Hodder, Ian and Hutson, Scott. *Reading the Past: Current Approaches to Interpretation in Archaeology* 3rd Ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/archaeology/archaeological-theory-and-methods/reading-past-current-approaches-interpretation-archaeology-3rd-edition?format=PB) [Salmon, Merrilee H. *Philosophy and Archaeology*. New York, NY: Academic Press, Inc., 1982.](http://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Archaeology-Studies-Merrilee-Salmon/dp/0126156506/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1394715497&sr=8-1&keywords=Philosophy+and+Archaeology+salmon) [Shanks, Michael and Tilley, Christopher. *Re-Constructing Archaeology: Theory and Practice*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987.](http://www.amazon.com/Re-constructing-Archaeology-Theory-Practice-Studies/dp/0415088704/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1394715607&sr=8-1&keywords=Re-Constructing+Archaeology%3A+Theory+and+Practice) [Trigger, Bruce G. *A History of Archaeological Thought*, 2nd Ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/archaeology/archaeology-general-interest/history-archaeological-thought-2nd-edition?format=PB) [Wylie, Alison. *Thinking from Things: Essays in the Philosophy of Archaeology*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002.](http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520223615) ### About the Author Indy Smith, PhD, is the pseudonym of an archaeologist who is interested in the philosophy of archaeology. Why do they write under a pseudonym? Perhaps only the archaeological record will tell! ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Science **Tags:** archaelogy --- ### [The Epistemology of Disagreement: How Should We Respond When People Disagree?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/epistemology-of-disagreement/) **Published:** May 14, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the epistemology of disagreement. **Content:** Author: Jonathan Matheson Category: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/) Word Count: 998 People tend to care deeply about their political, religious, ethical, and philosophical beliefs. For many of these beliefs, however, you know of people who disagree with you *and* are roughly as intelligent, informed, and open-minded as you are. How should you respond when you recognize this fact? Should you lose confidence in your own beliefs, gain confidence, reject your own beliefs, adopt others’ beliefs, suspend judgment on the issue, or some other response? This is the *epistemological problem of disagreement*. This essay introduces this problem. ![A Gathering Of Doctors, Disagreeing Over their Diagnoses : 18th century](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/a-gathering-of-doctors-disagreeing-mary-evans-picture-library.jpg?resize=656%2C534&ssl=1)A Gathering Of Doctors, Disagreeing Over their Diagnoses: 18th century ### 1. Peer Disagreement Philosophers try to understand the epistemic significance of disagreement initially by examining *idealized* cases of “peer disagreement.” People are “epistemic peers” about some matter when they are equally likely to be correct about that matter: they are roughly equal in terms of information, intelligence, and intellectual virtues, the factors that make them likely to have true beliefs. (*Actual* disagreements often don’t involve genuine epistemic peers in this sense; this is discussed below). The problem is that when peers disagree about some matter of fact, at least one of them *must* be incorrect: at least one of them has a false belief about the issue. Peer disagreement is troubling because, since the peers are equally likely to be right, it is just as likely that one peer made a mistake as the other. So, what is rational to do upon discovering that a peer disagrees? While you should seek out further evidence and double-check your reasoning, the central epistemological question concerns what you should *believe*. There are two main positions on the issue. *Conciliatory* views of disagreement claim that upon discovering a peer disagreement you are rationally required to decrease your confidence in your belief, if not give up your belief altogether. *Steadfast* views of disagreement maintain that it can be rational to continue believing just as you did before. ### 2. Conciliatory Views *Conciliatory* views claim that, upon discovering that a peer disagrees with you about some claim, you should change your mind. There is a wide spectrum of conciliatory views depending upon how much change they claim is rationally required. The most discussed conciliatory view is the *Equal Weight* view. According to it, your belief and your peer’s belief should be given equal evidential weight: each should be seen as equally reasonable. This equal weighing is thought to require both peers to ‘split the difference’ and meet in the middle. So, if one peer believed that God exists and the other peer disbelieved that God exists, the Equal Weight view requires that both peers should now suspend judgment as to whether God exists: any other response would be irrational. Two cases, among other considerations, support the Equal Weight view. First, the Thermometer case: You and I are in the same room. We each have what we reasonably believe are equally reliable thermometers. We see that my thermometer reads ‘72’ and yours reads ‘74’. What should we believe about the room’s temperature? To believe that the temperature is 72, simply because that is what my thermometer reads, would be arbitrarily biased. To disbelieve that it is 72, since your thermometer ‘disagrees’, would be to be overly deferential. The rational response, it seems, is to suspend judgment as to whether it is 72 and for whether it is 74: we should have no belief about the exact temperature. Second, the Restaurant Check case: Five people go out to dinner. We all agree to split the check evenly, not worrying about who ordered what. Eve does the math in her head and becomes highly confident that the shares are $43 each. Meanwhile, her peer Ava does the math in her head and becomes highly confident that everyone’s share is $45 each.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Intuitively, Eve should give up her belief that the shares are $43 upon learning that Ava disagrees. Again, given the disagreement, she should have no particular belief about each share of the bill, and neither should anyone else at the table. ### 3. Steadfast Views Not everyone agrees with these verdicts, or at least that the intuitive results of these examples generalize to other cases of peer disagreement. According to *Steadfast* views, it can be rational to keep believing just as you did before you found out your peer disagreed. Several motivations have been given for steadfast views. Some think that it makes a difference who reasoned correctly. Going back to the check case, if Eve, in fact, did the math correctly, then this is an important difference. If she correctly evaluated her evidence, then she should keep believing as she did. Learning that someone else made a mistake with the evidence should not make her give up her belief.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Additional support for such a position can come from thinking about more extreme disagreements. For instance, what if Ava believed each share of the bill was $4,500? Should Eve still reduce her confidence or simply dismiss that calculation outright?[\[3\]](#_ftn3) A second source of motivation for steadfast views comes from thinking about self-trust. The idea is that it makes a difference that *you* are one of the disagreeing parties. The trust that you place in yourself and your own faculties must come first (unlike a thermometer), so this can provide a symmetry breaker in the disagreement. ### 4. Conclusion Debates about idealized peer disagreements are difficult. While thinking about peer disagreement should help us figure out how to deal with everyday disagreements, things get even more complicated with real-world disagreements.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) When it comes to political, religious, ethical, and philosophical beliefs, you are aware of *many* people who disagree (and agree) with you. Most, if not all, of those people are not our epistemic peers, sometimes because they are our *epistemic superiors*: they are more likely to be right than you on the matter. So, how are we to weigh all these opinions?[\[5\]](#_ftn5) And where does this leave our beliefs at the end of the day? Navigating actual disagreements is even more complicated than complicated idealized disagreements but, given the importance of our beliefs, it is important work we must do. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This case follows Christensen (2007) p. 193. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Kelly (2005) for a more detailed defense of this view. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Lackey (2010) and Christensen (2009) for more on extreme disagreements. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See King (2011). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Further, these opinions are not always independently held. So, determining how the numbers matter is no easy thing. See Lackey (2013). ### References [Christensen, David (2007).](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/116/2/187/2738/Epistemology-of-Disagreement-The-Good-News?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [“Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” ](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/116/2/187/2738/Epistemology-of-Disagreement-The-Good-News?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*Philosophical Review*](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/116/2/187/2738/Epistemology-of-Disagreement-The-Good-News?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[ 116: 187-218.](https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-abstract/116/2/187/2738/Epistemology-of-Disagreement-The-Good-News?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Feldman, Richard (2006).](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophers-without-Gods-Meditations-Atheism/dp/019974341X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1526299022&sr=1-1) [“Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” In L. Antony, ed., ](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophers-without-Gods-Meditations-Atheism/dp/019974341X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1526299022&sr=1-1)[*Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life*](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophers-without-Gods-Meditations-Atheism/dp/019974341X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1526299022&sr=1-1)[. New York: Oxford University Press. ](https://www.amazon.com/Philosophers-without-Gods-Meditations-Atheism/dp/019974341X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1526299022&sr=1-1) [Frances, Bryan and Jonathan Matheson (2018). “Disagreement” (co-authored with Bryan Frances).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/) [*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/)[ (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/) [Kelly, Thomas (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199285907?lang=en&cc=us)[*Oxford Studies in Epistemology*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199285907?lang=en&cc=us)[, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199285907?lang=en&cc=us) [King, Nathan. (2011). “Disagreement: What’s the Problem? Or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00441.x)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00441.x)[ 85(2): 249-272.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00441.x) [Lackey, Jennifer (2010).](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&) [“What Should We Do When We Disagree?”](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&) [In ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Oxford Studies in Epistemology*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&)[, Vol. 3](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&)[.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&) [Eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&) [Oxford: Oxford University Press. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-epistemology-9780199584093?cc=us&lang=en&) [Lackey, Jennifer (2013). “Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why the Numbers Matter.” In The Epistemology of Disagreement, Eds. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001/acprof-9780199698370-chapter-12) [Matheson, Jonathan (2016).](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137400895) [*The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement*](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137400895)[. Hampshire: Palgrave.](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137400895) ### Related Essays [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) ### About the Author Jonathan Matheson is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida. He is the author of [*The Epistemology of Disagreement* (Palgrave)](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137400895) and co-editor of [*The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social* (Oxford University Press)](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethics-of-belief-9780199686520?cc=us&lang=en&). He has also written many articles on epistemology and philosophy of religion. [jonathandmatheson.wordpress.com](https://jonathandmatheson.wordpress.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology **Tags:** Disagreeement --- ### [Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) **Published:** November 20, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What makes something funny? This essay reviews some theories of what it is for something to be funny. **Content:** Author: Chris A. Kramer Category: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 995 *Video below* People can laugh at almost anything. What’s the deal with that? What makes something funny? This essay reviews some theories of what it is for something to be funny. Each theory offers insights into this question, but no single approach provides a comprehensive answer. [![A banana peel. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/banana_peel.jpg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/banana_peel.jpg?ssl=1)A banana peel. ### 1. The Superiority Theory of Humor According to the *superiority theory of humor*, funniness results from feeling superior to another person, or at a former version of ourselves, and we laugh *at* them: “Ha! I’m better than you (or former me)!” We look down on the butt of the joke, and by comparison, smugly perceive how different we are from that person.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Consider laughing at someone who slips on a banana peel. Maybe we laugh because we presume we’re better than them; after all, *we* have never slipped on pieces of fruit.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) However, I might feel superior to all sorts of things, such as oysters,[\[3\]](#_ftn3) yet not laugh at them. Also, imagine Socrates, who is notoriously ugly, exclaiming to a group of people, “I’m the most attractive man here.” That’s funny, but there’s no obvious assertion of superiority. But imagine *People* magazine’s “World Sexiest Man” saying that: that’s straightforward superiority, and it isn’t very funny. This reveals, for most scholars of humor, that the superiority theory misses the mark. After all, sometimes things are funny without resulting from superiority, and some feelings of superiority don’t make things funny.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. The Relief Theory of Humor Laughter feels good! Maybe this is because laughing releases pent-up pressure. According to the *relief theory of humor*, venting nervous energy is the primary function of laughter; it releases the energy or emotions or thoughts which are deemed inappropriate or unnecessary.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Consider an example from Sigmund Freud[\[6\]](#_ftn6) about a criminal who says, while being led to his execution on a Monday, “Well, this is a good beginning to the week.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Here, tension is built up in the set-up: we feel apprehension or pity for the criminal. When we recognize he’s unconcerned about his state, that energy becomes “excess” and is released through laughter. The joking context offers cover to express ourselves about issues we might feel pressure to repress, like death or sex. Since we need not repress those urges here, the superfluous energy is released in laughter. But sometimes humor doesn’t involve built-up energy at all. Consider this joke from Steven Wright: “On the other hand, you have different fingers.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) There is no time to induce any sort of mental energy based on the set-up of this joke. There’s no time to build up any energy that needs to be released. It’s funny independently of any pent-up feelings, so the relief theory of humor can’t account for this joke. ### 3. The Incongruity Theory of Humor According to the *incongruity theory of humor*, humor results from the sudden recognition of dissonance or incongruence where our expectations had prepared us for something completely different.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) The temporary confusion is replaced with humor when we reinterpret the setup and its relation to the punchline. Instead of confusion, there’s a kind of resolution, and our reward for getting it is humor.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The element of surprise cannot be frightening or dangerous, since these create negative emotions that block feelings of amusement. Finding the severed head of your favorite horse in your bed is incongruous, yet few would laugh. Mere surprise is insufficient for humor.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Consider: “The unfaithful artist heard his wife coming up the stairs. He said to his lover, ‘Quick, take off your clothes!’”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) On an immediate, superficial reading, we are befuddled by his unexpected and incongruous request. But, we can reinterpret the set-up so it clicks: he’s an artist “painting” her, and that sometimes happens in the nude, so the wife would suspect nothing.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Many simple and amusing riddles rely upon similar forms of ambiguity, such as this: “Why was 6 afraid of 7? Because, 7, 8, 9.” We easily shift between the meaning of *ate* and the phonetically identical numeral *eight*, and enjoy the alternating and incongruous frames of reference. With humor, we undergo a psychological and conceptual shift “from a serious state of perceiving and thinking about things that fit into our conceptual patterns, to a nonserious state of being amused by some incongruity.”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) When we are serious, we are worried when the world is inconsistent with how we expect it to be. When we are playful, the incongruities are enjoyable. This analysis offers the groundwork for an empirically-based study into humor where the degree of incongruity can be tweaked within a laboratory setting, thereby increasing or decreasing the level of humor.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) While most current theorists lean toward some version of the incongruity theory, it has limitations.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The theory best applies to instances of humor that are clearly verbal, where ambiguity, for example, is most easily constructed; but not all humor is verbal. Also, we sometimes enjoy re-experiencing instances of humor, like re-watching a sitcom, where our expectations are *not* violated; indeed we consciously anticipate the impending humor. Finally, the sense of “incongruity” is so broad, including dissonance, contradiction, outright absurdity, that it loses its meaning, making the theory difficult to falsify: the concept of “incongruity” is so elastic, that it can be expanded *ad hoc* to cover any instance of humor, even that which, on the face of it, does not appear to rely on incongruity as such.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### 4. Conclusion: It’s Funny, None of These Theories Seem Adequate Perhaps a combination of these theories can explain what makes something funny. There is little consensus regarding which theory is best, but, like most philosophical conundrums worth thinking about, this is not uncommon. The philosophy of humor relies on many other philosophical areas, including logic, philosophy of language, aesthetics, and others.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) And since humor and laughter are emotions and expressions present in every known society in every time period, it is no frivolous endeavor. Failure to find a complete account of what makes something funny might be because it’s in the early stages of study. Or maybe we just aren’t in on the joke. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) This view was considered by Plato (429?–347 B.C.E.) who worried that our uncontrollable laughter could lead to maliciousness, as one would be more likely to feel and think less of those inferior to them. See Plato’s (1989) *Philebus*, pp. 49–50. It was most famously championed by Thomas Hobbes: “Sudden glory, is the passion which makes those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleases them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves” (Hobbes 2002 \[1651\], Part 1 Ch 6). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Indeed, the extensive use of this example seems disproportionate to its occurrence in reality. Even though this example is central for Henri Bergson (1859–1941) (cf. Bergson 1911), and makes it into just about every analysis of humor, including this one, this has probably not happened that often in the history of humanity, or in the ape-world, where bananas are notoriously *appealing*. (Note: what just happened there is called a pun, sometimes deemed the *lowest form of humor.* But some puns can be *fruit*ful, like that one, so, clearly, I disagree. Also, where’s the butt in puns? \[Note on the note: *if* this note is funny, it is further evidence against the superiority theory of humor, since nothing in this note suggests any superiority on anyone’s part.\]) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) An example from Francis Hutcheson (1987) in response to Hobbes: “Strange!—that none of our Hobbists \[nice\] banish all canary birds and squirrels, and lap-dogs … out of their houses, and substitute in their place asses, and owls, and snails, and oysters to be merry upon. From these they might have higher joys of superiority” (p. 29). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Many humor theorists have sought both of these conditions to get at the essence of humor: “Traditionally, theories have taken an ‘essentialist’ approach … by searching for an essence that is necessarily present in all cases of amusement and the presence of which is sufficient for being a case of amusement” (Roberts 2019, 25). But not everyone thinks there is an essence of humor to be discovered: “I think the best we can do is to explain the ways ‘humor’ and ‘amusement’ have been used, and analyze paradigm cases that fit under most standard usages of these terms. A search for necessary and sufficient conditions would be futile” (Morreall 2009, 64). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) According to Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), our laughter is a physiological release of pent-up energy like in hydraulic systems (Spencer 1860). When there are few channels available, strong feelings of almost any sort lead to the discharge of energy, one being the uncontrollable paroxysms that is laughter. In this way, Jim Holt reminds us, borrowing a bit from the Marquis De Sade, “The objective of sexual congress is to elicit involuntary noisemaking from your partner–which is precisely the objective of humor” (Holt 2008, 66). We also release chemicals beneficial to pain and stress reduction through laughter (see Dunbar et. al. 2012), though Spencer would not have known this. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Speaking of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), he continues the relief hypothesis, but introduces a “psychical” element to describe what is released in laughter, offering an account of humor not explicit in Spencer (Freud 1960). When we suppress thoughts about taboo issues like sex and bodily functions, mental energy is released by a well-crafted joke that would otherwise be needed to censor such inappropriate thoughts. This view is encapsulated by Cicero, though not a Relief theorist: “An indecency decently put is the thing we laugh at hardest.” Quoted in Holt, (Preface). This is also a nice entry into Steven Gimbel’s “cleverness” theory of humor (Gimbel 2017). Briefly, his view is that all humor is intentional, conspicuous, playful cleverness. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Freud 1928, 1. Note, this might be humorous to you, yet fail to evoke any audible laughter (you might be tired, or just inclined to smile), revealing that the latter is not necessary to have the former. Also, one might laugh out of nervousness, laughing gas, or neurosurgeons stimulating a part of your brain forcing a guffaw, but none of these instances are caused by humor. Thus, laughter is also not sufficient for humor. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Quoted in Huemer n.d. Really almost any placid, extraordinarily dry, joke from Wright might stand as a counter-example to the Relief theory. For more on the Relief theory, see Morreall 1983, 20–37; Roberts 2019, 91–93, and Freud 1960. Roberts (2019, 92) and Hurley et. al. (2011, 44) point out the additional concern that “psychic” or “mental” energy is an outdated notion. But, “tension” and “arousal” might be useful in explaining some reactions to humor, they are simply not necessary for all instances, as the Wright example demonstrates. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See almost anything from Monty Python n.d. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) When our expectations are violated in a non-threatening way, we often laugh. According to Arthur Schopenhauer, it is this recognition of dissonance that is necessary for humor: “Amusement, reveals that it is ‘delightful for us to see this strict, untiring, and most troublesome governess, our faculty of reason, for once convicted of inadequacy’ in its attempt to discern a perfectly reasonable universe” (Schopenhauer 1887, 279-80). For more on the mirth-as-reward for catching cognitive, linguistic, or logical errors, see Hurley et al. 2011). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For an overview of this history see Morreall 1983, 1–59; Hurley et al. 2011, 37–56; Buckley 2005, 3–48, and for a defense of an incongruity theory against competing views such as Superiority and Relief/Release theories, see Oring 2003, 1–12; Marmysz 2003, 123–54. Other terms often used as synonyms to define/explain incongruity have been ludicrousness, ridiculousness, the unexpected, contradiction, paradox, absurdity, something inappropriate or inconsistent, logical fallacy, lack of harmony, ambiguity, having parts that do not fit together, etc. That is a lot! Perhaps too much, as we will see. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Marmysz 2003, 136. He adds: “When we laugh at a joke, we do so because we recognize that an unanticipated outcome sensibly completes the story without contradicting our most general assumptions about what the world is like” (Marmysz 2003, 137). But not all incongruity in humor sustains our sense of what is real: “There were two muffins in an oven. First one says ‘Wow, it’s like a sauna in here.’ Second one says, “Oh my God! A talking muffin!’” [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Immanuel Kant has a version of this approach: “Whatever is to arouse lively, convulsive laughter must contain something absurd (that the understanding cannot like for its own sake). *Laughter is an affect that arises if a tense expectation is transformed into nothing*.” Kant, 1987, Part I, Division 1, Section 54. With Schopenhauer (1887), our reason is flustered by the surprising punchline in a joke, but we are not angered like we would be upon recognizing a lie, though there is often deception in jokes; instead, we are “gladdened” by the jesting, especially if/when there can be a resolution to the initial incongruity, something not clearly captured with Kant’s hypothesis. But Kant connects wit, a humorous attitude, with “the play of thought”, that cultivates enjoyment of incongruity rather than annoyance. This notion has been extended to connect some humor with philosophical thought experiment See Gooding (1998, 396), Morreall (2009), and Veale (2015). Thought experiment can be translated as *Gedankenspiel*, thought-play in German. There are many ways from here to study the intersections between intellect and emotion via analyses of humor, making this a fruitful area of study. There are links to the Play theory of humor from an evolutionary lens, in which our capacity to enjoy humor arose out of our inclination to play, as animals play-fight, in a non-threatening, and learning, situation (see Boyd 2004, 6-13 and Hurley et al. 2011, who present an error-detection model of the evolution of humor). Relatedly, there is Steven Gimbel’s (2017) Cleverness theory in which the degree of cleverness in the play of ideas is the necessary element of humor, and must be present whether there is relief, superiority, or incongruity. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Morreall 1983, 38. But “nonserious” does not entail pure frivolity. One can be serious in their play, as with professional musicians and athletes, and one can be playful with serious ideas, as with philosophers and some subversive humorists (see Kramer 2020). John Morreall is largely responsible for making the philosophy of humor a significant field in its own right. Here is more on his brand of Incongruity theory: “1. We experience a *cognitive shift*—a rapid change in our perceptions or thoughts. 2. We are in a *play mode* rather than a serious mode, disengaged from conceptual and practical concerns. 3. Instead of responding to the cognitive shift with shock, confusion, puzzlement, fear, anger, or other negative emotions, we *enjoy* it. 4. Our pleasure at the cognitive shift is expressed in *laughter*, which signals to others that they can relax and play too” (Morreall 2009, 50). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See McGraw and Warner (2014) for the *Benign Violation Theory*. If a rule (usually social/cultural) is flouted but in an innocuous fashion in which no one is harmed or seriously offended (a difficult line to find), the violation is said to be “benign”, and we laugh. If there is no violation, or too strong of one, there is less amusement or none. This is an attempt to test the conditions for humor in a laboratory setting by tweaking the degree of rule violations. This is no easy task, as replicating any findings gets harder each time you introduce new subjects into the study, and the same subject cannot be used for additional tellings of the same jokes. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Latta (1999), Hurley et al. (2011) and Gimbel (2017) for more limitations of Incongruity theories. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Contrary to how this sounds, it is not necessarily a positive thing for any theory. At the very least, it renders it non-scientific, as there are no possible mechanisms for demonstrating under what conditions the theory would fail; the meaning of “incongruity” simply gets subtly reinterpreted in an *ad hoc* fashion in order to meet any challenge (see Gimbel 2017, 33–35 for a discussion on this point). This would be like trying to understand something like Freud’s Oedipal Complex, where all young boys pass through a phase in which they desire to kill their father and have sex with their mother. Anytime a boy who vehemently denies such feelings ever occurred to him, this putative counter-evidence is simply repurposed to support the theory: “That is *exactly* what a young man with the Oedipal Complex would say!” [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Despite its connection to philosophy more broadly, it was not until 2020 that the first journal devoted to this subject to emerge: *The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook* (Amir n.d.). ### References [Amir, Lydia (Ed.). N.d. ](https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/phhumyb/html)[*The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook*](https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/phhumyb/html)[. DeGruyter. ](https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/phhumyb/html) [Bergson, Henri. 1911. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4352)[*Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4352)[, C. Brereton and F. Rothwell (trs.), London: Macmillan.](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4352) [Boyd, Brian. 2004. “Laughter and Literature: A Play Theory of Humor,” ](https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/23605)[*Philosophy and Literature*](https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/23605)[, 28: 1–23.](https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/23605) [Buckley, Frank H. 2005. ](https://www.press.umich.edu/12004/morality_of_laughter)[*The Morality of Laughter: A Serious Look at the Meaning of Laughter*](https://www.press.umich.edu/12004/morality_of_laughter)[. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.](https://www.press.umich.edu/12004/morality_of_laughter) [Dunbar, Robin et. al. 2012. “Social laughter is correlated with an elevated pain threshold” in ](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21920973/)[*Proceedings of the Biological Sciences,* ](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21920973/)[22:279 (1731):1161–7](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21920973/)[.](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21920973/) [Freud, Sigmund. 1928. “Humour” in ](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=freud+s.+(1928).+humour.+international+journal+of+psychoanalysis+9+1%E2%80%936&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart)[*International Journal of Psychoanalysis*](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=freud+s.+(1928).+humour.+international+journal+of+psychoanalysis+9+1%E2%80%936&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart)[, Vol. 9: 1–6.](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=freud+s.+(1928).+humour.+international+journal+of+psychoanalysis+9+1%E2%80%936&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart) [Freud, Sigmund. 1960. ](https://www.amazon.com/Relation-Unconscious-Standard-Complete-Psychological/dp/0393001458)[*Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious.* ](https://www.amazon.com/Relation-Unconscious-Standard-Complete-Psychological/dp/0393001458)[Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.](https://www.amazon.com/Relation-Unconscious-Standard-Complete-Psychological/dp/0393001458) [Gimbel, Steven. 2017. ](https://www.routledge.com/Isnt-that-Clever-A-Philosophical-Account-of-Humor-and-Comedy/Gimbel/p/book/9780367594923)[*Isn’t that Clever: A Philosophical Account of Humor and Comedy.*](https://www.routledge.com/Isnt-that-Clever-A-Philosophical-Account-of-Humor-and-Comedy/Gimbel/p/book/9780367594923) [New York: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Isnt-that-Clever-A-Philosophical-Account-of-Humor-and-Comedy/Gimbel/p/book/9780367594923) [Gooding, David. 1998. “Thought Experiments.” In ](https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/thought-experiments/v-1)[*Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/thought-experiments/v-1)[, Vol. 9. Edited by Edward Craig, Taylor and Francis.](https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/thought-experiments/v-1) [Hobbes, Thomas. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm)[*Leviathan.* ](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm)[1651. The Project Gutenberg eBook, Release Date: July 2, 2002 \[eBook #3207\].](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm) [Holt, Tim. 2008. ](https://www.publishersweekly.com/9780393066739)[*Stop Me If You’ve Heard This: A History and Philosophy of Jokes.*](https://www.publishersweekly.com/9780393066739)[ New York: Norton and Company.](https://www.publishersweekly.com/9780393066739) [Huemer, Michael. “Stephen Wright Jokes.” Accessed 19 November 2022. https://www.owl232.net/wright.htm](https://www.owl232.net/wright.htm) [Hurley, Matthew, Daniel Dennett, and Reginald Adams Jr. 2011. ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inside-jokes)[*Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inside-jokes)[. Cambridge: MIT Press.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inside-jokes) [Hutcheson, Frances.1987. “Reflections Upon Laughter.” In ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/T/The-Philosophy-of-Laughter-and-Humor2)[*The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor.*](https://sunypress.edu/Books/T/The-Philosophy-of-Laughter-and-Humor2)[ Ed. John Morreall, New York: Suny. 26–40.](https://sunypress.edu/Books/T/The-Philosophy-of-Laughter-and-Humor2) [Kant, Immanuel. 1987. ](https://hackettpublishing.com/literature/aesthetics/critique-of-judgment)[*Critique of Judgment.*](https://hackettpublishing.com/literature/aesthetics/critique-of-judgment)[ Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.](https://hackettpublishing.com/literature/aesthetics/critique-of-judgment) [Kramer, Chris A. 2020. “Subversive Humor as Art and the Art of Subversive Humor.” In ](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/phhumyb-2020-0012/html)[*The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook,* ](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/phhumyb-2020-0012/html)[Ed. Lydia Amir, Vol. 1, No. 1: 153–179. ](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/phhumyb-2020-0012/html) [Latta, Robert. 1999. ](https://www.amazon.com/Basic-Humor-Process-Cognitive-Shift-Incongruity/dp/3110161036)[*The Basic Humor Process: A Cognitive-Shift Theory and the Case Against Incongruity.* ](https://www.amazon.com/Basic-Humor-Process-Cognitive-Shift-Incongruity/dp/3110161036)[New York: Mouton de Gruyter.](https://www.amazon.com/Basic-Humor-Process-Cognitive-Shift-Incongruity/dp/3110161036) [Marmysz, John. 2003. ](https://sunypress.edu/Books/L/Laughing-at-Nothing2)[*Laughing at Nothing: Humor as a Response to Nihilism*](https://sunypress.edu/Books/L/Laughing-at-Nothing2)[. Albany: State University of New York Press.](https://sunypress.edu/Books/L/Laughing-at-Nothing2) [McGraw, Peter and Warner, Joel. 2014. ](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Humor-Code/Peter-McGraw/9781451665420)[*The Humor Code: A Global Search for What Makes Things Funny.*](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Humor-Code/Peter-McGraw/9781451665420)[ New York: Simon and Schuster.](https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Humor-Code/Peter-McGraw/9781451665420) [Monty Python. “Monty Python.” Accessed 19 November 2022. https://www.montypython.com/ ](https://www.montypython.com/) [Morreall, John. 2009. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444307795)[*Comic Relief: A Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor.* ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444307795)[Malden MA: Wiley and Sons Ltd.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444307795) [Morreall, John. 1983. Taking Laughter Seriously. Albany: State University of New York Press.](https://sunypress.edu/Books/T/Taking-Laughter-Seriously2) [Oring, Elliot. 2003. ](https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p075933)[*Engaging Humor*](https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p075933)[. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.](https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p075933) [Plato. 1989. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691097183/the-collected-dialogues-of-plato)[*The Collected Dialogues of Plato.* ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691097183/the-collected-dialogues-of-plato)[Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns Eds. Bollingen Series LXXI, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691097183/the-collected-dialogues-of-plato). [Roberts, Alan. 2019. ](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-14382-4)[*A Philosophy of Humour*](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-14382-4)[. London: Palgrave Macmillan.](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-14382-4) [Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1887. ](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40097)[*The World as Will and Idea: Volume II*](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40097)[. Trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp. Boston: Ticknor and Company.](https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40097) [Spencer, Herbert. 1860. ](https://openlibrary.org/books/OL26294987M/The_physiology_of_laughter)[*The Physiology of Laughter*](https://openlibrary.org/books/OL26294987M/The_physiology_of_laughter)[. London: Macmillan. ](https://openlibrary.org/books/OL26294987M/The_physiology_of_laughter) [Stone, Sophia. 2021. “Why You’re Not Worthy: The Superiority Theory of Humor.” In ](https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=oer)[*It’s Funny ‘Cause It’s True: The Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society’s Introduction to Philosophy through Humor*](https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=oer)[, 31–37. Eds. Henrigillis, Jennifer Marra and Gimbel, Steven. Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society. 31–37.](https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=oer) [Veale, Tony. 2015. “The Humour of Exceptional Cases: Jokes as Compressed Thought Experiments.” In ](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110346343-004/html)[*Cognitive Linguistics and Humour Research*](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110346343-004/html)[, edited by Geert Brône, Kurt Feyearts, and Tony Veale, Berlin: De Gruyter, 69–90. ](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110346343-004/html) ### Related Essays [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) by Brock Rough [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta [Gricean Conversational Implicature: What We Say and What We Mean](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/05/gricean-conversational-implicature/) by Thomas Hodgson ### Video ### Translation [Thai](https://philososerious.wordpress.com/2024/06/05/%e0%b8%9b%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%b1%e0%b8%8a%e0%b8%8d%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%ad%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%a1%e0%b8%93%e0%b9%8c%e0%b8%82%e0%b8%b1%e0%b8%99-%e0%b8%ad%e0%b8%b0%e0%b9%84%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%97%e0%b8%b3%e0%b9%83/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/humor.pdf). ### About the Author Chris Kramer is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Santa Barbara City College. His interests intersect across the philosophy of humor, mind, religion, informal logic, existentialism and phenomenology, and oppression. He wrote his dissertation on “Subversive Humor,” half about humor, half about oppression. Readers will laugh and cry, but mostly cry, mostly because they are reading a Ph.D. dissertation: what has become of their lives? [sbcc.academia.edu/ChrisKramer](https://sbcc.academia.edu/ChrisKramer) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics, Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** funny, humor, laughing, Philosophy of humor --- ### [Idealism Pt. 1: George Berkeley's Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) **Published:** July 7, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Addison Ellis Category: [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/ "Historical Philosophy"), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/ "Metaphysics"), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/) Word Count: 1000 *Editor’s Note: This essay is the first of two essays in a series authored by Addison on the topic of philosophical idealism. Part 2 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism is [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/).* We often take it for granted that we have some knowledge about the way reality is. For instance, it seems clear to me that I know there is a computer screen directly in front of my face, and I believe it is clearly true that I know how to get to the refrigerator from where I currently sit. But what is the nature of the computer screen and the refrigerator? Common sense tells us that they are bundles of physical stuff and that our minds have become adapted, perhaps through a process like evolution, to knowing about and acting with respect to them. Idealism, on the contrary, is the view that what reality is like *depends* upon the way the mind works. There are many distinct versions of idealism in the history of philosophy, and we will consider three of the most important versions over three distinct installments: Berkeley’s subjective idealism, Kant’s transcendental idealism, and Hegel’s absolute idealism. This, then, will be part one of a three-part installment on idealism, and we will start with George Berkeley’s subjective idealism. ![Berkeley](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/berkeley.jpg?resize=430%2C329&ssl=1) ### 1. Two Arguments for Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism George Berkeley, an 18th-Century Irish philosopher, held that *esse est percipi*, or “to be is to be perceived.” When I perceive a black dog, according to many philosophers in the early modern period, I am in possession of a *representational state* – that is, my mind is affected by a physical thing, the dog, which in turn causes my mind to generate a mental representation of the dog. What I perceive, then, is really only a representation, from which I infer the existence of the thing represented. This is called indirect realism. Berkeley challenged this traditional picture in the following way.1 First, when we take a representation to accurately represent an object in the world, we do so on the assumption that the representation *resembles* the object in some way. But, Berkeley argues, we are in no position to say that our ideas resemble anything other than other ideas. According to Berkeley, we cannot compare ideas with material objects since to have knowledge of a material object would require that we know it *via* some idea. Thus, all we ever encounter are ideas themselves, and never anything material. If Berkeley is right, then we never have knowledge of anything material whatsoever; we only ever know our own ideas. This is part of a larger attack in which Berkeley argues that we are not entitled to believe that matter exists, in which case the only things that do exist include minds, ideas, and God. Berkeley is putting forth a view that is sometimes called *subjective idealism*: subjective, because he claims that the only things that can be said to exist are ideas *when they are perceived.* Thus, my black dog exists only when I am currently in possession of the idea of my black dog. If I leave my dog behind when I walk to the store, she no longer exists, and so her existence is purely dependent upon a subject’s perception of her. In addition to the resemblance argument above, and to strengthen his attack on realism and materialism, Berkeley also argues that matter is *impossible.* The basic idea goes like this: Matter is *defined* as physical stuff which can exist independently of our minds. We ordinarily take matter to be the stuff that makes up reality, and this stuff is supposed to go on existing whether we are perceiving it or not. That is, we think of matter as stuff that can exist unconceived. But we can never conceive of matter except through some idea. If so, then we cannot conceive of matter as something unconceived. In fact, it would be absurd to say so, since necessarily in conceiving of matter, we are conceiving of an *idea*, and surely we cannot conceive of an idea that is unconceived. If all of this is true, then, Berkeley argues, matter as it is defined is *impossible*.2 If matter is impossible, then no material objects exist, and it is only possible for minds, ideas, and God to exist. ### 2. Problems with Subjective Idealism If Berkeley is right, and things exist only insofar as they are ideas being perceived by a mind, then there were never physical objects like mountains and animals before minds capable of knowledge (i.e., minds like ours) came into existence. Since things, for Berkeley, exist only insofar as they are being perceived (esse est percipi), and since no minds were perceiving anything millions of years ago, then nothing would have existed millions of years ago, if Berkeley is right. This is an unsettling thought, since it directly conflicts with both common sense and our best scientific worldview. However, Berkeley may be able to avoid such a problem by suggesting that our ideas continue to exist in the mind of God even when we cease to possess them ourselves. When we have ideas, especially perceptual ones, they seem to be *passive* with respect to our minds. That is, in perception we seem to have little choice in what ideas we encounter. Because ideas are passive, they do not cause themselves. Additionally, since ideas are always *possessed* by a mind, and since our minds do not seem to simply produce their own ideas (since we passively *receive* them), they must be given to us from another mind. For this reason, Berkeley believes (i) that God exists, and (ii) that our ideas have their origin in the mind of God. If this is true, then arguably my dog does not simply pop out of existence when I cease to perceive her, since all our ideas are ultimately held in the mind of God.3 ### 3. Conclusions We should take away three important points from this essay. First, idealism is the view that the way reality is depends upon the way the mind is. Second, one version of idealism, Berkeleyan subjective idealism, holds that *all there is* are ideas, the minds that possess those ideas, and God.4 Third and finally, while Berkeley’s view is not without its problems, his arguments are compelling and worth taking very seriously. ### Notes 1 Berkeley rejects both indirect *and* direct realism, to be more precise. In traditional philosophical parlance, it is common to define realism as the view that there exists a mind-independent reality. If this is what realism means, then no idealist is a realist. Curiously, as we will see with Kant’s transcendental idealism, a distinction *can* be made between what Kant calls *transcendental* realism and *empirical* realism. Kant believes that he can be an empirical *realist* and a transcendental *idealist*. 2 See Dialogue Two in the *Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous.* 3 This is by no means the end of the discussion. As we will see in the next installment, Kant has more objections to Berkeley’s subjective idealism. 4 God is a kind of spirit or mind, but one that is infinite rather than finite like us. ### References [Berkeley, George. *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. Indianapolis: Hackett 1979.](http://www.amazon.com/Three-Dialogues-Between-Hylas-Philonous/dp/0915144611/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1404730909&sr=1-1&keywords=three+dialogues+between+hylas+and+philonous) [Downing, Lisa. “George Berkeley.” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford University, 10 Sept. 2004. Web. 07 July 2014. ](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/) ### Related Essays [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson ### About the Author [Addison Ellis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Ellis) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The American University in Cairo. His interests include Kant and Post-Kantian European Philosophy, with special attention to the topics of self-consciousness, ontology, and cognitive capacities and attitudes. [philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis](https://philpeople.org/profiles/addison-ellis) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Berkeley, Ellis, idealism --- ### [(Im)partiality: Partiality and Impartiality in Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) **Published:** August 18, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Shane Gronholz Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 1000 It’s natural to think that when it comes to morality, we should be impartial. And yet almost everyone thinks it is appropriate to treat certain people, like those who are near and dear to them, in a special sort of way. For example, while having food and clothing is clearly a good, it seems that I have a special obligation to my own children over the children of strangers to make sure that they have food and clothing. So we have two moral claims: Impartiality: When it comes to morality, we should be impartial. Partiality: It is appropriate to treat certain people in a special sort of way. There seems to be some tension between these two thoughts. To avoid it, we must either (1) reject the claim that we must be impartial, or (2) reject the claim that it is OK to be partial to certain people, or (3) come to understand impartiality in a different way. ![Dictionary definition of the word 'impartiality.'](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/impartiality.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1) Dictionary definition of the word ‘impartiality.’ ### 1. Why We Should Be Impartial Why think that we must be impartial and treat everybody alike? First, there is something intuitively appealing about the thought that morality requires us to be “as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”1 One might even say that the moral point of view just *is* the impartial point of view. After all, isn’t the point of ethics to step back and try to discover moral principles that apply to everyone? To say that someone acted impartially is often meant to imply that she acted *rightly*. Another reason to think we must be impartial is that it is arbitrary to act otherwise.2 Ask yourself: What is wrong with racism? Well, racists treat people differently on the basis of a feature that is totally morally irrelevant. White people, for example, are no more morally valuable than black people, so there is no good reason to treat those in one group any differently than those of another group. People who are partial to their friends and family, one might argue, make the same mistake. Why should it matter that Chelsea happens to be my friend? Does that make her more morally valuable than some stranger? Obviously not, so it’s hard to see what reason I have to treat her better than I treat strangers.3 ### 2. Why We Should Be Partial But there seems to be a problem with the impartiality view. Could it be wrong to have friends or to treat my family members better than I treat strangers? Do I have just as much reason to make sure every child is provided for as I do my own children? A view with these implications would be hard to swallow, so we might do better to go with option 1 and accept that partiality is morally permissible or even obligatory. For example, consider a parent who focuses the vast majority of his efforts providing the most basic requirements like food, water, and clothing for needy children, but not providing anything more than the basic requirements for his own children. This is not a good parent, and, plausibly, this parent behaves wrongly by treating all children the same. Or consider a person who treats her friends no better than she treats strangers. She sacrifices the interests of her friends whenever she realizes she can do slightly more good by doing so. Developing and maintaining friendships, after all, requires time, energy, and money that could be better spent doing other things. Suppose Annaleigh’s friend Kelly has just gone through a bad breakup and is very upset. The friendly thing for Annaleigh to do might be to go to Kelly’s house, make her dinner, and give her a shoulder to cry on. But now it occurs to Annaleigh that she could help more people by volunteering at the soup kitchen that night, so she does that instead. Annaleigh isn’t being a good friend, and, plausibly, if she’s willing to neglect her friends at the drop of a hat, she isn’t a friend at all. Some have argued that to be a friend is necessarily to treat one’s friends in a special sort of way.4 If it is morally permissible to have friends, for example, then it must also be permissible to be partial, since friendship requires partiality.5 Considerations like these have led some to argue that contemporary western moral theories, which tend to be abstract and impartial, are inadequate and require significant revision.6 ### 3. Alternative Ways to Understand Impartiality Finally, let’s consider option 3. So far, I have been assuming that to be impartial is to treat everyone the same, but that isn’t the only way to understand the term *impartial*.7 One alternative is [Kant’s Categorical Imperative](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/ "Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics"), which states that one should only act according to rules that she could will that everyone follow. It can be hard to know what rules those would be, but it’s not unreasonable to think that one could will that everyone follow a rule that says, “In some cases, I should treat my friends better than I treat strangers.” This is an impartial moral rule in the sense that everyone is allowed to follow it and the person who followed such a rule would approve of anyone else following it. Another solution, which is similar in some ways, is T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism. According to Scanlon, we should treat people “only in ways that would be allowed by principles they could not reasonably reject” (106). Since most of us think that friends and family are extremely important, it’s plausible to think that one could not reasonably reject a principle that entailed that it is OK for me to treat my friends and family better than I treat strangers. A reasonable person might accept that I chose to invest in a college fund for my child, because she is *my* child, even if I could have used that money to provide some more basic need for his children. But it could be much harder to explain to a very poor person why I chose to go on a tropical vacation with my family when I could have saved his children from disease, starvation, and death. ### Notes 1 Mill (1863) 2 See Bentham (1781) and Rachels (2012). Strictly speaking, it is not partiality to which Rachels compares racism, but ethical egoism, but the same line of reasoning can be applied to both. 3 See Cottingham (1986) for replies to this style of argument. 4 Jollimore (2002), Stocker (1976) 5 Several philosophers have attempted to reply to these concerns. See Railton (1988). See Jollimore (2002) for responses to Railton’s arguments. 6 See Gilligan (1993), Jagger (2001), Noddings (1984), Stocker (1976), Williams (1982), Wolf (1992). 7 See, for example, Hooker (2010), Jollimore (2014). ### References [Bentham, Jeremy. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. ](http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML1.html) [Coghlan, Peter. “The Prodigal and his Brother: Impartiality and the Equal Consideration of Interests.” *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 26 no. 3 (2005): 195-206.](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11017-005-3978-8) [Cottingham, John. “Partiality, Favouritism, and Morality.” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol 36, No. 144 (1986). 357-373.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2220190?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104537340147) [Gilligan, Carol. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.](http://www.amazon.com/In-Different-Voice-Psychological-Development/dp/B0025J3YDY/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408379763&sr=8-1&keywords=In+a+Different+Voice%3A+Psychological+Theory+and+Women%E2%80%99s+Development.) [Hooker, Brad. “When Is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?” in *Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World*, edited by Brian Feltham and John Cottingham, 98-130. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.](http://www.amazon.com/Partiality-Impartiality-Morality-Special-Relationships/dp/0199579954/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408379787&sr=8-1&keywords=Partiality+and+Impartiality%3A+Morality%2C+Special+Relationships%2C+and+the+Wider+World) [Jagger, Alison. “Feminist Ethics,” in *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, edited by Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker, 528-539. New York: Routledge, 2001.](http://www.amazon.com/Encyclopedia-Ethics-Lawrence-C-Becker/dp/0415936721/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408379810&sr=8-1&keywords=Encyclopedia+of+Ethics) [Jeske, Diane, “Special Obligations”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/special-obligations/>.](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/special-obligations/) [Jollimore, Troy. “Friendship Without Partiality?” *Ratio* 13 no. 1 (2002): 69-82.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9329.00109/abstract;jsessionid=AC94DAED9730F5F20A509153E4BA3F2D.f03t02?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Jollimore, Troy, “Impartiality”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/impartiality/>.](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/impartiality/) [Mill, John Stuart. *Utilitarianism*. 1861.](http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm) [Noddings, Nel. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.](http://www.amazon.com/Caring-Feminine-Approach-Ethics-Education/dp/0520057473/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408379936&sr=8-1&keywords=Caring%3A+A+Feminine+Approach+to+Ethics+and+Moral+Education) [Rachels, James. *The Elements of Moral Philosophy.* Seventh ed. by Stuart Rachels. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012.](http://www.amazon.com/Elements-Moral-Philosophy-James-Rachels/dp/0078038243/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408379963&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Elements+of+Moral+Philosophy) [Railton, Peter. “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” In *Consequentialism and its Critics*, edited by Samuel Scheffler, 93-133. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.](http://www.amazon.com/Consequentialism-Critics-Oxford-Readings-Philosophy/dp/0198750730/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408380008&sr=8-1&keywords=Consequentialism+and+its+Critics) [Scheffler, Samuel. “Morality and Reasonable Partiality,” in *Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World*, edited by Brian Feltham and John Cottingham, 98-130. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.](http://www.amazon.com/Partiality-Impartiality-Morality-Special-Relationships/dp/0199579954/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408380036&sr=8-1&keywords=Partiality+and+Impartiality%3A+Morality%2C+Special+Relationships%2C+and+the+Wider+World) [Stocker, Michael. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 no. 14 (1976): 453-466.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2025782?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104537340147) [Williams, Bernard. “Persons, Character, and Morality” in *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980.* 1-19. Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press, 1982.](http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Luck-Philosophical-Papers-1973-1980/dp/0521243726/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1408380126&sr=8-1&keywords=Moral+Luck%3A+Philosophical+Papers%2C+1973-1980) [Wolf, Susan. “Morality and Partiality.” *Philosophical Perspectives* 6 (1992): 243-259](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2214247?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104537340147) ### Related Essays [Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/ "Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics") by Andrew Chapman [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/ "Introduction to Consequentialism") by Shane Gronholz [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/ "Speciesism") by Dan Lowe [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/tarafsizlik-taraflilik-shane-gronholz/) ### About the Author [Shane Gronholz](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Gronholz/) has a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He holds a B.A. from Whitworth University where he double majored in philosophy and religion. Shane is interested in metaethics, ethical theory, practical rationality, and philosophy of religion. He lives in Washington with his wife (Stephanie), son (Maxwell), and dog (Benny). [TrivialorFalse.com](https://trivialorfalse.com/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** Gronholz, impartiality, partiality --- ### [John Stuart Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) **Published:** September 3, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Dale E. Miller Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/) Wordcount: 999 It may seem obvious that happiness is valuable, but is it the *only* thing valuable for its own sake, as opposed to being useful as a way to get something else? The 19th-century utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) argues that it is.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) His argument is notorious because some critics charge that it contains obvious errors. This essay considers whether Mill really makes elementary blunders. ![Cartoon drawing of John Stuart Mill](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/john-stuart-mill.jpg?resize=440%2C280&ssl=1) Cartoon drawing of John Stuart Mill ### 1. Mill’s Principle of Utility Mill’s name for the claim that only happiness is valuable for its own sake is the “principle of utility.” This is ripe for confusion. Mill offers this claim in the course of discussing the moral theory called *utilitarianism*. In its simplest form, utilitarianism says that actions are right if they would maximize the total amount of happiness in the world in the long run; otherwise they’re wrong.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Yet Mill’s principle of utility doesn’t directly concern the morality of actions.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Instead it concerns what’s “desirable as an end.” It’s the foundation of Mill’s utilitarianism, not the theory itself.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This subtlety often goes unnoticed. ### 2. The Proof Mill’s argument appears in Chapter 4 of his essay *Utilitarianism.* Today it’s called Mill’s “proof,” although the name is misleading since he admits that the “considerations” he offers aren’t a tidy deduction.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Mill’s argument consists of three steps, each meant to establish a different claim: 1\. Happiness is desirable as an end. 2\. The “general happiness” is desirable as an end. 3\. Nothing except happiness is desirable as an end. Mill takes these three claims together to compose the principle of utility. ### 2.1. First Step In the first step, Mill writes that: “The only proof … that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. … In like manner, … the sole evidence … that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.” One criticism of this step is that Mill overlooks the fact that while ‘visible’ means “capable of being seen,” to call something desirable means not that we *can* desire it but that we *ought* to. While our actually doing something is proof positive that we *can* do it, it doesn’t mean that we *should*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) But notice the shift in Mill’s wording from “only proof” to “sole evidence.” Even if the fact that everyone *actually* desires happiness doesn’t logically entail that they *should*, it might still be evidence for this. If happiness *isn’t* desirable then all of humanity has made the same huge mistake, which may seem implausible.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2.2. Second Step In the same paragraph, Mill turns to the second step: “No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person … desires his own happiness.” Elsewhere, Mill restates this step: “since A’s happiness is a good, B’s a good, C’s a good, &c., the sum of these goods must be a good.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Some critics have charged Mill with committing the “fallacy of composition,” which is the fallacy of reasoning that because the members of a collection all have some property, the collection must have it, too.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) An apple is spherical, but a bushel of apples isn’t. But while collections don’t always have the properties that their members share, sometimes they do. If I know that one gold bar is heavy, I’m not reasoning badly if I conclude that a pallet of these bars will be heavy, too. Sometimes combining good things might produce something bad, like topping a pizza with hot fudge sauce. Often, though, a collection of valuable items *will* also be valuable. It depends on the natures of the items, their value, and the collection. Mill reasons that if every person’s happiness is valuable then a world that contains more happiness is better than one that contains less, other things equal. That’s not obviously fallacious. ### 2.3. Third Step In the third step, Mill argues that happiness is the only thing we desire for itself. This means that it’s the only thing for whose desirability in itself we have evidence. Someone might challenge Mill by saying that other things are valuable in themselves. On the surface, Mill’s strategy is to agree that people “do desire things which, in common language, are … distinguished from happiness”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) for their own sakes. His chief example is being virtuous. However, he asserts, people only desire virtue for its own sake if they have incorporated it into their happiness. If virtue partially constitutes someone’s happiness, then they desire it “as a part of their happiness.” Hence “there is in reality nothing desired except happiness.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) But now Mill may appear inconsistent. He defines ‘happiness’ as “pleasure, and the absence of pain.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) How then, some of his critics have challenged, can virtue be part of our happiness? Virtue ≠ pleasure.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) The key may be in Mill’s account of how something like virtue can become part of our happiness. He explains how the experience of being treated better by others when we behave virtuously can cause us to form a mental association between virtue and pleasure. When people associate virtue with pleasure then the awareness or “consciousness” that they’re virtuous becomes pleasurable for them. It might then be this pleasure—not virtue itself, strictly speaking—that they desire as an end. If this is his intention, then contrary to surface appearances Mill’s really denying that some people desire to be virtuous for its own sake. But he’s explaining why they seem to: for them, the connection between virtue and pleasure has become much closer than it is for people who only want to be virtuous so they’ll be treated better.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Reading Mill this way still lets us say that he takes happiness to be the only thing we desire for itself, albeit at the cost of not taking his talk about virtue’s becoming part of our happiness or our desiring it as an end entirely literally. ### 3. Conclusion Perhaps, then, Mill’s “proof” doesn’t contain clumsy mistakes. At least Mill has some responses available to the critics who allege that it does. More work would be needed to judge whether the argument ultimately succeeds, and more work still to get from this principle to utilitarian morality, but Mill’s contribution shouldn’t be hastily dismissed.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mill 1969 \[1861\], 234–9. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) More specifically, this is true of the simplest form of the theory, which is sometimes called *classical act utilitarianism*. Some other versions of utilitarianism might apply the requirement to maximize happiness differently. For instance, *rule utilitarianism* says that whether actions are right or wrong depends on whether they would be permitted or forbidden by the set of rules whose general adoption would maximize happiness. So it applies the criterion of maximizing happiness directly to rules and only indirectly, via rules, to individual actions. There is some debate about what version of utilitarianism Mill accepts. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Brown (1973). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) To add to the potential for confusion, other philosophers (both before and after Mill’s time) have used the term ‘principle of utility’ to refer to principles that are concerned with what makes actions right or wrong. Given this, and the fact that Mill never offers a formal definition of the principle, it’s no surprise that even professional philosophers are often tripped up by this. Mill refers at one point to a ‘Greatest Happiness Principle’ (Mill 1969 \[1861\], 210), and it’s possible that he intends this to be a principle about the morality of actions, but if so he thinks it’s distinct from and rests on the principle of utility. While this may sound a bit sloppy on Mill’s part, one thing to bear in mind is that he was writing for a very wide audience, not only for philosophy professors or even philosophy students. The essay that contains his “proof” first appeared in a popular magazine of the day. So he sacrificed some precision for readability. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Here’s how Mill makes this point in Chapter 1: Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognisance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof. (Mill 1969, 207–8). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Here’s how the early 20th-century philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958) articulates this objection: Well, the fallacy in this step is so obvious, that it is quite wonderful how Mill failed to see it. The fact is that “desirable” does not mean “able to be desired” as “visible” means “able to be seen”. The desirable means simply what *ought* to be desired or *deserves* to be desired. (Moore 1903, 67). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Mill makes a very similar move in Chapter 2 of *Utilitarianism*, where he famously argues that the only way to determine which of two pleasures is of higher quality is by appeal to the judgment of people who have experience of both (Mill 1969, 210–4). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Mill 1972, 1414. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For example, Mackenzie 1901, 218–20. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Mill 1969, 235. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Mill 1969, 235–7. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Mill 1969, 210. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Money is another of Mill’s examples of something that can (seemingly) become part of our happiness, although in contrast with virtue he thinks that it’s unfortunate that some people do so. Moore references this example when criticizes this step of the argument: Does Mill mean to say that money, these actual coins, which he admits to be desired in and for themselves, are a part either of pleasure or of the absence of pain? Will he maintain that those coins themselves are in my mind, and actually a part of my pleasant feelings? If this is to be said, all words are useless: nothing can possibly be distinguished from anything else; if these two things are not distinct, what on earth is? (Moore 1903, 71–2). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The example of money can help to clarify what’s going on here, since Mill thinks that very much the same process can happen with it. Initially, we desire money simply because we can use it to buy things that we want. In some people, though, this leads to a mental association between money and pleasure such that just thinking about their money gives them pleasure. In the case of misers, this association grows so strong that they can’t bear to spend money even on things that are very important; the pleasure of having the money has become much greater than the pleasure of using it. Mill would say that people who have formed this association have made money part of their happiness and that they desire it as such, although this is speaking rather loosely. Strictly speaking, Mill would say, even misers don’t desire money for its own sake. What they desire for its own sake is the pleasure they get from the knowledge that they have money. It’s this pleasure that is part of their happiness, not the money itself. The real point is just that money and happiness are much more closely connected for people like this than they are for people who simply regard money as a way to buy things. Mill does think that there’s one important difference between money and virtue in this regard. We should want people to form this association between pleasure and being virtuous. This will help to motivate them to act in ways that lead to an overall happier society. In contrast, this sort of association between pleasure and money is pathological. Society will be much happier if people simply regard money as a tool. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) I give a more detailed discussion of Mill’s argument for the principle of utility in Miller 2010, 31–53. ### References [Brown, D. G. (1973). “What is Mill’s Principle of Utility?,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* III: 1–12.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.1973.10716066) [Mackenzie, John S. (1901). *A Manual of Ethics* 4th ed. New York: Hinds, Hayden & Eldredge.](https://www.amazon.com/Manual-Ethics-John-Stuart-Mackenzie/dp/1340336898/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=9781596053151&linkCode=qs&qid=1567432897&s=books&sr=1-1) [Mill, John Stuart (1969). *Utilitarianism*. In John M. Robson (ed.), *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* vol. X. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Originally published 1861.](https://utorontopress.com/ca/books/by-series/collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill) [—– (1972). Letter to Henry Jones (13 June 1868). In John M. Robson (ed.), *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* vol. XVI. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1413–4.](https://utorontopress.com/ca/books/by-series/collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill) [Miller, Dale E (2010). *John Stuart Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought*. Cambridge: Polity.](http://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745625836&subject_id=5) [Moore, G. E. (1903). *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted 1992](https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-texts/principia-ethica-2nd-edition?format=PB&isbn=9780521448482). ### For Further Reading Brink, David (2018). [“Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy.”](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mill-moral-political/) In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. ### Related Essays [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk ### Translation Turkish ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/principle-of-utility.pdf). ### About the Author [Dale E. Miller](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Miller) is a Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University and the editor-in-chief of *Utilitas.* [DrDaleEMiller.net](http://www.drdaleemiller.net) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** axiology, consequentialism, ethical theory, Miller, utilitarianism, value --- ### [Jean-Jacques Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) **Published:** September 27, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to Jean-Jacques's Rousseau views on human nature: and the concepts of “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre.” **Content:** Author: Corey McCabe Category: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 995 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) was a Swiss philosopher who described the *state of nature—*what life was like before governments were instituted—as the state “most suitable to mankind.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) He broke sharply with his contemporaries by arguing that people were good prior to the development of civilization, but have been corrupted by society. Rousseau’s central philosophical goal was to identify the ways society had distorted humanity’s innately good tendencies and characteristics. This essay explores Rousseau’s view of what went wrong and his proposed solution. [![Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/rousseau-.jpg?resize=656%2C526&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/rousseau-.jpg?ssl=1)Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) ### 1. Humanity in the State of Nature Writing prior to Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) assumed that life in the state of nature would be intolerable. He argued that without police, courts, and other authorities to protect people’s lives and belongings from those who would take them, life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Hobbes believed this violence was a result of human nature: human beings are never content merely to satisfy their own needs because they have “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The desire for domination over others inevitably leads to conflict.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Hobbes argued that government was justified because *only it* could prevent the violence endemic to the state of nature. Rousseau’s picture of the state of nature, and human nature, was the opposite. He argued that people in their natural state were motivated by what he called *amour de soi:* a “love of self.” This meant living primarily to eat, sleep and reproduce for the continuation of the species.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) People with such minimal desires could meet their needs without resorting to violence[\[6\]](#_ftn6) and so life was peaceful, *not* the war “of every man, against every man” that Hobbes theorized.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 2. What Went Wrong? While Hobbes’ estimation of human nature might better reflect our experiences, Rousseau argued that we should not assume that human beings had always been so selfish and driven to conflict. Rousseau proposed that the development of society had changed human nature itself, corrupting our natural goodness. In society, we became obsessed with vanity and the praise of our peers. The unceasing competition Hobbes spoke of was not a reflection of our original nature, but a distortion of it. Why did human motivation change? Rousseau explained the change through a mythical account of history. As people formed larger groups beyond the family, being noticed and esteemed became valuable.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) To be the *best* dancer or the *best* orator became valuable in the community; as a result, people began to desire more than mere survival.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Rousseau argued that the novel value of attention and prestige “was the first step towards inequality, and . . . towards vice.”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) With the advent of society, there was a new driver of human action: *amour propre*.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Unlike *amour de soi,* which aimed at the maintenance and survival of the individual, *amour propre* aimed at one’s comparative worth. It is inherently competitive, focused on standing out and being noticed among the crowd. And, crucially, it is a value that must be had at another’s expense: we cannot all be the best dancer.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Rousseau’s *amour propre* might intuitively seem like a pathological form of self-love, but he argues that it is not inherently harmful.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) It is when *armour propre* is “inflamed” that it becomes harmful, where, rather than living for ourselves, we enter a state of “being-for-others.”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Rather than living simply and modestly, concerned with satisfying our own needs, society drives us towards competition and division. At best, this discourages genuine connection with others and alienates us from our natural impulses.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) At worst, this competition makes us seek superiority over others.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) A modern example of this inflammation might be social media. It is commonly understood to be unhealthy to continually check social media, but it is often still done compulsively. For many people, they are driven towards presenting themselves in the best light for the sake of people responding positively, even at costs to their own mental health. ### 3. What Can Be Done? Rousseau did not think we could return to the state of nature, as he pictured it.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Instead, the path forward was to reform how our society works in light of the dangers posed by *amour propre*.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) This is a two-step process. First, the healthy love of self should be extended toward those around us, and eventually to the state that maintains our society, strengthening the bonds between citizens.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Second, the relationship between the citizen and the state must be reformed.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Rousseau thought the key purpose of the government was to manage the conflict between the freedom of the individual and the authority of the state.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) He thought this tension could be mediated by a “general will”: a representation of the collective interest of the members of the society.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) The concept of the general will requires that the people as a whole be represented in the ruler they live under. If they are not, then citizens are not bound by “any *obligation* of obedience” to the sovereign’s rulings.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) On Rousseau’s view, political rulings are illegitimate if they do not consider the perspectives of all community members. With the general will in place, individuals will then see their own desires represented as part of the community: in a society ordered by the general will, individuals flourish when the rest of society flourishes. When this is the case, *amour propre* is no longer destructive; one need not subjugate others for the sake of one’s own well-being. ### 4. Conclusion Unlike many of his contemporaries, Rousseau thought that life before government was the most suitable life for humanity: the state of nature was a beautiful place and the formation of society irrevocably damaged how people relate to one another, and themselves. Yet rather than be bound by impulses toward fame, Rousseau argues that these desires can be redirected toward producing a society that better meets the needs of individuals. Through fostering a society founded on the will of its constituents, we can live a more harmonious existence, freeing ourselves from our own vanity. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Rousseau (1755/2002), 105. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Hobbes (1651/1962), Ch. 13 Section 9. For a discussion of Hobbes and other thinkers about the state of nature, see [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Hobbes (1651/1962), Ch. 11 Section 2. To clarify, Hobbes did not necessarily think that this type of violence inevitably arose out of human nature, but rather that the state of nature placed individuals in a state of competition and fear, in which proactive violence was the only means to defend oneself. Rousseau thought otherwise. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Hobbes (1651/1962), Ch. 11 Section 3: “Competition of riches, honour, command, or other power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war.” [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Rousseau (1755/2002), 97, note O. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Rousseau (1755/2002), 97, note O. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Hobbes (1651/1962), Ch. 13 Section 8. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Rousseau (1755/2002), 118. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Rousseau (1755/2002), 118. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Rousseau (1755/2002), 118. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Both *amour de soi* and *amour propre* can be translated to self-love, though with slightly different connotations. *Amour propre* is sometimes translated as selfishness, but this risks unfairly interpreting Rousseau’s point. As such, the terms will be used untranslated. See Dent (1989) for a discussion of the difficulty in translation. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) And even when one gains the prestige one desires, there is little satisfaction to be had: “to lose \[these objects of desire\] was a misfortune, to possess them \[provided\] no happiness,” Rousseau (1755/2002), 117. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) ‘This amour-propre in itself or relative to us is good and useful … It becomes good or bad only by the application made of it and the relations given to it’ (Rousseau 1921, 92). See Dent (1989) and Dent and O’Hagan (1998) for a fuller discussion. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Rousseau (1762/1921), 40–41. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Bertram (2020), 2. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Dent (1989), 56–58, 60. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Not least because society has attenuated our nature, making us ill-suited to living in nature. Rousseau (1755/2002), 90. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) The connection from Rousseau here to future socialist thinkers such as Karl Marx is clear. See [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Dent (1989), 127. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Secondarily, the individual must see their relationship to others in society. This begins with viewing peers not as competitors but as friends and allies. We extend the love we have for the people nearest to us onto the wider community (Dent \[1989\], 143). We recognize and respect the individual agency and needs of others. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Bertram (2020), 3. This tension has been magnified by the fact that our needs in modern society are now more complex than in the state of nature. We cannot meet our modern needs with cooperation in society. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Bertram (2020), 3, 3.1. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Dent (1989), 172. ### References [Bertram, C (2020). “Jean Jacques Rousseau.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/)[. Edited by Edward Zalta.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/) [Dent, N. J. H (1989). ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DENRAI)[*Rousseau: An introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DENRAI)[. New York: Basil Blackwell.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DENRAI) [Dent, N. J. H and O’Hagan, T. (1998). “Rousseau on Amour Propre.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8349.00034)[*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Volumes*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8349.00034)[ 72 (1): 57–73.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8349.00034) [Goldstein, R (2014). ](https://www.amazon.com.au/Plato-Googleplex-Rebecca-Newberg-Goldstein/dp/0307378195)[*Plato at the Googleplex*](https://www.amazon.com.au/Plato-Googleplex-Rebecca-Newberg-Goldstein/dp/0307378195)[. New York: Pantheon Books.](https://www.amazon.com.au/Plato-Googleplex-Rebecca-Newberg-Goldstein/dp/0307378195) [Hobbes, Thomas (1962). ](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/91953.Leviathan)[*Leviathan*](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/91953.Leviathan)[. Edited by Michael Oakeshott. New York: Simon and Schuster.](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/91953.Leviathan) [Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1762/1921). ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/rousseau-emile-or-education)[*Emile, or on Education*](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/rousseau-emile-or-education)[. Translated by Barbara Foxley. New York: E. P. Dutton.](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/rousseau-emile-or-education) [Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1750/1755/1762/2002). ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1npwsh)[*The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1npwsh)[. Edited by Susan Dunn. New Haven: Yale University Press.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1npwsh) ### Related Essays [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira ### About the Author Corey McCabe is a graduate of the University of Melbourne, with a BA (hons) in politics and philosophy, in addition to further advanced study in political science. His research focus is on early modern philosophy, and contemporary political theory and philosophy. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** Amour de soi, Amour propre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau --- ### [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) **Published:** October 21, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The slogan “From each according to their ability, to each according to their needs” is one of German philosopher Karl Marx’s (1818-1883) few explicit descriptions of communism. This essay describes the origins of the slogan and its meaning. **Content:** Author: Sam Badger Categories: [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 The slogan “From each according to their ability, to each according to their needs” is one of German philosopher Karl Marx’s (1818-1883) few explicit descriptions of communism. Marx imagines communism as an economic system where workers themselves freely manage the production and distribution of goods and services.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay describes the origins of the slogan and its meaning. [![Karl Marx](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/karl-marx.jpg?resize=656%2C656&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/karl-marx.jpg?ssl=1)Karl Marx ### 1. Distribution under Capitalism In a *capitalist* society, goods and services are distributed through individuals and businesses trading in a competitive marketplace.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) In theory, competition ensures that nobody has too much unfair bargaining power, and economic freedom allows both parties to get what they need out of exchange.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) *Socialists* argue that there is only an illusion of equal bargaining power, as this system actually privileges those who own the *means of production*, or capital: factories, land, and other things labor uses to create commodities. In practice, it justifies the exploitation of workers who are increasingly reduced to “cogs” in the profit-making machine of capitalism.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Critics of Capitalism The French utopian socialist Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) laid out an alternative to capitalism centered on the leadership of experts to plan the economy to meet everyone’s needs.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The followers of Saint-Simon advocated for a principle of distributive justice—or a distribution of goods and services[\[6\]](#_ftn6)—which would inspire Marx’s: “From each according to their ability, to each according to their work.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) That is to say, everyone should provide for society to the best of their abilities, working no more than is mentally, physically, and socially healthy. However, the compensation for that work should be based on effort, not market rates. The later French socialist Louis Blanc (1811-1882) revised the slogan to read: “From each according to their ability, to each according to their need.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Like Saint-Simon’s slogan, all are free to pursue their own talents and enrichment. But the phrase “to each according to his needs” means that distribution will reflect individual needs, not how hard one works. ### 3. The Influence on Marx Marx would cite both Blanc’s and the Saint-Simonian slogans in his “Critique of the Gotha Program,” his critique of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) platform in 1875.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Though the platform was influenced by Marx’s ideas, it diverged from his thinking in important ways: it mistakenly focused only on a fair distribution of goods and services, and not how those goods and services were produced.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Workers shouldn’t merely be compensated better, they ought to own and control the means of production themselves, for the benefit of humanity. In emphasizing the production of goods, Marx took seriously the part of the slogan shared by Saint-Simon and Blanc, which emphasized production. Marx believed that each slogan would find its place in his vision for a socialist society. ### 4. Marx’s Lower Stage of Communism Marx proposes two stages of communism.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) He argued these would inevitably arise due to the economic crises within capitalism and the growing class consciousness of the working class.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) The first stage is organized like in the Saint-Simonian slogan where workers are paid proportionately to the length and difficulty of labor. This stage appears superficially egalitarian as there is equal pay for equal effort.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) But Marx points out the flaw in Saint-Simon’s formulation, since people have different needs: This *equal* right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content…[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Marx argues, this apparent “equality” conceals our individuality in a way that is fundamentally inegalitarian.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) A mother has two mouths to feed, a disabled person may not be able to work for as long, and so on, so equal pay for equal effort will still be unequal. ### 5. The Higher Stage of Communism In the second stage of communism, society is organized according to Blanc’s principle: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” This stage realizes full equality as everyone has their needs met and can develop their talents freely.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) People work according to their ability: work is not only necessary to sustain society, but is part of what makes us human.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Due to gains in productivity and organizing work in accordance with the ends of the workers, needs can be met without grueling working days.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) This also allows the leisure time to develop themselves and their needs beyond survival—to want music, art, philosophy, science and so on.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) People are compensated according to their needs: compensation is not based on effort, but rather what is required for them to flourish. This requires overcoming biases about which occupations are most valuable; society must overcome the hierarchy of mental labor over physical labor and all other similar hierarchies within the division of labor.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Some might worry whether people would be willing to work only for the fruits of their labor to be redistributed to those who did not work as hard. Marx states that people will voluntarily shoulder some of the social responsibility, the way we share chores, gardening, and childcare. This may seem naive, and Marx does not specify whether or how this would be enforced or encouraged.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) But eventually people will labor willingly because work is its own source of fulfillment. Marx thought human nature found its greatest realization in social labor, but capitalism had turned work into a burden.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) This is because work within capitalism is organized around the ends of profit, not the needs of the workers or humanity more generally.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) As we take pride in using our abilities to meet people’s needs, work becomes one of our desires instead of a mere means to survival. ### 6. Conclusion Marx’s slogan “From each according to their ability, to each according to their need” is a principle of social organization whereby work is both edifying and desirable, and where we see the needs of others as our own. Consequently, Marx saw this as a society freed from exploitation, dehumanization, and domination. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The definitions of “capitalism,” “communism” and “socialism” are themselves a matter of controversy: see [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf Alongside other early socialists, Marx coined the term “capitalism,” which he defined as an economy where the means of producing goods and services are privately owned, and distribution and price of goods, services and labor is determined by market competition. As capital grows, Marx argued, it had a tendency towards monopolization, alienation and worsening exploitation of the workers. He understood communism socialism to be systems where the producers directly control production and distribution, be it through the state or some other mechanism. Notably, Marx and Engels did not distinguish between socialism and communism, though later Marxists such as Lenin would identify socialism as the transitional phase between capitalism and communism. See *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* by Friedrich Engels. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Notably, Marx still argued that this notion of distributive justice, though problematic, was superior to that which existed under feudalism. In feudal relations, lords, peasants and townspeople alike were constrained in their economic choices because distributive justice was understood through the lens of feudal privileges which structured values in terms of arcane and largely unquestioned traditions. One of the important achievements of Adam Smith was identifying why the liberal capitalist notion of distributive justice was preferable to the feudal one in freeing individuals in the marketplace. For instance, Adam Smith identified how guild privileges under feudalism constrained the labor market in a way which exploited apprentices and consumers (Smith, 131). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Marx’s *Capital* delves into these dynamics in detail, describing how the capitalist principle of distributive justice endorses the exploitation of workers to create surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the value which workers produce for their employers and what they receive for their work, minus the value required for maintenance and material. Surplus value is divided between rent for landowners, returns for investors and interest for creditors. As Marx argues, profit can only come from this surplus value, as it is impossible for capitalists as a class to profit by exploiting one another. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Marx’s theory of alienation is famously outlined in his *1844 Manuscripts*, which describe the four kinds of alienation which emerge in capitalist production. These four forms of alienation contribute to the dehumanizing dimension of work. Though Marx uses the term “alienation” less frequently in his later writing, the description of society given in “The Critique of the Gotha Program” echoes some of the same themes about eliminating the dehumanizing aspects of work. See [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe. Marx’s theory of exploitation is laid out in *Capital*, and argues that profit comes from the surplus value or unpaid labor extracted from workers. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The early French and English Utopians such as Saint-Simon, Robert Owen and Charles Fourier all had a significant influence on Marx and his colleague, collaborator, and friend Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). The method of the utopians largely consisted in theorizing a blueprint for an ideal society then convincing both workers and elites that this ideal was superior to the current system. For instance, in his essay “The Rule of Scientists,” Saint-Simon (1966, 261-268) argues that industrialists (which, it should be noted, were capitalists) should pursue his utopia. Marx and Engels would come to reject “utopianism” in favor of a “scientific” approach to socialism (see *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* by Engels)*.* The key difference for Marx and Engels is that a scientific approach is grounded on an explanation of concrete social conditions instead of abstract theory. This is why Marx generally avoided explicit descriptions of the socialist society, and instead focused on more immediate struggles. Where Marx and Engels did describe it, it was usually through these sorts of general principles. Despite Marx and Engels’s rejection of utopianism as a political movement, Ernst Bloch argues that the idea of utopia remains important in Marx’s thought as a constructive utopia, or a normative ideal. “From each according to their ability, to each according to their need” is one such ideal. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For a description of the concept of distributive justice, see [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Luc Bovens and Adrien Lutz (2019) provide a brief history of the slogan and how it developed between Saint-Simon and Marx. They track the development from the Saint-Simonian idea through to Marx’s “Critique of the Gotha Program.” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Blanc used the phrase “*de chacun selon ses facultes, a chacun selon ses besoins*” to describe his notion of communism in his *Plus de Girondins* (92). Blanc advocated for an economy of worker’s cooperatives instead of private capital so that workers could democratically determine working conditions and hours of employment. The fate of Blanc is an interesting story in its own right, as he was involved with the Paris Commune uprising specifically and French politics more broadly. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The German *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* or SPD would become an important socialist party in Germany under the leadership of the Marxist Karl Kautsky and is today one of the two largest parties in the German Bundestag (or parliament) though it is politically more moderate today than it was in the times of Marx and Kautsky. The SPD was formed by the merger of two political parties, one organized by allies of Marx and Engels (though Marx and Engels lived in political exile in London, they remained engaged in German politics), and one influenced by Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864). Lassalle was a Prussian Jurist and socialist theorist. Though he was friends with Marx, Marx criticized Lassalle’s belief that the German state was a vehicle for socialism. Marx, on the other hand, viewed the German state as fundamentally captured by and structured in accordance with the needs of capitalist interests. The Gotha Program was its 1875 political program, which was only partially influenced by the ideas of Marx and Engels. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Marx was notably a critic of the political left (or the broader movement of socialists, anarchists, and communists united behind the goal of economic egalitarianism and internationalism) of his time. Though he was a strong advocate for the working class and their needs, he thought the workers needed the correct theoretical understanding of their circumstances to abolish exploitation, and so often critiqued ideas from various socialists, communists, social democrats, and anarchists. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Jon Elster argues that the difference between these principles and their ultimate justification seems at odds with other parts of Marx’s philosophy (222, 1985). As he argues, Marx rejects transhistorical principles of justice, but the principle of “from each according to their ability, to each according to their need” is surely such a principle! Sean Sayers, on the other hand, argues that this is not an abstract moral principle but an ideal which is only made real through historical progress (120-121, 1998). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For an account of Marx’s theory of historical development, see [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor. His theory was a materialist reinterpretation of Hegel’s idealist dialectic of philosophical history. Marx believed that every class society was ridden with internal contradictions which would eventually cause it to collapse and necessitate a new social order. The contradictions within feudalism led to the emergence of capitalism, which was a process that culminated in events like the French revolution. Marx thought that capitalism, in turn, would necessarily lead to socialism eventually. Marx’s theory was not entirely mechanistic, as he argues that workers in Germany can learn from the suffering of English workers to avoid their fate and bring about socialism more quickly (see *Capital Vol. I*, “Preface to the First German Edition” by Karl Marx). However, he clearly thought that economic crises were a mechanistic consequence of the contradictions within market economies, and that these crises would necessitate a socialist economy eventually. He likewise saw the stages of communism described in the “Critique of the Gotha Program” as necessary historical developments once capitalism had been abolished. However, it is notable that even here Marx’s description of socialism is sparse—he thought it was impossible to provide a detailed account of the specifics of future development. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *Egalitarianism*, or the promotion of equality, was a concept which was understood in various ways by different groups of capitalists and socialists. Engels provides a Marxist account of the history of egalitarianism as a political and moral ideal in his *Anti-Dühring* (Engels, 124-129), tracing it back to Christianity through the development of capitalism and socialism. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” section I (emphasis Marx’s). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) This injustice is socially necessary, as people are still habituated to being “incentivized” to work. It will take time for humanity to develop sufficiently to bring about a more egalitarian model. The idea that it could take generations to undo the norms habituated under capitalism is also found in the work of Friedrich Engels. In his *On the Family, Private Property and the State*, Engels argues that the sexual morality of the future will be more advanced than anything today because love will no longer be subject to wealth and power: “But what will there be new? That will be answered when a new generation has grown up: a generation of men who never in their lives have known what it is to buy a woman’s surrender with money or any other social instrument of power; a generation of women who have never known what it is to give themselves to a man from any other considerations than real love or to refuse to give themselves to their lover from fear of the economic consequences” (Engels, 114). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) In her analysis, Carol Gould understands the “Critique of the Gotha Program” through Marx’s claims in the *Grundrisse* that machinery enables people to develop freely, at least within the boundaries of the productive capacities of society and nature, to build a more comprehensive picture of Marx’s notion of socialism and cooperation (Gould, 66-68). She argues that the strongest model for such a society is a form of democratic socialism (or “communal society” and “mutuality” in her words) where democratic freedoms extends not only to the government but the workplace (177-178). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) The notion that we are beings who engage in social labor is fundamental to Marx and Engels alike and is a theme that runs from the 1844 Manuscripts to the “Critique of the Gotha Program.” In an article for *Die Neue Zeit* which was later incorporated into his posthumously published *Dialectics of Nature*, Engels even argues we evolved our hands and vocal abilities for the purpose of enabling labor (“The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,” 279-296). The defining feature of history is the development of increasingly complicated ways of organizing society and working alongside one another to realize our needs. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) After the previously mentioned quote from the third volume of *Capital*, Marx goes on to say that the true realm of freedom depends on the realm of material necessity; “But this remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it, though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis” (Marx 1981, 959). What Marx means by this is that we will be free to develop our skills, talents and desires however this realm of freedom depends on realizing our material needs in an efficient but humane way. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) For Marx, human beings are born with a certain number of basic needs which are relatively universal, but on top of these are new needs which stem from the development of our capacities. One example might be our contemporary need for instrumental music. This development of needs is explored in many places by Marx, most notably in his early 1844 Manuscripts. Agnes Heller also describes this enrichment of need in Marx’s theory in detail (Heller, 40-66). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Agnes Heller gives the following account of the abolition of the division between mental and physical labor: “So according to Marx’s view of the future, there will in effect be no specialized workers involved in ‘purely intellectual’ or ‘purely manual’ activities. This does not mean, however, that there will be no specialized intellectual activity in productive labor or in the control of production: it simply means that the specialized activity performed in production does not determine the direction of a person’s intellectual activity during their free time, and that it does not determine their chosen form of self-realization” (Heller, 107). That is to say, there will still be specialized manual and intellectual tasks, but one’s life will not be reduced to one or the other, manual and intellectual labor will have equal value, and all labor will have an intellectual component. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) This ought to be understood from Marx’s reluctance to create blueprints for a socialist society, preferring to keep his descriptions of communism abstract. For Marx, he can only grasp the general principles of such society and it must be the workers themselves who fill in the details. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) In his third volume of *Capital*, Marx provides a bit more detail about what such a society will look like: “Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature” (Marx 1981, 959). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) A part of this development would be the automation of as many tedious, uncomfortable, or dangerous jobs as possible. Marx describes the difference between how machines are deployed under capitalism as the human being becoming reduced to a cog or implement of the machine, where socialism would deploy machinery to reduce the burdens of labor. He makes this distinction in a number of places, most notably in the fragment on the machine in his unpublished *Grundrisse* (699-712). ### References [Blanc, Louis. ](https://books.google.com/books?id=YK9CAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)[*Plus de Girondins*](https://books.google.com/books?id=YK9CAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false)[. Edited by Charles Joudert, 1851](https://books.google.com/books?id=YK9CAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) [Bloch, Ernst. Translated by Plaice, Neville et. Al.. ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262521994/the-principle-of-hope/)[*The Principle of Hope Vol. I, II* ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262521994/the-principle-of-hope/)[&](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262521994/the-principle-of-hope/)[ *III*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262521994/the-principle-of-hope/)[. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262521994/the-principle-of-hope/) [\[1954-1959\]](https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262521994/the-principle-of-hope/) [Bovens, Luc & Lutz, Adrien. ‘From Each according to Ability; To Each according to Needs’: Origin, Meaning, and Development of Socialist Slogans. ](https://read.dukeupress.edu/hope/article-abstract/51/2/237/137098/From-Each-according-to-Ability-To-Each-according)[*History of Political Economy*](https://read.dukeupress.edu/hope/article-abstract/51/2/237/137098/From-Each-according-to-Ability-To-Each-according)[, volume 51 Issue 2, ](https://read.dukeupress.edu/hope/article-abstract/51/2/237/137098/From-Each-according-to-Ability-To-Each-according)[2019](https://read.dukeupress.edu/hope/article-abstract/51/2/237/137098/From-Each-according-to-Ability-To-Each-according) [Elster, Jon. ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Making_Sense_of_Marx.html?id=I14p3dFLerYC)[*Making Sense of Marx*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Making_Sense_of_Marx.html?id=I14p3dFLerYC)[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985](https://books.google.com/books/about/Making_Sense_of_Marx.html?id=I14p3dFLerYC) [Engels, Friedrich. ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/)[*Anti-Dühring*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/)[, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975 \[1876\]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/) [Engels, Friedrich. ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Origin_of_the_Family_Private_Propert/V4mMEAAAQBAJ?hl=en)[*The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Origin_of_the_Family_Private_Propert/V4mMEAAAQBAJ?hl=en)[. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2010 \[1884\] ](https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Origin_of_the_Family_Private_Propert/V4mMEAAAQBAJ?hl=en) [Engels, Friedrich. ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/index.htm)[*The Dialectics of Nature*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/index.htm)[. New York: International Publishers, 1940 \[1883\]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/index.htm) [Engels, Friedrich. Translated by Edward Aveling. ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/index.htm)[*Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/index.htm)[, in ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/index.htm)[*Marx and Engels Selected Work Vol. 3*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/index.htm)[. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970 \[1880\]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/index.htm) [Gould, Carol. “Socializing the Means of Free Development”. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/e48508801)[*Philosophical Topics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/e48508801)[, Volume 48, Issue 2, 2020](https://www.jstor.org/stable/e48508801) [Heller, Agnes. ](https://www.goodreads.com/work/editions/2282447-the-theory-of-need-in-marx)[*The Theory of Need in Marx.*](https://www.goodreads.com/work/editions/2282447-the-theory-of-need-in-marx)[ Translated by Allison and Busby. New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976](https://www.goodreads.com/work/editions/2282447-the-theory-of-need-in-marx) [Marx, Karl. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261069/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-ben-fowkes-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/)[*Capital Vol. I*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261069/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-ben-fowkes-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/)[. Translated by Ben Fowkes. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1976](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261069/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-ben-fowkes-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/) [\[1867\]](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/261069/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-ben-fowkes-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/) [Marx, Karl. ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/737247/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-david-fernbach-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/)[*Capital Vol. III*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/737247/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-david-fernbach-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/)[. Translated by Fernbach, David. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1981](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/737247/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-david-fernbach-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/)[ \[published posthumously 1894\]](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/737247/capital-by-karl-marx-translated-by-david-fernbach-introduction-by-ernest-mandel/) [Marx, Karl. ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/index.htm)[*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/index.htm)[. Edited by Alek Blain, 2006](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/index.htm)[ \[1852\]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/index.htm) [Marx, Karl. ](https://www.amazon.com/Grundrisse-Foundations-Critique-Political-Classics/dp/0140445757)[*Grundrisse*](https://www.amazon.com/Grundrisse-Foundations-Critique-Political-Classics/dp/0140445757)[. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1973 \[1861\] ](https://www.amazon.com/Grundrisse-Foundations-Critique-Political-Classics/dp/0140445757) [Marx, Karl. “The Critique of the Gotha Program”, from ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/)[*Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume III.*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/)[ Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, 1970](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/)[ \[1875\]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/) [Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm)[*Manifesto of the Communist Party*](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm)[. ](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm)[Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. One, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm)[ \[1848\]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm) [Marx, Karl and Fromm, Erich. Marx’s ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/)[*Concept of Man and the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/)[ (also referred to as 1844 or Paris Manuscripts). New York, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/)[ \[](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/)[*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/)[ 1844, ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/)[*Marx’s Concept of Man*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/)[ 1961\]](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/marxs-concept-of-man-9781472513953/) [Saint-Simon, Henri. Edited by Manuel, Frank, and Manuel, Fritzie. ](https://books.google.com/books/about/French_Utopias.html?id=U74YAAAAIAAJ)[*French Utopians*](https://books.google.com/books/about/French_Utopias.html?id=U74YAAAAIAAJ)[. New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1966](https://books.google.com/books/about/French_Utopias.html?id=U74YAAAAIAAJ) [Sayers, Sean. ](http://seansayers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sayers-Marxism_and_Human_Nature.pdf)[*Marxism and Human Nature*](http://seansayers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sayers-Marxism_and_Human_Nature.pdf)[. London, UK and New York, New York: Routledge Press, 1998](http://seansayers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sayers-Marxism_and_Human_Nature.pdf) [Smith, Adam. ](https://books.google.com/books/about/Wealth_of_Nations.html?id=SsvdQwAACAAJ)[*Wealth of Nations*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Wealth_of_Nations.html?id=SsvdQwAACAAJ)[. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1991 \[1776\]](https://books.google.com/books/about/Wealth_of_Nations.html?id=SsvdQwAACAAJ) ### Related Essays [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Marx’s Concept of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/ "Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism") by Daniel Weltman ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/marx-slogan.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author Sam Badger was born in the United Kingdom but grew up in California. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of South Florida in Spring, 2022. He currently works as an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida and at a few community colleges. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Social & Political **Tags:** Karl Marx, Marx, Marxism, Marxist --- ### [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) **Published:** September 20, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Pyrrhonian skepticism is named after an ancient school of thought based on the teachings of Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE). This essay explains Pyrrhonian skepticism, what motivates it, and some responses to it. **Content:** Author: Lewis Ross Category: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) Word Count: 995 *Skeptics* accept *skepticism*, the view that we lack knowledge or justified beliefs.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) There are different types of skepticism: extreme skeptics deny we have knowledge or justified beliefs about *anything*, whereas other skeptics deny only that we have knowledge or justified beliefs about certain topics, e.g., about religion, or ethics, or other specific areas. *Pyrrhonian* skepticism is named after an ancient school of thought based on the teachings of Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE).[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Pyrrhonian skeptics employ ingenious arguments that are supposed to show that we lack justified beliefs, and therefore knowledge, so we should *suspend judgment* about whatever matters we consider: that means that we should neither believe nor disbelieve claims about whatever matter is in question.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay explains Pyrrhonian skepticism, what motivates it, and some responses to it. [![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Pyrrhonian-Skepticism.jpg?resize=656%2C411&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Pyrrhonian-Skepticism.jpg?ssl=1)A man praying as he is run over by a horse-drawn cart. Oil painting. ### 1. Pyrrhonian Skepticism Everyone agrees that suspending judgment is sometimes justified. For example, if someone asks you whether a flipped coin will land heads or tails, you wouldn’t be justified in believing that it will land heads. And you wouldn’t be justified in believing that it will land tails. The reasonable response is to remain neutral and suspend judgment because you lack evidence that justifies believing either conclusion. Pyrrhonian skeptics argue that suspending judgment is the rational response to *every* question we might consider. Allegedly, Pyrrho was so skeptical in his attitude toward the world that he had to be pulled from the road by his friends whenever a wagon approached, apparently neither believing nor disbelieving that he’d get hit.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Pyrrhonian skeptics even urge suspending judgment about skeptical arguments themselves: they deny even that their skepticism is justified. ### 2. Arguments for Pyrrhonian Skepticism Pyrrhonians argue for such a radical view by emphasizing that appearances sometimes deceive— our senses mislead us—and that our minds are fallible: we cannot trust how things seem, our memories, or what people tell us. Given these defects, it’s possible to make any claim controversial to the point that we must suspend judgment.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) One way to appreciate this is to consider the potential for irresolvable disagreement. Suppose you’re a Pyrrhonian skeptic who currently suspends judgment on whether it will rain tomorrow. I want to convince you to believe that it will. People generally deal with disagreements by providing reasons that *justify* their beliefs. I might defend my belief that it will rain tomorrow by saying I read the weather report. But you might ask: why trust the weather report? I might respond by saying that meteorologists are often right. But you might persist: why accept that meteorologists got it right previously? A natural answer I might give is because I remember their predictions being accurate. But you could reply: why trust your memory? People often misremember things … and so on. Pyrrhonians note that attempts to justify beliefs against a persistent skeptic can only end in one of three ways: 1. you might try to keep answering until inevitably running out of responses; 2. you might eventually start repeating yourself, going in a circle; 3. you might insist that one of your assumptions should be accepted without providing reasons. Pyrrhonian skeptics are unimpressed by all three outcomes, as each of them appears to leave skeptical challenges unanswered.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Neither failing to respond to a challenge, arguing in a circle, nor insisting that some assumptions require no justification are uncontroversial ways to defeat skeptical doubts. Given the unresolved controversy, Pyrrhonians conclude that suspending judgment is the justified response. Pyrrhonian skeptics claim this pattern of tenacious disagreement can be repeated with *any* question—try it for yourself! They conclude that no beliefs can be justified and that we should suspend judgment on every matter. ### 3. Responses How might one respond to the Pyrrhonian skeptic? One way is to reject the reasoning above and defend the idea that some assumptions are justified without our providing further reasons for them. This view is known as “Foundationalism.” As the name suggests, the idea is that you can build up your knowledge on top of the firm support given by foundational beliefs, which are assumptions that are justified without our having to defend them against challenges. Another strategy is to embrace certain kinds of circular reasoning. “Coherentism” is the idea that beliefs can be justified because they are supported by other beliefs, creating a type of mutually reinforcing web. Coherentists claim that, taken together, our beliefs create a system of justification by explaining and supporting each other, even if we eventually stop providing new reasons in response to controversies.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) An obvious objection concerns the radical implications of suspension of judgment regarding everything. Going about our daily lives seems impossible without believing anything. How could we navigate the world while adopting the Pyrrhonian view, for example, suspending judgement on ordinary things like where our home is located (or even that we have homes)? One reply is that the correct attitude to have about the world does not involve *belief*, but rather some other cognitive state. Perhaps we can *accept that things seem* a certain way without believing that they actually are that way.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Timon, an ancient Pyrrhonian, supposedly said: “That honey is sweet I do not assert, but I agree that it seems to be.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) One concern is that this response really does involve belief—a belief that things *seem* a certain way—but perhaps things can *seem* to *seem* a certain way, without belief. ### 4. Conclusion Responding to Pyrrhonian arguments is essential if we are to explain how we know about anything, especially given controversies that exist in science, religion, philosophy, and most other domains of human thought. Pyrrhonians also thought that skepticism was not only the correct intellectual response to controversy but also a way of finding tranquillity in an unsettled world. Suspending judgment was said to free us from *dogmatism*—or overconfident, unreasonable belief—and brings us *ataraxia*, mental and emotional calmness and freedom from disturbance. Skepticism can, so the Pyrrhonians claimed, be a way of living a good life as well as being a theoretical position.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Pyrrhonian Skepticism is generally taken to be one of two main families of skepticism, with the other being *Cartesian Skepticism*, inspired by René Descartes’ skepticism: see [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro and [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli. An overview of both types of skepticism is found in Comesana and Klein (2024). Fogelin (1994) is an example of contemporary epistemology that takes the Pyrrhonian challenge seriously. For introductions to other types of skepticism, see [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman and [Al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey. For what is meant by “justified,” see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. A very concise explanation of justification is that justified beliefs are *likely to be true*. Justification is widely thought to be important since it *knowing* a claim arguably requires justifiably believing it (and it be true): see [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Information about Pyrrho and the development of ancient Pyrronhism is found in subsequent commentators on Pyrrho’s views. A particularly influential source is Sextus Empiricus, especially his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Interestingly, some claim that Pyrrho himself was not a Pyrrhonian skeptic as he endorsed some positive views about reality. Thorsrud (2009: Chapter 2) provides detailed historical discussion. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For contemporary epistemology on suspension of judgment, see McGrath (2021) and Friedman (2013). A well-known example of suspending judgment is *agnosticism*, which involves suspending judgment about whether there’s a God—considering whether there’s a God or not and then neither believing God exists nor that God does not exist: see [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) While Pyrrho’s writings have not survived, we have second-hand testimony about his philosophical outlook. The story about the wagon is found in Book IX, Section 62 of *The Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius. For more on Pyrrho, see Bett (2022). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The ancient skeptics developed standardized ways of calling propositions into dispute, called “modes.” These modes categorized typical ways to generate disagreement—e.g. the fact that things seem different to different people, or seem different in different circumstances, or seem different in different times and places, and so forth. For an introduction to the epistemic significance of disagreement, see [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson. Also see Christensen (2009). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) This is sometimes called the “Agrippan Trilemma”—it is a trilemma because attempting to respond to the skeptic involves three (supposedly) unsatisfactory outcomes. For recent scholarship on this trilemma and how it is generated through skeptical modes, see Sienkiewicz (2019). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For an introduction to foundationalism and coherentism, see [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf. Also see Sosa (1980). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For more on seemings, see [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Timon’s works, like those of Pyrrho, are also lost. This attribution is recounted in both Laertius (2018) and Thorsrud (2009). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Vogt (2022) provides a good introduction to ancient skepticism. Accepting this form of skepticism can also be part of applying philosophy as a way of life: see [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr. It can also be seen as an application of the later-developed “ethics of belief”: see [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. ### References [Bett, Richard, “Pyrrho”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/pyrrho/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/pyrrho/)[(Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/pyrrho/) [Christensen, David (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. ](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x)[ 4 (5):754-767.](https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x) [Comesaña, Juan and Peter Klein, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/skepticism)[“](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/skepticism)[Skepticism](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/skepticism)[”](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/skepticism)[, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/skepticism) [Fogelin, Robert J. (1994). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/pyrrhonian-reflections-on-knowledge-and-justification-9780195089875)[*Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/pyrrhonian-reflections-on-knowledge-and-justification-9780195089875)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/pyrrhonian-reflections-on-knowledge-and-justification-9780195089875) [Friedman, Jane (201](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y)[1](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y)[). Suspended judgment. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y)[ 162 (2):165-181.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y) [Laertius, Diogenes (2018). (James Miller, Editor; Pamela Mensch, Translator). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780190862176?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780190862176?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780190862176?cc=us&lang=en&) [McGrath, Matthew (2021). Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/nous.12323)[*Noûs*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/nous.12323)[ 55 (2):463-484.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/nous.12323) [Stefan Sienkiewicz, (2019). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/five-modes-of-scepticism-9780198798361?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Five Modes of Scepticism: Sextus Empiricus and the Agrippan Modes*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/five-modes-of-scepticism-9780198798361?cc=us&lang=en&)[, Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/five-modes-of-scepticism-9780198798361?cc=us&lang=en&) [Sosa, Ernest (1980). The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge. ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x)[*Midwest Studies in Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x)[ 5 (1):3-26.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x) [Thorsrud, Harald (2009). ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315711737/ancient-scepticism-harald-thorsrud)[*Ancient Scepticism*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315711737/ancient-scepticism-harald-thorsrud)[. Routledge.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315711737/ancient-scepticism-harald-thorsrud) [Vogt, Katja, “Ancient Skepticism”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/skepticism-ancien)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/skepticism-ancien)[(Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/skepticism-ancien) ### Related Essays [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman [Al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Pyrrhonian-Skepticism.pdf). ### About the Author Lewis Ross is a faculty member in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. He is also the Director of LSE’s Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS). He writes on various topics in epistemology, political philosophy, and philosophy of law. [LewisDylanRoss.com](http://www.lewisdylanross.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Pyrrho, Pyrrhonian Skepticism, skepticism --- ### [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) **Published:** May 1, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Duncan Purves Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics"), [Phenomenology and Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/ "Phenomenology and Existentialism") Word Count: 1000 *So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.* *—* Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus’ That death is generally very bad is one conclusion on which nearly all people seem to agree. However, as Epicurus famously argues in the above quotation, while death appears to be the greatest harm of all, it is a problematically special sort of harm. Unlike typical harms, the event of death does not cause things to go badly for us *after* it happens, because we do not exist after we die. Therefore, things do not appear to go badly for individuals at times after their death. We can call this the *No Subject Problem*. The No Subject Problem seems to entail that death is not bad for someone at times *after* her death. But why should we be concerned to identify some *time* at which death is bad for the person who dies? The reason is that *all* other harms appear to be bad at particular times. If I hit my head on my kitchen cabinet, this is bad for me at times after the event occurs – when I have a headache. If I stub my toe, this is bad for me at times after the event occurs—when I have throbbing pain in my foot. Since other bad events appear to be bad at times, if death is bad for us at no particular time, then we are pushed towards the Epicurean conclusion that death is not bad for us. We might sum up the Epicurean argument as follows: 1. Anything that is bad for someone must be bad for her at some time. 2. There is no time at which death is bad for the person who dies. 3. Therefore, death is not bad for the person who dies.1 If all bad events must be bad for individuals at times, when is death bad for the one who dies if it is not bad afterward? We can distinguish between four answers to this question, each of which I will briefly consider: - Atemporalism: Death is bad for its victim *at* *no time*. - Eternalism: Death is bad for the one who dies *at all times*. - Priorism: Death is bad for its victim *before* her death. - Concurrentism: Death is bad for the one who dies *at the time of* her death.![An image of a clock.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/time-of-death.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1) An image of a clock. ### 1. Atemporalism Thomas Nagel rejects premise (1) of the Epicurean argument, arguing that death is “timelessly bad” for the one who dies.2 The trouble with Nagel’s response to the Epicurean argument is that it seems to make a special case out of death, when death *seems* to be similar to other kinds of evils. But death does seem bad for me at a particular time—at the time when I’m dead and am deprived of the benefits of living. What is it about *death in particular* that allows it to be a timeless harm while other, apparently similar harms are not timeless? ### 2. Eternalism According to eternalists like Fred Feldman, death is bad at *all* times.3 Feldman believes that death is bad for someone just in case her life would have contained more value had she not died her actual death. Since it is *always* true, thinks Feldman, that a person’s life would have contained more value had she not died her actual death, death is eternally bad. The eternalist answer to the Epicurean argument is not entirely satisfying. For while it is true at *all times* that my life would have contained more value had I not stubbed my toe, it also seems like we can locate *particular* times *during* my life when stubbing my toe is bad for me. Plausibly, these are the times after the stubbing during which I feel pain. Once the pain subsides, contrary to Feldman’s view, the toe-stubbing is no longer bad for me. ### 3. Priorism According to priorism, death is bad for the one who dies *before* death occurs. On this view, the event of death detracts from the value of a person’s life at times before death’s occurrence, because it retroactively makes it the case that her earlier desires are frustrated.4 One trouble with priorism is that it seems to imply that death is a special kind of evil, similar to atemporalism. Other bad events do not appear to be bad for us at times *before* they occur. According to Ben Bradley: “If yesterday I desired that it not snow today, but it is snowing today, things were not going badly for me *yesterday*. If anything, they are going badly *today*.”5 ### 4. Concurrentism Concurrentists hold that the entirety of death’s badness for someone is contained in the interval of time during which *dying* occurs, as our vital capacities dwindle away. Steven Luper says: “The subject of death is a live creature; death harms (at least in part) by destroying that creature’s vital capacities; and that harm occurs at the very time the creature dies.”6 Perhaps concurrentism captures *part* of what is bad about death, but surely there is more to the story. If I fall into a temporary coma, certainly the badness of the coma is explained partly by the fact that I am deprived of many goods I would have otherwise enjoyed *after* the coma sets in. Similarly, the badness of death must, in part, be explained by that of which it deprives its victim. At best, concurrentism offers only part of the story. ### 5. Conclusion None of the answers to the Epicurean argument seem entirely satisfactory. In light of the difficulties with identifying a time at which death’s badness obtains, perhaps we should reconsider the possibility that death is a timeless evil. This would make death a unique case, but death is already unique in other ways insofar as its occurrence coincides with its subject going out of existence. ### Notes 1 This is roughly Ben Bradley’s understanding of Epicurus’s argument. 2 Nagel (1970). 3 Feldman (1991). 4 George Pitcher (1993) is one among several authors who defend priorism. 5 Bradley (2009: 87). 6 Luper (2006). ### References [Bradley, Ben. (2009). *Well-Being and Death*. Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/well-being-and-death-9780199596256?q=well-being%20and%20death&lang=en&cc=us) [Feldman, Fred. (1991) “Some Puzzles about the Harm of Death.” *The Philosophical Review* 100(2): 205–227.](http://people.umass.edu/ffeldman/PED.pdf?referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3DSome%2BPuzzles%2Babout%2Bthe%2BHarm%2Bof%2BDeath%26btnG%3D%26as_sdt%3D1%252C15%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22Some%20Puzzles%20about%20Harm%20Death%22) [Luper, Steven (2006) “Death.” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N Zalta (ed.).](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/death/) [Nagel, Thomas. (1970) “Death.” *Noûs* 4: 73–80.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2214297?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103946923147) [Pitcher, George. (1993) “The Misfortunes of the Dead.” In *The Metaphysics of Death*, ed. John Fischer, 159-68.](http://www.sup.org/book.cgi?id=2627) ### Related Essays [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/ "The Moral Status of Animals") by Jason Wyckoff [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman ### About the Author [Duncan Purves](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Purves) is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Florida. His research explores ethical theory, bioethics, and environmental ethics, focusing especially on emerging technologies, the normative significance of harm, death, and our obligations to future generations. [DuncanPurves.com](http://duncanpurves.com) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Phenomenology & Existentialism **Tags:** death, Purves --- ### [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) **Published:** February 6, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** An introduction to skepticism about the external world, or the denial that we know or reasonably believe that there's an external world. **Content:** Author: Andrew Chapman Category: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/ "Epistemology") Word Count: 1000 ### 1. Introducing and Motivating External World Skepticism Look around your environment—turn your head this way and that and really take in everything around you. Let’s use a variable for the sake of ease and say: Things seem to you to be P. P is just a complete description of the way things seemed to you to be when you looked around. It is certainly obvious to you that things seem to you to be P. You might say that you have a special sort of access to how things seem to you. Now, which of the following scenarios is better supported by, that is, is more *justified by*, its seeming to you to be P?: 1. Things actually are P. 2. You’re being deceived by a very powerful evil demon right now. This demon has the ability to manipulate your sensory impressions such that it will seem to you that things are some way when they are not that way at all. Accordingly, things are actually nothing like P. For example, suppose it seems to you as though you are in a room with a table and chair in it and that you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (1) is true, then you *actually are* in a room with a table and chair in it and you are reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, then you are not in a room with a table and chair in it and you are not reading from a computer screen, etc. If (2) is true, things are *very different* from how they seem to you to be.[1](#_ftn1) Philosophers call (2) a *skeptical scenario*. In skeptical scenarios, you are radically misled, deceived, or bamboozled by your evidence in such a way that how things seem to you is different from how things actually are. Perhaps the most famous propounder of skeptical scenarios in the history of philosophy is René Descartes (1596-1650) in his *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641). In the *Meditations*, Descartes considers that he might be dreaming or that he might be being deceived by the evil demon from our scenario (2) above. Hollywood has made much of skeptical scenarios in movies like *Total Recall*, *The Matrix*, and *Inception*. !["The Matrix" film](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/matrix_reboot_1000-630x400-1.jpg?resize=630%2C400&ssl=1)“The Matrix” film So back to our original question: Which of (1) or (2) is best supported or best justified by its seeming to you that P? If you’re being honest with yourself, you’ll conclude that *how things seem* equally well supports (1) and (2). From your internal, first-personal perspective, either of (1) or (2) could be true given how things seem to you. And if that weren’t bad enough, here comes the kicker: If both (1) and (2) are equally well supported by your evidence, *how can you ever possibly know anything* about the world outside your own skin? This is the problem of external world skepticism, perhaps the central problem of modern epistemology. Some people are tempted to shrug (or laugh) off skeptical arguments when they first encounter them. I hope that you see their power. The thrust of the skeptical argument isn’t just that *it’s a remote possibility* that we could be wrong about the external world. It’s that *we have no reason* to believe that things are the way we think they are rather than some other, massively different*,* way. If you have no good reason for believing that things are a certain way, then aren’t you a mere dogmatist to believe that you’re in a room with a table and chair, looking at a computer, living on Earth in the 21st Century? ### 2. Two Responses to External World Skepticism2 The famous defender of common sense, Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796), argued that absent some positive reason to believe that a skeptical scenario is true, *common sense* tips the epistemological scales in favor of the conclusion that we are not radically deceived. Similarly, following Michael Huemer (2001), recent philosophers have defended an epistemological principle known as Phenomenal Conservatism. This principle holds that, absent defeaters (i.e., things that could override or undercut our justification), we are justified in believing that the world is the way it seems to us to be.3 This position has some essentially Reidian elements to it. We needn’t let the possibility of skeptical scenarios destroy our knowledge of the external world *unless there is some good, positive reason* to consider those scenarios. Notice that both Reid’s and Huemer’s doctrines rely on a sort of justificational inertia. Our default epistemic position is *justified* and it takes some positive reason to destroy or question this justification. Some philosophers have been happy to accept our general ignorance of the external world. According to the Greek philosopher Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360 – 270 BCE), founder of the Skeptical school of philosophy, knowledge is impossible (Pyrrho’s writings are all lost—we know of his doctrines through the writings of Sextus Empiricus (c. 160 – 210 CE)). It is even impossible, says Pyrrho, to know that knowledge is impossible! This is the doctrine of *acatalepsia*, and is a form of what philosophers call *global skepticism* (global skepticism is the denial of knowledge tout court and is more extreme than mere external world skepticism). We can never know the true natures of things, says Pyrrho, and even if we accidentally believe something accurate about the world, we could never know that we’ve briefly stumbled upon the truth. While this doctrine might strike some as pessimistic, the Skeptics took the doctrine to be liberating. By relinquishing pretensions to knowledge, Pyrrho and his followers hoped to attain a state of *ataraxia* or peace of mind. ### 3. Conclusion The discussion of our knowledge of the world around us, then, begins with a discussion of our justification. If we can find some way, like Huemer’s Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, to get justification off the ground, then we might have a chance of attaining at least some knowledge. If, however, we find that knowledge is impossible (or find it impossible to know whether knowledge is possible…), then we might do well to adopt the quasi-religious attitude of the Skeptics in order to not worry so much about what we can’t possibly know. ### Notes 1 If the evil demon scenario is too far-fetched for you, imagine that you are dreaming or that you are hallucinating or even that you are in a laboratory and your visual cortex is being stimulated by electrodes. 2 There are nearly as many responses to skepticism as there are philosophers who think about skepticism. Here, I present only two due to space constraints. See DeRose & Warfield (1999) for a number of other interesting responses. 3 This formulation of Phenomenal Conservatism is actually too hasty, as has been discussed by Tooley and Huemer in Tucker (2013). A more careful formulation would be something like: If it seems to a person, S, that P, then, absent defeaters, S has thereby gained some degree of *prima facie* justification for P. ### References [DeRose, Keith, and Ted A. Warfield, eds. *Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader*. New York: Oxford UP, 1999.](http://www.amazon.com/Skepticism-Contemporary-Reader-Keith-DeRose/dp/0195118278/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391641481&sr=8-1&keywords=Skepticism%3A+A+Contemporary+Reader) [Descartes, René. *Meditations on First Philosophy: In Which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Demonstrated*. Ed. Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1993.](http://www.amazon.com/Meditations-First-Philosophy-Distinction-Demonstrated/dp/0872201929/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391641455&sr=8-1&keywords=Meditations+on+First+Philosophy%3A+In+Which+the+Existence+of+God+and+the+Distinction+of+the+Soul+from+the+Body+Are+Demonstrated.) [Huemer, Michael. *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.](http://www.amazon.com/Skepticism-Perception-Studies-Epistemology-Cognitive/dp/0742512533/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391641424&sr=8-1&keywords=Skepticism+and+the+Veil+of+Perception) [Tucker, Chris. *Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013.](http://www.amazon.com/Seemings-Justification-Dogmatism-Phenomenal-Conservatism/dp/0199899495/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391641400&sr=8-1&keywords=Seemings+and+Justification%3A+New+Essays+on+Dogmatism+and+Phenomenal+Conservatism) [Reid, Thomas. *Thomas Reid’s Inquiry and Essays*. Ed. Ronald E. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1983.](http://www.amazon.com/Thomas-Reids-Inquiry-Essays-Reid/dp/0915145855/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391641370&sr=8-1&keywords=Thomas+Reid%27s+Inquiry+and+Essays) [Sextus Empiricus. *Scepticism, Man, & God; Selections from the Major Writings of Sextus Empiricus*. Ed. Philip Paul Hallie. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 1964.](http://www.amazon.com/Sextus-Empiricus-Selections-Writings-Skepticism/dp/087220006X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1391641348&sr=8-1&keywords=Scepticism%2C+Man%2C+%26+God%3B+Selections+from+the+Major+Writings+of+Sextus+Empiricus) [Vogt, Katja. “Ancient Skepticism.” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford University, 24 Feb. 2010. Web. 03 Feb. 2014. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/>.](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/) ### Related Essays [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [Descartes’ Meditations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [The Gettier Problem and the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/ "The Gettier Problem") by Andrew Chapman ### Translation In [Azerbaijani](https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/endru-capman-xarici-alem-skeptisizmi/). ### About the Author [Andrew Chapman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Chapman/) is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder, an MA in philosophy from Northern Illinois University and a BA in philosophy and a BM in bassoon and sound recording technology from Ithaca College. He specializes in epistemology, metaethics, and the history of philosophy (especially Kant and the 20th Century Anglophone and Phenomenological traditions). When not philosophizing, Andrew is skiing, hiking, listening to great music, or playing the bassoon. ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Chapman, skepticism --- ### [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) **Published:** October 9, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Many claim that, when those you can help are innocent strangers with similar interests at stake, you’re required to save the greater number. Is this claim justified? This essay reviews some doubts. **Content:** Author: Theron Pummer Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 To your left, three strangers are drowning. To your right, one other stranger is drowning. You can effortlessly save the three by throwing a lifebuoy to your left. Alternatively, you can save the one by throwing the lifebuoy to your right. You cannot save all four. What should you do? It’s wrong to do nothing, but is it wrong to save just the one stranger? Are you morally required to save the three? Many claim that, when those you can help are innocent strangers with similar interests at stake, you’re required to save the greater number. Is this claim justified? This essay reviews some doubts. ![Four strangers: you can either save the three (left) or the one (right).](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/outline-top.jpg?resize=600%2C312&ssl=1)Four strangers: you can either save the three (left) or the one (right). ### 1. Who Is Wronged? If there is a requirement to save the three drowning strangers over the one, then it must be wrong to save the one. But consider the following skeptical argument:[\[1\]](#_ftn1) 1. Saving the one does not wrong anyone. 2. If saving the one is wrong, there must be someone it wrongs. 3. Therefore, saving the one is not wrong. First, consider (1). If you save the one, who is wronged? Take any one of the three. It may seem this person cannot reasonably complain about the fact that you saved the one instead. After all, were it between saving this person and saving the one, you’d wrong neither one if you saved the other—at least, assuming you used a fair method of selection, like flipping a coin.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But arguably, if you save the one over the three, each of the three could reasonably complain that you didn’t appropriately value her life. For example, each could ask, “Why’d you save *that person* at the cost of *three* lives, but didn’t save *me* at the cost of just *one* life?” So, contrary to (1), you *would* be wronging someone by saving the one. In fact, you’d be wronging each of the three.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Some reject (2), claiming that saving the one is wrong because it fails to bring about the most happiness. But if it’s wrong not to bring about the most happiness, it’d be wrong to save the life of a moderately happy person instead of saving the life of a very happy person. Many deny this.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Limited Addition Does the requirement to save the greater number hold only when the interests at stake for each are similar? Suppose the interests are *very different*. Suppose we’re scheduled to air a surprise commercial at the end of the World Cup, bringing laughs to billions. But then Jones gets trapped under some of our equipment, causing him extremely painful electrical shocks. We can still air our funny commercial, but only if we leave Jones in agony for an hour.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Many believe we’re morally required to save Jones from agony rather than bring laughs to billions. Some take cases like this to support a “limited addition” view, according to which: - when what is at stake for each person is *sufficiently similar* (deaths versus deaths), you are required to save many more over fewer; but, - when what is at stake for each is *sufficiently different* (deaths versus headaches), you are required to save those with more major interests at stake, regardless of the numbers.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This view may be unstable. Suppose you have three alternatives: (i) save one person from intense pain; (ii) save many people from moderate pain; (iii) save many *many* people from mild pain. Assume intense pain is sufficiently similar to moderate pain, moderate pain is sufficiently similar to mild pain, and intense pain and mild pain are sufficiently different.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Given this, the limited addition view seems to have the implausible implication that you must choose (ii) over (i), (iii) over (ii), and (i) over (iii).[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Defenders of the limited addition view might respond that, while you must choose (ii) over (i) when these are the only alternatives, and while you must choose (iii) over (ii) when these are the only alternatives, things are importantly different when all three alternatives are available.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) We could instead try to limit the requirement to save the greater number to cases in which the interests at stake for each are *exactly* similar, but then you’d almost never be required to save a group in virtue of its containing a greater number of people. And that seems implausible. ### 3. Favoring the Few According to another skeptical argument, if it’s not wrong to save *your friend* over three strangers, then it’s not wrong to save one stranger over three others.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) It is hard to deny that the special connection you have to your friend makes it permissible to favor them over strangers. But then it’s at least questionable whether you have a sufficiently special connection to the one stranger.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) What sorts of connections between you and the one can make it permissible to favor them over others? Suppose that, while the one is not your close friend, they are an acquaintance—you wave to each other on your journey to work. And arguably you can form a relevant connection without any shared history, as in love at first sight.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Or you might empathize with the one in particular. Even if such minimal connections could make it permissible to save the few, they apply to a limited range of cases. Suppose that four strangers are drowning: three a mile west, one a mile east. You can send a rescue team in either direction. That’s all you know. Here it seems you’d have no basis for favoring the one. Many cases of charitable giving are like this in that your information is impersonal—one charity saves one life on average per $X donated whereas another saves three.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Finally, suppose your choice is between saving one nearby stranger, who is looking into your eyes while drowning, or saving three anonymous distant strangers. Must you then save the one?[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. Conclusion Here we’ve reviewed some doubts about the requirement to save the many over the few.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Determining the plausibility and scope of this requirement may have important implications not only for emergency rescues, but also for issues like charitable giving and healthcare allocation.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) From Anscombe 1967. Also see Munoz-Dardé 2005. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) On selecting fairly, see Broome 1990 and Walden 2014. Some believe it’s permissible to select based on facts like who’s to your left, who’s closer, or who you see first, rather than employ a randomizing procedure like a coin flip. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For discussion, see Otsuka 2006 and Kumar 2011. See Zhang 2024 on the complaint from each of the three that you didn’t save her at the cost of one life, but saved the one at the cost of three lives. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For example, see Doggett 2013 and Pummer 2023 (chapter 2). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This is a modified version of a famous case from Scanlon 1998 (235). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Defenders of this sort of view include Kamm 1993, Scanlon 1998, and Voorhoeve 2014. What I’m calling a “limited addition” view is better known in the literature as a “limited aggregation” view, “restricted aggregation” view, or “partially aggregative” view. See Horton 2021 for a comprehensive discussion of such views and objections to them. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Rather than three pains (intense, moderate, and mild), we could appeal to a sequence of pains, beginning with very intense pain and ending with very mild pain, where each pain in the sequence is only slightly less bad than its predecessor. This would make it very difficult to deny that adjacent pains are sufficiently similar. See, for example, Norcross 1997. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) When your alternatives include (i), (ii), and (iii), the fact that you must choose (ii) over (i) seems to imply that (i) is impermissible, the fact that you must choose (iii) over (ii) seems to imply that (ii) is impermissible, and the fact that you must choose (i) over (iii) seems to imply that (iii) is impermissible. The result is that each of your alternatives is impermissible. But even if the choice between (i), (ii), and (iii) is a difficult one, it’s hard to believe you’re doomed to choose impermissibly. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For further discussion, see Kamm 1993, Voorhoeve 2014, and Horton 2021. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) From Taurek 1977. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See Parfit 1978. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Setiya 2014. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For example, see [G](https://www.givewell.org/)[ivewell.org](https://www.givewell.org/). GiveWell is an organization devoted to assessing charities that help people in extreme poverty in terms of average benefit delivered per dollar donated. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Woollard 2015 (156), Mogensen 2019, and Pummer 2023 (chapters 5 and 6). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Sung 2022 argues that, even if you’re almost certain that it’s permissible to save the few, you still ought to save the many just in case. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) I explore the scope of this requirement in Pummer 2023, with a focus on donating time and money to help strangers living in extreme poverty. On the relevance of numbers in the context of healthcare allocation, see Kamm 2013. ### References [Anscombe, Elizabeth. 1967. “Who Is Wronged?” ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjthqWzk8f6AhVaFcAKHQJ-B5QQFnoECA0QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Ffile%2Fd%2F0B9jlScR8SHVgTUxWQ2dVYmoyQUU&usg=AOvVaw1ROeogBgmzyv0xjAj3125p)[*Oxford Review*](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjthqWzk8f6AhVaFcAKHQJ-B5QQFnoECA0QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Ffile%2Fd%2F0B9jlScR8SHVgTUxWQ2dVYmoyQUU&usg=AOvVaw1ROeogBgmzyv0xjAj3125p)[ 5: 16–17.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjthqWzk8f6AhVaFcAKHQJ-B5QQFnoECA0QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Ffile%2Fd%2F0B9jlScR8SHVgTUxWQ2dVYmoyQUU&usg=AOvVaw1ROeogBgmzyv0xjAj3125p) [Broome, John. 1990. “Fairness.” ](https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/91.1.87)[*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*](https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/91.1.87)[ 91: 87–101.](https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/91.1.87) [Doggett, Tyler. 2013. “Saving the Few.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00829.x)[*Nous*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00829.x)[ 47: 302–315.](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00829.x) [Horton, Joe. 2021. “Partial Aggregation in Ethics.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12719)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12719)[ 16: 1–12.](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12719) [Kamm, Frances. 1993. ](https://doi.org/10.1093/0195119118.001.0001)[*Morality, Mortality. 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Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/doing-and-allowing-harm-9780199683642?cc=us&lang=en&) [Zhang, Erik. 2024. “Individualist Theories and Interpersonal Aggregation,” *Ethics* 134(4): 479-511.](https://doi.org/10.1086/729703) ### Related Essays [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/cogunlugu-mu-kurtarmali-azinligi-mi-sayilarin-ahlaki-iliskisi-theron-pummer/). ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/saving-the-many.pdf). ### About the Author Theron Pummer is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. Previously he was a Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Oxford. He is the author of [*The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism* ](https://theronpummer.com/the-rules-of-rescue/)[(Oxford University Press, 2023](https://theronpummer.com/the-rules-of-rescue/)[)](https://theronpummer.com/the-rules-of-rescue/). His articles have appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Review*, *Ethics*, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, and *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. [T](https://theronpummer.com/)[heron](https://theronpummer.com/)[P](https://theronpummer.com/)[ummer.com](https://theronpummer.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics --- ### [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) **Published:** June 6, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** We praise people for morally good things: giving to charity, being generous, having compassion for the needy. We blame for morally bad things: cheating on one’s spouse, being selfish, harboring ill will towards others. What are praise and blame, though? When are they appropriate? This essay reviews influential answers to these questions. **Content:** Author: Daniel Miller Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 We praise people for morally good things: giving to charity, being generous, having compassion for the needy. We blame for morally bad things: cheating on one’s spouse, being selfish, harboring ill will towards others.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) What are praise and blame, though? When are they appropriate? This essay reviews influential answers to these questions. [![Van Gogh, "First Steps"](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/vangogh.webp?resize=656%2C526&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/vangogh.webp?ssl=1) Van Gogh, “First Steps” ### 1. What Are Praise and Blame? Praise and blame are responses to individuals and groups based on their behavior, character, or attitudes.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Praise and blame come in many forms: e.g., we can praise with a glowing speech, by expressing admiration, or a pat on the back; we can blame with a stinging rebuke, a cold shoulder, or private feelings of anger.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) What do these types of responses have in common such that each counts as praise or blame? On the *Cognitive View,* to praise or blame someone is simply to *believe* that *their behavior, character, or attitude reflects well or poorly on them in a particular way*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) These beliefs can be thought privately or expressed openly. One concern for this view is that it seems possible to believe (or express) this about someone’s action (character, attitude) without *actually* praising or blaming them: someone might believe (or express) that someone’s action reflects well or poorly upon them while being entirely indifferent to that fact.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) If so, praise and blame require something more than this type of belief. The *Emotion View* aims to add the missing element: praise and blame involve an emotional response (e.g., gratitude or admiration, anger or resentment).[\[6\]](#_ftn6) When we blame someone for an inconsiderate joke, we don’t merely *believe* something about their behavior (e.g., that it reflects poorly on them); we *react* to it with feelings (and perhaps expressions) of indignation.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) However, perhaps we can confront others for wrongdoing (thereby *blaming*) without feeling anger, or openly commend someone (thereby *praising*) without feeling gratitude. If so, we need a more encompassing view of praise and blame. The *Functional* *View* casts a wider net, identifying praise and blame by what they are meant to *accomplish*. One observation is that praise and blame are communicative. Some view blame as moral protest communicating that the individual wronged deserves better treatment.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) If this view is correct, then perhaps anything that communicates the relevant message (e.g., open expressions, non-verbal behavior, reactive emotions) counts as praise or blame.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) One difficulty for this view, however, is that some blame (e.g., private anger) isn’t clearly communicative.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 2. When Are Praise and Blame Appropriate? Praise and blame are characteristic ways of holding individuals responsible for who they are and what they do. Consequently, it’s generally agreed that they aren’t appropriate responses to mere accidents. We’re not deserving of blame for shattering a glass as a result of a spasm, nor is someone deserving of praise if, while texting and distracted, they inadvertently bump someone out of the way of an oncoming car. Furthermore, acting rightly or wrongly may not merit praise or blame if the behavior results from coercion, compulsion, or manipulation (e.g., I’m not blameworthy for violent behavior resulting from a rage-inducing pill slipped into my drink). Instead, praise and blame are appropriate responses only to things for which we’re morally responsible. But when are we morally responsible? #### 2.1. The Control-Based View On one view, we are only praiseworthy or blameworthy for things that are under our *control*. This helps explain why we excuse individuals for mere accidents or when someone’s control is temporarily inhibited by coercion, compulsion, or manipulation. It also explains why we exempt certain individuals from praise and blame (e.g., young children, individuals who are severely mentally disabled), since they lack the basic abilities to control their behavior.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Most control-based theorists agree that an individual must have the abilities to deliberate about moral reasons for and against actions and to behave in accordance with those reasons.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) One long-standing debate concerns whether individuals also need the ability to do otherwise than what they actually do.[\[13\]](#_ftn13), [\[14\]](#_ftn14), [\[15\]](#_ftn15) #### 2.2. The Attitude-Based View On a competing view, we are praiseworthy or blameworthy for things that reveal something morally significant about our underlying attitudes, such as the commendable moral concern or objectionable lack of moral concern (or ill will) revealed by our behavior. Since mere accidents and compulsive behavior typically don’t reflect well or poorly on us, this view can explain why we don’t praise or blame individuals for these things. The attitude-based view seems better suited than the control-based view to explain why we sometimes praise or blame individuals for things that aren’t under their control. For example, we might blame a friend or spouse for forgetting something (e.g., a birthday or anniversary) when it reflects a failure of concern.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) #### 2.3. Additional Requirements on Praiseworthiness While individuals can be blameworthy for minor faults (e.g., arriving late to a meeting), people typically aren’t praiseworthy for fulfilling ordinary obligations (e.g., arriving on time), especially when doing so is easy. We also don’t think someone praiseworthy for acting rightly simply to build their reputation, as when a politician engages in moral grandstanding to appear virtuous.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Praiseworthiness for morally right behavior also requires one or more of the following: 1. one’s behavior is *motivated* by moral concerns (e.g., because it’s right, because it benefits others);[\[18\]](#_ftn18) 2. one’s behavior is *supererogatory*—it goes beyond one’s moral obligations;[\[19\]](#_ftn19) 3. one’s behavior is *difficult* (i.e., it requires effort or sacrifice).[\[20\]](#_ftn20) These proposed requirements suggest that the standards for praiseworthiness are higher than those for blameworthiness. #### 2.4. Further Considerations Even if someone is praiseworthy or blameworthy, there may be other reasons that these responses would be inappropriate. We might not have the *right* to blame if doing so would be hypocritical (perhaps we’re unrepentant for similar wrongdoing) or if the wrongdoing is none of our business.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) ### 3. Conclusion Since praise and blame are essential elements of our interpersonal relationships, we should think carefully about when they are appropriate responses to others while also reflecting upon when we merit them ourselves.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) We also engage in *non-moral* praise and blame. For example, one might praise an artist for a beautiful painting or blame an athlete for bungling a play. This article focuses on *moral* praise and blame. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Praise and blame might also be directed toward groups of people or institutions on these bases. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Although it’s widely agreed that blame can be either private or overt, it’s not clear that private praise makes as much sense as private blame (Coates and Tognazzini 2013: 4-5). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Theorists offer different accounts of what the content of this belief is. Michael Zimmerman (1988) maintains that to blame someone is to judge that they have a “discredit” in their “moral ledger”, and Pamela Hieronymi (2004) argues that blame involves the judgment that one has disregard for or ill will towards others. Parallel beliefs might be involved in praise (e.g., that one has a credit in one’s moral ledger, that one has a high regard for the interests of others). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) There are further reasons to think that praise and blame require something in addition to belief. For example, an evil person might believe (or express) that someone’s behavior reflects poorly upon them morally but relish this fact. That wouldn’t seem to count as *blame*. On the other hand, one might call attention to the good deeds of someone with repulsion (e.g., “Look at that goody goody, always ruining our fun!”). A response like this might acknowledge (at least implicitly) that the person’s action reflects well upon them morally, but it certainly wouldn’t count as *praise*. Lastly, one might recognize that someone’s behavior reflects poorly upon them but refrain from blaming because it would be hypocritical (e.g., “She may deserving of blame for what she did, but *I* sure have no right to blame her; after all, I do that all too often myself”). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) However, see Stout (2020) for a view according to which blame requires reactive emotions, but praise does not. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) P.F. Strawson (1969) is credited with establishing widespread acceptance of this view. See also Wallace (1994) and Wolf (2011) for further defenses of this view. On a less widely held view, blame involves a *desire* that the individual not have behaved as they did (Sher 2006). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Typical examples of praise could be understood as communicating an invitation to appreciate or take joy in some commendable behavior, character, or attitude (Telech 2021). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Talbert (2012) and Smith (2013) on blame as moral protest. For an alternative functional account of blame, see Shoemaker & Vargas (2019). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For a more in-depth treatment of what blame is, see Coates and Tognazzini (2021) (from which I take some of the names for the views discussed in this section). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) These two general reasons (excuses and exemptions) for not holding someone responsible were introduced by P. F. Strawson (1969). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Fischer and Ravizza (1998). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Van Inwagen (1983) for a defense of the view that being morally responsible (and therefore blameworthy) requires the ability to do otherwise, and Frankfurt (1969) for an argument against this requirement. Some authors have argued that this requirement holds for blameworthiness but not for praiseworthiness (Wolf 1980, Nelkin 2008). These authors maintain that if an agent could not avoid doing the morally *right* thing (because of their degree of commitment to morality or care for others) then their behavior is deserving of praise. Authors who defend this asymmetrical view of the requirements on praiseworthiness and blameworthiness argue that what explains the asymmetry is that the relevant requirement is the ability to do the *right thing* for the *right reason*. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For more on control requirements, see [Free ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/)[Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima as well as [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Some authors maintain that the control requirements on moral responsibility are impossible to fulfill, and therefore that no one is deserving of blame for anything. For further reading on how taking a control-based approach to moral responsibility and blameworthiness might lead to this view, see Galen Strawson (1994). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Angela Smith (2005) for this sort of argument against control-based views. It’s worth noting that authors who defend control-based views have their own strategies to account for responsibility for these things. According to control-based views, we may be *derivatively* praiseworthy or blameworthy for things that are not under our voluntary control if they are the foreseeable consequences of earlier behavior for which we are responsible (Fischer and Tognazzini 2009). For example, forgetting my anniversary may result from earlier failures to set myself reminders (this sort of case is discussed by Smith 2005). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Tosi and Warmke (2020). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See Arpaly (2002) for a view like this. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See Swinburne (1989) for a defense of this requirement. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See Nelkin (2016) for a discussion of how difficulty figures into praiseworthiness both for control-based views and attitude-based (sometimes called “quality of will”) views of moral responsibility. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See Fritz and Miller (2018) for a defense of the “non-hypocrisy” condition on the standing to blame, and McKiernan (2016) for a defense of the “business condition” on the standing to blame. See Todd (2019) for an attempt to unify various conditions on the standing to blame. While the current literature on these further considerations has focused mostly on blame, some authors have extended similar considerations to praise. For example, Lippert-Rasmussen (2021) points out that it can be hypocritical to praise *myself* for some trivial virtue while ignoring the greater virtues of those around me. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) I am grateful to Nathan Nobis, Chelsea Haramia, Felipe Pereira, Kristin Seemuth Whaley, Heather Starkey, and Matthew Talbert for thoughtful dialogue and helpful feedback on this essay. ### References [Arpaly, Nomy. (2002). “Moral Worth.” ](https://doi.org/10.2307/3655647)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.2307/3655647)[ 99(5): 223-245.](https://doi.org/10.2307/3655647) [Coates, Justin, and Neal Tognazzini. “The Contours of Blame.” In D.J. Coates and N.A. Tognazzini (eds.) Blame: It’s Nature and Norms (pp. 3-26). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.001.0001/acprof-9780199860821) [Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark. 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(1994). “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” ](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989879)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989879)[ 75: 5-24.](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989879) [Talbert, Matthew. (2012). “Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/41486948)[*The Journal of Ethics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/41486948)[ 16: 89–109.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/41486948) [Telech, Daniel. (2021). “Praise as Moral Address. In D. Shoemaker (ed.) Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 7 (pp. 154-181). New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-agency-and-responsibility-volume-7-9780192844644?cc=us&lang=en&) [Todd, Patrick. (2019). “A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12215)[*Nous*](https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12215)[ 53: 347-74.](https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12215) [Tognazzini, Neal and D. Justin Coates, “Blame”. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/blame/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/blame/)[(Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/blame/) [Tosi, Justin and Brandon Warmke. (2020). ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190900151.001.0001/oso-9780190900151)[*Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190900151.001.0001/oso-9780190900151)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190900151.001.0001/oso-9780190900151) [Wallace, R. Jay. (1994). ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674766235)[*Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments*](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674766235)[. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674766235) [Wolf, Susan. (1980). “Asymmetrical Freedom.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025667)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025667)[ 77(3): 151-166.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2025667) [Wolf, Susan. (2011). “Blame, Italian Style.” In Wallace, R. J., Kumar, R., Freeman, S. (eds.) ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001/acprof-9780199753673)[*Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001/acprof-9780199753673)[. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001/acprof-9780199753673) [Van Inwagen, Peter. (1983). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/an-essay-on-free-will-9780198249245?cc=us&lang=en&type=listing)[*An Essay on Free Will*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/an-essay-on-free-will-9780198249245?cc=us&lang=en&type=listing)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/an-essay-on-free-will-9780198249245?cc=us&lang=en&type=listing) [Zimmerman, Michael. (1988). ](https://www.worldcat.org/title/essay-on-moral-responsibility/oclc/16712250)[*An Essay on Moral Responsibility*](https://www.worldcat.org/title/essay-on-moral-responsibility/oclc/16712250)[. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.](https://www.worldcat.org/title/essay-on-moral-responsibility/oclc/16712250) ### Related Essays [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Ignorance and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/praise-and-blame.pdf). ### About the Author [Daniel Miller](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/DMiller) is an assistant professor of philosophy at West Virginia University. His research focus lies at the intersection of ethics and the philosophy of action, including blameworthiness and ignorance, the ethics of blame, and the ethics of forgiveness. He also writes on topics in health care ethics. His work has appeared in *Ethics*, *Philosophical Studies, Ergo, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Explorations, American Journal of Bioethics, and Journal of Applied Philosophy.* [DanielJamesMiller.com](http://www.danieljamesmiller.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** blame, Dmiller, Praise, responsibility --- ### [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) **Published:** February 28, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** The universe, or some of the objects in it, exhibit order, complexity, efficiency, and perhaps purpose. Many everyday objects with those features—e.g., watches and houses—were intentionally designed. Should we conclude, therefore, that some of the “natural” objects in the universe, or the universe itself, was also intentionally designed? If so, that designer might be God. This essay introduces design arguments for the existence of God. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word count: 1000 The universe, or some of the objects in it, exhibit order, complexity, efficiency, and perhaps purpose. Many everyday objects with those features—e.g., watches and houses—were intentionally designed. Should we conclude, therefore, that some of the “natural” objects in the universe, or the universe itself, was also intentionally designed? If so, that designer might be God. This essay introduces *design arguments* for the existence of God. ![Photo from Astronaut Alexander Gerst Aboard The International Space Station](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/one-strange-rock-2.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1) Photo from Astronaut Alexander Gerst aboard the International Space Station ### 1. The Arguments The standard ‘Design’ or ‘Teleological’ arguments for theism hold that there is evidence of design in nature and that this is evidence for the existence of God.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) There are three general versions of this argument: - ‘Biological Design Arguments’ claim that God designed some or all of the biological organisms in the universe.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - ‘Physical Design Arguments’ (or ‘Cosmic Design’ arguments) claim that God designed something about the large-scale structure and contents of the universe, or its laws of nature, or the small-scale structure of its components.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - ‘Fine-Tuning Arguments’ claim that God intentionally chose the physical laws, fundamental constants, and initial conditions of the universe so the universe would permit complex, biological life.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. The Evidence Biological organisms arguably exhibit interesting order, complexity, and purpose: e.g., the human eye. By analogy, if you were to find and examine a camera lying in a field somewhere, you would be irrational to conclude that it had formed mindlessly and naturally. You should instead notice that it has many parts, each serving a particular purpose, working together for a valuable, general function. But, of course, the human eye also has many parts, each serving a particular purpose, working together for a valuable, general function.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) One version of these arguments holds that some biological systems exhibit ‘irreducible complexity.’ This occurs when some system would not be adaptive or useful unless all of its parts were present simultaneously.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) As a simplified analogy, suppose that your immune system has two subsystems: a subsystem that detects and identifies invaders, and a subsystem that kills invaders and infected cells.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) If your immune system lacked the first type of subsystem, then it would either not kill invaders, or it would also kill your own, healthy cells. If your immune system lacked the second type of subsystem, then it wouldn’t do anything to the invaders it detected. Only if *both* types are present is the immune system adaptive. But surely—the proponent of the argument insists—it’s extremely unlikely that both subsystems should have independently evolved at the same time. Yet, of course, *God* could have created them both at once, thereby creating a well-functioning immune system. The physical universe itself, in the large scale, may also exhibit evidence of design.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Perhaps the planets’ orbiting their stars, and the probability-clouds of electrons, are orderly enough to remind us of the carefully-planned motion of mechanical systems inside a human-designed machine. Of course, someone might object that the planets are simply following the laws of conservation of angular momentum and gravity,[\[9\]](#_ftn9) but the proponent of the physical design-argument can reply that laws of nature are *also* evidence of a designer.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Last, scientists generally agree that if certain features of the universe were slightly different— say, if gravity were somewhat stronger or weaker—then living beings like us would be physically impossible.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) And there are allegedly very many other examples of laws, constants, and initial conditions that must be delicately balanced for life to exist. Yet here we are. So, the argument goes, either we got extremely lucky—perhaps as lucky as winning the lottery several times in a row[\[12\]](#_ftn12)—or God “fine-tuned” the universe to permit life like us. ### 3. Objections While design arguments have skilled defenders, most philosophers have not yet been persuaded.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) One potential problem with biological design arguments is that we know of a powerful mechanism that can mindlessly produce order, complexity, and purpose: the mechanism of evolution by natural selection.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) This might even explain “irreducible complexity.”[\[15\]](#_ftn15) For example, a species might evolve to have a simple immune-system in which the same system both identifies and attacks invaders; and then evolve, in addition, a second kind of subsystem, which only identifies invaders (thereby enhancing the power of the general immune system); and then evolve a third kind, which only attacks; and then cease to have the original system that does both. Another potential problem with biological design arguments is that living creatures may exhibit evidence of “poor design.”[\[16\]](#_ftn16) For example, human beings might have been better-designed if we didn’t use the same tube both to breathe and to swallow food. And we are vulnerable to several tragic, untreatable genetic diseases, such as Tay-Sachs disease,[\[17\]](#_ftn17) which chiefly affects young children. Given the hypothesis of a divine designer who is much-more-intelligent than we, it is puzzling that some creatures exhibit poor design. The philosopher David Hume challenged biological and physical design arguments in various ways. For example, he wondered whether God himself needs a designer, and whether mindless motion and laws might produce the order and complexity we observe. One might also ask how much we can conclude about a designer when we only have one universe to examine, and we have no track record of having observed universe-designers. And design arguments, in general, might better-support the hypothesis that there is an imperfect designer, or that there were many *designers*—both of which hypotheses are incompatible with traditional monotheism.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Last, fine-tuning arguments have been critiqued by arguing that life-permission isn’t so surprising, even given the hypothesis of atheism. Maybe we live in a multiverse of universes with varying laws and constants; maybe there is a more-fundamental, simpler principle that generates a life-permitting set of further laws; and maybe we shouldn’t be surprised that we—*living* beings—live in a *life*-permitting universe.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) How could it be otherwise? ### 4. Next Steps Some philosophers endorse design arguments, but few of these philosophers believe that these arguments prove the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect God.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Therefore, to decide whether God exists, we must consider other arguments for theism, and weigh the evidence from design against any evidence against the existence of God that we might have. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For landmark examples, see Aquinas (2006 \[1265-1274\]: Ia, 2, 3); Hume (1998 \[1779\]: Part 2); and Paley (2006 \[1802\]). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Other than the items cited in the previous note, see Behe (1996) and Dembski (1998) for biological design-arguments. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Swinburne (2004), Chapter 8. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Collins (2012). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Paley (2006 \[1802\]), Chapter 3. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Behe (1996), pp. 130-31. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Cf. Janeway *et al*. 2001. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Hume (*op. cit.*), Part 2. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *Ibid*. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Swinburne (1968), p. 202. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Collins (2012), §§ 2.2-2.4. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For example, Collins (2012: § 2.3.2) argues that even the strength of gravity could not have varied by more than one part in 1060 and allowed the universe to permit life. If you have a one-in-108 chance of winning a lottery, then mathematically, to win that lottery seven times in a row (assuming no cheating and independent trials) is still more probable than ending up with just the right strength of gravity among 1060 possible strengths. And the strength of gravity is allegedly only one of the many constants that needed to be fine-tuned to permit life like us. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See Bourget and Chalmers (2014), p. 476, for evidence that most philosophers have rejected arguments for the existence of God. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See for example Dawkins (2015). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Shanks and Joplin (1999). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Charles Darwin (1999 \[1859\]), Chapter 14. See also Gould (1980). Swinburne (1968, p. 201) notes that this may even be true in physical design-arguments [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Walker (2006). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Hume (*op. cit*.). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Collins (2012), §§ 5-7. See [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Swinburne (1968), p. 199. Collins (2012) himself presents his argument as evidential. ### References [Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologiae, Questions on God*, ed. Leftow, Brian and Davis, Brian. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006 \[1265-1274\].](https://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Theologiae-Questions-Cambridge-Philosophy/dp/0521528925) [Behe, Michael J. *Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution*. New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996.](https://www.amazon.com/Darwins-Black-Box-Biochemical-Challenge/dp/0743290313/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850021&sr=1-1&keywords=Behe%2C+Michael+J.+Darwin%E2%80%99s+Black+Box%3A+The+Biochemical+Challenge+to+Evolution.) [Bourget, David and Chalmers, David J. “What do Philosophers Believe?” *Philosophical Studies* 170 (3) (2014): 465-500.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-013-0259-7) [Collins, Robin. “The Teleological Argument,” in Craig, William Lane and Moreland, J. P. (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology* (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2012), pp. 202-281.](https://www.amazon.com/Blackwell-Companion-Natural-Theology/dp/1444350854/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850069&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Blackwell+Companion+to+Natural+Theology) [Darwin, Charles. *The Origin of Species*. New York, NY: Bantam Dell, 1999 \[1859\].](https://www.amazon.com/Origin-Species-150th-Anniversary/dp/0451529065/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850133&sr=1-1&keywords=Darwin%2C+Charles.+The+Origin+of+Species) [Dawkins, Richard. *The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design.* New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2015.](https://www.amazon.com/Blind-Watchmaker-Evidence-Evolution-Universe/dp/0393351491/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850166&sr=1-1&keywords=Why+the+Evidence+of+Evolution+Reveals+a+Universe+without+Design) [Dembski, William A. *The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998.](https://www.amazon.com/Design-Inference-Eliminating-Probabilities-Probability/dp/0521678676/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850201&sr=1-1&keywords=the+Design+Inference%3A+Eliminating+Chance+through+Small+Probabilities) [Gould, Stephen Jay. *The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History*. New York, NY and London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1980.](https://www.amazon.com/Pandas-Thumb-Reflections-Natural-History/dp/0393308197/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850223&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Panda%E2%80%99s+Thumb%3A+More+Reflections+in+Natural+History) [Hume, David. *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, 2nd ed., ed. Popkin, Richard H. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998 \[1779\].](https://www.amazon.com/Dialogues-Concerning-Natural-Religion-Classics/dp/0872204022/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850247&sr=1-1&keywords=Hume%2C+David.+Dialogues+Concerning+Natural+Religion) [Janeway, Charles et al. *Immunobiology*, 6th ed. New York, NY: Garland Science Publishing, 2005.](https://www.amazon.com/Immunobiology-Janeway-Charles-Travers-Shlomchik/dp/B00BTM716E/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850275&sr=1-1&keywords=Janeway%2C+Charles++Immunobiology%2C+6th) [Paley, William. *Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006 \[1802\].](https://www.amazon.com/Natural-Theology-Oxford-Worlds-Classics/dp/0192805843/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850394&sr=1-2&keywords=Paley%2C+William.+Natural+Theology+oxford) [Shanks, Niall and Karl H. Joplin. “Redundant Complexity: A Critical Analysis of Intelligent Design in Biochemistry.” *Philosophy of Science* 66 (2) (1999): 268-82.](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/392687) [Swinburne, Richard. “The Argument from Design.” *Philosophy* 43 (165) (1968): 199-212.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy/article/the-argument-from-design/116B74325890E9ED691F54B256E655B8) [Swinburne, Richard. *The Existence of God*, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004.](https://www.amazon.com/Existence-second-Swinburne-Richard-Paperback/dp/B00OVN3P9U/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850464&sr=1-1&keywords=Swinburne%2C+Richard.+The+Existence+of+God%2C+2nd) [Walker, Julie. *Tay-Sachs Disease*. New York, NY: Rosen Publishing Group, 2006.](https://www.amazon.com/Tay-sachs-Disease-Genetic-Diseases-Walker/dp/1404206973/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1519850481&sr=1-1&keywords=Walker%2C+Julie.+Tay-Sachs+Disease.) ### Related Essays [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/design-arguments.pdf). ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** design, God, metcalf --- ### [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) **Published:** December 8, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Andre Leo Rusavuk Category: [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word count: 990 We frequently say things like, ‘This seems possible,’ ‘That can’t be done,’ ‘This must happen,’ ‘She might be able to . . ,’ ‘This is necessary for . .’ and so on.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Claims like these are *modal* claims. They involve the modal concepts of *actuality, possibility*, and *necessity*. Modality concerns the *mode* or *way* in which a claim is true or false, and *how* something exists or does not exist. This essay explains basic modal concepts, illustrates some different *kinds* of possibility and necessity, and briefly explains how we try to identify whether a modal claim is true or false. [![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/modality.jpg?resize=656%2C365&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/modality.jpg?ssl=1)An image of different planets, suggestive of “possible worlds.” ### 1. Modal Concepts Modal concepts apply to *claims* and *beings*, at least.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Here are some basic definitions concerning claims, beliefs or sentences: - a claim is *possibly true* if it could be true; it’s *possibly false* if it could be false; - a claim is *necessarily true* if it must be true and cannot be false; it’s *necessarily false* if it must be false and cannot be true;[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - a claim is *contingently* true if it is actually true, but could have been false; true, but not necessarily true. Concerning beings, people and things: - a *being* is a possible being if it (he, she) *could* exist: a being is *impossible* if it couldn’t exist; - a *necessary* being *must* exist: a *necessarily non-existent* being cannot exist; - *contingent* beings, like us, actually exist, but could have failed to exist: they are neither necessary nor impossible beings. ### 2. Kinds of Possibility & Necessity There are many *kinds* or *types* of possibility and necessity. To understand a modal claim, we must identify what kind is meant.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Consider these claims: - It’s *possible* for Mary to jump to the moon. - *Necessarily,* Plato is either alive or not alive. - It’s *impossible* that something begin to exist but not have a cause. ### A. *Logical* Possibility & Necessity (1) might seem false, since nobody can jump to the moon, right? But (1) is true *if logical* possibility is what’s meant. Jumping to the moon is *logically possible*: that’s not a contradiction and so made impossible by the laws of logic. It’s logically possible that mythical creatures exist, for someone to bench-press a locomotive, and for a dog to speak French. The claim “Plato is both alive and not alive,” however, is contradictory and so a logical impossibility. Logical truths like “if A > B and B > C, then A > C” and “A is identical to A” are logical necessities. ### B. *Physical* (or Natural) Possibility & Necessity It is *logically* possible for Mary to jump to the moon. Is it *physically* possible? No. Something is physically *possible* if the physical laws of nature would allow it to happen. Mary’s jumping to the moon is physically impossible: the physical laws of nature won’t allow it. Cars driving twice their current top speed are physically possible: going twice the speed of light is physically impossible. A claim is a physical necessity if it must be true, given our physical laws: e.g., it is *physically* necessary that unsupported objects fall to the ground. This, however, is not logically necessary: there is no logical contradiction in floating, unsupported objects. Logical possibility and necessity entail, but are not entailed by, physical possibility and necessity. ### C. *Metaphysical* Possibility & Necessity Metaphysical possibility and necessity are the most controversial, and hardest to define, kind of modality. These are possibilities and necessities defined *not* by logic or the actual physical world, but, rather, reality itself. Claim (3) then might be understood that it is *metaphysically* impossible for something to begin to exist and yet be uncaused. The claim “something began to exist but is uncaused” is not self-contradictory, so it is not a logical impossibility. And it does not seem to be a mere physical impossibility, only impossible in a world with physical laws like ours. (3) seems to be a metaphysical impossibility, since nothing can begin to exist and remain uncaused in *any* circumstance. Some *physical* impossibilities are *metaphysically* possible: e.g., the laws of nature allowing for moving faster than light. Some metaphysically necessary truths include truths of mathematics (2+2=4) and analytic truths or definitions (“all bachelors are unmarried males”): these must be true, but not because of logic or the physical world. Some philosophers see metaphysical modality as concerned with what things *are*, in their natures or essences; so, water *is* H2O, *necessarily*: in no possible circumstances is water *not* composed of H2O.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) In the same way, necessarily, if an object has a shape, then it *must* have a size: this is in the nature or essence of shapes. ### D. Other Modalities There are still other *kinds* of necessity and possibility, e.g.: - a belief is *epistemically* possible if, for all we know, it could be true: “There might be life on Mars!” - it is *morally* impossible for good parents to abuse their children “for fun”: moral laws and good parents’ character make this impossible; - it could be *psychologically* impossible for someone intentionally to eat a cockroach, given her aversion to bugs; - something is *technologically* possible if technology might someday allow for it: e.g., medical treatments from Star Trek or from Wakanda, or robotic soldiers in the military; - something is *legally* necessary if the law of the land requires it: e.g., wearing a seat belt.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### 3. Knowing What’s Possible & Necessary How can we tell whether something is possible or necessary?[\[7\]](#_ftn7) First, we must clarify what *kind* of possibility or necessity is meant by the claim: logical, physical, metaphysical, legal, or something else? Next, we try to *imagine* whether what is said can or must be true, given the relevant laws that govern that type of modality, e.g., the laws of logic, the physical laws, and so on.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This method, too-briefly described, is controversial, but it is a starting point. ### 4. Conclusion Claims about what *can*, *cannot*, and *must be* are pervasive to many areas of thinking. We now better understand what they mean and how to try to tell whether they are true or false. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Modality is present in daily thinking and scientific theorizing and is *pervasive* to philosophy. For examples, ethical reasoning presumes that there are different *possible* actions we could do and some that we *must* do: consequentialists typically state their theory in modal terms, that we *must* perform the best *possible* action (see [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz). The free will debate results from tensions between thinking that, given the past, we *must* act in certain ways and thinking that there are many *possible* choices we *could* make (see [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima), and there is the related issue of whether it must be *possible* that you do other than what you actually do in order to be morally responsible for your actions (see [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki and [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia). A common idea of God is that of a being who *must* have certain attributes (see [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson); ontological arguments for God’s existence involve claims that reflection on the concept of God shows that such a being *must* exist or *necessarily* exists (see [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman); some arguments from evil, however, claim it is *impossible* that God exists, given the amount and types of evils in the world (see [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf). Epistemologists ask if it is *possible* that you have false beliefs about what seem to be even the clearest and obvious matters (see [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli). Metaphysicians ask what changes *could* occur to you, yet you continue to exist, and is *necessary* for your continued existence (see [Origin Essentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance). Indeed, some might argue that modal claims are *necessary* for a topic to be philosophical: it is *not possible* that a topic be philosophical yet there are no modal claims closely related to the topic. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Modal concepts also apply to *events* or things that happen, e.g., that *you could win a prize*. Since events can be understood in terms of the *claims* or *propositions* that represent those events, the claim “you could win a prize” is a possible truth, or is possibly true. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Possibility and necessity are related. Something is possible *if* its failing to occur is *not necessary*; if something is *necessary*, its *failure* to occur is *not possible*. Divers (2002), 3-4, provides a nice summary: “Possibility rules out impossibility and requires (exclusively) contingency or necessity. Impossibility rules out possibility, rules out necessity and rules out contingency. Necessity requires possibility, rules out impossibility and rules out contingency. Contingency requires possibility, rules out impossibility and rules out necessity.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For further discussion, see Kment, Boris, “Varieties of Modality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/modality-varieties/>>. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For a good overview of the issues surrounding metaphysical modality, see [Ross P. Cameron, “What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 79, 1, (July 2009): 1-16.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00264.x) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Many examples of modality in this essay were given to illustrate the ways in which those claims could be true or false: this is known as *alethic* modality, which concerns the truth and falsity of a claim. Other types of modality are *non-alethic*, meaning the modal word does not indicate a concern about the truth or falsity of the claim, but something else. For example, one non-alethic interpretation of “Claim p is possible” is an *epistemic* one, which deals not with the truth or falsity of the claim but with whether anything the speaker knows suggests or entails that the claim is false. So, “Claim p is *possible*” might mean “Nothing I know entails that claim p is false” or “Nothing I know makes it such that we should not believe p.” [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For further discussion, see [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer and [Vaidya](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)[, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)[Anand.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)[ “The Epistemology of Modality.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)*[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)*[, (ed.) Edward N. Zalta. URL: ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology> [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) One fruitful philosophical concept to aid our imagination is called *possible worlds*, or ways the world could have been. So, in some possible worlds, e.g., pigs fly, water freezes at 50 degrees Fahrenheit, and grass is orange. Here we consider imaginary “worlds” determined by different laws, e.g., logically-possible worlds, physically-possible worlds, and so on. “Possibly true” then means *true in at least one possible world,* “necessarily true” means *true in all possible worlds,* and “contingently true” means *true in the actual world but not all worlds.* For a brief, further discussion of possible worlds, see [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) by Thomas Metcalf. ### References [Cameron, Ross P. “What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.79, 1, (July 2009): 1-16.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00264.x) [Divers, John. ](https://www.routledge.com/Possible-Worlds/Divers/p/book/9780415155564)*[Possible Worlds](https://www.routledge.com/Possible-Worlds/Divers/p/book/9780415155564)*[. Routledge, 2002.](https://www.routledge.com/Possible-Worlds/Divers/p/book/9780415155564) Kment, Boris, “Varieties of Modality”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/modality-varieties](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/modality-varieties/)[/](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/modality-varieties/)>. [Vaidya](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)[, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)[Anand.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)[ “The Epistemology of Modality.” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)*[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)*[, (ed.) Edward N. Zalta. URL = ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/)<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology> ### For Further Reading [Parent, Ted. ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/)“Modal Metaphysics,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.). <http://www.iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/>. [Conee, Earl, and Theodore Sider. ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/riddles-of-existence-9780198724049?cc=us&lang=en)*[Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/riddles-of-existence-9780198724049?cc=us&lang=en)*[: New Edition. Oxford University Press, 2014.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/riddles-of-existence-9780198724049?cc=us&lang=en) ### Related Essays [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/)by Bob Fischer [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) by Thomas Metcalf [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [Origin Essentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Possibility-and-Necessity.pdf). ### Acknowledgments I would like to thank the editors and reviewers—especially Nathan Nobis, Bailie Peterson and Devon Belcher—for their helpful comments which greatly improved this essay. ### About the Author Andre Leo Rusavuk graduated from the University of Birmingham (UK) with a PhD in Philosophy where he wrote his dissertation on luck and perfect being theism. He teaches at a private classical education high school in North Carolina where he introduces students to the fascinating world of philosophy. (And yes, his students call him Dr. Dre!). [philpeople.org/profiles/andre-rusavuk](https://philpeople.org/profiles/andre-rusavuk) ##### FOLLOW 1000-WORD PHILOSOPHY ON [FACEBOOK](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) AND [TWITTER](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) AND SUBSCRIBE TO RECEIVE EMAIL NOTICE OF NEW ESSAYS AT THE BOTTOM OF [1000WORDPHILOSOPHY.COM](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics **Tags:** Metaphysics, Modality, philosophy --- ### [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) **Published:** June 28, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** People sometimes thing there's an obligation to vote. Is there such an obligation, especially an ethical obligation? **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Categories: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word count: 995 Your vote normally only has a very small chance of changing the outcome of any election for a public office.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) For your vote to make that difference, thousands or millions of other votes would need to end up in a tie, which is extremely improbable.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Given this, could you *still* be morally required to vote, because of the consequences that *would* occur if your vote *did*—somehow—change the outcome? You might be thus obligated even though your vote almost certainly wouldn’t cause such a change. To understand this, let’s think about voting from an *expected-value* perspective on decision-making. ![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/i_voted_sticker_1-2.png?resize=400%2C373&ssl=1) An “I Voted” sticker. ### 1. Expected Ethical Value Decisions in which your action will almost certainly create some effect are relatively easy to think about. For example, throwing a bomb through someone’s window has a very high probability of causing major damage. Unless there is some extraordinarily compelling reason to do so, it’s easy to see we shouldn’t do that. But what about decisions in which your action only has a small probability of changing the outcome, such as voting? You often have some very good reason to act, even when doing that action only has a very small chance of creating a benefit, when the benefit is large enough.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) For example, in any particular car trip, a serious collision is unlikely, so fastening your child’s seatbelt only has a very small chance of making the difference about whether your child survives the trip—there probably won’t be a collision at all. Still, you ought to fasten the seatbelt, because of the small chance of major harm. We can make this point in terms of *expected value*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) One expected-value calculation method involves multiplying the net benefits of your action’s success by the probability that those benefits will occur, and then subtracting the harms of making the attempt.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) If we’re talking about morality, then the “value” we’re talking about is *ethical* value: the sort of thing that we have moral reasons to produce.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Here, we assume that we can approximate ethical value with some unit of measurement. Let’s use a hypothetical unit of goodness called ‘utils.’[\[7\]](#_ftn7) For example, if there’s a 1% chance that buckling a seatbelt will save your child’s life, and the value of saving the child’s life is equal to ten million utils,[\[8\]](#_ftn8) and it costs you one util (say, in lost time) to buckle your child’s seatbelt,[\[9\]](#_ftn9) then the expected value of buckling your child’s seatbelt is equal to (1% of 10,000,000 utils) – 1 utils, i.e. 99,999 utils. Even though there is a small probability of having an effect, the value of the effect is so high that it’s worth doing. ### 2. Expected Value in Voting Let’s apply expected value to voting. There might only be a tiny chance that your vote will change who gets elected, but the net benefit of one candidate’s getting elected might be huge, for example in the billions of utils. Therefore, to decide whether you ought to vote, you must take into account the result of your vote’s changing the outcome, along with any other possible harms or benefits. Start with the value of the result. Suppose that Jane would, if elected, confer an average, net benefit of 1000 utils for each of 325 million people in Jane’s country.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Then the value of Jane’s winning is 325 billion utils. If your vote had a one-in-ten-million chance of changing the outcome, and it only harmed you by a net 100 utils to vote for Jane (you have to spend time, and it’s not much fun), and there were no other benefits or harms, then voting for Jane would have the following expected value: \[(probability of making a difference x total benefit if you make a difference)\] – harms = expected value. \[(1/10,000,000) x 325,000,000,000\] – 100 = 32,400. Thus from an expected-value perspective, it’s exactly like acting in some way that has a 100% chance of creating exactly net 32,400 utils of goodness.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) What’s the probability of affecting the outcome of the election? In presidential elections in the United States, a swing-state voter might have a one-in-ten-million chance of determining who wins, and a non-swing-state voter might have a one-in-one-billion chance.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) In this case, many voters might be obligated to vote for Jane in the above example.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) A similar calculation explains why you’re obligated to fasten your child’s seatbelt. ### 3. Other Benefits and Harms Of course, there can also be other good results of your voting. Maybe you love wearing an “I Voted” sticker. Add those into your calculation the same way: multiply the probability that you’ll get that benefit with the value of the benefit. At the same time, there can also be harms of your voting. Normally, setting aside the outcome of the election, the effects of *your* voting a certain way only really happen to you.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) But voting can be harmful to the voter, physically or psychologically. For example, if you are a member of an oppressed group, a dominant group may attack you for trying to vote: consider these harms in your calculation too. ### 4. Political Knowledge, Morality, and Blame Above, we estimated the values of voting a certain way and the probabilities of changing the outcome. But what if we were mistaken in our estimates? We could also be mistaken in our values: what we think is morally important. Most Americans have relatively little politically-relevant knowledge.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) It might be obligatory to *abstain* from voting if you don’t know enough about the election.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) By analogy, if you walk into a complicated factory and see a big, red, unlabeled button, and you don’t know what it does, don’t push the button. ### 5. Conclusion Expected value is normally not the only morally relevant consideration. One might feel a sense of civic obligation.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) One might feel an obligation to symbolically express approval or disapproval of some candidate or law, or of democracy itself.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) One might also simply enjoy voting: it’s kinda fun. And *deontologists* believe that actions can be morally wrong even if those actions maximize expected ethical value.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Here, as with in every moral question, we must take seriously the possibility that expected consequences are not the only relevant moral consideration. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Gelman et al. 2012. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) In that case, every vote would be the “deciding” vote, because every vote would be such that if it hadn’t gone that way, the result would have been different. Strictly, this result would have to be after the last step in the process, for example, after a recount has been conducted and all re-votes if any have been conducted. That is to say, it would have to be that the final tally after all re-votes or re-counts was such that setting your vote aside, everyone else ended up in a tie. You might wonder what the probability in general of such a result is. Consider an extremely favorable case: there are only 100 votes cast other than yours, and every voter, going into the vote, is exactly 50% likely to vote one way, and exactly 50% likely to vote the other way. Even then, there’s only about an 8% chance of a tie. With 10,000 votes cast, there’s only about a 1% chance. You can run the relevant calculations by changing the inputs here: [Wolfram Alpha](https://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=prob+x%3D50+if+x+is+a+binomial+with+p%3D0.5+and+n%3D100). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Cf. Singer 1972: 231. Most philosophers believe there is some obligation of beneficence: to make the world better. Arguably, nearly all utilitarians (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2020: § 1 and Gronholz 2014 \[“[Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/)” in *1000-Word Philosophy*\]) believe something like this, as do most deontologists, for example Kant (Beauchamp 2020: § 2.3; cf. Chapman 2014 \[[Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) in *1000-Word Philosophy*\]) and Ross 2002 \[1930\]: 21. For more, see Beauchamp 2020. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Cf. Briggs 2020: § 1 plus Brennan and Lomasky: § IV. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) We are hereby assuming that we can measure different things against each other in terms of value, for example that the extra time spent fastening a seatbelt can be compared against the benefit of a child’s surviving a collision. We can’t defend this assumption here, but of course, other philosophers have written about it (Hsieh 2019). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Of course, there’s debate about what exactly counts as ethically valuable: is it pleasure and the absence of pain, or well-being more generally, or some other set of phenomena? Cf. Crisp 2020. Note that this is a separate question—but related to—the question of how we should act. But if consequentialism is true (cf. Gronholz 2014 \[[Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) in *1000-Word Philosophy*\]), we need some way of deciding what matters morally. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) ‘Utility’ in philosophy usually refers to benefit or goodness. (It’s the root of the name ‘utilitarianism,’ for example. So we can use ‘utils’ to refer to hypothetical units of value.) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) It’s sometimes convenient to talk about ethical value in terms of dollars. We normally think there can be moral reasons to spend wealth on achieving certain ends, for example, to spend $500 to save a human life. Cf. Singer 1972. Or we might say a benefit worth $100 is a benefit that it would be morally permissible or obligatory to spend $100 on. But we can imagine these as units of happiness, or benefit, or whatever; cf. Briggs 2020. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Strictly speaking, of course, we have to think about the harm to the rest of society of buckling the child in, but I don’t know what that would be. Maybe the child would grow up to be the next Hitler, but let’s set aside that possibility. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Perhaps this estimate seems high. But note that presidents can serve for four or even eight years, and have many effects on many different people, in the present and the future. See n. 12 below. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Compare: Suppose there are two buttons. One has a 50% chance of killing two innocent people (and a 50% chance of doing nothing), and one has a 25% chance of killing four innocent people (and a 75% chance of doing nothing). If you consider pushing one button to be morally equal to pushing the other, then you’re reasoning in this way. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Gelman et al. 2012. The expected value of swing-state voting would be comparatively high. But if the stakes are high enough, non-swing-state votes may also have extremely high expected value. Given the length of presidential terms and the incumbency effects, the effects on the entire human race (for example, on the potential for catastrophic climate change and war), and effects on future generations, including not only the laws passed but also the executive orders issued, the Supreme-Court justices appointed, and the health of democracy itself, the expected value of a certain candidate’s being elected president might sometimes be in the tens of trillions or more. Given a 10-trillion-util expected value, even a one-in-a-billion chance of tipping the outcome delivers an expected value of 10,000 utils before the cost of your voting. In practice, it will harm very few voters equivalently to 10,000 utils to vote for any presidential candidate. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) There could be extreme cases, though, in which the standard calculation yields implausible results (cf. Bostrom 2009). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) For example, if you can either vote or take an injured person to the hospital, then perhaps you ought to do the latter. But that’s a rare sort of case. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See e.g. Annenberg Public Policy Center 2014 and the research cited in Caplan 2008 and Huemer 2016. But see e.g. Schleicher 2008 and Colander 2008 for critical perspectives on the effects and implications of this ignorance. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) At the very least, they may need to engage in *epistemic discounting*: reduce the expected net value of their candidate’s winning proportionally to their own lack of knowledge. Cf. Brennan and Lomasky 2000: § IV. Equally importantly, most voters may simply have false beliefs about the value of their candidates’ winning an election. If we’re making a *moral* assessment of the *voter* (rather than a value-based assessment of a particular *act of voting*, i.e. how much goodness or badness the act generates), it may be incorrect to *blame* the voter for their action. However, we could still ask whether the voter should have done a better job seeking out knowledge. Cf. Chignell 2020. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Indeed, in some places, it’s legally required (Moyo 2019). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See e.g. Brennan and Lomasky 2000: § VI; and Brennan 2020: § 3.1-3.2; and Sinnott-Armstrong 2005. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) For example, maybe you promised someone that you wouldn’t vote for Jane. See Chapman 2014 ([Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) in *1000-Word Philosophy*) for an introduction to a version of deontology. ### **References** [Annenberg Public Policy Center. 2014. “Americans Know Surprisingly Little About Their Government, Survey Finds.” Annenberg Civics Knowledge Survey. ](https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-know-surprisingly-little-about-their-government-survey-finds/) [Beauchamp, Tom. 2020. “The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.),](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/principle-beneficence/) [*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2020 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/principle-beneficence/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/principle-beneficence/) [Bostrom, Nick. 2009. “Pascal’s Mugging.” ](https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/pascal.pdf)[*Analysis*](https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/pascal.pdf)[ 69(3): 443-45.](https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/pascal.pdf) [Brennan, Geoffrey and Loren Lomasky. 2000. “Is There a Duty to Vote?” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/is-there-a-duty-to-vote/AC9698B1A128D21A2EF3F431D0964210)[*Social Philosophy and Policy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/is-there-a-duty-to-vote/AC9698B1A128D21A2EF3F431D0964210)[ 17(1): 62-86.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/is-there-a-duty-to-vote/AC9698B1A128D21A2EF3F431D0964210) [Brennan, Jason. 2020. “The Ethics and Rationality of Voting.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/voting/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2020 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/voting/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/voting/) [Briggs, R. A. “Normative Theories of Rational Choice: Expected Utility.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/rationality-normative-utility/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2020 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/rationality-normative-utility/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/rationality-normative-utility/) [Caplan, Bryan. 2008. ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691138732/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter)[*The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691138732/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter)[. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691138732/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter) [Chapman, Andrew. 2014. “Deontology: Kantian Ethics.” In 1000-Word Philosophy (ed.), ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/)[*1000-Word Philosophy*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/)[.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) [Chignell, Andrew. 2020. “The Ethics of Belief.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/ethics-belief/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2020 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/ethics-belief/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/ethics-belief/) [Colander, David. 2008. “The Myth of the Myth of the Rational Voter.” Critical Review 20(3): 259-71.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08913810802503426) [Crisp, Roger. 2020. “Well-Being.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/well-being/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2020 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/well-being/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/well-being/) [Gelman, Andrew et al. 2012. “What is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference?” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00272.x)[*Economic Inquiry*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00272.x)[ 50(2): 321-26.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00272.x) [Gronholz, Shane. 2014. “Consequentialism.” In 1000-Word Philosophy (ed.), ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/)[*1000-Word Philosophy*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/)[.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) [Hsieh, Nien-hê. 2019. “Incommensurable Values.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/value-incommensurable/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/value-incommensurable/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/value-incommensurable/) [Huemer, Michael. 2016. “Why People are Irrational About Politics.” In Jonathan Anomaly et al, ](https://global.oup.com/ushe/disciplines/philosophy/upper-division-courses/philosophy-politics-and-economics/?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Philosophy, Politics, and Economics: An Anthology*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/disciplines/philosophy/upper-division-courses/philosophy-politics-and-economics/?cc=us&lang=en&)[ (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press), pp. 456-67.](https://global.oup.com/ushe/disciplines/philosophy/upper-division-courses/philosophy-politics-and-economics/?cc=us&lang=en&) [Moyo, Dambisa. 2019. “Make Voting Mandatory in the U. S.” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/opinion/united-states-voting-mandatory.html)[*The New York Times*](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/opinion/united-states-voting-mandatory.html)[, October 15, 2019.](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/opinion/united-states-voting-mandatory.html) [Ross, W. D. 2002 \[1930\]. ](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199252653.001.0001/acprof-9780199252657)[*The Right and the Good*](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199252653.001.0001/acprof-9780199252657)[. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199252653.001.0001/acprof-9780199252657) [Schleicher, David. 2008. “Irrational Voters, Rational Voting.” Election Law Journal 7(2): 149-58.](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2008.7207) [Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1)[*Philosophy and Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1)[ 1(3): 229-43.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052?seq=1) [Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2005. “It’s Not ](https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/perspectives-on-climate-change-walter-sinnottarmstrongPerspectives-on-Climate-Change/)[*My* ](https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/perspectives-on-climate-change-walter-sinnottarmstrongPerspectives-on-Climate-Change/)[Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations.” In Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Richard B. Howarth (eds.), ](https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/perspectives-on-climate-change-walter-sinnottarmstrongPerspectives-on-Climate-Change/)[*Perspectives on Climate Change*](https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/perspectives-on-climate-change-walter-sinnottarmstrongPerspectives-on-Climate-Change/)[ (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier), pp. 293-315.](https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/perspectives-on-climate-change-walter-sinnottarmstrongPerspectives-on-Climate-Change/) [Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2020. “Consequentialism.” In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/consequentialism/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2020 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/consequentialism/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/consequentialism/) ### Related Essays [Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and Democracy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/20/condorcets-jury-theorem/) by Robert Weston Siscoe [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/)[ by Shane Gronholz](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/)[ by Andrew Chapman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) [Practical Reasons](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/20/practical-reasons/ "Practical Reasons") by Shane Gronholz [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Prisoner’s Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/ "The Prisoner’s Dilemma") by Jason Wyckoff ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/voting.pdf "voting") in PDF. ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. <http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf> ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** ethics of voting, metcalf, vote, voting, voting ethics, voting obligation --- ### [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) **Published:** October 25, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is an expert? What is expertise? This essay answers these questions. **Content:** Author: Jamie Carlin Watson Category: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Wordcount: 989 Want to improve your golf or tennis game? Take lessons from a local “pro.” Got an obscure medical problem? See a specialist. Nasty divorce? Hire a good lawyer. In short, if you’ve got a hard question or problem, you should seek the guidance of an *expert*. Experts don’t just guide personal choices: they shape social policy, law, and collective decision-making: how should scientific research be interpreted? What unintended consequences might result from this policy? Is this proposed law legally viable? Experts help answer hard questions like these. But what is an expert? How can we tell if someone is an expert? And, since experts are important, why do people often reject their advice? ![expertise](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/expertise.jpeg?resize=656%2C557&ssl=1) ### 1. What is expertise? There are many types of experts. Some experts – e.g., physicists, art historians, accountants – have exceptional knowledge. Others – e.g., chess masters, professional violinists, surgeons – have exceptional abilities. Some expertise relates less to *doing* and more to *perceiving*: e.g., an expert distiller can taste the nuances in whiskey; an expert radiologist can read an X-ray efficiently.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Despite these differences, all experts have a high degree of competence in a specific domain (or subject area) that makes them an authority in that domain.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Becoming an expert typically requires thousands of hours of focused study and practice.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Other experts usually review this practice and give feedback, leading to more practice.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Because expertise develops over time, someone can be more or less of an expert.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Expertise requires continual study and practice or else it can be lost. Experts are not simply reservoirs of information; they have a deep understanding of their domain, usually including how and why its claims are accepted.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) They are not dabblers or merely well-informed: they are *authorities*. The authority of an expert is *epistemic*: their knowledge and understanding gives us good reason to trust them in matters of their domain of expertise.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Our beliefs are more likely to be justified or true if we get them from experts.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Experts, then, make us better off, by sharing their knowledge or using their skills. ### 2. How can we tell whether someone is an expert? Sometimes it’s clear that someone is an expert: the proof is in their performance, e.g., gold medal winners, trial-winning attorneys. Other times, it’s harder to tell. There are, however, some general indicators that someone is *likely* an expert. Experts usually: - have extensive specialized education and experience; - have a track record of being right or helpful; - have high professional standing or credentials; - have marks of professional achievement, such as publications or awards; - can speak easily and confidently about their domain.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) These indicators aren’t perfect. Some degree programs, credentials and awards don’t amount to much. Some fields don’t have track records, or they aren’t available. Some experts tend to *lose* skill with greater experience.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Some well-meaning people claim to be among the experts in a domain, and even have credentials and experience, but they simply are not experts: they slipped through the cracks, so to speak. Some people claim expertise in areas where there is no genuine expertise: if there is no knowledge or well-justified belief in a domain (as opposed to mere beliefs or opinions), then there are no experts in that domain. And there are charlatans, people who, for a variety of reasons, present themselves as experts, even though they are not experts and they know it. Identifying who and who is not an expert is sometimes challenging. But it’s not impossible or not worth trying. And, again, sometimes it’s clear who the experts are. ### 3. Skepticism About Experts People who haven’t had the education, training, or practice of an expert are far less likely to be as skilled or knowledgeable in that domain, compared to an expert. So, expert guidance is more likely to be correct or useful than our own: this is why experts matter.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Some people, however, are skeptical of experts and even the whole idea of expertise.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Here are some reasons why: A. Expert opinion sometimes changes: We all know of cases where it seems like the experts got it wrong: butter was bad for you, now it’s fine; all women should get mammograms, now it’s only women over 50; one doctor told you X, but another said Y. Ever-changing “expert opinion” sometimes leads people to doubt experts in general. B. Experts sometimes overreach: Experts sometimes overstep their bounds. They make claims about subjects outside their expertise, e.g., physicians offering political commentary. When experts present themselves as authorities in areas outside of their expertise, it is harder to know who the genuine experts are and it’s easier to lose respect for experts. C. Experts sometimes disagree: Even genuine experts **–** people with equally strong training and experience **–** sometimes disagree. TV courtroom dramas make much of this: “You bring your experts; we’ll bring ours.” If we can’t decide which expert is more likely correct, we might lose confidence in experts generally. D. We sometimes resist expert authority: Experts sometimes tell us things we just don’t want to hear, and so we refuse to listen. We are so confident that we are right that we dismiss anyone who contradicts us, including experts.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Sometimes this is because a belief is so important to us that we are offended by the idea that others know more about it than we do. When we claim expertise that we really don’t have, this is often at our own peril. Recognizing why people sometimes reject expertise can make us more critical of that rejection. Sometimes skepticism about experts *is* justified. But, more often, experts are in better positions than us in knowing what we should think or do, and so skepticism is unwise. ### 4. Conclusion Studying expertise helps us better identify experts and understand why they are important. Many questions remain, however, e.g.: what should we believe, and do, when experts disagree?[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Could recognizing the value of expertise discourage democracy, which allows non-experts’ opinions to influence important decisions and policies?[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Are there experts on controversial topics, like ethics or justice or politics?[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Finally, are these all just questions for experts, or should everyone try to answer them as best they can? ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See Bilalić (2017). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) This characterization is not uncontroversial. Alvin Goldman (2018: 6) argues that computer algorithms like Google’s search engine are experts. The algorithms certainly “learn” from searchers and other click data, but whether this amounts to training that develops understanding remains an open question. Further, some think people with savant syndrome (a condition in which someone with significant mental disabilities has a far-above-average ability to count, calculate, or remember) have expertise without rigorous study (see Ericsson and Pool 2016: 219-222). And we might wonder whether, if there were an all-knowing being like God, that being would be an expert. Nevertheless, almost all cases of *human* expertise (including savants) requires specialized training or learning. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) According to Ericsson and Pool (2016), acquiring any type of expertise typically requires thousands of hours of training. The popular “10,000 hour” rule was a misinterpretation by Malcolm Gladwell (2008) of a point made by Krampe, Tech-Römer, and Ericsson (1993). By age 20, expert violinists had practiced an average of ten-thousand hours. But many were experts long before age 20. Their findings show that achieving expertise sometimes requires more than 10,000 hours of practice, and sometimes less. Improved teaching techniques help, too. Ericsson, et al. (2018: 6) note that the mathematics now taught in one college course is material that Roger Bacon (1214-1292) said would take 30 to 40 years to learn. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This is especially the case with people who want to achieve the highest levels of expertise: Olympians, professional athletes, chess grandmasters, and Noble Prize winners. Precisely what that standard is will be determined by the domain. For example, expert swimming requires technique and speed comparable to other expert swimmers, and expertise in a sub-domain of mathematics (like topology) requires drawing a sufficient number of valid inferences relative to the current state of that field. And what counted as the highest level of expert swimming in the 1968 Olympics was different from what counted in the 2016 Olympics. A widely studied version of this rigorous training was coined “deliberate practice” by psychologist K. Anders Ericsson (2009). This practice requires full attention on tasks that are not in one’s comfort zone and for which others have already developed training techniques and involves using copious feedback to improve particular aspects of a skill. For discussion, see Ericsson and Pool (2016). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Collins and Evans (2007) for a novel distinction between *interactional expertise* and *contributory expertise*. Both have extensive understanding of the concepts and methods in a domain, but whereas interactional experts can generally only discuss the history and development of a field, contributory experts have the ability to contribute new concepts, theories, and methods to the field. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Contrast this with “political authority,” the authority to make decisions and enforce behaviors at political or governmental levels. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Coady (2012). For an introduction to the concept of epistemic justification, see [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Goldman (2001). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Some health professionals tend to lose skill over time. Ericsson and Pool (2016, chapter 5) show that some physicians and nurses get worse despite increasing experience. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Raz (1986) and Zagzebski (2012). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Shaw (2016); Schrager (2016); Fox (2018); Burdick (2018). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) In some cases, the fact that we are not experts can lead us to distrust experts. Research on confidence in ourselves suggests that people who are especially incompetent in a domain are likely to be ignorant of their own incompetence. This results in a cognitive bias known as the Dunning-Kruger effect (Dunning and Kruger, 1999). David Dunning, who co-identified the problem, writes, “\[T\]he knowledge and intelligence that are required to be good at a task are often the same qualities needed to recognize that one is not good at that task” (2016). People under the influence of Dunning-Kruger have an over-inflated view of their own competence, which then leads them to demote the competence of others, including genuine experts. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Matheson (2015), as well as [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Noveck (2015); Brennan (2016) [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Burch (1974), Rasmussen (2005), Tetlock (2005), Watson (2017), and Watson and Guidry-Grimes (2018). ### References [Bilalić, Merim. (2017) ](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/psychology/cognition/neuroscience-expertise?format=PB&isbn=9781107446519)*[The Neuroscience of Expertise](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/psychology/cognition/neuroscience-expertise?format=PB&isbn=9781107446519)*[. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/psychology/cognition/neuroscience-expertise?format=PB&isbn=9781107446519) [Brennan, Jason. (2016) ](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10843.html)*[Against Democracy](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10843.html)*[. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10843.html) [Burch, Robert W. (1974) “Are There Moral Experts?” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BURATM-2)*[The Monist](https://philpapers.org/rec/BURATM-2)*[, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 646-658.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BURATM-2) [Burdick, Alan. (2018) “Looking for Life on a Flat Earth,” ](https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/looking-for-life-on-a-flat-earth)*[The New Yorker](https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/looking-for-life-on-a-flat-earth)*[, May 30.](https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/looking-for-life-on-a-flat-earth) [Coady, David. (2012) ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/What+to+Believe+Now%3A+Applying+Epistemology+to+Contemporary+Issues-p-9781405199940)*[What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/What+to+Believe+Now%3A+Applying+Epistemology+to+Contemporary+Issues-p-9781405199940)*[. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/What+to+Believe+Now%3A+Applying+Epistemology+to+Contemporary+Issues-p-9781405199940) [Collins, Harry and Robert Evans. (2007) ](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo5485769.html)*[Rethinking Expertise](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo5485769.html)*[. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo5485769.html) [Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Stuart E. Dreyfus. (1988) ](http://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Mind-Over-Machine/Hubert-Dreyfus/9780029080610)*[Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer](http://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Mind-Over-Machine/Hubert-Dreyfus/9780029080610)*[. New York: Free Press.](http://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Mind-Over-Machine/Hubert-Dreyfus/9780029080610) [Dunning, David. (2016) “The Psychological Quirk That Explains Why You Love Donald Trump.” ](https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/donald-trump-supporters-dunning-kruger-effect-213904)*[Politico Magazine](https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/donald-trump-supporters-dunning-kruger-effect-213904)*[, May, 26.](https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/donald-trump-supporters-dunning-kruger-effect-213904) [Ericsson, K. Anders and Robert Pool. (2016) ](https://www.indiebound.org/book/9780544456235?aff=PublishersWeekly)*[Peak: Secrets from the New Science of Expertise](https://www.indiebound.org/book/9780544456235?aff=PublishersWeekly)*[. Boston: Mariner Books.](https://www.indiebound.org/book/9780544456235?aff=PublishersWeekly) [Ericsson, K. Anders. (2009) “Enhancing the Development of Professional Performance: Implications from the Study of Deliberate Practice.” In K. Anders Ericsson, ed. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/development-of-professional-expertise/FF6A7EDDA721252304BF7816CF8F1DFA)*[Development of Professional Expertise](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/development-of-professional-expertise/FF6A7EDDA721252304BF7816CF8F1DFA)*[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 405-431.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/development-of-professional-expertise/FF6A7EDDA721252304BF7816CF8F1DFA) [Ericsson, K. Anders, Ralf Th. Krampe, and Clemens Tech-Römer. (1993) “The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance.” ](http://projects.ict.usc.edu/itw/gel/EricssonDeliberatePracticePR93.pdf)*[Psychological Review](http://projects.ict.usc.edu/itw/gel/EricssonDeliberatePracticePR93.pdf)*[. Vol. 100, No. 03, pp. 363-406.](http://projects.ict.usc.edu/itw/gel/EricssonDeliberatePracticePR93.pdf) [Feltovich, Paul J., Michael J. Prietula, and K. Anders Ericsson. (2006) “Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives.” In K. Anders Ericsson, Neill Charness, Robert R. Hoffman, and Paul J. Feltovich, eds. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-expertise-and-expert-performance/95B7A17EA9EE0E02A804B2930EB50C28)*[The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-expertise-and-expert-performance/95B7A17EA9EE0E02A804B2930EB50C28)*[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41-68.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-expertise-and-expert-performance/95B7A17EA9EE0E02A804B2930EB50C28) [Fox, Maggie.](https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/anti-vaccine-hotspots-rise-across-u-s-study-finds-n882461)[ (2018) “Anti-Vaccine Hot Spots on the Rise Around the US, Study Finds.” ](https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/anti-vaccine-hotspots-rise-across-u-s-study-finds-n882461)*[NBC News](https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/anti-vaccine-hotspots-rise-across-u-s-study-finds-n882461)*[, June 12.](https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/anti-vaccine-hotspots-rise-across-u-s-study-finds-n882461) [Fricker, Elizabeth. (2006) “Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.” In Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, eds. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-epistemology-of-testimony-9780199276011?cc=us&lang=en&)*[The Epistemology of Testimony](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-epistemology-of-testimony-9780199276011?cc=us&lang=en&)*[. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 225-250.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-epistemology-of-testimony-9780199276011?cc=us&lang=en&) [Gladwell, Malcolm. (2008) ](https://www.amazon.com/Outliers-Story-Success-Malcolm-Gladwell/dp/0316017930)*[Outliers: The Story of Success](https://www.amazon.com/Outliers-Story-Success-Malcolm-Gladwell/dp/0316017930)*[. New York: Little, Brown & Co.](https://www.amazon.com/Outliers-Story-Success-Malcolm-Gladwell/dp/0316017930) [Goldman, Alvin I. (2018) “Expertise.” ](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11245-016-9410-3.pdf)*[Topoi](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11245-016-9410-3.pdf)*[. Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 3-10.](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11245-016-9410-3.pdf) [\_\_\_\_\_. (2001) “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3071090)*[Philosophy and Phenomenological Research](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3071090)*[. Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 85-109.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3071090) [Klein, Gary. (1997) “Developing Expertise in Decision-Making.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135467897394329)*[Thinking and Reasoning](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135467897394329)*[. Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 337-352.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135467897394329) [Kruger, Justin and David Dunning. (1999) “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments.” ](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e320/9ca64cbed9a441e55568797cbd3683cf7f8c.pdf)*[Journal of Personality and Social Psychology](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e320/9ca64cbed9a441e55568797cbd3683cf7f8c.pdf)*[, Vol. 77, No. 6, pp. 1121-1134. ](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e320/9ca64cbed9a441e55568797cbd3683cf7f8c.pdf) [Lackey, Jennifer. (2018) “Experts and Peer Disagreement.” In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz, eds. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-belief-and-god-9780198798705?cc=us&lang=en&)*[Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-belief-and-god-9780198798705?cc=us&lang=en&)*[. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 228-245.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-belief-and-god-9780198798705?cc=us&lang=en&) [\_\_\_\_\_. (2006). “Introduction.” In Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, eds. ](https://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Testimony-Jennifer-Lackey/dp/0199276013/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1533129634&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Epistemology+of+Testimony.)*[The Epistemology of Testimony](https://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Testimony-Jennifer-Lackey/dp/0199276013/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1533129634&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Epistemology+of+Testimony.)*[. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-21.](https://www.amazon.com/Epistemology-Testimony-Jennifer-Lackey/dp/0199276013/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1533129634&sr=1-1&keywords=The+Epistemology+of+Testimony.) [Matheson, Jonathan. (2015) ](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137400895)*[The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137400895)*[. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.](https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137400895) [Noveck, Beth Simone. (2015) ](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B01AJRXK1E/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_hsch_vapi_tkin_p1_i2)*[Smart Citizens, Smarter State](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B01AJRXK1E/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_hsch_vapi_tkin_p1_i2)*[. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B01AJRXK1E/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_hsch_vapi_tkin_p1_i2). [Rakel, Horst. (2004) “Scientists as Expert Advisors: Science Cultures Versus National Cultures?” in Kurz-Milcke, Elke and Gerd Gigerenzer, eds. (2004) ](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9780306479038)*[Experts in Science and Society](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9780306479038)*[. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, pp. 3-25.](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9780306479038) [Rasmussen, Lisa, ed. (2005) ](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781402038198)*[Ethics Expertise: History, Contemporary Perspectives, and Applications](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781402038198)*[. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9781402038198) [Raz, Joseph. (1986) ](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001/acprof-9780198248071)*[The Morality of Freedom](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001/acprof-9780198248071)*[. Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198248075.001.0001/acprof-9780198248071) [Shaw, Julia. (2016)](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-real-reason-that-we-don-t-trust-experts-a7126536.html)[ “The Real Reason That We Don’t Trust Experts Anymore.” ](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-real-reason-that-we-don-t-trust-experts-a7126536.html)*[The Independent](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-real-reason-that-we-don-t-trust-experts-a7126536.html)*[, July 08.](https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-real-reason-that-we-don-t-trust-experts-a7126536.html) [Schrager, Allison. (2016) “People Don’t Trust Economists Anymore.” ](https://qz.com/735166/the-end-of-economists-influence-is-nigh/)*[Quartz](https://qz.com/735166/the-end-of-economists-influence-is-nigh/)*[, July 24.](https://qz.com/735166/the-end-of-economists-influence-is-nigh/) [Solas, Eduardo and Gary A. Klein, eds. (2001) ](https://www.crcpress.com/Linking-Expertise-and-Naturalistic-Decision-Making/Salas-Klein/p/book/9780805835397)*[Linking Expertise and Naturalistic Decision Making](https://www.crcpress.com/Linking-Expertise-and-Naturalistic-Decision-Making/Salas-Klein/p/book/9780805835397)*[. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, Inc.](https://www.crcpress.com/Linking-Expertise-and-Naturalistic-Decision-Making/Salas-Klein/p/book/9780805835397) [Tetlock, Philip. (2005) ](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11152.html)*[Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11152.html)*[ Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/titles/11152.html) [Tetlock, Philip and Dan Garner (2015) ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/227815/superforecasting-by-philip-e-tetlock-and-dan-gardner/9780804136716/)*[Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/227815/superforecasting-by-philip-e-tetlock-and-dan-gardner/9780804136716/)*[. New York: Crown Publishers.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/227815/superforecasting-by-philip-e-tetlock-and-dan-gardner/9780804136716/) [Turner, Stephen. (2015) ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Expertise/Turner/p/book/9780415709439)*[The Politics of Expertise](https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Expertise/Turner/p/book/9780415709439)*[. London: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Politics-of-Expertise/Turner/p/book/9780415709439) [Vickers, Andrew J., Fernando J. Bianco, Angel M. Serio, James A. Eastham, Deborah Schrag, Eric A. Klein, Alwyn M. Reuther, Michal W. Kattan, J. Edson Pontes, and Peter T. Scardino. 2007. “The Surgical Learning Curve for Prostate Cancer Control after Radical Prostatectomy.” ](https://academic.oup.com/jnci/article/99/15/1171/1006857)*[Journal of the National Cancer Institute](https://academic.oup.com/jnci/article/99/15/1171/1006857)*[. Vol. 99, No. 15, pp. 1171-1177.](https://academic.oup.com/jnci/article/99/15/1171/1006857) [Vickers, Andrew J., Fernando J. Bianco, Mithat Gonen, Angel M. Cronin, James A. Eastham, Deborah Schrag, Eric A. Klein, Alwyn M. Reuther, Michael W. Kattan, J. Edson Pontes, and Peter T. Scardino. 2008. “Effects of Pathologic Stage on the Learning Curve for Radical Prostatectomy: Evidence that Recurrence in Organ-confined Cancer is Largely Related to Inadequate Surgical Technique.” ](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2637145/)*[European Urology](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2637145/)*[. Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 960-966.](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2637145/) [Watson, Jamie Carlin. (2017) ](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498516426/Winning-Votes-by-Abusing-Reason-Responsible-Belief-and-Political-Rhetoric)*[Winning Votes by Abusing Reason: Responsible Belief and Political Rhetoric](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498516426/Winning-Votes-by-Abusing-Reason-Responsible-Belief-and-Political-Rhetoric)*[. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498516426/Winning-Votes-by-Abusing-Reason-Responsible-Belief-and-Political-Rhetoric) [Watson, Jamie Carlin and Laura K. Guidry-Grimes (2018) ](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319927589)*[Moral Expertise: New Essays from Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319927589)*[. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319927589) [Zagzebski, Linda. (2012) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/epistemic-authority-9780199936472?cc=us&lang=en&)*[Epistemic Authority](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/epistemic-authority-9780199936472?cc=us&lang=en&)*[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/epistemic-authority-9780199936472?cc=us&lang=en&) ### Related Essays [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/uzmanlik-jamie-carlin-watson/), [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/expertise/) ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/expertise.pdf). ### About the Author Jamie is an Associate Staff Bioethicist at Cleveland Clinic. He formerly was an Assistant Professor of Medical Humanities and Bioethics at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences. He received his Ph.D. from Florida State University. He specializes in traditional and social epistemology and applied bioethics. His research focuses on the nature and limits of expertise, especially in medicine and politics. He is the author of *[Expertise: A Philosophical Introduction](https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/expertise-a-philosophical-introduction-9781350083851/?fbclid=IwAR0Hyv-JBMXZ-fB7uzI2099JNMtIBv1VyUcWSdRDxZoeTyeyHWm8idO9hRs)*. Fitting for someone named Dr. Watson, he has a very intelligent dog named Sherlock. [JamieCarlinWatson.com](http://jamiecarlinwatson.com) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Ethics, expertise, philosophy, rationality, reason, science --- ### [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) **Published:** February 13, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Bob Fischer Categories: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 998 Alice hits Betty, and Betty gets mad. Is her anger justified? Betty thinks so. After all, Alice didn’t *need* to hit her; Alice *could have* controlled her temper. This justification for Betty’s anger seems reasonable. However, it isn’t reasonable unless we know that Alice could have behaved differently, and we don’t know that unless we know that it was *possible* for her to have behaved differently. Do we? !["Imagine The Possibilities" by Carol Groenen](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/1-imagine-the-possibilities-carol-groenen.jpg?resize=656%2C437&ssl=1)“Imagine The Possibilities” by Carol Groenen We’re now in the realm of *modal epistemology*, which concerns how we know what’s possible and necessary. Let’s break that down. First, “modal.” Many sentences can be true or false. For example, “I had tea with breakfast” is a false sentence (I had coffee); “2 + 2 = 4,” of course, is a true sentence. But sentences don’t just differ in terms of their truth or falsity: they also differ in terms of their *mode* of truth or falsity. Although it’s false that I had tea with breakfast, it might have been true: I *could* have made tea. However, “2 + 2 = 4” is true and couldn’t have been false—there is no way for 2 and 2 *not* to equal 4. In other words, though I didn’t have tea with breakfast, it’s *possible* that I did; by contrast, it’s *necessary* that 2 + 2 = 4. These two claims—about what’s possible and what’s necessary—are *modal* claims. Now, “epistemology.” Very roughly, epistemology is the study of the scope and sources of our knowledge. In other words, epistemologists ask how much we know, as well as how we know it. So, for example, epistemologists ask whether you know that you aren’t dreaming right now. (How could you tell?) And, if you *do* know that you aren’t dreaming, epistemologists wonder *how* you know it. What *explains* your knowing that you aren’t dreaming? Modal epistemology, then, is the study of the scope and sources of our modal knowledge. So: *which* modal claims do we know, and how, exactly, do we know them? Applied to the question about Betty’s anger: do we know that Alice could have done otherwise, and if so, then what explains our having that knowledge? There are two popular answers to the scope question: the *conventional answer* and the *moderate skeptic’s answer*. The conventional answer is that we know all sorts of things about what could and couldn’t be: for example, that there could be naturally purple cows, that there could be a device that instantly transports you to Mars, that you couldn’t be a peanut. The conventional answer to the scope question is linked to the conventional one about sources: namely, that we know what is and isn’t possible based on what we can imagine. According to this line of thinking, you know that there could be naturally purple cows because you can imagine them, and you know that you couldn’t be a peanut because you draw a blank when you try to imagine yourself as a legume. On this view, we definitely know that Alice didn’t need to hit Betty. The moderate skeptic isn’t so sure. She might agree that we should answer the source question with reference to the imagination, but she worries that we rarely imagine things in sufficient detail. This leads her to doubt that we know as much as the conventional answer suggests. After all, what are we imagining when we say that we’ve imagined a teletransportation device? Are we picturing someone stepping into a box in one location, disappearing behind some falling glitter, and then appearing in another location? If we don’t imagine the mechanism that makes this possible, then why not think that we’re just imagining some special effects? (Bad answer: because we *stipulate*—that is, just decide and proclaim—that it’s a teletransportation machine. But we can stipulate that we’re imagining a circular square behind a curtain, and surely there can’t be any circular squares.) Unfortunately, though, the moderate skeptic is at risk of becoming a *complete* skeptic. Recall Betty’s claim that Alice could have done otherwise. Can we imagine *that* in sufficient detail? Do we understand how the world would need to be different for Alice to behave differently? If not, then perhaps we’re imagining a nicer scene—one where, say, Alice gives Betty a hug—but not one that’s possible. The moderate skeptic seems to raise an important worry about the conventional answer, but complete skepticism seems untenable: we do know that Alice didn’t need to hit Betty. What’s going on? Perhaps we went wrong when thinking about the source question. Granted, imagining seems to be behind many modal judgments. But maybe this mental operation isn’t the source of our modal knowledge, but instead draws on another source of modal information. This is the idea behind *essence-based* modal epistemologies. According to these views, we figure out what things are essentially—what it is to *be* a rhododendron, or a human being, or a quasar; the properties that make those things the things they are, and without which they wouldn’t exist—and then that knowledge informs our imaginings. So if we know that every detail in a person’s history isn’t essential to her, we can know that she could have done otherwise. The obvious trouble with essence-based views is that they push the problem back: how do we know about essences? This seems no easier a question than: how do we know what’s possible and necessary? Such worries lead some philosophers to start with more mundane ways of gaining knowledge: namely, analogical and inductive arguments. For example, I’ve seen other houses repainted, and mine doesn’t seem to be relevantly different; so, mine could be repainted. Likewise, I know that people make many different decisions about how to behave. Alice doesn’t seem unlike those people in any important respect. So, probably, she could have made a different decision. These simple arguments probably won’t take us very far: for example, they might not tell us what to say about teletransporters, where various analogies might point in various directions. But they might deliver a lot of ordinary modal knowledge, and that may be good enough. ### *For Further Reading* [Evnine, Simon. 2008. Modal epistemology: Our knowledge of necessity and possibility. *Philosophy Compass* 3: 664-684.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00147.x/abstract) [Mcleod, Stephen. 2005. Modal epistemology. *Philosophical Books* 46: 235-245.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.00371.x/abstract) [Vaidya, Anand. 2015. The epistemology of modality. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/modality-epistemology](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/modality-epistemology) [Van Inwagen, Peter. 1998. Modal epistemology. *Philosophical Studies* 92: 67-84.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1017159501073?LI=true) [Yablo, Stephen. 1993. Is conceivability a guide to possibility? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 53: 1-42.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108052) ### Related Essays [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/modal-epistemology.pdf). ### About the Author [Bob Fischer](http://www.bobfischer.net/) teaches philosophy at Texas State University. He’s the author of[ *Modal Justification via Theories*](https://www.amazon.com/Modal-Justification-Theories-Synthese-Library/dp/3319491261/) (Springer, 2017) and co-editor of [*Modal Epistemology After Rationalism*](http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319443072) (Springer, 2017). He has also edited and written a number of books and essays on animal ethics. For students, he put together [*College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues That Affect You*](https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/college-ethics-9780190063337?cc=us&lang=en&#:~:text=Ideal%20for%20introductory%20ethics%20or,to%2D%2Dtoday's%20college%20students.), 2nd Ed. (Oxford, 2020) and [*Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/ethics-left-and-right-9780190882785?cc=us&lang=en&) (Oxford, 2019). [www.bobfischer.net](http://www.bobfischer.net/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Metaphysics **Tags:** Modality --- ### [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) **Published:** October 5, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** A review of the knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. **Content:** Author: Tufan Kıymaz Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 In philosophy of mind, *physicalism* is the view that mental states, like beliefs, feelings and desires, are nothing over and above the physical states of the brain: we don’t have souls or any non-physical features, and so all facts about our minds are, at bottom, physical facts.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Physicalism is the theory of mind that many argue is most consistent with a scientific understanding of the universe.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But imagine this: Mary is a brilliant super-scientist who has never left her black-and-white room, in which she has never seen colors. She has complete physical knowledge, that is, scientific knowledge expressible in physical and functional terms, about human color vision from books and black-and-white television. So, she knows every *physical* fact about human color vision. One day, however, she leaves the room and sees a red tomato (she knows that tomatoes are red). She exclaims “*This* is what it is like to see red! *This* is what people experience when they see red!”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Now, we have an argument against physicalism, known as the *knowledge argument*: Mary apparently learns a new fact about human color experience. But she already knew all the *physical* facts before she left her room. So, what she learns must be a *non-physical* fact. Since there are non-physical facts, physicalism is false.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Let’s consider four of the most prominent responses to this argument. ![A red tomato.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/tomato.jpg?resize=611%2C458&ssl=1)A red tomato. ### 1. The Ability Hypothesis According to the *ability* *hypothesis*, Mary does learn something when she sees red, however, what she learns is not a new *fact*, but it is *know-how*; she just acquires new cognitive abilities. Knowing what it is like to have a certain experience, on this view, consists in the possession of the abilities to recognize, imagine, and remember the relevant experience. If what Mary learns is just know-how, which doesn’t involve a new truth, then her pre-release knowledge can still be complete.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) By analogy, consider that Mary has complete scientific knowledge about swimming. But if she leaves the room and learns how to swim, that doesn’t mean that her scientific knowledge about swimming was incomplete: by learning how to swim she didn’t learn a new fact, she just acquired an ability. A problem with the ability hypothesis, however, is that Mary does seem to learn a new truth when she sees red, beyond mere know-how. When she says “*This* is what people experience when they see red!” she states a true belief, which she didn’t have before seeing a red tomato. ### 2. The Acquaintance Hypothesis A similar response is that Mary doesn’t learn a new truth but she gains nonfactual *acquaintance knowledge*.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Suppose I ask you whether you know Oprah, and, as an answer, you give me some facts about her. But, then, I say “No, what I am asking is do *you* know her?” I am asking whether you know her *personally.* According to the acquaintance hypothesis, Mary comes to know what it is like to see red in this sense of “know.” To know what it is like to experience a mental state is just to experience that mental state. Then, of course, Mary cannot know what it is like to see red before she leaves the room, but this doesn’t mean that there were some facts that she didn’t know. It is possible to know all the facts about Oprah without knowing her personally, and it is possible to know all the facts about the red seeing experience without actually having that experience[\[7\]](#_ftn7). The acquaintance hypothesis, however, like the ability hypothesis, denies that Mary learns a new truth, so the above objection to the ability hypothesis can be raised against it also. ### 3. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy According to this view, Mary’s new knowledge is about the physical facts that she already knows about.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) First-personal knowledge of experiences involves *phenomenal concepts*, concepts that directly denote subjective experiences, and phenomenal concepts can only be acquired by subjective experience. When Mary sees red, she says, “*This* is what it is like to see red.” Let’s say physicalism is true and the experiential redness Mary is talking about is actually a physical property of the brain. Let’s call this physical property “R.” So, what Mary says is equivalent to this: “R is what it is like to see red.” “*This*” in her remark expresses a phenomenal concept. So, what Mary learns upon seeing red is not a new truth, but a new way of apprehending a physical truth that she already knew. By analogy, this is just like “Superman can fly” expressing the same fact as “Clark Kent can fly.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) The main difficulty with the phenomenal concept strategy is to explain the nature of phenomenal concepts in completely physical terms, given that phenomenal concepts seem to involve subjective experiences from the first-person perspective.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. The No Learning Objection Some physicalists argue that the intuition that Mary learns something new upon seeing red is *prima facie* powerful only because we lack adequate understanding of what complete physical knowledge would be.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) According to them, even if we cannot see how, Mary would be able to deduce whatever fact is expressed by “*this* is what it is like to see red” from physical knowledge. By analogy, it seems that before Einstein we would think that complete information about matter would not give us complete knowledge of energy, but that’s because we did not yet have Einstein’s theory explaining how matter and energy are not distinct entities. However, many physicalists disagree. They maintain that Mary learns something when she sees red for the first time and that, even though this is not a new truth, it is something new (either know-how or acquaintance knowledge or a phenomenal concept) that is not deducible from her physical knowledge. ### 5. Conclusion The knowledge argument is one of the most influential arguments against physicalism.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) Explaining the nature of our subjective knowledge of our experiences in physical terms seems to be very difficult, and, simply put, the knowledge argument says this: if our experiences were physical, then explaining our knowledge of them wouldn’t be this difficult. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) One version of physicalism holds that mental states *are* brain states or neural states: mental states *are* brains or the neurons of brains in different configurations. Another version of physicalism holds that mental states are *functional states* of the brain. One way of understanding a functional state is this: If A is a functional state of B, then A is something B *does* and nothing more. For example, a particular computation is a functional state (or, process, to be precise) of the computer hardware. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The main alternative to physicalism is *dualism*, of which there are different types. According to *substance dualism*, in addition to the physical body you have, there is also a separate non-physical thing, a soul. According to *property dualism*, which is the most common type of dualism today, you don’t have a soul but your brain has some non-physical properties. These non-physical properties would be subjectively-accessible properties of experiences, such as the feeling of pain, that are over and above the neural and functional properties of the brain. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The qualitative features of experiences that are detectable only through introspection are called “qualia” (singular: quale). So, for example, red quale is the “raw feel” of seeing red; it is what distinguishes the experience of seeing red from all other experiences (such as seeing green) from the first person perspective. This is what Mary means by “*this*.” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The “Knowledge argument” and the case of Mary is developed by Frank Jackson (1982, 1986). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The ability hypothesis is developed by Lewis (2004) and Nemirow (1980, 1990, 2007). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Developed by Earl Conee (1994). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Note that acquaintance knowledge is different from know-how. I may have the ability to recognize Oprah (I have seen her pictures), but I have never met her, so I don’t have the acquaintance knowledge of her, in the relevant sense. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See, for example, Horgan (1984), Loar (2004), Levin (2007), Papineau (2002, 2007). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) This view might seem similar to the acquaintance hypothesis, but, the key difference is, according to the phenomenal concept strategy, as opposed to the acquaintance hypothesis, Mary’s new knowledge is propositional. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) David Chalmers, for example, argues that any account of phenomenal concepts that is expressible in completely physical terms cannot explain our epistemic situation concerning our subjective experiences (since, subjectivity is an essential part of phenomenal concepts and we cannot capture subjectivity in objective/scientific terms), and any account that cannot be expressed in purely physical terms is not an adequately physicalistic account. This is a simplified version of Chalmers’ “Master Argument” against the phenomenal concept strategy. For his original argument, see Chalmers (2007). For a defense of the phenomenal concept strategy against his argument, see Balog (2007). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Such as Churchland (1985) and Dennett (2004, 2007). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Frank Jackson changed his mind about his own argument in the late 1990’s. He is a physicalist now. ### References [Balog, Katalin. 2012. “In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210063)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Researc*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210063)[h 84 (1):1-23.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210063) [Chalmers, David J. 2007. ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap.’](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&) [In Alter, Torin, and Sven Walter (eds.) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[ 167-194.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&) [Churchland, Paul M. 1985. Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328182)[*Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328182)[ 82 (January):8-28.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3328182) [Conee, Earl. 1994. “Phenomenal Knowledge.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409412345971)[*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409412345971)[ 72(2): 136–50. ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048409412345971) [Dennett, Daniel C. 2004. “Epiphenomenal Qualia?” In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[*There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[. MIT Press. 59-68.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary) [———. 2007. “What RoboMary Knows.” In Alter, Torin, and Sven Walter (eds.) ](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001/acprof-9780195171655)[*Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001/acprof-9780195171655)[. Oxford University Press. 14-31. ](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001/acprof-9780195171655) [Horgan, Terence 1984. “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.” ](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/34/135/147/1590255/?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*Philosophical Quarterly*](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/34/135/147/1590255/?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[ 34: 147-52.](https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/34/135/147/1590255/?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Howell, Robert J. 2008. ”Subjective Physicalism.” In Edmond Wright (ed.), ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/case-qualia)[*The Case for Qualia*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/case-qualia)[. MIT Press. 125-139](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/case-qualia) [———. 2013. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/consciousness-and-the-limits-of-objectivity-9780198776611?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/consciousness-and-the-limits-of-objectivity-9780198776611?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/consciousness-and-the-limits-of-objectivity-9780198776611?cc=us&lang=en&) [Jackson, Frank. 1982. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077)[*The Philosophical Quarterly*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077)[ 32: 127–36. doi:10.2307/2960077.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077) [———. 1986. “What Mary Didn’t Know.” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026143)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026143)[ 83(5): 291–95. doi:10.2307/2026143.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026143) [Levin, J. 2007. “What is a phenomenal concept?” In Alter, Torin, and Sven Walter (eds.) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press, 87–110.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&) [Lewis, David. 2004. “What Experience Teaches.” In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.),](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[ *There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[. MIT Press. 77-104.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary) [Loar, Brian. 2004. “Phenomenal States (Revised Version).” In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.),](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[ *There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[. MIT Press. 219-240.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary) [Nemirow, Laurence. 1980. “Review of Nagel’s Mortal Questions,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184400)[*Philosophical Review*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184400)[ 89: 473-477.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184400) [———. 1990. “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/NEMPAT)[*Mind and Cognition: A Reader*](https://philpapers.org/rec/NEMPAT)[, ed. by W. Lycan (Oxford: Blackwells). 490-499.](https://philpapers.org/rec/NEMPAT) [———. 2007. “So, This is What It’s Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis.” In Alter, Torin, and Sven Walter (eds.) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press. 32-51.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&) [Papineau, David. 2002. ](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199243824.001.0001/acprof-9780199243822)[*Thinking about Consciousness*](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199243824.001.0001/acprof-9780199243822)[. Oxford: Clarendon Press.](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199243824.001.0001/acprof-9780199243822) [———. 2007. “Phenomenal and perceptual concepts,” In Alter, Torin, and Sven Walter (eds.) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press, 111–144.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/phenomenal-concepts-and-phenomenal-knowledge-9780195377040?cc=us&lang=en&) [Van Gulick, Robert. 2004. “So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary”. In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar and Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), ](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[*There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary)[. MIT Press. 365-406.](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/theres-something-about-mary) ### For Further Reading [Alter, Torin. “The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.” In the ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/know-arg/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.iep.utm.edu/know-arg/)[. ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/know-arg/) [Nida-Rümelin, Martine and O Conaill, Donnchadh, “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/)[ (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/) ### Related Essays [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author Tufan Kıymaz is an Assistant Professor at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. He received his PhD in Philosophy, with a minor in History and Philosophy of Science, from Indiana University, Bloomington. His main area of research is philosophy of mind. He is also interested in philosophy of religion and philosophy of well-being. [www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr/index.php/tufan-kiymaz](http://www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr/index.php/tufan-kiymaz/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Mind & Language **Tags:** Frank Jackson, Mary, Philosophy of Mind, What Mary Didn't Know --- ### [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) **Published:** August 12, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is hope? A philosophical and ethical introduction. **Content:** Authors: Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale Categories: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Social & Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 994 Hope is ubiquitous: family members express hope that we find love and happiness, politicians call for hope in response to tragedies, and optimists urge people to keep their hopes up. We also tell ourselves to maintain hope, to find it, or in darker moments, to give it up. We hope for frivolous things, too. But what *is* hope? Can hope be rational or irrational? Is hope valuable? Is it ever dangerous? This essay reviews recent important answers to these questions with the goal of better understanding hope.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) ![bodek-one-spring](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/bodek-one-spring.jpg?resize=454%2C500&ssl=1) ###### [**Karl Robert Bodek and Kurt Conrad Löw, One Spring, Gurs Camp, 1941**](http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/art/bodek.asp) ### 1. What is Hope? The typical starting point for analyzing hope is that it involves a *desire* for an outcome and a *belief* that the outcome’s occurring is at least *possible*. The sense of possibility isn’t merely *physical* possibility, for we can hope that, say, God perform some miracle that violates the law of gravity. Philosophers tend to think that a person can hope for anything they believe is possible (no matter how low the odds), though it is a separate question whether a hope is rational or not, and to what degree.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) But the belief-desire account of hope appears insufficient: we might desire an outcome, and believe that the outcome is possible, yet have absolutely no hope that it will happen![\[3\]](#_ftn3) A prisoner facing execution may *desire* a pardon, believe that a pardon is *possible*, yet be altogether hopeless that he will be pardoned.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Hope, then, requires more than a desire for something and belief in its possibility. What else? Luc Bovens argues that hope also requires positive conscious thoughts or “mental imaging” about the desired outcome: basically, fantasizing about the desired outcome occurring.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The prisoner facing execution thus hopes for a pardon *only if* he has pleasant thoughts or imaginations about being pardoned. If hope involves, beyond belief and desire, pleasant thoughts about the outcome occurring, we might be able to distinguish being *hopeful* for something from being *hopeless* about it: hope involves pleasant thoughts whereas hopelessness involves unpleasant ones. Adrienne M. Martin questions whether Bovens’s view adequately distinguishes hope from hopelessness. She argues that a prisoner who is *hopeless* about the possibility of an overturned conviction may still desire the outcome, believe it possible, and fantasize about being pardoned.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) To distinguish hope from hopelessness, Martin defends an “incorporation analysis” of hope:[\[7\]](#_ftn7) the inmate *incorporates* his desire into his plans, believing that he has reasons to plan and act (e.g., with his lawyer) about the prospects of freedom. But does hope really require that hopeful people believe that they have reasons to feel, act, and plan in accordance with their desire, as Martin’s view requires? Michael Milona and Katie Stockdale argue that it does not.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) We sometimes wholly reject our hopes (e.g., to return to a previous bad romantic relationship), believing that that we have *no reason* for what we hope for. Rejecting a hope, or believing that we should not have that hope, does not mean that this hope is *any less of a hope*, contrary to what the incorporation analysis suggests: hopes we wish we didn’t have are hopes nevertheless. Milona and Stockdale develop the idea that hope is akin not to a judgment, but rather, to a *perceptual experience*. Just as perceivers often judge their perceptions to be misguided (e.g., at magic shows), so too may hopers judge their hopes are misguided. Hope then involves, beyond belief and desire, a perceptual-like experience of reasons to pursue the desired outcome, or to prepare themselves for its possible occurrence. So, in hoping we may experience reasons to, say, return to an ex partner without believing such reasons exist. In sum, there continue to be significant debates about the nature of hope, most notably what needs to be added to hope (if anything) beyond mere belief and desire. ### 2. The Rationality and Value of Hope Hope is generally thought to be *epistemically* rational if one’s belief about the possibility (or in some cases, the specific likelihood) of the outcome is correct in light of the available evidence.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Hope may be *practically* rational in a variety of ways as well. Hope is thought to contribute to well-being, motivate the achievement of goals, and inspire courageous action, among other things.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Beyond epistemic and practical rationality, some hopes may even be rational because they are constitutive of who we are (e.g., a member of a certain religion), and to lose such fundamental hopes would be to lose part of our identity.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 3. The Dangers of Hope Hope is not without risks. Thwarted hopes can result in strong feelings of disappointment. Hope may also be a source of wishful thinking, leading people to see the world as tilting in their favor despite the evidence.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) For example, hope that the problems of climate change will be effectively addressed might lead someone not to bother with climate change activism or to take any personal responsibility to work to mitigate it. Hope can also be exploited, such as when politicians take advantage of the hopes of people in positions of powerlessness. For example, people who desperately hope for greater economic security may be influenced to accept policies that primarily serve the politician’s own ends rather than the people’s. These and other dangers of hope might lead us to explore alternative emotions to hope. Stockdale argues that in the face of persistent injustices, *bitterness* (i.e., anger without hope) might be a justified emotional response.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) The relevance of hope to politics and society has also inspired investigation of whether hope is a democratic or political virtue[\[14\]](#_ftn14) and whether a form of radical hope is needed in the face of cultural devastation and other severe hardships.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 4. Conclusion In a world where our needs and desires are so often met with uncertainty, hope tends to emerge. Philosophy has much to contribute to understanding this phenomenon, and the potential value and risks of hope to all aspects of our lives: personally, socially, morally, intellectually, religiously, politically and more. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Only recently have philosophers given the topic sustained attention. Some discussions of hope are found in the philosophy of religion (see Augustine, c. 420 \[1999\]), in existentialist writings (see Marcel, 2010), and in bioethics (see, e.g., Simpson (2004); Murdoch and Scott (2010); McMillan, Walker, and Hope (2014)). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Chignell (2014) for a discussion of Immanuel Kant’s defense of the rationality of hoping for miracles, divine grace, and a truly ethical society. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Despair has long been considered to be the attitude which is the opposite of hope. This view traces back to St. Thomas Aquinas who argues that despair is the contrary to hope insofar as it implies “withdrawal” from the desired object while hope implies “approach” (*Summa Theologiae* II-II.40.4). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The claim that the standard account fails to distinguish hope from hopelessness (or in his terms, despair) is due to Ariel Meirav (2009). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Bovens (1999). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Martin (2013, 18-19). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Moellendorf (2006) defends a similar theory. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Milona and Stockdale (2018). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Martin (2013, 37). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See Bovens (1999) and Kadlac (2015). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Blöser and Stahl (2017). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Bovens (1999). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Stockdale (2017). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Moellendorf (2006) and Mittleman (2009). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Lear (2006). ### References [Aquinas, Thomas. \[1485\] 1948. ](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/)[*Summa Theologiae*](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/)[. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 5 vols. Benziger Brothers.](https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/) [Augustine. ](https://www.amazon.com/Augustine-Catechism-Enchiridion-Faith-Charity/dp/1565482980)[\[c. 420\] ](https://www.amazon.com/Augustine-Catechism-Enchiridion-Faith-Charity/dp/1565482980)[1999. ](https://www.amazon.com/Augustine-Catechism-Enchiridion-Faith-Charity/dp/1565482980)[*The Augustine Catechism: The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity*](https://www.amazon.com/Augustine-Catechism-Enchiridion-Faith-Charity/dp/1565482980)[. Trans. Bruce Harbert. Ed. Boniface Ramsey. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Augustine-Catechism-Enchiridion-Faith-Charity/dp/1565482980) [Blöser, Claudia, and Titus Stahl. 2017. “Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity.” ](https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2017.1400918)[*Philosophical Papers*](https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2017.1400918)[ 46 (3): 345–71. ](https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2017.1400918) [Bovens, Luc. 1999. “The Value of Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.2307/2653787)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*](https://doi.org/10.2307/2653787)[ 59 (3): 667–81. ](https://doi.org/10.2307/2653787) [Chignell, Andrew. (2014). “Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kants-religion-within-the-boundaries-of-mere-reason/39C3D636ED2D5792A47E790651EE10B5)[in Gordon E.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kants-religion-within-the-boundaries-of-mere-reason/39C3D636ED2D5792A47E790651EE10B5) [Michalson (ed.), ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kants-religion-within-the-boundaries-of-mere-reason/39C3D636ED2D5792A47E790651EE10B5)[*Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kants-religion-within-the-boundaries-of-mere-reason/39C3D636ED2D5792A47E790651EE10B5)[. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98-117.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kants-religion-within-the-boundaries-of-mere-reason/39C3D636ED2D5792A47E790651EE10B5) [Kadlac, Adam. 2015. “The Virtue of Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9521-0)[*Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9521-0)[ 18 (2): 337–54. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9521-0) [Lear, Jonathan. 2006. ](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674027466)[*Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674027466)[. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674027466) [Marcel, Gabriel. 2010. ](http://www.staugustine.net/our-books/books/homoviator/)[*Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Hope*](http://www.staugustine.net/our-books/books/homoviator/)[. Updated ed. South Bend, Ind: St. Augustine’s Press.](http://www.staugustine.net/our-books/books/homoviator/) [Martin, Adrienne. 2013. ](https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400848706)[*How We Hope: A Moral Psychology*](https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400848706)[. Princeton: Princeton University Press.](https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400848706) [McMillan, John, Simon Walker, and Tony Hope. 2014. “Valuing Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-014-0006-7)[*Monash Bioethics Review*](https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-014-0006-7)[ 32 (1–2): 33–42. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-014-0006-7) [Meirav, Ariel. 2009. “The Nature of Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00427.x)[*Ratio*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00427.x)[ 22 (2): 216–33. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00427.x) [Milona, Michael. 2018. “Finding Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1435612)[*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1435612)[, February, 1–20. ](https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1435612) [Milona, Michael, and Katie Stockdale. 2018. “A Perceptual Theory of Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.008)[*Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.008)[ 5. ](https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.008) [Mittleman, Alan. 2009. ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hope-in-a-democratic-age-9780199297153?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Hope in a Democratic Age: Philosophy, Religion, and Political Theory*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hope-in-a-democratic-age-9780199297153?cc=us&lang=en&)[. New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/hope-in-a-democratic-age-9780199297153?cc=us&lang=en&) [Moellendorf, Darrel. 2006. “Hope as a Political Virtue.” ](https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640609485189)[*Philosophical Papers*](https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640609485189)[ 35 (3): 413–33. ](https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640609485189) [Murdoch, Charles E., and Christopher Thomas Scott. 2010. “Stem Cell Tourism and the Power of Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161003728860)[*The American Journal of Bioethics*](https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161003728860)[ 10 (5): 16–23. ](https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161003728860) [Simpson, Christy. 2004. “When Hope Makes Us Vulnerable: A Discussion of Patient-Healthcare Provider Interactions in the Context of Hope.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00408.x)[*Bioethics*](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00408.x)[ 18 (5): 428–47. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00408.x) [Stockdale, Katie. 2017. “Losing Hope: Injustice and Moral Bitterness.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12314)[*Hypatia*](https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12314)[ 32 (2): 363–79. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12314) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/hope.pdf). ### Related Essays [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller [Introduction to Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Authors Milona Michael is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Ryerson University. His principal research interests are at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. [michaelmilona.com](http://michaelmilona.com/) Katie Stockdale is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria. Her research is primarily in ethics (especially moral psychology) and feminist philosophy. [kstockdale.com](https://www.kstockdale.com/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics **Tags:** Hope --- ### [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) **Published:** July 3, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** There are many varieties of formal logic of varying complexity. Here we survey one that’s somewhat more complex than sentential or propositional logic, but still fairly elementary: quantificational or predicate logic. **Content:** Author: Timothy Eshing Category: [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word count: 1000 *Editor’s note: for many readers, this essay would be more profitably read after reading [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf.* There are many varieties of formal logic of varying complexity. Here we survey one that’s somewhat more complex than *sentential* or *propositional* logic, but still fairly elementary: *quantificational* or *predicate* logic.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) [![Rudolf Carnap’s notes on Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift, the progenitor of modern quantificational logic.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/54662-screenshot2b2016-10-122b17-57-04.png?resize=650%2C1024&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/54662-screenshot2b2016-10-122b17-57-04.png?ssl=1) Rudolf Carnap’s notes on Gottlob Frege’s *Begriffsschrift*, the progenitor of modern quantificational logic. ### 1. Atomic Formulas We call symbolized sentences “formulas”. And we call some formulas “atomic” because they can’t be split into simpler formulas. We call all other formulas “molecular” or “complex”. In sentential logic, atomic formulas consist of single *sentence letters*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) In quantificational logic, by contrast, atomic formulas have a bit more structure. Now they consist of a *subject* or subjects and a *predicate*. Subjects are typically symbolized using lowercase letters, and predicates using uppercase letters. Three examples: | English | Sentential Logic | Quantificational Logic[\[3\]](#_ftn3) | |---|---|---| | “**S**ocrates is **h**uman.” | H | H(s) | | “**C**ate is **m**ortal.” | M | M(c) | | “**A**be **l**oves **B**eth.” | L | L(a,b) | Our atomic formulas now contain more structure, but they can still behave just like they did in sentential logic, because all of the sentential logical constants are retained in quantificational logic: | “**It is not the case that** **S**ocrates is **h**uman” or ““**S**ocrates is **not h**uman”. | ¬H | ¬H(s) | |---|---|---| | “**C**ate is **m**ortal **and** **A**be **l**oves **B**eth.” | M ∧ L | M(c) ∧ L(a,b) | | “**C**ate is **m**ortal **or** **A**be **l**oves **B**eth.” | M ∨ L | M(c) ∨ L(a,b) | | “**If** **S**ocrates is **h**uman, **then** **C**ate is **m**ortal.” | H → M | H(s) → M(c) | | “**S**ocrates is **h**uman **if and only if** **A**be **l**oves **B**eth.” | H ↔ L | H(s) ↔ L(a,b) | ### 2. Variables and Quantifiers Quantificational logic introduces two new kinds of symbols: variables and quantifiers. *Variables* are typically symbolized with *x*, *y*, etc. Just like in algebra, variables in quantificational logic stand in for unknown or unspecified items. In algebra, variables stand in for numbers. In quantificational logic, they stand in for the subjects of our formulas.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Three examples: | English[\[5\]](#_ftn5) | Quantified Logic | |---|---| | “***x*** is **h**uman.” | H(*x*) | | “***y*** is **m**ortal.” | M(*y*) | | “***x*** **l**oves ***y***.” | L(*x*,*y*) | In these examples, the variables are “free”. But formulas with free variables are not *sentences* in quantificational logic.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Variables have to be “bound”. To do that, in quantificational logic we add two more symbols to the roster from sentential logic: the *existential* and *universal* *quantifiers*: | Name | Symbol[\[7\]](#_ftn7) | English | |---|---|---| | Existential Quantifier | ∃*x* | “**For some *x*,** …” or “**There is/exists an *x* that** …”. | | Universal Quantifier | ∀*x* | “**For all *x*,** …” or “**Every *x*** …”.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) | Quantifiers *quantify over* or “bind” the variables in our formulas. Eight examples: | Formula | English | |---|---| | ∃*x*\[H(*x*)\] | “**For some *x*,** ***x*** is **h**uman” or “**There is/exists an *x* that** is **h**uman”. | | ∀*y*\[H(*y*)\] | “**For all *y*,** ***y*** is **h**uman” or “**Every *y*** is **h**uman”. | | ¬∀*z*\[M(*z*)\] | “**It is not the case that** **for all *z*, *z*** is **m**ortal” or “**Not every *z*** is a **m**ortal”. | | ∃*z*\[¬M(*z*)\] | “**For some *z*,** ***z*** is **not m**ortal” or “**There is/exists a *z* that** is **imm**ortal”.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) | | ∃*y*\[H(*y*) ∧ M(*y*)\] | “**For some *y*, *y*** is **h**uman **and *y*** is **m**ortal” or “**There is/exists a *y* that** is **h**uman **and** **m**ortal” or simply “Something is a human mortal”. | | ∀*x*\[H(*x*) → M(*x*)\] | “**For all *x*,** **if *x*** is **h**uman, **then** ***x*** is **m**ortal” or “**Every** **h**uman is **m**ortal”. | | ∃*y*∀*z*\[L(*y*,*z*)\] | “**For some *y***, **for all *z*,** ***y*** **l**oves ***z***” or “**There is/exists a *y* that** **l**oves **every *z***” or simply “Something loves everything”. | | ∀*y*∃*z*\[L(*y*,*z*)\] | “**For all *y***, **there is/exists a *z* that** ***y*** **l**oves” or “**Every *y*** **l**oves **some *z***” or simply “Everything loves something”.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) | Notice how we can bind both atomic (simple) and molecular (complex) formulas. Also notice how we can employ multiple quantifiers, and how their order matters. ### 3. Proofs To prove things in quantificational logic, we must specify a *domain* containing all the individuals that can be subjects in our formulas. Sometimes our domain includes absolutely everything there is. In that case, “Something is human”, ∃*x*\[H(*x*)\], is true, because humans such as you and me exist. But “Everything is human”, ∀*x*\[H(*x*)\], is false, because other things exist, too, like potatoes. Yet here is something seemingly true of absolutely everything: ∀*x*\[P(*x*) ∨ ¬P(*x*)\], “Everything is a potato or not a potato”! Our domain doesn’t have to include absolutely everything though. Suppose our domain only contains three classmates: **A**be, **B**eth, and **C**ate. They’re all **s**tudents: S(a), S(b), and S(c). Now we can *universally generalize* over our domain and infer that *everyone* is a student: ∀*x*\[S(*x*)\]. We can also go in reverse by *instantiating* (giving an instance of) that universal generalization. If we know that everyone is a student, ∀*x*\[S(*x*)\], then we can infer that some specific individual in our domain, like Abe, is a student: S(a). Suppose not all the members of our domain are the same gender, but at least one of them, **B**eth, is **f**emale: F(b). Now we can *existentially generalize* from that fact and infer that *someone* is female: ∃*x*\[F(*x*)\]. We can go in reverse here too, but we have to be careful. If we know that someone is female, ∃*x*\[F(*x*)\], but don’t know who that is, then we can instantiate by giving that someone a new name, one we haven’t used already, like “d”. Then we can infer that whomever “d” refers to is female: F(d). It just so happens that “d” could refer to the same person as another letter we’ve already used, like “b” for Beth. Here’s a formal proof (whose domain includes absolutely everything) using two such inferences. It demonstrates that from “every human is mortal” and “Socrates is human” we can infer “something is mortal”: | Number | Formula | English | Rule[\[11\]](#_ftn11) | |---|---|---|---| | 1. | ∀*x*\[H(*x*) → M(*x*)\] | “Every human is mortal.” | Assumption | | 2. | H(s) | “Socrates is human.” | Assumption | | 3. | H(s) → M(s) | “If Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal.” | From 1 | | 4. | M(s) | “Socrates is mortal.” | From 2 and 3 | | 5. | ∴∃*x*\[M(*x*)\] | “Therefore, something is mortal.” | From 4 | ### 4. Beyond Quantificational Logic Once we know the rules for quantificational logic, it’s not difficult to symbolize even more complex sentences and arguments. For example, we might want to quantify over predicates and not just subjects, or formalize generalizations that are probably or necessarily true or false; but those are topics for other entries. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Sentential logic is also known as “propositional” or *zeroth-order* logic. Quantificational (sometimes “quantified”) logic is also known as “predicate” or *first-order* logic. Note: the labels “predicate” and “first-order” and even “quantified” are far more common in the literature than “quantificational”. But “quantified” isn’t quite apt, because the logic itself is not quantified. And “predicate” isn’t quite apt, because what’s distinctive about the logic is not just the subject-predicate structure of its sentences, but also the use of quantifiers ranging over subject variables. “First-order” is apt, because herein we only quantify over subjects, and not predicates (as we do in second-order logic); but that’s a more mysterious label than “quantificational”, so the latter is the preferred term in this essay. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See section 1 of [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Notice how compared to English the order of subject and predicate is reversed: the predicate comes first, next comes the subject(s) to which it applies. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) But not predicates. However, in *second-order* logic we can also quantify over predicates. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Technically, we should write “⌜*x*⌝ is human”, “⌜*y*⌝ is mortal”, etc., where the variables *x* and *y* are placed in *quasi-quotes*. This is because we’re not saying that the letter *x* itself is human, or that the letter *y* itself is mortal, but rather that something as yet undefined we’ll put in place of *x* or *y* (like Abe or Beth) is human or mortal. For more information, see note 6 of [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf. As in that essay, herein quasi-quotation marks are left out to avoid confusion. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) To be more precise: such formulas are *well-formed* expressions, but they are not *semantically complete*, which means we cannot evaluate them for truth or falsity. “Sentence” is a technical term defined as a well-formed formula with no free variables. In quantificational logic, only sentences can have truth-values. Formulas with free variables are often called “sentence functions” (or something similar) to indicate that they are not themselves sentences, but mere building blocks of sentences: they can be turned into sentences by either (i) replacing all their free variables with one or more individual constants representing one or more definite subjects, or (ii) binding their variables with at least one quantifier as described in the main text above. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Alternative symbol for the universal quantifier: “(*x*)”. Sometimes people place the symbols above in parentheses too: “(∃*x*)” and “(∀*x*)”, but doing so is just for readability; it doesn’t change how the logic works. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Note: the universal quantifier does not imply that anything exists. For example, we can rightly say that “All unicorns are horned”, translating that into quantified logic as “∀*x*\[U(*x*) → H(*x*)\]”, without committing ourselves to the existence of any unicorns. So “All unicorns are horned” can be true, even when “There exists a unicorn”, “∃*x*\[U(*x*)\]”, is false. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Notice that this example means the same as the previous one: we can swap “¬∀*x*” with “∃*x*¬”, as well as “∀*x*¬” with “¬∃*x*”. This is because the quantifiers are *duals*, which means we can define one in terms of the other plus the negation operator: “∀*x*” is equivalent to “¬∃*x*¬”, and “∃*x*” is equivalent to “¬∀*x*¬”. For example, “Everything is a potato” means the same as “nothing is not a potato”, and “something is a potato” means the same as “not everything is not a potato”. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) To be clear: “Everything loves something, but not necessarily the same thing”. To formalize “Everything loves one and the same thing” we’d write “∃*y*∀*z*\[L(*z*,*y*)\]”, that is, “There is something that everything loves”. Compare this to the previous example! [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) In most proof systems, we don’t just say where the line came from; we also say why, by citing a specific rule for each line. To save time and avoid confusion, in this presentation we’ve just said where each line comes from, without saying how. Line 3 follows from line 1 by *universal instantiation* and line 5 follows from line 4 by *existential generalization*. Both of these rules were discussed in the main text above. The other two rules we discussed, *universal generalization* and *existential instantiation*, are more complicated to use, so we’ve avoided them in this example. Line 4 follows from lines 2 and 3 by a different rule, called *modus ponens*, which works like this: from the truth of both “P” and “If P, then Q”, we can infer that “Q” is true, too; but this and other rules of inference are topics for other entries. ### For Further Reading *The following are all excellent introductory textbooks covering quantificational logic:* [Allen, Colin and Michael Hand: ](https://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/0262511266.The_.MIT_.Press_.Logic_.Primer.-.2nd.Edition.Feb_.2001.pdf)[*Logic Primer*](https://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/0262511266.The_.MIT_.Press_.Logic_.Primer.-.2nd.Edition.Feb_.2001.pdf)[ (2nd ed., Bradford, 2011). ](https://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/0262511266.The_.MIT_.Press_.Logic_.Primer.-.2nd.Edition.Feb_.2001.pdf) [Barker-Plummer, Dave, Jon Barwise, and John Etchemendy: ](https://homepages.uc.edu/~martinj/Symbolic_Logic/341%20Syllabus,%20Textbook,%20Handouts,%20Notes/LPL%20textbook.pdf)[*Language, Proof, and Logic*](https://homepages.uc.edu/~martinj/Symbolic_Logic/341%20Syllabus,%20Textbook,%20Handouts,%20Notes/LPL%20textbook.pdf)[ (2nd. ed., CSLI Publications, 2011).](https://homepages.uc.edu/~martinj/Symbolic_Logic/341%20Syllabus,%20Textbook,%20Handouts,%20Notes/LPL%20textbook.pdf) [Copi, Irving M., Carl Cohen, and Kenneth McMahon: ](https://archive.org/details/irving-m-copi-introduction-to-logic/Irving%20M%20Copi-%20Introduction%20to%20logic/mode/2up)[*Introduction to Logic*](https://archive.org/details/irving-m-copi-introduction-to-logic/Irving%20M%20Copi-%20Introduction%20to%20logic/mode/2up)[ (14th ed., Routledge, 2016).](https://archive.org/details/irving-m-copi-introduction-to-logic/Irving%20M%20Copi-%20Introduction%20to%20logic/mode/2up) [Gensler, Harry J.: ](http://harryhiker.com/books.htm#15)[*Introduction to Logic*](http://harryhiker.com/books.htm#15)[ (3rd. ed., Routledge, 2017).](http://harryhiker.com/books.htm#15) [Hodges, Wilfred: ](https://www.goodreads.com/work/editions/1519952-logic-an-introduction-to-elementary-logic)[*Logic: An Introduction to Elementary Logic*](https://www.goodreads.com/work/editions/1519952-logic-an-introduction-to-elementary-logic)[ (Penguin, 2001).](https://www.goodreads.com/work/editions/1519952-logic-an-introduction-to-elementary-logic) [Howard-Snyder, Frances, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Ryan Wasserman: ](https://www.poweroflogic.com)[*The Power of Logic*](https://www.poweroflogic.com)[ (6th ed., McGraw-Hill, 2020).](https://www.poweroflogic.com) [Hurley, Patrick J. and Lori Watson: ](https://www.cengage.com/c/a-concise-introduction-to-logic-13e-hurley/9781305958098/)[*A Concise Introduction to Logic*](https://www.cengage.com/c/a-concise-introduction-to-logic-13e-hurley/9781305958098/)[ (13th ed., Cengage Learning, 2018). ](https://www.cengage.com/c/a-concise-introduction-to-logic-13e-hurley/9781305958098/) [Magnus, P. D. et al.: ](https://forallx.openlogicproject.org)[*forall x: Calgary: An Introduction to Formal Logic*](https://forallx.openlogicproject.org)[ (issued under a CC BY 4.0 license, 2011). ](https://forallx.openlogicproject.org) ### Related Essays [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores ### About the Author Timothy Eshing is a philosophy graduate student at Saint Louis University. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Logic, Predicate Logic, Quantificational Logic --- ### [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) **Published:** May 30, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** What is it to be a friend, especially a good friend? Aristotle’s claims about friendship began debates that continue today. This essay presents his views on friendship and a contemporary debate he inspired. **Content:** Author: G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/ "Historical Philosophy") Wordcount: 992 Imagine that you could choose between living two lives. Option 1 promises amazing beauty, wealth, power, fame, and health. But you would have zero friends. Option 2 offers only average beauty, wealth, reputation, and health. But you would have profound friendships. Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC) bet that no one would choose the first option.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) He argued that we need friends to live a good life. After all, when life is bad, they help us. And when life is good, they celebrate with us.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Aristotle’s claims about friendship began debates that continue today.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This essay presents his views on friendship and a contemporary debate he inspired. [![An image of Aristotle and Hypatia laughing together, next to the first page of a Latin and Greek version of Nicomachean Ethics. Generated using Midjourney AI and edited by G.M.Trujillo.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/aristotlefriendship-v4.png?resize=656%2C364&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/aristotlefriendship-v4.png?ssl=1) An image of Aristotle and Hypatia laughing together, next to the first page of a Latin and Greek version of Nicomachean Ethics. Generated using Midjourney AI and edited by G.M. Trujillo, Jr. ### 1. Friendship, Useful Friends, and Pleasurable Friends For Aristotle, all friendships are relationships where people mutually like each other, do good for one another, and share goals for the time they spend together.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) But the friendship changes depending on the reasons that friends value each other and the ways that they do good for each other. Consequently, Aristotle split friendship into three types. The first two types—useful and pleasurable friendships—are similar to each other. *Useful friendships* are those between people whose foremost goal is to work together to accomplish some practical goal. Think coworkers or teammates. *Pleasurable friendships* are those between people who routinely enjoy themselves together. Think friends who you invite to meals or nights out, or those you play games with.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Useful and pleasurable friendships have upsides. They are casual and easy to form, as they are defined by their small-scale goals. Useful friends focus on getting things done, and pleasurable friends focus on enjoying each other’s company. The basis for these friendships, and the reason behind the mutual affection and planning, is simple use or pleasure. But these friendships also have downsides. As soon as the task or fun disappears, so do these friendships. Consider what often happens to friendships with your coworkers when you leave your job, or what usually happens with most of your teammates when you quit playing a sport. Useful and pleasurable friendships are mostly motivated by what people can get out of them. This is why Aristotle deemed them as imperfect compared to the last type. ### 2. Virtuous Friends, the Best Friends For Aristotle, the best friendships have a deeper meaning than utility or pleasure: becoming better people together. They are rare and hard to form. But they are the most important for living a good life.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Aristotle called these *virtuous friendships*. Virtuous friends not only focus on getting things done or having a good time together. Rather, they primarily focus on *each other as persons*, attending to character and flourishing. They want their friends to be good people and live good lives *for their own sake*. And they work together to accomplish this.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Virtuous friends become a part of each other’s lives by spending time together and having deep conversations. They share the same core ideas about what it means to be a good person and live a good life.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Aristotle argued that this deep bond makes virtuous friends “other selves,” or, “One soul dwelling in two bodies.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Together, virtuous friends live, learn, struggle, and improve. Living a full life is difficult. Not only do we need to become good as individuals, but also as family members, citizens, and contributors to our communities. And we need to avoid the common dangers of pursuing money above all things, caring too much about what strangers think, and losing ourselves in hobbies or addictions. Virtuous friends help with this. In success, friends celebrate. In failure, friends offer comfort and counsel, and sometimes they speak hard truths that only people who know and love you can.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. Do Good Friends Have to Be Good People? When philosophers discuss friendship, they usually have Aristotle’s virtuous friendship in mind. Implicitly, it is taken as the most important type of friendship to scrutinize. Specifically, some philosophers debate whether immoral actions or bad people corrupt the quality of friendships.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Imagine that your phone wakes you up late at night. It’s your best friend. She says it’s an emergency, and she needs your help. So you rush to the address she gave you. Then she reveals that she’s murdered someone. She asks you to help hide the body. But now you wonder: would a good friend help to hide the corpse, or would she encourage her friend to explain the situation to the authorities?[\[12\]](#_ftn12) This case raises some related questions: is being a good friend compatible with doing immoral things together? Can bad people really be good friends? And generally, are the good things about friendship also things that we should judge by moral standards? Aristotle and Aristotelians argue that good friends must be ethically good people. Virtuous friends largely share the same values and help each other become excellent—and they hold each other accountable. Such explicitly ethical goals make immorality incompatible with deep friendship. So, in this scenario, Aristotelians would say that your friend who calls you to ask for help hiding a corpse is no longer a good friend. This request changes the friendship fundamentally for the worse.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Non-Aristotelians disagree. They argue that the qualities that we appreciate in friendship are separate from complying with moral principles. Good friends share interests and are loyal to each other. And this is compatible with sometimes doing immoral things. A moral failure does not mean a failure in friendship. In fact, helping your friend in morally dubious circumstances might indicate that you are a real friend.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 4. Conclusion Philosophers might disagree with Aristotle about how to define friendship or who can be a good friend. However, most agree that we must analyze our own ideas about what it means to be a good friend and whether we live up to them. Friendships reveal important things about who we are and how we love. And if, as Aristotle argued, good friends make us better and bad friends make us worse, our friendships could make or break us.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Aristotle wrote, “For no one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all other good things” (2020, *NE* 1155a5-6). Aristotle’s greatest work, *Nicomachean Ethics*, dedicated two of its ten books to friendship, Books VIII and IX. And they have largely set the philosophical agenda for discussing friendship. Often, even philosophers who disagree with Aristotle start by summarizing his views. As far as philosophers and poets who came before Aristotle, none produced a definitive theory of friendship. For example, Plato’s *Lysis* discusses friendship. But as with many Socratic dialogues, there is no conclusive definition or view. However, for an argument that Greek philosophers before Aristotle had a theory of friendship, see: El Murr 2020. Throughout, this essay will translate Aristotle’s Greek word *philos* as “friend” and *philia* as “friendship.” This is the most accessible way to render the Greek in English, and it captures the idea of being committed to someone in a specific context. The hope is that this broadens the terms outside of excessively specified roles in Greek society but doesn’t make friendship into a contemporary notion of abstract regard for others without context. However, a few things need clarification. First, the Greek *philia* refers to more types of relationships than the English “friendship.” *Philia* refers to friendship, but also the relationship between family members, spouses, lovers, members of a political community, or patrons and clients. Second, *philia* describes relationships with widely varying qualities. Some are deep with knowledge, emotion, and well-wishing; some are shallow and casual. *Philia* can be long-term and durable or transitory and quick to vanish. *Philia* encompasses voluntary associations replete with choice, as in choosing your friends or confidants, but it can also include unchosen associations, such as family. *Philia* can be sexual and desirous, or it can be friendly and cool. Third, *philia* can be translated as “love.” But in the context of relationships with others, many Greek words might also be translated as “love.” *Storgē* means love, often within familial contexts or within the context of affection. *Eros* means love, often with romantic implications. And not as much a concern for ancient Greece, but important to mention because Christian philosophers make use of the term, *agapē* gets rendered as love, usually within the context of God loving creation, or selfless love. These complex associations lead some philosophers to leave terms untranslated and merely transliterate them into the English alphabet, e.g., change φιλία to *philia* (see: Nussbaum 2009). This essay, however, opts for translation, hoping that the context of this discussion about friendship removes ambiguities. But serious scholarship about Aristotle’s theory of friendship attends to the details of the original Greek. For more discussion on translation, see: Annas 1993, pp. 223-4; Nussbaum 2009, p. 354; Cooper 1999a, p. 313, no. 5. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Aristotle, *NE*, 1171b28. Aristotle himself had powerful friends. His teacher was Plato, and his student was Alexander the Great. He also had powerful enemies who drove him into exile, where he died. There is a famous saying regarding Aristotle’s death. Aristotle was living in Athens and running his school, The Lyceum. But politics in Athens shifted against Aristotle’s home city-state of Macedonia and against the rulers who Aristotle associated with, Phillip II and Alexander the Great. Aristotle feared that Athens would try to do the same thing to him that they did to Socrates, hold a mockery of a trial and sentence him to death. Aristotle apocryphally said, “I will not let Athens sin twice against philosophy,” and he took exile in Chalcis, where he died. See: Diogenes Laertius, 2018, V.5-6, 10; Shields 2020, sec. 1, esp. n. 3; Nussbaum 2009, p. 345, n. 8. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For many historical examples of philosophers celebrating and analyzing friendship, see: Pakaluk 1991. For the rare exceptions of historical philosophers who criticize friendship, see: Trujillo 2020. It is also important to note that this small article cannot go into all the issues Aristotle covered when discussing friendship. For example, there is arguably a fourth type of friendship, civic friendship, that describes people living in a political community together. (See: Cooper 1999b for an overview of Aristotle’s theory of civic friendship. See: Cherry 2021 for a debate between her and Robert Talisse about civic friendship and whether it can solve political polarization in the USA.) Additionally, Aristotle discusses matters of equality in money and power, arguing that good friends must be as equal as possible. Also, because Aristotle usually focuses on the best people possible, his work leaves open questions about what friendships look like for the rest of us, those morally imperfect and without all the wealth and power that Aristotle (or the people he had in mind) had. All these questions have become invaluable in the philosophy of technology, where people now use these distinctions to talk about social media, online friendships, robots, and friendships involving far-future technology. Aristotelians shape many conversations about the past, present, and future of friendship. (See: Elder 2018.) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This essay takes a general stance with respect to the common features of useful, pleasurable, and virtuous friendships, especially as characterized by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* II.4: “We may describe friendly feeling towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return. Those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends.” It is clear that, for Aristotle, some amount of reciprocity and recognition is necessary from each friend, as far as feelings about one another and what the friendship involves. This is why Aristotle says we cannot be friends with wine, no matter how much we like it. Wine just doesn’t love us back. (*NE* 1155b27-31). But beyond these generalities, philosophers disagree. Julia Annas, for example, offers her own interpretation of qualities Aristotle seems to endorse as belonging to all forms of friendship: (1) friends wish and do good for each other, (2) friends want their friends to stay alive for their own sake, (3) friends spend time with each other, (4) friends make similar choices, and (5) friends find similar things painful and pleasant. 1993, p. 254. Martha Nussbaum proposes that all friendships involve mutual affection, mutual separateness and respect for that independence, mutual well-wishing for the friend and for that friend’s own sake, and mutual awareness of the good feelings and wishes. 2009, p. 355. In addition to deciding what is common in all forms of friendships, philosophers argue over what distinguishes the different types. For example, philosophers argue over the kind of affection and interest that friends take in each other in useful, pleasurable, and virtuous friendships. There is no doubt that virtuous friends are interested in their friends being good and doing well for their own sake. But philosophers disagree about whether such disinterested or non-self-interested motivation exists in useful or pleasurable friendships. John Cooper (1999a), for example, takes the position that all friendships involve a not-completely-self-interested motivation. But Kenneth Alpern (1983) thinks that useful and pleasurable friendships are not disinterested, even if they exhibit dependence, cooperation, trust, communion, and sharing. Aristotle is borderline incoherent on this point, sometimes writing that useful and pleasurable friends are self-centered, sometimes implying that all friendships share disinterested other-regarding concern. See: Cooper 1999a, p. 317. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Aristotle, *NE*, VIII.3. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Julia Annas summarizes Aristotle’s arguments for why virtuous friendships are necessary for living a good life. She identifies two reasons that are important to highlight. First, friends help you to learn about yourself. Virtuous friends share values, so their perspectives on each others’ lives are important. And because friends are outside of your life, they have an outside perspective that allows for accurate assessment. (Sometimes your friends know you better than you know yourself.) Second, friends can do more together than separately. When friends work together, they can sustain activities for a longer time, make activities much more pleasant, and make activities much more effective. 1993, p. 251. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Aristotle, *NE*, 1170b11-14. In this passage, Aristotle emphasizes that friends share conversation and thought while living together. Sharing a human life together means more than “feeding in the same location as with grazing animals.” So, the quality of the shared time and the content of the actions matter, not just the hours logged. On the point of sharing the same values, see also: *Rhet*. II.4. Thanks go to Alexis Elder for emphasizing this point in her work. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Aristotle, *NE*, VIII.3, 13; IX.5–6. See also: Diogenes Laertius (2018), V.31. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) For the “other selves” claim, see: Aristotle, *NE*, 1166a31. For the “One soul dwelling in two bodies,” see: Diogenes Laertius (2018), V.20. Aristotle argues that the deepest friendships are those between equals, in almost all respects. This is part of what makes virtuous friends “other selves.” For the most part, virtuous friends have the same values, the same strategies in approaching life, and maybe a lot of other similarities, such as economic class and political status. This means that when virtuous friends see each other living life, they understand what they’re doing and why, and they can counsel each other well. Additionally, because friends would do basically the same things as each other, they get to live somewhat vicariously. Aristotle’s works are rarely beautiful or poetic. But the phrasing of friends being “other selves” has inspired admiration of the phrase, leading to much philosophical reflection. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See: Aristotle, *NE*, IX.11. On bitter times in friendship, Aristotle wrote, “\[F\]or as the proverb has it, people cannot have got to know each other before they have savored all that salt together, nor indeed can they have accepted each other to be friends before each party is seen to be lovable, and is trusted, by the other. Those who are quick to behave like friends towards each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they are also lovable, and the other party knows it; for what is quick to arise is wish for friendship, not friendship” (2002, *NE*, 1156b27-33). In other words, friends need to spend a lot of time together to get to know each other, which would include difficult times. This reveals how good a person is (so how loveable they are) and how deep the friendship is. Good people and good friendships endure the bad times; they go beyond mere well wishes. It is also worth noting that Aristotle thought you could not be good friends with many people at once (*NE*, 1158a11-2). Diogenes Laertius took this claim to an extreme when he reported that Aristotle said, “He who has friends has no true friend” (2018, V.21). In other words, having more than one serious friend means you are not serious friends with any one person. Diogenes Laertius, however, reports this hundreds of years after Aristotle died. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For an overview of recent scholarship on friendship, see: Helm 2021 and Jeske 2023. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) This case is based on the film *Death in Brunswick* (1990), which is the primary example for Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett in their influential article “Friendship and Moral Danger” (2000). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See: Aristotle, *NE*, IX.9-10; Elder 2013. There is an added complication here that many philosophers do not address. Aristotle seems OK with friends being vulnerable around each other and doing things around each other that might not be proper in public. Friends feel comfortable around each other and trust one another, and sometimes they confide their own weaknesses in friends. So, the requirement that virtuous friends be good has small exceptions and doesn’t require moral perfection. See: *Rhet*. II.4. Aristotle’s theory of friendship has political implications too. For Aristotle, humans are fundamentally political, in that they live in communities. And he argues that a community of good people who are friends with one another wouldn’t need justice or rules. People would inherently share things with one another and treat each other fairly. Inversely, Aristotle also argues that friendship is impossible under conditions of severe injustice. *NE*, VIII.1, 9, 11. See also: Cooper 1999b, p. 356. It is important to qualify this claim, however. Aristotle’s work on friendship seems only to extend to actual, day-to-day relationships, and not to people we don’t have relationships with, as in people living in distant communities. See: Annas 1993, p. 253. It is not really until the Cynics and Stoics that philosophers develop a sense of cosmopolitanism. For a discussion of cosmopolitanism, see: Moles 1996. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See: Cocking and Kennett 2000. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Aristotle, *NE*, IX.12. Thanks go out to Nathan Nobis, Dan Lowe, Chelsea Haramia, Kristin Seemuth Whaley, Spencer Case, and Felipe Pereira for their feedback. They improved the paper significantly. ### References [Annas, Julia. (1993) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-morality-of-happiness-9780195096521?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Morality of Happiness*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-morality-of-happiness-9780195096521?cc=us&lang=en&)[. New York: Oxford.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-morality-of-happiness-9780195096521?cc=us&lang=en&) [Alpern, Kenneth D. (1983) “Aristotle on the Friendships of Utility and Pleasure,” ](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/227001/pdf)[*Journal of the History of Philosophy*](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/227001/pdf)[, vol. 21, no. 3: pp. 303-15.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/227001/pdf) [Aristotle. (1991) ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-2)[*Rhetoric*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-2)[ \[](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-2)[*Rhet*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-2)[.\]. Trans. W. Rhys. Roberts. In: ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-2)[*The Complete Works of Aristotle*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-2)[, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691016511/complete-works-of-aristotle-volume-2) [Aristotle. (2002) ](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics-9780198752714?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Nicomachean Ethics*](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics-9780198752714?cc=us&lang=en&)[ \[](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics-9780198752714?cc=us&lang=en&)[*NE*](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics-9780198752714?cc=us&lang=en&)[\]. Trans. Christopher Rowe. Oxford: Oxford.](https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/aristotle-nicomachean-ethics-9780198752714?cc=us&lang=en&) [Cherry, Myisha. (2021). “On the Cultivation of Civic Friendship,” ](https://philpapers.org/archive/CHEOTC-4.pdf)[*Journal of Philosophical Research*](https://philpapers.org/archive/CHEOTC-4.pdf)[, vol. 46: pp. 193-207.](https://philpapers.org/archive/CHEOTC-4.pdf) [Cocking, Dean and Jeanette Kennett. (2000) “Friendship and Moral Danger,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2678396)[*The Journal of Philosophy*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2678396)[, vol. 97, no. 5: 278-96.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2678396) [Cooper, John M. (1999a) “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship.” In: ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691058757/reason-and-emotion)[*Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691058757/reason-and-emotion)[. Princeton: Princeton, ch. 14.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691058757/reason-and-emotion) [Cooper, John M. (1999b) “Political Animals and Civic Friendship.” In: ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691058757/reason-and-emotion)[*Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691058757/reason-and-emotion)[. Princeton: Princeton, ch. 16.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691058757/reason-and-emotion) [Diogenes Laertius. (2018) ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780197523391?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780197523391?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Trans. Pamela Mensch. Oxford: Oxford.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lives-of-the-eminent-philosophers-9780197523391?cc=us&lang=en&) [*Death in Brunswick*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_in_Brunswick)[. (1990) Dir. John Ruane.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_in_Brunswick) [El Murr, Dimitri. (2020) “Friendship in Early Greek Ethics.” In: ](https://academic.oup.com/book/33502/chapter-abstract/287818603)[*Early Greek Ethics*](https://academic.oup.com/book/33502/chapter-abstract/287818603)[, ed. David Conan Wolfsdorf. Oxford: Oxford. Ch. 24.](https://academic.oup.com/book/33502/chapter-abstract/287818603) [Elder, Alexis. (2013) “Why Bad People Can’t Be Good Friends,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12017)[*Ratio*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12017)[, vol. 27, iss. 1: 84-99.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/rati.12017) [Elder, Alexis. (2018) ](https://www.routledge.com/Friendship-Robots-and-Social-Media-False-Friends-and-Second-Selves/Elder/p/book/9780367889432)[*Friendship, Robots, and Social Media: False Friends and Second Selves*](https://www.routledge.com/Friendship-Robots-and-Social-Media-False-Friends-and-Second-Selves/Elder/p/book/9780367889432)[. New York: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/Friendship-Robots-and-Social-Media-False-Friends-and-Second-Selves/Elder/p/book/9780367889432) [Helm, Bennett. (2021) “Friendship,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/)[: plato.stanford.edu.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/) [Jeske, Diane. (2023) ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Friendship/Jeske/p/book/9780367440022)[*The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Friendship*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Friendship/Jeske/p/book/9780367440022)[. New York: Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Friendship/Jeske/p/book/9780367440022) [Moles, John L. (1996) “Cynic Cosmopolitanism.” In: ](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics)[*The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics)[, eds. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé. Berkeley: California.](https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520216457/the-cynics) [Nussbaum, Martha C. (2009) ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fragility-of-goodness/B212012979833A828690B9CA907A87BF)[*The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fragility-of-goodness/B212012979833A828690B9CA907A87BF)[. Updated Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fragility-of-goodness/B212012979833A828690B9CA907A87BF) [Pakaluk, Michael. (1991) ](https://hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/philosophy-readings/other-selves)[*Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship*](https://hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/philosophy-readings/other-selves)[. Indianapolis: Hackett.](https://hackettpublishing.com/philosophy/philosophy-readings/other-selves) [Shields, Christopher. (2020) “Aristotle,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/)[: plato.stanford.edu.](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/) [Trujillo, G.M. (2020) “Friendship for the Flawed: A Cynical and Pessimistic Theory of Friendship,” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2020_0036_0001_0199_0209)[*Southwest Philosophy Review*](https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2020_0036_0001_0199_0209)[, vol. 36, iss. 1: 199-209.](https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2020_0036_0001_0199_0209) ### For Further Reading [Katz, Emily. (2023) “Three lessons from Aristotle on Friendship,” ](https://theconversation.com/three-lessons-from-aristotle-on-friendship-200520)[*The Conversation*](https://theconversation.com/three-lessons-from-aristotle-on-friendship-200520)[. ](https://theconversation.com/three-lessons-from-aristotle-on-friendship-200520) ### Related Essays [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) By Felipe Pereira [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people/) by Kiki Berk [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) By Matthew Pianalto [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) By Matthew Pianalto ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/aristotelesin-arkadaslik-hakkindaki-gorusleri-iyi-bir-arkadas-olmak-neleri-gerektirir-g-m-trujillo-jr/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/aristotle-friendship.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [G.M. Trujillo, Jr.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Trujillo) is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. He specializes in ethics, especially virtue ethics and bioethics. [www.Boomert.info](https://boomert.info/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Aristotle, friends, friendship, Trujillo --- ### [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) **Published:** February 13, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Brock Rough Category: [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/ "Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art") Word Count: 1000 ### 1. The Distinction While some people take the field of aesthetics, broadly construed, to include the philosophy of art, it is instructive to examine whether and where the two notions diverge. Recognizing the distinction between the appropriate scopes of these concepts is important because there has been confusion over their definitions ever since Alexander Baumgarten appropriated the term ‘aesthetic’ in the mid-18th Century to stand for *the study of taste according to the senses*. The distinction was further blurred by a long tradition of misunderstanding Kant’s “Analytic of the Beautiful” as pertaining to art, rather than merely to aesthetics. But the distinction can be made clear: the study of aesthetics is the study of the felt quality of perceptions of the senses, while the study of art is the study of the historical practice of making art objects. Some have argued that these are co-extensive pursuits; we will see that this is not so. In this essay, I will show that aesthetic properties are neither necessary nor sufficient for art, and identify some issues that remain. The distinction between the two is perhaps made most perspicuous by showing the difference between aesthetic and artistic *properties*. Roughly, aesthetic properties are those that are the properties of sensory taste that we perceive in the things we experience: properties like ‘beautiful,’ ‘dynamic,’ ‘graceful.’ Frank Sibley was fond of listing aesthetic properties, and characterizes them as not merely perceptual properties, but as *depending on* perceptual properties, requiring taste to perceive them and resisting discovery by means of what he called “condition-governedness” (i.e. being reducible to underlying physical properties).1 Meanwhile, artistic properties are those that are relevant to artworks: facts about the context of creation, who the artist was, when they made the work, what their intentions for the work were, etc.2 Some have argued, and continue to argue,3 that art is defined by the aesthetic. However, there are several reasons to resist this conclusion. Intuitively, we use aesthetic terms to describe nature, as when we call a sunset “beautiful,” but we do not thereby think of nature as a literal work of art.4 Conversely, much art, especially of the last century, is not primarily concerned with having a high aesthetic quality, e.g., Marcel Duchamp’s *The Fountain*, or in the case of conceptual art, with having any aesthetic properties at all, lacking a physical object to support aesthetic judgment (e.g., Robert Barry’s *Telepathic Piece*). There is much research into the aesthetics of various domains that do not standardly contain artworks. Some of these domains are defined by not being about artifacts at all—by most definitions, by their non-art-objecthood. These include: - The aesthetics of design.5 - The aesthetics of nature.6 - The aesthetics of everyday life.7 - The aesthetics of our sense of touch.8 - The aesthetics of our sense of proprioception.9 - The aesthetics of the experience of scratching an itch.10 - The aesthetics of the pleasurable experience of eating disgusting food.11 - The aesthetics of the microscopic and the cosmically gigantic (and elephants too).12 With such a large scope of things to be approached aesthetically, and with some arguing that all perceptual objects have aesthetic properties,13 unless we want to expand the scope of ‘art’ to include all perceptual objects, there is clearly a distinction to be made between the study of art and the study of aesthetics. The distinction becomes even clearer when one considers cases of forgery. If art really were solely concerned with the aesthetic properties of works, and if those properties depended solely on the physical properties of the work,14 then a perfect forgery should be as artistically valuable as the original. This, however, is not the case. This case serves to show why the conflation of art and aesthetics is untenable. One might worry, however, that the history of art, and its longstanding concern with making beautiful objects, is being unduly ignored; in other words: how do we make sense of the fact that so many artists have focused on making beautiful objects? It is true that many objects in the history of art are beautiful, and are largely concerned with the aesthetic. However, focusing exclusively on the beauty of artworks has been called a kind of historical myopia by many; the conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth said, “It is necessary to separate aesthetics from art because aesthetics deals with opinions on perception of the world in general,”15 and that, “Formalist painting and sculpture can be granted an ‘art condition,’ but only by virtue of their presentation in terms of their art idea”.16 Kosuth’s view is certainly not the final word on the debate, but his is representative of an increasingly dominant view in the artworld since Duchamp, and by some accounts, much earlier.17 The idea driving the distinction is that making art is about something other than a concern for the aesthetic, though traditionally, an aesthetic concern has been swept up into art practice. So while there is historical overlap, we can see that the two remain logically distinct. ### 2. Remaining Issues Even if one agrees that the concepts ‘art’ and ‘aesthetics’ pick out different things, clarifying their differences remains problematic. For instance, it remains to be discovered just which properties are artistic ones *rather than* aesthetic ones and whether some properties can do double duty. Another difficulty is determining just which properties are *purely* aesthetic. Many people want to preserve yet another distinction: that between aesthetic properties and merely sensory properties. Even acknowledging the vague boundary between these, there is no obviously principled way of distinguishing between, say, the pleasure felt by slipping into a hot bath, the awe one feels before a brilliant sunset, and whatever aesthetic response is felt when one contemplates a Caravaggio. Finally, though there seems to be a distinction between aesthetic and artistic properties, what about the aesthetic properties of works of literature? Books as physical objects have aesthetic properties, but given the abstract nature of the content of a book, what is there for our taste to perceive in a way that is appropriately analogous to how we perceive aesthetic properties of physical objects? ### Notes 1 See Sibley (1959). 2 See, for example, Levinson (2011). 3 See, for instance, Iseminger (2004). 4 Though there is room for an interesting theistic argument to be made here. 5 See Forsey (2013). 6 See, for example, Allen Carlson’s “Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art, and Architecture” (2000). 7 See Thomas Leddy (2012). 8 See Carolyn Korsmeyer’s “Touch and the Experience of the Genuine” (2012). 9 See Barbara Montero’s “Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense” (2006). 10 See Sherri Irvin’s “Scratching an Itch” (2008b). 11 See Carolyn Korsmeyer’s “Delightful, Delicious, Disgusting” (2002). 12 See Hans Maes’s “Elephants, Microscopes and Free Beauty: Reply to Davies” (2009). 13 See Irvin (2008a). 14 Not everyone agrees that they do, at least not solely. Sibley (1959) argues that they do, but Walton (1970) gives a compelling argument that context plays a larger role in determining aesthetic properties than one might initially think, though in the end he also thinks that aesthetic properties depend on the physical properties of the work. 15 See Kosuth (1973, 76). 16 See Kosuth (1973, 78). 17 See art historian and critic Michael Fried (1980). ### References [Carlson, A. (2000). *Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art, and Architecture.* Routledge.](http://www.amazon.com/Aesthetics-Environment-Appreciation-Nature-Architecture/dp/041530105X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392263802&sr=8-1&keywords=Aesthetics+and+the+Environment%3A+The+Appreciation+of+Nature%2C+Art%2C+and+Architecture) [Forsey, J. (2013). *The Aesthetics of Design.* Oxford University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Aesthetics-Design-Jane-Forsey/dp/019996436X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392263849&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Aesthetics+of+Design) [Fried, M. (1980). *Absorption and theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot.* University of California Pr.](http://www.amazon.com/Absorption-Theatricality-Painting-Beholder-Diderot/dp/0226262138/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392263901&sr=8-1&keywords=Absorption+and+theatricality%3A+Painting+and+Beholder+in+the+Age+of+Diderot) [Irvin, S. (2008a). “The Pervasiveness of the Aesthetic in Ordinary Experience.” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 48(1), 29–44.](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/48/1/29.short) [Irvin, S. (2008b). “Scratching an Itch.” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 66(1), 25–35.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-594X.2008.00285.x/abstract;jsessionid=E7F8A3F57BE2BDC7040AF9710F9BE99C.f01t04?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Iseminger, G. (2004). *The Aesthetic Function of Art* (1999). Cornell University Press.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Aesthetic-Function-Gary-Iseminger/dp/B007K4NY98/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392264025&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Aesthetic+Function+of+Art) [Korsmeyer, C. (2002). “Delightful, Delicious, Disgusting.” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 60(3), 217–225.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1540-6245.00069/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Korsmeyer, C. (2012). “Touch and the Experience of the Genuine.” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 52(4), 365–377.](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/52/4/365.short) [Kosuth, J. (1973). Art After Philosophy I. In G. Battcock (Ed.) *Idea Art*. E. P. Dutton. (1969).](http://www.amazon.com/Idea-Art-Battcock/dp/0525473440/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392264982&sr=8-1&keywords=idea+art) [Leddy, T. (2012). *The Extraordinary in the Ordinary: The Aesthetics of Everyday Life.* Broadview Press.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Extraordinary-Ordinary-Aesthetics-Everyday/dp/155111478X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392264502&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Extraordinary+in+the+Ordinary%3A+The+Aesthetics+of+Everyday+Life.) [Levinson, J. (2011). “What a Musical Work Is.” *Music, Art, & Metaphysics*, (pp. 63–88). Oxford University Press. (1980).](http://www.amazon.com/Music-Art-Metaphysics-Jerrold-Levinson/dp/0199596638/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392264439&sr=8-1&keywords=Music%2C+Art%2C+%26+Metaphysics) [Maes, H. (2009). “Elephants, Microscopes and Free Beauty: Reply to Davies.” *Philosophical Quarterly*, 59(235), 332–336.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.592.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Montero, B. (2006). “Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense.” *Journal Of Aesthetics And Art Criticism*, 64(2), 231–242.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0021-8529.2006.00244.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Sibley, F. (1959). “Aesthetic Concepts.” *Philosophical Review*, 68(4), 421–450.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2182490?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103442213187) [Walton, K. L. (1970). “Categories of Art.” *Philosophical Review*, 79(3), 334–367.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2183933?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103442213187) ### Related Essays [Definitions of Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/ "Definitions of Art") by Brock Rough [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson ### About the Author [Brock Rough](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rough) earned a PhD in philosophy at the University of Maryland, College Park. His research focuses on the art status and ontology of videogames, their role as a test case for theories of art, and the ontology and intersection of games and art. Before pursuing philosophy, Brock spent several years working as a portrait painter. [www.brockrough.com](http://www.brockrough.com/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Art & Aesthetics **Tags:** Rough --- ### [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/platos-form-of-the-good/) **Published:** February 13, 2018 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Ryan Jenkins Category: [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/), [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 938 You have often heard it said that the Form of the Good is the greatest thing to learn about, and that it is by their relation to it that just things and \[other virtuous things\] become useful and beneficial (*Republic*, 505a). Plato’s *Republic* is a wide-ranging tract, admired for its depth, nuance, and ambition. Plato sets himself to answering two questions: *What is justice?* and *Is the just or unjust life better for a person?* In the process of answering these questions, he defends a sublime theory of the nature of reality and human knowledge. The ultimate foundation of Plato’s metaphysics—his view of reality—is his theory of Forms, culminating in the Form of the Good. Few, says Plato, really understand the nature of the Good itself (505e).[\[1\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/#_ftn1) ![Plato's Republic](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/plato.jpg?resize=656%2C458&ssl=1)Plato’s Republic ### 1. The Sun Analogy The Form of the Good sits atop Plato’s hierarchy of being as the ultimate Form. The Forms themselves are abstract, although they do inform the concrete world[\[2\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/#_ftn1), and Plato frequently relies on metaphor to describe them. To understand the Good itself, Plato relies on an analogy with the sun. There are visible objects, which are visible but not intelligible in themselves. (Plato’s central concern is that the world of material objects is shifting, deceptive, and unreliable.) Then there are the Forms themselves, which are intelligible but not visible (507b). The Form of the Good, Plato says, is to the intelligible realm as the sun is to the visible realm. In the visible realm, there is a need of “something else” to make things visible, namely, the sun (507d). We need sight in ourselves and color in objects, but we also need the sun, or light, to make those things really visible, detectable by us. Sight receives its power to see from the sun, as if from an overflowing treasury. And sight is the most “sunlike” of the senses, i.e., it and the sun have a kind of affinity or compatibility. The sun and our sense of sight *go together*. Likewise, the intelligible realm receives its order and intelligibility from the Form of the Good. Without the Form of the Good, we would be like people fumbling in the dark, with a capacity to understand but no “third thing” to render the world intelligible. Plato says that the sun is the “cause” of the visible realm. The connection here may seem tenuous, but this much is clear: without the sun, most or all of the things on the earth would die out. This is presumably what Plato means. In the intelligible realm, the Form of the Good plays the same role: it is not only the reason for the *intelligibility* of the Forms, but the source of their *existence* as well. Though, as Plato says, the existence that it enjoys is “beyond being, superior to it in rank and power” (509b).Plato’s mysticism—his conviction that there are superior forms of existence—inherited from Pythagoras, is here on full display. ### 2. A Divine Order So, the Form of the Good is more real, even, than the rest of the Forms: the realest and most fundamental thing that exists, the cause of the Forms and the explanation of the rational order of the universe. It resembles a *divine logos*, or divine rationality, which became an object of worship for successive schools of philosophy that developed under the influence of Plato’s ideas. Nowadays, we might compare the Form of the Good to laws of nature, though this is not fully satisfying, since the Form of the Good is not particular law of nature, but the reason why there are laws at all. Stephen Hawking famously quipped that we should ask not only what the equations governing the universe are, but also “what breathes fire into the equations?” For Plato, both the equations and the fire are the Form of the Good. ### 3. The Forms and Human History We can gauge the significance of Plato’s contributions to humanity by his influence on the history of thought. Plato’s was the first major metaphysical system in the West, and it dominated Western thought through the middle of the second millennium. Consider the subject of mathematics and geometry. What is a point? It is a location in space with no dimension. In other words, it is not a real object. Points are ideal entities, not space-time particulars. They take up no space. Likewise, lines have length but no breadth. Mathematics is *about* ideal entities, and some mathematicians today are still “Platonists” about numbers: they hold the view that numbers or other mathematical objects are immaterial things. And they *have* to be in order for us to be able to know eternal truths about them. If we live in a rationally ordered cosmos, this helps underwrite a social order that is rigidly hierarchical. It is no surprise then that through the Middle ages humans organize themselves into strict hierarchies. We find a hierarchical church and a stratified social structure, with serfs serving the king and the king serving God. Consider Plato’s influence on theology: The Form of the Good is the ground of all being, an immaterial object that exists more perfectly than anything else, a thing responsible for the goodness and rationality in the world. This is something like an interpretation of the Christian view of God developed in the Middle Ages, founded in Platonic and Neo-Platonic metaphysics. Perhaps most importantly, Plato’s arguments in *Republic* make possible scientific inquiry. Science is only possible if the natural world is intelligible to our rational faculties. Many people credit Plato’s student Aristotle with the initiation of the scientific project of humanity, and many in turn credit the scientific method as the West’s most profound contribution to humanity. ### Notes [\[1\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/#_ftnref1) *Republic* is firstly an argument about the ideal structure of a city. Notoriously, Plato installs philosopher-kings as a benevolent council. If the rulers of the city are to make themselves, their citizens, and their city good, they must first know Goodness itself. [\[2\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/#_ftnref1) For example, a concrete table is a *table* rather than, say, a *chair* or a *dog*, because it participates—albeit partially—in the Form of table-hood. Concreta are what they are because of the Forms they participate in, and the Forms are ontologically and explanatorily prior to concreta. ### References [Pappas, Nickolas. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the Republic*. Psychology Press, 2003.](https://www.amazon.com/Routledge-Philosophy-GuideBook-Republic-GuideBooks/dp/0415299977) [Plato. *Republic*. Translated by Reeve, C. D. C. Vol. 1. Hackett Publishing, 2004.](https://www.amazon.com/Republic-Hackett-Classics-Plato/dp/0872207366/ref=mt_paperback?_encoding=UTF8&me=) ### Related Essays [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case ### About the Author [Ryan Jenkins](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Jenkins) is an associate professor of philosophy and a senior fellow at the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo. He studies the ethics of emerging technologies, especially automation, cyber war, autonomous weapons, and driverless cars. His work has appeared in journals such as Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, and the Journal of Military Ethics, as well as public fora including Slate and Forbes. [calpoly.academia.edu/RyanJenkins](http://calpoly.academia.edu/RyanJenkins) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** Jenkins, Plato --- ### [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) **Published:** January 30, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** One way of denying parents the opportunity to raise children would be to require them to procure a license to parent in the same way we require licenses to drive a car or own a handgun. Many would find this surprising, but perhaps there is a good argument for licensing parents. **Content:** Author: Ryan Jenkins Category: [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/ "Social and Political Philosophy"), [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) Word Count: 1000 Most people think it’s obvious that we have a right to procreate and raise children. In fact, many people think reproductive rights are among the most important rights we have. After all, reproductive rights protect some of the most intimate acts between adults and many people think that rearing children is the greatest source of meaning and fulfillment in life. It’s hard to fathom a government with the arrogance to deny its citizens these rights. At the same time, most of us think there are some situations where the government is justified in taking away someone’s children. Cases of extreme neglect or abuse come to mind – cases where people have demonstrated that they are *not fit parents*. If it’s okay to take someone’s children away after the fact, could it ever be okay to deny them the right to raise children *beforehand*? One way of denying parents the opportunity to raise children would be to require them to procure a *license to parent* in the same way we require licenses to drive a car or own a handgun. Many would find this surprising, but perhaps there is a good argument for licensing parents. ![the-holy-family-with-the-little-bird](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/the-holy-family-with-the-little-bird.jpg?resize=656%2C482&ssl=1) Quickly, we should note that there’s a difference between the government restricting a person’s right to *procreate* and restricting her right to *raise* children. The first raises the specter of eugenics and forced sterilization. Those are dark chapters in humanity’s history – and not our focus here. Instead, we want to know whether a government can require that people obtain a license before they *raise* children. This may seem like a distinction without a difference, but the difference here is between a government sterilizing its citizens – to take an extreme case – and merely requiring that they understand some basic principles of parenting before *keeping* the children they have. One approach is to ask, “When do we think it is appropriate to require a license for an activity in general?” Then, with a general theory in hand, we could see whether parenting fits the mold. So, for example, Hugh LaFollette has suggested that we should require a license for activities that: (1) have a high potential to harm innocent people, (2) require some competence to perform, and where we (3) have a generally reliable method for determining that competence beforehand. Driving a car, for example, meets all three of these conditions, and so we require a person to obtain a license before she can legally drive a car. Likewise when a person seeks to purchase a gun, to perform surgery, or to practice law. LaFollette then points out that parenting meets these criteria as well. But there are some counterexamples to this approach: according to this view, we should also have to obtain licenses in order to go skiing – after all, there’s a possibility you could injure a bystander on your way down the slopes. By the same reasoning, a person should have to obtain a license to cook for her friends at home, at least to make sure she knows the proper way to prepare foods that could carry food-borne diseases. Yet it is outlandish to suggest that activities as mundane as cooking and skiing should be licensed. So LaFollette’s theory seems too restrictive. But there is another approach, and that is to think about when we are justified in restricting a person’s rights. Imagine I have robbed you at gunpoint, causing you psychological harm. As a result, the government takes my guns away. When I cause you some harm, I *forfeit* my right to own a gun. The right to own a gun is controversial, but if anything can overturn that right, it would be committing a grave harm with your gun. At any rate, we can suppose this is true for the time being. Now, imagine that we have some way of being very confident, in advance, that I will exercise my right to own a gun in a way that causes harm. If we could be very confident about that, and if the harm I was likely to commit was grave enough, it seems we would be justified in revoking my right *in advance*. That is, the government wouldn’t need to wait until I’ve *already* harmed you to take my right away. The government could be proactive, instead, and *prevent* that harm altogether. Even though the government has revoked my right in this case, it did so to prevent a grave harm, and that seems justified. Consider another example: If I have assaulted someone, the government restricts my freedom of movement by imprisoning me. If the government could be confident that I was going to assault someone, it would be justified in restricting my freedom of movement ahead of time. This is just what the government does when it places a restraining order on me. A restraining order revokes some of my freedom of movement, but only because the government is fairly confident I would use that freedom in a way that harms someone. Again, restraining orders seem justified. The same principle could justify a government requirement to license parents before they raise children. We already recognize a class of *sufficiently grave harms*, harms so severe that inflicting them on your children forfeits your right to raise children. This class of sufficiently grave harms includes sexual or physical abuse and extreme neglect. If someone does this to her children, she has forfeited her right to raise them. If we have reason *in advance* to believe she would inflict any of those harms on her children, it is plausible that we are permitted to override her right to raise children before she *actually* inflicts those harms. Notice that we already think it is not just acceptable, but *a good idea* to screen parents before they *adopt* a child. Perhaps we should apply the same logic to biological parents that we do to adoptive parents in the hopes of preventing harms to children. Thus what began as a controversial – even outrageous – position may turn out more plausible than we thought. ### References [LaFollette, Hugh. “Licensing parents.” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 9.2 (1980): 182-197.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2265111?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103356907347) ### About the Author [Ryan Jenkins](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Jenkins) is an associate professor of philosophy and a senior fellow at the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo. He studies the ethics of emerging technologies, especially automation, cyber war, autonomous weapons, and driverless cars. His work has appeared in journals such as *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, and the *Journal of Military Ethics*, as well as public fora including *Slate* and *Forbes*. [calpoly.academia.edu/RyanJenkins](http://calpoly.academia.edu/RyanJenkins) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Social & Political **Tags:** Jenkins, parents --- ### [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) **Published:** September 26, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Dale E. Miller Category: [Ethics, ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/)[Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/historical-philosophy/) Wordcount: 994 *Video below* One important question in ethics is what makes people’s lives go well for them. Philosophers have proposed various theories about what things in and of themselves make people better off, i.e., theories of “well-being.” Many such theories say that pleasurable experiences are at least part of what makes our lives go well. But do some types of pleasure contribute more to our well-being than others? The 19th-century philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–73) answers “yes.” This discussion explains why. ![John Stuart Mill](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/john-stuart-mill-small.jpg?resize=429%2C538&ssl=1) John Stuart Mill ### 1. Mill’s Hedonism Mill contends that pleasure is not merely one thing that contributes to our well-being, it’s the only thing. Similarly, only pain makes us worse off. Mill thinks that a person’s life goes well for her just insofar as she is happy. Mill defines “happiness” as pleasure and freedom from pain. In his *Utilitarianism*, he describes the best life as “an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This theory of well-being is called “hedonism.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Mill’s case for hedonism comes in Ch. 4 of *Utilitarianism*, in his so-called “proof of the principle of utility.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) There he contends that “the sole evidence … that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Because pleasure is the only thing that we desire for its own sake, Mill argues, we can know that it’s uniquely valuable. ### 2. Bentham and Pushpin An earlier utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), also subscribes to hedonism.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) However, his hedonism differs significantly from Mill’s. For Bentham, how much a pleasurable experience adds to our happiness is strictly a matter of how much pleasure it contains. This in turn depends on the intensity of the pleasure and how long it lasts. So two factors, *intensity* and *duration*, determine a pleasurable experience’s value. Bentham sees the source of pleasure as irrelevant to its value. He compares reading poetry with playing the mindless game “push-pin.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) As Mill summarizes Bentham’s conclusion, “quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) ### 3. “Qualitative” Hedonism: A Plurality of Pleasures While Bentham may believe that pleasure is a single feeling that’s present in all pleasurable experiences. In contrast, Mill believes that there are distinct varieties of pleasures; a person may enjoy both reading poetry and running, but the pleasures these activities yield can have entirely different “feels.” It’s therefore possible that some “*kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Mill believes that some are; certain qualitatively superior pleasures add more to our happiness than an equal or even greater quantity of others. For Mill, therefore, the value of a pleasurable experience depends on *three* factors: intensity, duration, and (unlike Bentham) *quality*. ### 4. The Competent Judges Test How do we compare the quality of pleasures? Mill says that we must consult people who have enjoyed both. Only they are competent to make this comparison. If they unequivocally desire one more strongly, then it’s of higher quality: Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Note the continuity with Mill’s “proof”: the sole evidence that one pleasure is *more* desirable is that people do actually desire it *more strongly*. Mill believes that the results of this test are apparent. While virtually everyone has experiences of bodily pleasures that we share with animals, only some people are sufficiently mentally cultivated to enjoy the distinctly human “pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” to any extent.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Those who are, he claims, decidedly prefer them: Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This lets Mill answer the objection that hedonists would approve of a person’s living a life “worthy only of swine,” as long as she enjoyed it.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) His qualitative hedonism can explain why, although such a life would have *some* value (since lower-quality pleasures have some value), she’d be far happier and much better off were her life rich in higher-quality pleasures.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) One practical upshot of Mill’s view is the importance of providing an education sufficient for enjoying higher-quality pleasures to everyone. People lacking such preparation may not appreciate why these pleasures are superior, but they’re not competent judges: It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 5. Unanswered Questions Some important questions about Mill’s views do not receive clear answers. One is whether there are qualitative differences between pains. The other is just how much more valuable than bodily pleasures higher-quality pleasures are. Clearly he considers them *significantly* more valuable; controversially, some scholars believe that he considers them *infinitely* more valuable.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) ### 6. Conclusion: Is Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism Plausible? Mill may seem to underrate the value of bodily pleasures. His view could seem to entail that we should all spend as much time as possible on “rarified” activities like museum visits and opera, and none on “exciting” pursuits like sports or sex. However, people with developed faculties can find higher-quality pleasure in diverse activities and combined with other pleasures. Someone who knows football well may derive intellectual and aesthetic pleasure from it, along with less refined pleasure in the collisions. Sex can be both emotionally fulfilling and physically pleasurable. Mill suggests that the best lives combine tranquility and excitement.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) It also bears mentioning that Mill had a somewhat unusual life, starting with a childhood that involved little if any play. So he may not have been entirely competent to judge some bodily pleasures himself.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mill 1969b, 214. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The word *hedonism* comes from the Greek word *hēdonē* (“pleasure”). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) For an introduction to this argument see my [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Mill 1969b, 234. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) In its simplest form, u*tilitarianism* is the moral theory that says that actions are right if they would maximize the total amount of happiness in the world in the long run; otherwise, they’re wrong. Utilitarianism is a version of the type of moral theory called *consequentialism*. For an introduction to that type of theory, see Shane Gronholz’s [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) For a description see [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push-pin\_(game)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push-pin_(game)). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Mill 1969a, 113. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Mill 1969b, 211. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Mill 1969b, 211. Note that Mill admits that even people “with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority” of higher-quality pleasures sometimes give in to the temptation to choose lower-quality pleasure instead (Mill 1969b, 212). Those who do so too often may lose the ability to enjoy the higher quality pleasures altogether, since “Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed” (Mill 1969b, 213). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Mill 1969b, 211. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Mill 1969b, 211. Note that Mill’s requiring that people really have enjoyed the pleasure in question, not merely that they’ve participated in the activity that can potentially give rise to the pleasure. Forcing someone who has not learned to appreciate classical music to sit through a symphony doesn’t make them a competent judge of the aesthetic pleasure that fans of the symphony derive from it. Arguably they’re not acquainted with the *pleasure* at all, even if they’re acquainted with the symphony, but they certainly aren’t capable of appreciating and enjoying it. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Mill 1969b, 210. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Mill suggests that even earlier utilitarians like Bentham were able to answer this objection adequately without introducing the notion of qualitative distinctions between pleasures. They could say, for example, that we can enjoy intellectual and aesthetic pleasures for much longer than bodily ones, and without the same painful aftereffects (e.g., hangovers) (Mill 1969b, 211). But by invoking this notion Mill is able to make an even more powerful answer. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Mill 1969b, 212. In virtue of his belief that the employment of our distinctly human faculties produces superior pleasures, Mill’s hedonistic understanding of happiness bears some resemblance to the Greek philosopher Aristotle’s decidedly non-hedonistic understanding (Aristotle 1999, 1–18). While Mill rarely acknowledges Aristotle as an influence, this is one of several echoes of Aristotle’s thought in his. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) E.g., Riley 2003. For a contrasting interpretation, see Miller 2010, 58–9. Part of what’s at issue here is how to read the sentence “If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account” (Mill 1969b, 211). Points of disagreement include 1) Whether Mill believes that the ‘if’ clause of this sentence is satisfied every time that one pleasure is of higher quality than another, or only in certain cases where the qualitative difference is especially great, 2) Whether to “resign” the higher quality pleasure means to lose the ability to enjoy the pleasure altogether or only to give up only a small amount of it, e.g., five minute’s worth, and 3) What Mill means by “of small account.” [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Mill 1969b, 215. Mill might consider it a mistake for a person ever to choose lower-quality pleasures at the expense of higher-quality ones. But that doesn’t mean that he believes that we should try to abstain from lower-quality pleasures altogether. Many activities that are just ordinary parts of our everyday lives, like exercise, involve some lower-quality pleasures. Often, as already remarked, we can be enjoying lower-quality pleasures in company with higher-quality intellectual and emotional ones, and the combination would be more valuable than either alone. And perhaps sometimes we just need to rest our higher faculties for a while, to recharge them for later use and let us enjoy more higher-quality pleasure in the long run. So enjoying bodily pleasure doesn’t always mean enjoying less mental pleasure. Perhaps it may still seem like the best life for us is one that involves a bit more bodily pleasure than Mill believes. But if he has persuaded you that that the pleasures that come from exercising the distinctly-human faculties are sufficiently superior to the bodily pleasures that the best life is one in which the former would greatly predominate over the latter, then he might well be satisfied even if there is still some lingering disagreement over just how great this predominance should be. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Note that while as a hedonist Mill believes that only pleasure (and freedom from pain) are valuable, his account of the qualitative differences between pleasures holds significance as long as pleasure is among the things that have value, even if there are others. ### References [Aristotle (1999). ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/nicomachean-ethics)[*Nicomachean Ethics*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/nicomachean-ethics)[. 2](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/nicomachean-ethics)[nd](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/nicomachean-ethics)[ edition. Ed. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett. ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/nicomachean-ethics) [Mill, John Stuart (1869a). “Bentham.” In John M. Robson (ed.), ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-x-essays-on-ethics-religion-and-society)[*Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-x-essays-on-ethics-religion-and-society)[ vol. X. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 77–115. Originally published 1838.](https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-x-essays-on-ethics-religion-and-society) [—– (1969b). ](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?geo=US&q=well%20being,the%20good%20life,hedonism)[*Utilitarianism*](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?geo=US&q=well%20being,the%20good%20life,hedonism)[. In John M. Robson (ed.), ](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?geo=US&q=well%20being,the%20good%20life,hedonism)[*Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?geo=US&q=well%20being,the%20good%20life,hedonism)[ vol. X. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 203–59. Originally published 1861.](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?geo=US&q=well%20being,the%20good%20life,hedonism) [Miller, Dale E. (2010). ](http://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745625836&subject_id=5)[*John Stuart Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought*](http://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745625836&subject_id=5)[. Cambridge: Polity.](http://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9780745625836&subject_id=5) [Riley, Jonathan (2003). “Interpreting Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism.” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00321)[*The Philosophical Quarterly*](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00321)[ 53: 410–18. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00321) ### For Further Reading [Brink, David (2018). “Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mill-moral-political/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mill-moral-political/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mill-moral-political/) ### Related Essays [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/john-stuart-mill-iyi-yasam-uzerine-yuksek-nitelikli-hazlar-dale-e-miller/) ### Video ### PDF Download Download [this essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life.pdf) in PDF. ### About the Author [Dale E. Miller](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Miller) is a Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University and the editor-in-chief of *Utilitas.* [www.drdaleemiller.net](http://www.drdaleemiller.net) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and[*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at the* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Historical Philosophy **Tags:** hedonism, Mill, Miller, pleasure --- ### [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) **Published:** February 16, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to Principlism in Biomedical Ethics or Bioethics, which includes the principles of Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice. **Content:** Author: G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Wordcount: 999 Suppose that you have an ethical problem in medicine or science. How would you solve it? Some ethicists appeal to an *ethical theory*, a general explanation of when and why actions are wrong or not.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) For example, Kantians argue that you should treat all people with dignity and act only on rules that everyone can endorse. Consequentialists argue that you should pick whatever action produces the most good effects for those involved (or avoids the most bad). Virtue ethicists argue that actions must help people form better characters or live better lives. And care ethicists argue that we should foremost consider our feelings and the relationships we share. But there are deep disagreements among advocates of these differing ethical theories. And these disagreements sometimes lead to stalemates in ethical decision-making. To try to address this impasse, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress developed a new approach to ethical decision-making in their 1977 book, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) They developed a set of principles that most ethicists can agree to, an approach named **principlism**. They hoped these core principles would be detailed enough to guide analyses and decisions, yet flexible enough to adapt to different cases and cultures.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Their book, now in its eighth edition, helped organize the field of medical ethics and remains a standard text. They defend four principles as central to medical ethics: *respect for autonomy*, *non-maleficence*, *beneficence*, and *justice*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Here I explain each principle using examples from contemporary medical practice.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ![“Principles of Biomedical Ethics” by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/beauchampchildressprinciplies2.png?resize=656%2C364&ssl=1)“Principles of Biomedical Ethics” by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress ### 1. Respect for Autonomy **Respect for autonomy** centers on respecting persons’ capacities to make decisions for themselves.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) In clinical settings, physicians typically evaluate patients’ decision-making capacities by checking whether patients can understand the diagnosis and available treatment options, appreciate the risks and benefits of treatments, and offer reasons for their decisions.[\[7\] ](#_ftn7)Competent adults are generally assumed to be able to decide what to do with their own healthcare, so long as medical professionals explain the diagnosis and treatment options in ways patients understand. But autonomy comes in degrees. So, even though children do not have capacity to approve complicated, invasive procedures, they can choose their lunch or TV channel.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) However, patients’ capacities to make decisions can be impaired, for example by sedation or falling unconscious. To respect patient autonomy in these circumstances, practitioners should encourage advance directives, living wills, and clear conversations with loved ones about quality of life and what should happen if the patient needs resuscitation (e.g., CPR) or life support (e.g., breathing and feeding tubes). These documents and conversations enable medical teams and families to respect a patient’s autonomy, even when the patient cannot decide at that moment.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 2. Non-Maleficence and Beneficence **Non-maleficence** means avoiding harm, and **beneficence** means doing good. Together, they represent two sides of the same coin, as medicine often sets health as its destination but painful, risky treatments as its path. You may hear medical practitioners say, “First, do no harm,” which aligns with non-maleficence. Or, “Cure sometimes, treat often, comfort always,” which lists the good things practitioners do, especially by being human in the alienating, stressful, and disempowering situations that patients face.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) In conversations about non-maleficence and beneficence, practitioners often balance the harms and benefits of available options. However, non-maleficence and beneficence sometimes conflict with autonomy. For example, doctors used to be comfortable with **paternalism**, or overriding patients’ wishes to do what is good for them. A paternalistic doctor in the 1970s might not have told a patient about their untreatable, terminal lung cancer to avoid distressing them, non-maleficence thus overriding autonomy.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Today, such paternalism is often condemned.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) However conflicts between principles still occur. Consider a patient with a strict religious code who refuses simple-yet-life-saving treatments like blood transfusions. Medical practitioners might recommend the transfusion to help the patient survive (beneficence), but they may respect the autonomy of the patient to refuse, even if it leads to death.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 3. Justice **Justice** concerns the distribution of benefits and burdens in society: people should get what is fair. For medical ethics, this means asking who an institution serves, and at what cost to whom.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) For example, many wealthy countries provide their citizens access to state-funded healthcare. They think that providing medicine for citizens is fair, and that easy access to primary care physicians and preventive medicine bring overall costs down and health outcomes up. Some countries choose to redistribute wealth through taxes to contribute toward the flourishing of their citizens, not just those who can afford private insurance or emergency expenses. Systemic issues are complex, involving policy, administrators, and legislators. Some physicians respond, therefore, that healthcare practitioners cannot address justice at the bedside and should just care for the patients in front of them. But practitioners *can* advocate for justice. They can always ask whether a practice, department, or organization can better accommodate marginalized groups or improve access to resources.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) One contemporary example is offering gender-affirming categories on paperwork and shifting to specific questions that a practice needs to know (rather than relying on sex- or gender-based generalities). For example, rather than a colorectal surgeon asking whether patients are “male,” she could ask for age and whether they have prostates. Specific qualities or questions might be more relevant than gender or sex.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Some trans patients report that bias or stigma prevents them from seeking medical care. As citizens with rights to healthcare, they shoulder unnecessary burdens and lack fair access to medical resources. But providing better training to healthcare teams, reevaluating intake procedures, and considering patient experiences can improve access to community resources. And this is all more just. ### 4. Conclusion: A Team Effort *Respect for autonomy*, *non-maleficence*, *beneficence*, and *justice* work best together: no single principle always takes priority. In situations where principles conflict, Beauchamp and Childress argue that ethicists must work to balance the competing demands of the principles with the cases.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) While this guarantees no particular verdict, Beauchamp and Childress argue that this critical and open dialogue, involving all stakeholders, provides the best chance to resolve ethical problems. Given the influence of their approach, they may very well be right.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For introductions to two of these ethical theories see [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman and [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*, 8th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019 \[1st ed. 1977\]). In the 1970s bioethics was not established as a field, though there was increasing pressure for it, especially coming on the heels of the *Nuremberg Code* (1949), *The Declaration of Helsinki* (1964)*,* and *The Belmont Report* (1976), which all proposed guidelines for human research and argued that scientists and healthcare practitioners have moral obligations to uphold. (In fact, Tom Beauchamp was intimately involved with *The Belmont Report*.) Beauchamp and Childress’s method was new for bioethics. But it shares many similarities with: W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002 \[1930\]), esp. ch. II. Ross also develops a set of what he calls “prima facie” duties that combines many traditions, where no single value takes absolute priority. Medical ethics as a field was born of scientific and medical atrocities in the 20th century. For example, American scientist Charles Benedict Davenport, who earned his Ph.D. from and taught at Harvard, led the American eugenics movement. Many universities had eugenicist groups too, including Yale, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins. The Nazis took the ideas of the American movement and employed them through medical experiments on prisoners to find ways to sterilize minorities and facilitate genocide. Josef Mengele’s work at Auschwitz is the most infamous, but there were many other doctors who did similarly. For a quick survey of the history of race science, see Nicholas Wade, *A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race, and Human History* (New York: Penguin, 2015), ch. 2. For a detailed history of Nazi medical abuses, see Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2017). For more on the philosophical controversies surrounding eugenics, see Sara Goering, “[Eugenics](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eugenics/),” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2 July 2014). There were many other American experiments that brought wide scrutiny to medicine and science. The most notorious was the forty-year Tuskegee Syphilis Study in Tuskegee, Alabama. The United States government oversaw and funded experimenters to observe Black men infected with syphilis. These experimenters actively prevented the men from seeking treatment, and they continued observing the ill effects of syphilis for nearly two decades after the discovery and availability of penicillin as a treatment. Only media pressure stopped the experiment, as internal reviews done by doctors and scientists reached consensus to continue the experiment. For a history and analysis of ethical problems, see Allan M. Brandt, “Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” *Hastings Center Report*, rep. 8, no. 6 (Dec. 1978): pp. 21-9. For extensive histories of unethical medical research, see Harriet Washington, *Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Harlem Moon, 2006); Allen M. Hornblum, *Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at Holmesburg Prison* (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Carl Elliot, *White Coat, Black Hat: Adventures on the Dark Side of Medicine* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2011), esp. pp. 16-17, 147. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Beauchamp and Childress were also conscious of how new technologies affected the field of bioethics. For example, consider the definition of death. In the past, doctors could reliably call a patient dead after he stopped breathing and began decaying. But the ventilator changed that. A corpse could keep “breathing” via mechanical aid, so the cessation of breathing did not seem an appropriate definition in all cases. Also, surgeons can save many lives by using the organs and tissues from a single corpse to provide transplants for ill patients. But these organs must be fresh. So, a definition of death needed to be precise enough to accurately declare a patient dead before the organs began decaying. Ventilators and organ transplantation techniques gave rise to new debates in bioethics. The same could be said about in vitro fertilization, genetic screening, and internet-enabled prostheses. Beauchamp and Childress think that their principles of biomedical ethics can help guide people moving forward. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Beauchamp and Childress hold that these principles can help ethicists and practitioners do serious ethical work and avoid debates about ethical theories. Beauchamp and Childress did not seek absolute principles; instead, they wanted to facilitate reflection guided by earnest, critical conversants who sought to balance competing views with the goal of solving practical problems. Kantians might prioritize autonomy, consequentialists beneficence and non-maleficence, natural law traditions justice, and virtue ethicists a mix. But Beauchamp and Childress want to avoid these theoretical debates and show that their principles can do useful work in bioethical contexts. Yet it is precisely the combination of principles that has led some critics to say that Beauchamp and Childress’s approach is incoherent, as the principles conflict so much as to be useless. See K. Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert, “A Critique of Principlism,” *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, vol. 15, iss. 2 (Apr. 1990): pp. 219-36. Other critics argue that Beauchamp and Childress must add more principles to their system to get it to work because four principles alone will not capture the core values that all humans have. See Tom Walker, “What Principlism Misses,” *Journal of Medical Ethics*, vol. 35, iss. 4 (2009): pp. 229-31. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) As far as Beauchamp and Childress are concerned, no one principle takes priority. They explain, “Our position is that it is a mistake in biomedical ethics to assign priority *a priori* to any basic principle over other basic principles—as if morality is hierarchically structured or as if we must value one moral norm over another without consideration of particular circumstances. The best strategy is to appreciate the contributions and the limits of various principles, virtues, and rights, which is the strategy we have embraced since the first edition and continue throughout this edition.” *Principles*, p. ix. In other words, the four principles work together, and they often work in concert with other philosophical and religious traditions. For a critical discussion of such core principles, see Matti Häyry, “European Values in Bioethics: Why, What, and How to Be Used?” *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics: Philosophy of Medical Research*, vol. 24, no. 3 (2003): pp. 199-214. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) It is important to note that Beauchamp and Childress have been criticized for being too American, which pejoratively amounts to being too individualistic or too focused on individual autonomy. They explicitly deny this, “In a properly structured account of biomedical ethics, respect for autonomy has no distinctly American grounding and is not excessively individualist or overriding. We do not emphasize individual rights to the neglect or exclusion of social responsibilities and communal goals … we have always argued that many competing moral considerations validly override \[autonomy\] under certain conditions.” *Principles*, p. ix. Another complication is considering whether an individual ought to make the decisions, or whether a family might do so on behalf of the patient, as some Confucian traditions suggest. In other words, is the *unit of autonomy* an individual or a family? For example, if a patient is diagnosed with terminal cancer in China, the practice might choose to inform the family before informing the patient to see what the family wishes to tell the patient. The family may then decide not to reveal the diagnosis to the patient. It is a philosophical controversy as to whether this violates individual autonomy or affirms filial autonomy. See Daniel Fu-Chang Tsai, “Ancient Chinese Medical Ethics and the Four Principles of Biomedical Ethics,” *Journal of Medical Ethics*, vol 25 (1999): pp. 315-21. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Usually physicians will assess capacity for autonomous decision-making, as they work closely with patients. But sometimes psychiatry departments may assist, and patients deemed unable to decide can be assigned parties to decide for them. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Patient autonomy does not always trump physician autonomy. A patient must also be able to find a physician willing to perform the medical intervention. For example, healthy patients who would like their limbs amputated often face difficulty finding physicians to perform such procedures. It is not clear in these cases whether the patient’s autonomous decision to have their limbs amputated should be respected over a physician’s autonomous decision not to provide services to the patient without some illness that merits putting the patient at risk for the procedure. For contemporary cases, see Carl Elliot, “[A New Way to Be Mad](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/12/a-new-way-to-be-mad/304671/),” *The Atlantic* (Dec. 2000). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Deciding things in a moment of crisis is more stressful than considering things ahead of time. During medical emergencies, incapacitated patients cannot decide for themselves, and families (if present at all) might find it difficult to think lucidly under duress or make life-altering or life-ending decisions on behalf of the patient. But advance directives and early, frank conversations between loved ones and the medical team can ensure that a patient’s autonomy is respected, and they can remove some of the burden from surrogate decision makers. Moreover, patients can revoke advance directives if there is a change of heart, so patients need not feel locked in. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Both sayings are often attributed to Hippocrates, but, to my knowledge, neither can be traced to extant writings. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) How physicians deal with terminal diagnoses and prognoses varies by country and culture. See Eduardo Bruera, Catherine Neumann, et al., “Attitudes and Beliefs of Palliative Care Physicians Regarding Communication with Terminally Ill Cancer Patients,” *Palliative Medicine*, vol. 14 (2000): pp. 287-98. See also: Kwon Ivo, Koh Younsuck, et al., “A Survey of the Perspectives of Patients Who Are Seriously Ill Regarding End-of-Life Decisions in Some Medical Institutions of Korea, China, and Japan,” *Journal of Medical Ethics*, vol. 38 (2012): pp. 310-6. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) In fact, detractors of paternalism argue that you cannot even understand what is good for patients without open conversations (thus undermining the assumed good of the paternalistic decision). But there are significant populations of physicians who assume that their patients would not like to know distressing information, even if they themselves would. And some patients do, in fact, prefer for physicians to make the best decisions for them. See L.J. Fallowfield, V.A. Jenkins, and H.A. Beveridge, “Truth may hurt but deceit hurts more: communication in palliative care,” *Palliative Medicine*, vol. 16 (2002): pp. 297-303. The authors, however, stress: “The important clinical point is, of course, to ensure that vigorous attempts are made to ascertain an individual’s preferences whatever his or her cultural background rather than to make assumptions about needs” (p. 298). This is especially important because patients witness their own health deteriorating. And if other family members know about a terminal diagnosis, not only might the truth slip out, but keeping the diagnosis from the patient might discourage direct confrontation of things that need to be discussed before the patient’s death (p. 302). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Some believe it is not the job of physicians to determine the good for their patients; it is only their job to communicate openly and let patients decide for themselves. See, for example, Richard Singelenberg, “Jehovah’s Witnesses—The Blood Transfusion Taboo,” *Journal of Medical Ethics*, vol. 27 (2001): p. 138. These cases are complicated when the patient needing the transfusion is a minor, setting a parent’s religiously-motivated wishes against the healthcare team’s concerns for the child’s physical health and future opportunities. For a discussion of future opportunities, see Dena S. Davis, “Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future,” *Hastings Center Report*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1997): pp. 7-15. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) No theory of justice is assumed here. If readers are inclined to think through issues by trying to find consensus and paying special attention to fair distribution of resources, they may find the work of Norman Daniels helpful. See *Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). If readers are inclined to respect individual autonomy foremost and withhold as many judgments and values as possible from healthcare, they may find the work of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. useful. See *The Foundations of Bioethics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). If readers would rather focus on the list of goods and opportunities that make a life worth living, and using communities and institutions to ensure that people can flourish, they may find Martha Nussbaum’s work useful. See *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2011). Each provides a different framework for asking questions about justice and determining what is owed to patients, citizens, practitioners, or others. Elements of public health also deserve mention—e.g., access to clean air, water, and housing; access to grocery stores with nutritious food; and access to healthcare professionals and health education. So, the concern for justice will extend beyond the boundaries of a hospital. See Olga Khazan, “[Being Black in American Can Be Hazardous to Your Health](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/being-black-in-america-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/561740/),” *The Atlantic* (July/Aug. 2018). At the forefront of many people’s minds are legal concerns. Many large hospitals or medical companies employ legal teams, and private practitioners secure access to lawyers who specialize in medical law. Laws vary by region, and novel cases establish new precedent, so legal concerns surrounding medicine are best handled by those with proper credentials and abilities to give legal advice. However, it should be stressed that legal considerations are not equivalent to moral, ethical, social, or political concerns about justice. Legal actions are not necessarily just actions. Nazi experiments and segregation were legal but not just. And advocating for justice can lead to the courtroom. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Gender and racial disparities in the American healthcare system are alarming. For example, Black women are three to four times more likely to die from pregnancy-related causes than white women. See Linda Villarosa, “[Why America’s Black Mothers and Babies Are in a Life-or-Death Crisis](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/magazine/black-mothers-babies-death-maternal-mortality.html),” *New York Times Magazine* (11 Apr. 2018). And pain reports by women are taken less seriously by physicians than those of men. See Joe Fassler, “[How Doctors Take Women’s Pain Less Seriously](https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/emergency-room-wait-times-sexism/410515/),” *The Atlantic* (15 Oct. 2015). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Lauren Freeman and Saray Ayala López, “Sex Categorization in Medical Contexts: A Cautionary Tale,” *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, vol. 28, no. 3 (Sept. 2019): pp. 243-80. The authors clarify: “… \[W\]hereas currently one of the first questions that patients are asked on patient in-take forms in medical contexts is whether they are male or female, we want to shift the focus away from this emphasis due to the many harmful consequences that can follow. The kind of change in thinking and practice that we are proposing requires a shift in medical education and training to include information about individual variability in relation to sex properties, controversies about determining someone’s sex, and information about the variety of bodies and needs, including those related to trans folks, intersex people, and those who are gender non-binary … \[W\]ithin many medical contexts, relying on sex properties as opposed to sex categories can help to alleviate some of the harms faced by intersex, trans, and gender non-binary people.” (pp. 244-5). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) In clinical practices, decisions are best made by calling in nurses, doctors, social workers, chaplains, and ethicists, as well as patients and their families. Collaboration and open communication of the complexities of a decision almost always fare better than strong-arming a judgment. For a discussion of how Beauchamp and Childress address theoretical conflicts, see *Principles*, ch. 9. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) I owe three colleagues for giving me extensive feedback: Elizabeth Lanphier, Ph.D., M.S. (Ethics Center at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center), Stephen Hanson, Ph.D. (Tulane University School of Medicine), and Joseph Fanning, Ph.D. (Center for Biomedical Ethics and Society at Vanderbilt University Medical Center). I also want to thank Vanderbilt University Medical Center’s Center for Biomedical Ethics and Society for all the events they allowed me to attend and participate in from 2014 to 2019, from case studies to grand rounds in the Medical School. The University of Louisville School of Medicine has been similarly generous. Nathan Nobis, Dan Lowe, Chelsea Haramia, and Thomas Metcalf also provided comments that improved this work. ### References [Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. 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Danner and Bernard Gert, “A Critique of Principlism,” ](https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/15/2/219/903616)[*The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*](https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/15/2/219/903616)[, vol. 15, iss. 2 (Apr. 1990): pp. 219-36.](https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/15/2/219/903616) [Daniels, Norman. ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/just-health/1322AC95E8FEA51A978F200200A103A4)[*Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/just-health/1322AC95E8FEA51A978F200200A103A4)[ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/just-health/1322AC95E8FEA51A978F200200A103A4) [Davis, Dena S. “Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future,” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2307/3527620)[*Hastings Center Report*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2307/3527620)[, vol. 27, no. 2 (1997): pp. 7-15.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2307/3527620) [Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Doctors in Clinical Research, 18th World Medical Assembly, Helsinki, Finland (June 1964).](https://www.wma.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/DoH-Jun1964.pdf) [Elliot, Carl, “A New Way to Be Mad,” ](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/12/a-new-way-to-be-mad/304671/)[*The Atlantic*](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/12/a-new-way-to-be-mad/304671/)[, Dec 2000.](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/12/a-new-way-to-be-mad/304671/) [Elliot, Carl, ](http://www.beacon.org/White-Coat-Black-Hat-P901.aspx)[*White Coat, Black Hat: Adventures on the Dark Side of Medicine*](http://www.beacon.org/White-Coat-Black-Hat-P901.aspx)[, Beacon Press, 2011.](http://www.beacon.org/White-Coat-Black-Hat-P901.aspx) [Engelhardt, Jr., H. Tristram, ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-foundations-of-bioethics-9780195057362?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Foundations of Bioethics*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-foundations-of-bioethics-9780195057362?cc=us&lang=en&)[, 2](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-foundations-of-bioethics-9780195057362?cc=us&lang=en&)[nd](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-foundations-of-bioethics-9780195057362?cc=us&lang=en&)[ ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-foundations-of-bioethics-9780195057362?cc=us&lang=en&) [Freeman, Lauren and Saray Ayala López, “Sex Categorization in Medical Contexts: A Cautionary Tale,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol. 28, no. 3 (Sept 2019): pp. 243-80.](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/707064) [Fallowfield, L.J., V.A. Jenkins, and H.A. Beveridge, “Truth may hurt but deceit hurts more: communication in palliative care,” ](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1191/0269216302pm575oa)[*Palliative Medicine*](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1191/0269216302pm575oa)[, vol. 16 (2002): pp. 297-303.](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1191/0269216302pm575oa) [Fassler, Joe, “How Doctors Take Women’s Pain Less Seriously,” ](https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/emergency-room-wait-times-sexism/410515/)[*The Atlantic*](https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/emergency-room-wait-times-sexism/410515/)[ (15 October 2015).](https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/10/emergency-room-wait-times-sexism/410515/) [Goering, Sara, “Eugenics,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eugenics/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eugenics/)[ (2 July 2014).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eugenics/) [Häyry, Matti, “European Values in Bioethics: Why, What, and How to Be Used?” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1024814710487)[*Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics: Philosophy of Medical Research*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1024814710487)[, vol. 24, no. 3 (2003): pp. 199-214.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1024814710487) [Hornblum, Allen M., ](https://www.routledge.com/Acres-of-Skin-Human-Experiments-at-Holmesburg-Prison/Hornblum/p/book/9780415923361)[*Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at Holmesburg Prison*](https://www.routledge.com/Acres-of-Skin-Human-Experiments-at-Holmesburg-Prison/Hornblum/p/book/9780415923361)[, Routledge, 1998.](https://www.routledge.com/Acres-of-Skin-Human-Experiments-at-Holmesburg-Prison/Hornblum/p/book/9780415923361) [Hursthouse, Rosalind, “Virtue Ethics,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/)[(2016).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/) [Ivo, Kwon, Koh Younsuck, et al., “A Survey of the Perspectives of Patients Who Are Seriously Ill Regarding End-of-Life Decisions in Some Medical Institutions of Korea, China, and Japan,” ](https://jme.bmj.com/content/38/5/310.info)[*Journal of Medical Ethics*](https://jme.bmj.com/content/38/5/310.info)[, vol. 38 (2012): pp. 310-6.](https://jme.bmj.com/content/38/5/310.info) [Khazan, Olga, “Being Black in American Can Be Hazardous to Your Health,” ](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/being-black-in-america-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/561740/)[*The Atlantic*](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/being-black-in-america-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/561740/)[ (July/Aug. 2018).](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/being-black-in-america-can-be-hazardous-to-your-health/561740/) [Lifton, Robert Jay, ](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-jay-lifton/the-nazi-doctors/9780465093397/)[*The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-jay-lifton/the-nazi-doctors/9780465093397/)[, Basic Books, 2017.](https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/robert-jay-lifton/the-nazi-doctors/9780465093397/) [Murphy, Mark, “The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/)[*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/)[ (2019).](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/) [The Nuremberg Code, “Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10”, Vol. 2, pp. 181-182. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, (1949).](https://history.nih.gov/display/history/Nuremberg+Code) [Nussbaum, Martha, ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674072350)[*Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* ](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674072350)[(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2011).](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674072350) [Ross, W.D., *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002 \[1930\]).](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199252653.001.0001/acprof-9780199252657) [Singelenberg, Richard, “Jehovah’s Witnesses—The Blood Transfusion Taboo,” ](https://jme.bmj.com/content/27/2/138)[*Journal of Medical Ethics*](https://jme.bmj.com/content/27/2/138)[, vol. 27 (2001): p. 138.](https://jme.bmj.com/content/27/2/138) [Tsai, Daniel Fu-Chang, “Ancient Chinese Medical Ethics and the Four Principles of Biomedical Ethics,” ](https://jme.bmj.com/content/25/4/315)[*Journal of Medical Ethics*](https://jme.bmj.com/content/25/4/315)[, vol 25 (1999): pp. 315-21.](https://jme.bmj.com/content/25/4/315) [Villarosa, Linda, “Why America’s Black Mothers and Babies Are in a Life-or-Death Crisis,” ](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/magazine/black-mothers-babies-death-maternal-mortality.html)[*New York Times Magazine*](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/magazine/black-mothers-babies-death-maternal-mortality.html)[ (11 April 2018).](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/magazine/black-mothers-babies-death-maternal-mortality.html) [Wade, Nicholas, ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/308785/a-troublesome-inheritance-by-nicholas-wade/)[*A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race, and Human History*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/308785/a-troublesome-inheritance-by-nicholas-wade/)[, Penguin, 2015.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/308785/a-troublesome-inheritance-by-nicholas-wade/) [Walker, Tom, “What Principlism Misses,” ](https://jme.bmj.com/content/35/4/229)[*Journal of Medical Ethics*](https://jme.bmj.com/content/35/4/229)[, vol. 35, iss. 4 (2009): pp. 229-31.](https://jme.bmj.com/content/35/4/229) [Washington, Harriet, ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/185986/medical-apartheid-by-harriet-a-washington/)[*Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/185986/medical-apartheid-by-harriet-a-washington/)[, Harlem Moon, 2006.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/185986/medical-apartheid-by-harriet-a-washington/) ### Related Essays [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) by Ryan Jenkins [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/principlism-in-ethics.pdf). ### About the Author [G. M. Trujillo, Jr.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Trujillo) is Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso. He specializes in ethics, especially virtue ethics and bioethics. [www.Boomert.info](https://boomert.info/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** bioethics, biomedical ethics, James Childress, principlism, Tom Beauchamp, Trujillo --- ### [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) **Published:** March 11, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to the Doctrine of Double Effect, which claims that it is permissible to harm someone if it will also result in good consequences that outweigh the harm and the harm is just a “side-effect” of your action, rather than something you intend to make happen. **Content:** Author: Gabriel Andrade Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word count: 1000 When is it morally permissible to harm someone? One answer to this question is provided by *the doctrine of double effect* (or the “DDE” for short). The DDE claims that it is permissible to harm someone if it will also result in good consequences that outweigh the harm *and* the harm is just a “side-effect” of your action, rather than something you *intend* to make happen.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay introduces the DDE. ### 1. Trolley Problems To better understand the DDE, imagine this: a streetcar is going to run over five people; the brakes have failed, but you can pull a lever to divert the streetcar onto another track in which only one man will be run over. Would you pull the lever? Most people (about 90%) say that it’s permissible to do so.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) [![Trolley problems: should he pull the switch?](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/trolley1.jpeg?resize=600%2C317&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/trolley1.jpeg?ssl=1) Trolley problems: should he pull the switch? Now, imagine a different scenario: a streetcar is going to run over five people; someone is standing on a footbridge over the tracks, and you can push the person off the bridge so their body will stop the streetcar, thus saving the five, but killing the man who was pushed. Would you push that man? Most people (about 70%) say it’s *not* permissible to do so.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) [![Trolley problems: should he push the man?](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/trolley2.jpg?resize=506%2C269&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/trolley2.jpg?ssl=1) Trolley problems: should he push the man? But why would it be permissible to pull the lever but impermissible to push the man off the bridge? Here’s one answer: in the first scenario, you *foresee* the death of the man, but you don’t *intend* it. You don’t intend it because his death isn’t part of your “plan” to save the five. You don’t *need* him to die: if he could (somehow) escape when the streetcar is diverted, your plan would still succeed. In the second scenario, though, his death isn’t just a foreseen side-effect of your action. You *need* his death to save the other five. If he were pushed, but somehow bounced back to the bridge, then your “plan” to save the five would fail. The DDE gives an explanation of the difference here: the DDE claims it’s permissible to harm someone if doing so will result in good consequences that outweigh the harm, and the harm is just a foreseen “side-effect” of your action, not something *intended*. So, in the first scenario, you *foresee* but do not *intend* the harm, whereas in the second scenario, the harm was *intended*, as part of your plan. And since the good consequences of saving five outweighs the harm of killing one, pulling the lever is permissible, but pushing the man is wrong.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### 2. Applications Let’s consider how the DDE applies to some real-life situations. #### 2.1. Military Ethics Is it permissible to kill civilians in war? Suppose you drop a bomb on a terrorist training camp, killing one hundred terrorists, but, as collateral damage, killing ten innocent civilians. According to DDE, that’s permissible. You may even foresee that those civilians will die. What matters is that you’re not intending their death: if the bomb kills the terrorists without killing the civilians, your plan would still be a success.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) What about killing civilians to force an enemy to surrender (as in Hiroshima)?[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Is that permissible? Not according to the DDE. Even if you save more lives with this action (say, by bringing a quicker end to the war), you *need* them to die to force your enemy to surrender. If the bomb dropped on civilians somehow fails to kill them (and so the enemy does not surrender), your plan would fail. #### 2.2. Medical Ethics Suppose, for the sake of argument, that abortion is wrong because it harms the fetus.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Is it still permissible to remove a cancerous womb from a pregnant woman to save her life, even if you know the fetus will die as a result? According to DDE, yes. You’re not targeting *the fetus*; if you could remove the womb while saving the fetus, you wouldn’t object. The fetus’ death is an unintended side-effect of your action. Now, suppose we’re considering killing the fetus because the pregnant woman is diabetic, and her pregnancy increases her risk of dying during delivery. Here you *need* the fetus to die to reduce her risk of dying: the fetus’ death wouldn’t just be a side-effect. If the fetus survives inside the woman’s body, that would defeat the purpose of reducing the risk of the mother’s death during delivery. About euthanasia, if a terminally-ill patient is in intense pain, is it ethical for a physician to administer a morphine shot, even if that action would likely lead to the patient’s death?[\[8\]](#_ftn8) According to the DDE, yes. The physician is seeking to alleviate pain; the patient’s death is foreseen, but not intended. In contrast, if the patient asks the physician to assist her in suicide, and the physician complies, the physician isn’t merely attempting to alleviate pain, but rather, to *intentionally* kill the patient. This is unethical, according to the DDE. ### 3. An Objection The DDE’s verdicts about what is and isn’t permissible match many people’s intuitions. But it’s still open to objections. A common objection to the DDE appeals to extreme cases. Suppose a terrorist knows the location of a ticking nuclear time bomb that would kill millions of people, but refuses to disclose the information. Interrogators know that *the only way* to make him cooperate is by torturing his innocent underage son. Torturing the child is a *necessary step* in this plan to prevent a nuclear disaster: you’d be intentionally harming him. So, according to the DDE, torturing the terrorist’s son is wrong. But it’s counterintuitive to say that we must let *millions* of people (including many innocent children) die to avoid torturing *one* innocent child. So, it seems permissible to bypass the DDE to prevent disasters. But what’s a “disaster”?[\[9\]](#_ftn9) If 10 people will die, does that count as a disaster? If not, what’s the threshold? 100 lives? 1,000 lives? 1 million? The answer is unclear.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. Conclusion To many, the DDE is intuitively appealing. However, some cases suggest that a strict application of the principle may sometimes be problematic. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)The doctrine of double effect can be traced to Medieval philosophy and discussions about the morality of war and self-defense. St Augustine believed that one is never ethically authorized to kill in self-defense, because that would be a form of egoism. However, other scholars disagreed. Thomas Aquinas argued that while self-defense may bring about the bad effect of killing an aggressor, it brings about the good effect of preventing the concerned person’s life. For an overview of the history of the DDE, as well as alternative formulations of the DDE, see McIntyre (2018). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Greene (2014). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Edmonds (2014). \[4\] For an application of the ethics of Immanel Kant (1724-1804) to trolly problems, see [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. Also see [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Fotion, N., & Elfstrom (2020). \[6\] In 1945, the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing around 200,000 civilians. Soon afterward, the Japanese surrendered and World War II came to an end. There is a historical debate about whether the bombing truly prompted the Japanese surrender. But a further ethical debate considers whether, even if the bombings did prompt the Japanese to surrender, targeting civilians was morally permissible. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) For an introduction to this topic, see [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis. For a discussion of the assumption that at least beginning, pre-conscious fetuses are *harmed* by abortion, see Ekendahl, K., & Johansson, J. (2022). \[8\] For an introduction to these issues, see [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Walzer (1973). \[10\] For a discussion of the potential relevance of the numbers of people or beings affected by our actions to our moral obligations, see [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer. ### References [Edmonds, D. (2014). ](https://books.google.ae/books?id=8cMPAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Would+You+Kill+the+Fat+Man?+The+Trolley+Problem+and+What+Your+Answer+Tells+Us+About+Right+and+Wrong&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj3t8H9rIv9AhUYXqQEHcycCrsQ6AF6BAgLEAI#v=onepage&q=Would%20You%20Kill%20the%20Fat%20Man%3F%20The%20Trolley%20Problem%20and%20What%20Your%20Answer%20Tells%20Us%20About%20Right%20and%20Wrong&f=false)[*Would You Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley Problem and What Your Answer Tells Us About Right and Wrong.* ](https://books.google.ae/books?id=8cMPAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Would+You+Kill+the+Fat+Man?+The+Trolley+Problem+and+What+Your+Answer+Tells+Us+About+Right+and+Wrong&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj3t8H9rIv9AhUYXqQEHcycCrsQ6AF6BAgLEAI#v=onepage&q=Would%20You%20Kill%20the%20Fat%20Man%3F%20The%20Trolley%20Problem%20and%20What%20Your%20Answer%20Tells%20Us%20About%20Right%20and%20Wrong&f=false)[New York: Princeton University Press.](https://books.google.ae/books?id=8cMPAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Would+You+Kill+the+Fat+Man?+The+Trolley+Problem+and+What+Your+Answer+Tells+Us+About+Right+and+Wrong&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj3t8H9rIv9AhUYXqQEHcycCrsQ6AF6BAgLEAI#v=onepage&q=Would%20You%20Kill%20the%20Fat%20Man%3F%20The%20Trolley%20Problem%20and%20What%20Your%20Answer%20Tells%20Us%20About%20Right%20and%20Wrong&f=false) [Ekendahl, K., & Johansson, J. (2022). Does Abortion Harm the Fetus? ](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000406)[*Utilitas*](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000406)[, 34(2), 154-166. ](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000406) [Fotion, N., & Elfstrom, G. (2020). ](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003100720/military-ethics-fotion-gerard-elfstrom)[*Military Ethics: Guidelines For Peace and War*](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003100720/military-ethics-fotion-gerard-elfstrom)[. New York: Routledge.](https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003100720/military-ethics-fotion-gerard-elfstrom) [Greene, J. (2014). ](https://books.google.ae/books?id=xIeAAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Greene,+J.+(2014).+Moral+tribes:+Emotion,+reason,+and+the+gap+between+us+and+them.+Penguin.&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiWj42jrYv9AhU0VqQEHfvlBAkQ6AF6BAgHEAI#v=onepage&q=Greene%2C%20J.%20(2014).%20Moral%20tribes%3A%20Emotion%2C%20reason%2C%20and%20the%20gap%20between%20us%20and%20them.%20Penguin.&f=false)[*Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us And Them*](https://books.google.ae/books?id=xIeAAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Greene,+J.+(2014).+Moral+tribes:+Emotion,+reason,+and+the+gap+between+us+and+them.+Penguin.&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiWj42jrYv9AhU0VqQEHfvlBAkQ6AF6BAgHEAI#v=onepage&q=Greene%2C%20J.%20(2014).%20Moral%20tribes%3A%20Emotion%2C%20reason%2C%20and%20the%20gap%20between%20us%20and%20them.%20Penguin.&f=false)[. London: Penguin.](https://books.google.ae/books?id=xIeAAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Greene,+J.+(2014).+Moral+tribes:+Emotion,+reason,+and+the+gap+between+us+and+them.+Penguin.&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiWj42jrYv9AhU0VqQEHfvlBAkQ6AF6BAgHEAI#v=onepage&q=Greene%2C%20J.%20(2014).%20Moral%20tribes%3A%20Emotion%2C%20reason%2C%20and%20the%20gap%20between%20us%20and%20them.%20Penguin.&f=false) [McIntyre, Alison. (2018). “Doctrine of Double Effect”, ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/)[(Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/) [Walzer, M. (1973). Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265139)[*Philosophy & Public Affairs*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265139)[, 2(2), 160-180.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265139) ### Related Essays [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/doctrine-double-effect.pdf). ### About the Author Dr. Gabriel Andrade is an assistant professor at Ajman University, in the United Arab Emirates. He received his PhD in Human Sciences from the University of Zulia, Venezuela. He specializes in psychology, philosophy and the social sciences. [www.ajman.ac.ae/en/medicine/directory/staff/gabriel-ernesto-campo-redondo-andrade](https://www.ajman.ac.ae/en/medicine/directory/staff/gabriel-ernesto-campo-redondo-andrade) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** doctrine of double effect, Trolley Problem, Trolley Problems --- ### [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) **Published:** July 8, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Categories: [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Science, ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/)[Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word count: 996 Consider this exchange from the 1994 American film *[Dumb and Dumber](https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0109686/)*: Lloyd: What do you think the chances are of a guy like you and a girl like me ending up together? … Mary: Not good. Lloyd: You mean, not good like one out of a hundred? Mary: I’d say more like one out of a million. Lloyd: So, you’re telling me there’s a chance. Yeah! When Mary says, “one in a million,” what does she mean? Mary’s claim, about *chance*, might be about a mathematical or logical calculation. It might be about the properties of the objects in the world. And it might be about people’s mental states. We call these alternatives ‘interpretations’ of probability. Let’s explore these alternatives. ### 1. Logical Conceptions: Classical and Logical Probability A popular rule for assigning probabilities is the *Principle of Indifference*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) One version says that if there are so many – *n –* possible outcomes of an event, and we have insufficient reason to expect any outcome over any other outcome, then each distinct outcome has a 1/*n* probability: each is equally likely to occur. The Principle of Indifference is controversial, but versions of it are widely employed. *Classical Probability* is the version of probability we get by using the Principle of Indifference: divide the number of outcomes we are interested in by the number of possible outcomes.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) If there are four aces but fifty-two cards in a deck (and each card is equally likely to be drawn), then the classical probability of drawing an ace in one draw is 4/52, i.e., 1/13. A relative of classical probability is *‘Logical’ Probability*, which attempts to refine Classical Probability in a way that provides a general logic for learning from experience. The basic idea is that we can describe outcomes in more ways than just listing all the possibilities. For example, if I toss two coins, we can list the four possible outcomes: HH, HT, TH, and TT. But we can also describe *three* possible outcomes: ‘both Heads,’ ‘both Tails,’ and ‘half and half.’ In brief, the ability to describe outcomes in this latter way – as “structures” rather than merely as “states” – may allow us to explain logically how learning from experience works.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In the Lloyd-Mary exchange, if she’s referring to Classical Probability, she might be reasoning like this: ‘There are only about one million people I might realistically end up with, and Lloyd is only one of those one million people; but there’s no reason to believe he’s more likely than any other. Therefore, the chance is only about one in a million.’ ### 2. Physical Conceptions[\[4\]](#_ftn4): Frequency and Propensity Probability We calculate *Frequency Probability* by considering a set of trials or events and counting how many of those events feature the outcome we care about.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) If I watch cars go by for a few hours, and I find that 5% of the cars I’ve seen are Toyotas, then there’s a 5% frequency-probability that a car in this set I’ve seen is a Toyota. *‘Propensity’ Probability* is a related conception.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Who would win in a 100-meter sprint: [Napoleon Bonaparte](https://www.google.com/search?q=napoleon+bonaparte&rlz=1C1CHFX_enUS743US743&oq=Napoleon+Bonaparte&aqs=chrome.0.0l6.895j0j9&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8) on his twenty-fifth birthday, or [Usain Bolt](https://www.google.com/search?q=usain+bolt&rlz=1C1CHFX_enUS743US743&oq=usian+&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0l5.2439j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8) on his fiftieth birthday? It may seem as if there are facts *now* about the probability of Bonaparte’s winning, as well as the probability of Bolt’s winning. But frequency probability can’t tell us, because the two have never raced, and they never will. If there’s a fact about how likely it is that Bonaparte would beat Bolt, then, this must be because of the inherent features of Bolt and Bonaparte themselves: their strengths, weights, levels of cardiovascular fitness, stride-lengths, and so on. So there is some inherent propensity-probability that Bolt will win, but there is also some (far lesser) inherent propensity-probability that Bonaparte will win.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In the Lloyd-Mary exchange, if Mary is talking about Frequency Probability, then she means something like this: ‘In general, people like you end up with people like me about one time out of a million.’ If she’s talking about Propensity Probability, then she means that at the current moment, the qualities of Lloyd and the qualities of Mary make it such that they are inherently one-in-a-million likely to end up together. On the assumption that induction is reliable,[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Frequency Probability is good evidence of a propensity, and in turn, that tells you how justified you are in expecting a certain event. ### 3. Cognitive Conceptions: Subjective Probability and Objective, Epistemic Probability We can describe our personal, subjective confidence in something (e.g., that a belief is true, that something will happen, etc.) in terms of percentages. For example, if I’m completely certain that something will occur, I am 100% confident that it will occur. If I’m only 20% certain that something will occur (and 80% certain that it won’t occur), then I might say that it ‘probably’ won’t occur. So, I might say, ‘You’ll probably never understand Michael Bay’s genius,’ meaning that I’m confident that you won’t. If I’m just offering a description of my own mental states, I’m talking about my *Subjective Probability*: my confidence in something. This doesn’t say whether a person’s confidence is *justified*: whether that confidence is reasonable, given the person’s evidence. That notion may be called ‘*Objective, Epistemic Probability.*’[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In the Lloyd-Mary exchange, if Lloyd were happy about Mary’s reply because he confidently concluded that he would end up with her, then that would be objectively unreasonable. Indeed, we normally think that if you learn that the objective (say, propensity) probability that something will occur is *x*, then you *should* set your confidence that it will occur to be *x*.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. Conclusion There are debates about each of these conceptions of probability: whether they give rise to paradoxes, whether they match intuitive conceptions of probability or everyday-language uses of ‘probability,’ and so on.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) But because knock-down *proofs* are uncommon in philosophy – conclusions rarely are reached with certainty – the language of probability is very common, as it is in daily life.[\[12\]](#_ftn12),[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Keynes 1921: chapter IV. The Principle of Indifference is controversial, but versions of it are widely employed. See e.g. Jaynes 2003: chs. 7 and 12 for discussion of the principle and alternatives. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Laplace 1902 \[1814\]: ch. 1. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Carnap 1950. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) We can call these “physical” conceptions because they tend to deal with observed, physical phenomena and objects (cf. Venn 2006 \[1888\]: ch. IV). But strictly speaking, we may be able to imagine abstract objects’ having propensities. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Venn, *op. cit*. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See Peirce 1910: 237 and Popper 1957: 67 for discussions of propensity probability. I say it’s “related” because it is also about objective features of the objects in the trials or events, and frequency is commonly taken to be good evidence of propensity. See n. 8 below as well. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Arguably, however, if determinism is true, then the only propensity probabilities that exist are 0% and 100%. See, e.g., Loewer 2004. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See the entry on the [Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Whether there are such things as objective facts about which beliefs are reasonable or unreasonable for a person, given their evidence, is a distinct, but related, philosophical debate. But we can understand the experience of gaining evidence for a belief in terms of probabilities. Perhaps ˹*x* is evidence of *y*˺ means that the (epistemic) probability of *y*, after encountering *x*, is higher than the probability of *y* before having encountered *x*: *x* makes *y* more (epistemically) likely or probable*,* and you would be justified in raising your confidence that y. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Lewis (1980) calls this the “principal principle” (p. 266). Compare Pettigrew 2016: ch. 8. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For a much deeper introduction, see Hájek 2018. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See for example Swinburne 2004 as an example of the use of probabilistic arguments to attempt to justify belief in (but not 100% prove) the existence of God, and Rowe 1979 as an example of the use of probabilistic arguments to attempt to justify belief in (but not 100% prove) the nonexistence of God. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Thanks to Alan Hájek for helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. ### References Carnap, Rudolf. [*Logical Foundations of Probability*](https://www.amazon.com/Logical-foundations-probability-Rudolf-Carnap/dp/B0006ASDN0). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1950. Hájek, Alan. “[Interpretations of Probability](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/probability-interpret/),” in Zalta, E. N. (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2018 Edition, URL = < <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/probability-interpret/>>. Hoefer, Carl. “[Causal Determinism](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/determinism-causal/),” in Zalta, E. N. (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2018 Edition, URL = < [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/determinism-causal/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/determinism-causal/>);. Jaynes, E. T. [*Probability Theory: The Logic of Science*](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/physics/theoretical-physics-and-mathematical-physics/probability-theory-logic-science). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Keynes, John Maynard. [*A Treatise on Probability*](https://www.gutenberg.org/files/32625/32625-pdf.pdf). London, UK: Macmillan and Co., 1921. Laplace, Pierre-Simon. [*A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*](http://bayes.wustl.edu/Manual/laplace_A_philosophical_essay_on_probabilities.pdf), tr. Truscott, Frederick Wilson and Emory, Frederick Lincoln. London, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 1902 \[1814\]. Lewis, David. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In Jeffrey, Richard C. (ed.), [*Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II*](https://www.amazon.com/Studies-Inductive-Logic-Probability-II/dp/0520038266) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 263-93. Loewer, Barry. “[David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/428015?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).” *Philosophy of Science* 71 (5) (2004): 1115-1125. Peirce, C. S. “[Notes on The Doctrine of Chances](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-1282-8_14).” *Popular Science Monthly* 44 (1910): 237-45. Pettigrew, Richard. [*Accuracy and the Laws of Credence*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/accuracy-and-the-laws-of-credence-9780198732716?lang=en&cc=us). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. Popper, Karl R. “[The Propensity Interpretation of Probability](https://www.jstor.org/stable/685773?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).” *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 10 (1959): 25-42. Rowe, William. “[The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009775?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents).” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (4) (1979): 335-41. Swinburne, Richard. [*The Existence of God*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-existence-of-god-9780199271672), 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004. Venn, John. [*The Logic of Chance*](https://archive.org/details/logicofchance029416mbp), 3rd ed. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2006 \[1888\]. White, Alan. “[The Propensity Theory of Probability](https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article-abstract/23/1/35/1469437).” *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 23 (1) (1792): 35-43. ### Related Entries [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Probability --- ### [Semantic Externalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/24/semantic-externalism/) **Published:** February 24, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Rachel Bourbaki Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/ "Philosophy of Mind and Language") Word Count: 1000 ### 1. Internalism and Externalism Examples of *mental phenomena* are things like pain, joy, and perceptual states. *Internalism* about mental phenomena is the view that all mental phenomena are spatially located inside the brain or skin of the creature that possesses them. *Externalism* about mental phenomena is the view that not all mental phenomena are exclusively located inside the skull or skin of the creature that has them (Rowlands 2003, 2). Language, one component of the bedrock of human cognition, includes terms that have meaning. But where do these meanings come from? *Semantic externalism,* a species of externalism about mental phenomena, is the view that the meanings of terms are not fully determined by factors internal to the speaker, but are instead bound up with the speaker’s environment (Kallestrup 2012, i). Meanings, according to semantic externalism, are not to be found merely in the head. ### 2. Meaning and the Intension and Extension of Terms The *intension* of a term is the internal concept or idea that goes along with it—similar in many ways to the definition of a term. The intension of the term ‘book,’ for instance, is the idea of a bound copy, including a front and back cover, with many pages in between. The *extension* of a term is simply the set of things that that term applies to or is true of. The extension of the term ‘book’ will include all actual books in the world, be they dictionaries, copies of *Harry Potter*, or the *Summa Theologiæ*. Hilary Putnam, in his seminal paper, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975), challenges the assertion that knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state (i.e., he challenges the thesis of semantic internalism). Namely, Putnam thinks that two persons can be in the same psychological state while the terms they use have different meanings. This is because two persons can be in the same psychological state while the extensions of the term they are using differ. ### 3. Semantic Internalism and Externalism The traditional view of meaning—the internalist view—rests on the assumption that knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state (Wikforss 2008, 160). It follows from this assumption, Putnam suggests, that the psychological state of the speaker *determines* the meaning of the term being used by a speaker (Wikforss 2008, 160). Semantic externalism tells us that this isn’t true. Instead, the external environment “plays a role in the determination of meaning” (Wikforss 2008, 159). In virtue of what does a term like ‘water’ or ‘tiger’ or ‘aluminum’ have the meaning that it does? According to the semantic externalist, these meanings are determined at least in part by features of the external world. Let’s start by contemplating the meaning of the word ‘water.’ Putnam famously uses the idea of Twin Earth in a thought experiment in order to show that the meaning of this term is partially determined by external facts in the world. First, imagine a planet, Twin Earth, which is nearly identical to regular Earth. In fact, people on Earth have exact (physical, biological, and psychological) copies of themselves on Twin Earth. However, there is one peculiarity of Twin Earth as it compares to regular Earth. On Twin Earth, the liquid called ‘water’ is not H2O but is instead XYZ, which behaves in exactly the same ways as H2O does on regular Earth—it flows in rivers, falls from the sky in the form of rain, is drinkable for Twin-Earthlings, etc. (See Putnam 1975). But, although XYZ is superficially like water, and is called ‘water’ by twin-Earthlings, it is not water because it has a different chemical composition (Kallestrup 2012, 59). Now, say there are two speakers named ‘Oscar’ and ‘Twin-Oscar’ on Earth and Twin Earth, respectively. Oscar and Twin-Oscar are exact copies of one another. One thinks ‘water’ while observing H2O, and the other thinks ‘water’ when observing XYZ. The term ‘water’ used by Oscar on Earth differs in meaning from the term used by his twin on Twin Earth, despite the fact that the two, Oscar and Twin-Oscar, are in *identical* psychological states. The twins share psychological states in virtue of sharing beliefs about what they call ‘water’ (Kallestrup 2012, 59). Oscar and Twin-Oscar have associated all the same descriptions with their respective term ‘water’ (i.e., that it is colorless, transparent, tasteless, thirst-quenching, etc.). But their respective terms have different extensions because Oscar and Twin-Oscar are situated in environments that differ in the essential respect that on Earth, the liquid called ‘water’ has the chemical composition H2O, whereas on Twin Earth, it has the entirely different chemical composition XYZ (Wikforss 2008, 160). When Oscar uses the term ‘water,’ he refers to H2O, and when Twin-Oscar uses the term ‘water,’ he refers to XYZ. Since the terms refer to different things, Oscar and Twin-Oscar mean different things when they use the term. Because Oscar and Twin-Oscar are exactly internally alike, what they mean is determined “behind their backs” by hidden features of their physical environment (Kallestrup 2012, 90). The meanings are different because the stuff they are referring to is different; thus, according to Putnam “meanings just ain’t in the *head*” (Putnam 1975, 144). The moral of this thought experiment is that we ought to give up thinking that the psychological state of a speaker determines the meaning of the term she uses. Defenders of internalism might reply that Oscar and Twin-Oscar only deploy the broad concept of ‘the watery stuff’ when they think or use the term ‘water.’ This concept does not include the microstructure of the watery stuff in question. And both H2O and XYZ will fall under this description. Like the word ‘vitamin,’ which picks out distinct organic compounds, ‘water’ also picks out distinct substances as long as they are sufficiently watery (Kallestrup 2012, 65). If this is true, then the two speakers do mean the same thing when they use the term ‘water.’ If we accept this internalist rejoinder, we also must accept that XYZ really is water, which flies in the face of scientific practice—‘water’ is H2O, say chemists. There may be some ways in which the internalist might improve on the above defense, but the threat of semantic externalism continues to loom large on the horizon. ### References [Kallestrup, Jesper. *Semantic Externalism*. New York: Routledge (2012).](http://www.amazon.com/Semantic-Externalism-New-Problems-Philosophy/dp/0415449960/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1393004180&sr=8-1&keywords=Semantic+Externalism) [Putnam, Hilary. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 7 (1975). pp. 131-193.](http://mcps.umn.edu/assets/pdf/7.3_Putnam.pdf) [Rowlands, Mark. *Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again*. Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press (2003).](http://www.amazon.com/Externalism-Putting-World-Together-Again/dp/0773526501/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1393004384&sr=8-1&keywords=Externalism%3A+Putting+Mind+and+World+Back+Together+Again) [Wikforss, Asa. “Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism”. *Philosophy Compass*, Vol. 3, No.1 (2008). pp. 158-181. ](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00107.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) ### Translation [Turkish](https://medium.com/@hacettepefelsefe/%C3%A7eviri-semantik-d%C4%B1%C5%9Fsalc%C4%B1l%C4%B1k-rachel-bourbaki-af883dabc6e1) ### About the Author [Rachel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Bourbaki) has a PhD in philosophy. She is interested in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, action theory, and free will and moral responsibility. In her free time, she enjoys hiking, cycling, and participating in other outdoor activities. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifcations of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Mind & Language **Tags:** Bourbaki, externalism, meaning, semantic --- ### [Gricean Conversational Implicature: What We Say and What We Mean](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/05/gricean-conversational-implicature/) **Published:** July 5, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Thomas Hodgson Category: [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) Word count: 997 Alex and Chris are making cabbage soup and realize that there isn’t any cabbage in the kitchen. Alex states ‘there is a market nearby’. Chris takes Alex to have *said* that there is a market nearby. Alex also *meant* that cabbage can be bought at that market, and Chris recognises this. The example suggests a general distinction between things that are merely *meant*, and things that are both *meant* and *said*. This essay explores the difference between these by introducing British philosopher Paul Grice’s (1913–1988) theory of “conversational implicature”.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In Grice’s theory, the thing that is *meant* but not *said*—that *cabbage can now be bought there*—is a conversational implicature.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The theory uses a central idea—that communication is a rational, cooperative process—and uses it to explain facts about how we communicate. [![Paul Grice and the cover of his "Studies in the Way of Words."](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/paul-grice-studies-in-the-ways-of-words.jpg?resize=656%2C452&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/paul-grice-studies-in-the-ways-of-words.jpg?ssl=1) Paul Grice and the cover of his *Studies in the Way of Words*. ### 1. Being Cooperative The cabbage situation is a normal situation. Chris recognised what Alex meant, even though it was not literally said. The question that Grice’s theory is trying to answer is how this is possible. Grice proposes that conversation is governed by what he calls the *Cooperative Principle*:[\[3\]](#_ftn3) “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” This might be paraphrased as the requirement to provide the right information at the right time in a helpful way. ### 2. The Maxims Grice then proposes some further *maxims*, or rules. These are rules which cooperative speakers can be expected to follow.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The maxims are divided into four categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Quantity 1\. “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).” 2\. “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.” Quality “Try to make your contribution one that is true.” 1\. “Do not say what you believe to be false.” 2\. “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Relation “Be relevant.” Manner “Be perspicuous.” 1\. “Avoid obscurity of expression.” 2\. “Avoid ambiguity.” 3\. “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) 4\. “Be orderly.” If speakers are cooperative, and generally follow the maxims, conclusions can be drawn about what they mean. This will be particularly relevant in cases where what they say is not obviously cooperative. ### 3. Calculating Conversational Implicatures According to Grice, conversational implicatures can be inferred by making the assumption that the speaker is cooperative, and that they are therefore following the maxims, or breaking them for some good reason.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In the cabbage example, what Alex says is not sufficiently relevant to Chris to satisfy the maxim of relevance, unless Alex thinks that the market has cabbage.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The mere fact that there is a market nearby does not help with the soup. But, Chris has no reason to think that Alex is not being cooperative. On that basis, Chris can reason that Alex means something that is relevant. The obvious relevant thing is that cabbage can be bought at the market nearby.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In the cabbage example, the maxims have been followed. Grice presents further examples of conversational implicature, which are inferred using different maxims. In some of these cases, a maxim has been broken. Suppose Alex asks “where is the salt?” and Chris responds “somewhere in the kitchen.” What Alex requires at that point in the conversation is more specific information about where the salt is. Chris is not following the maxim of Quantity. The assumption that Chris is being cooperative can be maintained only if a more specific response would violate some other maxim. If Chris does not know where in the kitchen the salt is, any more specific response would violate the second maxim of Quality (“Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”). This generates the implicature that Chris does not know where in the kitchen the salt is. Another sort of example involves a speaker who deliberately breaks a maxim, and the implicature is inferred as an explanation of why they did so. Suppose that Alex is giving a reference for Chris who is applying for a job as a chef, and that Alex is in a position to form a good opinion about Chris’ qualifications. Alex states “Chris is always on time,” and nothing else. Alex could have provided more information about Chris’s qualifications. The reasonable explanation of why Alex did not is that Chris does not have any, although Alex does not want to say that. The conversational implicature is that Chris is not a good candidate for the job.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 4. Cancellation Grice proposed a test for distinguishing conversational implicatures from what is said.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Conversational implicatures are easy to *cancel*. This means either that the context is such that the implicature does not arise, or that the sentence can be followed with an explicit denial of what, in another context, would be a natural implicature.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) For an example of cancellation, consider a variation of the cabbage example where Alex continues their utterance of “there is a market nearby” with “but I think that it is closed today.” In that case, Chris will not take Alex to have meant that cabbage can be bought there. There is no sense of contradiction. This is unlike a situation where Alex’s continuation is “but there is no market nearby,” which is incompatible with what Alex said. ### 5. Conclusion Grice’s theory has been extremely influential. Most contemporary work on communication in linguistics and philosophy is a development of or a reaction against Grice. The most important application in philosophy, one which Grice intended, is that what an expression, such as the sentence ‘there is a market nearby’, means should not be confused with what speakers mean when they use that expression.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Grice’s theory provides a way to distinguish between the two in a principled way, and explain how an expression that has a relatively simple meaning can be used to communicate something different and more complex. This then allows for simpler theories of what expressions mean, because what is communicated can be explained by the principles of the theory. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Grice taught at Oxford and Berkeley. His most famous contributions to philosophy of language are his 1967 William James Lectures. The lectures are published as Grice 1989d, part 1. For an overview of Grice’s life and work see Chapman 2005. For a survey of Grice’s ideas see Neale 1995. Blome-Tillman 2013 is a longer introduction to conversational implicature. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Grice introduces the term ‘implicate’ to cover what might otherwise be called ‘suggesting’, ‘implying’, or ‘meaning’ (Grice 1989b, 24–25). He does this to show that he is using a technical term in order to present his theory. Grice distinguishes conversational implicature, which is what this entry is about, from *conventional* implicature (Grice 1989b, 25–26). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Grice 1989b, 26. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Whether it is true that speakers generally follow the maxims is another question. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) These quotations are all from Grice 1989b, 26–27. People discussing Grice’s work sometimes refer to the categories as ‘maxims’, e.g., ‘the maxim of Manner’. In Grice’s presentation, Quality, Relation, and Manner are described as including ‘supermaxims’, e.g., ‘be perspicuous’, and further maxims that fall under the category, e.g., ‘avoid obscurity of expression’. Grice allows that the lists of maxims might be extended and improved. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Grice is joking: this is itself unnecessarily prolix, i.e., it uses too many words. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) In Grice’s terms, implicatures are ‘calculated’, rather than ‘inferred’. Grice 1989b, 31 says that conversational implicatures are *calculable*: they can be derived from the assumption of the cooperative principle and the maxims. He does not say that speakers must consciously calculate them. The important idea, for Grice and those who have developed his ideas, is that general principles of rational behavior can explain observed facts about the use of language. For more on this, see Saul 2002. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Grice 1989b, 32. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) One might think that we do not need a complicated theory of this kind of example. Isn’t it obvious that in some sense Alex says one thing and means another, and what it is that is meant? The thing to keep in mind is that Grice intends to provide a general explanation for a range of cases, including ones that are obvious, and that the explanation he provides is of a certain sort, i.e., that it makes use of the cooperative principle. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Grice 1989b, 32–37 divides conversational examples into Group A, B, and C, and gives several sorts of examples of each. The cabbage example is Group A, where the maxims are followed. The salt example is Group B, where one maxim is broken in order to satisfy another. The reference example is Group C, where the maxims are broken. One thing this shows is that, according to Grice, we can communicate perfectly well without following the maxims. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Grice 1989b, 39; 1989a, 43–44. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Zakkou 2018 is a longer introduction to the cancellability test. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Grice 1989c presents this motivation and several examples of philosophical questions that were actively discussed by Grice’s contemporaries. ### References [Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2013. ‘Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them)’. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12003)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12003)[ 8 (2): 170–85.](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12003) [Chapman, Siobhan. 2005. ](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230005853)[*Paul Grice: Philosopher and Linguist*](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230005853)[. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230005853) [Grice, Paul. 1989a. ‘Further Notes on Logic and Conversation’. In ](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[*Studies in the Way of Words*](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[, 41–57. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428) [Grice, Paul. 1989b. ‘Logic and Conversation’. In ](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[*Studies in the Way of Words*](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[, 22–40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428) [Grice, Paul. 1989c. ‘Prolegomena’. In ](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[*Studies in the Way of Words*](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[, 3–21. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428) [Grice, Paul. 1989d. ](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[*Studies in the Way of Words*](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428)[. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428) [Neale, Stephen. 1992. ‘Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language’. ](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00630629)[*Linguistics and Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00630629)[ 15 (5): 509–59.](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00630629) [Saul, Jennifer Mather. 2002. ‘What Is Said and Psychological Reality; Grice’s Project and Relevance Theorists’ Criticisms’. ](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015221313887)[*Linguistics and Philosophy*](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015221313887)[ 25 (3): 347–72.](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015221313887) [Zakkou, Julia. 2018. ‘The Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicatures’. ](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12552)[*Philosophy Compass*](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12552)[ 13 (12).](https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12552) ### Related Essays [Frege’s Puzzle and the Meaning of Words](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/11/19/freges-puzzle-and-the-meaning-of-words/) by Graham Seth Moore ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/gricein-konusmaya-dayali-sezdirimleri-ne-diyoruz-ve-neyi-kastediyoruz-thomas-hodgson/) ### Graphic ![Grice's Maxim's of Conversation. Image created by Cédric Eyssette: https://eyssette.github.io](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/grice-flowchart.jpg?resize=656%2C343&ssl=1) [Grice’s Maxim’s of Conversation. Image created by Cédric Eyssette](https://eyssette.github.io/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/grice.pdf). ### About the Author Thomas Hodgson has a PhD in Philosophy from the University of St Andrews, and works at the School of Philosophy and Sociology, Shanxi University. His interests are philosophy of language and metaphysics. [twshodgson.net](https://twshodgson.net) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Mind & Language **Tags:** conversational implicature, Grice, Paul Grice --- ### [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) **Published:** January 25, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Daniel Peterson Categories: [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/), [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/), [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) Word Count: 1000 Philosophers looking to support a position about how certain we ought to be of some belief, given our other beliefs, sometimes take advantage of *Dutch book arguments*. These arguments show that alternative positions lead to accepting a series of bets, each of which seems acceptable on its own, but which, together, are guaranteed to lose money (a *Dutch book*) and thus are unacceptable.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Here we’ll see how Dutch books generate important philosophical arguments and consider two examples of such arguments. ![A mural of Dutch books on a building in Utrecht, Netherlands.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/dutch-books-1.jpg?resize=656%2C495&ssl=1) A mural of Dutch books on a building in Utrecht, Netherlands. ### 1. Understanding Dutch Books Let’s better understand Dutch books. Imagine that you have a button that destroys a dollar in your wallet whenever you push it. Would you push it?[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Of course not – doing so is against your self-interest and is irrational! The situation is the same if we replace buttons with bets: taking a bet or a series of bets you know is *guaranteed* to lose you money is as irrational as pushing the money-loss button. Dutch books reveal a kind of inconsistency in a position since someone who is willing to accept each bet in the book on its own wouldn’t accept all of the bets bundled together for a guaranteed loss. For example: | | Costs | Payout | |---|---|---| | Bet 1 | $0.50 | $1 if it rains today | | Bet 2 | $0.60 | $1 if it doesn’t rain today | If I accept Bets 1 and 2 together, then I have paid $1.10; however, I will make exactly $1 because either it’s going to rain today or not. Since it’s impossible for both bets to pay out, I’m guaranteed to lose $0.10 if I accept both bets, accepting both bets is irrational, and Bets 1 and 2 together constitute a Dutch book. ### 2. Dutch Book Arguments Philosophers have deployed *Dutch book arguments* to reveal the irrationality of specific positions by showing that they would require us to accept a Dutch book. These arguments concern what *credences*, or degrees of belief represented by numbers between 0 and 1,[\[3\]](#_ftn3) it’s rational for a person to assign to a claim under certain conditions, like learning new relevant information or having certain other credences.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) One of the reasons Dutch book arguments are useful when discussing credences is because of the connection between credences and betting behavior: if your credence in a claim can be represented by the fraction X/Y, then you should treat as fair (and thus accept) any bet that costs X dollars and pays out Y dollars if the claim is true.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 3. Dutch Books and Probabilism The position that our credences ought to obey the rules of probability is called *probabilism*, and one argument for it relies on the fact that having credences that violate the rules of probability opens us up to a Dutch book. For example, the rules of probability tell us that the probability of some event happening and the probability of it not happening should add up to 1. So our credence in, for example, “It will rain today” and our credence in “It will not rain today” should, together, add up to 1 if we’re probabilists. If we’re not probabilists, then we might assign a credence of 0.5 to the claim “It will rain today” and a probability of 0.6 to the claim “It will not rain today”. But doing so opens us up to the Dutch book just discussed: | | Costs | Payout | |---|---|---| | Bet 1 | $0.50 | $1 if it rains today | | Bet 2 | $0.60 | $1 if it doesn’t rain today | We’re guaranteed to pay $1.10 for these bets and gain $1, resulting in a loss of $0.10.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The same reasoning can be used to show that any set of credences that doesn’t respect the rules of probability[\[7\]](#_ftn7) (for instance, a credence in a certainty like “either it’s raining or it isn’t” that isn’t 1) is “Dutch-bookable”, and so we have good reason to think that violating probabilism is irrational.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 4. Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty Dutch book arguments may be helpful for those looking to resolve the Sleeping Beauty problem too.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ![Sleeping Beauty](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/sleeping-beauty.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1) Sleeping Beauty The Sleeping Beauty problem asks how Beauty’s credence in the claim “the coin landed heads” should change in the following situation: on Sunday night, Beauty is put to sleep. Then, the experimenters flip a fair coin. If the coin lands *heads*, Beauty is awakened on Monday, then is put back to sleep until the experiment ends. If the coin lands *tails*, Beauty is awakened on both Monday and Tuesday; however, after her Monday waking, Beauty is given a drug that makes her forget her Monday waking when she wakes up on Tuesday. When Beauty wakes up, she wonders what credence she ought to have in the claim “the coin landed heads”. The two most popular positions in the literature are that she should have credence 1/2 (so say *halfers*) and that she should have credence 1/3 (so say *thirders*). Christopher Hitchcock has shown that halfers are susceptible to a Dutch book argument.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Since no Dutch book can be constructed against the thirder, it seems like the thirder’s position is correct. Consider the following two bets: | | Costs | Payout | |---|---|---| | Bet 1 | $15 | $30 if tails | | Bet 2 | $10 | $20 if heads | Bet 1 costs $15 and pays out $30 if the coin landed on tails, and Bet 2 costs $10 and pays out $20 if the coin landed on heads. The halfer should think each of these bets is fair. If Beauty is offered Bet 1 before she goes to sleep and Bet 2 each time she wakes up, then a halfer Beauty will be Dutch-booked: if the coin lands heads, then she’ll take Bets 1 and 2 once each, meaning that she’ll win a net $10 from Bet 2 and lose a net $15 from Bet 1 for a total loss of $5. If the coin lands tails, then she’ll take Bet 1 once and Bet 2 twice, meaning that she’ll win a net $15 from Bet 1 and lose a net $20 from buying Bet 2 twice for, again, a loss of $5. So regardless of the coin flip result, a halfer Beauty loses $5. Thus, it seems we have a good reason to believe that Beauty ought to be a thirder thanks to this Dutch book argument.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ### 5. Conclusion Dutch book arguments do have their critics;[\[12\]](#_ftn12) however, as the Dutch book arguments in favor of probabilism and the thirder solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem show, they are an important tool for philosophers, especially those interested in formal epistemology and rational choice theory. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The origin of the term “Dutch book” is something of a mystery. It’s found in a number of texts foundational to formal epistemology (see, for instance, Ramsey’s reference to “books” in his “Truth and Probability”). Wakker (2011) has presented the most exhaustive attempt to track down the origin of the term that I’ve seen, yet even his attempt remains inconclusive: the term may be taken from horse racing or Dutch auctions, or it may be simply one in a number of expressions in English that refer to the Dutch negatively. It may even refer to a gangster with the nickname “Dutch” and so have nothing to do with the Dutch nationality at all. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) We exclude here cases where someone is compelling you to push the button (perhaps someone puts a gun to your head) or provides some external incentive greater than the penalty you face from pushing the button (perhaps I offer to pay you two dollars to push the button) as these cases break the analogy between the button and Dutch book arguments. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) If we’re certain that a particular sentence is true, then we assign it a credence of 1, and if we’re certain that a particular sentence is false, then we assign it a credence of 0. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Though I will focus on Dutch book arguments for probabilism and the thirder solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem, Dutch book arguments have a range of applicability far beyond the two cases I’ve chosen. Dutch book arguments have also been presented in favor of a range of principles that impose constraints on what credences are acceptable, including conditionalization, Jeffrey conditionalization, the principle of reflection, and the principle of countable additivity. As a full explanation of even the principles supported by these Dutch book arguments (let alone the arguments themselves) would take us far beyond our 1,000 words, I refer the interested reader to Briggs (2015) and the references therein. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) This connection only holds under certain conditions: see Bradley and Leitgeb (2006) and Briggs (2010) for more on the connection between credences and betting behavior. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) To walk through things a bit more slowly: because the non-probabilist assigns credence 0.5 to “it will rain today”, they see Bet 1 as fair ($0.50/$1=.5). Because they assign credence 0.6 to “it will not rain today”, they see Bet 2 as fair ($0.60/$1=.6). However, if you accept Bets 1 and 2 together, then you have paid $0.50+$0.60=$1.10 for both bets, and either Bet 1 will pay out or Bet 2 will pay out (but not both). Hence, you’re guaranteed to pay $1.10 and gain $1, so you are guaranteed to lose $0.10. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See the article “The Probability Calculus” by Thomas Metcalf for more information on the rules of probability referenced here. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This style of this Dutch book argument is an example of a *synchronic* Dutch book argument – it tells us something about what rational consistency constraints should apply to our credences *at a particular point in time*. Next, we’ll turn to a *diachronic* Dutch book argument which concerns how consistent our credences need to be with credences at earlier or later times. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See my entry on The Sleeping Beauty Problem for more about this philosophical puzzle. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Given some reasonable assumptions about how Dutch book arguments should work in this strange scenario, at least; see Hitchcock (2004) for the full presentation of this argument. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Neither of the arguments sketched in this article is without its critics, but let’s highlight one criticism here in particular. As Briggs (2010) has pointed out, what bets we accept depends not just on our credences but on our understanding of the utility offered by each bet. Briggs has shown that both the halfer and the thirder are “Dutch-bookable” depending on which of the two central theories of utility (causal or evidential decision theory – see Gibbard and Harper (1981)) one adopts. And so Dutch book arguments against the halfer require a substantial commitment to a theory of assessing utility. Another notable objection to Hitchcock’s thirder argument appears in Draper and Pust (2008). See also Arntzenius (2002). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) While there are many concerns about Dutch book arguments that have been raised in the literature, I’ll mention just one here. Hayek (2008) asks us why we should think that being open to a Dutch book argument makes us practically irrational if we’re never going to take the kinds of bets that play such a central role in Dutch book arguments. In other words, if I just decide to follow the rule “never take any bets”, I can have whatever credences I want and still never lose money should I find myself offered bets in a Dutch-book-style situation or be open to charges of inconsistent behavior. What this objection gets at is that those who propose Dutch book arguments need to say more to convince us that there really is something irrational about being open to taking a Dutch book – the kind of motivation I began this article with isn’t enough. ### References [Arntzenius, Frank. 2002. “Reflections on Sleeping Beauty.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/ARNROS)[*Analysis*](https://philpapers.org/rec/ARNROS)[. 62(1). 53-62.](https://philpapers.org/rec/ARNROS) [Bradley, Darren and Hannes Leitgeb. 2006. “When betting odds and credences come apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRAWBO-4)[*Analysis*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRAWBO-4)[. 66(2). 119-127](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRAWBO-4) [Briggs, Rachael. 2010. “Putting a value on Beauty.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIPAV-2)[*Oxford Studies in Epistemology*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIPAV-2)[. 3. 3-34.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIPAV-2) [Briggs, Rachael. 2015. “Foundations of Probability.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIFOP)[*Journal of Philosophical Logic*](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIFOP)[. 44(6). 625-640.](https://philpapers.org/rec/BRIFOP) [Draper, Kai and Joel Pust. 2008. “Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/DRADDB)[*Synthese*](https://philpapers.org/rec/DRADDB)[. 164(2). 281-287.](https://philpapers.org/rec/DRADDB) [Gibbard Allan and William Harper. 1981. “Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility.” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBCAT-3)[*Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem*](https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBCAT-3)[. eds. Richard Campbell and Lanning Sowden. 133-158.](https://philpapers.org/rec/GIBCAT-3) [Hayek, Alan. 2008. “Arguments for – or against – Probabilism?.” ](http://fitelson.org/coherence/hajek.pdf)[*British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*](http://fitelson.org/coherence/hajek.pdf)[. 59. 793-819.](http://fitelson.org/coherence/hajek.pdf) [Hitchcock, Christopher. 2004. “Beauty and the Bets.” ](https://philpapers.org/rec/HITBAT)[*Synthese*](https://philpapers.org/rec/HITBAT)[. 139. 405-420.](https://philpapers.org/rec/HITBAT) [Ramsey, Frank. 1926. “Truth and Probability.” in ](https://philpapers.org/rec/RAMTAP)[*Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings*](https://philpapers.org/rec/RAMTAP)[. ed. Antony Eagle. 52-94.](https://philpapers.org/rec/RAMTAP) [Wakker, Peter. 2011. “History of the Term Dutch Book.” Online.](https://personal.eur.nl/wakker/miscella/dutchbk.htm) ### For Further Reading [Vineberg, Susan, “Dutch Book Arguments,” ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/dutch-book)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/dutch-book)[(Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/dutch-book) ### Related Essays [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson ### Translation [Arabic](https://metamorphos.org/2022/10/09/dutch-book-arguments). ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/dutch-book-arguments.pdf). ### About the Author [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson) is a part-time professor of philosophy at Morehouse College and South Georgia State College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 2013 and specializes in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. He has research and teaching interests in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of education, and ethics. He is also the co-founder and executive director of Mind Bubble, an educational nonprofit in Atlanta that provides local students with free tutoring and educational workshops. [DanielJamesPeterson.com](https://danieljamespeterson.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Logic & Reasoning, Philosophy of Science **Tags:** decision theory, Dutch book, Peterson --- ### [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) **Published:** September 17, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An essay on longtermism — the view that positively affecting the long-run future of humanity is a key moral priority of our time. **Content:** Author: Dylan Balfour Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) Word count: 1000 Imagine you’ve been given a million dollars to donate to charitable causes of your choice. How would you spend the money? Perhaps you’d donate it to a cause close to your heart, like a local community project. Or perhaps you’d try to help the global poor by funding disaster relief, or the distribution of antimalarial bednets. Advocates of a growing philosophical movement known as *longtermism* argue, surprisingly, that spending the money in these ways would be wrong. Longtermists believe that you should almost entirely ignore the concerns of people in need today and instead use the money to try to help secure and improve humanity’s long-term future: their goal is to benefit people who will exist in the thousands, millions, and *billions* of years to come.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) This essay introduces longtermism. [![The Milky Way galaxy.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/milky-way.jpg?resize=656%2C281&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/milky-way.jpg?ssl=1)The Milky Way galaxy. ### 1. What is Longtermism? Longtermism is the view that we should prioritize the far future of humanity, primarily through preventing human extinction and improving the lives of our distant descendants. Some longtermists go further, arguing that we should aim to fulfill humanity’s cosmic potential by accelerating technology to colonize the stars and enable the existence of astronomical numbers of future people. Some even propose that we should transform humanity into a digital civilization of computerized minds, giving people practically unlimited lifespans.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Because humanity’s resources are limited, these efforts would require paying less attention to those in need today. So longtermists believe that it is almost always preferable to allocate resources towards producing a better long-term future for humanity than helping present generations.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### 2. Why Longtermism? Longtermists often motivate their view by pointing to the *sheer size* of the future human population. On a conservative estimate, the Earth might be able to sustain around ten quadrillion people in total before it becomes uninhabitable (that’s ten plus *fifteen* zeros!).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) And if humanity successfully spreads across the Milky Way, then this number may grow by many orders of magnitude.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Longtermists argue that if human lives are valuable, then it follows that these oceans of future people are overwhelmingly more important than the people living today: there could be so many people in the future that, cumulatively, their interests outweigh our own. This is not to say that future people are individually more valuable than we are, but that *as a whole* they deserve more attention than present generations.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Because of this, longtermists argue that actions that aim to improve the far future can achieve far more good than actions that produce short-term benefits. Longtermism is also supported by the suggestion that we have an obligation to steward forthcoming generations just as our ancestors did for us.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Another argument is that we have a duty to preserve humanity because of our cosmic significance as possibly the only intelligent life in the universe.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### 3. Longtermist Priorities Longtermists typically highlight two kinds of interventions that they think should be prioritized. The first is preventing *existential catastrophes*—events that could stunt civilization or cause human extinction—such as nuclear war, asteroid impacts, and extreme climate change.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Many researchers are also concerned about the risks posed by advanced artificial intelligence which could become dangerous to humanity if its goals were misaligned with our interests.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The second intervention is to enact positive *trajectory change* or, in other words, to try to improve the long-term course of civilization:[\[11\]](#_ftn11) e.g., improving the rate of annual economic growth by even a fraction of a percentage point would generate vast amounts of wealth in just a few centuries’ time.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) From a long-term perspective, economic growth is far more important than on short- or medium-term timescales, and thus a higher priority for individuals and governments. ### 4. Objections Longtermism is a controversial view; there are, of course, many objections to it. One objection is that longtermism depends on predictions that we cannot confidently make: we don’t *know* how long humanity will last, and it’s very difficult to know exactly which actions will improve the far future. By contrast, we *can* be very confident of our ability to benefit existing people.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) A related objection is that, by asking us to pay less attention to the interests of those alive today, many of whom suffer greatly, longtermism asks us to be unacceptably callous.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Surely we shouldn’t turn a blind eye to those in need today, like the millions of people currently living in absolute poverty, over people who only *might* come to exist. One response is to agree that longtermism *does* seem callous, but that we should accept it anyway. The needs of the present generation may elicit a greater emotional pull on us, but this does not mean they matter more than the swathes of future generations to come. Longtermists may even flip the accusation: it would be *at least* as callous to neglect the interests of future people, who vastly outnumber us, and yet have no social or political power. Privileging our present generation might mean neglecting the trillions of people yet to come who cannot advocate for their own interests. ### 5. Implementing Longtermism If longtermism sounds plausible, what can we do now to help? Many longtermists argue that we should donate money to research organizations working on longtermist issues, such as asteroid detection and artificial intelligence safety.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Other longtermists argue that we should abstain from donating money within our own lifetimes, and arrange to have our personal wealth donated in the future to maximize our philanthropic impact.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) We may also devote our careers to the long-term future. The organization [80,000 Hours](https://80000hours.org/), which gives altruistic career advice, recommends that, to have the biggest impact with our careers, we work on longtermist causes like pandemic preparedness and nuclear security, rather than intuitively worthwhile near-term causes like global poverty and inequality.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Longtermists also urge governments to devote far more resources towards securing and improving humanity’s long-term future. ### 6. Conclusion Longtermism implies that we should spend fewer resources combatting the problems of today, instead of using them to assist future generations. For the sake of the many people who may come to exist, we should evaluate longtermism’s proposals carefully, even if they are controversial. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Longtermism is an offshoot of the “effective altruism” movement, which aims to identify and resource the most important and effective altruistic causes. For an introduction to effective altruism, see [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See Bostrom (2003, 2013). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) This view has been termed ‘axiological strong longtermism’ in an authoritative argument for longtermism made by Greaves and MacAskill (2021). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) This is Nick Bostrom’s calculation (2013, 18), which assumes that the Earth can carry an average of one billion inhabitants at any given time, for a period of one billion years. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Newberry (2021) estimates that up to 10³⁵ people could come to exist if humanity spreads across the Milky Way. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Such thinking implicitly assumes that value can be “aggregated” or, in simpler terminology, added up. Aggregation is often associated with the moral theory of consequentialism (see [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz). Aggregation is a controversial idea. Parfit (1987) pointed out that aggregation may lead to the *Repugnant Conclusion*, in which a large enough population of people with lives barely worth living is considered more valuable than a smaller population of blissful lives (see [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman). Others think that, although we should aggregate value to some degree, there are limits. So-called “partially aggregative” theories of value hold that some goods or experiences can never add up to a value higher than some other goods or experiences—e.g., that preventing no number of headaches could ever be as morally important as saving a human life: see Norcross (1997). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is a point made by Ord (2020, 49-51). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) This is also a point made by Ord (2020, 53-6). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See Ord (2020) for a comprehensive description and evaluation of many existential catastrophes. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For just a few examples, see Bostrom (2014), Russell (2019)**,** and Ord (2020) who estimates, frighteningly, that there is a 1 in 10 chance that humanity will go extinct in the next century due to misaligned artificial intelligence. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The term ‘trajectory change’ is owed to Nick Beckstead (2013). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See Cowen (2018). Additionally, lowering the annual rate of growth could be an enormously regrettable trajectory change. As MacAskill (2020) explains, lowering the rate of annual growth from 0.8% to 0.2% would: ‘after a couple of centuries \[…\] becomes the equivalent of a catastrophe that wipes out half the world’s wealth’. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Peter Singer is a philosopher who, in 2021, received a million-dollar prize and pledged to give it all to effective charities. He explains why he did *not* decide to donate to longtermist efforts: “Some thoughtful effective altruists urge us to focus on reducing the risk of extinction. But the uncertainties about how to achieve that objective are so great that I prefer to donate to projects for which the odds of accomplishing something positive are vastly higher.” See Singer (2021). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Torres (2021) for an argument to this effect. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See Greaves and MacAskill (2021, 16-7). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See Trammell (2020). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) <https://80000hours.org/key-ideas/#longtermism>. Note that 80,000 hours does also recommend careers in “short-termist” cause areas, but that they think the best opportunities are typically in the longtermist space. ### References [Ahmed, A (2018) ‘Rationality and Future Discounting’ ](https://philpapers.org/rec/AHMRAF-3)[*Topoi* ](https://philpapers.org/rec/AHMRAF-3)[39(2): 245-56](https://philpapers.org/rec/AHMRAF-3) [Beckstead, N (2013) ‘On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future’ (PhD thesis). Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University](https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/40469/PDF/1/play/,) [Beckstead, N (2014) ‘Will we eventually be able to colonize other stars? 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Stripe Press](https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/31283667-stubborn-attachments) [Greaves, H; MacAskill, W (2021) ‘The Case for Strong Longtermism’ ](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/hilary-greaves-william-macaskill-the-case-for-strong-longtermism-2/)[*Global Priorities Institute Working Paper* ](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/hilary-greaves-william-macaskill-the-case-for-strong-longtermism-2/)[5-2021](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/hilary-greaves-william-macaskill-the-case-for-strong-longtermism-2/) [John, T.M; MacAskill, W (2020) ‘Longtermist Institutional Reform’ ](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/tyler-m-john-and-william-macaskill-longtermist-institutional-reform/)[*Global Priorities Institute Working Paper*](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/tyler-m-john-and-william-macaskill-longtermist-institutional-reform/)[ 14-2020](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/tyler-m-john-and-william-macaskill-longtermist-institutional-reform/) [MacAskill (2020) ‘What We Owe the Future’ (Lecture)](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/will-macaskill-what-we-owe-the-future/) [Newberry, T (2021) ‘How Many Lives Does the Future Hold?’ ](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/how-many-lives-does-the-future-hold-toby-newberry-future-of-humanity-institute-university-of-oxford/)[*GPI Technical Report no.T2 – 2021*](https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/how-many-lives-does-the-future-hold-toby-newberry-future-of-humanity-institute-university-of-oxford/) [Norcross, A (1997) ‘Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives’ ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1088-4963.1997.tb00079.x)[*Philosophy and Public Affairs*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1088-4963.1997.tb00079.x) [Ord, T (2020) ](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/precipice-9781526600233)[*The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/precipice-9781526600233)[. London: Bloomsbury](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/precipice-9781526600233) [Parfit, D (1987) ](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[*Reasons and Persons,*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085) [*2*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[*nd*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[ *edition.*](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085)[ Oxford: OUP](https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001/acprof-9780198249085) [Russell, S (2019) ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/566677/human-compatible-by-stuart-russell/)[*Human Compatible: AI and the Problem of Control*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/566677/human-compatible-by-stuart-russell/)[. London: Penguin](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/566677/human-compatible-by-stuart-russell/) [Singer, P (1972) ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ ](https://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/teaching/mm/articles/Singer_1972Famine.pdf)[*Philosophy and Public Affairs* ](https://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/teaching/mm/articles/Singer_1972Famine.pdf)[1(3): 229-43](https://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/teaching/mm/articles/Singer_1972Famine.pdf) [Singer, P. (2021) ‘How to Give Away a Million Dollars’ ](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-to-give-away-a-million-dollars-by-peter-singer-2021-09)[*Project Syndicate*](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-to-give-away-a-million-dollars-by-peter-singer-2021-09) [Tarsney, C (2017) ‘Does a Discount Rate Measure the Costs of Climate Change?’ ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-and-philosophy/article/does-a-discount-rate-measure-the-costs-of-climate-change/62E21F7AF09080AC880768023374755A)[*Economics and Philosophy*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-and-philosophy/article/does-a-discount-rate-measure-the-costs-of-climate-change/62E21F7AF09080AC880768023374755A)[ 33: 337-65](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-and-philosophy/article/does-a-discount-rate-measure-the-costs-of-climate-change/62E21F7AF09080AC880768023374755A) [Torres, P (2021) ‘The Dangerous Ideas of “Longtermism” and “Existential Risk”’ ](https://www.currentaffairs.org/2021/07/the-dangerous-ideas-of-longtermism-and-existential-risk)[*Current Affairs*](https://www.currentaffairs.org/2021/07/the-dangerous-ideas-of-longtermism-and-existential-risk) [Trammell, P (2020) ‘How Becoming a “Patient Philanthropist” Can Allow You to Do Far More Good’ ](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/phil-trammell-patient-philanthropy/)[*The 80,000 Hours Podcast*](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/phil-trammell-patient-philanthropy/) ### For Further Reading [Cargill, N; John, T (2021) *The Long View.* London: First](https://www.longview.org/research "https://www.longview.org/research") [Moorhouse, F (2021) ‘Introduction to Longtermism’ *Effective Altruism*](https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/longtermism/ "https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/longtermism/") ### Related Essays [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) in God by Liz Jackson [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman ### Translations [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/uzun-donemcilik-uzak-gelecegi-ne-kadar-onemsemeliyiz-dylan-balfour/), [Arabic](https://metamorphos.org/2022/11/22/longtermism/) ### About the Author Dylan Balfour is a philosophy PhD student at the University of Edinburgh. He works on topics related to ethics, decision theory, and longtermism. [www.ed.ac.uk/profile/dylan-balfour](http://www.ed.ac.uk/profile/dylan-balfour) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** longtermism, longtermist --- ### [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) **Published:** March 11, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Darren Hibbs Categories: [Philosophy of Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 How tall do you have to be to be *tall*? How much hair do you have to lose to be *bald*? How old do you have to be to be *old*? It is an unremarkable feature of language that words such as ‘tall’, ‘bald’, and ‘old’ are *vague* in the sense that it may be unclear whether someone is tall, bald, or old. (Many other words are vague also). However, vagueness plays a crucial role in a range of philosophical issues, including fundamental problems in logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) ![A heap of sand.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/heapimage.jpg?resize=656%2C394&ssl=1)A heap of sand. ### 1. Vague terms If Kathryn has no money, then she is clearly not rich. However, suppose $20 is deposited into her bank account every minute of every day for a year. Assuming she did not spend the money, at the end of the year she would have over 10 million dollars and would, therefore, be rich. If she was *not rich* at the beginning of the year but is *rich* at the end of the year, at what point in the year does she become *rich*? If tasked with assigning *true* or *false* to the statement ‘Kathryn is rich’ after each deposit of $20, there would be easy cases very early in the year (false) and later in the year (true). But there would be many cases where there is no definitive answer. The difficulty of specifying the point at which she becomes rich is due to the vagueness of the term ‘rich’.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Vague terms admit of *borderline cases*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) A borderline case is one where it is unclear whether a statement, like ‘Kathryn is rich’, is true or false. ### 2. The Sorites Paradox Vague terms give rise to a difficult problem known as the *Sorites Paradox*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) A paradox occurs when apparently sound reasoning entails a false conclusion. A version of the *Sorites Paradox* is as follows: (1) One grain of sand is not a heap. (2) If one grain of sand is not a heap, then two grains of sand are not a heap. (3) Hence, two grains of sand are not a heap. (4) If two grains of sand are not a heap, then three grains of sand are not a heap. (5) Hence, three grains of sand are not a heap. Continue the process of addition until we infer… (6) 100 million grains of sand are not a heap. (6) is false, but it follows from the preceding valid chain of inferences. The inferences in the argument exemplify *Modus Ponens*, a valid rule of inference in propositional logic with the following form: (1) If P, then Q. (2) P. (3) Hence, Q A *valid* inference is one where it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are all true. Thus, if statements (1) and (2) are true, then (3) must be true. If (3) and (4) are true, then (5) must be true. Ultimately, this means, absurdly, that (6) must be true. But are the premises true? They are if the following statement is true: If *N* grains of sand are not a heap, then *N + 1* grains of sand are not a heap. Intuitively, adding one grain of sand to a non-heap does not create a heap, so the *Sorites* argument appears to be a valid argument with all true premises that yields a false conclusion.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### 3. Responses to the Sorites Paradox[\[6\]](#_ftn6) #### 3.1. Epistemicism One response to the paradox, *Epistemicism*, maintains that there is a point in the *Sorites* argument where a conditional premise of the form *If N grains of sand are not a heap, then N + 1 grains of sand are not a heap* is false.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) According to this view, it is objectively true that there are sharp lines dividing heaps and non-heaps, rich and non-rich, and so on. However, we *cannot know* where the line is, so we cannot know which conditional premise in the *Sorites* argument is false. Thus, the *Epistemicist* argues that the paradox is a result of ignorance rather than an issue arising from the imprecision of terms. #### 3.2. Denying Bivalence[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Another strategy is to reject a principle of classical logic known as *Bivalence*. *Bivalence* states that every declarative statement has one, and only one, truth-value: *true* or *false*. One proposal of this sort is to introduce a *trivalent* account of truth-values where declarative statements have one of *three* possible truth-values: *true*, *false*, or *indeterminate*. According to this approach, the statement *N grains of sand is not a heap* is *true* or *false* in some cases, but *indeterminate* in borderline cases. If a statement employed as a premise at some stage in the *Sorites* argument is *indeterminate*, then no valid inference can be drawn since validity assumes that the premises of an inference are *true*. Thus, *indeterminate* truth-values defuse the paradox by halting the chain of inferences leading to (6). #### 3.3. Fuzzy Logic Another proposal, known as *Fuzzy Logic*, posits an infinite range of possible truth-values for statements that can be expressed numerically. A statement that is completely false has a truth-value of (0) and a statement that is completely true has a truth-value of (1). However, some propositions are neither completely true nor completely false, so their truth-value would be a number between (0) and (1). These values can be calibrated to any decimal place depending on the circumstances. In the *Sorites* argument, the statement *N grains of sand is not a heap* gradually changes its truth value from clearly not a heap (0) to clearly a heap (1) as more sand is added. This maneuver attempts to disarm the paradox by representing the change from non-heap to heap in a way that tracks our level of confidence in the truth-values of the statements about whether a heap is present. ### 4. Conclusion The *Sorites Paradox* is just one issue that arises in connection with vagueness. Grasping the implications of vagueness is part of the much larger and longstanding philosophical project of understanding how language relates to the world, and the world itself. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) With respect to logic, the central concern for scholars has been finding the correct analysis of the truth conditions for statements involving vague terms. Are statements of this sort always true or false, or might they be indeterminate or partially true in some cases? There is also the question of the source of vagueness. Is vagueness purely a feature of language? Are there vague objects in reality, or is it the case that language and reality are both vague? Vagueness poses a problem in epistemology in connection with the previous issues. Knowledge typically implies that what one knows is true. However, if vague terms or objects are involved, it might be the case that vagueness thwarts knowledge under those conditions. See Dietz and Moruzzi (2010) for articles on the full range of vagueness-related philosophical issues. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Vagueness is not synonymous with *ambiguity*, although terms can be both vague and ambiguous. Vague terms have imprecise applications in some cases while ambiguity involves a term having two or more meanings. For example, the term ‘rich’ is vague in the sense that we may not know whether someone is rich in a given context. This may be the case even in very restricted domains such as “rich for a Fortune 500 CEO”. The word ‘rich’ is ambiguous in the sense that it not only refers to wealth but it can also mean *flavorful*. We must choose the meaning that is implied based on context. See Sorensen’s “Vagueness” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a discussion of the distinction. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See Bueno and Colyvan (2012) for an account of vagueness that rejects the “borderline cases” definition of vagueness. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The paradox gets its name from the Greek term for “heap”: *soros*. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) With appropriate substitutions, arguments with the same form can be constructed using other vague terms such as ‘rich’, ‘tall’, ‘bald’, ‘old’, and so on. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Responses to the paradox are numerous. For a critical survey of these and other approaches to the paradox, see Sorensen’s “Vagueness” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See Williamson (1994) for a defense of *Epistemicism*. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Denying Bivalence is a general strategy with many variations. For a description and critical assessment of this strategy, see Sorensen’s “Vagueness” entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ### References [Bueno, Otavio, and Colyvan, Mark (2012), “Just What is Vagueness?”, *Ratio* 25 (1): 19-33.](http://www.colyvan.com/papers/jwiv.pdf) [Dietz, Richard and Sebastiano Moruzzi, *Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic*. Oxford University Press,](https://philpapers.org/rec/DIECAC) 2010. [Sorensen, Roy, “Vagueness”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vagueness/) [Williamson, Timothy (1994), *Vagueness*. Routledge.](https://philpapers.org/rec/WILV) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/vagueness.pdf). ### About the Author Darren Hibbs is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Nova Southeastern University. His research interests are in the areas of metaphysics and the history of philosophy. [cahss.nova.edu/faculty/horace-hibbs.html](https://cahss.nova.edu/faculty/horace-hibbs.html) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Metaphysics, Mind & Language **Tags:** vagueness --- ### [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) **Published:** December 3, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** An introduction to modal ontological arguments for the existence of God. **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/), [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) Word count: 994 Many people define God as a *perfect being*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Some philosophers argue that it follows from this definition that God, if he (or she or it) exists at all, exists *necessarily*: he *must* exist. It might intuitively seem great or impressive if a being cannot possibly fail to exist, so it might seem that possibly *not* existing is a kind of vulnerability or flaw, and so a perfect being would *have to exist*, no matter what.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) So far, atheists, who deny that God exists, might agree. Sure, *if* God (so defined) exists, then he can’t possibly not exist. But that doesn’t show that he actually *does* exist, does it? Well, some argue it does. That’s the conclusion of what are called *modal ontological arguments* for the existence of God.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) [![](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/possible-worlds.png?resize=656%2C408&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/possible-worlds.png?ssl=1)An illustration of many Earths, suggesting different possible worlds. ### 1. Modal arguments and ontological arguments Modal arguments are generally arguments that depend on claims about possibility, necessity, and impossibility, different “modes” of truth or existence. To say that “1+1=2” is necessarily true, or to say that a square circle can’t exist, is to make a modal claim. Similarly, the claim that God exists necessarily is a modal claim.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Modality is often understood in terms of *possible worlds*, basically, ways the world could have been. One possible world is the actual world, the world we live in. If a proposition is actually true, then it’s true in the actual world. If it’s true in all possible worlds, then it’s necessarily true: true no matter how the world is or could have been. If it’s not true in any possible worlds, then it’s impossible: there’s no way the world could have been that would have made it true. Now, ontological arguments for God’s existence hold that something about God’s alleged perfection or greatness entails that God exists.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) To combine these concepts, modal ontological arguments are ontological arguments that invoke possibility or necessity. These arguments define God in a way that entails that he exists necessarily *if* he exists at all, and the conclusion is that he does in fact exist necessarily. The best-known modal ontological arguments are basically of this form:[\[6\]](#_ftn6) (1) It is at least *possible* for God to exist.[\[7\] ](#_ftn7) (2) If God’s existence is possible, then necessarily, God does exist. (3) Therefore, necessarily, God exists. As noted, even most atheists will initially agree to (1). And it seems pretty clear that *if* (1) and (2) were true, *then* (3) would be true. What might be really puzzling at this point is (2). Why would the mere *possible* existence of God entail his *necessary* existence? ### 2. The S5 Theory of Modal Logic According to one popular theory of modal logic—a theory we can call the “S5 theory”[\[8\]](#_ftn8)—the following claim is true: If a proposition *could have been* necessarily true, then it *is* necessarily true. Thus, if we’re justified in accepting the S5 theory, then (2) is justified. For *if God is defined as a necessarily existing being*, then (2) is just an instance of that S5-based claim. It says that if *possibly*, God exists necessarily, then God *does* exist necessarily. So is the S5 theory justified? It’s justified if we’re justified in believing that no matter which possible world turns out to be actual, any other possible world still could have been actual instead.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Some will find it intuitive to think that what’s *possible* doesn’t depend on what’s *actual*. But that’s subject to some dispute.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) ### 3. Could God Have Existed? Someone might also question whether God is possible. If God is defined to be a necessarily existing being, then in some sense, it’s more “difficult” for him to exist than it is for beings like ourselves who only need to exist in *one* possible world. For a *necessary* God to exist, he must exist in *all* possible worlds. Plus, God’s alleged attributes might be incompatible with each other, which would render him impossible. If God is defined as necessarily omnipotent and morally perfect, for example, then perhaps those attributes are in conflict with each other, the way “square” and “circular” are in conflict with each other. Then God, like a square circle, would be impossible.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) In turn, some critics of modal ontological arguments have questioned whether we know, after all, that God is possible. At the very least, they observe that for all they know, (1’) It is at least possible for God to not exist. is just as plausible as (1).[\[12\]](#_ftn12) But given God’s definition as a necessary being, then (2’) If God could have failed to exist, then God does not exist. Recall: If a necessary being exists, then it can’t possibly not exist. So if it’s *possible* for God to not exist, then he simply *does* not exist. Thus, if (1) and (1’) are equally plausible, then (2) and (2’) may be equally plausible. But then the modal ontological argument has given us no reason to prefer theism over atheism. For this reason, most of the recent literature about modal ontological arguments discusses whether God is possible after all.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ### 4. Parodies As with other ontological arguments, one can parody this argument. Consider: (1’’) There could have been a necessarily existing Atlantis. (3’’) Therefore, Atlantis exists. Given the S5 theory and (1’’), (3’’) follows, for the same reasons that (3) follows from (1) and the S5 theory. Defenders of modal ontological arguments respond to parodies by arguing that something about God allows him to be a necessarily existent being, while (for example) Atlantis couldn’t have existed necessarily. For example, perhaps it seems intuitively impossible for a continent (or any other physical object) to exist necessarily, but not impossible for a being such as God to exist necessarily.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ### 5. Conclusion Modal ontological arguments arguably have a major advantage over traditional ontological arguments in that they seem to only require affirming that God *could have* existed. Despite this, they are generally not considered among the best arguments for theism.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Still, they are interesting exercises in employing modal logic to attempt to demonstrate an important conclusion. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Anselm 1965, chs. II-III. See Almeida (2008) for more on the conception of God as a perfect being. See also [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman. Note that this definition is not intended to have a built-in commitment to the existence of God. See the next sentence: God, *if* he exists at all, exists necessarily. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Plantinga (1974, 214). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The most important ones are Malcolm’s (1960), Anselm’s (1965, ch III), Gödel’s (1967), Plantinga’s (1974: ch. 10), Hartshorne’s (2011) (cf. Goodwin 1978), and Maydole’s (2003 and 2009). See Oppy (2021: §§ 7-8) for general discussion of modal ontological arguments. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For more on modality in general, see [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See n. 2 above. Specific instances tend to offer unique defenses of the possibility premise. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is a simplification to deal with the fact that using the word “possibly” and related terms can be misleading (see Engel \[2020, 106-107\] for some discussion), in that some people will interpret “possibly” in the epistemic, “for all we know” sense. Normally the first premise says something like, “Possibly, God exists,” or “It is possible for there to be a being with God’s properties,” or “There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated” (cf. Plantinga 1974, 214). Sophisticated formulations of modal ontological-arguments are careful in their statements of the possibility premise, but the more careful they are, the less understandable they are to lay readers. Therefore, I’ve elected to state the possibility premise in the way I have here. However, crucially, everything else I say in the entry works if we replace it with, e.g., “it could have been the case that a God-like being existed,” “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated,” or any of the other standard replacements, mutatis mutandis. That is, the key objections I note (namely, that God may not be possible and that S5 may not be sound) apply to arguments with more-sophisticated analogues of (1). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The discussion here is greatly simplified from what it could have been. “The S5 theory” is the theory that *system* S5 is sound, i.e, that all *theorems* of S5 are *true*. See Garson (2021, § 2) on modal logic in general and Lewis and Langford (1959) for the name “S5.” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) That’s stronger than it needs to be. I have described the situation in which no matter which world turns out to be actual, any other possible world could have existed instead. We describe that situation as “universality”: accessibility—i.e., which possible worlds are possible relative to which—is universal. But strictly speaking, accessibility doesn’t need to be universal; it only needs to be reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, or reflexive and Euclidean. Indeed, you can get something a lot like the modal ontological argument with mere symmetry: from “possibly, God exists necessarily,” you can infer that (actually) God exists. See Kane (1984). See also Garson (2021, §§ 6-7) for more on these topics. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) For example, arguably, if the past cannot be changed, then accessibility is not universal (cf. Metcalf 2017). Given that the Berlin Wall fell, it is impossible that: the Berlin Wall never fell. But it could have been the case that the Berlin Wall never fell: that world is possible in itself but not possible given the actual world. If that’s correct, then this shows that accessibility is not symmetric, and so a fortiori it’s not universal. Also, some philosophers have questioned transitivity; see e.g., Salmon (1986) and Jacquette (2006). Questioning S5 is not normally considered a major objection to the modal ontological argument, however; cf. Maydole (2009, §§ 3-5). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) For example, can God intend to do evil? Arguably, if “yes,” then he’s not necessarily morally perfect, and if “no,” then he’s not omnipotent. If “yes and no,” then that appears to be a contradiction, and arguably, contradictions are impossible. See for example Morriston (2001) and Metcalf (2004). See also [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See e.g., Findlay (1948). See also Oppy (2021, § 8). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Malcolm 1960; Maydole 2003 and 2009; Metcalf 2005. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See Devine (1975) and compare the discussion of existent lions in Descartes (2006, 51 ff). If we define an “elion” as an existent lion, then it appears as if one cannot deny that “elions” exist. Descartes replies that existence is essentially a part of God’s nature in the way that the concept of existence isn’t essentially part of a lion. Compare Plantinga’s (1977, 90-91) reply on behalf of Anselm as well, which is that greatest possible islands are incoherent in a way that a perfect being is not. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See PhilPapers n.d. Very few philosophers in general, or philosophers of religion in particular, believe that ontological arguments are the strongest arguments for theism. Indeed, there is some discussion of whether they have any worth at all (Engel 2020). ### References [Almeida, M. (2008). ](https://www.routledge.com/The-Metaphysics-of-Perfect-Beings/Almeida/p/book/9780415762533)[*The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Metaphysics-of-Perfect-Beings/Almeida/p/book/9780415762533)[. Routledge.](https://www.routledge.com/The-Metaphysics-of-Perfect-Beings/Almeida/p/book/9780415762533) [Anselm. (1926). ](https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/deane-proslogium-monologium-an-appendix-in-behalf-of-the-fool-by-gaunilon-and-cur-deus-homo)[*Basic Writings: Proslogion; Monologium; An Appendix In Behalf of the Fool by Guanilo; and Cur Deus Homo*](https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/deane-proslogium-monologium-an-appendix-in-behalf-of-the-fool-by-gaunilon-and-cur-deus-homo)[ (S. N. Deane, Ed. and Trans.). 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(2006). ](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/meditations-objections-and-replies)[*Meditations, Objections, and Replies*](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/meditations-objections-and-replies)[ (R. Ariew & D. Cress, Eds. and Trans.). Hackett.](https://www.hackettpublishing.com/meditations-objections-and-replies) [Devine, P. E. (1975). The perfect island, the devil, and existent unicorns. ](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009581)[*American Philosophical Quarterly, 12* ](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009581)[(3), 255-260.](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009581) [Engel, M. (2020). What ontological arguments don’t show. ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-019-09718-x)[*International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 88*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-019-09718-x)[ (1), 97-114.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-019-09718-x) [Garson, J. (2021). Modal logic. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/logic-modal/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/logic-modal/)[.](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/logic-modal/) [Goodwin, G. L. (1978). ](https://www.amazon.com/Ontological-Argument-Hartshorne-Dissertation-American/dp/089130228X)[*The Ontological Argument of Charles Hartshorne*](https://www.amazon.com/Ontological-Argument-Hartshorne-Dissertation-American/dp/089130228X)[. Montana Scholars Press.](https://www.amazon.com/Ontological-Argument-Hartshorne-Dissertation-American/dp/089130228X) [Hartshorne C. (2011). ](https://www.sunypress.edu/p-5203-creative-experiencing.aspx)[*Creative Experiencing*](https://www.sunypress.edu/p-5203-creative-experiencing.aspx)[ (D. W. Viney and J. O, Eds.). State University of New York Press.](https://www.sunypress.edu/p-5203-creative-experiencing.aspx) [Jacquette, D. (2006). Modality of deductively valid inference. In D. Jacquette (Ed.), ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470996751)[*A Companion to Philosophical Logic*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470996751)[ (pp. 256-261). Blackwell.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9780470996751) [Kane, R. (1984). The modal ontological argument. ](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/XCIII/371/336/978490?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[*Mind, 93* ](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/XCIII/371/336/978490?redirectedFrom=fulltext)[(371), 336-350.](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/XCIII/371/336/978490?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Lewis, C.I. & Langford, C.H. (1959). ](https://www.amazon.com/Symbolic-Clarence-Irving-Langford-Cooper/dp/B000FS4OLI)[*Symbolic Logic*](https://www.amazon.com/Symbolic-Clarence-Irving-Langford-Cooper/dp/B000FS4OLI)[. Dover Publications.](https://www.amazon.com/Symbolic-Clarence-Irving-Langford-Cooper/dp/B000FS4OLI) [Malcolm, N. (1960). Anselm’s ontological arguments. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182266)[*The Philosophical Review, 69* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182266)[(1), 41-60.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182266) [Maydole, R. (2003). The modal perfection argument for the existence of a supreme being. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_2003_0006_0002_0299_0313)[*Philo, 6* ](https://www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_2003_0006_0002_0299_0313)[(2), 299-313.](https://www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_2003_0006_0002_0299_0313) [Maydole, R. 2009. The Ontological Argument. In W. L. Craig and J. P. Moreland (Eds.), ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444308334)[*The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444308334)[ (pp. 553-592). Blackwell.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781444308334) [Metcalf, T. (2004). Omniscience and maximal power. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20008535)[*Religious Studies, 40* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20008535)[(3), 289-306.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20008535) [Metcalf, T. (2005). Entailment and ontological arguments. ](https://www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_2005_0008_0002_0131_0133)[*Philo, 8* ](https://www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_2005_0008_0002_0131_0133)[(2), 131-133.](https://www.pdcnet.org/philo/content/philo_2005_0008_0002_0131_0133) [Metcalf, T. (2017). On Gödel’s ontological argument. ](https://inference-review.com/letter/on-goedels-ontological-argument)[*Inference, 3* ](https://inference-review.com/letter/on-goedels-ontological-argument)[(2). ](https://inference-review.com/letter/on-goedels-ontological-argument) [Morriston, W. (2001). Omnipotence and necessary moral perfection: Are they compatible? ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/omnipotence-and-necessary-moral-perfection-are-they-compatible/93B93DFFACC6F4189A24D487A28CD2EA)[*Religious Studies*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/omnipotence-and-necessary-moral-perfection-are-they-compatible/93B93DFFACC6F4189A24D487A28CD2EA)[, 37 (2), 143-160.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/omnipotence-and-necessary-moral-perfection-are-they-compatible/93B93DFFACC6F4189A24D487A28CD2EA) [Oppy, G. 2021. Ontological arguments. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/ontological-arguments/)[*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 Edition*](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/ontological-arguments/)[. ](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/ontological-arguments/) [PhilPapers. (N.d.) ](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all)[*2020 PhilPapers Survey*](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all)[. https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all](https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all) [Plantinga, A. (1974). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-nature-of-necessity-9780198244141?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Nature of Necessity*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-nature-of-necessity-9780198244141?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Clarendon Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-nature-of-necessity-9780198244141?cc=us&lang=en&) [Pruss, A. R. (2009). A Gödelian ontological argument improved. ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27750023)[*Religious Studies,* 45 ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27750023)[(3), 347-53.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27750023) [Salmon, N. (1986). Modal paradox: Parts and counterparts, points and Counterpoints. In P. French et al. (Eds.), ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1986.tb00489.x)[*Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1986.tb00489.x)[ (pp. 75-120). University of Minnesota Press.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1986.tb00489.x) ### Related Essays [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. [shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf](http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) and [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Historical Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** God, metcalf, modal ontological arguments, natural theology, ontological arguments --- ### [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) **Published:** July 28, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Benjamin S. Yost Category: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) Word Count: 992 The death penalty—executing criminals, usually murderers—is more controversial than imprisonment because it inflicts a more significant injury, perhaps *the* most serious injury, and its effects are irreversible.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Some advocates of the death penalty, or *capital punishment*, argue that it is justified because murder is so bad that death is the only appropriate response. Others defend capital punishment on the grounds that it has important benefits for society. This essay surveys both types of arguments and critical responses. ![The “death chamber” at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Huntsville Unit.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/death-penalty.jpg?resize=656%2C420&ssl=1)The “death chamber” at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Huntsville Unit. # 1. Deontological Justifications *Deontological* defenses of capital punishment see execution as a morally “fitting” response to murderers’ horrible deeds.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) There are two main varieties. ## 1.1. Retributivist Justifications The idea that punishments should be equal in severity to their crimes underlies *retributivist* defenses of capital punishment. Retributivists argue that execution is justified because it matches the badness or wrongness of murder—i.e., it is a *proportionate* punishment for murder.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) How is proportionality established? “Eye for an eye” principles suggest that execution is proportional to murder because it involves the same *kind* of act (killing).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) More sophisticated approaches begin with the idea that life is uniquely valuable: it is the precondition of everything else good for someone. Because being murdered prevents the victim from having *any* valuable experiences, murderers are punished too lightly if they can enjoy even the limited goods life in prison allows.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ## 1.2. Purgative Justifications Some argue for a duty to *purge* exceptionally evil offenders from society by executing them.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) On this view, the continued existence of such offenders morally stains society: by expending resources on them, society takes on responsibility for their violation of human dignity. Execution dissolves that responsibility.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) # 2. Consequentialist Justifications Many defend the death penalty *not* as a response to criminals for their past evil deeds, but by arguing that executing murderers produces better overall social consequences than not doing so.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Two consequences are frequently discussed. ## 2.1. Deterrence Common sense suggests that the fear of being executed prevents, or *deters*, potential murderers from killing. For *deterrent* justifications of capital punishment, the beneficial consequences of executions—innocent lives saved—outweigh the costs to the legal system and the executed person.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ## 2.2. Incapacitation Deterrence is about reducing murder rates overall. *Incapacitation* aims at preventing specific offenders from reoffending: some murderers might be so dangerous, only death ensures they won’t kill again.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) # 3. Criticisms of Deontological Justifications Let’s consider some objections to the above arguments. “Eye for an eye” retributivism seems to mandate immoral punishments like raping rapists or torturing torturers. Proportionality-based retributivism also faces challenges. Capital punishment is sometimes judged to be *disproportionately harsh* because murderers suffer from prison time, from knowing their execution date, and from losing their lives, whereas murder victims only lose their lives.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) More often, critics argue that life in prison, the longest sentence possible, is just as proportionate as execution and less morally controversial.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) # 4. Criticisms of Consequentialist Justifications Deterrence theorists presume that execution is more “persuasive” than imprisonment. But researchers have found no evidence of execution’s *marginal* deterrent effect—i.e., a deterrent impact on murder rates *exceeding that of imprisonment*.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) It is not enough for proponents to show that execution deters murder. Execution must deter murder *better* than imprisonment for its costs to be justified.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) An objection to both theories is that they permit punishing people for actions they didn’t perform.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Most believe that only those guilty of criminal acts should be punished. But deterrence theories could allow executing the innocent: if executing an innocent person would prevent future murders and authorities could keep her innocence secret, the benefits would plausibly outweigh the costs and deterrence theories would support killing her.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) And incapacitation theories punish offenders for what they might do in the future, rather than any wrongs actually committed.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) # 5. General Objections to Capital Punishment Death penalty *abolitionists* raise a number of general objections to capital punishment. ## 5.1. The Right to Life Abolitionists argue that execution violates murderers’ inviolable right to life. Advocates respond that offenders forfeit their right to life by committing murder. And assertions of an *absolute* right to life have the implausible consequence of prohibiting killing in justified self-defense. ## 5.2. Dignity Dignity arguments against capital punishment focus on whatever basic human capacity (e.g., rationality) imparts *dignity*, that in virtue of which persons are owed respect. Actions that violate dignity, like torture, are widely condemned. Abolitionists argue that because execution destroys the capacity for dignity, it violates dignity and is thus immoral. Advocates question whether eliminating the condition of some valuable feature actually offends against that feature: e.g., killing people annihilates their ability to practice religion, yet it’s odd to characterize execution as violating religious freedom. ## 5.3. Procedural Problems Capital punishment is often rejected on account of flaws in the legal procedures leading to death sentences. Some reject the death penalty *in practice* for these procedural reasons, even though they believe it is justified *in theory*. ### 5.3.1. Arbitrariness In the U.S., capital juries may sentence a convicted murderer to life in prison, instead of execution, for almost any reason whatsoever. There is little consistency in who is sentenced to death and who is sent to prison, and so the death penalty is condemned as being intolerably arbitrary.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ### 5.3.2. Discrimination One pattern in capital sentencing is that those who murder white people are more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murder black people (blacks who murder whites are the most likely to face execution).[\[19\]](#_ftn19) It can seem deeply unfair, if not racist, for the likelihood of a death sentence to depend on racial factors.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Death penalty advocates respond by insisting that what an individual murderer deserves is unaffected by how other murderers are treated. They add that arbitrariness and discrimination are reasons to *reform*, not abolish, sentencing procedures. ### 5.3.3. Irrevocability If someone is wrongly executed—either because she is innocent, or subject to procedural injustice at trial—there is no way to right the wrong. Some abolitionists argue that because a just state is obliged to undo its serious mistakes, it mustn’t impose irrevocable punishments like the death penalty.[\[21\], ](#_ftn21)[\[22\]](#_ftn22) # 6. Conclusion Retributivist justifications dominate contemporary politics, but have recently suffered some legislative defeats to proceduralist arguments.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) Determining whether *practical* worries about capital punishment trump concerns about potentially treating murders too leniently is thus of great legal and moral significance. # Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For a general introduction to the debates about what justifies punishments in general and what makes particular punishments appropriate, see [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers. In the U.S., twenty-nine states, the federal government, and the military allow for the death penalty. State and federal death rows are populated solely by murderers and accomplices to murder. Some states and the federal government permit execution for treason and other crimes, but these laws have never been tested in court. Fifty-five other countries permit capital punishment, while more than one hundred nations have abolished it or no longer use it. In countries with an active death penalty, death-eligible crimes include kidnapping, drug trafficking, treason, and sexual immorality. For detailed information on capital punishment by U.S. [state](https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state) and [country](https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/international/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries#state-and-federal-info), see the [Death Penalty Information Center](https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Deontologists see murder as the only crime for which capital punishment is appropriate, because murder is uniquely bad, and so only murderers deserve death. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Proportionality is sometimes called *commensurability*. Some retributivists claim that proportionate punishments are justified because they give wrongdoers what they deserve. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The “eye for an eye” principle is called the *lex talionis.* The most famous *lex talionis* defense of the death penalty can be found in Immanuel Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals,* vi: 332–333. For more on Kant’s view, see Yost (2010). For an introduction to Kant’s ethics see [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Sorell (1993). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The purgative rationale applies only to extraordinarily evil offenders, not to garden-variety first-degree murderers (Kramer 2011). That is, it applies only to people like Adam Lanza, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter, who in 2012 shot to death twenty six- and seven-year old students and six school staff. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) These purgative theorists regard executing evil offenders as morally *obligatory*, whereas retributivists typically consider it merely *permissible*. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See Shane Gronholz’s [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) for discussion of the ethical theory known as “consequentialism” that these arguments often depend on. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) John Stuart Mill defends capital punishment in these terms (1868). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) This rationale best applies to countries other than the U.S., which has invested in technologically advanced maximum-security prison divisions, where inmates are (inhumanely) restricted to solitary confinement and under constant supervision. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Camus (1963). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Bedau (2002); Finkelstein (2002). Critics of retributivism as a general theory of punishment often raise a related objection: it is hard to know how much punishment to assign to a given offense. Does armed robbery merit a year in jail? A year and a month? A year and one hundred days? [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) State of the art research neither establishes nor disproves a marginal deterrent effect; see Nagin and Pepper (2012). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Although the cost varies from state to state, the price for executing a murderer in the U.S. is always higher than keeping him in prison for life. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Pure deterrence theories can be contrasted with two-level theories. Two-level theories of punishment endorse deterrence as the general justifying aim of punishment, but maintain that the determination of who and how much to punish is governed by retributive principles (see, e.g., Hart 1968). These views sidestep the innocence objection, but inherit the problems of deontological approaches. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) A related worry is that deterrence theories condone execution for crimes far less serious than murder: if executing one or two burglars would eliminate property crimes, deterrence rationales might allow such a punishment. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See, e.g., Nadelhoffer, *et al*. (2012). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See Justice Blackmun’s dissent in *Callins v. Collins*. For a more philosophical approach, see Nathanson (2001). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Poor people are more likely to be executed than well-off people, though the research on this comparison is scant. But when we consider that litigating capital cases is difficult and time-consuming, and poor defendants must rely on overworked public defenders, many of whom have no experience with capital trials, the consequences seem clear. For harrowing stories of how bad lawyering leads to death sentences, see Bright (1994). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Cholbi (2006). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Yost (2019). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) The irrevocability of execution is, however, philosophically controversial. Davis argues that authorities can compensate a wrongly executed person by advancing her interests or values (1984). For example, the state could send her son to college or donate five million dollars to her favorite charity. Davis concludes that compensation of this sort counts as revoking the wrongful execution. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) For example, in 2018 the Washington Supreme Court [struck down the death penalty](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/us/death-penalty-ruling-washington-state.html), citing its arbitrary and discriminatory nature. # References [*Callins* ](https://casetext.com/case/callins-v-collins)[*v*](https://casetext.com/case/callins-v-collins)[*. Collins*](https://casetext.com/case/callins-v-collins)[. 510 U.S. 1141. U.S. Supreme Court, 1994.](https://casetext.com/case/callins-v-collins) [Bedau, Hugo (2002). “The Minimal Invasion Argument against the Death Penalty.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0731129X.2002.9992122)[*Criminal Justice Ethics*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0731129X.2002.9992122)[ 21 (2): 3-8.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0731129X.2002.9992122) [Bright, Steven (1994). ](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=4500&context=fss_papers)[“Council for the Poor: the Death Penalty Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer.” ](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=4500&context=fss_papers)[*Yale Law Journal*](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=4500&context=fss_papers)[ 103 (7): 1835-83. ](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=4500&context=fss_papers) [Camus, Albert (1963). “Reflections on the Guillotine.” ](https://libcom.org/files/Reflections%20on%20the%20Guillotine.pdf)[*Resistance, Rebellion, and Death.*](https://libcom.org/files/Reflections%20on%20the%20Guillotine.pdf)[ New York: Modern Library.](https://libcom.org/files/Reflections%20on%20the%20Guillotine.pdf) [Cholbi, Michael (2006). “Race, Capital Punishment, and the Cost of Murder.” ](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-005-4958-6)[*Philosophical Studies*](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-005-4958-6)[ 127: 255-282.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-005-4958-6) [Davis, Michael (1984). “Is the Death Penalty Irrevocable?” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_1984_0010_0002_0143_0156)[*Social Theory and Practice*](https://www.pdcnet.org/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_1984_0010_0002_0143_0156)[ 10 (2): 143-156.](https://www.pdcnet.org/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_1984_0010_0002_0143_0156) [Finkelstein, Claire (2002). “Death and Retribution.” ](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0731129X.2002.9992124)[*Criminal Justice Ethics*](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0731129X.2002.9992124)[ 21 (2): 12-21.](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0731129X.2002.9992124) [Hart, H.L.A. (1968). ](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001/acprof-9780199534777)[*Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in Legal Philosophy.*](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001/acprof-9780199534777)[ Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534777.001.0001/acprof-9780199534777) [Kramer, Matthew (2011). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethics-of-capital-punishment-9780199642199?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of Evil and Its Consequences.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethics-of-capital-punishment-9780199642199?cc=us&lang=en&)[ Oxford: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-ethics-of-capital-punishment-9780199642199?cc=us&lang=en&) [Mill, John Stuart (1868). “Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment.” ](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Speech_In_Favor_of_Capital_Punishment) [Nagin, Daniel, and John Pepper (2012). “Deterrence and the Death Penalty.” National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.](https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13363/deterrence-and-the-death-penalty) [Nadelhoffer, Thomas, ](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4114735/)[et al. (2012).](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4114735/)[ “Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage.” ](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4114735/)[*Neuroethics*](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4114735/)[ 5 (1): 67-99. ](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4114735/) [Nathanson, Stephen (2001). ](https://www.amazon.com/Eye-Immorality-Punishing-Modernity-Political/dp/0742513262)[*An Eye for an Eye : The Immorality of Punishing by Death.*](https://www.amazon.com/Eye-Immorality-Punishing-Modernity-Political/dp/0742513262)[ Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.](https://www.amazon.com/Eye-Immorality-Punishing-Modernity-Political/dp/0742513262) [Sorell, Tom (1993). “Aggravated Murder and Capital Punishment.” ](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00076.x)[*Journal of Applied Philosophy*](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00076.x)[ 10 (2): 201-213.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1993.tb00076.x) [Yost, Benjamin S. (2010). “Kant’s Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered.” ](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/kants-justification-of-the-death-penalty-reconsidered/AE3FF9444424FBB50A0F032895304947)[*Kantian Review*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/kants-justification-of-the-death-penalty-reconsidered/AE3FF9444424FBB50A0F032895304947)[ 15 (2): 1-27.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/kants-justification-of-the-death-penalty-reconsidered/AE3FF9444424FBB50A0F032895304947) [Yost, Benjamin S. (2019). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/against-capital-punishment-9780190901165?cc=us&lang=en&)[*Against Capital Punishment.*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/against-capital-punishment-9780190901165?cc=us&lang=en&)[ New York: Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/against-capital-punishment-9780190901165?cc=us&lang=en&) # For Further Reading [Hoag, Robert. “Capital Punishment.” ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/cap-puni/)[*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](https://www.iep.utm.edu/cap-puni/)[. ](https://www.iep.utm.edu/cap-puni/) # Related Essays [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier # PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/death-penalty.pdf). # About the Author Benjamin S. Yost is Professor of Philosophy at Providence College and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University. His specializations include the philosophy of punishment and Kant’s practical philosophy. His book [*Against Capital Punishment*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/against-capital-punishment-9780190901165?cc=us&lang=en&) was published by Oxford University Press (2019), and he has a co-edited volume titled [*The Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-movement-for-black-lives-9780197507773?cc=us&lang=en&#) forthcoming from Oxford. His papers appear in journals such as *Utilitas, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Kantian Review,* and *Continental Philosophy Review*. [www.benjaminsyost.net](https://benjaminsyost.net/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Ethics, Race, Social & Political **Tags:** capital punishment, death penalty, execution --- ### [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) **Published:** September 22, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Rachel Bourbaki Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics"), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 1000 Intuitively, a person is morally responsible for what she has done *only if* she could have done otherwise. This is the *Principle of Alternate Possibilities* (PAP): for any person and any action, that person is morally responsible for performing or failing to perform that action *only if* she had a genuine alternate possibility open to her at the time. An alternate possibility is simply another option that an agent has at the time that he or she acts. This principle may hold in part because of the *Ought Implies Can* principle, which states that a subject ought to do something *only if* she can do that action.1 So, someone ought to refrain from a morally incorrect action *only if* she has the option, or an alternate possibility, to do so. But, is this really the case? Is it truly the case that you need to be making a choice between two genuine alternatives in order to be responsible for your actions? ![Harry Frankfurt](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/harry-frankfurt.jpg?resize=480%2C360&ssl=1)Harry Frankfurt ### 1. Frankfurt Cases & the PAP Harry Frankfurt famously argued that alternate possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility, and therefore that PAP is false. Consider a case in which one subject, Mr. Jones, wishes to vote Democratic in a forthcoming election. Now suppose that another subject, Mr. Blue, wants very badly for Jones to vote Democratic. He is, in fact, prepared to go to considerable lengths to ensure that Jones votes accordingly. If it becomes clear that Jones is going to refrain from voting Democratic, Blue will intervene to ensure that Jones casts a Democratic vote. Perhaps Blue is even able to manipulate the processes in Jones’ brain to ensure this. Now, suppose that Blue never has to intervene, and that Jones goes ahead and votes for the Democratic candidate. Intuitively, Jones is responsible for the action that he has performed, but it is also the case that, at the time that he acted, he did not have the ability to do otherwise due to Blue’s imminent intervention.2 Let us look at a more morally significant case. Suppose that Jones is a disgruntled postal worker. He goes to work on Monday unaware that his boss is going to fire him before just before noon. Blue is aware of the fact that Jones will be fired, and he hopes that getting fired will make Jones so angry that he will decide to burn the post office to the ground. Though he would prefer that Jones act on his own, Blue does not want to take any chances. So, Blue has, unbeknownst to Jones, implanted a small device in Jones’s brain which will enable him to cause Jones to decide to set fire to the post office (and do so), should Jones give any indication that he will refrain from burning the place down. If just before noon Blue is able to tell that Jones is not going to set the fire on his own, Blue will activate the device implanted in Jones’ brain via remote control, causing Jones to set fire to the post office. As it happens, upon being fired, and *without* any interference from Blue, Jones burns the post office to the ground.3 It seems as if Jones is responsible for his action, even though he had no ability to do otherwise. PAP, is it stands, is therefore false. Cases similar to this are now dubbed “Frankfurt-style” cases. These are cases in which a subject does something, is responsible for doing that something, but could not have done otherwise. ### 2. Responses Some argue that these types of cases are flawed, however, and therefore they do not show PAP to be false.4 One objection to Frankfurt has been dubbed the “flicker defense”.5 Defenses of this kind generally argue that there *are* alternate possibilities in Frankfurt-style cases. These “flickers of freedom” constitute the alternatives necessary for moral responsibility. So, Jones is morally responsible for his action, but he also had an alternate possibility open to him. This allows us to preserve PAP in its original form. Jones is responsible for what he does because he decided to do it on his own, when he could have been coerced into doing it by Blue. It is therefore within Jones’ power to act on his own *or* to not act on his own. And, therefore, there is an alternate possibility open to Jones. There seems to be a “flicker of freedom” here, such that Jones actually does have multiple possibilities open to him, however small they might be. In the post office case, for instance, Jones has the freedom either to burn down the post office voluntarily or to be compelled by Blue to burn down the post office. This kind of alternate possibility leaves room for moral responsibility, and allows for the truth of PAP.67 ### 3. Conclusion Whether these possibilities are genuine, or whether they are robust enough to ground moral responsibility, is open to question. The problem of alternate possibilities and moral responsibility is one that philosophers continue to pursue, and understanding this issue is important for understanding our moral assessments of people and their actions. ### Notes 1 See Widerker, David. “Frankfurt on ‘Ought Implies Can’ and Alternative Possibilities”. *Analysis*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct. 1991). pp. 222-224. Also see Schnall, Ira. “The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and ‘ought’ implies ‘can’”. *Analysis*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct. 2001). pp. 335-340. 2 Frankfurt, Harry. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 66 (1969). pp. 829-839. pg. 835-836. 3 Robinson, Michael. “Modified Frankfurt-type Counterexamples and Flickers of Freedom”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 157 (2012). pp. 177-194. 4 See Naylor, Margery. “Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1984). pp. 249-258. See also, Mele, Alfred and Robb, David. “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases”. *The Philosophical Review,* Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998). pp. 97-112. 5 Robinson (2012), and Timpe, Kevin. “The Dialectic Role of Flickers of Freedom”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 131 (2006). pp. 337-368. 6 See Glatz, Richard. “The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibility for Moral Responsibility”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 139, No. 2 (2008). pp. 257-272. See also, Zimmerman, Michael. “Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Alternate Possibilities,” *Pacific PhilosophicalQuarterly, Vol. 63* (1982). pp 243-254. 7 Also see Blumenfeld, David. “The Principle of Alternate Possibilities”. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 68, No. 11 (1971). pp. 339-345. ### References [Blumenfeld, David. “The Principle of Alternate Possibilities”. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 68, No. 11 (1971). pp. 339-345.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2024867) [Frankfurt, Harry. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 66 (1969). pp. 829-839. pg. 835-836.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2023833?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [Glatz, Richard. “The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibility for Moral Responsibility”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 139, No. 2 (2008). pp. 257-272.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-007-9116-x) [Mele, Alfred and Robb, David. “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases”. *The Philosophical Review,* Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998). pp. 97-112.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2998316) [Naylor, Margery. “Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1984). pp. 249-258.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4319705) [Robinson, Michael. “Modified Frankfurt-type Counterexamples and Flickers of Freedom”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 157 (2012). pp. 177-194.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/41406971) [Schnall, Ira. “The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and ‘ought’ implies ‘can’”. *Analysis*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct. 2001). pp. 335-340.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00317) [Timpe, Kevin. “The Dialectic Role of Flickers of Freedom”. *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 131 (2006). pp. 337-368.](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-004-7482-1) [Widerker, David. “Frankfurt on ‘Ought Implies Can’ and Alternative Possibilities”. *Analysis*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct. 1991). pp. 222-224.](https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article-abstract/51/4/222/136229?redirectedFrom=fulltext) [Zimmerman, Michael. “Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Alternate Possibilities,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 63* (1982). pp. 243-254.](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1982.tb00103.x) ### Related Essays [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller ### About the Author Rachel has a PhD in philosophy. She is interested in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, action theory, and free will and moral responsibility. In her free time, she enjoys hiking, cycling, and participating in other outdoor activities. ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** free will, responsibility --- ### [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) **Published:** May 3, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word count: 987 Here’s a simple experiment to help test whether God exists: Hold a refrigerator magnet about one inch above a paperclip. If the magnet picks up the paperclip, then that tiny magnet was able to overcome the gravity of an entire *planet*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) How might this provide evidence that God exists? Well, if gravity had been as strong as magnetism is now, then you wouldn’t be reading this article, because you never would have existed. The entire universe might just be a huge black hole. It’s fortunate for us, then, that the *physical constants*, such as the strength of gravity, have the values they do. Similarly, there are *laws of nature* that appear to be necessary for our existence.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) And a third example of the universe’s being suited for us is its *initial conditions*, for example, that the universe began in a state with lots of usable energy.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Some philosophers and scientists estimate that some of these constants, forces, and conditions couldn’t have varied by more than one part in 1060 (i.e., a one with sixty zeros after it) and still permitted life. Therefore, perhaps, we should very strongly expect that a universe in which the constants, laws, and conditions formed mindlessly and purposelessly would be one in which life was almost certainly impossible: not just human life, but anything remotely resembling conscious life as we know it.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) It’s difficult to imagine how any conscious life could be composed of hydrogen alone, or could live in a black hole. And if these facts about the universe are truly *universal* constants and laws, then if life is impossible *anywhere* (because of these features), then it’s impossible *everywhere*. Arguably, if God exists, then he would intentionally fine-tune a universe’s laws, constants, and conditions so that they permit life like us.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) A morally perfect God would value life, especially embodied human beings with free will, and so ensure the universe’s physical laws, constants and initial conditions allowed for our existence.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This is the basic reasoning behind the Fine-Tuning Argument for God’s existence.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) We can summarize the argument as follows:[\[8\]](#_ftn8) 1. If God does not exist, then it was extremely unlikely that the universe would permit life. 2. But if God exists, then it was very likely that the universe would permit life. 3. Therefore, that the universe permits life is strong evidence that God exists. Even if that argument is cogent, it doesn’t *prove* that God exists or that belief in God is justified. For that, we’d need to take into account all the other evidence for or against the existence of God. But the argument does allege to provide powerful evidence for theism. Critics of the Fine-Tuning Argument, however, have challenged both premises. ![Photo from Astronaut Alexander Gerst Aboard The International Space Station](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/one-strange-rock-2.jpg?resize=656%2C369&ssl=1)Photo from Astronaut Alexander Gerst aboard the International Space Station ### 1. The Probability of a Life-Permitting Universe, Given Atheism The first challenge argues that a life-permitting universe isn’t improbable, *even if there isn’t a God*. The three most-popular ways to make this case are as follows.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ### 1.1. The Anthropic Principle Some objectors argue that it’s not improbable that we would find ourselves in a life-permitting universe, because that’s the only sort of universe we could find ourselves in—otherwise, we wouldn’t exist at all.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) One reply: If you were to survive being shot at by a firing-squad of ten expert sharpshooters, you should still be surprised that you survived, even though if they’d killed you, you wouldn’t have been around to notice.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) So we can still say that something is unlikely, even when, if it *had not* happened, we wouldn’t have been alive to observe its *not* happening. ### 1.2. A Deeper, Fundamental Law Some suggest that the probability of a life-permitting universe, given atheism, might be much higher than we thought. Perhaps all these constants, laws, and initial conditions are all determined by some deeper, fundamental law, which can only take on a few values.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) One reply: Other than this objection’s being a speculative hypothesis, this deeper, fundamental law seems to need its own fine-tuning.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Why did we happen to live in a universe that had *this* deeper, fundamental law at all, instead of having a slightly *different* deeper, fundamental law, with life-*forbidding* sets of constants, laws, and initial conditions? ### 1.3. A Multiverse Perhaps we live in a multiverse: a set of parallel universes with differing laws, constants, and initial conditions. If so, then it’s not improbable, even given atheism, that at least one of those universes would permit life. And surely if one universe permits life, then we’ll exist in that universe.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) One reply: The existence of a multiverse doesn’t raise the probability that *this* universe (that we’re in right now) would permit life, so it doesn’t really help explain why we would live in such a universe.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Think back to the Sharpshooter Analogy: Even if you knew that all over the world, there were many other firing squads shooting at prisoners at the same time, you should still be surprised that you survived. So, the existence of a multiverse doesn’t make it any more likely that *our* universe would permit life, given atheism. ### 2. The Probability of Our Universe, Given Theism The second sort of challenge argues that it’s not really very likely that God would have created a life-permitting universe like ours. Maybe there’s no reason for an omnipotent God to create fragile creatures like us: why not create disembodied minds, and not worry about whether the universe’s constants, laws, and initial conditions permitted *physical* life?[\[16\]](#_ftn16) One reply: perhaps there is something particularly good about the existence of *embodied* moral agents, who can affect each other’s lives and well-being in predictable ways. Perhaps only physical beings can be seriously harmed and so their acts of free-will are morally significant.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) ### 3. Conclusion There is widespread debate about whether the facts of fine-tuning are evidence for theism. But if the evidence from fine-tuning is a strong as proponents of the argument say it is, then only very powerful evidence *against* the existence of God could outweigh it. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Collins 2012: §2.3.2. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Ibid*., §2.2. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Ibid*., §2.4. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Cf. Collins (2012: § 7.4). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Collins 2012: § 5.2. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Swinburne (2004: 168-169). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) This is an example of a Design Argument for the existence of God. For a general discussion of such arguments, see Thomas Metcalf’s “[Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/).” [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) For two of the most-important recent presentations, see Collins (2012) and Swinburne (2004: 172 *ff*.). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Here I set aside the ‘no probability’ objection (cf. McGrew et al. 2001), according to which we cannot meaningfully assign probabilities when there is only one example (one universe), or when there are infinitely many possible variations between strengths of constants and forces. My reply is that we’re discussing *epistemic* probabilities, which report the degree to which a person is justified in believing or expecting something. Collins (2012: § 3.1). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See, e.g., Leslie (1989: Ch. 6) and Collins (2012: § 6.1). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) *Ibid*. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Cf. Collins (2012: § 7.2). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *Ibid.* [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Cf. Landsman (2015). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See e.g. White (2000: 271). See also Metcalf (2018) for a more-detailed criticism of the Multiverse Objection. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) For example, Philipse (2012: 157) questions both why God would want to create any other minds at all, and why he would want to create physically embodied minds. Here, compare Dougherty and Poston (2008), which examines the interesting relationship between the Fine-Tuning Argument and other design arguments. Metcalf (2018: § VI) considers this objection and argues that it doesn’t seriously threaten the Fine-Tuning Argument. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) For this reply, see Collins (2012: § 5.2). See also Swinburne (2004: 99 ff.) for discussion of the value of these embodied moral-agents. ### References Collins, Robin. “The Teleological Argument,” in Craig, William Lane and Moreland, J. P. (eds.), [*The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology*](https://academic.oup.com/jts/article-abstract/61/2/895/1700029) (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2012), pp. 202-281. Dougherty, Trent and Poston, Ted. “[A User’s Guide to Design Arguments.](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/a-users-guide-to-design-arguments/46B0BCF69966BEC230EF571E21113F0E)” *Religious Studies* 44 (2008): 99-110. Hacking, Ian. [*An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/an-introduction-to-probability-and-inductive-logic/EA38518337057366AD690C789DD546B8). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Landsman, Klaas. “The Fine-Tuning Argument: Exploring the Improbability of Our Existence.” In Landsman, Klaas and van Wolde, Ellen (eds.), [*The Challenge of Chance: A Multidisciplinary Approach for Science and the Humanities*](https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319262987) (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2016), 111-130. Leslie, John. [*Universes*](https://www.routledge.com/Universes/Leslie/p/book/9780415139557). Oxon, UK and New York, NY: Routledge. McGrew, Timothy, McGrew, Lydia, and Vestrup, Eric. “[Probabilities and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Skeptical View](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/110/440/1027/1010893).” *Mind* 110 (2001): 1027-38. Metcalf, Thomas. “[Fine-Tuning the Multiverse](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=faithphil&id=faithphil_2018_0999_1_9_92).” *Faith and Philosophy* 35 (January 2018): 3-32. Metcalf, Thomas. “[Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/).” *1000 Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.* (February 28, 2018). Philipse, Herman. [*God in the Age of Science? A Critique of Religious Reason*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/god-in-the-age-of-science-9780199697533?cc=us&lang=en&). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012. Swinburne, Richard. [*The Existence of God*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-existence-of-god-9780199271689?cc=us&lang=en&), 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004. White, Roger. “[Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00210).” *Noûs* 34 (2000): 260–76. ### Related Essays [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Tom Metcalf [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### About the Author [Tom Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/) is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. Website: <http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf> ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** design, fine-tuning, God, metcalf --- ### [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) **Published:** March 27, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Ryan Jenkins Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 1000 Very few of us are pacifists, which is to say that most of us accept that killing in warfare is at least sometimes morally justified. But the philosophical exploration of when killing in war is permissible—one area of the discipline of *military ethics*—is complicated by worries that arise from the innovative ways in which people can be killed in war. Think, for example, of the special moral considerations associated with “collateral damage,” chemical weapons, or remotely piloted aircraft. This essay explores the last of these, which have attracted significant public controversy. ![An unmanned drone at Creech air force base in Indian Springs, Nevada. Photograph: Ethan Miller/Getty Images](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/an-unmanned-drone-at-cree-008.jpg?resize=460%2C276&ssl=1) “Drones,” or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), first saw regular battlefield use roughly a decade ago. While the thought of such remote killing makes many uncomfortable, it’s not clear that drones are a problematic weapon *in themselves*. Bradley Strawser’s argument in favor of the use of drone strikes is by far the best known (so well known that the controversy surrounding Strawser’s article bleds over into the popular press, where he has published additional arguments defending his view1). Strawser’s argument looks like this: 1. The “principle of unnecessary risk”: If we have a morally justified goal, we are required to minimize risk to our soldiers in pursuing that goal as long as we could do so without sacrificing some greater value. 2. Deploying a drone rather than conventional forces usually reduces the risk to our soldiers. 3. Deploying a drone rather than conventional forces usually does not sacrifice any greater value. 4. So, deploying drones rather than conventional forces is sometimes obligatory. This argument is valid, which means that if all of its premises are true then its conclusion will be true as well. Thus, if we want to challenge its conclusion, we must challenge one of its premises. The first premise seems uncontroversial, especially if we imagine ourselves in the position of a commanding officer. Why would I ever subject my soldiers to unnecessary risk if doing so wouldn’t serve any greater purpose? Likewise, it would be morally wrong for a police department to deploy a human bomb-defuser when they have access to a robot substitute. The second premise also seems uncontroversial. Some worry that drone strikes take a special toll on their operators: that a soldier’s ability to fight justly is undermined by the video game-like quality of piloting a drone, that their character is corrupted, or that they are subject to unique psychological strains. But just the opposite seems true: When soldiers are deployed to combat zones—when their lives are actively threatened—*this* seems to be the time when they are under enormous stresses. If anything, the comfort of a drone pilot’s environment should result in less pressure, and should give her additional time to check and re-check her information in order to make just decisions in wartime. And if need be, drone pilots *could* be moved to combat zones rather than an air-conditioned building stateside. At any rate, whatever psychological harm is done to drone pilots is surely less than the harm that could befall others sent on manned missions instead. The third premise, however, *is* controversial. Let’s consider several objections to that premise. Most obviously, we might worry that drone strikes cause more harm to innocent civilians than conventional strikes. However, this claim is far from settled.2 A second objection we may call the *threshold objection*. This objection says that drone strikes lower the political or psychological cost of military attack, and therefore make military attacks more common. And this could result in greater harm over time. Note that even if drones do lower the threshold to a military attack, this does not undermine the justification for drone strikes *per se*. Notice, for example, that there are presumably some times when it would be *good* to use military force, for example, in some case where we could prevent a genocide (e.g. Rwanda, 1994). In these cases, we should be thankful that we have a way of intervening that carries a lower political cost. At any rate, it is a problem that must be taken case by case, and not a problem with drone strikes in themselves. Another objection we may call the *framing objection*. This objection claims that technological inventions profoundly affect the way we see the world and our relationship to one another. That is, rather than seeing our enemies as human beings with dignity, we are apt to see them as mere pawns in some geopolitical chess game. And this would sacrifice some great value. Even if such a change in *mere outlook* could be morally problematic, it’s not clear that this is a *new* feature of the world. Cruise missiles must have had the same effect, and some time ago. But many people would find it implausible that cruise missile strikes are wrong in themselves, which this objection seems to imply. Yet another objection we may call *the asymmetry objection*: many people feel that there is something especially disrespectful about drones as a weapon of war. They may think that we treat our enemies as vermin when we kill them with a drone, or that the kind of asymmetric warfare we wage with drones is unfair. Again, we also must think this means giving up some important value. We can return to Strawser’s original argument for a response to this objection: if our end goal is justified, then why is it problematic for us to accomplish it *more safely*? The use of drones here is not obviously different from the use of cruise missiles, long-range artillery, or even cannon, all weapons that in one sense or another allow the military to kill its enemies from great distance and with less risk of retribution. Yet, these more conventional military technologies seem permissible. At this point, we might be satisfied that, as Strawser originally says, drones represent merely “an extension of a long historical trajectory of removing a warrior ever farther from his foe for the warrior’s better protection” (343). In this way, they are essentially no different from other weapons whose use we already find morally acceptable. ### Notes 1 Strawser, Bradley. “The morality of drone warfare revisited.” *The Guardian*. August 6, 2012. <[http://www.theguardi](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/06/morality-drone-warfare-revisited)[an.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/06/morality-drone-warfare-revisited](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/06/morality-drone-warfare-revisited)> 2 For example, see Plaw, Avery. (2010) “Sudden Justice.” Paper presented at 7th Annual Global Conference on War and Peace, Prague, 1 May. ### References [Strawser, Bradley Jay. “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles.” *Journal of Military Ethics* 9.4 (2010): 342-368.](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15027570.2010.536403#.UzQcI61dVy8) ### Related Essays [Just War Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins ### About the Author [Ryan Jenkins](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Jenkins) is an associate professor of philosophy and a senior fellow at the Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo. He studies the ethics of emerging technologies, especially automation, cyber war, autonomous weapons, and driverless cars. His work has appeared in journals such as Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, and the Journal of Military Ethics, as well as public fora including Slate and Forbes. <http://calpoly.academia.edu/RyanJenkins> ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics **Tags:** drones, Jenkins, War --- ### [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) **Published:** February 27, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Duncan Purves Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) Word Count: 1000 Consider the following scenario: Wilma is interested in having a baby. Wilma’s doctor tells her that she has a condition such that if she conceives *now*, any child she conceives will suffer from incurable blindness. However, her doctor also tells her that this result is not unavoidable. If Wilma *waits* to conceive, and instead takes a pill every day for two months prior to conceiving, then she will conceive a child who is not afflicted with incurable blindness. Had Wilma waited and taken the pill, she would have conceived and given birth to a perfectly sighted boy she would have named ‘Rocks.’ However, she decides not to take the pill in favor of conceiving immediately. As a result, she conceives and gives birth to an incurably blind baby girl. She names this child ‘Pebbles.’1 Typically, we can criticize morally wrong actions by citing their effects on individuals who existed prior to the performance of the action. For example, if Smith steals Jones’s wallet, *Jones*, a person who already exists, is clearly the one who suffers the harm. The wrongness of this kind of action can be straightforwardly explained in “person-affecting” terms. Normally, a wrongdoer’s act causes an existing person to suffer in some way, or that act violates an existing person’s rights. In these cases, we can identify someone who has been *wronged* by the action. In the above case, however, Wilma’s action appears to elude moral assessment using person-affecting moral principles. It appears that Wilma has obviously done something morally wrong by conceiving Pebbles now rather than waiting two months and then conceiving Rocks. But one feature of the case, which may not be immediately obvious, seems to stymie this conclusion: Had Wilma waited to conceive, Rocks *rather than* Pebbles would have come to exist. Pebbles would not have come to exist at all, and so Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles *now* does not harm or wrong Pebbles. Let us focus on this claim for a moment. ### 1. How Can an Action Be Identity-Affecting? In order for the above problem to rear its head, it must be the case that Pebbles and Rocks are distinct individuals. What reasons are there for thinking that Pebbles is not the same individual that Rocks would have been? Perhaps the best reason is that one’s identity appears to be tightly dependent on the timing of one’s conception. An example should suffice to make the point. Suppose my parents had waited a year before becoming pregnant: the child who would then have been born—call her Zoe—would *not* be Duncan. To see this, note that it is possible for my parents to have had both children: Zoe could be born a year after the birth of Duncan, and then she and I would be brother and sister. But this also entails that Pebbles is not identical to Rocks, because it is possible that Wilma conceives both Pebbles and Rocks, that they are sister and brother. ### 2. The Non-Identity Problem If Pebbles is not the same individual that Rocks would have been had Wilma waited two months to conceive, then it is difficult to explain in person-affecting terms why it is wrong for Wilma to conceive Pebbles now rather than to wait two months (and then to conceive Rocks). After all, Pebbles will have a life worth living, despite her disability. Her life will not be worse than non-existence. But if Wilma had waited two months prior to conceiving, Pebbles *would not have had* a life at all. She would never have come to exist. Rocks would have existed in her stead. So it seems that Wilma’s act of conceiving now does not make Pebbles worse off than she otherwise would have been, and so it does not *harm* her. But if Wilma does not harm Pebbles by conceiving her, then it appears that Pebbles has no complaint *against* Wilma. In response to any complaint, Wilma can avail herself of the reply that she gave Pebbles the only life she might have had. Therefore, if Wilma’s action is wrong, its wrongness cannot be explained in straightforward “person-affecting” terms. ### 3. Solutions to the Problem In what way, then, does Wilma act wrongly by conceiving now rather than waiting? Providing a satisfying answer to this question is the challenge that constitutes the Non-Identity Problem. Some authors have argued that a person need not have been made worse off than she otherwise would have been to have a legitimate complaint about having been wronged or harmed (cf. Harman 2004; Shiffrin 1999; Woodward 1986). For instance, if I go around in a helicopter, dropping gold bullion onto poor villages in a developing nation, I surely *harm* (and thereby wrong) the person whose arm I crush with a brick of gold, even if they are benefitted all-things-considered by my action (Shiffrin 1999: 127). The brick of gold that they now possess can more than pay for mending a broken arm, but that does not *justify* my act. Perhaps then, Pebbles is similarly wronged by Wilma’s act of conceiving her, even though Wilma’s act does not leave Pebbles worse off than she otherwise would have been. Others have taken the Non-Identity Problem to be evidence that the wrongness of some actions simply *cannot* be explained in person-affecting terms (cf. Brock 1995; Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler 2000: 249; Peters 2009: 325; Savulsecu 2001; and Steinbock 2009: 172, 174; 2011: 90). These authors conclude that some acts are wrong even though they do not *wrong* any particular individual. Still others have argued that we should simply accept the conclusion of the Non-Identity Problem, and revise our judgment that Wilma acts wrongly by conceiving Pebbles (cf. Boonin 2008; Heyd 2009). ### 4. Conclusion The solution to the Non-Identity Problem is not obvious, and the Problem itself is not a mere puzzle for academic philosophers to ponder. The solution we settle on (if we settle on one) will have important implications for an array of [applied ethical issues](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/ "Applied Ethics") that appear to face the Non-Identity Problem. For example, many arguments against human cloning appeal to the thought that the resulting clone might be *harmed* by the procedure that is responsible for her existence (cf. The President’s Council on Bioethics 2002). But the Non-Identity Problem undermines such arguments. Without a solution to the Non-Identity Problem, we might question whether the common moral aversion to reproductive human cloning is well supported. ### Notes 1 This case is modified from Boonin (2008, pp. 127-128). ### References [Boonin, David. 2008. “How to Solve the Non-Identity Problem.” *Public Affairs Quarterly* vol. 22(2).](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40441486?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103535031147) [Brock, Dan W. 1995. “The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms — The Case of Wrongful Handicaps.” *Bioethics*, vol. 9, nos. 3-4, pp. 272-75.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8519.1995.tb00361.x/abstract;jsessionid=F37D346230C6A783BC89DCA8955688C3.f03t01?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Buchanan, Allen. E, Brock, Dan W., Daniels, Norman, and, Wikler, Daniel. 2000. *From Chance to Choice: Genes and Social Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/printView/item1162282/?site_locale=en_GB) [Harman, Elizabeth. 2004. “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?” *Philosophical Perspectives,* vol. 18, pp. 89-113.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00022.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Heyd, David. 2009. “The Intractability of the Non-Identity Problem.” M.A. Roberts, D.T. Wasserman (eds.), *Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics, and the Non-Identity Problem*, International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine.](http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/book/978-1-4020-5696-3) [Parfit, Derek. 1984. *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/reasons-and-persons-9780198249085?q=reasons%20and%20persons&lang=en&cc=us) [President’s Council on Bioethics. 2002. “Human Dignity and Human Cloning An Ethical Inquiry.”](https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/cloningreport/) [Savulescu, Julian. 2001. “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children.” *Bioethics*, vol. 15, no. 5-6, pp. 413-426.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8519.00251/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. 1999. “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm.” *Legal Theory*, vol. 5, pp. 117-148.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=48518&jid=LEG&volumeId=5&issueId=02&aid=48517) [Steinbock, Bonnie. 2009. “Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions.” In Roberts and Wasserman, eds., *Harming Future Persons*. pp. 155-78.](http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/book/978-1-4020-5696-3) ### Related Essays [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/ "Applied Ethics") by Chelsea Haramia [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis [Origin Essentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/ "Origin Essentialism") by Chad Vance [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman ### About the Author [Duncan Purves](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Purves) is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Florida. His research explores ethical theory, bioethics, and environmental ethics, focusing especially on emerging technologies, the normative significance of harm, death, and our obligations to future generations. [DuncanPurves.com](http://duncanpurves.com/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Ethics, Metaphysics **Tags:** Parfit, Purves --- ### [Practical Reasons](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/20/practical-reasons/) **Published:** February 20, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Shane Gronholz Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics") Word Count: 1000 We make choices about what to do all the time. When we deliberate about what to do, we consider reasons for various actions. Imagine you are deciding whether to attend your grandmother’s 90th birthday party or stay home and work on a big term paper, which is due in a few days. Reasons to stay home and work on the paper might include the following: 1\. You would improve your chances of getting the grade you want on the paper. 2\. You would acquire some peace of mind by making progress on the paper. 3\. You would save gas money by staying home. On the other hand, reasons to attend the party might include the following: 4\. You would enjoy the party. 5\. Your grandmother would be honored by your presence. 6\. You made a promise to attend the party. Since these are all reasons to *do* something, philosophers call these practical reasons. But what are *practical reasons*? And what explains the fact that these considerations (or facts) *count* as reasons? ### 1. Two Views about Practical Reasons The first question is pretty straightforward. A practical reason is a fact1 that counts in favor of performing some action or having some desire (and perhaps certain other attitudes as well). So, for example, that you would enjoy the party seems to count in favor of attending, so we can call that a *reason* to attend. The second question is much trickier: What explains the fact that the above considerations *count* as reasons? And, related, what sorts of facts can count as a *practical reason*? Broadly, there are two views about this. *Reasons internalists*2 hold that practical reasons must bear some important relationship to features that are, so to speak, *internal* to the agent to whom the reasons apply, e.g., desires, goals, projects, interests, etc. Bernard Williams calls this set of motivating features a *subjective motivational set*. There are a variety of opinions about just what sort of relationship this relationship is, but many internalists hold that an agent can only have a reason to perform an action if that agent is *motivated* to perform the action, or would be motivated to perform it under certain conditions. But for most, if not all, internalists, that you are currently not motivated to attend the party does not automatically mean you have no reason to attend, for you might be motivated if, for example, you were to appreciate how much your presence would mean to your grandmother. That you *would* desire to attend the party under some relevant (perhaps ideal) conditions can be a reason to attend, even if you presently lack a desire to attend. These views are therefore known as “counterfactual” theories of practical reasons. The details of this counterfactual aspect of an internalist theory are, to a large degree, what distinguishes the various internalist theories. *Reasons externalists*,3 by contrast, hold that practical reasons need not connect in any way to internal features of the agent (e.g., desires, motivations). Instead, reasons have another source—usually value or goodness (hence, some refer to these practical theories as *value-based theories*). According to reasons externalism, I could have a reason to exercise even if I don’t want to exercise, I don’t care about my health, and I couldn’t be made to care about my health. Why? Because exercise is *good* for me. It doesn’t matter that I don’t care about my health, because I *should* care about my health. ### 2. An Argument for Each View What does each of these views have going for them? We’ll start with internalism, but first, a quick detour: Some actions are rational, some are irrational, and some are somewhere in between. In general, the rational status of an action is determined by what reasons there are for performing that action in favor of some alternative. In other words, what is most rational for us to do is determined by what we have most reason to do.4 If you discover that you have most reason to attend the party, then it would be most rational for you to attend the party, and, plausibly, you therefore *should* attend the party. Your failure to attend the party when you have most reason to do so would be irrational, or less than fully rational. Now, one reason internalists find their view appealing is that it seems like a reason to do something just has to connect in some way to our motivations or desires. If there could be reasons that have no connection to internal features of the agent, and reasons in large part determine the rational status of an action, the denial of internalism would seem to entail, for example, that an agent could be irrational for failing to do something that in no way connects to her desires or motivations, and wouldn’t even under ideal conditions. This strikes some as unintuitive. We don’t normally call a person who is very good at achieving everything they want irrational, even if their aims differ from ours. Indeed, people who are good at getting what they want are often held up as paradigms of rationality. One reason some find externalism appealing is this: While it is pretty obvious that some actions are irrational, it is (nearly) just as obvious that some *desires* are irrational. For example, it seems irrational for me to want to eat my car. But if whether we have a practical reason *depends* on our desires, then desires themselves are not subject to rational assessment. On this view, there are no reasons to have desires.5 But this strikes some as unintuitive. Of course I have reason, say, to care about whether I am tortured, or to hope that a genocide ends, even if I, in fact, do not care about these things. That I don’t care, the thought goes, is precisely what makes me irrational. ### 3. Conclusion The debate over whether reasons are internal or external has important implications for moral philosophy since moral philosophy is, in large part, about what we should do and want, and what we should do and want is, in large part, determined by practical reasons. ### Notes 1Some say a reason *is* or *constitutes* a fact. Others prefer to say a reason is *provided* by a fact. Nothing said here hangs on this distinction. 2See Philippa Foot, Christine Korsgaard, Michael Smith, Bernard Williams 3See Derek Parfit, T.M. Scanlon, Russ Shafer-Landau 4This is so provided that our relevant beliefs are true. Bernard Williams illustrates this point with the following example: I have most reason to drink a gin and tonic, and I *believe* that the glass before me contains gin and tonic, but it in fact contains gasoline, it may be that although it would be rational for me to drink the contents of the glass, I in fact have no reason to drink the contents of the glass (1982). 5To be more precise, we should say that on this view, there are no reasons to have *basic* desires, that is, desires that are not derived from other desires. If I want pleasure, in a basic way, for its own sake, an internalist can coherently maintain that I have reason to desire the means to get pleasure. But she cannot say whether I have reason to want pleasure itself. It would be just as rational to desire to pain. ### References [Foot, Philippa, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” *The Philosophical Review* 81.3. (1972): 305-316.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2184328?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103485964087) [Korsgaard, Christine, M, “Skepticism About Practical Reason.” *Journal of Philosophy*. 83.1 (1986): 5-25.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2026464?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103485964087) [Parfit, Derek, “Normativity,” In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1*, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 325-380. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.](http://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Studies-Metaethics-Volume-1/dp/0199291896/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392899999&sr=8-1&keywords=Oxford+Studies+in+Metaethics%2C+Volume+1) [———. *On What Matters*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.](http://www.amazon.com/On-What-Matters-Volume-Set/dp/0199265925/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392900034&sr=8-1&keywords=on+what+matters) [———. “Rationality and Reasons,” In *Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values,* edited by Egonsson, Dan et al., 17-39. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001.](http://www.amazon.com/Exploring-Practical-Philosophy-Action-Values/dp/0754606767/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392900062&sr=8-1&keywords=Exploring+Practical+Philosophy%3A+From+Action+to+Values) [Scanlon, T.M. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995.](http://www.amazon.com/What-We-Owe-Each-Other/dp/067400423X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392900101&sr=8-1&keywords=What+We+Owe+to+Each+Other) [Shafer-Landau, Russ. *Moral Realism: A Defense.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.](http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Realism-Defence-Russ-Shafer-Landau/dp/0199280207/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392900145&sr=8-1&keywords=Moral+Realism+Shafer-Landau) [Smith, Michael. *The Moral Problem*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.](http://www.amazon.com/The-Moral-Problem-Michael-Smith/dp/0631192468/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392900176&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Moral+Problem) [———. “Internal Reasons.” *International Phenomenological Society.* 55.1 (1995): 109-131.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2108311?uid=3739664&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103485964087) [Williams, Bernard, “Internal and External Reasons.” In *Moral Luck,* 101-113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.](http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Luck-Bernard-Williams/dp/0521286913/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1392900242&sr=8-1&keywords=Moral+Luck) ### Related Essays [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman ### About the Author [Shane Gronholz](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Gronholz/) has a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He holds a B.A. from Whitworth University where he double majored in philosophy and religion. Shane is interested in metaethics, ethical theory, practical rationality, and philosophy of religion. He lives in Washington with his wife (Stephanie), son (Maxwell), and dog (Benny). [TrivialorFalse.com](https://trivialorfalse.com/) ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Epistemology, Ethics, Logic & Reasoning **Tags:** Gronholz, reasons --- ### [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) **Published:** July 14, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Author: Jana Mohr Lone Category: [Philosophy of Education](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/) Word Count: 994 ***What does it mean to be normal?*** ***Why am I here?*** ***What makes someone love you?*** ***Can you think and feel at the same time?*** ***Are numbers real?*** ***How do I know the right thing to do?*** Children begin speculating about philosophical questions early in their lives. Almost as soon as they can formulate them, most children start asking what we call “big questions.” Walk into any kindergarten class, and you’ll see children eager to explore almost any facet of their lives. Virtually every parent is familiar with the experience of listening to “why” questions—question after question—from young children, to whom the world, a familiar blur to adults in the rush of everything on our minds, is a series of fresh and vivid encounters. Brimming with curiosity about aspects of life most adults take for granted, children demonstrate an interest in exploring the most basic elements of the human condition. *Philosophy for Children* takes as a starting point young people’s inclinations to question the meaning of such concepts as truth, knowledge, identity, fairness, justice, morality, art, and beauty. *[Philosophical Children](https://vimeo.com/136588083) from [UW Philosophy for Children](https://vimeo.com/user32759775) on [Vimeo](https://vimeo.com).* ### 1. Wonder Plato refers to wonder as the origin of philosophy (Theaetetus, 155d3). Wonder is the catalyst for recognizing that the most ordinary of experiences can give rise to philosophical perplexity. Fundamentally, wonder emerges in childhood, from an awareness of the novelty of being alive in the world. Children are wide open to philosophical mystery, often lying awake at night thinking about such issues as whether God exists, why the world has the colors it does, the nature of time, whether dreams are real, and why we die. Philosophy for Children pioneer Matthew Lipman puts it this way (1980, 32): When we find the world wonderful, it is because we seem to be confronted not by soluble problems, but by utter mysteries. . . . \[C\]hildren wonder not only about themselves, but about the world. Where did it come from? How did it get to be the way it is? To what extent are we responsible for it? And if not we, then who? This is the beginning of what I call the *philosophical self*: the part of us that understands that many aspects of our existence are profoundly mysterious. ### 2. The Philosophical Self The philosophical self is fascinated by the puzzles at the heart of everyday life and the deeper meanings of our ordinary concepts, and is manifested in the propensity to ask searching questions about them. Some of the strengths children bring to this enterprise are the free play of imagination and openness to changing their minds. They don’t tend to assume they already have the answers, and they’re willing to entertain a wide range of possibilities, some of which adults would immediately rule out as implausible. In a fourth grade philosophy session, students examine the question, “Does everything have a right to live?” Most of the children initially respond that everything does have a right to life, and the conversation leads to a discussion of whether people have a greater right to life than other living beings. Let’s listen in: “We think that people are the most important,” suggests one student, “but that’s just because we’re people.” “I agree,” puts in another student. “You always see things from your own perspective. I mean, mosquitoes probably think they’re the most important beings on the planet. Imagine living on a planet where we were tiny and there were these giant mosquitoes that were constantly swatting at us whenever we got near them. We wouldn’t think that just because we were smaller and less powerful, that the giant mosquitoes had more of a right to life than we did.” “What you think about which creatures are the most important,” responds a third student, “really depends on your attachments. We think people, and dogs and cats and other pets, are more important than mosquitoes, but that’s just because we have relationships with them. If someone had a mosquito for a pet, they would probably see it differently.” For children, philosophical inquiry is both serious and playful, merging wonder, imagination, questioning, and reflection. ### 3. Questioning Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel suggests that philosophy can be defined as “the art of asking the right questions.” Young children’s questions can be profoundly philosophical, yet adults regularly fail to recognize the philosophy in what children say. When a child asks, “What is time?” this is a different question than “How does a clock work?” Children frequently ask questions about aspects of the world that adults have stopped questioning (“Why do we have numbers?”). Responding to children’s philosophical wondering involves taking their questions seriously. Unfortunately, this doesn’t happen often enough. Children are typically underestimated, and in no area is this truer than in their capacities for genuine and sustained reflection about complex topics. When we fail to listen to a child’s questions, or provide quick answers that close off further questioning, or react to a child’s serious observation with something like, “Oh, what a cute comment,” we miss an opportunity to engage with a child’s thinking about the world. ### 4. How Do You Do Philosophy with Children? Philosophy sessions in schools, particularly with younger students, typically occur in “communities of philosophical inquiry,” in which the questions explored emerge from the students themselves. These sessions begin with a philosophically suggestive prompt, which could be a story, an activity, a puzzle, or just the posing of a question, leading to a discussion of the questions in which the students are most interested. At the end of the session, closure can be provided by summarizing what has been discussed or through a creative activity. With individual children, try stepping away from the adult role of providing the answers, and just inquire along with them! ### 5. Conclusion Wondering, unselfconscious, eager to learn — children’s questions are emblematic expressions of the human desire for understanding. Philosophy is a particularly powerful discipline for sustaining the questioning mind of childhood. We can think about philosophical questions our entire lives, beginning in childhood. ### References and For Further Reading Gheaus, Anca, Gideon Calder and Jurgen De Wispelaere, [*The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-the-Philosophy-of-Childhood-and-Children/Gheaus-Calder-Wispelaere/p/book/9781138915978)*.* London: Routledge, 2019. Goering, Sara, Nicholas Shudak and Thomas Wartenberg, [*Philosophy in Schools: An Introduction for Philosophers and Teachers*](https://www.routledge.com/Philosophy-in-Schools-An-Introduction-for-Philosophers-and-Teachers/Goering-Shudak-Wartenberg/p/book/9780415640633)*.* New York: Routledge, 2013. Gregory, Maughn, Joanna Haynes and Karin Murris. [*The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children*](https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-International-Handbook-of-Philosophy-for-Children/Rollins-Gregory-Haynes-Murris/p/book/9781138847675)*.* London: Routledge, 2017. Lipman, Matthew. [*Philosophy Goes to School*](http://tupress.temple.edu/book/3421)*.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988. Lipman, Matthew, Ann Margaret Sharp and Frederick S. Oscanyan. [*Philosophy in the Classroom*](http://tupress.temple.edu/book/3422). Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980. Lipman, Matthew. [*Thinking in Education*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/thinking-in-education/C96667BA6F51079D8AA8D3983C57581C). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Lone, Jana Mohr. [*The Philosophical Child*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781442217348/The-Philosophical-Child)*.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Lone, Jana Mohr and Michael D. Burroughs. [*Philosophy in Education: Questioning and Dialogue in Schools*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781442234789/Philosophy-in-Education-Questioning-and-Dialogue-in-Schools)*.* Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. Lone, Jana Mohr and Roberta Israeloff, eds. [*Philosophy* ](http://www.cambridgescholars.com/philosophy-and-education-15)[*and*](http://www.cambridgescholars.com/philosophy-and-education-15)[ *Education: Introducing Philosophy to Young People*](http://www.cambridgescholars.com/philosophy-and-education-15)*.* Cambridge Scholars Press, 2012. Matthews, Gareth. [*Dialogues with Children*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674202849)*.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. Matthews, Gareth. [*Philosophy and the Young Child*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674666061). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. *Matthews, Gareth.* [*The Philosophy of Childhood*](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674664814). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. McCall, Catherine. [*Transforming thinking: Philosophical Inquiry in the Primary and Secondary Classroom*](https://www.routledge.com/Transforming-Thinking-Philosophical-Inquiry-in-the-Primary-and-Secondary/McCall/p/book/9780415476683). Great Britain: Routledge, 2009. Murris, Karin. [*Teaching Philosophy with Picture Books*](https://openlibrary.org/works/OL11888946W/Teaching_philosophy_with_picture_books). Newport, UK: Infonet Publications, 1992. Shapiro, David. [*Plato Was Wrong! Footnotes on Doing Philosophy with Young People*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781610486200/Plato-Was-Wrong!-Footnotes-on-Doing-Philosophy-with-Young-People). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Wartenberg, Thomas. [*A Sneetch Is a Sneetch and Other Philosophical Discoveries*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/A+Sneetch+is+a+Sneetch+and+Other+Philosophical+Discoveries%3A+Finding+Wisdom+in+Children%27s+Literature-p-9780470656839)*.* Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Wartenberg, Thomas. [*Big Ideas for Little Kids: Teaching Philosophy through Children’s Literature*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781475804461/Big-Ideas-for-Little-Kids-Teaching-Philosophy-through-Children's-Literature-2nd-Edition)*.* Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. White, David. [*Philosophy for Kids: 40 Fun Questions That Help You Wonder About Everything!*](https://www.prufrock.com/Philosophy-for-Kids-40-Fun-Questions-That-Help-You-Wonder-About-Everything-P102.aspx) Austin, Texas: Prufrock Press, 2000. Worley, Peter. [*The If Machine: Philosophical Enquiry in the Classroom*](https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-if-machine-9781441155832/). London: Bloomsbury, 2010. ### About the Author Jana Mohr Lone is Director of the [Center for Philosophy for Children](https://depts.washington.edu/nwcenter/) and Affiliate Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, and the author of [*The Philosophical Child*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781442217348/The-Philosophical-Child) (2012), co-author of [*Philosophy in Education: Questioning and Dialogue in Schools*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781442234789/Philosophy-in-Education-Questioning-and-Dialogue-in-Schools) (2016)*,* and co-editor of [*Philosophy and Education: Introducing Philosophy to Young People*](http://www.cambridgescholars.com/philosophy-and-education-15) (2012). She works with teachers and students in Seattle schools and around the country and with students, parents, school administrators, and others interested in philosophical inquiry with youth. Jana is the founding president of [PLATO (Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization)](https://www.plato-philosophy.org/) and the founding editor-in-chief of the journal [*Questions: Philosophy for Young People*](http://www.questionsjournal.org/). Her latest book is [*Seen and Not Heard: Why Children’s Voices Matter*](https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781475843255/Seen-and-Not-Heard-Why-Childrens-Voices-Matter). <https://phil.washington.edu/people/jana-mohr-lone> ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/f67b246fb652cdfb1aa4d48bf91c07fad27125dc86e85083f64608d47280d4ee?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology "1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology" is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a bus ride or a waiting room stay or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But we all ask and try to answer philosophical questions myriad times daily: philosophy is the purview not just of the expert, but of all thoughtful people. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/ [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/nathannobis/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Education **Tags:** Pre-College Philosophy --- ### [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) **Published:** March 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** Author: Tomás Bogardus Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 1000 True story: My friend’s daughter failed a hearing test when she was two years old, and was subsequently diagnosed with a rare hearing disorder. The doctors recommended a battery of follow-up tests and procedures, both expensive and invasive. My friend was, of course, crushed by the news. I suspect most parents would grimly set their teeth and proceed with the doctors’ orders for the child’s sake. Fortunately, my friend was a philosophy student in those days, studying probability theory. What he learned allowed him to decline further treatment and still sleep in peace. For he knew that, though this test was highly reliable, it was not infallible. It occasionally, though rarely, issued false positives. And he knew that the *incidence* of this hearing disorder—its *base rate*, its frequency in the general population, the *prior probability* that his child had the disease, before the test—was low enough to de-claw the test’s result. Just how low is low enough? Suppose the disease is as common as the test’s failure rate: One in a thousand. Now picture my friend’s child standing last in a line of one thousand anxious children waiting to take this hearing test. Let’s say every child before my friend’s gets a true negative result from the test; they all check out fine. Now my friend’s child steps up and receives the dreaded positive result. On the one hand, we feel cause for concern: This test fails only 0.1% of the time, so isn’t the diagnosis overwhelmingly likely to be accurate? But, on the other hand, we know that, after 999 true results, this test was “due” to fail, like a bald tire approaching its last mile. So, *should* we be concerned? The correct answer is that, given the low base rate of the disease—and despite the test’s very low failure rate—there is only a 50% chance that the child who tested positive actually has the disease. Maybe it’s the real deal, but just as likely it’s a false positive. And, of course, the rarer the disease—the lower its base rate—the more likely it is that this child pulled the “false positive” card rather than the “rare disease” card. If the base rate of the disease is vanishingly small—as it was in the case of my friend and his daughter—a positive result from a test that rarely fails can, paradoxically, be almost certainly false. Careful attention to probabilities might yield many more useful conclusions, beyond my friend’s. For example, philosopher Larry Shapiro believes that what we just learned should convince us that no one can justifiably believe in miracles, e.g., that God raised Jesus from the dead. His argument follows my friend’s right down the line. Shapiro generously grants to the miracle-believer that those who tell us about these miracles—St. Paul, say—are as reliable as the hearing test we discussed, falsely reporting miracles only 0.1% of the time. The problem, according to Shapiro, is that the *base rate* of miracles like resurrection of the dead—the frequency of resurrection, its “prior” probability, before the testimony—is vanishingly small. It’s a *miracle*, after all. And so, Shapiro says, any testimony of a miracle, even from a highly reliable source, is almost certainly false. So much for Christianity, Shapiro concludes: It’s irrational. As is any other religion based on miracle reports. Shapiro’s argument is as smooth as wind on ice, as menacing now as it was when David Hume premiered it back in 1748. But perhaps it’s *too* quick. Before you give up on miracles, let me develop a response to Hume offered by Peter van Inwagen. Try this colorful experiment for yourself. Find some lipstick and the nearest mirror. Pick an improbable string of numbers or letters—maybe, “Miracles *do* happen, Larry!”—and write them across your forehead. Stare into the mirror. Look at what you’ve become. Can you believe you wrote that message on your face just because the internet told you to? Seriously. *Can* you? Yes, of course you can. In fact, you *do* and you *should*. That belief is highly rational, given the testimony of your eyes. But hold on: While your eyes are reliable, they’re not infallible. Occasionally they’ll issue false positives, reporting something’s there when it’s not. Presently, they’re reporting that message on your face. But what’s the base rate of *that*? Prior to reading this essay and watching it happen, how likely would you have thought it that you would be standing there with a lipstick message on your face? Nothing just like that has ever happened before in the history of the universe. So the base rate of that event—its prior probability—must be vanishingly small, right? But then doesn’t the general form of Shapiro’s argument lead us to the conclusion that it would be irrational to believe what’s staring you in the face? Perhaps this shows that something’s wrong with Shapiro’s argument. Most likely it’s his assumption that, because something has never happened before, or only rarely, its base rate—its prior probability—must be low. The lipstick message on your face had never happened before. But we know of things *like* that, we know how such a thing easily *might* happen, so its prior probability need not be low. That would explain why the reliable albeit fallible testimony of our eyes convinces us that it’s happening. And, if that’s right, the miracle-believing Christian could reason this way: “Before Jesus, the dead rose rarely. Or maybe even never. It needn’t follow that the prior probability of God’s raising Jesus from the dead is small. For we know of things *like* that, how such a thing easily *might* happen. It’s God, after all, who can do as he likes, and he may like resurrecting people. And that’s why, contra Shapiro and Hume, it may be fully rational for the reliable albeit fallible testimony of St. Paul et al. to convince us that it happened.” So says the miracle believer. What do *you* say? ### References [Hume, David (1748) “Of Miracles”](https://mywebspace.wisc.edu/lshapiro/web/The_Greatest_Debate_Readings_files/Hume%20Of%20Miracles.pdf) [Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1996) “On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions”](http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~martin/Csci6402/Papers/kahneman-tversky.pdf) [Shapiro, Lawrence (2013) “A Drop in the Sea,” *Aeon Magazine*, 11/1/2013](http://www.aeonmagazine.com/altered-states/dont-believe-in-miracles/) [Van Inwagen, Peter (1998) “Of ‘Of Miracles’”](http://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Of_Of_Miracles.pdf) ### Related Essays [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case [Conspiracy Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson ### About the Author Tomás Bogardus is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California. <https://sites.google.com/site/tbogardus> ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) ![author avatar](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/a59ac6ef64ea41d78636438210f6ce86d2db9a7b882e3d35772487e801df9dd9?s=300&d=identicon&r=g) 1000wordphilosophy [See Full Bio](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/author/1000wordphilosophy/) **Categories:** Philosophy of Religion **Tags:** God, miracles --- ## Pages ### [Home](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) **Published:** January 22, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** Welcome to 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, an ever-growing set of original 1000-word essays on philosophical questions, figures, theories, and arguments. **Content:** Welcome to ***1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology***, an ever-growing set of over 225 original 1000-word essays on philosophical questions, theories, figures, and arguments. These short essays introduce important philosophical ideas in clear and accessible ways for students, readers new to philosophy, and more experienced philosophical thinkers. All of our essays are available in audio format; many are also available as [videos](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/videos/). **Start with the essays below, search for a topic, or browse by category.** ## New to philosophy? Start with these essays: - [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case ## Find Essays Browse [all essays](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/), explore our [newest essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/essays/), or search the site: ## Newest Essays Here are some of our newest essays: - [The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/10/06/ship-of-theseus/ "The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?") by Chad Vance - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski - [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco - [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/ "Immigration Ethics: An Overview") by Daniel Weltman - [Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/03/19/pragmatic-encroachment/ "Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?") by Alexandra Lloyd - [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson - [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi - [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/ "Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology") by Michael Zerella See more of our [newest essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/essays/). ## Popular Essays Some of our most popular essays include: - [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli and [Descartes’ Meditations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [“God is Dead”: Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science: Comparing Philosophical and Scientific Understanding](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz ## Essay Categories Browse essays by topic: - [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/) - [Africana Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/african-philosophy/) - [Bioethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/bioethics/) - [Buddhist Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/buddhist-philosophy/) - [Chinese Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/) - [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/) - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) - [Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Continental Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) - 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Many of our essays have been translated into [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/etiket/1000wordphilosophy/). ### Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art - [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/ "Aesthetics vs. Art") by Brock Rough - [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/ "Definitions of Art") by Brock Rough - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/ "Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?") by Matthew Sanderson - [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson - [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson ### Africana Philosophy - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal ### Buddhist Philosophy - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones - [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman ### Chinese Philosophy - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/)[Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [*Wu-Wei*: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider ### Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge #### Foundations - - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/ "The Gettier Problem") by Andrew Chapman - [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long - [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller - [Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/03/19/pragmatic-encroachment/ "Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?") by Alexandra Lloyd #### The Value of Knowledge and Justification - - [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case #### Testimony as a Source of Justification and Knowledge - - [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case - [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/ "Moral Testimony") by Annaleigh Curtis #### What Do We Know? - - [The Problem of Induction](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/ "The Problem of Induction") by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur - [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski - [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Archaeology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/13/philosophy-of-archaeology/) by Indy Smith #### On Skepticism: Lacking Knowledge or Justified Beliefs - - [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [External World Skepticism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/ "External World Skepticism") by Andrew Chapman - [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli - [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross #### Knowledge and Society - - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas #### Responding to Disagreements - - [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross #### Probability - - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf #### The Epistemology of Religious Beliefs: also see the [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) category - - [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner - [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/ "Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson - [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson #### Other Epistemological Issues and Applications - - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson - [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/)[1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/)[2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis #### Tools for Studying Epistemology - - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis ### Ethics #### Practical Ethics \| Applied Ethics \| Moral Issues #### General Issues in Thinking about Ethics - - [Applied Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson - [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/ "Moral Testimony") by Annaleigh Curtis #### [Bioethics and Medical Ethics](http://www.1000WordPhilosophy.com/bioethics) - - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis - [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade - [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist #### Ethics and Education - - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg - [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/ "Moral Testimony") by Annaleigh Curtis - [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb #### Ethics and Technology - - [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson #### Happiness, Meaning and the Good Life - - [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Moral Luck](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley #### Ethics and Existentialism - - [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk #### Moral Growth and Development - - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira - [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone - [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis - [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe #### Ethics and Relationships - - [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson - [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis #### Ethics and Death - - [Is Death Bad? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/)[Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [The Badness of Death](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves - [Is Immortality Desirable?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira #### Ethics and the Future - - [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour - [The Non-Identity Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves - [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/ "The Repugnant Conclusion") by Jonathan Spelman #### Sex, Gender, and Feminism - - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis - [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani #### Ethics and Animals - - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe - [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson - [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist #### Business Ethics - - [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger #### Capitalism and Socialism; Marxism - - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Karl ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/ "Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation")[Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/ "Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation") by Dan Lowe - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger #### Ethics and Social Issues - - [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - [“The Ethics of Belief”: ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis #### Ethics and Race - - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontology of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman #### Ethics and the Law - - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn - [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta #### Ethics and Punishment - - [Theories of Punishment](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost #### Ethics and War - - [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Just War Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins #### Ethics and Literature - - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case #### Normative Ethics / Ethical Theories / Moral Principles #### Ethics and Authority - - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Ethical Egoism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis #### Consequentialism - - [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/ "Introduction to Consequentialism") by Shane Gronholz - [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller - [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case - [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer #### Kant’s Ethics - - [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/ "Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics") by Andrew Chapman #### Social Contract Theory - - [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe - [How to Establish Social Order? ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/)[Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider #### Theories of Justice - - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/ "Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism") by Daniel Weltman #### Virtue Ethics - - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/ "Situationism and Virtue Ethics") by Ian Tully - [G. E. M. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/)[Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey #### Ethical Pluralisms - - [W.D. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/)[Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. #### Global Ethics: Africa and China - - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/)[Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider #### Other Ethical Perspectives and Concerns - - [Why be Moral? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/)[Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case - [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins - [(Im)partiality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/ "(Im)partiality") by Shane Gronholz - [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade - [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Ignorance and Blame](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/ "Free Will and Moral Responsibility") by Chelsea Haramia - [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki - [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Practical Reasons](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/20/practical-reasons/ "Practical Reasons") by Shane Gronholz - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier #### Meta-Ethics / The Philosophy of Ethics - - [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Moral Error Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/ "Moral Error Theory") by Ian Tully - [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco - [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman ### Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Continental Philosophy #### Phenomenology - - [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson - [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson - [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/ "Martin Heidegger on Technology") by Matthew Sanderson - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson #### Existentialism - - [Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/ "Introduction to Existentialism") by Addison Ellis - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof #### Happiness and Meaning - - [Happiness: What is it be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/ "Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control") by Matthew Pianalto - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson - [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer #### Love, Life and Death - - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira - [Is Death Bad? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/)[Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [The Badness of Death](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/ "The Badness of Death") by Duncan Purves - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A. G. Holdier #### Continental Political Thought - - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini - [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor ### Historical Philosophy #### Ancient Philosophy - - [How to Establish Social Order? ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/)[Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [Wu-Wei: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider - [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - [Why be Moral? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/)[Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case - [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek - [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing - [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross - [Is Death Bad? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/)[Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/10/06/ship-of-theseus/ "The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?") by Chad Vance - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer #### Medieval Philosophy - - [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf #### Modern Philosophy - - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro - [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [“I think, therefore I am”: René Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies”](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/)[1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis - [Idealism Pt. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/)[2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis - [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson #### 19th and 20th Century Philosophy - - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/ "Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?") by Matthew Sanderson - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger - [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman - [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller - [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller - [“The Ethics of Belief”: ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson - [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson - [W.D. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/)[Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli - [G. E. M. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/)[Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis #### Non-Western Philosophy - - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones - [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [Wu-Wei: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey ### Islamic Philosophy - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Logic and Reasoning #### Foundations - - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson #### Syllogisms - - [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing - [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing #### Formal and Symbolic Logic - - [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing - [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf - [Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/06/01/godel/) by Jon Charry #### Probability, Induction, and Rational Belief - - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson - [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson #### Epistemology and the Ethics of Belief - - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [“The Ethics of Belief”: ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas #### Reason, Emotion, and Pragmatic Justification - - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson ### Metaphilosophy, or Philosophy of Philosophy - [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### Metaphysics #### Possibility and Necessity - - [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk - [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer - [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf #### Minds - - [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz - [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf #### Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time - - [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/ "Personal Identity") by Chad Vance - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Are We Animals? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/)[Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman #### Objects and Existence - - [The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/10/06/ship-of-theseus/ "The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?") by Chad Vance - [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibbs - [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [Objects and their Parts: The Problem of Material Composition](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/04/18/material-composition/) by Jeremy Skrzypek - [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson #### Causation - - [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson #### Present, Future, and Past People - - [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/ "Origin Essentialism") by Chad Vance - [The Non-Identity Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/ "The Non-Identity Problem") by Duncan Purves - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman #### Free Will and Moral Responsibility - - [Free Will and Free Choice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima - [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki - [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Ignorance and Blame](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller #### Time and Space - - [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ the](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ Past and Future Real](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist #### Perception and Experience - - [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones #### The External World - - [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/)[1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis - [Idealism Pt. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/)[2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis #### Why Do We Exist? - - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson #### The Existence of Race - - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontology of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal #### God - - [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson - [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier #### Also see the essays in [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) and [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/). ### Philosophy of Education - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone - [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominick Berg - [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller ### Philosophy of Law #### Fundamentals - - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta #### Obeying the Law - - [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn #### Speech - - [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta #### Justice - - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson #### Punishment - - [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost #### Other Issues - - [Just War Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins - [The Prisoner’s Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini ### Philosophy of Mind and Language #### Philosophy of Mind - - [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz - [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson - [Intentionality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/ "Intentionality") by Addison Ellis - [The Extended Mind](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/19/the-extended-mind/ "The Extended Mind") by Rachel Bourbaki - [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur - [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski - [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson #### Philosophy of Language - - [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibbs - [Frege’s Puzzle and the Meaning of Words](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/11/19/freges-puzzle-and-the-meaning-of-words/) by Graham Seth Moore - [Gricean Conversational Implicature: What We Say and What We Mean](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/05/gricean-conversational-implicature/) by Thomas Hodgson - [Semantic Externalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/24/semantic-externalism/) by Rachel Bourbaki - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/14/wittgensteins-private-language-argument/ "Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument") by Ian Tully - [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing ### Philosophy of Race - - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontology of Race: What Are Races?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### Philosophy of Religion #### Concepts of God; Theism, Agnosticism, Atheism - - [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson - [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/ "Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief") by Tom Metcalf - [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska - [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis #### Arguments for God’s Existence and Belief in God - - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments) by Thomas Metcalf - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman - [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk - [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus - [Conspiracy Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson - [ “The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case #### Belief without Arguments: Religious Experience and Mysticism - - [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without An Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner - [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism) by Matthew Sanderson - [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/ "Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson - [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson #### The Problem of Evil and the Afterlife: Arguments Against Belief in God - - [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska - [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis - [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed - [Divine Hiddenness: Do Some People Not Find God Because God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism-could-god-sentence-anyone-to-eternal-punishment/)[: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier - [Personal Identity](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/ "Personal Identity") by Chad Vance - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [The Epistemology of Disagreement: How Should We Respond When People Disagree?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof #### Religion, Ethics, and Meaning - - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira #### Historical and Philosophical Contexts - - [Descartes’ Meditations 1–3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro - [Descartes’ Meditations 4–6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson #### Logical Tools - - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf *Editors’ note: philosophy of religion often involves the application of theories and insights in [metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), and other areas of [philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/) to philosophical questions about religion. Readers are encouraged to review essays in these other areas to see how they might relate to religious belief and practice.* ### Philosophy of Science #### Science, Philosophy, and Their Boundaries - - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/ "Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science") by Thomas Metcalf - [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson #### Scientific Reasoning and Knowledge - - [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/ "Karl Popper and Falsificationism") by Michael Zerella - [The Problem of Induction](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/ "The Problem of Induction") by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson - [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson #### Structure and Progress of Science - - [Laws of Nature](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/ "Laws of Nature") by Michael Zerella - [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson - [Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm Shifts, and Academic Rifts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/16/thomas-kuhn-paradigm-shifts-and-academic-rifts/) by Michael Zerella #### Space, Time, and Physical Reality - - [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ the](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ Past and Future Real](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/) by Dan Peterson - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths") by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations") by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications") by Thomas Metcalf #### Philosophy of Mind, Biology, and Artificial Intelligence - - [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/ "Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology") by Michael Zerella - [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali #### Epistemology in Scientific and Social Contexts - - [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case - [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Philosophy of Archaeology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/13/philosophy-of-archaeology/) by Indy Smith #### Also see the essays in [Epistemology](http://www.1000WordPhilosophy.com/epistemology) and [Metaphysics](http://www.1000WordPhilosophy.com/metaphysics). ### Philosophy of Sex and Gender #### Feminism and Misogyny - - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/ "Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach") by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/ "Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach") by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb #### Love and Attraction - - [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis - [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani #### Justice and Injustice - - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### Social and Political Philosophy #### Theories of Justice - - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman #### Social Contract Theory - - [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe - [The Prisoner’s Dilemma](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and Democracy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/20/condorcets-jury-theorem/) by Robert Weston Siscoe - [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf #### African and Chinese Perspectives - - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider #### The Law - - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn - [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta #### Social and Cultural Issues - - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis #### Global Issues - - [Just War Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins - [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali - [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale #### Historical and Literary Reflections - - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case #### Sex, Gender, and Feminism - - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis #### Race - - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman #### Punishment - - [Theories of Punishment](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost #### Business; Capitalism and Socialism; Marxism - - [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor #### Also see [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. --- ### [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) **Published:** July 7, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ### Ancient Philosophy - [How to Establish Social Order? ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/)[Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [Wu-Wei: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider - [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - [Why be Moral? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/)[Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case - [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek - [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing - [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross - [Is Death Bad? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/)[Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/10/06/ship-of-theseus/ "The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?") by Chad Vance - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer ### Medieval Philosophy - [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi ### Modern Philosophy - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro - [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [“I think, therefore I am”: René Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies”](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/)[1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis - [Idealism Pt. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/)[2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis - [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson ### 19th and 20th Century Philosophy - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/ "Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?") by Matthew Sanderson - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger - [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman - [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller - [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller - [“The Ethics of Belief”: ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)[Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson - [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson - [W.D. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/)[Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli - [G. E. M. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/)[Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### Non-Western Philosophy - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones - [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [Wu-Wei: Acting without Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi --- ### [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/) **Published:** January 16, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ### Possibility and Necessity - [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk - [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer - [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf ### Minds - [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz - [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time - [Personal Identity](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/ "Personal Identity") by Chad Vance - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Are We Animals? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/)[Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman ### Objects and Existence - [The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/10/06/ship-of-theseus/ "The Ship of Theseus: What Makes an Object the Same Object Over Time?") by Chad Vance - [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibbs - [Form and Matter: Hylomorphism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/12/04/hylomorphism/) by Jeremy W. Skrzypek - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [Objects and their Parts: The Problem of Material Composition](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/04/18/material-composition/) by Jeremy Skrzypek - [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson ### Causation - [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson ### Present, Future, and Past People - [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/ "Origin Essentialism") by Chad Vance - [The Non-Identity Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/ "The Non-Identity Problem") by Duncan Purves - [Is Death Bad? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/)[Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman ### Free Will and Moral Responsibility - [Free Will and Free Choice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima - [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki - [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Ignorance and Blame](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller ### Time and Space - [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ the](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ Past and Future Real](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist ### Perception and Experience - [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones ### The External World - [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/)[1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis - [Idealism Pt. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/)[2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis ### Why Do We Exist? - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson ### The Existence of Race - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontology of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal ### God - [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson - [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi - [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier ### Also see the essays in [Epistemology](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) and [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/). ### --- ### [Accessibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/accessibility/) **Published:** October 6, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** ### Accessibility *1000-Word Philosophy* is committed to making its essays and other educational materials accessible to as many people as possible, including people with disabilities. We aim to follow recognized best practices for web accessibility, including the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG). We periodically review the website and its content with the goal of improving accessibility and identifying barriers that may make our materials difficult to access or use. ### Accessible Formats *1000-Word Philosophy* provides its essays as web-based text that can be accessed using a variety of devices and assistive technologies. All of our essays are also available in audio format, and many essays are available as videos. Because *1000-Word Philosophy* has been publishing essays since 2014 and contains hundreds of pages and other resources, some older content may not meet current accessibility best practices. We are working to identify and address accessibility issues as we become aware of them. ### Reporting an Accessibility Problem If you encounter an accessibility barrier on *1000-Word Philosophy*, or if you have difficulty accessing an essay or other resource because of a disability, please let us know. Please email [**1000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com**](mailto:1000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com) and, if possible, include the web address of the page and a brief description of the problem. We will make reasonable efforts to address the issue and, when possible, provide the material in an accessible alternative format. We welcome feedback that can help us make *1000-Word Philosophy* more accessible to everyone. --- ### [About 1000-Word Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/) **Published:** January 16, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** About 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. **Content:** *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology* is a constantly growing collection of over 225 original essays on important philosophical topics. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles. Each essay is as close to 1000 words (while never going over!) as the author can get it. A 1000-word essay takes between five and ten minutes to read. That’s about the length of a short bus ride or a waiting room stay, or the lead-up to a class meeting. Professional philosophy can seem abstract, esoteric, and hyper-specialized. But each day we all ask and answer philosophical questions: philosophy is the purview not just of experts, but of all thoughtful people. *1000-Word Philosophy* is an open-access journal of philosophy. Its intended audience is general readers who are interested in philosophy and students in philosophy, and *philosophical*, courses. Our goal in writing and sharing these essays is to provide high-quality introductions to great philosophical questions and debates. We hope that philosophers and non-philosophers alike will benefit from perusing these essays. Our authors generally provide references or sources for more information for readers whose interest is piqued by a particular topic or debate. New essays are always very much welcome: please see the [submissions](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/submissions/) page for details. *1000-Word Philosophy* began in 2014. In 2018, the *Blog of the American Philosophical Association* posted an article about the Anthology, entitled “[1,000-Word Philosophy: Philosophy for Everyone](https://blog.apaonline.org/2018/11/05/1000-word-philosophy-philosophy-for-everyone/)” which provides more information about the project and its goals. Many of our essays are translated and reposted (with our permission) by online publications such as [*Öncül Analitik Felsefe Dergisi* ](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/etiket/1000wordphilosophy/)(Turkish), [*The Curious* ](https://thecurious.tr/category/yazilar/1000-word-philosophy/)(Turkish), and [*Doing Philosophy* ](https://doingphilosophy.kr/ethical-egoism/)(Korean), among others. *1000-Word Philosophy has minimal operating costs, but if you appreciate the page and would like to make a financial contribution to its continuation and development, you may donate [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/support/). Thank you! Annual Reports are available [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/annual-reports/).* Our text to speech services are provided by [**GSpeech**](https://gspeech.io/). Please [email](mailto:%201000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com) us any questions or comments, or use the form below. If you notice an error or oversight in one of our essays, please email us, and your comments will be passed along to the essay’s author. [← Back](/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=as_async_request_queue_runner&nonce=4f73786c83) #### Thank you for your response. ✨ ![]() Name (optional) Email (optional) Website (optional) Message 1. Submit Δ ### Editorial Board Our editorial board is composed of authors at *1000-Word Philosophy* who have taken a special interest in the project’s development and success. We seek to expand and diversify this team. - Lead Editor: [Nathan Nobis](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Nobis/), [Morehouse College](https://morehouse.edu/academics/majors/philosophy), Georgia: [NathanNobis.com](http://www.NathanNobis.com) - Editor: [Spencer Case](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Case/), [Center for the Philosophy of Freedom](https://freedomcenter.arizona.edu/team/spencer-case/), University of Arizona: [SpencerCasePhilosophy.com](https://www.spencercasephilosophy.com/) - Editor: [Chelsea Haramia](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Haramia/), [University of Bonn, Germany](https://www.cst.uni-bonn.de/en/persons/chelsea-haramia): [ChelseaHaramia.com](https://chelseaharamia.com/) - Editor: [Dan Lowe](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/lowe/), [University of Michigan](https://lsa.umich.edu/philosophy), Ann Arbor: [Dan-Lowe.com](https://www.dan-lowe.com/) - Editor: [Thomas Metcalf](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/metcalf/), [Spring Hill College](https://www.shc.edu/academics/department-of-philosophy/), Alabama: [ThomasMetcalf.info](http://thomasmetcalf.info/) - Editor: [Felipe Pereira](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Pereira/), [University of Pittsburgh](https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/), Pennsylvania: [Felipe-Pereria.weebly.com](https://felipe-pereira.weebly.com) - Editor: [Dan Peterson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Peterson/), [Morehouse College](https://morehouse.edu/academics/majors/philosophy), Georgia: [DanielJamesPeterson.com](http://www.DanielJamesPeterson.com) - Editor: [Tiina Carita Rosenqvist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rosenqvist), [Dartmouth College](https://society-fellows.dartmouth.edu/), New Hampshire: [TiinaRosenqvist.com](https://www.tiinarosenqvist.com/) - Editor: [Matthew Sanderson](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Sanderson), [West Shore Community College](https://www.westshore.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/), Michigan: [philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson](https://philpeople.org/profiles/matthew-sanderson) - Editor: [Kristin Seemuth Whaley](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Seemuth-Whaley), [Carroll University](https://www.carrollu.edu/academics/arts-sciences/philosophy-politics-economics/minor), Wisconsin: [KristinSeemuthWhaley.com](https://kristinseemuthwhaley.com/) *1000-Word Philosophy* was founded in 2014 by [Andrew D.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Chapman/) [Chapman](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Chapman/), who was then a PhD student in philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder; he continues to serve as an advisor for the project. A former editor is [Shane Gronholz](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Gronholz/), who taught at Gonzaga University, Washington and is now a Current Affair Specialist at the Spokane Public Library. ### Copyright All essays are original contributions to *1000-Word Philosophy* and are published with permission from the authors, unless otherwise noted. Contributing authors retain any and all copyright interests in their individual works. *1000-Word Philosophy* holds copyright to the collective work. Please do not reproduce this work in part or in full without permission from the Editors, the author(s) and appropriate attribution to the original source of the material. # [Accessibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/accessibility/) *1000-Word Philosophy* is committed to making its essays and other educational materials accessible to as many people as possible, including people with disabilities. We aim to follow recognized best practices for web accessibility, including the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG). We periodically review the website and its content with the goal of improving accessibility and identifying barriers that may make our materials difficult to access or use. ### Accessible Formats *1000-Word Philosophy* provides its essays as web-based text that can be accessed using a variety of devices and assistive technologies. All of our essays are also available in audio format, and many essays are available as videos. Because *1000-Word Philosophy* has been publishing essays since 2014 and contains hundreds of pages and other resources, some older content may not meet current accessibility best practices. 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We welcome feedback that can help us make *1000-Word Philosophy* more accessible to everyone. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*. --- ### [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) **Published:** February 23, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ### Philosophy of Mind - [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz - [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/ "Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment") by Thomas Metcalf - [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski - [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur - [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson - [Intentionality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/03/intentionality/ "Intentionality") by Addison Ellis - [The Extended Mind](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/19/the-extended-mind/ "The Extended Mind") by Rachel Bourbaki - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson ### Philosophy of Language - [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibbs - [Frege’s Puzzle and the Meaning of Words](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/11/19/freges-puzzle-and-the-meaning-of-words/) by Graham Seth Moore - [Gricean Conversational Implicature: What We Say and What We Mean](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/05/gricean-conversational-implicature/) by Thomas Hodgson - [Semantic Externalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/24/semantic-externalism/) by Rachel Bourbaki - [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/14/wittgensteins-private-language-argument/ "Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument") by Ian Tully - [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing --- ### [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/) **Published:** January 16, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ### Foundations - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/ "The Gettier Problem") by Andrew Chapman - [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long - [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller - [Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/03/19/pragmatic-encroachment/ "Pragmatic Encroachment: Do Our Practical Interests Affect What We Know?") by Alexandra Lloyd ### The Value of Knowledge and Justification - [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case ### Testimony as a Source of Justification and Knowledge - [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case - [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/ "Moral Testimony") by Annaleigh Curtis ### What Do We Know? - [The Problem of Induction](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/ "The Problem of Induction") by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [Self-Knowledge: Knowing Your Own Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/15/self-knowledge/) by Benjamin Winokur - [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski - [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Archaeology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/13/philosophy-of-archaeology/) by Indy Smith ### On Skepticism: Lacking Knowledge or Justified Beliefs - [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [External World Skepticism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/ "External World Skepticism") by Andrew Chapman - [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli - [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross ### Knowledge and Society - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist ### Responding to Disagreements - [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/ "Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment") by Lewis Ross ### Probability - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### The Epistemology of Religious Beliefs: see the [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) category - [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner - [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/ "Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson - [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson - [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis ### Other Epistemological Issues and Applications - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson - [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/)[1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis - [Idealism Pt. ](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/)[2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis ### Tools for Studying Epistemology - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis --- ### [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/) **Published:** January 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ### Science, Philosophy, and Their Boundaries - [Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/09/12/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science: What is Science and How Does It Work?") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/ "Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science") by Thomas Metcalf - [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson ### Scientific Reasoning and Knowledge - [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/ "Karl Popper and Falsificationism") by Michael Zerella - [The Problem of Induction](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/ "The Problem of Induction") by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [Causation: What Are Causes?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/12/20/causation/ "Causation: What Are Causes?") by Dan Peterson - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson - [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson ### Structure and Progress of Science - [Laws of Nature](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/ "Laws of Nature") by Michael Zerella - [Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm Shifts, and Academic Rifts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/16/thomas-kuhn-paradigm-shifts-and-academic-rifts/) by Michael Zerella ### Space, Time, and Physical Reality - [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ the](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[ Past and Future Real](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/)[?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/) by Dan Peterson - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths") by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations") by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/ "Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications") by Thomas Metcalf ### Philosophy of Mind, Biology, and Artificial Intelligence - [Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/18/teleology/ "Teleological Explanations: Purposes, Functions, and Goals in Biology") by Michael Zerella - [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/ "Animal Minds") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/29/mindreading/ "Mindreading: Understanding Others’ Thoughts and Feelings") by Emma Otterski - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali ### Epistemology in Scientific and Social Contexts - [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case - [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Philosophy of Archaeology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/13/philosophy-of-archaeology/) by Indy Smith ### Also see the essays in [Epistemology](http://www.1000WordPhilosophy.com/epistemology) and [Metaphysics](http://www.1000WordPhilosophy.com/metaphysics). --- ### [Submissions](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/about/submissions/) **Published:** January 16, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology* is a constantly-growing collection of original essays on important philosophical topics, figures, and traditions. These essays are introductions rather than argumentative articles, although arguments or preferred positions on issues are sometimes lightly suggested. If you are a philosophy instructor interested in contributing a 1000-word essay (or essays) on a philosophical topic that interests you and would interest our readers, please [email us](mailto:1000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com). Please either send us your full essay for review, *or* an essay proposal, *or* any other inquiries regarding the appropriateness and desirability of your topic and approach. *We are currently focused on prioritizing essays on “core” topics typically addressed in introductory philosophy and ethics classes, so that our essays address nearly all the topics anyone would want or need to address in teaching such classes.* *1000-Word Philosophy* will only consider article submissions by philosophy instructors or advanced graduate students in philosophy *who have extensive experience teaching philosophy.* While the Editors want to encourage philosophical writers at all stages, they have found that it is nearly impossible for someone to develop a successful essay for *1000-Word Philosophy* if they do not have teaching experience and so, for efficiency, we have this requirement for submissions. *1000-Word Philosophy* does not consider “sponsored posts.” ### Topics An incomplete list of desired essays is available [here](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/desired-essays/). We are especially interested in essays on topics frequently addressed in introductory courses, as well as topics that are difficult to cover in introductory courses because the relevant literature is difficult for beginning students. We especially welcome material addressing under-represented philosophical traditions, including global philosophy, philosophy of race, LGBTQIA issues, and more, as well as submissions on all topics by women and members of other under-represented populations. We are open to the possibility of multiple essays on the same topic since there are always many useful ways of addressing any philosophical issue. A Call for Papers flyer is available [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/poster.pdf). A graphic of that Call is below, suitable for saving and sharing. A [call for essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/call-for-teaching-materials/) to help address current events has been posted: please share it. Also, a [teaching](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching) page has been created. ### Style The style of essays published by *1000-Word Philosophy* is best seen by reading the essays themselves; *please focus on the more recent essays as examples***.** We strive to publish essays that are radically concise, extremely clear, well-organized, and *inviting*. Each serves as an ideal introduction to the problem, question, issue, or figure. Essays should be clear and understandable to readers with little to no philosophical background. We hope the essays serve as a springboard for informed discussion and debate and a basis for further learning on the topics. Typical features of our essays include: - an understanding of our intended audience—people who lack prior understanding of the issues of the article—and how they are are likely to approach issues, and so a presentation that works for them: article drafts should be “tested” with students and general readers, and revised in light of their feedback, before submission; - a short, inviting introduction; - a “what this essay is about” statement at the end of the introduction; - labeled and numbered sections: please do not italicize the section headings; - short paragraphs that focus on only one topic: this is especially important for online publications; - clear and direct explanation: *never too little, never too much*; - clear, simple, and direct language and word choices; - vivid examples to illustrate abstract points; - rigorous editing to eliminate any needless words, sentences, and sections; - few to no rhetorical questions: explain the issues and make statements instead; - generally do not use abbreviations since the reader is forced to repeatedly remember what they are, which is mentally taxing; - little to no “name-dropping” for topical or issues-focused essays: focus on the ideas themselves, not the thinker who developed or articulated them: address that in the notes; - at best, merely *suggestive* conclusions on issues, presented in tentative, discussion-provoking ways; - any links (to anything other than Related Essays) should only be *on* the referenced in the *References* section item as we do: do not “display” links or URLS; do not put links on anything in the Notes—any exceptions here are rare; - any notes should be informative and “self-contained”: e.g., briefly tell readers what they would find at the mentioned source, instead of just mentioning a source; - references should first be to related *1000-Word Philosophy* articles, before references to other materials. The 1000 word wordcount is of only the main text and headings: it does not include any endnotes or other text. Submitting to *1000-Word Philosophy* is not like submitting to a traditional academic journal. For article drafts or proposals that are promising, the typical review and editing-to-publication process involves feedback at many stages from multiple editors and sometimes external reviewers. These reviews address everything from the overall structure of the essay to the presentation of the philosophical issues to exact word choices. The editors seek to ensure that our essays meet high scholarly standards and are readily accessible to readers without any background in the topics. Accordingly, to meet our intended audiences, contributors with promising submissions can expect far more fine-grained and interactive feedback than at academic journals. This careful and meticulous process, however, results in very strong introductory essays that are understandable, interesting, and beneficial to nearly any reader. ### Template A submission template is available in [Word](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/1000-word-philosophy-template.docx) and [Google Docs](https://docs.google.com/document/d/14hMEp0j9RxdIsda9kkEOkvXsj_PtWpy34X2nQELxSAo/edit?usp=sharing). Do not submit PDF files, as those are difficult to review. Essay submissions via links to a cloud-based platform, such as Google Docs, or Dropbox, or Microsoft OneDrive are welcome, especially if the file can be edited and commented on through that cloud service. Please format your submission so it, as close as you can, resembles a published article at *1000-Word Philosophy*. 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What are good arguments? And why is thinking critically and having good arguments important? - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [“The Ethics of Belief” Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case ## Justice There are many injustices in our world, and many people want to seek justice and oppose injustice. But what is justice? What is injustice? What are the best theories or explanations here? - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers ## Government Why do we have government? One answer is a question: what if we didn’t have government? What would life be like? Answers here points towards what better, more just forms of government might be: - [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe ## The Law Many people think we should usually obey the law, but not always or necessarily: what are those exceptions? And what is the authority of law anyway? - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn - [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case ## Knowledge Most people know a lot. But many people claim to know things that they probably don’t know. But what is knowledge anyway? - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/ "The Gettier Problem") by Andrew Chapman - [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long ## Conspiracy Theories People believe in a large variety of conspiracy theories, e.g., regarding JFK’s assassination, 9/11, Jeffrey Epstein, etc. Why are these theories so appealing to people and is it ever rational to believe in them? - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores ## Indoctrination People are often opposed to “indoctrination,” but what is indoctrination anyway? Is it always bad? How can it be resisted, when it should? - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominic Berg. - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores ## Free Speech People sometimes claim to value free speech. But some people think some speech should be restricted? But what is “free speech” and who might impose any restrictions of it, of any kind? - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ## Expertise People today often question expertise and say, for instance, that you should “do your own research.” What makes someone an expert? When should we trust experts and when should we question them? - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long - [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case - [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis ## Disagreements What should you think when people disagree with your views on an issue? What should you think when smart, accomplished, experienced people disagree with you? - [The Epistemology of Disagreement](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas ## Ethical Disagreements How do we make ethical decisions when people often disagree about which basic moral rules or principles are best? - [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto ## Ethical Principles What are some of the most historically influential ethical theories or answers to the question, “What makes wrong actions wrong?” Quick answers: harm, disrespect, and unfairness, explained here: - [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz - [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies ## Ethics and Authority Just because a culture believes something doesn’t make it true. And just because a culture—or perhaps anyone—disapproves of doing an action doesn’t seem to make it wrong. Why is that, at least according to many philosophers? - [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis ## Friendship and Relationships Many people find that friendships and romantic relationships are important to a good, happy life. But what’s a good friend? What are good relationships? - [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry ## Artificial Intelligence What is artificial intelligence? What philosophical and ethical issues are raised by artificial intelligence? - [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley ## Socialism and Capitalism People often have strong views both for and against socialism and capitalism. But what are either of these really? - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers ## Marxism People often call things “Marxist,” what is Marxism? What did Karl Marx actually say about various issues? - [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor ## Punishment Why do we punish anyone? What punishments are justified? Why? - [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta ## Race and Racism What are races? And what is racism and what makes it wrong? - [The Ontology of Race: What Are Races?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas ## Reparations Some people say there should be reparations to African Americans for slavery (and reparations to other groups for other injustices). What’s their basic case? What are the typical responses? - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal ## Feminism Some people today consider themselves feminists, while others do not. What are the different types of feminism? - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey ## Orwell, Arendt, and Le Guin George Orwell, Hannah Arendt, and Ursula Le Guin offer powerful insights into truth, power, and resistance. Orwell exposed the dangers of authoritarianism and propaganda, Arendt examined totalitarianism and moral responsibility, and Le Guin used fiction to challenge ethical assumptions. These essays explore why their ideas still matter today: - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case ## Blame and Praise When should we blame people for what they do? - [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Ignorance and Blame](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ## Meaning and Happiness People want meaningful lives. They want to be happy. What is a meaningful, or a more meaningful, life? What is it to be happy? - [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto ## Helping Other People Do we ever have to help other people? Most people think so, but what are the limits on that not helping? - [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour - [(Im)partiality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider ## Animals and Ethics Many people believe that many animals can be treated wrongly and that there are some moral obligations to animals. What do they think and why do they think that? - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe - [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson - [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali - [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist ## Abortion Some people are against abortion—both ethically and legally–while others think that abortion can be morally permissible. What are the ethical issues involved in abortion? - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman ## Videogames and Fun Videogames aren’t just fun: they’re philosophical. But how so? Fun is sometimes *funny*, so what is it to be funny? Finally, videogames and fun often make people happy, so what’s that? - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer - [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk ## Quantum Mechanics Quantum Mechanics is one of physics’ greatest achievements, and it is often claimed to have fascinating philosophical implications. Just what is this theory, and what might it tell us about the world we live in? - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) by Thomas Metcalf ## Time and Space Science fiction stories and scientific theories provoke interesting questions about the nature of space and time. For instance, is time travel possible? Does time always move in one direction? And just what are space and time anyway? - [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson - [Philosophy of Time: Time’s Arrow](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/17/times-arrow/) by Dan Peterson ## Belief in God Many people believe in God. What are the most influential arguments to believe there is a God? - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments) by Thomas Metcalf - [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson ## Atheism and Agnosticism Not everyone believes in God or believes that God exists. Why are some people not theists? - [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska - [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Divine Hiddenness: Do Some People Not Find God Because God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless ## An Afterlife Many people, especially religious people, hope to experience an afterlife, in hopefully “the good place” and not “the bad place.” But what might these be like? Could there be an afterlife anyway? - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves ## Ethics and Religion If ethics doesn’t depend on religion (such as what God or a religion says), what might ethics depend on–meaning, what *makes* wrong actions wrong and right actions right? Some quick answers: harm, disrespect, and unfairness, explained here: - [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz - [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case ## Why Study Philosophy? The questions and answers above are all philosophical. What is philosophy anyway? Why study philosophy? - [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr *What other units should be created? [Please let us know!](mailto:%201000Wordphilosophy@gmail.com)* --- ### [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/) **Published:** January 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Excerpt:** Introductory essays on ethics: on moral issues, ethical theories, meta-ethics and more. **Content:** Below are essays on: - **[contemporary moral issues](#applied-ethics)** and topics in applied or practical ethics; - [***ethical theories***](#ethical-theories) or explanations for what, in general, *makes* wrong actions wrong and *makes permissible actions permissible;* and - [***metaethics***](#metaethics) or philosophical theories of whether and how moral judgments are true or false (or neither) and whether and how we know them (if we do), and other philosophical issues about ethics. ### Practical Ethics \| Applied Ethics \| Moral Issues ### General Issues in Thinking about Ethics - - [Applied Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/ "Moral Testimony") by Annaleigh Curtis ### [Bioethics and Medical Ethics](http://www.1000WordPhilosophy.com/bioethics) - - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis - [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade - [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist ### Ethics and Education - - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg - [Moral Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/ "Moral Testimony") by Annaleigh Curtis - [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb ### Ethics and Technology - - [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson ### Happiness, Meaning and the Good Life - - [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Moral Luck](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley ### Ethics and Existentialism - - [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk ### Moral Growth and Development - - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira - [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone - [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis - [Ancient Cynicism: Rejecting Civilization and Returning to Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/26/cynicism/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe ### Ethics and Relationships - - [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis - [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk ### Ethics and Death - - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [The Badness of Death](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves - [Is Immortality Desirable?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira ### Ethics and the Future - - [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour - [The Non-Identity Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves - [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/ "The Repugnant Conclusion") by Jonathan Spelman ### Sex, Gender, and Feminism - - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis - [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani ### Ethics and Animals - - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist - [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe - [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson - [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist ### Business Ethics - - [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger ### Capitalism and Socialism; Marxism - - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/ "Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation") by Dan Lowe - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger ### Ethics and Social Issues - - [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman - [“The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/): Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? by Spencer Case - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### Ethics and Race - - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontology of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman ### Ethics and the Law - - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn - [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta ### Ethics and Punishment - - [Theories of Punishment](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost ### Ethics and War - - [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Just War Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins ### Ethics and Literature - - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case ### Normative Ethics / Ethical Theories / Moral Principles ### Ethics and Authority - - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis - [Ethical Egoism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis ### Consequentialism - - [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/ "Introduction to Consequentialism") by Shane Gronholz - [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller - [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case - [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer ### Kantian Ethics and Non-Consequentialism - - [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/ "Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics") by Andrew Chapman - [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade ### Virtue Ethics - - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/ "Situationism and Virtue Ethics") by Ian Tully - [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey ### Social Contract Theory - - [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider ### Theories of Justice - - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/ "Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism") by Daniel Weltman ### Ethical Pluralisms - - [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. ### Global Ethics: Africa and China - - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider ### Other Ethical Perspectives and Concerns - - [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case - [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins - [(Im)partiality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/ "(Im)partiality") by Shane Gronholz - [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Ignorance and Blame](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller - [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/ "Free Will and Moral Responsibility") by Chelsea Haramia - [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki - [Manipulation and Moral Responsibility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/manipulation-and-moral-responsibility/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Practical Reasons](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/20/practical-reasons/ "Practical Reasons") by Shane Gronholz - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier ### Meta-Ethics / The Philosophy of Ethics - - [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Moral Error Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/ "Moral Error Theory") by Ian Tully - [Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/10/ethical-non-cognitivism/ "Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Are Ethical Judgments More Like Desires Than Beliefs?") by Rodrigo Valencia Pacheco - [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case - [Evolution and Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman ### Also see [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) --- ### [Bioethics and Medical Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/bioethics/) **Published:** February 16, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Here are our essays that are especially related to *bioethics* and *medical ethics*, broadly understood. ### Foundations - [Applied Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/ "Applied Ethics") by Chelsea Haramia - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. ### Theoretical Issues; also see the [Ethical Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/#ethical-theories) section of the [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/ethics/) category. - [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [Saving the Many or the Few: The Moral Relevance of Numbers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/09/saving-the-many-or-the-few/) by Theron Pummer ### Medical Ethics - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis - [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - [The Badness of Death](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/ "The Badness of Death") by Duncan Purves - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/ "Philosophy of Pain") by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist ### Sex, Gender, and Race - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Ethics and Animals - [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/ "The Moral Status of Animals") by Jason Wyckoff - [Speciesism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/ "Speciesism") by Dan Lowe - [Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/07/16/vegetarianism-veganism/ "Vegetarianism and Veganism: The Ethics of Eating Animals") by Zach Ferguson - [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/ "Ethics and Animal Research") by Paul Bali - [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis ### See also the essays in [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), and [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/), among other categories. --- ### [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/) **Published:** June 3, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** ### Feminism and Misogyny - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/ "Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach") by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/ "Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach") by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb ### Love and Attraction - [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - [Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/01/24/platos-symposium/ "Plato’s Symposium: Philosophizing About Love") by Matthew Sanderson - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis - [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani ### Justice and Injustice - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis --- ### [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/social-and-political-philosophy/) **Published:** January 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ### Theories of Justice - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman ### Social Contract Theory - [Social Contract Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe - [The Prisoner’s Dilemma](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and Democracy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/20/condorcets-jury-theorem/) by Robert Weston Siscoe - [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf ### The Law - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn - [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/ "Immigration Ethics: An Overview") by Daniel Weltman ### Social and Cultural Issues - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf ### Global Issues - [Just War Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins - [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali - [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale ### African and Chinese Perspectives - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider ### Historical and Literary Reflections - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case ### Sex, Gender, and Feminism - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - [The Ethics of Homosexuality: Is It Morally Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/06/04/homosexuality/) by Nathan Nobis - [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson ### Race - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman - [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson ### Punishment - [Theories of Punishment](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost ### Business; Capitalism and Socialism; Marxism - [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor ### Also see [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) --- ### [Support](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/support/) **Published:** November 6, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** *1000-Word Philosophy* is funded, in part, by a Public Social Sciences & Humanities Grant Award from the [Humanities, Social Sciences, Media and Arts (HSSMA) Division](https://morehouse.edu/academics/divisions/hssma) of [Morehouse College](https://morehouse.edu/), Atlanta, GA. We appreciate their support. Our text to speech services are provided by [GSpeech](https://gspeech.io/). Please [email](mailto:%201000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com) us any questions or comments, or use the form below. If you notice an error or oversight in one of our essays, please email us, and your comments will be passed along to the essay’s author. [← Back](/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=as_async_request_queue_runner&nonce=4f73786c83) #### Thank you for your response. ✨ ![]() Name (optional) Email (optional) Website (optional) Message 1. Submit Δ *1000-Word Philosophy* would appreciate *your* financial support. We will use any contributions towards the cost of our webpage and domain fees and, potentially, to advertise this page in new spaces. Our editors, contributors, and reviewers are all volunteers and do not receive any payment. Thank you! #### Make a one-time donation Your contribution is appreciated. 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[Donate yearly](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/support/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/).* --- ### [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/philosophy-of-religion/) **Published:** March 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ##### *Editors’ note: philosophy of religion often involves the application of theories and insights in [metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/), [epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/), [ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/), and other areas of [philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/) to philosophical questions about religion. Readers are encouraged to review essays in these other areas to see how they might relate to religious belief and practice.* ### Concepts of God and Basic Positions - [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson - [Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/27/theism-and-atheism/ "Theism and Atheism: Reasons for Belief and Disbelief") by Tom Metcalf - [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis - [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska ### Arguments for God’s Existence and Belief in God - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments) by Thomas Metcalf - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman - [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk - [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/22/divine-command-theory/ "Ethics and God: the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma") by Nathan Nobis - [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus - [Conspiracy Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/ "Take My Word for It: On Testimony") by Spencer Case - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager/) by Liz Jackson - [ “The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case ### Belief without Arguments: Religious Experience and Mysticism - [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God Without An Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner - [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism) by Matthew Sanderson - [William James on Mystical Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/11/21/james-mystical-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson - [Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/05/24/otto/ "Rudolf Otto on “Numinous” Religious Experience") by Matthew Sanderson - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson ### The Problem of Evil and the Afterlife: Arguments Against Belief in God - [Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/09/21/atheism/ "Atheism: Believing God Does Not Exist") by Nathan Nobis - [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska - [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence That There Is Not a God?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed - [Divine Hiddenness: Do Some People Not Find God Because God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless - [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism)[: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier - [Personal Identity](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/ "Personal Identity") by Chad Vance - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [The Epistemology of Disagreement: How Should We Respond When People Disagree?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof ### Religion, Ethics, and Meaning - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira ### Historical and Philosophical Contexts - [Descartes’ Meditations 1–3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) by Marc Bobro - [Descartes’ Meditations 4–6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson ### Logical Tools - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf --- ### [Philosophy of Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/philosophy-of-law/) **Published:** April 3, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** ### Fundamentals - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta ### Obeying the Law - [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn ### Speech - [Free Speech](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta ### Justice - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/23/equality/ "Equality: What Is It and How Is It Different from Equity?") by Daniel Weltman - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman ### Punishment - [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost ### Other Issues - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [Just War Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/ "Immigration Ethics: An Overview") by Daniel Weltman - [The Prisoner’s Dilemma](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini --- ### [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/philosophy-of-race/) **Published:** July 17, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ontology of Race: What Are Races?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal - [Racism: What Makes Something Racist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/05/12/racism/ "Racism: What Makes Something Racist?") by Dan Peterson - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/10/dehumanization/ "Dehumanization: What is it to Dehumanize People?") by Dan Peterson - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman - [Immigration Ethics: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2026/04/01/immigration-ethics/) by Daniel Weltman - [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/ "Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law") by Henry Krahn - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### *Readers interested in philosophical issues about race may also find these essays especially relevant:* - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe --- ### [How to Write a Philosophical Essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/writing-essays/) **Published:** January 3, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** How to write philosophy. **Content:** Authors: The Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Category: [Student Resources](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/for-students/) Word Count: 998 If you want to convince someone of a philosophical thesis, such as that *God exists*, that *abortion is morally acceptable*, or that *we have free will*, you can write a philosophy essay.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Philosophy essays are different from essays in many other fields, but with planning and practice, anyone can write a good one. This essay provides some basic instructions.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) [![An image of an open, blank notebook with a black pen lying on the right-side page.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/open-blank-notebook-black-amp-white.jpg?resize=615%2C307&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/open-blank-notebook-black-amp-white.jpg?ssl=1)An image of an open, blank notebook with a black pen lying on the right-side page. ### 1. Planning Typically, your purpose in writing an essay will be to argue for a certain thesis, i.e., to support a conclusion about a philosophical claim, argument, or theory.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) You may also be asked to carefully explain someone else’s essay or argument.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) To begin, select a topic. Most instructors will be happy to discuss your topic with you before you start writing. Sometimes instructors give specific prompts with topics to choose from. It’s generally best to select a topic that you’re interested in; you’ll put more energy into writing it. Your topic will determine what kind of research or preparation you need to do before writing, although in undergraduate philosophy courses, you usually don’t need to do outside research.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Essays that defend or attack entire theories tend to be longer, and are more difficult to write convincingly, than essays that defend or attack particular arguments or objections: narrower is usually better than broader. After selecting a topic, complete these steps: - Ensure that you understand the relevant issues and arguments. Usually, it’s enough to carefully read and take notes on the assigned readings on your essay’s topic. - Choose an *initial* thesis. Generally, you should choose a thesis that’s interesting, but not extremely controversial.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) You don’t have to choose a thesis that you agree with, but it can help. (As you plan and write, you may decide to revise your thesis. This may require revising the rest of your essay, but sometimes that’s necessary, if you realize you want to defend a different thesis than the one you initially chose.) - Ensure that your thesis is a *philosophical* thesis. Natural-scientific or social-scientific claims, such as that *global warming is occurring* or that *people like to hang out with their friends*, are not philosophical theses.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Philosophical theses are typically defended using careful reasoning, and not primarily by citing scientific observations. Instructors will usually not ask you to come up with some argument that no philosopher has discovered before. But if your essay ignores what the assigned readings say, that suggests that you haven’t learned from those readings. ### 2. Structure Develop an outline, rather than immediately launching into writing the whole essay; this helps with organizing the sections of your essay. Your structure will probably look something like the following, but follow your assignment’s directions carefully.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) #### 2.1. Introduction and Thesis Write a short introductory paragraph that includes your thesis statement (e.g., “I will argue that eating meat is morally wrong”). The thesis statement is not a preview nor a plan; it’s not “I will consider whether eating meat is morally wrong.” If your thesis statement is difficult to condense into one sentence, then it’s likely that you’re trying to argue for more than one thesis.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) #### 2.2. Arguments Include at least one paragraph that presents and explains an argument. It should be totally clear what reasons or evidence you’re offering to support your thesis. In most essays for philosophy courses, you only need one central argument for your thesis. It’s better to present one argument and defend it well than present many arguments in superficial and incomplete ways. #### 2.3. Objection Unless the essay must be extremely short, raise an objection to your argument.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Be clear exactly which part of the other argument (a premise, or the form) is being questioned or denied and why.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) It’s usually best to choose either one of the most common or one of the best objections. Imagine what a smart person who disagreed with you would say in response to your arguments, and respond to them. #### 2.4. Reply Offer your own reply to any objections you considered. If you don’t have a convincing reply to the objection, you might want to go back and change your thesis to something more defensible. #### 2.5. Additional Objections and Replies If you have space, you might consider and respond to the second-best or second-most-common objection to your argument, and so on. #### 2.6. Conclusion To conclude, offer a paragraph summarizing what you did. Don’t include any new or controversial claims here, and don’t claim that you did more than you actually accomplished. There should be no surprises at the end of a philosophy essay. ### 3. Style Make your writing extremely clear and straightforward. Use simple sentences and don’t worry if they seem boring: this improves readability.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Every sentence should contribute in an obvious way towards supporting your thesis. If a claim might be confusing, state it in more than one way and then choose the best version. To check for readability, you might read the essay aloud to an audience. Don’t try to make your writing entertaining: in philosophy, clear arguments are fun in themselves. Concerning objections, treat those who disagree with you charitably. Make it seem as if you think they’re smart, careful, and nice, which is why you are responding to them. Your readers, if they’re typical philosophers, will be looking for *any possible way* to object to what you say. Try to make your arguments “airtight.” ### 4. Citations If your instructor tells you to use a certain citation style, use it. No citation style is universally accepted in philosophy.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) You usually don’t need to directly quote anyone.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) You can paraphrase other authors; where you do, cite them. *Don’t plagiarize*.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Most institutions impose severe penalties for academic dishonesty. ### 5. Conclusion A well-written philosophy essay can help people gain a new perspective on some important issue; it might even change their minds.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) And engaging in the process of writing a philosophical essay is one of the best ways to develop, understand, test, and sometimes change, your own philosophical views. They are well worth the time and effort. ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Primary author: Thomas Metcalf. Contributing authors: Chelsea Haramia, Dan Lowe, Nathan Nobis, Kristin Seemuth Whaley. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) You can also do some kind of oral presentation, either “live” in person or recorded on video. An effective presentation, however, requires the type of planning and preparation that’s needed to develop an effective philosophy paper: indeed, you may have to first write a paper and then use it as something like a script for your presentation. Some parts of the paper, e.g., section headings, statements of arguments, key quotes, and so on, you may want to use as visual aids in your presentation to help your audience better follow along and understand. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Many of these recommendations are, however, based on the material in Horban (1993), Huemer (n.d.), Pryor (n.d.), and Rippon (2008). There is very little published research to cite about the claims in this essay, because these claims are typically justified by instructors’ experience, not, say, controlled experiments on different approaches to teaching philosophical writing. Therefore, the guidance offered here has been vetted by many professional philosophers with a collective hundreds of hours of undergraduate teaching experience and further collective hundreds of hours of taking philosophy courses. The editors of 1000-Word Philosophy also collectively have thousands of hours of experience in writing philosophy essays. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) For more about the areas of philosophy, see [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) For an explanation of what is meant by an “argument” in philosophy, see [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Outside research is sometimes discouraged, and even prohibited, for philosophy papers in introductory courses because a common goal of a philosophy paper is not to report on a number of views on a philosophical issue—so philosophy papers usually are not “research reports”—but to rather engage a specific argument or claim or theory, in a more narrow and focused way, and show that you understand the issue and have engaged in critically. If a paper engages in too much reporting of outside research, that can get in the way of this critical evaluation task. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) There are two reasons to avoid extremely controversial theses. First, such theses are usually more difficult to defend adequately. Second, you might offend your instructor, who might (fairly or not) give you a worse grade. So, for example, you might argue that abortion is usually permissible, or usually wrong, but you probably shouldn’t argue that anyone who has ever said the word ‘abortion’ should be tortured to death, and you probably shouldn’t argue that anyone who’s ever pregnant should immediately be forced to abort the pregnancy, because both of these claims are extremely implausible and so it’s very unlikely that good arguments could be developed for them. But theses that are controversial without being implausible can be interesting for both you and the instructor, depending on how you develop and defend your argument or arguments for that thesis. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Whether a thesis is philosophical mostly depends on whether it is a lot like theses that have been defended in important works of philosophy. That means it would be a thesis about metaphysics, epistemology, value theory, logic, history of philosophy, or something therein. For more information, see [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) and [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) both by Thomas Metcalf. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Also, read the grading rubric, if it’s available. If your course uses an online learning environment, such as Canvas, Moodle, or Schoology, then the rubric will often be visible as attached to the assignment itself. The rubric is a breakdown of the different requirements of the essay and how each is weighted and evaluated by the instructor. So, for example, if some requirement has a relatively high weight, you should put more effort into doing a good job. Similarly, some requirement might explicitly mention some step for the assignment that you need to complete in order to get full credit. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) In some academic fields, a “thesis” or “thesis statement” is considered both your conclusion *and* a statement of the basic support you will give for that conclusion. In philosophy, your thesis is usually just that conclusion: e..g, “Eating meat is wrong,” “God exists,” “Nobody has free will,” and so on: the support given for that conclusion is the support for your thesis. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) To be especially clear, this should be an objection to the argument given for your thesis or conclusion, not an objection to your thesis or conclusion itself. This is because you don’t want to give an argument and then have an objection that does not engage that argument, but instead engages something else, since that won’t help your reader or audience better understand and evaluate that argument. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) For more information about premises, forms, and objections, see [Arguments: Why do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) For a philosophical argument in favor of clear philosophical writing, and guidance on producing such writing, see Fischer and Nobis (2019). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The most common styles in philosophy are APA (Purdue Online Writing Lab, n.d.a) and Chicago (Purdue Online Writing Lab, n.d.b.). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) You might choose to directly quote someone when it’s very important that the reader know that the quoted author actually said what you claim they said. For example, if you’re discussing some author who made some startling claim, you can directly quote them to show that they really said that. You might also directly quote someone when they presented some information or argument in a very concise, well-stated way, such that paraphrasing it would take up more space than simply quoting them would. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Plagiarism, in general, occurs when someone submits written or spoken work that is largely copied, in style, substance, or both, from some other author’s work, and does not attribute it to that author. However, your institution or instructor may define “plagiarism” somewhat differently, so you should check with their definitions. When in doubt, check with your instructor first. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) These are instructions for relatively short, introductory-level philosophy essays. For more guidance, there are many useful philosophy-writing guides online to consult, e.g.: Cartaya (2026); Horban (1993); Huemer (n.d.); Pryor (n.d.); Rippon (2008); Weinberg (2019). ### References [Cartaya, Jazlyn. (2026). How to Write a Philosophy Paper: A 25-Rule Guide for Undergraduate Students.](https://www.jazlyncartaya.com/blog/writing-a-philosophy-paper) [Fischer, Bob and Nobis, Nathan. (2019, June 4). Why writing better will make you a better person. ](https://www.nathannobis.com/p/why-writing-better-will-make-you-better.html)[*The Chronicle of Higher Education*](https://www.nathannobis.com/p/why-writing-better-will-make-you-better.html)[. ](https://www.nathannobis.com/p/why-writing-better-will-make-you-better.html) [Horban, Peter. (1993). Writing a philosophy paper. ](http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/resources/writing.html)[*Simon Fraser University Department of Philosophy*](http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/resources/writing.html)[. ](http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/resources/writing.html) [Huemer, Michael. (N.d.). A guide to writing. ](https://www.owl232.net/writing.htm)[*Owl232.net*](https://www.owl232.net/writing.htm)[. ](https://www.owl232.net/writing.htm) [Pryor, Jim. (N.d.). Guidelines on writing a philosophy paper. ](http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html)[*Jimpryor.net*](http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html)[. ](http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html) [Purdue Online Writing Lab. (N.d.a.). General format. ](https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/apa_style/apa_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html)[*Purdue Online Writing Lab*](https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/apa_style/apa_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html)[. ](https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/apa_style/apa_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html) [Purdue Online Writing Lab. (N.d.b.). General format. ](https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/chicago_manual_17th_edition/cmos_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html)[*Purdue Online Writing Lab*](https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/chicago_manual_17th_edition/cmos_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html)[. ](https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/research_and_citation/chicago_manual_17th_edition/cmos_formatting_and_style_guide/general_format.html) [Rippon, Simon. (2008). A brief guide to writing the philosophy paper. ](https://philosophy.fas.harvard.edu/files/phildept/files/brief_guide_to_writing_philosophy_paper.pdf)[*Harvard College Writing Center*](https://philosophy.fas.harvard.edu/files/phildept/files/brief_guide_to_writing_philosophy_paper.pdf)[. ](https://philosophy.fas.harvard.edu/files/phildept/files/brief_guide_to_writing_philosophy_paper.pdf) [Weinberg, Justin. (2019, January 15). How to write a philosophy paper: Online guides. ](https://dailynous.com/2019/01/15/write-philosophy-paper-online-guides/)[*Daily Nous*](https://dailynous.com/2019/01/15/write-philosophy-paper-online-guides/)[.](https://dailynous.com/2019/01/15/write-philosophy-paper-online-guides/) ### Related Essays [Arguments: Why do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Philosophy and its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) By Thomas Metcalf ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/writing-essays/), [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/bir-felsefe-metni-nasil-yazilir-1000-word-philosophy-editorleri/) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/writing-philosophy.pdf). ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). --- ### [SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT: 1000-Word Products!](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/1000-word-products/) **Published:** April 1, 2026 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** After years of providing clear, concise, and accessible philosophy, *1000-Word Philosophy* is expanding into new areas! Introducing the new **1000-Word™ Product Line!** We aim to bring the same commitment to clarity and simplicity to everyday products: - **1000-Word Mayonnaise** – Now with 3 arguments for flavor. - **1000-Word Laundry Detergent** – Removes 99.9% of stains and weak arguments. - **1000-Word Toothpaste** – Clear arguments. Clean teeth. - **1000-Word Coffee** – Brewed for clarity. - **1000-Word Hair Dye** – Applied aesthetics you can trust. - **1000-Word Windshield Washer Fluid** – Clear vision, clearly explained. - **1000-Word Vitamins** – No unnecessary ingredients. Just what’s justified. - **1000-Word Mattress** – Sleep on a well-supported position. [![1000-Word Mayonnaise – Now with 3 arguments for flavor.1000-Word Laundry Detergent – Removes 99.9% of stains and weak arguments. 1000-Word Toothpaste – Clear arguments. 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Just what’s justified.1000-Word Mattress – Sleep on a well-supported position.](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/image4.png?resize=656%2C984&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/image4.png?ssl=1)1000-Word Vitamins – No unnecessary ingredients. Just what’s justified. 1000-Word Mattress – Sleep on a well-supported position. These products reflect our core goals: clarity, accessibility, and careful attention to what matters most. Each product is carefully designed to meet our core standards: no fluff, no confusion, and nothing over 1000 words. We believe consumers deserve products that are as clear, concise, and well-justified as the ideas they rely on. More products coming soon! Thank you for your support on this exciting new venture! *Interested in getting in on the ground floor of 1000-Word Products and becoming a distributor? Apply to join our **1000-Word Distribution Network™** on our webpage.* ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy), [Bluesky](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social), [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter / X](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil), [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy), [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com/@1000wordphilosophy), and [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/), and subscribe to receive email notifications of new products at [1000WordProducts.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/1000-word-products).* --- ### [Videos](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/videos/) **Published:** September 20, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Some of our essays are available as video presentations, and now *all* our essays are available in audio format also. Also available as a [YouTube playlist](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLABQ4xhUUKQ91NO72h6h27YaAFofnuizS). - [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller - [Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/ "Introduction to Existentialism") by Addison Ellis - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer - [“God is Dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis - [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [“I think, therefore I am”: Descartes on the Foundations of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli --- ### [Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Continental Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) **Published:** April 21, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** ### Existentialism - [Existentialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/ "Introduction to Existentialism") by Addison Ellis - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Albert Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken - [Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/ "Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?") by Matthew Sanderson ### Happiness and Meaning - [Happiness: What is it be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/ "Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control") by Matthew Pianalto - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson - [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer ### Love, Life and Death - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk - [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/ "Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?") by Felipe Pereira - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [The Badness of Death](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/ "The Badness of Death") by Duncan Purves - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A. G. Holdier ### Phenomenology - [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/ "Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective") by Matthew Sanderson - [Martin Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/ "Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?") by Matthew Sanderson - [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/ "Martin Heidegger on Technology") by Matthew Sanderson - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson ### Continental Political Thought - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini - [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger - [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor --- ### [Categories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/home/categories/) **Published:** December 13, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** We have essays in these categories: - [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/ "Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art") - [Africana Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/african-philosophy/) - [Bioethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/bioethics/) - [Buddhist Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/buddhist-philosophy/) - [Chinese Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/)[](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/ "Ethics") - [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics/ "Ethics") - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/epistemology/ "Epistemology") - [Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Continental Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/ "Phenomenology and Existentialism") - [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) - [Historical Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/ "Historical Philosophy") - [Islamic Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/islamic-philosophy/) - [Logic and Reasoning](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) - [Metaphilosophy, or Philosophy of Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphilosophy/ "Metaphilosophy") - [Metaphysics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphysics/ "Metaphysics") - [Philosophy of Education](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/) - [Philosophy of Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-law/) - [Philosophy of Mind and Language](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/ "Philosophy of Mind and Language") - [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/) - [Philosophy of Religion](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/ "Philosophy of Religion") - [Philosophy of Science](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-science/ "Philosophy of Science") - [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/) - [Social and Political Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/social-and-political-philosophy/ "Social and Political Philosophy") New categories are added as the project expands. *New*! We have [units of essays on topics of current and everlasting interest](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/units/). --- ### [Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Continental Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/existentialism/) **Published:** January 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** This category has moved [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/). --- ### [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/global-philosophy/) **Published:** February 16, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Here are our essays on non-Western and non-Anglo-American or European philosophy. *We are actively seeking more essays in these categories so that more readers might be introduced to these philosophical traditions.* See also our essays on [Philosophy of Race](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/) and [Philosophy of Sex and Gender.](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/) ### [Africana Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/african-philosophy/) - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal ### [Buddhist Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) - [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones ### [Chinese Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/) - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider - [*Wu-Wei*: Acting without Desire](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider ### [Islamic Philosophy](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/islamic-philosophy/) - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf --- ### [Islamic Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/islamic-philosophy/) **Published:** July 27, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** - [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey - [Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/11/06/avicennas-proof/ "Avicenna’s ‘Proof’ for the Existence of God") by Farbod Akhlaghi - [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf --- ### [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/) **Published:** January 20, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** - [Definitions of Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/ "Definitions of Art") by Brock Rough - [Aesthetics vs. Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/ "Aesthetics vs. Art") by Brock Rough - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/01/nietzsche-on-tragedy/ "Friedrich Nietzsche on Tragedy: Why Do We Like Tragic Art?") by Matthew Sanderson - [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson - [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer - [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher - [Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/10/31/ecstatic-experiences/ "Ecstatic Experiences: The Philosophy of ‘Losing Yourself’") by Matthew Sanderson - [Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/21/jean-luc-marion/ "Jean-Luc Marion on ‘Saturated Phenomena’: What Are Mind-blowing Experiences?") by Matthew Sanderson --- ### [Annual Reports](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/annual-reports/) **Published:** January 1, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Dear Supporters of *1000-Word Philosophy*, A quick update for **2024**: in 2024, we published 11 new essays and we had about 680,000 views 378,000 visitors. Unfortunately, these numbers, for views and visitors, were down from previous years. However, *these numbers are down for many reference online works.* This is widely thought to be due to more people using AI to learn about whatever issues they want to learn about, instead of checking out reference sources. Also, “no click searches” were beginning to have an impact, which further reduce demand for online reference works. If anyone has any guidance they could provide us to help address these broad issues affecting all reference works (not just us!), please let us know. *A quick update for **2023**: in 2023 had 22 new essays and 990,000 views. Unfortunately, many of the editors were preoccupied with other responsibilities this year and so we didn’t produce as many essays as we often do. But we currently have 187 total essays. End of 2023 update!* ***2022** update:* Happy New Year! Let’s hope that 2023 is a great year! *1000-Word Philosophy* is based on the simple assumption that philosophical ideas and arguments matter and make a difference — for our personal lives and our collective lives, in so many important ways — and we want more people to be better able to engage those ideas and be better off for it. We wanted to send a quick report on some of our 2022 activities and accomplishments, with some requests for how you might help share and grow what *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology* has to offer. First, we ended the year with **1,030,755 views and 663,361 visitors**. We are very proud to have reached that million views milestone. The previous year, we had 764,507 views and 500,263 visitors, so 2022 was a pretty big jump in readership. We currently have **170 published essays**, and 30 were published in 2022. This year we started making some of our essays available as **[audio recordings](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/audio-recordings/)**, and an animator (from Iran) started making some of the essays into **[videos](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/videos/)**, which are really excellent. Many of our essays have been translated into other languages, and we try to link to those translations from the initial essays’ pages. So we are excited that there’s been so much interest in our essays and a desire to share them and build on them. 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And if you would like to volunteer to pursue any great ideas you might have, we’d be happy to talk about that and how we might collaborate. We thank you for your support and, again, we hope 2023 is a great year for us all! Sincerely, The Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* This post is available [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/1000-word-philosophy-2022-year-end-report/). --- ### [Definitions of Art (original version)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/definitions-of-art-original-version/) **Published:** August 30, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** *Editors’ note: this essay has been updated: see [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) for the 2025 update; below is the original 2014 version.* Author: Brock Rough Category: [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/ "Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art") Word Count: 1000 In 1964, Andy Warhol exhibited reproductions of Brillo Boxes, visually indistinguishable from commercially available ones. What made the ones in the gallery art but not the ones in the supermarket? This sent Arthur Danto on a famous exploration of the difference between art and non-art, if this difference cannot be drawn by visual means alone.1 There are many works of art in the world. There are also many things in the world that are not works of art. How do we tell the difference? The project of defining *art* undertakes to answer this question. Many people have strong intuitions about this sort of thing, and the hard work of philosophy comes in at its usual place, articulating helpful distinctions that clarify the issue, with the hope of doing so to the degree that it settles the debate. Many people, though, who can identify paradigm cases of artworks and non-artworks, struggle to identify sharp boundaries for art. If we are interested in defining art, there is a large set of things to be categorized. Painting, sculpture, drama, music, dance, and more have all been considered to be art throughout much of (Western) history. Many of these kinds of things don’t seem to bear much similarity, and certainly much of what they share in common is not formal, or intrinsic to their perceptual structures. Yet we call many of these things art. One of the goals of defining art is to find out just what it is that these things, despite all their many differences, share in common such that they are properly called *works of art*. ![1998-1-709_pub_01-Web-Ready-475px-longest-edge-Check-Copyright-Before-Using-on-Web-470x475](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/1998-1-709_pub_01-web-ready-475px-longest-edge-check-copyright-before-using-on-web-470x475.jpg?resize=470%2C475&ssl=1) ### 1. Which Art History? The cave paintings of Lascaux are over seventeen thousand years old. Our present western Eurocentric concept of art was largely formed in the 18th Century. Should our definition of art include the Lascaux cave paintings, or, on the other extreme, even concern itself with what we casually call *art* from before the days of the French Academy? This raises the issue of the cultural dependence of our notion of art. Plausibly, without humans (or persons sufficiently like us), there is no art, so there is no ahistorical, human-independent type that is art that exists separate from us and our practices and interests. Metaphysics aside, to define art is to offer conditions that capture all and only those things that are properly categorized as works of art. For many, a definition of art should incorporate both historical periods, our contemporary non-visually distinguishable art, and pre-Renaissance art, perhaps extending back even to the Lascaux paintings.2 ### 2. Classification vs. Evaluation Another stumbling block can be cleared by recognizing two major and different uses of the term *art*. One sometimes hears, “That is a work of art,” said about something that one may intuitively reject as a work of art, say a cleanly-mowed lawn, a well-made cake, or a fantastic fadeaway jump shot in basketball.3 What is often meant by such exclamations is that the thing referenced achieves some high quality, whether of aesthetic value, or some skill in execution.4 This *evaluative* use can be set aside as tangential to the question at hand. What we are concerned with is a *classificatory* sense, correctly labeling things as works of art and non-works of art. ### 3. Definition vs. Account The art question is further muddied by yet another distinction, that between definitions of art and accounts of art. For some, the classificatory question is to be answered by a definition such that one can determine, for any X, whether X is a work of art or not. For others, to provide an answer to the question of what is art is to give an account of art as a complete practice, which includes making sense of why cultures make and appreciate art, what are the values of art, etc. The strict *classificatory* aim of a definition is only to give necessary and sufficient conditions for when some X is a work of art, leaving for further exploration the broader questions that an account of art considers. ### 4. Functionalism vs. Proceduralism Not everyone is convinced that there is such a clean distinction between the aims of providing a definition and providing an account. Some have argued that a correct *classificatory* definition must incorporate the proper function of art, and that proper function itself might have evaluative content. *Functionalist* definitions are this sort, where the main function of art is to provide some positive kind or amount of aesthetic value or experience.5 This differs from *proceduralist* definitions, by which for something to be art is that it be deemed to be art in an appropriate way.6 Both *institutional* and *historical* definitions provide such accounts. *Institutional* definitions define an artwork as anything that has been recognized as a candidate for art status by a representative of the artworld.7 This definition has faced problems of over-conventionalizing art, and for being viciously circular.8 The other main *proceduralist* definitions are *historical* definitions. These definitions define art by reference to what has properly been regarded as art in the past. Perhaps the best known *historical* definition defines art as anything that has been intended to be regarded as artworks have properly been regarded in the past.9 This offloads a lot of contingent details onto art history, perhaps leaving unanswered the *point* of art, but suggesting a satisfying *classificatory* definition. ### 5. The Possibility of Definitions Lastly, not everyone is convinced that a definition of art is forthcoming, or even necessary. Following right on the heels of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*, Morris Weitz argued that art cannot be defined.10 Just as Wittgenstein argued that games cannot be defined, but are better understood as a group of things with a family resemblance,so should we understand art. Contemporary theorists have followed suit. One such attempt is the Cluster Account of art, whereby a cluster of properties is noted as giving evidence towards a thing being an artwork without offering a philosophically suspect definition. There has been disagreement over this kind of account, centering on the possibility that it is merely a disguised definition.11 In the end, the search continues for ever more extensionally accurate definitions of art. ### Notes 1 See Danto 1974. 2 This brief essay must, for space considerations, not provide an exhaustive account of definitions of art that have been influential in the past. These include Clive Bell’s theory of *Significant Form*, Leo Tolstory’s *Transmission Theory*, and R. G. Collingwood’s *Expression Theory*, among others. 3 Though some have argued that these can all be instances of art. See, respectively Ross 1999, Quinet 1981, Elcombe 2012. 4 For an extended treatment of the importance of this distinction, see my essay *[Aesthetics vs. Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/ "Aesthetics vs. Art").* 5 Stecker 1990 6 For a nice account of the difference between functionalists and proceduralism, see Davies 1990. 7 Dickie 1984 8 For a review see Matravers 2000. 9 Levinson 2011 10 Weitz 1956 11 Davies 2004 ### References [Danto, A. C. (1974). “The Transfiguration of the Commonplace.” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 33 (2), 139-148.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/429082?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897) [Davies, S. (1990). “Functional and Procedural Definitions of Art.” *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 99-106.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3332789?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897) [Davies, S. (2004). “The Cluster Theory of Art.” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 44 (3), 297-300.](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/44/3/297.short) [Dickie, G. (1984). *The Art Circle: A Theory of Art*. New York: Haven.](http://www.amazon.com/Art-Circle-A-Theory/dp/1886094705/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1399296820&sr=8-2&keywords=The+Art+Circle%3A+A+Theory+of+Art) [Elcombe, T. L. (2012). “Sport, Aesthetic Experience, and Art as the Ideal Embodied Metaphor.” *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport,* 39 (2), 201-217.](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00948705.2012.725901#.U2eTaa1dVy8) [Levinson, J. (2011). “Defining Art Historically,*”* in *Music, Art, & Metaphysics*, (pp. 3-25). Oxford University Press. (1975).](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/music-art-and-metaphysics-9780199596621?q=Defining%20Art%20Historically.%20In%20Music,%20Art,%20&%20Metaphysics&lang=en&cc=us) [Matravers, D. (2000). “The Institutional Theory: A Protean Creature.” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 40 (2), 242-250.](http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=1543088) [Quinet, M. L. (1981). “Food as Art: The Problem of Function.” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 21 (2), 159-171.](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/2/159.extract) [Ross, S. (1999). “Gardens’ Powers.” *Journal of Aesthetic Education*.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3333698?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897) [Stecker, R. (1990). “The Boundaries of Art.” *British Journal of Aesthetics* , 30 (3), 266-272.](http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/content/30/3/266.extract) [Thomasson, A. L. (1999). *Fiction and Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/epistemology-and-metaphysics/fiction-and-metaphysics?format=PB) [Weitz, M. (1956). “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics.” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 15 (1), 27-35.](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/427491?uid=3739656&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103971799897) ### Related Essays [Aesthetics vs. Art](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/ "Aesthetics vs. Art") by Brock Rough [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson ### PDF Download Download this [essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/definitions-of-art.pdf). ### About the Author [Brock Rough](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Rough) earned a PhD in philosophy at the University of Maryland, College Park. His research focuses on the art status and ontology of videogames, their role as a test case for theories of art, and the ontology and intersection of games and art. Before pursuing philosophy, Brock spent several years working as a portrait painter. [www.brockrough.com](http://www.brockrough.com/) ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*,* [*Threads*](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy)*, and* [*LinkedIn*](https://www.linkedin.com/company/1000wordphilosophy/)*, and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)*.* --- ### [Metaphilosophy, or Philosophy of Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphilosophy/) **Published:** January 16, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** - [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/ "Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science") by Thomas Metcalf - [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis --- ### [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) **Published:** September 24, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** ### Foundations - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson ### Syllogisms - [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing - [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing ### Formal and Symbolic Logic - [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing - [Modal Logic: Axioms and Systems for Alethic Modal Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/26/modal-logic/) by Tom Metcalf - [Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/06/01/godel/) by Jon Charry ### Probability, Induction, and Rational Belief - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [Dutch Book Arguments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/25/dutch-book-arguments/) by Daniel Peterson - [The Sleeping Beauty Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/15/the-sleeping-beauty-problem/) by Daniel Peterson ### Epistemology and the Ethics of Belief - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/)by Spencer Case - [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/08/21/philosophical-counseling/ "Philosophical Counseling: Using Philosophy to Address Life’s Challenges") by Nathan Nobis ### Reason, Emotion, and Pragmatic Justification - [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson --- ### [A Very Comprehensive 1000-Word Philosophy Reading List](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/reading-syllabus/) **Published:** July 31, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** ### **What is Philosophy?** 1. [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf 3. [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case 4. [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr 5. [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone ### **Arguments and Critical Thinking** 1. [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores 3. Desirable: something on fallacies ### **Epistemology: Theory of Knowledge** #### **Knowledge and Justification** 1. [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [The Gettier Problem ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/)[& the Definition of Knowledge](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman 3. [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long 4. [Seemings: Justifying Beliefs Based on How Things Seem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/01/16/seemings/) by Kaj André Zeller 5. [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case #### **Skepticism: What We Might Not Know** 1. [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli 2. [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro 3. [Pyrrhonian Skepticism: Suspending Judgment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/09/20/pyrrhonian-skepticism/) by Lewis Ross 4. [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey 5. [Moore’s Proof of an External World: Responding to External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/23/moores-proof-of-an-external-world/) by Chris Ranalli #### **Epistemology and Society** 1. [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson 2. [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson 3. [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli 4. [The Epistemology of Disagreement: How Should We Respond When People Disagree?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson 5. [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas ### **Metaphysics** #### **Possibility and Necessity** 1. [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk 2. [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer ### **Personal Identity** 1. [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance 2. [Psychological Theories of Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley 3. [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley 4. [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman 5. [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance #### **Free Will and Moral Responsibility** 1. [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima 2. Potentially desirable: articles on libertarianism, compatiblism, and hard determinism 3. [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia 4. [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki 5. *Related Readings* on punishment and praise and blame #### **Space and Time** 1. [Philosophy of Space and Time: What is Space?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/03/what-is-space/) by Dan Peterson 2. [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson 3. [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr 4. [Heidegger on Being: Why is There Something Rather than Nothing?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/12/09/heidegger-on-being/) by Matthew Sanderson ### **Philosophy of Mind and Language** #### **Philosophy of Mind** 1. [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger 2. [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf 3. [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist 4. [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz 5. [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist 6. [Philosophy of Color](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/26/philosophy-of-color/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist #### **Philosophy of Language** 1. [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibbs 2. [Frege’s Puzzle and the Meaning of Words](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/11/19/freges-puzzle-and-the-meaning-of-words/) by Graham Seth Moore 3. [Gricean Conversational Implicature: What We Say and What We Mean](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/05/gricean-conversational-implicature/) by Thomas Hodgson ### **Philosophy of Religion: Belief and God** #### **Theism, Atheism, Agnosticism** 1. [Attributes of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson 2. [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska 3. Atheism: in progress: near complete #### **Arguments for God’s Existence** 1. [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro 3. [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf 4. [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman 5. [Modal Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/03/modal-ontological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf 6. *Related Reading in ‘Ethics’*: [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case 7. [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus #### **Religious and Mystical Experiences** 1. [Philosophy of Mysticism: Do Mystical Experiences Justify Religious Beliefs?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/31/philosophy-of-mysticism/) by Matthew Sanderson 2. [Richard Swinburne on Religious Experience](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson #### **Arguments Against God’s Existence** 1. [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence that God Does Not Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [Divine Hiddenness: Do Some People Not Find God Because God Doesn’t Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless 3. [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed 4. [“God is dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - #### **Reason, Faith and Evidence** 1. Desired: faith and reason 2. [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson 3. [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner #### **An Afterlife** 1. [Hell and Universalism: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier 2. [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira 3. *Related Reading in ‘Metaphysics’*: [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance ### **Ethical Theory** #### **About Ethics** 1. Desired: Philosophical Ethics: An Overview, analogous to the epistemology overview ### **Ethical Theory: What *Makes* Wrong Actions Wrong? *Why* are Right Actions Right?** #### Ethics and Authority 1. [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis 2. [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis 3. [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case 4. [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis 5. [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer Case #### Consequentialist Ethics 1. [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz 2. [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller 3. [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller 4. [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case #### Kantian and Non-Consequentialist Ethics 1. [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman 2. Desired: objections to Kant’s ethics 3. In progress: moral and legal rights 4. [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade #### Virtue Ethics 1. [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry 2. [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz 3. [G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/20/anscombe/) by Daniel Weltman 4. [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/) by Ian Tully 5. [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey 6. [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey #### Pluralism 1. [W.D. Ross’s Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto 2. *Related, in ‘Applied and Practical Ethics’*: [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. ### **Meta-Ethics: Are there Ethical Facts? Are there Ethical Truths?** 1. [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [Moral Error Theory: Are There Moral Facts?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/) by Ian Tully 3. Desired: Moral Epistemology: Can We Know What’s Wrong? 4. [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk ### **Applied and Practical Ethics** #### **Engaging Ethical Issues** 1. [Applied Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia 2. In progress: Ethical Expertise: Becoming a Moral Expert #### **Ethics and Education** 1. [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli 2. [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominik Balg 3. [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis #### **Bioethics and Medical Ethics** #### Theories 1. [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman 2. [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. Issues 1. [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis 2. *Related, in ‘Ethical Theory’*: [The Doctrine of Double Effect: Do Intentions Matter to Ethics?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/11/doctrine-of-double-effect/) by Gabriel Andrade 3. Desired: genital cutting: female and male circumcision 4. *Related, in ‘Philosophy of Mind and Language’*: [Philosophy of Pain](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/01/08/philosophy-of-pain/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist 5. Defining death: in progress 6. [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman 7. [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis 8. [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch 9. Desired: an overview of environmental ethics #### **Ethics and Punishment** 1. [Theories of Punishment](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers 2. Needed: punishing people for (illegal) drug use 3. [The Death Penalty](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost #### **Ethics and Animals** 1. [The Moral Status of Animals](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff 2. [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe 3. [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman 4. [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist 5. In progress: vegetarianism and veganism 6. [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali #### **Ethics and Technology** 1. [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher 3. [Martin Heidegger on Technology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/23/heidegger-on-technology/) by Matthew Sanderson #### **Ethics and the Future** 1. [Longtermism: How Much Should We Care About the Far Future?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/17/longtermism/) by Dylan Balfour 2. [The Non-Identity Problem](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves #### **Ethics and Social Issues** 1. Desired: something on guns. 2. [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf 3. *Related in ‘Law’*: [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta 4. *Related in ‘Epistemology’*: [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case 5. Related in ‘Epistemology’: [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson 6. [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) by Ryan Jenkins 7. An essay on anti- and pro-natalism is in progress #### **Ethics and Relationships** 1. [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira 2. [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. 3. [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk #### **Praise and Blame** 1. [Praise and Blame](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/06/praise-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller 2. [Ignorance and Blame](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) by Daniel Miller 3. [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis #### **Business Ethics** 1. [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. *Related essays* in ‘Economic justice’ and ‘Marxism’ #### **Ethics and War** 1. [Just War Theory](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins 2. [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) by Ryan Jenkins #### **Ethics and Literature** 1. [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta 2. [Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones who Walk Away from Omelas”: Would You Walk Away?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/19/omelas/) by Spencer Case ### **Social and Political Philosophy** #### **Social Contract Theory** 1. [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini 2. [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman 3. [Rousseau on Human Nature: “Amour de soi” and “Amour propre”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/27/rousseau-on-human-nature/) by Corey McCabe 4. [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider 5. [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider #### **Theories of Justice** 1. [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies 2. [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman #### **Economic Justice** 1. [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers 2. [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf 3. [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf #### **The Law** 1. [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta 2. [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta 3. [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case 4. [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn 5. [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini #### **Marxism** 1. [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe 2. [On Karl Marx’s Slogan “From Each According to their Ability, To Each According to their Need”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/karl-marx-slogan/) by Sam Badger 3. [Karl Marx’s Theory of History](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/04/marx-theory-of-history/) by Angus Taylor ### **Philosophy of Sex and Gender** 1. [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey 2. [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb 3. [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis 4. [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis 5. [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia 6. [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani ### **Philosophy of Race** 1. [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf 2. [The Ontology of Race: What Are Races?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal 3. [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe 4. *Related, in ‘Phenomenology and Existentialism’*: [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal 5. [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault 6. [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman ### **Philosophy of Science** 1. [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/) by Michael Zerella 2. [Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm Shifts, and Academic Rifts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/16/thomas-kuhn-paradigm-shifts-and-academic-rifts/) by Michael Zerella 3. [Laws of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella ### **Formal Logic and Probability** 1. [Classical Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/28/classical-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing 2. [Contemporary Syllogisms](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/23/contemporary-syllogisms/) by Timothy Eshing 3. [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Sentential Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/02/formal-logic-symbolizing-arguments-in-sentential-logic/) by Thomas Metcalf 4. [Formal Logic: Symbolizing Arguments in Quantificational or Predicate Logic](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/03/quantificational-or-predicate-logic/) by Timothy Eshing 5. [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf 6. [The Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf 7. [Bayesianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/12/bayesianism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### **Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art** 1. [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough 2. [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) by Brock Rough 3. [Kant’s Theory of the Sublime](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/11/11/kants-theory-of-the-sublime/) by Matthew Sanderson 4. [The Philosophy of Humor: What Makes Something Funny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/11/20/the-philosophy-of-humor/) by Chris A. Kramer ### **Phenomenology and Existentialism** 1. [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/) by Matthew Sanderson 2. [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis 3. [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal 4. [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken ### **Meaning, Happiness and Hope** 1. [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk 2. [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto 3. [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto 4. [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto 5. [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira 6. [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale --- ### [For Instructors](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/) **Published:** March 14, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** *New*! We have [units of essays on topics of current and everlasting interest](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/units/). ### Sets of Readings We have some drafts of orders of readings, which can be used to develop syllabi. Here is a new (August 2025) Philosophy 101 reading list: > [Philosophy 101: An Introduction to Philosophy Reading List](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/philosophy101/) *Also, a very complete* order of readings: > [A 1000-Word Philosophy Reading Syllabus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/reading-syllabus/) And here are links to two earlier [Introduction to Philosophy (1)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/an-introduction-to-philosophy-reading-list-for-syllabi-construction/) and [Introduction to Philosophy (2)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/introduction-to-philosophy-readings-list/) courses, and two orders of readings for [Introduction to Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/introduction-to-ethics-reading-lists/) courses. Of course, philosophy and ethics courses can have many structures and these are just a few possibilities. If you are an instructor who uses *1000-Word Philosophy* essays in your courses, please [let us know](mailto:%201000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com) which you use and how you use them! ### Student Resources We also have two new resources for students on [How to Write a Philosophical Essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/writing-essays/). and [How to Read Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/reading/) by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy*. These are also available at the new [Student Resources](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/for-students/) tab. Students often appreciate that all our essays are available in audio format and some are available as [videos](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/videos/). ### Modules or Teaching Units Below are links to *select* sets of short introductory readings from *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology* to help create “course modules” or “teaching units” on common topics in introductory philosophy and ethics courses: - [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#epistemology) - [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#metaphysics) - [Ethical Theory and Theories of Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#ethics) - [Contemporary Moral & Social Issues](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#issues) - [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#existentialism) - [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#religion) - [Philosophy of Race *&* Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#race) - [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#science) - [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#history) - [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/#art) This page will be periodically updated as [more essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/) are identified as especially ideal for this resource. But please check the [front page](http://www.1000wordphilosophy.com) for our newest essays. Also see the *American Philosophical Association’s* “[Teaching Resources](https://www.apaonline.org/page/teaching_resources)” page for other types of materials and teaching guidance. *Note: philosophy instructors may find this article, by* 1000-Word Philosophy *editor and contributor Tom Metcalf, to be interesting and useful in their teaching philosophy and advocating for the value of philosophy: [Metcalf, Thomas. (2022). “The Case for Philosophy as a General-Education Requirement.” ](https://www.pdcnet.org/collection/show?id=teachphil_2022_0045_0003_0299_0326&file_type=pdf)*Teaching Philosophy, 45*(3), 299–326.* ([Pre-publication version](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/penultimate-phil-as-gen-ed-req.pdf)). Some essays that are especially good for the beginning of a class: - [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone Epistemology - [The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem/) by Andrew Chapman - [External World Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/06/external-world-skepticism/) by Andrew Chapman - [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [Conspiracy Theories](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas - [Modal Epistemology: Knowledge of Possibility & Necessity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) by Bob Fischer - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Take My Word for It: On Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/27/take-my-word-for-it-on-testimony/) by Spencer Case - [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro Metaphysics - [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr - [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima - [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki - [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk - [Origin Essentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance - [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves - [The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/05/the-knowledge-argument-against-physicalism/) by Tufan Kıymaz - [Vagueness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/11/vagueness/) by Darren Hibbs - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro Ethical Theories and Theories of Justice - [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller - [Situationism and Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/10/situationism-and-virtue-ethics/) by Ian Tully - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) By Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey and [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis Contemporary Moral and Social Issues - [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia - [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis - [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman. - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff - [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe - [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves - [Just War Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/21/just-war-theory/) by Ryan Jenkins - [The Non-Identity Problem](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/27/non-identity-problem/) by Duncan Purves - [The Ethics of Drone Strikes](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/27/the-ethics-of-drone-strikes/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini - [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) by Ryan Jenkins - [The Repugnant Conclusion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/04/the-repugnant-conclusion/) by Jonathan Spelman Existentialism - [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira - [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken - [The Badness of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/01/the-badness-of-death/) by Duncan Purves - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Hannah Arendt’s Political Thought](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/17/hannah-arendts-political-thought/) by David Antonini Philosophy of Religion - [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson - [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk - [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/03/the-fine-tuning-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson - [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus - [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed - [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless - [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira - [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof Philosophy of Race - [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman Philosophy of Sex and Gender - [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis Philosophy of Science - [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Karl Popper and Falsificationism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/12/karl-popper-and-falsificationism/) by Michael Zerella - [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon - [Laws of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/17/laws-of-nature/) by Michael Zerella - [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk - [Interpretations of Probability](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/08/interpretations-of-probability/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Introduction to the Probability Calculus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/23/introduction-to-the-probability-calculus/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm Shifts, and Academic Rifts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/16/thomas-kuhn-paradigm-shifts-and-academic-rifts/) by Michael Zerella - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy I: The Superposition of Paths](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/23/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-i-the-superposition-of-paths/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy II: Measurement and Interpretations](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/29/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-ii-measurement-and-interpretations/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Quantum Mechanics and Philosophy III: Implications](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/04/28/quantum-mechanics-and-philosophy-iii-implications/) by Thomas Metcalf Historical Philosophy - [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins - [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) Marc Bobro - [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/) by Addison Ellis - [Idealism Pt. 2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/) by Addison Ellis - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art - [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough - [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) by Brock Rough *Comments are open below for suggestions!* ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) --- ### [Philosophy 101: An Introduction to Philosophy Reading List](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/philosophy101/) **Published:** August 9, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** # How Should We Reason? Philosophical Thinking and Arguments ## 1. What is Philosophy? - 1. [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - 2. [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - 3. [Philosophy as a Way of Life](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/10/21/philosophy-as-a-way-of-life/) by Christine Darr - 4. [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone ## 2. Arguments and Critical Thinking - 1. [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - 2. [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - 3. [“That’s ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/)[Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - 4. Needed: something on fallacies # What Do We Know? Epistemology and Philosophy of Science ## 3. Epistemology: Theory of Knowledge ### 3.1. Knowledge and Justification - 1.1. [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - 1.2. [Epistemic Justification: What is Rational Belief?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/03/19/epistemic-justification/) by Todd R. Long - 1.3. [“The Ethics of Belief”: Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case ### 3.2. Skepticism: What We Might Not Know - 2.1. [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - 2.2. [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro ### 3.3. Knowledge and Society - 3.1. [Expertise: What is an Expert?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - 3.2. [Conspiracy Theories](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/17/conspiracy-theories/) by Jared Millson - 3.3. [The Epistemology of Disagreement: How Should We Respond When People Disagree?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson - 3.4. [Epistemic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas ## 4. Philosophy of Science - 1. [The Problem of Induction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/26/the-problem-of-induction/) by Kenneth Blake Vernon - 2. Needed: Distinguishing Science from Pseudoscience: on Demarcation # What Are We? Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind ## 5. Metaphysics ### 5.1. Personal Identity - 1.1. [Personal Identity: How We Exist Over Time](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance - 1.2. [Psychological Theories of Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley ### 5.2. Free Will and Moral Responsibility - 2.1. [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima - 2.2. [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia - 2.3. [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki ### 5.3. Space and Time - 3.1. [Philosophy of Space and Time: Are the Past and Future Real?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/24/philosophy-of-time/) by Dan Peterson - 3.2. [Time Travel](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/23/time-travel/) by Taylor W. Cyr ## 6. Philosophy of Mind - 1. [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger - 2. [Artificial Intelligence: The Possibility of Artificial Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/13/artificial-intelligence/) by Thomas Metcalf - 3. [Animal Minds](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/24/animal-minds/) by Tiina Carita Rosenqvist # Does God Exist? Philosophy of Religion ## 7. Philosophy of Religion: Belief and God ### 7.1. Ideas of God - 1.1. [The Concept of God: Divine Attributes](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson ### 7.2. Arguments for God’s Existence and Belief in God - 2.1. [Cosmological Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/14/cosmological-arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - 2.2. [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - 2.3. [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman - 2.4. [Arguments from Religious Experience: Richard Swinburne’s ‘Principle of Credulity’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/14/swinburne-on-religious-experience/) by Matthew Sanderson ### 7.3. Arguments Against God’s Existence and Belief in God - 3.1. [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska - 3.2. Atheism: in progress: near complete - 3.3. [The Problem of Evil: Is Suffering Evidence that God Does Not Exist?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf - 3.4. [“God is dead”: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof ### 7.4. Reason, Faith and Evidence - 4.1. Desired: faith and reason. - 4.2. [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson - 4.3. [“Properly Basic” Belief in God: Believing in God without an Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/20/properly-basic-belief/) by Jamie B. Turner ### 7.5. An Afterlife - 5.1. [Hell and Universalism: Could God Sentence Anyone to Eternal Punishment?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier - 5.2. [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira # How Should We Live? Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy ## 8. Ethical Theory ### 8.1. Ethics and Authority - 1.1. [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis - 1.2. [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - 1.3. [Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis - 1.4. [Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/)[Gyges’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/)[ Thought Experiment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/14/platos-ring-of-gyges/) by Spencer ### 8.2. Consequentialist Ethics - 2.1. [Consequentialism and Utilitarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz ### 8.3. Kantian and Non-Consequentialist Ethics - 3.1. [Kantian Deontology: Immanuel Kant’s Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - 3.2. In progress: moral and legal rights ### 8.4. Virtue Ethics - 4.1. [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - 4.2. [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - 4.3. [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey **and/or** [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey ### 8.5. Ethical Pluralism - 5.1. [W.D. ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/)[Ross’s](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/)[ Ethics of “Prima Facie” Duties](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/07/03/prima-facie-duties/) by Matthew Pianalto - 5.2. [Principlism in Biomedical Ethics: Respect for Autonomy, Non-Maleficence, Beneficence, and Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. ### 8.6. Meta-Ethics: Are there Ethical Facts? Are there Ethical Truths? - 6.1. [Ethical Realism, or Moral Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf - 6.2. [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk ## 9.Applied and Practical Ethics ### 9.1. Bioethics and Medical Ethics: Life and Death - 1.1. [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - 1.2. [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - 1.3. An essay on anti- and pro-natalism is in progress - 1.4. something on defining death (and life) (and their value) is in progress, - 1.5. Desired. bodily autonomy: genital cutting: female and male . - 1.6. [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - 1.7. [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis ### 9.2. Ethics and Punishment - 2.1. [Theories of Punishment: What Justifies Punishment?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - 2.2. Needed: punishing people for (illegal) drug use - 2.3. [The Death Penalty](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost ### 9.3. Ethics and Animals - 3.1. [Speciesism: Discrimination on the Basis of Species](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe - 3.2. [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman **OR** In progress: vegetarianism and veganism - 3.3. [Ethics and Animal Research](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/05/animal-research/) by Paul Bali ### 9.4. Ethics and Social Issues - 4.1. [Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, Society, and the Environment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/03/ai-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf - 4.2. Desired: something on guns. - 4.3. [Business Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/12/business-ethics/) by Thomas Metcalf ### 9.5. Ethics and Education - 5.1. [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - 5.2. [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - 5.3. [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis ### 9.6. Ethics and Relationships - 6.1. [What Is It To Love Someone?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - 6.2. [Aristotle on Friendship: What Does It Take to Be a Good Friend?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/30/aristotle-on-friendship/) by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - 6.3. [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk ## 10. Social and Political Philosophy ### 10.1. Theories of Justice - 1.1. [Social Contract Theory: Hobbes, Locke, and the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - 1.2. [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - 1.3. [Robert Nozick’s “Wilt Chamberlain” Argument for Libertarianism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/10/11/wilt-chamberlain/) by Daniel Weltman ### 10.2. Economic Justice - 2.1. [Distributive Justice: How Should Resources be Allocated?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/07/distributive-justice-how-should-resources-be-allocated/) by Dick Timmer and Tim Meijers - 2.2. [Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - 2.3. [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - 2.4. [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf ### 10.3. The Law - 3.1. [Philosophy of Law: An Overview](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/05/18/philosophy-of-law/) by Mark Satta - 3.2. [Free Speech](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/04/free-speech/) by Mark Satta - 3.3. [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case - 3.4. [Civil Disobedience: Seeking Justice by Breaking the Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/04/10/civil-disobedience/) by Henry Krahn ## 11. Philosophy of Sex, Gender and Race - 1. [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - 2. [Sexual Orientation, Sex, and Gender](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/05/sexual-orientation/) by Raja Halwani - 3. [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - 4. [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - 5. [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault # Why Are We? Art, Happiness, and Meaning ## 12. Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art - 1. [Definitions of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/05/definitions-of-art/) by Brock Rough - 2. [Aesthetics vs. Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/13/aesthetics-vs-art/) by Brock Rough - 3. [Videogames and Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/26/videogames-and-philosophy/) by Alex Fisher ## 13. Phenomenology and Existentialism - 1. [Phenomenology: Describing Experiences From a First-Person Perspective](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/12/phenomenology/) by Matthew Sanderson - 2. [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis - 3. [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken ## 14. Meaning, Happiness and Hope - 1. [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - 2. [Stoicism: Finding Happiness in What’s Under Your Control](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/03/28/stoicism/) by Matthew Pianalto - 3. [Transformative Experiences: Can Life-Changing Choices Be Both Rational and Authentic?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/06/24/transformative-experiences/) by Felipe Pereira - 4. [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - 5. [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto --- ### [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/) **Published:** June 29, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Moral Education: Teaching Students to Become Better People](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/07/18/moral-education/) by Dominick Berg - [“That’s Subjective”: Subjectivism about Truth, Beauty, and Goodness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2025/07/26/subjectivism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Plato’s Allegory of the Cave: the Journey Out of Ignorance](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/05/26/allegory-of-the-cave/) by Spencer Case - [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller --- ### [Moral Error Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/moral-error-theory/) **Published:** July 23, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Note: An updated version of this essay below is available [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/14/moral-error-theory/). This essay below was originally posted on April 14, 2014. It was revised and updated by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* and reposted on July 23, 2025. # Moral Error Theory[“Moral Error Theory”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=795&action=edit) Author: Ian Tully Category: [Ethics](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/ "Ethics")Word Count: 1000 Though we often disagree about *which* actions are morally wrong, most of us would agree that at least some actions are actually wrong. An obvious example is abusing children for fun. Yet according to the meta-ethical theory known as *error theory,* it is *false* that abusing children for fun is wrong (and *false* that abusing children for fun is right, too!). This is because, according to error theory, all moral statements are false (or neither true nor false).1 This essay will explain this highly counterintuitive view. ![John Mackie's (1977) "Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong"](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/220px-ethics-_inventing_right_and_wrong.jpg?resize=220%2C361&ssl=1)John Mackie’s (1977) “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong”### I. Understanding the Error Theory The moral error theory originates with J.L. Mackie (1977) and has attracted a number of modern defenders.2 According to one contemporary proponent (Joyce 2001), the view is committed to two theses, the *Conceptual Thesis* and the *Substantive Thesis.* The Conceptual Thesis states that moral statements attempt to make reference to the existence of certain kinds of properties or facts in the world.3 When we use moral language, we are not merely *expressing* our attitude towards certain things; we are attempting to *describe* facts about reality. The Substantive Thesis states that there are no such properties or facts. Therefore, all moral statements are false, attempting to predicate properties or describe facts that do not exist. Compare moral language with ‘witch’ language. When we make statements about witches, our statements are clearly descriptive. When the people of Salem, MA named certain individuals as witches, they were attributing to them certain features – magical powers, say – constitutive of witchhood. Yet there are no individuals with such powers. So all witch-talk fails to refer; anytime someone names someone else a witch, what that person says is false, in error. Moral Error Theorist hold that moral language is similarly in error. ### 2. The Argument from Queerness Why think moral language is like witch language? Mackie provides two arguments, which he calls ‘The Argument from Disagreement’ and ‘The Argument from Queerness’. Though both arguments are interesting and powerful, it is the latter argument that will be the focus of this essay. Mackie sums up the argument as follows: “If there were objective values, then they would be entities…of a very strange sort, *utterly different from anything else in the universe*. (Mackie 77 – my emphasis). What makes moral properties or “objective values” so utterly strange? The problem is their intrinsic normative authority: \[S\]omething’s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, *but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it* (Mackie 78—my emphasis). Now, the way Mackie spells out the worry has raised concerns that he is attacking a strawman.4 However, there is a more plausible reading of the argument from queerness which claims that what is so mysterious about moral properties is their intrinsic *reason-giving force,* or what Richard Garner calls their “intrinsic imperativeness” (Garner 2006: 96). According to error theorists, “obligations exist, but they are hypothetical and institutional” (Garner 98). For instance, if I have a desire, say, to see the latest superhero movie, then I have a reason to go to the movies. Such a reason (or obligation) is hypothetical: it holds *only if* I have the right kind of psychological state – say, a desire. For anyone lacking that state, the reason does not hold. But the moral realist (according to the error theorist) needs more than this. For genuine moral reasons hold regardless of one’s desires or interests. If someone is drowning in a shallow pond and I can easily save her, then I have a reason – a moral reason – to save her regardless of whether I want to, or whether doing so will further some interest of mine. Moral reasons, then, are said to be *categorical*.5 But how could there be reasons for action that are utterly independent of our desires, interests, or other psychological attitudes? As Garner puts it: “It is hard to believe in objective prescriptivity because it is hard to make sense of a demand without a demander, and hard to find a place for demands or demanders apart from human interests and conventions” (Garner 102). In short, the argument for error theory is very simple. When we use moral language, we are attempting to describe or refer to certain properties in the world, properties that provide reasons for action to all rational agents regardless of their interests or attitudes. Yet we can make no sense of what these properties are like. Such language is, arguably, merely a holdover from a theistic worldview, an attempt to have laws without the lawgiver, laws or commands that are somehow built right into the fabric of the world. So, we should reject the existence of moral facts or properties, just as we’ve rejected the existence of witches. ### 3. Responses Moral error theory is a radically counterintuitive view. Not surprisingly, then, it has attracted a number of criticisms. One line of response attacks the conceptual thesis discussed above. Recall that error theorists argue that genuine moral reasons must be categorical. Such a claim is exactly like saying that genuine bachelors must be unmarried: a person simply couldn’t be a bachelor if he were married. Likewise, say error theorists, a reason simply couldn’t be a *moral* reason if were not categorical. However, many philosophers have disputed this.6 Perhaps moral reasons are, like all reasons, (merely) hypothetical. But if the error theorist’s conceptual claim is false, then error theory can’t get off the ground. However, such a reply seems to concede quite a lot to error theorists. Thus, some philosophers (Cuneo 2007; Rowlands 2013) choose instead to attack the substantive thesis, arguing that categorical reasons are not problematic after all. A favorite strategy here is to argue that other sorts of reasons are also categorical, namely, *epistemic reasons.* So, for instance, they argue that the fact that the Earth orbits the Sun is a reason for anyone, regardless of her desires, interests, or inclinations, to believe in the heliocentric theory of the solar system. But if there can be categorical epistemic reasons, why can’t there be categorical moral reasons? ### Notes 1 You may be wondering how error theorists can claim that *all* moral statements are false. After all, by the law of excluded middle, a statement *and its negation* can’t both be false. There are a number of ways around this worry: see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) and Olson (2010) for details. 2 Joyce 2001; Olson 2010; Garner 2012. 3 In philosophical jargon, the claim is that moral statements are “cognitive” or “truth apt.” 4 The way Mackie describes the worry makes it sound as though recognition of the fact that *x* is good would not only provide reason for any agent to pursue *x,* but would *make* anyone pursue *x.* This commits the moral realist to a very strong version of motivational internalism, the thesis that moral facts are intrinsically motivating. But motivational internalism in any form is highly controversial, for it has seemed coherent to many philosophers that a person might sincerely judge that it is right to φ, and yet feel no motivation whatsoever to φ (Brink 1986). At any rate, few, if any, moral realists would subscribe to Mackie’s very strong version of the view. 5 Some error theorists think this line of reasoning doesn’t go far enough. They contend that *all* reasons, oughts, or other normative (as opposed to descriptive) phenomena are mysterious or ‘queer’. So there aren’t any moral reasons, because there aren’t any reasons at all! 6 See, e.g., Shafer-Landau (2005: 111); Kelly et al (2007); Cuneo (2012). ### References [Brink, David. (1986) “Externalist Moral Realism.” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* Supplement: 23-42.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01594.x/abstract;jsessionid=3372C7AE094F866E3546ADD6731F11E8.f04t01?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Cuneo, Terence. (2012) “Moral Naturalism and Categorical Reasons.” In Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds. *Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates*. New York: Cambridge University Press.](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/ethical-naturalism-current-debates?format=PB) [———. (2007) *The Normative Web.* New York: Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-normative-web-9780199581382?q=normative%20web&lang=en&cc=us) [Garner, Richard. (2006) “On The Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts.” In *Arguing About Metaethics*, Andrew Fischer and Simon Kirchin, eds. New York: Routledge. Pgs. 96-107.](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415380270/) [Joyce, Richard. (2001) *The Myth of Morality.* New York: Cambridge University Press. Kelly, D., Stich, S.,](http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/myth-morality?format=PB) [Haley, K., Eng, S., and Fessler, D. (2007) “Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction.” *Mind & Language*, Vol. 22 No. 2. Pgs. 117–131.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00302.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false) [Mackie, John L. (1977) *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.* New York: Penguin Books.](http://www.amazon.com/Ethics-Inventing-Right-Wrong-Mackie/dp/B00DS9390I/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1397430634&sr=8-2&keywords=Ethics%3A+Inventing+Right+and+Wrong) [Olson, Jonas. (2010) “In Defense of Moral Error Theory,” in Michael Brady, ed., *New Waves in Metaethics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 62-84.](http://us.macmillan.com/newwavesinmetaethics/MichaelBrady) [Rowland, Richard. (2013) “Moral Error Theory and The Argument From Epistemic Reasons.” *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* Vol 7 No 1.](http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jetshy7&div=4&id=&page=) [Shafer-Landau, Russ. (2005) “Error Theory and the Possibility of Normative Theory.” *Philosophical Issues* (Normativity) \[15\] Pgs. 107-120.](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00056.x/abstract) [Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. (2006) *Moral Skepticisms.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.](http://global.oup.com/academic/product/moral-skepticism-9780195342062?q=Moral%20Skepticisms&lang=en&cc=us) ### Related Essays [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/ "Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory") by Spencer Case [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk [Reason is the Slave to the Passions: Hume on Reason vs. Desire](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/11/17/reason-is-the-slave-to-the-passions/) by Daniel Weltman ### About the Author [Ian Tully](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/tag/Tully) is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy and Mental Disorder at Johns Hopkins University’s Berman Institute of Bioethics. He completed his PhD in philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. He also holds an M.A. in philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder and a B.A. in philosophy from George Washington University. He is interested in ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of mind. <https://ianmtully.wixsite.com/iantullyphilosophy> ##### Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) --- ### [For Students](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/for-students/) **Published:** March 17, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** *1000-Word Philosophy* is a resource developed for students, their instructors, and anyone interested in philosophy, ethics, and critical thinking. All of our essays are now available in audio format; many of our essays are available as [videos](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/videos/). We also have two resources developed for students, written by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy*: - [How to Read Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/reading/) - [How to Write a Philosophical Essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/writing-essays/) ## New to Philosophy? You might begin with these essays: - [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case ## Units *New*! We have [units of essays on topics of current and everlasting interest](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/units/). ## Further Resources ### Encyclopedias and Research Tools - *[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/):* overviews by experts in philosophy: written for advanced philosophers. - [*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:* ](https://iep.utm.edu/)accessible overviews on all areas of philosophy: good for students. - [*Early Modern Texts*: ](https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/)texts from early modern philosophy translated into more accessible language. - [*PhilPapers*: ](https://philpapers.org/)a searchable index of philosophical publications. - [*Diversity Reading List*](https://diversityreadinglist.org/): collects high quality texts in philosophy written by authors from under-represented groups. ### Why Study Philosophy - [*American Philosophical Association’s Brief Guide for Undergraduates:* t](https://www.apaonline.org/page/undergraduates)he APA’s guide on the value of studying philosophy. - [*Why Major in Philosophy?* ](https://philosophy.unc.edu/undergraduate/the-major/why-major-in-philosophy/)The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s explanation for why you should major in philosophy. - [*Why Study Philosophy?* ](https://philosophy.northwestern.edu/about/why-study-philosophy.html)A list of reports from people about how studying philosophy benefitted them in their professional careers. ### Philosophy Magazines - [*The Philosophers’ Magazine*](https://philosophersmag.com/) - [*Philosophy Now*](https://philosophynow.org/) - [*New Philosopher*](https://www.newphilosopher.com/) - [*Think*](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/think): an academic journal specializing in accessible essays on topics in philosophy written by top scholars. - [*The Stone – The New York Times*](https://www.nytimes.com/column/the-stone): a column in The New York Times devoted to philosophical topics. ### Philosophy Summaries - [*Mini Philosophy*](https://miniphilosophy.com/): philosophical ideas and theories explained in short, accessible summaries designed for a general audience. - [*Philosophy Break*](https://philosophybreak.com/): a philosophy resource that explains philosophy for non-experts, including free courses. - [*that-which \| Philosophy Philosophemes Philosophers*](https://that-which.com/): summaries of 19th and 20th century philosophers who write primarily on phenomenology and existentialism. - [*Daily Philosophy*](https://daily-philosophy.com/): essays on philosophical topics for the general public, including many on applying philosophy to everyday problems. - [*Philosophy Unlocked*](https://www.dustinlocke.com/philosophy-unlocked): accessible summaries of philosophy written from the standpoint of the original authors. - [*The Philosophy Teaching Library*](https://philolibrary.crc.nd.edu/) : guided tours of major philosophical texts. - [*Prindle Post*](https://www.prindleinstitute.org/prindle-post/): short essays on philosophical issues in contemporary society. - [*The Deviant Philosopher*](https://thedeviantphilosopher.org/primers/): introductions to major topics in philosophy. ### Philosophy News and Information - [*Daily Nous*](https://dailynous.com/): news and discussion for people interested in philosophy. - [*Who Studies Philosophy?*](https://www.apaonline.org/page/whostudiesphilosophy): a list of significant people in business, politics, and entertainment who studied philosophy in college. - [*American Philosophical Association’s Undergrad Resources*](https://www.apaonline.org/page/undergrad_resources): a page maintained by the American Philosophical Association with links to student resources. ### Philosophical Organizations - [*American Philosophical Association*](https://www.apaonline.org/) - [*Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy*](https://american-philosophy.org/) - [*Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*](https://www.spep.org/) - [*PLATO, the Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization*](https://www.plato-philosophy.org/): this organization nurtures young people’s curiosity, critical thinking, and desire to explore big questions, through philosophy and ethics programs for students, educators, and families. ### Philosophical Videos - *[Wi-Phi: ](https://www.wi-phi.com/)*videos on philosophers and topics in all areas of philosophy. - [*Train of Thoughts*](https://www.youtube.com/@TrainOfThoughts/): animated videos on philosophical issues, including many *1000-Word Philosophy* essays ### Philosophy Podcasts - *[philosophy bites](https://nigelwarburton.typepad.com/philosophy_bites/)*: a popular podcast featuring philosophers. - [*Philosophy Talk:* ](https://www.philosophytalk.org/)a radio program and podcast devoted to philosophy. - [*The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast*](https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/): a popular philosophy podcast. - [*Hi-Phi Nation:* ](https://hiphination.org/)a podcast on all areas of philosophy driven by stories. - [*Micro-Digressions: A Philosophy Podcast*](https://www.buzzsprout.com/956725): philosophical excursions into interesting, and often controversial, topics. - [*Overthink*](https://overthinkpodcast.com/): a podcast hosted by philosophy professors that explores new perspectives on perennial philosophical questions. - [*Story Phi*](https://storyphi.buzzsprout.com/): Come for the story. Stay for the philosophy. ### Interviews with Philosophers - [*What Is It Like to Be a Philosopher?*](https://www.whatisitliketobeaphilosopher.com/): interviews with living philosophers about their work and lives. - [*I Am An American Philosopher*](https://american-philosophy.org/i-am-an-american-philosopher-interview-series/): interviews with contemporary American philosophers. ### Philosophy Q&A - *[Ask Philosophers: ](https://www.askphilosophers.org/)*submit questions and professional philosophers will answer them. *Please check back for more resources that would be especially useful for students. Please send us any suggestions. Thank you!* --- ### [Chinese Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/) **Published:** June 25, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey - [The Ethics of Mozi: Social Organization and Impartial Care](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/08/01/the-ethics-of-mozi/) by Henrique Schneider - [*Wu-Wei*: Acting without Desire](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider - [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider --- ### [Buddhist Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/buddhist-philosophy/) **Published:** February 25, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** - [The Buddhist Theory of No-Self (Anātman/Anattā)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/25/no-self/) by Daniel Weltman - [Dharma in Abhidharma Buddhism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) by Nicholaos Jones --- ### [Africana Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/african-philosophy/) **Published:** September 8, 2019 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal --- ### [Search](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/search/) **Published:** June 30, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** --- ### [Divine Hiddenness: please see updated version](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/divine-hiddenness-please-see-updated-version/) **Published:** May 24, 2025 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** ##### Editors’ note: an updated version, posted 5/24/2025 is posted [here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/); below is the original version of this essay which was posted on May 18, 2016. # Divine Hiddenness Author: David Bayless Category: [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) Word Count: 1000 If God exists, wants us to know him, and has the power to reveal himself to us, then why do so many people claim to have such a difficult time experiencing or interacting with him? Why does God appear to be *hidden* from so many people? Perhaps the reason is not because God exists and is in some way concealed, but, instead, because God does not exist. A type of argument against God’s existence—a “Divine Hiddenness Argument”[\[1\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn1)—argues this. The argument maintains that God’s hiddenness would be incompatible with his divine nature, so the fact that God seems hidden from many of us is best explained by the fact that God does not exist.[\[2\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn2) Here we’ll examine this type of argument and three of the most promising responses to it. ![Michelangelo_Caravaggio_063](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/michelangelo_caravaggio_063.jpg?resize=656%2C797&ssl=1) ### 1. The Argument Hiddenness Arguments begin with a claim to which many theists agree: that God, if he exists, is *all-loving*, *all-knowing*, and *all-powerful*. This premise aligns with the traditional monotheistic idea that God is the greatest conceivable being.[\[3\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn3) The argument then claims that if God is all-loving, he would care deeply about whether his creatures believe that he exists. As a result, it would be unacceptable to God if any reasonable individuals failed to believe in him; a truly loving creator would want to form relationships with his creatures—which can’t happen if they are ignorant of his existence.[\[4\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn4) Also, God wouldn’t want anyone (reasonable or not) to die in a state of nonbelief, lest the departed miss their chance to go to Heaven.[\[5\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn5) We can imagine additional scenarios where not believing in his existence would be repugnant to an all-loving God.[\[6\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn6) The final step in Hiddenness Arguments is to observe that there *are* reasonable people who fail to believe in God, and that there *are* people who die as nonbelievers. Simply put, God is *hidden* when it seems he should not be. What does all of this entail? If God exists and were in fact all-loving, then he would want creatures like us to know that he exists. But if God is hidden, then such knowledge is difficult or impossible for such creatures to attain. And God *is in fact hidden* from many of us. Therefore, we can conclude that God doesn’t exist. For, if God *did* exist, he would not be hidden in a way that results in the nonbelief of many. This is the crux of Hiddenness Arguments. ### 2. Three Proposed Solutions Now let’s review three of the most popular responses to these arguments. ### 2.1. There Are No Real Nonbelievers We have seen that Hiddenness Arguments must cite some fact about the absence of human belief in God that is purportedly incompatible with an all-loving God’s existence. That some reasonable people fail to accept his reality is one case in point. This leads to our first response: *there are no real nonbelievers*: it’s *not* true that there are reasonable people who fail to believe in God.[\[7\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn7) These people must be guilty of self-deception, negligence, or stubbornness, so they aren’t *really* reasonable. This response, though easy to understand, is difficult to accept. There certainly *seem* to be reasonable people who fail to accept God’s existence, as anyone who has spoken with a thoughtful, informed nonbeliever can attest. In any case, we’d need strong evidence to doubt this or any other belief-related observations referenced by Hiddenness Arguments, and it is very unclear how this claim about what other people *really* believe, reasonably or not, could be supported. ### 2.2. Hiddenness Promotes Some Greater Good A second response asks this: what if God can achieve something good he otherwise couldn’t by concealing himself in a manner described by Hiddenness Arguments? God might, for example, induce someone to seek him all the more fervently by *not* clearly revealing himself to this individual. [\[8\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn8) Or maybe God hides himself to respect our autonomy as moral agents: if we were always aware of his presence, we may come to choose good actions out of fear rather than desire for what is right.[\[9\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn9) One worry with this response is that we can readily imagine God figuring out ways to secure these and other related ends while nevertheless revealing himself. So it seems *possible* for God to achieve whatever good he desires *while also* making himself known; if he couldn’t do this, we might wonder why an all-powerful, all-knowing being lacked this apparently possible ability.[\[10\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn10) To respect our moral autonomy, for instance, God might provide a mild, almost subconscious awareness of his presence that wouldn’t significantly interfere with our day-to-day moral reasoning. If we want to find a successful response in this vein, we’ll have to argue that the “greater good” designated must truly be unattainable so long as God is revealing himself to his creatures. ### 2.3. God’s Will Is Inscrutable A final response submits that we finite creatures are in a poor position to discern the motives of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving creator.[\[11\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftn11) Can a toddler guess why her parents take her to the doctor or daycare center? Of course not. The parents have good reasons for their actions, but the toddler can’t possibly know them. This response claims we’re like toddlers relative to God, and so shouldn’t hope to understand why he’s hidden. In response, although humans are underdeveloped vis-à-vis God, it doesn’t follow that we’re *totally incapable* of predicting when he should reveal himself. This is because mature individuals are often clever and creative—more so than any toddler. Our predictions may not be unquestionably accurate, but can they be *that* wide of the mark? If so, it’s hard to understand how anyone could be confident in any of their beliefs about God. ### 3. Conclusion For people who seek God but do not find God, Hiddenness Arguments are especially important. They are also important to anyone who thinks that God loves and cares for everyone. This type of argument, and responses to it, are surely worthy of further consideration. ### Notes [\[1\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref1) Two other common names are ‘Arguments from Reasonable Nonbelief’ and ‘Arguments from Divine Hiddenness.’ [\[2\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref2) The arguments began with the work of J.L. Schellenberg. Schellenberg (2006) is his earliest presentation of a Hiddenness Argument. Refurbished renditions are found in Schellenberg (2007) and Schellenberg (2015). [\[3\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref3) Such a notion of God originates with St. Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033-1109). See Anselm (2001), p. 7. [\[4\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref4) See Schellenberg (2006), pp. 38-40 and Schellenberg (2015), pp. 41-42 for elaboration of these points. [\[5\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref5) This is similar to how Theodore Drange formulates his Hiddenness Argument in Drange (1996). [\[6\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref6) One is the uneven distribution of theistic belief throughout the globe, a sociological datum on which Stephen Maitzen builds a Hiddenness Argument in Maitzen (2006). [\[7\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref7) This response is pressed in Henry (2001) and Henry (2008). [\[8\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref8) An approach derivable from various suppositions in Pascal (1995), e.g., that humans are “miserable” without God. [\[9\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref9) This sort of response is elucidated in Moser (2008), e.g., on pp. 20-21. [\[10\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref10) Cf. Schellenberg (2015), pp. 109-112. [\[11\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/#_ftnref11) For a representative presentation of this response, see McBrayer and Swenson (2012). ### References [Anselm. *Proslogion, with the replies of Gaunilo and Anselm*. tr. Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001 \[1075-78\].](http://www.amazon.com/Proslogion-Replies-Gaunilo-Anselm/dp/0872205657/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462939903&sr=8-1&keywords=Anselm.+Proslogion%2C+with+the+replies+of+Gaunilo+and+Anselm) [Drange, Theodore. “Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief.” 1996. Published on The Secular Web.](http://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/aeanb.html) [Henry, Doug. “Does Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?” *Faith and Philosophy* 18 (1), 2001: 75-92.](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=faithphil&id=faithphil_2001_0018_0001_0075_0092) [–– “Reasonable Doubts about Reasonable Nonbelief.” *Faith and Philosophy* 25 (3), 2008: 276-289.](https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=faithphil&id=faithphil_2008_0025_0003_0276_0289) [Maitzen, Stephen. “Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism.” *Religious Studies* 42 (2), 2006: 171-191. ](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=425931&fileId=S0034412506008274) [McBrayer, Justin and Swenson, Philip. “Skepticism about the Argument from Divine Hiddenness.” *Religious Studies* 48 (2), 2012: 129-150.](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8553395&fileId=S003441251100014X) [Moser, Paul. *The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.](http://www.amazon.com/Elusive-God-Reorienting-Religious-Epistemology/dp/052112008X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462973654&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Elusive+God%3A+Reorienting+Religious+Epistemology) [Pascal, Blaise. *Pensees*. tr. A.J. Krailsheimer. New York: Penguin Classics, 1995 \[c. 1660\].](http://www.amazon.com/Pensees-Penguin-Classics-Blaise-Pascal/dp/0140446451/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462973705&sr=8-1&keywords=Pascal++Krailsheimer) [Schellenberg, J. L. *Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason*. New York: Cornell University Press, 2006 \[1993\]. ](http://www.amazon.com/Hiddenness-Cornell-Studies-Philosophy-Religion/dp/0801473462/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462973736&sr=8-1&keywords=Divine+Hiddenness+and+Human+Reason.) [–– *The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism*. New York: Cornell University Press, 2007.](http://www.amazon.com/Wisdom-Doubt-Justification-Religious-Skepticism/dp/0801478510/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462973770&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Wisdom+to+Doubt%3A+A+Justification+of+Religious+Skepticism.) [–– *The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.](http://www.amazon.com/Hiddenness-Argument-Philosophys-Challenge-Belief/dp/0198733089/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1462973801&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Hiddenness+Argument%3A+Philosophy%E2%80%99s+New+Challenge+to+Belief+in+God) ### Related Essays [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/ "The Problem of Evil") by Thomas Metcalf [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier ### About the Author David Bayless, MD, holds BAs in physics and philosophy from the Samford University Fellows Program, and is a Resident in Internal Medicine at the Mayo Clinic School of Graduate Medical Education in Rochester, MN. His non-medical academic interests include philosophy of religion, social psychology, and the philosophy of dreaming. He believing that the study of philosophy and other humanities can enhance the quality of medical research and patient care. ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy)*,* [*Bluesky*](https://bsky.app/profile/1000wordphilosophy.bsky.social)*,* [*Instagram*](https://www.instagram.com/1000wordphilosophy/)*,* [*Twitter / X*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil)*, and [Threads](https://www.threads.com/@1000wordphilosophy) and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com.*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/) --- ### [An Introduction to Philosophy readings list](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/introduction-to-philosophy-readings-list/) **Published:** May 31, 2024 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** A readings schedule for an 11 week summer philosophy class that meets once a week for 2 hours. **Content:** A readings schedule for an 11-week summer philosophy class that meets once a week for 2 hours. These readings bundled into a [single file packet in PDF here](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Introduction-to-Philosophy-readings-packet.pdf). *Obviously, so many more readings could (and should!) be included, but we can only cover so much: other topics will surely come up in discussion!* **Week 1: What is philosophy? What are good arguments? What’s the meaning of Rene Descartes’ famous phrase, “I think, therefore I am” from his *Meditations*?** - [What is Philosophy?](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli **Week 2: What is Descartes’ *Meditations* all about? What is knowledge? What are we, what’s our *essence*? What are our minds? Is there a God?** - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro **Week 3: What is knowledge? What are reasonable, justified beliefs? Is there an “ethics of belief”?** - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case. **Week 4: What are we? When do we begin? When might we end (if ever)? What (again) are our minds? How do we exist over time? Do we ever have free will (and what is “free will” anyway?)?** - [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2024/02/03/mind-body-problem/) by Jacob Berger - [Free Will and Free Choice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/ "Free Will and Free Choice") by Jonah Nagashima **Week 5: What does “God” mean? Is there a God? Should we believe there’s a God? What religious beliefs should we have (if any)?** - [Attributes of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson - [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf - [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson **Week 6: What *makes* wrong actions wrong? What makes right actions right? Utilitarianism and Kant’s ethics.** - [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz - [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case **Week 7: Why do we have government? What form of government would be ideal? What is justice? Does government have to make up for its wrongs? Social contract theories and reparations.** - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault **Week 8: Ethical issues concerning the ends and beginnings of life. Abortion and euthanasia, or mercy killing.** - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis **Week 9: Ethical issues concerning discrimination: racism, sexism, *speciesism*, and more.** - [What Is Misogyny?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/07/06/what-is-misogyny/) by Odelia Zuckerman and Clair Morrissey - [Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/06/20/philosophy-and-race/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe **Week 10: Ethical issue(s): students’ choices! *To be determined!*** **Week 11: What is a meaningful life? What makes life more meaningful?** - [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/) by Matthew Pianalto - [The Meaning of Life: What’s the Point?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2023/02/06/meaning-of-life/) by Matthew Pianalto --- ### [Two "Introduction to Ethics" Reading Lists for Syllabi Construction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/introduction-to-ethics-reading-lists/) **Published:** December 18, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Below are partial reading lists for two Introduction to Ethics courses that are based on readings from *1000-Word Philosophy*. These are not full syllabi, of course, but they can give ideas for how these readings might be used in a course. Please feel free to use this and modify it in any way you see fit for your classes. Here is a draft reading list for [Introduction to Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/an-introduction-to-philosophy-reading-list-for-syllabi-construction/). Return to the [teaching](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching) page. ### Reading List 1 | Module | Objectives You should be able: | Required Learning Resources | |---|---|---| | 1: What Is Philosophy? What Is Ethics? | to distinguish philosophical study from other areas of study; to accurately summarize and evaluate different views on the status of ethics and apply them to your prior understanding of the study of ethics | Reading 1: [What Is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf Reading 2: [Evolution and Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution-and-ethics/) by Michael Klenk Reading 3: [Ethical Realism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/11/05/ethical-realism/), or Moral Realism by Thomas Metcalf | | 2: Happiness and the Good Life | to define, explain, and apply views on the value of happiness and utility to summarize and evaluate Mill’s arguments regarding happiness and the good life | Reading 1: [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/): What Is It to Be Happy? by Kiki Berk Reading 2: [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller Reading 3: [John Stuart Mill on the Good Life: Higher Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller | | 3: Consequentialism vs. Deontology | to summarize and evaluate the normative theories of consequentialism and deontology, and to explain the implications of each to apply these theories to moral issues and compare and contrast what each entails | Reading 1: [Introduction to Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz Reading 2: [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman Reading 3: [(Im)partiality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/18/impartiality/) by Shane Gronholz | | 4: Moral Responsibility and Reactive Attitudes | to accurately characterize the free will debate and describe the implications for moral responsibility to apply puzzles regarding moral responsibility to our reactive attitudes of praise and blame | Reading 1: [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia Reading 2: [Ignorance and Blame: Can Ignorance Excuse?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/14/ignorance-and-blame/) By Daniel Miller Reading 3: [Moral Luck](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/08/moral-luck/) by Jonathan Spelman | | 5: Punishment and Crime | to summarize and evaluate competing justifications of punishment and their implications to apply theories of punishment to concrete issues and situations | Reading 1: [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Roberts Reading 2: [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) Benjamin S. Yost 3: [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) By Spencer Case | | 6: Justice and Race | to summarize and evaluate arguments that relate to race and other identifying characteristics to apply philosophical and justice-based arguments to real-world topics and experiences | Reading 1: [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe Reading 2: [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman Reading 3: [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas Reading 4: [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal | | 7: Applied Ethics Topics | to accurately summarize and evaluate particular applied ethics arguments to apply theoretical knowledge from earlier in our course to these arguments to evaluate consistency in your own reasoning and to apply that reasoning to your understanding of your moral obligations | Reading 1: [Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/) by Dan Lowe Reading 2: [Licensing Parents](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/01/30/licensing-parents/) by Ryan Jenkins Reading 3: [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch Required Viewing: [The How and Why of Effective Altruism](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Diuv3XZQXyc) by Peter Singer | ## Reading List 2 Most of the readings for this course are from *1000-Word Philosophy*. When other materials are publicly available, we’ve included links for those also. #### Unit 1 \| Introductory Weeks: Welcome to Ethics! - [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Tom Metcalf - [An Ethical Theory: Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [Video: Kant & Categorical Imperatives](https://youtu.be/8bIys6JoEDw) - [An Ethical Theory: Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz - [Video: Utilitarianism (a form of Consequentialism)](https://youtu.be/-a739VjqdSI) - [An Ethical Theory: The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [Videos: Ubuntu](https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=ubuntu+ethics) - [An Ethical Theory: John Rawls’ Theory of Justice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Videos: Rawls Theory of Justice](https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=rawls+veil+of+ignorance) - [Ethics and Extra Credit ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/)by Nathan Nobis #### Unit 2 \| Bio-medical Ethics; Euthanasia, Health Disparities - This unit’s main reading is James Rachels’ *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*, “What is Morality?” chapter. A link for that chapter is not provided here. - [Video overview of Elements of Moral Philosophy](https://youtu.be/vtqtE5f7oNk) chapter (40 minutes) - “[Euthanasia or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/)” by Nathan Nobis - “[Principlism in Biomedical Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/principlism-in-biomedical-ethics/)” by G. M. Trujillo, Jr. - “[Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/)” by Chelsea Haramia - “[Racial Health Disparities](https://www.pfizer.com/news/hot-topics/health_disparities_among_african_americans)” (also “[Racism, Inequality and Health Care for African Americans](https://tcf.org/content/report/racism-inequality-health-care-african-americans/?agreed=1)”) #### Unit 3 \| Relativism and some Applications: Genital Cutting, Polyamory - [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis. - [A video on relativism: Is Cultural Relativism Racist?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLqj8yCmGxI): (60 minutes): There are many good videos that give an overview and critique of cultural or ethical relativism. This is a good one that reviews many of the objections to the theory, focusing on how the theory could be used to defend racism and slavery (and so that’s a good reason to reject the theory): - Readings on genital cutting - [What’s Culture Got to Do with It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14SVM-Kcug43O4JEfNZZ8QyjD6umGxoHw/view?usp=sharing), Harvard Law Review, 1993. - [“Boys and girls alike: An un-consenting child, an unnecessary, invasive surgery: is there any moral difference between male and female circumcision?”](https://aeon.co/essays/are-male-and-female-circumcision-morally-equivalent) Brian Earp, Aeon. - A video: [Female genital mutilation and male circumcision – don’t compare them?](https://youtu.be/MXfjgPr-YsA) Also, there are many videos on the topic of female genital mutilation, female circumcision, and female genital cutting, as well as the ethics of male circumcision. If you’d like, look on Youtube to see what you find! - Two readings on polyamory and monogamy (60 minutes): - [A philosopher makes the case for polyamory](https://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/2/23/14684236/monogamy-valentines-day-polyamory-marriage-love), Vox. - [“Why Monogamy Is Marvelous: In Defence Of Fidelity,”](http://www.thecritique.com/articles/why-monogamy-is-marvelous/) Fiona Woollard, The Critique, 2017 #### Unit 4 \| Ethics & Religion: Sexual Ethics - A reading on the [divine command theory of ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case - A reading on ethics and the Bible (link not available) - A [Video on both Arguments from the Bible & the Divine Command Theory](https://youtu.be/wRHBwxC8b8I) - Video: John Corvino, “[What’s morally wrong with homosexuality](https://youtu.be/5iXA_0MED98)?” (60 minutes) (see his [other videos](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCIfaK23JF8w-x7LBEtuX0eg) also) - [What is it to love someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - An article on racism in dating. (link not available) - [Do Black Men Have a Moral Duty to Marry Black Women?](http://charleswmills.com/content/Mills_ShouldBlackMenMarryBlackWomen.pdf) by Charles Mills, 1994 ### Unit 5 \| Abortion; Ethics & Animals - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - “[Speciesism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/20/speciesism/)” by Dan Lowe - [The Moral Status of Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) by Jason Wyckoff - Video: “[Their Future is in your hands](https://youtu.be/w-AUBaabXL8)” by Animal Aid - “[Reasonable Humans and Animals](https://philosophy302.blogspot.com/p/1-reasonable-humans-and-animals-by-john.html)” by John Simmons - [Abstract of the Position of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics: Vegetarian Diets ](https://www.eatrightpro.org/-/media/eatrightpro-files/practice/position-and-practice-papers/position-papers/vegetarian-diet.pdf) ### Unit 6 \| Punishment; Capital Punishment; Punishment for Drug Use - [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers - [Is death bad?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman (Please read the Introduction, Sections 1 & 2 and the conclusion, section 6) - [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin Yost - [America’s Unjust Drug War ](https://spot.colorado.edu/~huemer/papers/drugs.htm)by Michael Huemer - [Video: Overview of America’s Unjust Drug War](https://youtu.be/Aum9VxT0f-Q) - [Video: Introduction to Michelle Alexander’s “The New Jim Crow”](https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=michelle+alexander+the+new+jim+crow) (review a number of videos) - “[Racial Justice Requires Ending the War on Drugs](https://philpapers.org/rec/LEWRJR)” by Brian Earp, *et al* - Video: Discussion of “[Racial Justice Requires Ending the War on Drugs](https://youtu.be/KMaj5ew-dA8)” (60 minutes) ### Unit 7 \| Absolute Poverty; Reparations for Slavery - An Ethical Theory: [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis - Ethics and Absolute Poverty: [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - Video: [Effective Altruism](https://youtu.be/Diuv3XZQXyc) - An Ethical Theory: [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini and [“Nasty, Brutish, and Short”: Thomas Hobbes on Life in the State of Nature](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/07/14/hobbes-on-the-state-of-nature/) by Daniel Weltman - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [A Basic Argument for Reparations](https://www.colinmcginn.net/reparations/) by Colin McGinn - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault - [Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Testimony on Reparations](https://youtu.be/kcCnQ3iRkys) - Video: [Ta-Nehisi Coates On The Case For Reparations](https://youtu.be/vKsv4nMzSeg) - [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf #### Unit 8 \| Moral Progress; Happiness and Meaning in Life - Video: [The Progress of Liberalism](https://youtu.be/lrZ2DJzbYYo): Michael Huemer - [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis - [African American Existentialism: DuBois, Locke, Thurman, and King](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/16/african-american-existentialism/) by Anthony Sean Neal - [Happiness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Birk Return to the **[teaching page](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching-units/)**. --- ### [How to Read Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/reading/) **Published:** February 3, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** How do you read philosophy? This is a guide to reading philosophy. **Content:** Author: The Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* Category: [Student Resources](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/for-students/) Word Count: 1000 When you are reading philosophy in any form—a book, essay, dialogue, or anything else—it’s going to take time: philosophy isn’t the kind of subject to be taken in passively while you sit back and relax.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) There may be ideas and claims that you don’t immediately understand, but this is completely normal: philosophy, more than many other subjects, requires actively trying to understand what the text means. Practically, this means that before you read, you should find a comfortable place to read without distractions. You should also mark up the text or take notes, especially when an author defines any important terms or theories. This essay will help you get the most out of your reading by providing a 3-step strategy for reading philosophical texts. [![Actively reading a philosophy text. ](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/reading-philosophy.jpeg?resize=656%2C492&ssl=1)](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/reading-philosophy.jpeg?ssl=1) Actively reading a philosophy text. ### 1. Step 1: Skim to Get the Lay of the Land Once you’re ready, you can start by skimming the text to try to figure out the *topic*: e.g., God’s existence, what knowledge is, the morality of abortion, or any other philosophical topic. Next, look for the author’s *main point*, their conclusion on that topic. In contemporary philosophy articles, this will often be in the introduction, sometimes explicitly stated as a thesis. In older writings, the main point may not become clear until the end of the text. But it’s OK to skip to the end! Philosophy isn’t a mystery—there aren’t spoilers. When you start reading, it’s OK not to know whether you agree with the author’s main point. In fact, it’s best to hold off on forming an opinion until you find their *argument*, or their support for that main claim.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) At this stage, your goal is just to know where the author is going. Sometimes it is difficult to find the main point by skimming, especially if the text is a dialogue or a poem. But it can still be worthwhile to skim to see what’s coming up and how it’s organized. You might even write a brief outline of the text to keep track of its organization. Sometimes the author will do this for you—contemporary articles often summarize their organization at the end of the introduction. ### 2. Step 2: Read Slowly and Actively Once you know the lay of the land, you should start reading more slowly and seriously, starting from the beginning. Look for the author’s *argument* for their main point—the reasons they provide for their conclusion. As you go, check in with yourself about how comfortable you feel that you understand what the author is saying. When you feel your confidence slipping, slow down. *Don’t assume the author agrees with a claim they’re talking about* Philosophers sometimes write at length about some view or argument, even though they don’t agree with it. Sometimes this sets up a contrast with their own views. If an author brings up conflicting ideas, it can seem like they are contradicting themselves. But be on the lookout for indications of which ideas are accepted by the author and which aren’t. *Ask yourself what you think about the author’s ideas* Philosophers very often write in response to questions and objections that they think readers will have. If you are reading passively, and not forming questions and objections, it can be unclear why the author is talking about something. As you take notes, mark up where you find yourself doubting a claim and why. *Read charitably* Whenever we can, we should interpret someone’s ideas in the strongest possible form. Philosophers call this *the principle of charitable interpretation*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Suppose an author argues that we do not have free will. This will seem ridiculous or simplistic, since surely people do things all the time—they’re not frozen in place! But stop yourself and ask what the author *means* by “free will.” Perhaps it is *not* the idea that *people never do things*, but rather that *everything people do is determined by past events*. This is more plausible. It’s always worth looking for a charitable interpretation, even if afterwards the idea is still implausible. Doing so helps ensure that you are considering the best possible argument. ### 3. Step 3: Pause When You Need Help When you get confused, it’s tempting to just skip ahead a few paragraphs and hope that the text starts making sense. Occasionally this works, but often you’ll end up *more* confused. Philosophical ideas and arguments build gradually, incorporating previous concepts as they go. When you get confused, backtrack a little ways, and try to pinpoint exactly where you got lost. *Apply your own words and examples* A good test for understanding a text is whether you can put the author’s ideas in your own words. With a difficult passage, try “translating” it into words that make sense to you. Sometimes you understand the words, but find the ideas very abstract. In this case, fill in your own examples of what the author is saying. Imagine how you would apply a concept or a claim to a simple, concrete case. *Look up any confusing terms* When you are confused because there is a specific word that you don’t know, or which seems to be used in a strange way, look it up in a reference *specific to philosophy*, such as: - [*1000-Word Philosophy*](http://1000wordphilosophy.com) - [*The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](http://www.iep.utm.edu) - [*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*](http://plato.stanford.edu) Some of these entries are long, but you don’t need to read the entire entry—just read until you understand the technical term. Sometimes philosophy is *about* how to define a concept, and the entry will contain lengthy discussion of the term. Nevertheless, a reference can still give you the gist of it. *Try an alternative translation where applicable* If the text was translated from another language, try a different translation of a confusing passage. *Talk to other people* It will be easier to work out puzzling passages with people reading the same text—especially if all of you are using the strategies above. ### 4. Conclusion Reading philosophy can be disorienting, even baffling. But if you develop good reading habits like the ones above, philosophy will be more comprehensible, rewarding, and enjoyable.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ### Notes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) For an introductory explanation of what philosophy is, see [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) For an explanation of what philosophers tend to mean by an “argument,” see [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Using the principle of charity in reading and, really, all forms of listening to understand other people is part of being a critical thinker. For an introduction to critical thinking, see [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Philosophy is easier to read when it is better written. For an introductory guide to writing philosophy, see [How to Write a Philosophical Essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/writing-essays/). by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy.* ### For Further Reading [David W. Concepción: “Reading As A Philosopher.”](https://www.philosophersmag.com/essays/201-reading-as-a-philosopher) [Jim Pryor: “Guidelines on Reading Philosophy.”](http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/reading.html) [Kimberly Blessing: “I Re-Read, Therefore I Understand.”](https://philosophynow.org/issues/94/I_Re-Read_Therefore_I_Understand) [Crystal L’Hote: “Reading Philosophy – Some Tips”](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fZ-tiLxZhIwlERLD6laeTkeB60ONHCyZ/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=108154974511692412680&rtpof=true&sd=true) ### Related Essays [How to Write a Philosophical Essay](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/writing-essays/) by the Editors of *1000-Word Philosophy* [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf [Arguments: Why Do You Believe What You Believe?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/12/28/arguments/) by Thomas Metcalf [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores ### Translation [Turkish](https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/felsefe-metni-nasil-okunur-1000-word-philosophy-editorleri/), [Korean, ](https://doingphilosophy.kr/reading-philosophy/)[Thai](https://philososerious.wordpress.com/2024/06/19/%e0%b8%a7%e0%b8%b4%e0%b8%98%e0%b8%b5%e0%b8%ad%e0%b9%88%e0%b8%b2%e0%b8%99%e0%b8%9b%e0%b8%a3%e0%b8%b1%e0%b8%8a%e0%b8%8d%e0%b8%b2/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1MG4OZ8QP4WTIDMxTLJIMxy8mOFPZ6N4t-NNx0p8W5eVu7eqy54nhAzXs_aem_ZmFrZWR1bW15MTZieXRlcw) ### PDF Download Download [this essay in PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/reading-philosophy.pdf). ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on* [*Facebook*](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/) *and* [*Twitter*](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) *and subscribe to receive email notifications of new essays at* [*1000WordPhilosophy.com*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/). --- ### [Desired Essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/desired-essays/) **Published:** June 1, 2018 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** The following is an incomplete list of topics we are seeking submissions on. This list is *not exhaustive*, and *1000-Word Philosophy* welcomes submissions on a wide variety of topics. *However, we are currently focused on prioritizing essays on “core” topics typically addressed in introductory philosophy and ethics classes, so that our essays address nearly all the topics anyone would want or need to address in teaching such classes.* Please [email the editors](mailto:1000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com) with further suggested topics. We are especially interested in essays on topics frequently addressed in introductory courses, as well as topics that are difficult to cover in introductory courses because the relevant literature is difficult for beginning students. We especially welcome material addressing under-represented philosophical traditions, including global philosophy, philosophy of race, LGBTQIA issues, and more, as well as submissions on all topics by women and members of other underrepresented populations. We are open to the possibility of multiple essays on the same topic, since there are always many useful ways of addressing any philosophical issue. For more information, see the [submissions](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/submissions/) page. Due to the popularity of the essay on [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) essay, we are interested in essays that explain these well-known philosophical quotes and claims (and we are welcome to more suggestions along these lines): - “The Unexamined Life Is Not Worth Living”: Socrates on the Value of Philosophy - “Man is the Measure of All Things”: The Relativism of Protagoras - “The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number” J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism - “Existence Precedes Essence”: Sartre’s Existentialism - Arendt on “The Banality of Evil” Essay Categories: - [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/aesthetics-and-philosophy-of-art/) - The Paradox of Tragedy - The Paradox of Fiction - Ethicism about Art - Aristotle’s Theory of Tragedy - Plato’s Criticism of Poetry - Nietzsche on the Birth of Tragedy - The Death of the Author - [Buddhist Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/01/dharma-in-abhidharma-buddhism/) - *1000-Word Philosophy* welcomes essays on a variety of topics in Buddhist Philosophy, as well as Non-Western Philosophy in general. - [Chinese Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/chinese-philosophy/) - *1000-Word Philosophy* welcomes essays on a variety of topics in Chinese Philosophy, as well as Non-Western Philosophy in general. - [Ethics](000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/) - Metaethics - Non-Cognitivism - Metaethical Naturalism - Metaethical Nonnaturalism - The Open Question Argument - Ethical Intuitionism - Ethical Theory - Rights - The Concept of Welfare - Objective List Theories of Welfare - Discussion of Various Moral Virtues and Vices - Perfectionism - Hedonism - Desire Satisfactionism - The Experience Machine - The Separateness of Persons - Moral Particularism - Ross on Prima Facie Duties - Natural Law Theories of Ethics - Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool - The Doctrine of Double Effect - Kant on Universalizability - Kant on Moral Worth - Kant on the Duty Not To Lie - Kierkegaard on the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical - Aristotle’s Function Argument - Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean - Aristotle on Eudaimonia - Nietzsche’s Genealogical Approach to Ethics - Adam Smith’s Sentimentalism - Care Ethics - Sartre on Bad Faith - Moral Perception - The Golden Rule - Doing and Allowing - Meaning In Life - The Absurd - Theories of Moral Status - Duties To the Dead - Posthumous Harm - Ethicism about Art - Religious Ethics, compared to Philosophical Ethics - Moral Knowledge - Persons, or What Persons Are - Moral Issues - Immigration and national borders - Racial Profiling - Capitalism - Drugs - Poverty, Absolute Poverty - The Trolley Problem - Why Be Moral? - Thomson’s Defense of Abortion - Marquis’s “Future Like Our’s” Argument Against Abortion - Embryo Experimentation - Torture - Vegetarianism - Animal Research - Public Health Ethics - Genital Mutilation - Ethics and Policing - Issues in Environmental Ethics - Causal Impotence Challenges / Collective Responsibility - Anti-Natalism - Obligations to Future Persons - *See more ethics-related categories below* - Sexual Ethics - Homosexuality - Monogamy & Polyamory - Marriage - Love - Consent - Sexual Objectification - [Epistemology](000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/epistemology/) - Theories of Epistemic Justification - Epistemologies of Ignorance - Naturalized Epistemology - Internalism and Externalism - Rationalism and Empiricism - Evidentialism - Direct and Indirect Realism - Kant on Synthetic A Priori Knowledge - Virtue Epistemology - Discussion of Various Epistemic Virtues and Vices - The Problem of Other Minds - Pragmatic Encroachment - Pyrrhonian Skepticism - Reflective Equilibrium - Standpoint Theory - [Historical Philosophy](000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/) - Ancient Philosophy - The Origins of Western Philosophy - Zeno’s Paradoxes - Socratic Irony - Aporia in the Platonic Dialogues - Plato on Immortality - Plato on Utopia - Plato’s Noble Lie - Plato’s Criticism of Poetry - Aristotle on the Four Causes - Aristotle’s Teleology - Aristotle’s Method: Saving the Appearances - Aristotle’s Theory of Tragedy - Aristotle’s Function Argument - Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean - Aristotle on Eudaimonia - The Epicurean Conception of Pleasure - Stoic Ethics - Pyrrhonian Skepticism - The Cynics - The Cyrenaic School - Ancient Atomism - Plotinus on The One - Medieval Philosophy - Augustine on Original Sin - Aquinas’s Five Ways - Aquinas on Natural Law - Early Modern Philosophy - Machiavelli on *Virtù* - Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool - Locke on Education - Locke on Property - Locke on the State of Nature - Locke on the Origin of Ideas - Hume on Causation - Hume’s Fork - Hume’s Critique of Social Contract Theory - Rousseau on Education - Rousseau on the General Will - Leibniz on Monads - Leibniz’s Law - Pragmatic Arguments for Religious Belief - Spinoza’s Pantheism - Kant on Synthetic A Priori Knowledge - Kant on Universalizability - Kant on Moral Worth - Kant on the Duty Not To Lie - Kant’s Views on Race - Reid on Common Sense - Adam Smith’s Sentimentalism - 19th and 20th Century Philosophy - Montesquieu on the Separation of Powers - Burke on Social Change - Hegel on Recognition - Kierkegaard on the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical - Marx on Base and Superstructure - Mill’s Harm Principle - Mill’s Arguments in Favor of Free Speech - Mill’s Arguments against Paternalism - Nietzsche on the Birth of Tragedy - Nietzsche’s Genealogical Approach to Ethics - E.B. DuBois’s Concept of Double-Consciousness - The DuBois-Washington Debate - William James’s “The Will to Believe” - Dewey on Education - Wittgenstein’s Beetle in a Box - Russell’s Theory of Descriptions - Sartre on Bad Faith - Heidegger’s Concept of Dasein - G.E. Moore - [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/logic/) - Arguments. - Fallacies - Begging the Question - Equivocation - Slippery Slopes - Arguments from Analogy - The Principle of Charity - Parsimony - Definitions; Conceptual Analysis; Necessary and Sufficient Conditions - Implicit Premises - Counterexamples - [Metaphilosophy](000wordphilosophy.com/metaphilosophy/) - Conceptual Analysis - Reflective Equilibrium - Ordinary Language Philosophy - Pragmatist Approaches to Philosophical Problems - Wisdom - [Metaphysics](000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/metaphysics/) - Hard Determinism - Compatiblist Theories of Free Will - Libertarian or Indeterministic Theories of Free Will - Collective Responsibility - Causation - Material Constitution - Identity - Time - Persons, or What Persons Are - Essences, or what an Essence Is - Primary and Secondary Qualities - Form and Matter - Modal Realism - Plato on Immortality - Aristotle’s Teleology - [Phenomenology and Existentialism](000wordphilosophy.com/phenomenology-and-existentialism/) - The Meaning of Life - Hegel on the Master and Slave Dialectic - Nietzsche’s Genealogical Approach to Ethics - Heidegger’s Concept of Dasein - Heidegger and Technology - Postmodernism - Postructuralism - Sartre on Bad Faith - Hermeneutics - Deconstruction - Derrida on Differance - Phenomenological Approaches to Race and Gender - [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-education/) - The Aims of Education - Rousseau on Education - Locke on Education - Dewey on Education - Ethics and Educational Systems - [Philosophy of Mind and Language](000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-mind-and-language/) - Topics in Philosophy of Mind - Physicalism - The Qualia Argument Against Physicalism - Property Dualism - Consciousness - Embodied Cognition - Zombies - The Problem of Other Minds - Topics in the Philosophy of Language - Sense and Reference - Wittgenstein’s Beetle in a Box - Theories of Names - Indeterminacy of Translation - The Verificationist Theory of Meaning - Russell’s Theory of Descriptions - Speech Acts - Gricean Implicature - The Distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics - Generics - Problems of Religious Language - Non-Cognitivism about Morality - Ordinary Language Philosophy - Hermeneutics - [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/) - *Issues, topics and figures in African-American philosophy, Native-American philosophy, Asian-American philosophy, and other underrepresented philosophical traditions.* - Theories of Racism - Implicit Bias - Affirmative Action - White Privilege - The Black Lives Matter movement - The Schelling Model of Segregation - Integration - Color Blindness - The Distinction between Race and Ethnicity - Racial Profiling - Stereotype Threat - E.B. DuBois’s Concept of Double-Consciousness - The DuBois-Washington Debate - Phenomenological Approaches to Race and Gender - Intersectionality - racial discrimination - racial stereotypes - racial solidarity or racial pride - racialized sexual/romantic preferences - implicit bias - slavery - racially-oriented hate speech and hate crimes - mass incarceration - policing - racial jokes - transracialism - honoring racist founders and symbols - protest - self-respect - microaggressions - cultural appropriation - whiteness & white privilege - Social Darwinism - passing & traveling - redlining - racial health disparities - [Philosophy of Religion](000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) - Augustine on Original Sin - Aquinas’s Five Ways - Faith (and Reason) - The Relationship Between Science and Religion - Properly Basic Belief in God - William James’s “The Will to Believe” - The Problem of Religious Language - Free Will and God’s Foreknowledge - Skeptical Theism - Spinoza’s Pantheism - Petitionary Prayer - Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism - Arguments from Religious Experience - Philosophical Issues in Non-Western, Non-Monotheistic Religions - [Philosophy of Science](000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/philosophy-of-science/) - Scientific Realism - The Demarcation Problem - Scientism - The Value-Ladenness of Science - Underdetermination of Scientific Theory - The Deductive-Nomological Model of Scientific Explanation - The Relationship Between Science and Religion - [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/) - The Sex-Gender Distinction - Essentialism - Social Construction - The Waves of Feminism - Care Ethics - The Problem of Speaking for Others - Phenomenological Approaches to Race and Gender - Sexism - Privilege - Misogyny - Standpoint Theory - Testimonial Injustice - Intersectionality - Marxist and Socialist Feminism - Pornography - Friedan on “The Problem that Has No Name” - Rich on Compulsory Heterosexuality - Postcolonial Feminism - Ecofeminism - [Social and Political Philosophy](000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) - Philosophy of Law - The Duty to Obey the Law / Just and Unjust Laws - Civil Disobedience - The Hart-Devlin Debate - Legal Realism - Defining Hate Speech - Constitutional Originalism - Living Constitutionalism - Natural Law Theory - Positivism - Theories of Justice - The Difference Principle - Rawls on Public Reason - Robert Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument for Libertarianism - Liberalism and Communitarianism - Equality of Opportunity - Global Justice - History of Political Philosophy - Plato on Utopia - Machiavelli on *Virtu* - Locke on Property - Locke on the State of Nature - Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool - Rousseau on the State of Nature - Rousseau on the General Will - Montesquieu on the Separation of Powers - Hume’s Critique of Social Contract Theory - Burke on Social Change - Hegel on Recognition - Marx’s Theory of History - Mill’s Harm Principle - Mill’s Arguments in Favor of Free Speech - Mill’s Arguments against Paternalism - Miscellaneous topics - Anarchism - Left-Libertarianism - Integration - Positive and Negative Liberty - Luck Egalitarianism - Political Legitimacy - Patriotism - Civil Disobedience - Ideology - Universal Basic Income - Democratic Socialism - Natural Rights - Racial Profiling - Paternalism - Libertarian Paternalism - The Public Goods Problem - Self-Ownership - Redistributive Taxation - Marxist and Socialist Feminism - Feminist Debates about Pornography - Exploitation - Hayek on Markets and Information - The Tragedy of the Commons - Collective Action Problems - The Limits of Markets - Gun Control - Anarchism - The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory - Foucault on the Panopticon - Protest - National Borders - Healthcare Policy - Policing Policy / Police Ethics --- ### [Audio recordings of 1000-Word Philosophy essays](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/audio-recordings/) **Published:** January 14, 2022 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** All our essays are now available in audio format thanks to a text-to-speech service, [GSpeech](https://gspeech.io/). Some are also available as [videos](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/videos/). Below, however, are earlier audio recordings of our essays. They are generally lower quality than the newer AI-produced audio versions. About Philosophy: - [What is Philosophy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Tom Metcalf - [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores - [Philosophy and Its Contrast with Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/philosophy-and-its-contrast-with-science/) by Thomas Metcalf History of Philosophy: - [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli - [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe - [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Religion: - [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case - [Indoctrination: What is it to Indoctrinate Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/16/indoctrination/) by Chris Ranalli - [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska - [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley - [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: - [Virtue Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/06/virtue-ethics/) by David Merry - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Cultural Relativism: Do Cultural Norms Make Actions Right and Wrong?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/30/cultural-relativism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia - [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis - [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman - [Theories of Moral Considerability: Who and What Matters Morally?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/01/theories-of-moral-considerability/) by Jonathan Spelman - [“Can They Suffer?”: Bentham on our Obligations to Animals](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/03/18/bentham-on-animals/) by Daniel Weltman - [Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/05/ethics-and-absolute-poverty/) by Brandon Boesch - [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis - [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk - [What Is It To Love Someone?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/12/09/what-is-it-to-love-someone/) by Felipe Pereira - [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis - [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk - [George Orwell’s Philosophical Views](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/12/17/george-orwell/) by Mark Satta We will be creating more audio files like these; if there are any essays you would especially want to be created in this text-to-speech format, please [let us know](mailto:1000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com). --- ### [Appendix to “Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/appendix-to-responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) **Published:** July 17, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** Appendix to “Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies” **Content:** Appendix to “[Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/)” Authors: Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis Categories: [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/), [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/), [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/), [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-sex-and-gender/), [Metaphilosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/metaphilosophy/) In *The Politics,* **Aristotle** tells us plainly, “the relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior, of the ruling to the ruled. This general principle must similarly hold good of all human beings generally” (1254b14). In **Aristotle,** [*The Politics*](https://www.amazon.com/Politics-Oxford-Worlds-Classics-Aristotle/dp/0199538735), R.F. Stalley (ed.). Ernest Barker (trans.), Oxford University Press, 1998. Cynthia Freeland discusses **Aristotle**’s misogyny in detail, “Aristotle says that the courage of a man lies in commanding, a woman’s lies in obeying; that ‘matter yearns for form, as the female for the male and the ugly for the beautiful’; that women have fewer teeth than men; that a female is an incomplete male or ‘as it were, a deformity.’” In “[Nourishing Speculation: A Feminist Reading of Aristotelian Science,” in ](https://books.google.com/books?id=8Iw_Z2-pXdwC&pg=PA145&lpg=PA145&dq=nourishing+speculation+a+feminist+reading+of+aristotelian&source=bl&ots=SmDVze-78m&sig=iNH2UT3-7jbKUdFLcJUaPjp-xqA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjk7NGl4pXcAhUJVt8KHS7QAjgQ6AEwAnoECAEQAQ#v=onepage&q=nourishing%20speculation%20a%20feminist%20reading%20of%20aristotelian&f=false)[*Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle*](https://books.google.com/books?id=8Iw_Z2-pXdwC&pg=PA145&lpg=PA145&dq=nourishing+speculation+a+feminist+reading+of+aristotelian&source=bl&ots=SmDVze-78m&sig=iNH2UT3-7jbKUdFLcJUaPjp-xqA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjk7NGl4pXcAhUJVt8KHS7QAjgQ6AEwAnoECAEQAQ#v=onepage&q=nourishing%20speculation%20a%20feminist%20reading%20of%20aristotelian&f=false), Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), State University of New York Press, 1994. Also, according to **Aristotle**, natural slaves are unfortunate beings who are necessarily slaves due to their nature, as opposed to those who are contingently slaves (e.g. say, as a result of being captured in battle). In *The Politics,* **Aristotle** tells us “Someone is thus a slave by nature if he is capable of becoming the property of another (and for this reason does actually become another’s property) and if participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself” (1254b22). In a letter to Henry More, **Descartes** described animals as automata with no thought. He writes, “speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a body. All men use it, however stupid and insane they may be, and though they may lack tongue and organs of voice; but no animals do. Consequently it can be taken as a real specific difference between men and dumb animals.” “Letter to Henry More,” February 5, 1649” in A. Kenny (trans. and ed.), [*Descartes: Philosophical Letters*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Descartes.html?id=Km8PAQAAIAAJ), Clarendon Press, \[1649\]/1970. **Kant** made racist remarks about the “perfection” of the white race and the ineptitude of the non-white races right up until his death. Concerning white people, he claims, that it is “The white race possesses *all* motivating forces and talents *in* *itself;* therefore we must examine it somewhat more closely.” See Eze’s translation in his “[The Color of Reason](https://www.amazon.com/Postcolonial-African-Philosophy-Critical-Reader/dp/0631203400),” in [*Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader,* ](https://www.amazon.com/Postcolonial-African-Philosophy-Critical-Reader/dp/0631203400)[1st Edition](https://www.amazon.com/Postcolonial-African-Philosophy-Critical-Reader/dp/0631203400), Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, p. 115. The source is from one of Kant’s lectures, [*Kant’s philosophische Anthropologie: Nach handschriftlichen Vorlesungen*](http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/receive/jportal_jparticle_00218324). In Friedrich Christian Starke (ed.), *Leipzig: Expedition des europaischen Aufsehers*, 1831, p 353. In his 1764 *Observations*, Kant tells us that: The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling \[i.e., the unimportant or trivial\] … Although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praise-worthy quality. . . So fundamental is the difference between \[the black and white\] races of man . . . A clear proof that what \[a Negro\] said was stupid \[was that\] this fellow was quite black from head to foot. (Kant, [*Observations on the feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Observations_on_the_Feeling_of_the_Beaut.html?id=K-9G31HUQEwC), in John T. Goldthwait (trans.), University of California Press, \[1764\]/1960, pp. 111-113. Kant’s views did not improve with age: in 1802, two years before his death, he claims that the “race of the \[native\] american cannot be educated,” “has no motivating force” and is “lazy.” Eze’s translation in the “[The Color of Reason](https://www.amazon.com/Postcolonial-African-Philosophy-Critical-Reader/dp/0631203400)” p. 116. **Hume** made an infamous remark in a footnote to his 1753-4 essay *Of National Characters:* “I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.” The complete footnote can be found in Jordan Winthrop’s [*White Over Black: American Attitudes Towards the Negro, 1550-1812*](https://muse.jhu.edu/book/40707), Omohundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 2012, p. 253. Further discussion of Hume’s racist remarks can be found in John Imerwahr “[Hume’s Revised Racism](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2709889),” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 53, 3, 1992, pp. 481- 486, as well as Aaron Garrett’s “[Hume’s Revised Racism Revisited](http://www.humesociety.org/hs/issues/v26n1/garrett/garrett-v26n1.pdf),” *Hume Studies,* 26, 1, 2000, pp. 171- 177. In one of his *many* problematic quotes in *Twilight of the Idols, §* 36*,* **Nietzsche** writes “*Morality for doctors. –* Sick people are parasites on society. It is indecent to keep living in a certain state. There should be profound social contempt for the practice of vegetating in cowardly dependence on doctors and practitioners after the meaning of life, the *right* to life, is gone.” In [*The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: And Other Writings*](https://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Anti-Christ-Twilight-Cambridge-Philosophy/dp/0521016886), Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 209-210. Of course, exactly what Nietzsche means by sick people and sickness, whether he means physical, spiritual, or mental sickness, is unclear. In *Black* *Skin*, *White* *Masks* **Fanon** writes a damning criticism of Mayotte Capécia book *I am a Martinician Woman* and her desire for a white man*,* saying that “She is looked at with distaste. Things begin their usual course… it is because she is a woman of color that she is not accepted in this society. Her resentment feeds her own artificiality. We shall see why love is beyond the reach of Mayotte Capécias of all nations.” pp. 29-30. Fanon also writes “I have never been able, without revulsion, to hear a *man* say of another man: ‘He is so sensual!’” See his [*Black Skin, White Masks*](http://www.worldcat.org/title/black-skin-white-masks/oclc/257152802?referer=di&ht=edition), Charles Lam Markmann (trans.), Pluto Press, 1991, p. 156. For a discussion on Fanon and feminism see chapter one, “Fanon, Conflicts, Feminisms,*”* in Tracy Denean Sharpley-Whiting’s “[*Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms*](https://www.amazon.com/Frantz-Fanon-Conflicts-Denean-Sharpley-Whiting/dp/0847686396),” Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. On **Heidegger**’s Naziism, see [Joshua Rothman, “Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism? ](https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-contaminated-by-nazism)[*The New Yorker*](https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-contaminated-by-nazism)[.](https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-contaminated-by-nazism)[ April 28, 2014](https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-contaminated-by-nazism), and [Victor Farias’s ](https://www.amazon.com/Heidegger-Nazism-Victor-Farias/dp/0877228302)[*Heidegger And Nazism*](https://www.amazon.com/Heidegger-Nazism-Victor-Farias/dp/0877228302)[, ](https://www.amazon.com/Heidegger-Nazism-Victor-Farias/dp/0877228302)[Temple University Press. 1991](https://www.amazon.com/Heidegger-Nazism-Victor-Farias/dp/0877228302). Peter Trawny discusses **Heidegger**’s anti-semitism and notion of “world Judaism,” of which **Heidegger** says, “The question concerning the role of *world Judaism* is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical question concerning the kind of humanity which, *utterly unattached,* can take over the uprooting of all beings from being as its world-historic ‘task.’” Peter Trawny, “[Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy](http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo22228791.html),” Andrew J Mitchell (trans.), University of Chicago Press, 2014, p. 19. In the *Foundations of Arithmetic,* **Frege** writes early on, “In arithmetic, simply as a result of the origin of India of many of its methods and concepts, reasoning has traditionally been less strict than in geometry, which had mainly been developed by the Greeks.” **Frege,** *The Foundations of Arithmetic.* In [*The Frege Reader*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Frege+Reader-p-9780631194453), Michael Beaney (ed.), Blackwell Publishing, 1997, p. 91. In late life, **Frege** became not only very conservative, but his diary also showed his sympathies towards fascism and anti-semitism. **Frege,** [*Diary: Written by Professor Gottlob Frege in the Time from 10 March to 9 April 1924*](https://philpapers.org/rec/MENDWB), G. Gabriel and W. Kienzler (eds.). In [*Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*](https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?pub=420), 1996, 39, 3 & 4, pp. 303-342. In the *Philosophy of History,* **Hegel** is very dismissive of Africa and its accomplishments. After briefly discussing the continent, **Hegel** writes “At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it – that is, in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or European World.” In Hegel, [*The Philosophy of History*](https://www.amazon.com/philosophy-history-John-Sibree/dp/B005GWRHGW), John Sibree (ed.). University of Toronto Libraries. \[1822-1830\]/2011. p. 78 **Mill** made pernicious comments regarding colonialism, saying that his anti-paternalist “harm principle” “is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties,” not to “backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage,” concluding that “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement.” John Stuart Mill, [*On Liberty and Other Writings*](https://books.google.com/books/about/J_S_Mill_On_Liberty_and_Other_Writings.html?id=PlZll-SI1FQC)*,* Stefan Collini (ed.), Cambridge University Press, (1859\]/1989, p. 13. For a critique of Mill and Locke’s colonialism, se Bhikhu Parekh’s “[Liberalism and Colonialism: A Critique of Locke and Mill,” in ](https://www.amazon.com/Decolonization-Imagination-Culture-Knowledge-Power/dp/185649280X)[*The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power*](https://www.amazon.com/Decolonization-Imagination-Culture-Knowledge-Power/dp/185649280X), Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (eds.), Zed Books, 1995, pp 81-98. **Schopenhauer** was sexist: he reveals his misogyny in his essay *On* *Women*, “Women are suited to being the nurses and teacher of our earliest childhood precisely because they themselves are childish, silly and short-sighted, in a word big children, their whole lives long: a kind of intermediate stage between the child and the man, who is the actual human being, ‘man.’” Schopenhauer, [*Essays and Aphorisms*](https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/34883/essays-and-aphorisms/), R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), Penguin Books, 2004, p. 81. For lengthy discussion and analysis on the lives and misdeeds of **Rousseau**, **Wittgenstein**, **Nietzsche**, and **Sartre,** among others, see Nigel Rodger’s and Mel Thompson’s [*Philosophers Behaving Badly*](https://books.google.com/books/about/Philosophers_Behaving_Badly.html?id=a3oFAQAAIAAJ)*,* Peter Owen Publishers, 2005. ### Translation [Korean](https://doingphilosophy.kr/appendix-to-responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) ### PDF Download Download this [Appendix as a PDF](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/appendix-to-responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies.pdf). ##### *Follow 1000-Word Philosophy on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/1000wordphilosophy/), [Twitter](https://twitter.com/1000wordphil) and subscribe to receive email notice of new essays at the bottom of [1000WordPhilosophy.com](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/)* --- ### [ความหมายในชีวิต: อะไรทำให้ชีวิตเรามีความหมาย](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ความหมายในชีวิต-อะไรทำใ/) **Published:** December 30, 2023 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Excerpt:** ความหมายในชีวิต: อะไรทำให้ชีวิตเรามีความหมาย **Content:** ## ความหมายในชีวิต: อะไรทำให้ชีวิตเรามีความหมาย BY [แปล](https://philososerious.wordpress.com/category/%e0%b9%81%e0%b8%9b%e0%b8%a5/) แปลโดยได้รับอนุญาตจาก Matthew Pianalto. (2022, October 31). Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful? *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology*. <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/> นึกภาพว่าคุณทนทั้งที่ทำงานและที่บ้านไม่ไหวแล้ว คุณตัดสินใจทิ้งทุกอย่างไป เดี๋ยวนี้คุณใช้เวลาทั้งวันนอนชมวิวริมชายหาด อเล็กซ์ เพื่อนของคุณ ได้มาพบคุณเข้าวันหนึ่งที่ริมชายหาดและตั้งคำถามกับวิถีชีวิตใหม่ของคุณ “แกเอาชีวิตมาทิ้ง!” อเล็กซ์พูด คุณตอบอเล็กซ์ว่าคุณเคยไม่มีความสุขและตอนนี้คุณมีความสุขขึ้นมาก อย่างไรก็ดี อเล็กซ์ตอบ “ชีวิตมันมีอะไรมากกว่าความสุข แกไม่ได้ทำอะไรที่มี*ความหมาย*กับชีวิต!”\[1\] แต่อะไรเล่าคือชีวิตที่มีความหมาย? เราจะมาพิจารณาบางคำตอบที่ทรงอิทธิพลของคำถามนี้กัน ![](https://philososerious.files.wordpress.com/2023/12/meaning-in-life.webp?w=656)กลุ่มคนเล่นโยคะบนชายหาด ขณะพระอาทิตย์ตก # 1. การมองโลกในแง่ร้ายจากมุมจักรวาล ปะทะ ความหมายในชีวิตจากมุมประจำวัน *คนมองโลกในแง่ร้าย*อาจกล่าวว่าชีวิตไม่ได้มีความหมายสูงสุดหรือความหมายจากมุมจักรวาลดังนั้นชีวิตคนจรริมชายหาดก็มีความหมายไม่มากไม่น้อยไปกว่าชีวิตของบีโธเฟ่น หรือมาร์ติน ลูเธอร์คิง จูเนียร์ หรือมารี คูรี่ เมื่อมองจากมุมของจักรวาลอังเวิ้งว้างไพศาล\[2\] กระนั้น นักปรัชญาหลายคนอภิปรายว่าแม้ความหมายสูงสุด*ของ*ชีวิต (meaning of life) อาจไม่มีอยู่จริง แต่ความหมาย*ใน*ชีวิตอาจมีอยู่จริง ชีวิตของเราอาจมีความหมายในทางธรรมดา ทางที่เราไม่จำเป็นต้องมีบทบบาทพิเศษอะไรในปกรณัมระดับจักรวาล เรียกสิ่งนี้ว่า*ความหมายประจำวัน* (everyday meaning)\[3\] แต่อะไรล่ะที่ทำให้ชีวิตเรามีความหมายแบบนี้? # 2. การเชื่อถืออัตนัย (subjectivism) ผู้เชื่อถืออัตนัยกล่าวว่าชีวิตของคนผู้หนึ่งมีความหมายเมื่อมันเติมเต็มยิ่ง มัดใจยิ่ง หรือน่าพึงพอใจยิ่ง\[4\] แต่ละคนเห็นสิ่งที่มีความหมายมัดใจต่างกัน อาขีพการงานที่ท้าทายอาจจะมัดใจและเติมเต็มบางคน แต่กลับน่าเบื่อหน่ายและไม่น่าพึงพอใจสำหรับคุณ (คุณอาจพบว่าชีวิตนอนบนหาดทรายเติมเต็มกว่ามาก) ต้องเป็นคนแปลกประหลาดมากพอดูจึงจะเติมเต็มจากการมองทรายหรือทรมานลูกหมา เราสามารถจัดชรวิตที่แปลกประหลาดแบบนี้ให้เป็นชีวิตที่มีความหมายได้หรือไม่? ผู้เชื่อถืออัตนัยอาจพยักหน้า แต่หลายคนคงปฏิเสธคำตอบนั้น และสรุปว่าการเชื่อถืออัตนัยนั้นผิดพลาด # 3. ความหมายปรนัย คำอธิบายปรนัยถือว่าชีวิตที่มีความหมายต้องมีโปรเจ็คที่มีค่าเชิงบวก เช่น การเสริมสร้างบุคลิกภาพ ใช้ความคิดสร้างสรรค์ และทำให้โลกน่าอยู่ขึ้นผ่านการทั้งไขว่คว้าทั้งส่งเสริมความจริง ความยุติธรรม ความงาม\[8\] การเป็นคนจรชายหาดก็ไม่ได้ทำให้โลกมันน่าอยู่น้อยลงหรอก แต่ก็ไม่ได้ก่อประโยชน์สักเท่าไหร่เช่นกัน อเล็กซ์ (เพื่อนของคุณ) กังวลว่าคุณทอดทิ้งศักยภาพหรือก็คือการล้มเหลวที่จะทำให้ชีวิตมีความหมาย อย่างไรก็ตาม คุณ*อาจ*ตัดสินใจมาเป็นคนจรชายหาดเพื่อกบฏต่อการแข่งขันเอาเป็นเอาตายของสังคมบ้างานที่แข่งขันกันเหลือเกิน บางทีคุณอาจจะเลือกขัดเกลาชีวิตที่มีสติและพินิจพิจารณาสุนทรียะของความงามตามธรรมชาติ ถ้ามองจากกรอบนั้น ชีวิตของคุณก็จะดูไปทางเดียวกันคุณค่าที่สำคัญ ยืนยง และเป็นปรนัย แต่คำอธิบายเชิงปรนัยของความหมายต้องอธิบายว่าทำไมบางกิจกรรมจึงมีความหมายเชิงปรนัยมากกว่ากิจกรรมอื่น ลำบากก็ตรงที่สิ่งซึ่งบางสายตามองว่าฟุ่มเฟือยหรือเปล่าประโยชน์กลับกลายเป็นเลอค่าและคุ้มค่าในอีกสายตาหนึ่ง บางคนมองการปีนเทือกเขาเอเวอเรสต์เป็นการใช้ความอดทนกายใจอันน่าเคารพ เป็นความสำเร็จอันน่านับถือ บางคนมองว่ามันงี่เง่าที่เราจะปีนหินก้อนใหญ่ เสี่ยงตายและสิ้นเปลืองทรัพยากรที่สามารถเอาไปทำเรื่องที่มีประโยชน์กว่านี้ได้ แต่บางทีพวกเขาอาจจะแค่ใจแคบ การมีความหมายของคนจรชายหาด นักปีนเขา หรืออะไรก็ตามอาจขึ้นอยู่กับแรงจูงใจหรือตัวเลือกของพวกเขาด้วย ไม่ได้ขึ้นอยู่กับแค่ตัวกิจกรรมเท่านั้น\[9\] # 4. ทฤษฎีผสมผสาน (Hybrid Theory) ทฤษฎีผสมผสานของความหมายในชีวิตผสานความคมคายจากทั้งการเชื่อถืออัตนัยและคำอธิบายเชิงปรนัย ชีวิตที่มีความหมายเติมเต็มเรา*และ*ชีวิตเรามีความหมายเมื่อเราอุทิศจนให้การทำโปรเจ็คที่มีคุณค่าเชิงปรนัย\[10\] ทฤษฎีผสมผสานต่างจากคำอธิบายเชิงปรนัยเพราะมันยืนกรานว่าชีวิตที่มีความหมายต้องเติมเต็มเจ้าของชีวิต มี*หลากหลาย*โปรเจ็ครอคอยเราอยู่ เพราะมีหลากหลายทางที่เติมเต็ม เพราะมีหลายหนทางอันเติมเต็มให้เรา (ขึ้นอยู่กับบุคลิกและความสามารถอันโดดเด่นแตกต่างของเรา) ให้เราไปพันผูกกับความจริง ความยุติธรรม และความงาม อย่างไรก็ตาม เช่นเดียวกับที่ชีวิตซึ่งเติมเต็มแบบอัตนัยอาจดูไร้ค่าเรือน่าชัง บางทีชีวิตที่มีความหมายอาจจะไม่เติมเต็มเสมอไป\[11\] พิจารณาจอร์จ เบลี่ย์ในภาพยนตร์คลาสสิก *It’s a Wonderful Life*\[12\] จอร์จคิดว่าชีวิตสูญเปล่าและหวังให้ตนไม่เคยเกิดมา โชคดี แคลเรนส์ เทวดาประจำตัวช่วยจอร์จจากการพยายามฆ่าตัวตายและช่วยให้จอร์จเข้าใจว่าการตัดสินใจในชีวิตของ*เขา*มีความหมายเพียงใด ทฤษฎีผสมผสานสื่อว่าชีวิตของจอร์จ*ได้*ความหมายเพราะเรื่องดีๆที่เขาทำเติมเต็มเขา แต่คำอธิบายเชิงปรนัยเสนอว่าชีวิตจอร์จมีความหมาย*มาตลอด*แม้เขาจะไม่รู้ตัวมาก่อน!\[13\] นึกถึงเรื่องเล่าต้นบทความ คุณได้ทิ้งชีวิตที่มีความหมาย (แต่อาจน่าหงุดหงิด) เพื่อชีวิตริมชายหาดหรือไม่? # 5. สรุป # จิตแพทย์และผู้รอดชีวิตจากโฮโลคอสต์ Viktor Frankl ถือว่าการแสวงหาความหมายเป็นแรงขับพื้นฐานของมนุษย์\[14\] เขาอ้างว่าการรู้สึกว่าชีวิตมีความหมายมอบพลังให้มนุษย์อยู่รอดและอาจถึงขั้นเจริญรุ่งเรืองแม้บางครั้งจะต้องเผชิญกับอุปสรรคและความไม่ยุติธรรมก็ตาม\[15\]คำถามเกี่ยวกับความหมายในชีวิตมักผุดขึ้นมาเวลาเรารู้สึกว่ามีอะไรขาดหายไปจากชีวิต แม้จะแตกต่างกัน แต่ทฤษฎีที่เราได้สำรวจข้างต้นดูจะเห็นพ้องต้องกันว่ามีหลายสิ่งที่เราสามารถทำ หรือลองพยายามทำ ที่มีความหมาย การคุยกับอเล็กซ์เพื่อนคุณอาจเป็นจุดเริ่มต้นที่ดี\[16\] ทำไม? เพราะเรามักจัดความสัมพันธ์ที่ดีให้เป็นแหล่งสำคัญของความหมาย เป็นไปได้ว่าบ่อยครั้ง ความหมายเป็นสิ่งที่เราสร้าง หรือค้นพบ ร่วมกัน โน้ต [\[1\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref1) Emily Esfahani Smith (2017) ใช้ความแตกต่างระหว่างความสุขกับความหมายในชีวิต ในการสำรวจงานวิจัยทางจิตวิทยาเรื่องความหมายในชีวิต ดู TED Talk ของเธอ, “There’s More to Life Than Being Happy.” [\[2\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref2) ดู อย่าง Benatar (2017) และ Weinberg (2021) สำหรับการเข้าข้างมุมมองมองโลกในแง่ร้าย มีฝั่งเชื่อในพระเจ้าอย่างน้อยหนึ่งคนที่เห็นด้วยกับพวกมองโลกในแง่ร้ายว่าถ้าชีวิตขาดความหมายหรือจุดประสงค์*ศักดิ์สิทธิ์* แปลว่าอะไรก็ตามที่เราทำหรือเป็นล้วนขาดนัยยะอันยืนยงและชีวิตของพวกเราล้วนเหลวไหลไม่ต่างกัน ดู Craig (2013) \[3\] นักปรัชญาหลายคนที่เสนอทฤษฎีเรื่องความหมายในชีวิตเป็นผู้เชื่อว่าไม่อาจมีใครรู้ได้ (agnostic) หรือผู้กังขาต่อความคิดว่าชีวิตในความหมายหรือจุดประสงค์ศักดิ์สิทธิ์ ดู อย่าง Wolf (2010) แน่นอน ถ้าเราคิดว่าชีวิตมีความหมายหรือจุดประสงค์ศักดิ์สิทธิ์ แปลว่าการมีความหมาย**ใน**ชีวิตเราอาจเป็นเรื่องการใช้ชีวิตตามประเด็นเหนือธรรมชาติของการดำรงอยู่ บางคำอธิบายของความหมายในชีวิตสอดคล้องกับความคิดทางศาสนาเรื่องความหมายของชีวิต ผมทิ้งไว้ให้ผู้อ่านลองคิดลองคิดดูเองแล้วกันว่าทัศนะไหนเข้าหรือไม่เข้ากับความเชื่อมั่นทางศาสนาของตน \[4\] Taylor (2000) พัฒนาความคิดนี้ในบทสุดท้าย [\[5\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref5) John Stuart Mill เตือนเช่นกันไม่ให้ปนความสุขกับความพึงพอใจใน *Utilitarianism* บทที่ 2 [\[6\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref6) มีการพัฒนาประเด็นนี้ในคำอธิบายอัตนัยที่เจนโลกกว่านี้ของความหมายในชีวิต ดู เช่น Calhoun (2015) และ Parmer (2021) [\[7\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref7) ดู Campbell and Nyholm (2015) หรือผลงานของพวกเขาใน Landau (2022) สำหรับการเสวนาของพวกเขาเรื่อง “ปฏิความหมาย” (anti-meaning) กิจกรรม โปรเจ็ค และชีวิตที่มีนัยยะเชิงลบและเป็นภัย [\[8\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref8) ดู Metz (2013) สำหรับการเสวนาของคำอธิบายอันแตกต่างหลากหลายจำพวกนี้ Metz ปกป้องฉบับของเขาในบทสุดท้าย ด้านการสร้างสรรค์ ดู Taylor (1987) และ Matheson (2018) [\[9\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref9) ตัวอย่างแบบคนจรชายหาดมักจะบรรยายน้อยเกิดควร รวมทั้งในเรียงความนี้! คุ้มค่าที่เราจะพิจารณาการปรับตัวแปรของเจตนา แรงจูงใจ สถานการณ์ และอื่นๆเพื่อพิจารณาว่าการเปลี่ยนแปลงองค์ประกอบต่างๆเหล่านี้อาจจะเปลี่ยนการประเมินของเราเรื่องการมีความหมายของชีวิตหรือกิจกรรมได้อย่างไร ชีวิตทั้งชีวิตมักจะ (ถ้าไม่เสมอไป) สลับซับซ้อนกว่าตัวอย่างสั้นๆพวกนี้ นักปรัชญาผู้แนะนำ***ทฤษฎีเรื่องเล่าของความหมายในชีวิต***จะเสนอว่าการพุ่งความสนใจไปยังกิจกรรมและบทบาทหนึ่งๆพลาดที่จะพิจารณาว่า***ชีวิต***ที่มีความหมายอาจจะต้องเมคเซ้นส์แบบองค์รวมในฐานะเรื่องราวที่มีความหมาย ดู Kauppinen (2012) [\[10\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref10) คำว่า “โปรเจ็ค” ในที่นี้นับรวมไม่ใช่แค่กิจกรรมที่ทำให้เสร็จสิ้นได้อย่างการวาดภาพแต่ยังรวมถึงกิจกรรมปลายเปิดอย่างการรักษาความสัมพันธ์อันเหนียวแน่วกับเพื่อนและครอบครัว Susan Wolf พัฒนาแนวทางนี้ใน **ความหมายของชีวิต** และในสามเรียงความที่รวบรวมไว้ใน Wolf (2014) ดูเรียงความในภาคสอง “The Meanings of Lives” “Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life” และ “Happiness and Morality” สามารถอ่านตัวบทของต้นฉบับภาษาอังกฤษของ *ความหมายของชีวิต* (*Meaning in Life and Why It Matters*) ได้ใน Tanner Lectures website ดูฉบับพิมพ์สำหรับการวิจารณ์อันยอดเยี่ยมต่อจุดยืนของวูล์ฟและคำตอบโต้ของวูล์ฟ Peter Singer พัฒนาจุดยืนที่คล้ายกันใน *How Are We to Live?* (1993) บทที่ 10 [\[11\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref11) อีกปัญหาที่เป็นไปได้คือขณะที่ทฤษฎีผสมผสานมุ่งจะผสมจุดแข็งของการเติมเต็มอัตนัยและคำอธิบายปรนัยของความหมายในชีวิต มันรับเอา***ปัญหา***ที่เป็นไปได้ของทั้งสองจุดยืนมาด้วย ยิ่งไปกว่านั้น ถ้าคำอธิบายเชิงอัตนัยและปรนัยขัดแย้งกันเอง ทฤษฎีผสมผสานก็อาจจะขัดแย้งกันเองด้วย [\[12\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref12) Smuts (2013) พัฒนาประเด็นนี้ โดยใช้ตัวอย่างจอร์จ เบลี่ย์ [\[13\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref13) สำหรับการศึกษาที่คล้ายกันในชีวิตที่ดูมีความหมายอย่างยิ่งจากมุมคนนอก (อาชีพการงานดี มั่งคั่ง และครอบครัวสุขสันต์) แต่ภายในหายนะด้วยการเป็นทุกข์ การหวาดผวาชีวิต และความรู้สึกผิดทางจริยธรรม ดู Leo Tolstoy **คำสารภาพ** วรรณกรรมด้านความหมายในชีวิตมักถกวิกฤติความหมายของโตลสตอย ทั้งเพราะการอธิบายกุมใจของเขาเรื่องความกลัวตายกับการรู้สึกว่าชีวิตไร้ความหมาย และการเสวนาของเขาว่าเราสามารถพบคำตอบของปัญหาได้ที่ความศรัทธาทางศาสนา [\[14\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref14) Frankl (2006) [\[15\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref15) แน่นอน นี่ไม่ได้***ให้ความชอบธรรม***การกระทำของเหล่าคนที่จับผู้อื่นไปอยู่ในสถานการณ์เลวทราม ในสายตา Frankl ประเด็นเป็นเรื่องแรงจูงใจไม่ใช่ความชอบธรรม อาทิ การปฏิวัติผู้กดขี่อาจเป็นโปรเจ็คที่มีความหมายอย่างยิ่งสำหรับผู้ถูกกดขี่ ดู Camus (2018) [\[16\]](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/10/31/meaning-in-life/#_ftnref16) ดู Smith (2017) เรื่องความสัมพันธ์และแหล่งอื่นของความหมายในชีวิต งานที่แนะนำให้อ่านต่อมี Landau (2017) Landau (2022) และ Singer (2009) สำหรับการเสวนาว่าสำนึก ”ชาวบ้าน” ทั่วไปเกี่ยวกับความหมายเกี่ยวพันกับทฤษฎีปรัชญาต่างๆเรื่องความหมายในชีวิตได้อย่างไร ดู Fuhrer and Cova (2022) # อ้างอิง [Benatar, David (2017). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?cc=us&lang=en&)[*The Human Predicament*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?cc=us&lang=en&)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-human-predicament-9780190633813?cc=us&lang=en&) [Calhoun, Cheshire (2015). “Geographies of Meaningful Living,” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12089)[*Journal of Applied Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12089)[32(1): 15-34.](https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12089) [Campbell, Stephen M. and Sven Nyholm (2015). “Anti-Meaning and Why It Matters,” ](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.9)[*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.9)[ 1(4): 694-711.](https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.9) [Camus, Albert (2018). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/23470/the-myth-of-sisyphus-by-albert-camus/)[*The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/23470/the-myth-of-sisyphus-by-albert-camus/)[. Trans. Justin O’Brien. Vintage.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/23470/the-myth-of-sisyphus-by-albert-camus/) [Craig, William Lane (2013). “The Absurdity of Life Without God.” In: Jason Seachris, ed. ](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Exploring+the+Meaning+of+Life%3A+An+Anthology+and+Guide-p-9780470658796)[*Exploring the Meaning of Life*](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Exploring+the+Meaning+of+Life%3A+An+Anthology+and+Guide-p-9780470658796)[. Wiley-Blackwell: 153-172.](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Exploring+the+Meaning+of+Life%3A+An+Anthology+and+Guide-p-9780470658796) [Frankl, Viktor E. (2006). ](http://www.beacon.org/Mans-Search-for-Meaning-P602.aspx)[*Man’s Search for Meaning*](http://www.beacon.org/Mans-Search-for-Meaning-P602.aspx)[. Beacon Press. Originally published in 1946.](http://www.beacon.org/Mans-Search-for-Meaning-P602.aspx) [Fuhrer, Joffrey and Florian Cova (2022). “What makes a life meaningful? Folk intuitions about the content and shape of meaningful lives,” ](https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2046262)[*Philosophical Psychology.*](https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2046262) [Kauppinen, Antti (2012). “Meaningfulness and Time,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210081)[*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210081)[84(2): 345-377.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210081) [Landau, Iddo (2017). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/finding-meaning-in-an-imperfect-world-9780190092221?q=landau%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[*Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/finding-meaning-in-an-imperfect-world-9780190092221?q=landau%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/finding-meaning-in-an-imperfect-world-9780190092221?q=landau%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us) [Landau, Iddo (2022). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-meaning-in-life-9780190063504?lang=en&cc=us)[*The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-meaning-in-life-9780190063504?lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-meaning-in-life-9780190063504?lang=en&cc=us) [Metz, Thaddeus (2013). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780198748014?q=metz%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[*Meaning in Life*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780198748014?q=metz%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meaning-in-life-9780198748014?q=metz%20meaning&lang=en&cc=us) [Mill, John Stuart (1863). ](https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm)[*Utilitarianism*](https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm)[.](https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm) [Parmer, W. Jared (2021). “Meaning in Life and Becoming More Fulfilled,” ](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i1.978)[*Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i1.978)[20(1): 1-29.](https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i1.978) [Singer, Irving (2009). ](https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2351/Meaning-in-LifeThe-Creation-of-Value)[*Meaning in Life, Vol. 1: The Creation of Value*](https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2351/Meaning-in-LifeThe-Creation-of-Value)[. MIT Press.](https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/2351/Meaning-in-LifeThe-Creation-of-Value) [Singer, Peter (1993). ](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9780879759667)[*How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest*](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9780879759667)[. Prometheus.](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9780879759667) [Smith, Emily E. (2017). ](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/)[*The Power of Meaning*](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/)[.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/) [Crown.](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/246945/the-power-of-meaning-by-emily-esfahani-smith/) [Smith, Emily E. (2017). “There’s More to Life Than Being Happy.” TED.com.](https://www.ted.com/talks/emily_esfahani_smith_there_s_more_to_life_than_being_happy?language=en) [Smuts, Aaron (2013). “The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life,” ](https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12044)[*The Southern Journal of Philosophy* ](https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12044)[41(4): 536-562.](https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12044) [Taylor, Richard (2000). ](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529)[*Good and Evil*](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529)[. Prometheus. Originally published in 1970.](http://prometheusbooks.com/books/9781573927529) [Taylor, Richard (1987). “Time and Life’s Meaning,” ](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128521)[*The Review of Metaphysics*](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128521)[ 40(4): 675-686.](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20128521) [Tolstoy, Leo (2005). ](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html)[*My Confession*](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html)[. Translated by Aylmer Maude. Originally published in Russian in 1882.](https://store.doverpublications.com/0486438511.html) [Weinberg, Rivka (2021). “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have It, We Can’t Get It, and We Should Be Very, Very Sad,” ](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004)[*Journal of Controversial Ideas*](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004)[ 1(1), 4.](http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jci01010004) [Wolf, Susan (2010). ](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters)[*Meaning in Life and Why It Matters*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters)[. Princeton University Press.](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691154503/meaning-in-life-and-why-it-matters) ([Wolf’s lecture is also available at the Tanner Lecture Series website](https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_resources/documents/a-to-z/w/Wolf_07.pdf)). [— (2014). ](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us)[*The Variety of Values*](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us)[. Oxford University Press.](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-variety-of-values-9780195332810?q=wolf%20varieties&lang=en&cc=us) --- ### [Essays by Women Philosophers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/essays-by-women-philosophers/) **Published:** October 8, 2018 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** *1000-Word Philosophy* seeks to publish essays by women philosophers, as well as essays by other philosophers who have been underrepresented in academic philosophy. Below is our current list of essays written by women philosophers, which we very much hope to extend: please see our [submission guidelines](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/submissions/) if you are interested in contributing. Some of the essays below are in multiple categories, although only one is mentioned here. ### Epistemology [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Katie Stockdale (and Michael Milona) [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis ### Ethics [Applied Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/applied-ethics/) by Chelsea Haramia [Moral Testimony](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/06/moral-testimony/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Happiness: What is it to be Happy?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/05/08/happiness/) by Kiki Berk [“Hell Is Other People”: Sartre on Personal Relationships](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/02/08/hell-is-other-people-sartre-on-personal-relationships/) by Kiki Berk ### Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia ### Philosophy of Education [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone ### Philosophy of Religion [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Agnosticism about God’s Existence](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/05/agnosticism-about-gods-existence/) by Sylwia Wilczewska [Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/01/04/pascals-wager-a-pragmatic-argument-for-belief-in-god/) by Liz Jackson ### Philosophy of Education [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb ### Metaphysics [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia [Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/09/22/alternate-possibilities-and-moral-responsibility/) by Rachel Bourbaki [Psychological Approaches to Personal Identity: Do Memories and Consciousness Make Us Who We Are?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley [Are We Animals? Animalism and Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/03/11/are-we-animals-animalism-and-personal-identity/) by Kristin Seemuth Whaley ### Philosophy of Mind and Language [The Extended Mind](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/19/the-extended-mind/) by Rachel Bourbaki --- ### [An "Introduction to Philosophy" Reading List for Syllabi Construction](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/an-introduction-to-philosophy-reading-list-for-syllabi-construction/) **Published:** December 20, 2021 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** An introductory philosophy course can take many forms. Here is a ***very rough draft*** reading list – at least, a potential order of course topics and related readings – based mostly on essays from [*1000-Word Philosophy*](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays). This document could be used to develop a syllabus for an introductory philosophy course. The second half of this syllabus could also serve as the start of a plan for an introductory ethics course. Two [Introduction to Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/introduction-to-ethics-reading-lists/) readings lists are available here. The general approach here is to begin with more abstract epistemological and metaphysical (yet practical and relevant!) issues and move towards more practical ethical and justice-related issues. Sometimes there are ways to include more potentially “lively” topics that are relevant to the more abstract ones: these are indicated by calling them “applications” and “extensions.” Of course, other instructors want to begin with more “concrete” topics and then move to more potentially abstract topics: there is no uniquely best way to organize a philosophy class. These essays are useful to teach, or use in teaching, in many contexts because they are short: they can be read together in class, before class, or out of class. They can be read quickly or read with a closer eye. Since they are short, many readings can be assigned, but that’s of course not necessary: it all depends on the course goals and what will work. Below is just a suggestion and anyone should modify any of this to fit their goals and what will be effective with their students. This document is also available as a Google Doc. Return to the [teaching page](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching-units/). #### **1. What is philosophy? What is philosophy like? What is its value?** [Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/10/philosophy/) by Thomas Metcalf [Is it Wrong to Believe Without Sufficient Evidence? W.K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/01/28/ethics-of-belief/) by Spencer Case [Bertrand Russell on the Value of Philosophy ](https://www.nathannobis.com/2020/06/bertrand-russell-on-value-of-philosophy.html) [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis (which is related to “cancel culture” and responding to bad celebrities, etc.). This can be thrown in, to think about the point of classes: [Ethics and “Extra Credit”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/25/ethics-and-extra-credit/) by Nathan Nobis #### **2. Arguments, logic and critical thinking.** Many online options here for basics about arguments. [Critical Thinking: What is it to be a Critical Thinker?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2021/09/28/critical-thinking/) by Carolina Flores #### **3. Knowledge and reasonable belief:** [Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/24/epistemology-or-theory-of-knowledge/) by Thomas Metcalf (a good overview of the issues) [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument for Skepticism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey Applications: - [Expertise](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/25/expertise/) by Jamie Carlin Watson - [The Epistemology of Disagreement](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/05/14/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/) by Jonathan Matheson “Extensions”: [Epistemic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/21/epistemic-injustice/) by Huzeyfe Demirtas #### **4. What are we? Persons and personal identity** Some essential background knowledge on claims about possibility that are common in metaphysics: - [Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/08/possibility-and-necessity-an-introduction-to-modality/) by Andre Leo Rusavuk - Bob Fischer’s [The Epistemology of Modality: Knowledge of Possibility and Necessary](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/modal-epistemology/) [Personal Identity](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/10/personal-identity/) by Chad Vance An application (and some foreshadowing of Philosophy of Religion): [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Hold An application (and some foreshadowing of Ethics): [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis Related: how is our race(s) related to who we are? [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal [Origin Essentialism: What Could Have Been Different About You?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/28/origin-essentialism/) by Chad Vance #### **5. What are we? Are we such that we have free will?** [Free Will and Free Choice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/03/free-will-and-free-choice/) by Jonah Nagashima [Free Will and Moral Responsibility](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/02/free-will-and-moral-responsibility/) by Chelsea Haramia #### **6. Philosophy of religion: what should we think about religious beliefs?** [Attributes of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/09/15/attributes-of-god/) by Bailie Peterson [Design Arguments for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/28/design-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Thomas Metcalf [The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/30/the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/) by Andrew Chapman [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case [The Problem of Evil](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/07/the-problem-of-evil/) by Thomas Metcalf [Divine Hiddenness](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/05/18/divine-hiddenness/) by David Bayless [The Problem of No Best World](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/24/the-problem-of-no-best-world/) by Kirk Lougheed [Can We Believe in Miracles?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/17/can-we-believe-in-miracles/) by Tomas Bogardus [Hell and Universalism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/10/18/hell-and-universalism/) by A.G. Holdier [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/02/13/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof [Hope](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/12/hope/) by Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale #### **7. Ethics** #### 7.1. Arguably **worse** ethical theories and theories of justice: - Needed: something on relativism. (in progress) - [Ethical Egoism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/02/02/ethical-egoism/) by Nathan Nobis - [Because God Says So: On Divine Command Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/03/31/because-god-says-so/) by Spencer Case #### 7.2. Arguably **better** ethical theories and theories of justice: - [Deontology: Kantian Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/06/09/introduction-to-deontology-kantian-ethics/) by Andrew Chapman - [Consequentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/05/15/introduction-to-consequentialism/) by Shane Gronholz - [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [The African Ethic of Ubuntu](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/08/the-african-ethic-of-ubuntu/) by Thaddeus Metz - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey - [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey #### 7.3. Practical ethical issues; some potential “units” include: - **7.3.1. Death:** - [Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/10/02/is-death-bad-epicurus-and-lucretius-on-the-fear-of-death/) by Frederik Kaufman and then many of the essays related to that topic, such as these and many more: 1. [The Ethics of Abortion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/) by Nathan Nobis 2. [Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/03/05/euthanasia-or-mercy-killing/) by Nathan Nobis 3. [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost. - **7.3.2. Reparations:** - [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini - [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault go well together: when the social contract hasn’t been created by all and doesn’t benefit all (and was designed to harm many), what response is warranted? - **7.3.3. Punishment:** - capital punishment; drugs (and criminalizing drugs) are good, but we don’t yet have a reading on that. [Huemer](http://www.owl232.net/papers/drugs.htm) and a [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aum9VxT0f-Q) are good. - **7.3.4. Slavery & Reparations:** - [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe and [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis (which is related to “cancel culture), and [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault. - **7.3.5. Feminism:** - [Feminism Part 1: The Sameness Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/17/feminism-part-1-the-sameness-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 2: The Difference Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/10/14/feminism-part-2-the-difference-approach/) by Annaleigh Curtis - [Feminism Part 3: The Dominance Approach](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/08/25/feminism-part-3-the-dominance-approach/) by Chelsea Haramia - There are timely: - [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf and [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman - **7.3.6. Marxism and Socialism and Capitalism:** - [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe and [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf pair well. - **7.3.7. Animals:** - [7.3.8. The Moral Status of Animals by Jason Wyckoff and Speciesism by Dan Lowe.](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/02/03/the-moral-status-of-animals/) Other essays on ethics and animals are in development. - Many other options: <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#ethics> #### **8. Course Conclusion?** There are many options, beyond what’s above. #### 8.1. Something on existentialism? - [Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/21/introduction-to-existentialism/) by Addison Ellis - [Is Immortality Desirable?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/01/23/is-immortality-desirable/) by Felipe Pereira - [Camus on the Absurd: The Myth of Sisyphus](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/01/camus-on-the-absurd-the-myth-of-sisyphus/) by Erik Van Aken #### 8.2. Philosophy of Education? - [Philosophical Inquiry in Childhood](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/14/philosophical-inquiry-in-childhood/) by Jana Mohr Lone #### 8.3. Other units can be created from other essays or sets of essays; see “All Essays” #### **9. All Essays** See here for current list: <https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/> #### 9.1. Essay Categories - [Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#art) - [African Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#african) - [Buddhist Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#buddhist) - [Chinese Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#chinese) - [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#ethics) - [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#epistemology) - [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#historical) - [Islamic Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#islamic) - [Logic and Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#logic) - [Metaphilosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#metaphilosophy) - [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#metaphysics) - [Phenomenology and Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#phenomenology) - [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#education) - [Philosophy of Mind and Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#mind) - [Philosophy of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#race) - [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#religion) - [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#science) - [Philosophy of Sex and Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#sex) - [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/all-essays/#social) \* New categories are added as the project expands. Return to the **[teaching page](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching-units/)**. --- ### [Call for Teaching Materials](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/teaching/call-for-teaching-materials/) **Published:** June 4, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology* is seeking experienced philosophy instructors to develop introductory teaching essays on topics of current and urgent social, ethical, and political interest in the United States. We expect that most, if not all, of these essays will be included in the [Philosophy of Race ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-race/)category, as well as [Social and Political Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/social-and-political-philosophy/) and [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/ethics/). *1000 Word Philosophy* has been seeking essays on these issues for a long time now, and wanted to make this interest known again. Instead of developing a list of potential topics, we are asking instructors this: - What issues relevant to current events would you like to teach, and need to be discussed, in philosophy (and other) courses? - What topics do students want and need to learn about and discuss and so introductory guides to those topics would help for fruitful discussion? *1000-Word Philosophy*’s essays are of a unique genre in that its articles are not argumentative: they are introductory overviews that inform and inspire critical discussion: they are an effective first step towards engaging deeper, often argumentative, sources. It must be acknowledged though that although *1000-Word Philosophy’s* essays are not argumentative (in a sense that there is nothing like “I will argue that *p*”), they are also *not neutral*: they acknowledge and build upon reasonable agreements and informed and fair-minded consensus. For more information about *1000-Word Philosophy*, and important [submission guidelines](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/submissions/), please see [www.1000WordPhilosophy.com](http://www.1000wordphilosophy.com/) And please contact the editors at <1000WordPhilosophy@gmail.com> with any questions, to discuss any potential essay ideas and for suggested topics. ![1000 word philosophy CFP](https://i0.wp.com/1000wordphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/1000-word-philosophy-cfp.jpg?resize=656%2C629&ssl=1) Here is the current main set of relevant essays that we wish to expand on: [The Ontology of Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/07/the-ontology-of-race/) by Abiral Chitrakar Phnuyal [Reparations for Historic Injustice](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/05/08/reparations-for-historic-injustice/) by Joseph Frigault [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis [Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/10/aristotles-defense-of-slavery/) by Dan Lowe [Removing Confederate Monuments](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/19/removing-confederate-monuments/) by Travis Timmerman [Ethics and the Expected Consequences of Voting](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/06/28/ethics-and-the-expected-consequences-of-voting/) by Thomas Metcalf *Readers interested in philosophical issues about race may also find these essays especially relevant:* [Social Contract Theory](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/03/social-contract-theory/) by David Antonini [John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/27/john-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/) by Ben Davies [Plato’s Crito: When should we break the law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Theories of Punishment](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/02/05/theories-of-punishment/) by Travis Joseph Rodgers [The Death Penalty](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/07/28/the-death-penalty/) by Benjamin S. Yost [Defining Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/defining-capitalism-and-socialism/) and [Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/17/arguments-for-capitalism-and-socialism/) by Thomas Metcalf [Marx’s Conception of Alienation](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2015/05/13/karl-marxs-conception-of-alienation/) by Dan Lowe --- ### [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy-2/) **Published:** January 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** [Plato’s Form of the Good](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/historical-philosophy/platos-form-of-the-good/) by Ryan Jenkins [Plato’s Crito: When Should We Break the Law?](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/12/30/platos-crito-when-should-we-break-the-law/) by Spencer Case [Descartes’ Meditations 1-3](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/04/descartes-meditations-1-3/) and [Descartes’ Meditations 4-6](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/08/05/descartes-meditations-4-6/) by Marc Bobro [Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/11/26/descartes-i-think-therefore-i-am/) by Charles Miceli [al-Ghazālī’s Dream Argument](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/07/25/al-ghazalis-dream-argument/) by John Ramsey [Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/03/27/leibnizs-principle-of-sufficient-reason/) by Marc Bobro [Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley/ "Idealism Pt. 1: Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism") by Addison Ellis [Idealism Pt. 2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/08/11/idealism-pt-2-kants-transcendental-idealism/ "Idealism Pt. 2: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism") by Addison Ellis [Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/09/03/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility/) by Dale E. Miller [John Stuart Mill on The Good Life: Higher-Quality Pleasures](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2020/09/26/john-stuart-mill-on-the-good-life-higher-quality-pleasures/) by Dale E. Miller [Mary Astell’s “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies” (1694)](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/06/03/mary-astells-a-serious-proposal-to-the-ladies-1694/) by Simone Webb [Nietzsche and the Death of God](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/85-2/existentialism/nietzsche-and-the-death-of-god/) by Justin Remhof [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-1-the-four-moral-sprouts/) by John Ramsey [Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 2: The Cultivation Analogy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/04/10/mengzis-moral-psychology-part-2-the-cultivation-analogy/) by John Ramsey [*Wu-Wei*: Acting without Desire](http://1000wordphilosophy.com/2019/06/03/wu-wei-acting-without-desire/) by Henrique Schneider [How to Establish Social Order? Three Early Chinese Answers](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/09/how-to-establish-social-order-three-early-chinese-answers/) by Henrique Schneider [Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/responding-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-and-philosophies/) by Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis --- ### [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion-2/) **Published:** January 17, 2014 **Author:** 1000wordphilosophy **Content:** This category has moved! Please see here: [https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/ ](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-of-religion/) --- ### [Philosophy for Beginners](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/philosophy-for-beginners/) **Published:** August 11, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Welcome to ***1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology***, an ever-growing set of original 1000-word essays on philosophical questions, figures, and arguments. We have over 100 original essays on a wide range of philosophical issues, and we publish new essays frequently. We are an ideal source of philosophical materials for beginners! Please see our [main page](http://1000wordphilosophy.com) for these essays and other materials. --- ### [Ethics for Beginners](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/ethics-for-beginners/) **Published:** August 11, 2020 **Author:** 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology **Content:** Welcome to ***1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology***, an ever-growing set of original 1000-word essays on philosophical questions, figures, and arguments. We have over 100 original essays on a wide range of philosophical issues, and we publish new essays frequently. We are an ideal source of materials on ethics and moral philosophy for beginners! Please see our [main page](http://1000wordphilosophy.com) for these essays and other materials. --- ## Categories ### [Uncategorized](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/uncategorized/) --- ### [Buddhism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/buddhism/) --- ### [Ethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/ethics/) --- ### [Epistemology](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/epistemology/) --- ### [Race](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/race/) --- ### [Metaphysics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/metaphysics/) --- ### [Philosophy of Science](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/philosophy-of-science/) --- ### [Philosophy of Religion](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/philosophy-of-religion/) --- ### [Philosophy of Education](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/philosophy-of-education/) --- ### [Sex & Gender](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/sex-gender/) --- ### [Art & Aesthetics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/art-aesthetics/) --- ### [Chinese Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/chinese-philosophy/) --- ### [Metaphilosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/metaphilosophy/) --- ### [Historical Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/historical-philosophy/) --- ### [African Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/african-philosophy/) --- ### [Philosophy of Law](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/philosophy-of-law/) --- ### [Islamic Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/islamic-philosophy/) --- ### [Social & Political](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/social-political/) --- ### [Logic & Reasoning](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/logic-reasoning/) --- ### [Mind & Language](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/mind-language/) --- ### [Phenomenology & Existentialism](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/phenomenology-existentialism/) --- ### [Global Philosophy](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/global-philosophy/) --- ### [bioethics](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/category/bioethics/) ---